Theism, Compatibilism and Neurodeterminism: A Response to Marcel Sarot

Abstract

Christian theology affirms that humans are free. In his paper ‘Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience,’Marcel Sarot defends the view that libertarianism is the best account of our freedom and argues that recent results of neuroscience are compatible with libertarianism. Although I am sympathetic towards his latter conclusion, I am not as sure about the former. My paper discusses some of Sarot’s arguments and maintains that theists might still have some good reasons to be compatibilists. Theological reasons for compatibilism have to do with traditional doctrines of providence, grace and human sinfulness. Certain solutions to the problem of free will and foreknowledge also suggest compatibilism. Philosophically, libertarianism suffers from problems that have to with reasons causing actions. Furthermore, the paper also provides some reasons to think that the results of neuroscience are, for the most part, irrelevant for assessing whether we are free in the compatibilist or libertarian sense. This is because neuroscience seems to be unable to give us evidence that neuroscientific / psychological laws are universal or exceptionless.