From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

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From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference
 
Visser, A.
(2019) Journal of Logic and Computation, volume 29, issue 5, pp. 595 - 604
(Article)
Abstract
In this paper, we provide a fairly general self-reference-free proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem from Tarski's Theorem of the Undefinability of Truth.
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Keywords: formal theories, consistency, self-reference, truth
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exz004
ISSN: 0955-792X
Publisher: Oxford University Press
(Peer reviewed)
 
 
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