Justice, Thresholds, and the Three Claims of Sufficientarianism

Note: Funding Information: For valuable discussion and comments on earlier drafts of this article, I wish to thank David Axelsen, Michael Bennett, Huub Brouwer, Rutger Claassen, Philip Cook, Savriël Dillingh, Anca Gheaus, Colin Hickey, Matthias Kramm, Sem de Maagt, Tim Meijers, Lasse Nielsen, Ingrid Robeyns, Yara Al Salman, Liam Shields, Teruji Thomas, and the audiences at the Thresholds in Justice conference at Utrecht University, the Sufficientarianism and Limitarianism Revisited workshop at the Bucharest Center for Political Theory, and the 23rd Oxford Graduate Conference in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. I am also grateful to Christian Barry and two referees for this journal for their detailed and thoughtful feedback. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 726153).