Bondgenootschap onder spanning. Nederlands-Amerikaanse betrekkingen, 1969-1976

Abstract

Dutch-American relations in the post-war period have been inexorably intertwined with the Cold War. In the course of the 1960s the East-West struggle entered a new phase with the beginning of a period of détente, which had important consequences for the Dutch-American relationship. In this dissertation, which focuses on the governmental level, the following issues are dealt with: firstly, to what extent was the relationship affected by the complicating developments that took place in the years 1969-1976? Secondly, how did Dutch and American policy makers view the relationship? Finally, what did the asymmetry in the relationship mean and were the Dutch able to exert any influence? When taking into account both international and domestic factors, the picture that emerges is one of both change and continuity. What makes the period concerned stand out is the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was at a point where a redefinition of the common goals seemed unavoidable. Security concerns and preserving the American dominant position in the international arena were the foremost concerns of President Nixon and NSC-advisor Kissinger. These ideas clashed with those of Dutch politicians of for instance the Labour Party who wanted détente, an active human rights policy and development cooperation to be part of the Atlantic foreign policy agenda. The American embassy in The Hague was aware of these changes: it noticed a turn to the left in Dutch society and the political landscape. The Dutch cabinets in the period concerned faced domestic pressure to take a more critical stance towards the United States, where the Nixon administration faced problems concerning its image and credibility because of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, unmistakable signs of continuity in the Dutch-American relationship were present. The Dutch governments in the years concerned did not turn away from Atlantic cooperation, as the Netherlands remained dependent on the American military commitment to Western Europe. Détente was in this sense not a cause for optimism, but rather for concern, particularly for Foreign Minister Luns, as well as for Van der Stoel. They were both concerned that the spirit of détente would reduce the willingness to maintain the defence burdens that were needed to counter Soviet expansionism. A second aspect of continuity was the fact that the Dutch government wanted to be treated as a serious partner. This was the case because frequent and substantive contacts with the Americans were of crucial importance to the Dutch in order to be able to exert influence in the international arena. If the Dutch had the impression that they were overlooked, they would not hesitate to openly express their discontent. In American eyes, this was the most destabilising factor in the bilateral relationship. Finally, the American government also had an interest in good relations with the Netherlands. Repeatedly American policymakers stated that the Dutch were able to fulfil an exemplary role for other (smaller) Western European allies. Their support could also serve as justification for the American foreign policy agenda. This created leverage for the Dutch government at certain moments to achieve its own goals.