

Heidegger's Question of Being and the 'Augustinian Picture' of Language

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I. Introduction

Heidegger and Wittgenstein had in common more than just their year of birth, 1889. To an astonishing extent they shared philosophical preoccupations¹. It is not difficult to find parallelisms between, for instance, Heidegger's inaugural lecture 'What is Metaphysics?' and Wittgenstein's 'Lecture on Ethics'². There also seem to be structural similarities between central themes of Heidegger's thought and Wittgenstein's later work.

¹ Consider for instance topics like the relation between a scientific understanding of the world and 'the mystical' or 'nothingness', the place of logic within philosophy, the limits of propositional language, the impossibility of ethical theory, the relation between philosophy and art, and the nature of philosophy. Many of these parallelisms have been explored in the literature. See e.g.: Karl-Otto Apel, 'Wittgenstein und Heidegger: die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und der Sinnlosigkeitsverdacht gegen alle Metaphysik' (1962, 1967); 'Heideggers philosophische Radikalisierung der "Hermeneutik" und die Frage nach dem "Sinnkriterium" der Sprache' (1968) and 'Wittgenstein und das Problem des hermeneutischen Verstehens' (1966), all reprinted in TPh; Nicholas F. Gier (1981), *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty* (with bibliography), State Univ. of New York Press, Albany; George F. Seffler (1974), *Language and the World. A Methodological-Structural Synthesis within the Writings of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein*, Humanities Press, Atlantic Heights; Ross Mandel, 'Heidegger and Wittgenstein: A Second Kantian Revolution', in Michael Murray, ed. (1978), *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, Critical Essays*, Yale U.P., pp. 259-70, and finally Winfried Franzen, 'Zusätzliches zum Thema "Wittgenstein und Heidegger"', in Paul Weingartner and Johannes Czermak, eds., *Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie, Akten des 7. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums* (1982), Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1983, pp. 546-49.

² See WiM and Wittgenstein 1929: 'A Lecture on Ethics', *Philosophical Review* 74 (1965), pp. 3-12. According to Heidegger, in *Angst* we simultaneously experience nothingness and the totality of beings. Thus, *Angst* transforms us in our being there (WiM, p. 33) and it leads to the question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' (WiM, p. 42). This is similar to TLP §§ 6.44 and 6.45 and to 'A Lecture on Ethics' p. 8: "I believe the best way of describing it [i.e. Wittgenstein's experience *par excellence*] is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world". Cf. Russell Nieli (1987), *Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language, A Study of Viennese Positivism and the Thought of*

According to Heidegger, the question concerning the sense of being is the fundamental question for philosophy. Being is the basic theme of thought³. This question of being is intimately connected with Heidegger's critique of the ontology of presence, which supposedly dominates traditional philosophy⁴. In the ontology of presence, being is interpreted as the permanent presence of things⁵. The implicit interpretation of being as presence excludes an adequate understanding of human existence and precludes an authentic search for the sense of being⁶. The ontology of presence exemplifies human existence in its mode of decay or Fall⁷. Reanimating the question of being is impossible without a 'destruction' of the ontology of presence⁸.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, State University of New York Press, Albany, especially chapters I and II. One could of course argue that there is one decisive difference between the 'mysticisms' of the early Wittgenstein and of WiM. Whereas Wittgenstein thinks that we cannot speak about the mystical (TLP § 7 and 'A Lecture on Ethics'), Heidegger's quest is concerned with another kind of language, which is not dominated by logic, and which responds to being. But even here, there is a striking parallel. In his discussion on Heidegger (in fact, on WiM, which was published in 1929?) on Monday the 30th of December 1929, Wittgenstein not only interpreted Heideggerian *Angst* as the running up against the limits of language which is ethics. The entry in Waismann's notebook ends with a quotation from Augustine: 'What, you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter!' (*Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*, ed. by Brian McGuinness, Blackwell, Oxford 1979, p. 69). Thus it seems that Wittgenstein also wants to say that it is impossible to avoid talking nonsense, and that § 7 of TLP was merely the expression of a youthful bravado.

³ SZ, § 7, pp. 27, 38 and passim in Heidegger's works.

