On how we experience ourselves as intentional agents : An examination of the role of intentional action in the sense of agency

Abstract

Intentional actions that cause an effect are accompanied by an experience of a feeling of control and a sense of agency. Past research suggests that this explicit feeling is associated with an altered temporal perception of the interval between action and effect. For example, when pressing a key on the keyboard that causes a tone to sound shortly after, the temporal interval between these two events is compressed in temporal perception. Due to the assumed importance of intentional motor action in it, this phenomenon has been termed intentional binding effect. Nonetheless, there are also theoretical accounts that propose that temporal binding can emerge in the absence of motor action and motor-predictive processes. To understand the role of intentional motor action in intentional binding, the current dissertation systematically investigated how action-related factors modulate the temporal perception of two events in the popular Libet clock-based paradigm.

In an initial step, it was tested how two sensory stimuli of either the same or different modality are perceived in when they do not originate from motor action. Findings revealed a strong temporal repulsion effect. That is, instead of being attracted to each other, the two events were shifted away from each other in temporal perception. Interestingly, this repulsion was only partially affected by action-related variables such as a belief in the causal link between the stimuli and the stimuli being predictable in identity and in timing. These findings thus pointed towards a special role for intentional motor action in the experience of agency.

Building on these insights, the second part focused on closely examining the influence of intentionality in the facilitation of intentional binding. Interestingly, executing an action with stronger intentions (higher intentional strength), caused the binding effect to increase, suggesting a stronger agency experience. Remarkably, undermining intentionality by restricting autonomy of the individual, while evidently affecting explicit experiences, did not affect the intentional binding effect. Hence, for the effect to emerge, it seems to be sufficient to endogenously start up one’s motor system to execute an action.

These findings offer compelling and robust evidence for the pivotal role of intentional motor action in intentional binding, additionally offering support for the effect being related to agentic experiences.