Abstract
Scientific theories are accepted or rejected in terms of their observable predictions. If the predictions of a theory are verified in experiments and observations, the theory is evidentially confirmed, but if the results of observations and experiments do not correspond to the predictions, the theory gets falsified. Now, if two
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rival and incompatible theories make exactly the same predictions, and if the results of all relevant observations and experiments correspond to those predictions, then both the theories get equally verified, and we have no evidential criterion to select the correct one. And since the theories are rivals and incompatible, we cannot accept them both.
This situation is known in the philosophy of science as the problem of empirical equivalence (EE) and underdetermination (UD) of theory choice: if two theories predict the same observations, then empirical evidence is not able to determine a choice between them. Furthermore, since some philosophers argue that given any theory whatsoever an empirically equivalent rival theory can be formulated, it seems that the problem poses a universal threat on the objectivity and rationality of theory choice in science as a whole.
This problem is the subject matter of my dissertation. In its first chapter I offer a philosophical appraisal of the problem from which I conclude that the main worries that are usually though to be implied by the problem are not founded: EE and UD is not a problem that threats science as a whole, it only comes up in some specific cases. Besides, the natural development of science may be such that specific cases of EE and UD can be solved: via new theoretical or technological sources that could break either the EE or the UD. In other words, I argue that the problem, when present, is more a problem for science to solve than a problem of epistemology. As in all scientific problems, that a solution will be found is not guaranteed from the outset; and although the problem can be in principle solved, persistent scenarios of EE and UD may occur.
In chapters two and three I present two case-studies that work as a test for my evaluation of the problem. In chapter two I deal with the case of Albert Einstein’s special relativity vs. Hendrik Lorentz’s ether theory. In chapter three I provide an analysis of the case of standard quantum mechanics vs. David Bohm’s quantum theory. I argue that the first case study was actually solved by the regular practice of science, via the inter-theoretic connections between the theories involved and early quantum physics and the general theory of relativity. Regarding the second case study, I maintain that it constitutes an instance of persistent UD. Taken together, these two case studies illustrate that my evaluative assessment of the problem at issue is correct.
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