⁴ I am referring to *die Ontologie der Vorhandenheit des Vorhandenen*, or briefly, *die Ontologie der Vorhandenheit*. The programme of a 'destruction' of this ontology is formulated in SZ, § 6. A clear instance of such a destruction is Heidegger's criticism of Descartes, SZ, §§ 6, 19–21 and PGZ § 22. For a summary of Heidegger on Descartes, see J.-I. Marion, 'Heidegger et la situation de Descartes', *Archives de Philosophie* 38 (1975), pp. 253–63. The usual translation of 'Ontologie der Vorhandenheit' as 'ontology of presence' is somewhat misleading, because it suggests that Heidegger's notion has something to do with phenomenism. What Heidegger means is, however, that in the Western tradition 'to be' has always been interpreted as the permanent *being—there* (presence) of things or substances. This ontology of presence is related to the traditional primacy of the theoretical attitude in Western philosophy. Heidegger's concept of the ontology of presence is part of a complex network of concepts and cannot be understood without taking in account this network. The opposition between *Vorhandenheit* (being—there or being—available) and *Zuhandenheit* (being—at—hand), for instance, is crucial to understand what Heidegger wants to say. See also note 5.

⁵ 'Sein = ständige Vorhandenheit', SZ § 21, p. 96. See passim in Heidegger's works.

⁶ SZ § 6 and passim.

⁷ SZ § 43 a, p. 206: "...Verfallen des Daseins und der darin motivierten Verlegung des primären Seinsverständnisses auf das Sein als Vorhandenheit...". See also §§ 25, 38, 68c, 71, 81; cf. PGZ § 29. Of course Heidegger says in § 38 (p. 176) of SZ that *Verfallen* does not have a negative connotation and that it does not refer to the Biblical Fall. But the typical density of meaning of SZ is due to the fact that, although Heidegger officially condemns traditional religious or metaphysical interpretations of his terminology, he systematically coins technical terms which suggest these interpretations.

⁸ SZ § 6.

There is at least a formal analogy between Heidegger's critique of the ontology of presence and Wittgenstein's analysis of 'Augustine's picture' of language. From the *Brown Book* (1934-'35) onwards, Wittgenstein grouped his investigations under the heading of a quotation from—or an implicit reference to—Augustine, *Confessions*, I.8., in which the latter describes how he learned language as a child⁹. In this description Wittgenstein sees a 'picture' of what one often tacitly assumes to be the essence of human language: the words of a language are names of objects, and sentences, being combinations of names, are used to describe states of affairs¹⁰. He equates Augustine's conception with the idea that ostensive definition is the fundamental form of an explanation of the meaning of a word¹¹.

The fact that the reference to Augustine opens typescript 220 and the *Philosophical Investigations* reflects the fundamental importance Wittgenstein accords to Augustine's picture of language. The picture functions as an *Urbild*, which not only informs a range of accounts of meaning, but also is the hidden motive behind the traditional theories in philosophical disciplines as diverse as the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics¹². Only if one implicitly presupposes, for instance, that a sentence like 'Eight is greater than five' is a description, will one raise the philosophical question of what it describes—a relation between abstract objects, marks on paper or mental constructs? Similarly, if one assumes that 'I want a glass of beer' is a description, like 'He wants a glass of beer', one is tempted to accept the idea of a Cartesian inner realm of the mental. For where else should the described wish reside? The correct observation that my utterance of my wish is a criterion for others to know what I want, is then misinterpreted as a corollary of a privileged access to my own mental states by introspection¹³. In similar ways philosophical questions and theories arise from the presupposition that all words function as *names*. And indeed Augustine's conception of language naturally develops into "a whole *Weltanschauung* encompassing language, the mind, and the world", which may be called the Augustinian picture¹⁴.

It was Wittgenstein's conviction that this Augustinian picture prevents us from seeing language as it is, and that it generates the paradigmatic theories of metaphysics¹⁵. His diagnosis of the philosophy of the past, including his own past philosophy, is expressed in § 116 of the *Investigations*: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our lan-

⁹ PhU I, § 1; BB, p. 77. Cf. WMU, p. 3 and RGN, pp. 3, 13–15.

¹⁰ PhU I, §§ 1–64. Cf. WMU, Chapter 1.

¹¹ Wittgenstein, 'Big Typescript', TS. 213, p. 25. Cf. WMU, p. 1 and PhU I §§ 28–36.

¹² WMU, pp. 13–15; RGN, pp. 8–15.

¹³ Cf. RGN, pp. 9–11.

¹⁴ Cf. WMU, p. 13.

