Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons: The law of arms control and the international non-proliferation regime

Abstract

The proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a severe threat to international peace, security and stability. In order to counter this threat, the international community has taken numerous measures, legal and otherwise, resulting in a global framework of treaties and political agreements known as the international non-proliferation regime. Despite such efforts, however, a number of recent problems and crises have illustrated that the danger of nuclear proliferation persists. This research analyses how international law and international politics interact to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers and to provide to all states the reassurance that the number of nuclear-weapon possessors remains limited on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. It does so by examining, in particular, three instruments of arms control law: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the global system of trade controls. It takes a look at their development over time, their strengths and weaknesses, and their influence on global non-proliferation politics – and vice versa. The NPT is widely seen as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. That is a consequence of its near-universal adherence, and the fact it lays out the ground rules for the international political order aimed at maintaining international peace and security through nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It has certainly been effective in limiting the number of nuclear-weapon states since its entry into force in 1970, yet it is not without its flaws. Due to political deadlock the implementation and development of a number of its key provisions has not been optimal. Some of its terms lack the precision needed to prevent proliferation, induce disarmament or encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the option to withdraw from the treaty leaves a legal loophole in the non-proliferation regime. Some of these issues are addressed by other non-proliferation instruments, such as trade controls – and the international-political mechanisms designed to harmonise these in order to increase their effectiveness. These have turned into a crucial element for the implementation of the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT. They provide states with a pro-active tool to raise barriers for those who attempt to procure materials and items needed for constructing nuclear weapons. Yet the system of trade controls, too, leaves room for improvement, mostly due to their lack of international coordination, integration and precision. The IAEA supervises the adherence to non-proliferation rules by states. It is a dynamic, technical international organisation that, through information gathering, review, political assessment and compliance control, provides a sufficient amount of certainty regarding the absence of illegal nuclear activities by states. Its activities are supplemented by those of the UN Security Council and unilateral efforts. Together, these form a well-integrated and generally effective mechanism for the supervision of arms control law. The problems here lie mainly in the limited capacity to coerce states into compliance against their will, and the political resistance that such efforts invoke.