Abstract
This thesis describes the parliamentary scrutiny system of the Dutch Government in the European decision-making process. More specifically, this study concerns the instruments of the British parliamentary scrutiny reserve and the Danish and Austrian mandating systems, and the added value that such instruments might have for the Netherlands. The main
... read more
lesson to be learned from the British scrutiny reserve is that both the Government and Parliament are encouraged to become actively involved at an early stage of the European decision-making process. The system also ensures structural provision of information throughout the European decision-making process. In the Netherlands such structural information agreements between Parliament and the Government do not exist. The introduction of a parliamentary scrutiny reserve would solve this problem. The instrument of the parliamentary reserve that was introduced in the Netherlands when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force is much more limited than the British scrutiny reserve. The Dutch parliamentary reserve lacks the most essential aspect that makes the scrutiny reserve a valuable instrument. It is not linked to Government information and therefore does not stimulate as much dialogue between the Government and Parliament from the earliest stages of the European decision-making process as the British scrutiny reserve does. The Danish mandating system adds little to the Dutch Parliament’s existing instruments to scrutinize the Government in the EU decision-making process. It may be doubted whether a mandating system would be suitable in a bicameral system such as the Dutch one. The Tweede Kamer (the Dutch House of Representatives) and the Eerste Kamer (the Dutch Senate) may occasionally give contradictory instructions. Furthermore, the fact that the presentation of the mandates often takes place at a later stage of the European decision-making process can be seen as a major drawback of the Danish mandating system. Despite the fact that the system ensures that Parliament is involved in important European decisions, at such a late stage it is difficult for Parliament to have actual influence. The Dutch Tweede Kamer has similar problems, as the deliberation on the annotated agendas of the Council meeting also takes place only shortly before the Council meeting in Brussels. The Austrian system with respect to the Stellungnahmen would be no addition to the existing instruments that the Dutch Parliament has to scrutinize the Government in the EU decision-making process either. The major problem with the Austrian system is that the provision of information by the Government is limited to forwarding European documents without any additional information, such as the negotiation position. As the Austrian Government provides so little information, Parliament is not stimulated enough to become actively involved in the European decision-making process. Most of the European proposals are discussed only just before the Council meeting in which the final decisions on the proposals have to be made. Based on these conclusions the thesis outlines various alternatives that could solve the problems of the Dutch system. The introduction of a parliamentary scrutiny reserve is considered to be the most optimal solution for these problems.
show less
