The dynamics of de-delegation: a principal-agent explanation of the reversal of private authority in international sport governance

Abstract

What explains the reversal of transnational private rule‐making authority? Embedding constructivist insights within a rational principal‐agent model, this article advances a five‐step sequential process that nuances the traditional explanation of delegitimation. It argues that entrepreneurs must first successfully promote the belief that the high costs of ineffective private policies follow from the private rule‐setter's flawed institutional attributes. Subsequently, a de‐delegation solution that minimises transaction and uncertainty costs must be proposed. The examination of two cases in the field of international sport governance, namely the deliberate reversal of private authority in anti‐doping governance and the lack thereof in anti‐match‐fixing governance, lends support to these propositions. It sheds new light on the creation of the World Anti‐Doping Agency (WADA) and explains why there will probably be no counterpart to fight match‐fixing.