¹⁵ Cf. RGN, pp. 9–22.

guage and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably". Wittgenstein's therapy consists in showing that the picture is misleading as to the actual functioning of language, being a generalization from one very specific and barely understood language game to a universal grammatical model, and in pointing out how it informs specific philosophical problems. Positively, the cure consists in giving a descriptive survey of the uses of the relevant expressions, in order that we recognize the workings of our language in spite of an urge to misunderstand them¹⁶. This therapy is successful as soon as we cease to feel the need to raise the treated philosophical question. Metaphysical problems disappear if words are brought back from their metaphysical to their everyday use¹⁷.

In a still impressive series of papers published in the late sixties, Karl-Otto Apel enforced a rapprochement between Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein, based on the heuristic point of view that Heidegger's destruction of the ontology of presence may be compared to Wittgenstein's view of traditional philosophy as informed by the Augustinian picture of language¹⁸. Let me mention just two of the striking and specific analogies which prove the fertility of this approach¹⁹. In § 308 of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein diagnoses the origin of the mind/body problem. Typically, he says, the crucial first step escapes notice: we talk of (mental) *processes and states* and leave their nature undecided. That is: we think that we are still neutral, not having decided whether mental processes and states are behavioral processes and states, or processes in the brain, or states of some mental substance etc. But in fact this first step commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. By talking of processes and states, we have adopted a specific grammatical model; we are under the spell of Augustine's picture. We have interpreted psychological words as names of processes or states of some kind, and we know what it is to investigate states and processes further. Similarly, according to Heidegger, in asking the apparently innocuous question *what* the thinking ego is, Descartes had already adopted a specific ontological model, the model of substances and attributes, in other words, the ontology of presence. Heidegger's criticism that Descartes omitted to ask the question of being, which is, in this context, the question in terms of which network of categories should we interpret ourselves, clearly corre-

¹⁶ PhU I §§ 109 and 126.

¹⁷ PhU I §§ 118, 133. There is some analogy between Wittgenstein's method and psychoanalysis. Cf. RGN, p. 14.

¹⁸ TPh, the papers mentioned in note 1. See in particular TPh, pp. 253 ff.

¹⁹ Of course Apel does not neglect differences between PhU and SZ. But he argues that these differences are to be explained as divergent expressions of a fundamental position common to Heidegger and Wittgenstein: TPh, p. 258.

sponds to Wittgenstein's observation that the philosopher of mind overlooks the diversity of logical grammar²⁰.

Another specific point that shows the fecundity of Apel's heuristic decision is concerned with the inner mechanism of the *Urbild* which informs traditional ontology and epistemology. The original sin of both the Augustinian picture and the ontology of presence is that some secondary and local phenomenon—ostensive definition or the dissociated attitude to the world of the scientist, respectively—is taken to be the basic and global phenomenon. Wittgenstein's analysis of ostensive definition, which shows that this type of definition cannot be the primary way to learn the meaning of words because understanding it is parasitic on knowledge of the language, corresponds to Heidegger's qualification of the 'objective' attitude to the world as a deficient mode of a more fundamental indwelling-in-the-world²¹.

Notwithstanding the general merits of Apel's approach, one may question specific details of his rapprochement. Apel decides, for example, to disregard Wittgenstein's warning that his philosophy is purely an activity, which uses a variety of methods or therapies, and that it does not consist of theses or theories²². This decision permits Apel to read into the *Investigations* a kind of transcendental theory, the theory that our daily language embodies a preliminary understanding of the world which is somehow constitutive of the world we live in, an understanding which Heidegger called *Seinsverständnis*²³. Concepts like *language game* and *form of life* are supposed to be elements of this general theory; they would not merely refer to Wittgenstein's methods of inventing objects of comparison to highlight uses of language, and of assembling reminders for a particular purpose²⁴. One

²⁰ SZ §§ 6, 19–21; PGZ, § 22; cf. TPh, pp. 259–60, 354. Heidegger's criticism of Husserl is similar to that of Descartes; cf. PGZ §§ 11 and 12. It is also more fundamental to SZ, because it justifies Heidegger's transformation of phenomenology from an analysis of the constitutive activity of the transcendental ego into the study of the *Seinsfrage*. But Heidegger, probably on grounds of academic policy, dissimulated his critique of Husserl in SZ, the book which had to bring about his appointment as Husserl's successor at Freiburg.

²¹ TPh, pp. 262–63.

²² TPh, pp. 328/9, 353, 356–58. Cf. PhU §§ 109, 128.

