Crisis Rhetoric and Policy Change in China: Toward a Dynamic Process Model of Crisis Exploitation

Abstract

Crisis is defined as “a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimating the pre-existing socio-political order” (‘t Hart 1993 p. 39). In this definition, a crisis is an episode whose impact cannot be controlled merely by astute on-the-ground incident management, particularly in cases involving widespread doubt about the legitimacy of established policy paradigms or the political order as a whole. Crisis can create “political windows” for advocacy groups challenging established policies in pluralist democracies. To explore the process of crisis exploitation in China, this study employed the theory of crisis exploitation. However, the plural but not democratic style of the policy-making in China does not provide a fertile soil for the framing contest as a critical sphere as the original theory expected. As such, it is a key contention in this research that the foundations of crisis framing by policy elites in the authoritarian system are radically different from the way it is depicted in the Western context. Policy elites have a story competence in the dealing with a crisis and bring the situation back to the normalcy. The official position of policy elites shapes the framing in public. Chinese leadership always presents itself as united to the outside world because of the discipline of democratic centralism. Accordingly, our theoretical discussion suggests that policy elites with framing dynamics can alter the terms of debate by skillfully manipulating issue definitions and the power of formal agenda control in a context of the non-rival contest By focusing on crisis framing, exploitation and policy change, this research argues that crises are politically powerful for Chinese policy elites, especially in the context of gradually plural and open society. The variance in the framing strategy among them indicated that Chinese policy elites had a strong motivation and capacity for exploiting a crisis for their policy claims. .This research conducts a qualitative case comparison basing on the process-tracing analysis. Drawing on three cases in the Hu-Wen generation of leadership: the SARS virus crisis in 2003, the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, and the 2009-2010 H1N1 epidemic crisis. A tentative conclusion in this research is that Chinese policy elites are motivated to cultivate political approval for their advocacy by framing strategies during a crisis. Furthermore, their framing strategy can influence the process of policy change in the aftermath of a crisis. If policy elites deem a crisis an opportunity to exploit significant policy change in framing, they are more likely to acknowledge the significance of the event, blame the crisis on existing policy vulnerabilities under general claims of exogenous cause, and propose more explicit policy alternatives at the macro level. The conclusion is that the variance in the predisposition for policy change and the crisis framing strategy of policy elites in China helps to explain the original puzzle. Policy elites take different framing strategies to exploit or restrict the policy implications of crises. Therefore, some crises trigger major policy changes, whereas others do not. This conclusion answers the research question, at least to some degree . Firstly, the study extends the crisis exploitation theory beyond the Western. Secondly, this research explores the virgin territory of crisis politics research in China. Thirdly, the conclusion helps us recognize the landscape for policy elites in the process of crisis-induced policy change. Finally, Chinese policy elites can learn recapture lessons learned from crises discussed in this research. With the difficulties and burdens of exercising authority and upholding credibility during a crisis in mind, efficient leadership practices help minimize human and material losses and societal and political costs.