Abstract
This study deals with the rise and decline of the system of unelected representative bodies that accompanied post-war democracy in the Netherlands. After World War II, the number of these unelected representative bodies grew spectacularly, but from the seventies onwards, it started to decrease. How can we account for this
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remarkable political change? In traditional historiography, this change is associated with the pillarisation of Dutch society, the institutionalisation of corporatist arrangements, the emergence of new social movements or the deep-rooted practice of consensus building. As these accounts turn out to be problematic, this study focuses on the democratic character of unelected representative bodies. Chapter 1 introduces a framework for analysing the democratic character of these bodies, based on the criteria of a democratic political order as identified by R.A. Dahl. The framework encompasses the constitution of the domains represented by unelected bodies; the recruitment of their members; the tasks they fulfilled; and their internal decision-making process. Chapter 2 presents the cases used to analyse how the democratic character of the system of unelected representative bodies developed. These cases are the Sociaal-Economische Raad (1950), the Landbouwschap (1954 - 1995), the Nationale Raad voor Maatschappelijk Werk (1946 - 1989) and the Raad voor de Kunst (1955 - 1995). Chapter 3 shows that the represented domains were either constituted from above by the state or from below by interest groups. The involvement of interest groups led to the exclusion of rivals and, later on, to petrifaction, with the composition of unelected bodies remaining the same despite fundamental social changes. Chapter 4 highlights a similar pattern as the members delegated by interest groups managed to exclude a large number of newcomers. This resulted in a fierce critique of the involvement of interest groups in member recruitment and led to a new generation of unelected councils composed of independent experts. Chapter 5 illustrates that most bodies turned to interest articulation, consultation and advisory tasks instead of governing the domains they represented – one of their initial tasks. Meanwhile, as chapter 6 shows, the internal decision-making process acquired a more democratic character because both its openness to the public and opportunities for participation increased. However, conflicts of interest intensified. There were two categories of unelected representative bodies, as the concluding Chapter 7 makes clear. One category remained largely unaffected by social pressures and was influenced mainly by internal processes aiming to consolidate the position of insiders. The other category transformed in accordance with political initiative or administrative changes. These bodies were the first to be abolished or transformed into assemblies of experts, intensively controlled by the state. A dialectics of loss of control and interference explains why the state delegated public responsibility first but withdrew it later, causing the system to decline. A dialectics of expertise and social support explains why its composition changed. By recruiting members from interest groups, the government tried to enhance social support for political decisions. The introduction of experts helped to overcome the shortcomings these members exposed but weakened links with society
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