Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Abstract

This dissertation examines hypernudging – a sophisticated form of user influencing online - within the context of big technology companies and their prominent role in shaping digital markets. Digital platforms are increasingly adopting user influencing practices to encourage engagement and spending, sometimes to the detriment of the users. This research takes the form of a legal and normative assessment of the role that European competition law should play in addressing the challenges posed by hypernudging by big technology companies.

The thesis unfolds through three interrelated themes. Firstly, it defines hypernudging in its multiple aspects by establishing a consolidated framework and situating these practices within the transdisciplinary debate on user influencing, underscoring the risks of individual and collective harm. Secondly, the study examines hypernudging in the context of the abuse of dominance prohibition under European competition law. Using case studies in the ad tech and voice assistant markets, it shows that hypernudging can facilitate exclusionary self-preferencing behavior by powerful firms. Furthermore, a case study on political microtargeting takes a normative perspective to question the boundaries of European competition law. It underlines the need for balancing between efficiency and democratic considerations, particularly as big technology companies extend their influence into the political sphere.

Finally, hypernudging is situated within the EU's digital policy agenda, highlighting the complexities policymakers face in regulating digital markets. While existing competition law theories can be applied to hypernudging, a normative stance advocates for an expanded role that facilitates the co-creation of digital markets in line with EU values.