Agential Self-consciousness : beyond conscious agency

Abstract

Although we perform many of our actions without much consciousness of these, occasionally we are explicitly conscious that we are doing something for a reason. Such consciousness I call ‘agential self-consciousness’. Since ages we have understood such agential self-consciousness in terms of the self-ascribed conscious faculties that allow us to reason about our conduct and make choices. This dissertation develops the ‘extraordinary thesis’ about agential self-consciousness, i.e., that agential self-consciousness is independent of a capacity to consciously act for a reason. Chapter 1 aims to clarify what such ‘mere’ agential self-consciousness could be for an agent who has it. It is argued that such self-consciousness would require that we could coherently attribute to an agent independent of a capacity to consciously act for a reason (i) a capacity to act for a reason; and (ii) a capacity to make explicit that one is acting for a reason. In chapter 2 rational actions are defined as actions that give application to a why-question for reasons. Based on this definition, the question is raised whether reasons for action as well as the capacity to act for reasons are independent of the mind. In chapter 3 the view is developed that a reason for action x is a fact about that action, i.e., that action x is a factor for something s. In addition, it is proposed that acting on ground of such a fact can be explained in terms of motivational responsiveness to such a fact. It is explained how such reasons and motivational responsiveness could be independent of the mind. Chapter 4 forestalls the objection that this account of action is not really an account of rational action, as it does not explain that action as the conclusion of an agent’s capacity to form a practical judgment on basis of reasons. It is argued that this objection assumes what it should not, i.e., that rational action depends on a mental capacity for practical deliberation. In chapter 5 the view is developed that an agent’s capacity to make explicit that he acts for a reason is independent of and even prior to his self-consciousness, let alone to a capacity to consciously act for a reason. Chapter 6 contains an account of self-consciousness that starts of with the view that although self-consciousness involves consciousness of mental states, it might as well involve consciousness of non-mental states. Self-consciousness is explained as an effect of an agent's use of linguistic expressions by which he, from the group’s perspective, indicates himself and attributes observable features to himself. Chapter 7 concludes that it is possible to develop the extra-ordinary thesis that agential self-consciousness is independent of a capacity to consciously act for a reason. It is recommended to explore this thesis further, for if true that might require us to scrutinize (i) quite common views on responsibility-imputation; (ii) quite common views on moral status and responsibility by which the powerful rationalize their exploiting powerless human and animal life forms, including their natural environment; and (iii) the social and political ambitions of the modern west