²³ TPh, pp. 252, 258, 263, 267, 272, 328 ff., 359. Apel's interpretation is supported by many texts from UG, like §§ 92–99, 103, 105–107, 112, 140 ff., 151–162, 167, 185 ff., 208–09, 262, 358–59, 410, 419, 594 and 603. In these sections Wittgenstein argues that there is a *world-picture* or a *system* which is presupposed by all our justifications of beliefs, but which itself is not justified or unjustified. This is very similar to Heidegger's *Seinsverständnis* and *Entwurf*. Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein would probably claim that the idea that there are world-pictures in this sense is a purely descriptive finding. But Apel, by speaking of a *theory*, raises the question to what extent Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian 'descriptions' are theory-laden. Cf. for a similar problem in Husserl FLH, pp. 3–6.

²⁴ Cf. PhU I, § 127. Apel's transcendental interpretation of the later Wittgenstein (and of TLP) has been fiercely criticised by E. Vollrath, 'Eine Fehlinterpretation—und was ihre Folgen sind. Zu den politischen Implikationen von K.-O. Apels Wittgenstein-

might also have doubts about Apel's conviction that Wittgenstein's later method for eliminating metaphysics stands in need of some general justification, apart from its illuminating results on specific issues²⁵. Apel finds this justification in a linguistic pragmatism, which he attributes to the later Wittgenstein²⁶.

The first of these points leads to a very close parallelism between *Being and Time* and the *Investigations* and it prepares Apel's own transcendental philosophy of communication. The second point yields not only a somewhat stretched comparison between Wittgenstein's 'pragmatism' and Heidegger's interpretation of signs as a particular kind of tool²⁷. It also enables Apel to ensure Heidegger's final victory over Wittgenstein. Apel had already criticised Wittgenstein's early philosophy of the *Tractatus* from the point of view of *Being and Time* as a typical specimen of the ontology of presence²⁸. By his interpretation of the later Wittgenstein as a pragmatist, he now seems to have acquired the means to stigmatize the *Investigations* from the point of view of the later Heidegger: Wittgenstein's comparison of language with tools would prove that his later philosophy is just another expression of the purely technical relation of modern man to the world, a symptom of the 'technical era'²⁹. And doesn't this interpretation imply that even Wittgenstein's later philosophy squarely belongs to the ontology of presence?

In this paper I shall explore the relations between Heidegger's question of being and the Augustinian conception of language from a different point of view. The possibility of such a point of view different from Apel's is implied by the inner structure of the question of being, a structure which is characterized as one of unity and diversity. As Heidegger says in 'My way to

Interpretation', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 87 (1980), pp. 149–64. According to Vollrath, the TLP defends a 'rigorous positivist objectivism' (p.150) and Wittgenstein is said to be 'blind for the transcendental and deaf to the hermeneutical' (p. 151). From TLP § 5.631 ("There is no such thing as the subject that thinks....") he infers that the TLP excludes the kind of reflection which is required in transcendental philosophy, because the subject is banned from the world. But one might just as well argue, as Husserl did, that transcendental philosophy is impossible as long as one does not distinguish between the empirical subject, which according to TLP is a complex within the world (§§ 5.542, 5.421), and the transcendental subject, which is not a part but the limit of the world (§ 5.641). The transcendental subject in TLP is not only transcendent to the world, but also transcendental in the proper sense: things which can only be shown must be shown to someone: the transcendental subject. Vollrath's critique of the transcendental interpretation of PhU is no less dogmatic, and in general Vollrath is insensitive to the subtleties of both Wittgenstein and Apel.

²⁵ TPh, pp. 268, 320–25.

²⁶ TPh, pp. 268–70, 320 ff., 329 ff.

²⁷ TPh, pp. 270–71.

²⁸ TPh, p. 251.

²⁹ TPh, p. 269. Apel's implicit allusion to Heidegger's view of the 'technical era' is evident to a continental philosophical public.

phenomenology', Brentano's dissertation on *The Multiple Meaning of Being According to Aristotle* (1862) formed the origin of his philosophical career. To the young Heidegger, the Aristotelian dictum that "Being is said in many ways" inspired a more basic question: if being is said in many ways, what is the one and fundamental meaning? What does 'to be' mean?³⁰ Or, in a slightly different formulation: what is the unity and simplicity of being which then articulates itself in manifold fashion?³¹ But for Heidegger this ontological principle of identity is at once a principle of differentiation. The question of being as search for the one and fundamental sense of being has to be accompanied by an attempt to articulate the manifold modes of being³².

