On preferences and doing the right thing : Satisfaction with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is limited

Abstract

We examine outcome satisfaction in situations in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons. Building on classical and modern social psychological theories, we argue that when reacting to these arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and easy as preferences are primary. We further propose that adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Extending the literature on cognitive busyness, we therefore predict that people should be more satisWed with advantageous inequity when cognitive processing is strongly—as opposed to weakly—limited. Findings across several diVerent experimental paradigms support our predictions. Taken together, our Wndings shed light on the psychological processes underlying the intriguing interplay between egoism- and fairnessbased considerations when evaluating outcomes, as well as on more general preference and adjustment processes.