Imperial Presidency versus Fragmented Executive? Unilateral Trade Measures and Executive Power in the United States and the European Union

Abstract

Faced with a changing geopolitical environment, the European Union has embarked on a legislative program to upgrade its unilateral trade instruments toolbox. By reforming existing instruments - for example, anti-dumping - and by adding new instruments to the European Commission's toolbox (foreign subsidies instrument, international procurement instrument, anti-coercion instrument, and others), the EU legislature is significantly strengthening the position of the Commission in the governance of unilateral trade policy in the EU. This development raises accountability questions. By means of a comparative analysis of democratic accountability in unilateral trade policy in the United States and the EU, I describe this transformation of executive power in the EU and I argue that a further strengthening of democratic accountability mechanisms is needed to match the Commission's growing responsibilities in this underexamined corner of EU trade policy.