In this latter respect of differentiation the question of being is concerned with the problem of the categories. Here Heidegger is far more radical than Aristotle. There are not only different categories in which 'to be' is said in different ways. Rather there are different systems or networks of categories, and the Aristotelian idea that there is only one such system is the very ontology of presence which has to be 'destroyed'. In particular, Heidegger in *Being and Time* transforms Dilthey's project to articulate the 'categories of life' into the attempt to elucidate a network of existential categories of *Dasein*, that is, to elaborate a *fundamental ontology* which then permits us to interpret the various regional ontologies in relation to the existential categories. It is only in comparison to this existential analysis of *Dasein* that we can see that the traditional ontology in fact applies merely to things, and not to *Dasein*. The destruction of traditional ontology and the existential analysis of *Dasein* go hand in hand.

No wonder then that Apel's rapprochement between Heidegger's destruction of the ontology of presence and Wittgenstein's critique of the Augustinian picture heavily draws on *Being and Time*³³. In other words, this rapprochement concerns the pole of differentiation of the question of being. But what about the relation between the other pole and the Augustinian picture? If one accepts Wittgenstein's critique of the Augustinian picture of language, what should one think of Heidegger's question of being to the extent that it is concerned with "the leading and fundamental sense of being, that manifests itself in and through the amazing polyvalence of the single

³⁰ SD, p. 81.

³¹ This formulation is Kiesel's. Cf. Theodore Kiesel, 'Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorical', in H.J. Silverman, J. Sallis and T.M. Seebohm, eds., *Continental Philosophy in America*, Duquesne UP, Pittsburgh 1983, p. 167. This paper will be quoted as Kiesel 1983.

³² Kiesel 1983, p. 167.

³³ TPh, pp. 250-68. It is only when Apel goes on to criticise the later Wittgenstein that he uses the middle and later Heidegger: TPh, pp. 268-72.

little word 'is'?"³⁴. How to evaluate Heidegger's search for "the unity and simplicity of being" ³⁵.

This question is obviously a minor concern for Apel, although there is some discussion of it in two footnotes of his 1967 paper and in the main text of the article of 1968³⁶. In the footnotes Apel tries to defend Heidegger's view that the 'is' as copula, the 'is' of existence and the 'is' of identity have a common root of meaning. In footnote 32 he argues, "against the view of most logicians", that because the 'is' of predication carries the assertive force of an assertion, and because the assertive force is the claim that a corresponding state of affairs exists, the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of existence have a common root of meaning. However, Apel's first premise is obviously false, because it commits him to the eccentric (or pre-Fregean) idea that the 'is' of predication is somehow implied in all assertions. Footnote 36 is concerned with the 'is' as copula and the 'is' of identity. Here Apel argues that because the 'is' as copula presupposes the so-called hermeneutical synthesis, in which we conceive of something *as* something—or, as Apel says in a Heideggerian vein, we "let something be *as* something"—the 'is' as copula and the 'is' of identity have a common root of meaning. But this argument rests on the dubious notion that predication is partial identity, or on a confusion between 'identifying *a* as *a*' and 'identifying *a* as an *F*'.

Of course Apel is aware of the fact that Heideggerian locutions like 'the voice of being' or 'being withdraws' will offend the ears of analytically oriented philosophers, because such phrases apparently refer to a pseudo-object³⁷. However, according to Apel these locutions are 'grammatical metaphors'³⁸. They *only seem* to betray the grip of the Augustinian image on Heidegger's thought, whereas in fact Heidegger's overworked 'ontological difference', his distinction between *beings* and *to be*, warns him of this pitfall³⁹. According to Apel, the syntactical metaphor of 'the to be' (*das Sein*) is even a philosophical necessity, because it discloses a domain of phenomena the neglect of which is far more dangerous than the risk of misinterpreting the metaphor⁴⁰.

In this paper I shall mainly concentrate on Heidegger's question of being in so far as it is a search for *the leading and fundamental sense* of 'to be'. Let us call this question the question of being in the strict sense, in contradistinction to the programme of developing existential categories for *Dasein*. Notwithstanding Heidegger's stress on the ontological difference, my

³⁴ Cf. Kisiel 1983, p. 167.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ TPh, footnotes 32 and 36 on pp. 243 and 245, respectively. See also pp. 296 ff., and 327 ff.

³⁷ TPh, pp. 296 ff.

³⁸ TPh, pp. 257, 325–28.

³⁹ TPh, p. 327.

⁴⁰ TPh, pp. 327–28.

working hypothesis will be that his question of being in the strict sense is informed by the Augustinian picture of language. It may be true that purely metaphorical interpretations of Heidegger's jargon of being are fruitful and necessary. But to the extent that the question of being aims at 'the' fundamental and leading sense of being, which supposedly is the common root of the meanings of the 'is' of predication, of identity and of existence, it is a pseudo-question generated by the Augustinian picture. Or at least so I shall argue.

