Confronting Discrimination and Unravelling the Veil of Prejudice : The epistemic conditions of responsibility for hidden prejudices

Abstract

Social psychological research shows that people have hidden prejudices ('implicit biases'): without their knowledge, these have a discriminatory influence on their behaviour. This is a problem for liberal democracies. A deliberative method – entering into a debate, convincing – is pointless: anyone who believes in it is already committed to the equality ideal. One possible solution is a non-deliberative method. An example would be administering a – conceivable - anti-prejudice pill. But what does it mean to have hidden biases and hold people accountable through non-deliberative methods? This dissertation examines these issues from two theoretical frameworks: mentalism and pragmatism. Mentalism is the dominant framework in social psychology and ethics: it determines research into implicit biases and methods to combat implicit biases. My analysis of mentalism shows that people who are unaware of their hidden biases cannot become aware of them. Second, people are not responsible for their biases and therefore cannot be held responsible for them. In short: it remains unclear whether you should, for example, administer an anti-prejudice pill. Based on Robert Brandom's normative pragmatism, the pragmatism I propose shows that prejudice is a social, normative and practical phenomenon. People are responsible for their hidden biases and thus can be held accountable. I propose non-deliberative methods of accountability: it does not influence individuals or their brains but focuses on narrative influencing public opinion.