Abstract
As was the case in the United States and other European countries, there was much social criticism in the Netherlands against the American military intervention in Vietnam (1965-1973). Much of the criticism was levelled at the Dutch government. This thesis examines the tension between public opinion and the government in
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relation to the Vietnam War. The first Hoofdstuk deals with how the official Dutch position was formed and also looks at the history of the conflict and American attempts to involve the Netherlands in it. The second Hoofdstuk examines the increasing social and political criticism in 1965 and 1966 of American presence in South Vietnam. The criticism did not leave Cals's centrist-left cabinet unscathed (1965-1966). However, the criticism did not bring about a change in policy on Vietnam. The Catholic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joseph Luns, continued to support the American action, mainly as an attempt to maintain unity within NATO. The third Hoofdstuk pauses to assess the controversy between parliament and the new centrist-right De Jong cabinet in 1967 and 1968. The reason was the decision of De Jong's cabinet to disregard a motion of parliament on the Vietnam War. The motion called on the government to urge the Americans to cease their bombardment of North Vietnam. The Hoofdstuk shows that critical voices from parliament, especially from the confessional government parties, worried the government. The controversy was fuelled by the leftist opposition, led by the PvdA. By taking a strong stance on the Vietnam War, this party tried to increase the dissension among the Christian governing parties. Finally, in February 1968, and by way of compromise, Luns started an initiative for an international call for peace. This initiative foundered in its infancy. The fourth Hoofdstuk deals with the protest against the arrests of people carrying posters with the slogan 'Johnson war criminal' in the spring of 1968. This slogan had been banned in the Netherlands as an insult against a 'friendly head of state'. The protest actions forced the Ministry of Justice to expedite a review of the relevant section of the law. The whole issue supports the theory of the historian, James Kennedy that the Dutch authorities were sensitive to conflicts in the sixties and were inclined to yield quickly to pressure. The fifth through seventh Hoofdstuks relate to the period 1969-1973. That was the period in which the character of the Vietnam War changed significantly due to the negotiations in Paris, Richard M. Nixon taking office and the American military withdrawals from South Vietnam. Although actions during this period were less frequent, they were organised on a wider and larger scale than in the sixties. Aid to North Vietnam also got underway during this time, arranged mostly through the private organisation, Medisch Comité Nederland-Vietnam. Hoofdstuk 5 deals with the outrage at the American invasion of Cambodia. Hoofdstuk 6 deals with the attempt of the Dutch government to extradite an American deserter. This gave rise to such protest that the Dutch government backed down and asked the American government to withdraw its extradition request. Hoofdstuk 7 examines the protests against the renewed American bombardment in December 1972. The commotion surrounding the Christmas bombings was reason enough for Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norbert Schmelzer, to lodge a protest with the American government. It is evident that he was concerned about the rising anti-American sentiments in Dutch society and the damage that continued bombardments could cause to NATO's reputation. In conclusion we can state that the Dutch government always backed American policy on Vietnam. It was far from a trouble-free ride however. The Cals, De Jong and Biesheuvel (1971-1973) cabinets were all uncertain on how to deal with disapproving social reactions to American action. In order to cushion the criticism and maintain its support for American policy on Vietnam, the government was forced to make regular concessions.
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