Commentary: Is the Frontal Lobe Involved in Conscious Perception?

Abstract

Like any other field, the field of consciousness research benefits from a careful distinction between the concepts involved. An example is the distinction between the state of being conscious (e.g., whether someone is awake) and the contents of consciousness (e.g., whether someone perceives a dress as white or blue). A similar type of distinction can contribute to the resolution of a debate regarding the role of the frontal cortex in conscious perception. In a recent publication Safavi et al. (2014) responded to conclusions drawn in a study regarding the role of frontal cortex in conscious perception. This study, by Frässle et al. (2014), employed binocular rivalry to show that well-established frontal BOLD correlates of perceptual switches (Lumer et al., 1998; Sterzer and Kleinschmidt, 2007) were strongly diminished when participants passively viewed these switches rather than reporting them. Frässle and co-workers (among whom the present paper's first author) concluded: “frontal areas are associated with active report and introspection rather than with rivalry per se.” This statement is a bit audacious, as it rules out any role of frontal areas in rivalry other than their role in reporting perception. As such, Safavi and co-workers draw into question this conclusion, based on evidence indicating that neural activity in frontal areas, in particular in the lateral prefrontal cortex, reflects the contents of consciousness in paradigms that do not involve active report.