The argument will develop as follows. In section II there is some preliminary discussion of the question of being from a Wittgensteinian perspective. However, the main support for the thesis is historical. In sections III and IV I shall try to demonstrate that Heidegger endorsed Husserl's view that 'is' is a referring expression, although it obviously does not refer to objects of sensation or reflection. Heidegger repeatedly says that Husserl's theory of categorial intuition was essential for his question of being. Accordingly, I shall explore the relation between the notion of categorial intuition and the Augustinian picture. In section V two objections will be discussed and I shall finish with a short coda.

II. The Question of Being: a preliminary discussion.

The later Husserl distinguished several approaches towards the transcendental reduction, the core of his philosophical method. There is an approach by way of an analysis of sensory perception, an approach via psychology, one via a reflection on formal logic, one via a meditation on the crisis of the European sciences and the history of philosophy, etc.. Similarly, one might discern in Heidegger's writings various paths to the question of being, apart from the approach via Aristotle or Dilthey I already mentioned. In the first place, Heidegger singles out specific moods (*Stimmungen*), like angst, spleen, despair, or jubilation, which make us feel "the hidden power of this question"⁴¹. Secondly, one might approach the question of being by reading the writings of authentic Christians, like St. Paul, St. Augustine, Eckhart, Luther or Kierkegaard, whose works Heidegger discussed in his early lectures⁴². Finally, he claims that a reflection on ordinary language leads to the

⁴¹ See, for instance, WiM, pp. 31–42 and EM, p. 1.

⁴² In the winter term of 1920/21 Heidegger lectured on the factual experience of life in the letters of Paul (*Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion*); in the summer term of 1921 he lectured on Augustine and Luther (*Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*). Luther criticises the traditional interpretation of the letter to the Romans I, 20, that we might know God by studying the creation. According to Luther, 'works' in this passage does not refer to the world, but to Christ's Passion and the Cross. The traditional interpretation is due to the influence of Greek philosophy, which, according to Paul, God turned into folly. This Lutheran criticism is crucial to an understanding of the Heideggerian *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger still quotes Luther's arguments in the *Introduction to Was ist Metaphysik?*

question of being. We say, for example, that the sky is blue, and that I *am* happy. We think that we perfectly understand the meaning of the verb 'to be'. But according to Heidegger this is not true. Our average understanding (*durchschnittliche Verständlichkeit*), he declares in section 1 of *Being and Time*, merely shows a lack of understanding (*Unverständlichkeit*)⁴³.

Heidegger assumes that these different approaches give access to one and the same question, the question of being. Nevertheless he probably thinks that the approach to the question of being by way of reflection on the use of 'to be' in ordinary language is more superficial than the others and runs the risk of failing to lead to the real question. For concerning the related query *What is thinking?* he observes that the idea that it is concerned with the meaning of the word 'thinking' is not its authentic interpretation, although he also says that there is a deep unity between the different manners of asking it⁴⁴.

But this very unity of the question of being is problematical. If, for instance, one approaches the question of being from *Stimmungen* like *angst*, one will tend to identify the question of being with the quest for the meaning of life. Dilthey's influence on Heidegger reinforces this interpretation. However, is there a relation between this quest and the meaning of the word 'is' in ordinary language? Has the implicit understanding we have of our existence and our world—Heidegger's *Seinsverständnis*—anything to do with our understanding the word 'is'? Following Apel one may try to defend the jargon of being against the suspicions of analytic philosophy by saying that it is purely metaphorical. But this move weakens the plausibility of Heidegger's claim that the question of being is also concerned with the meaning of the verb 'to be' in common usage.

from 1949 (WiM, p. 20). They are also echoed in Heidegger's discussion with Ernst Cassirer in Davos (1929), where he says that it is the aim of philosophy to throw man back into the harshness of his destiny ("gewissermassen den Menschen zurückzuwerfen in die Härte seines Schicksals", KM, p. 263). Cf. on this topic Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, Neske, Pfullingen 1963, pp. 36–45.

⁴³ See also e.g.: H, pp. 59–62 and PGZ, p. 194: "Wir leben immer schon in einem Verständnis des 'ist', ohne dass wir genauer sagen könnten, was das eigentlich bedeutet".

⁴⁴ WD, pp. 79–80. Cf. also SZ, pp. 94–95: "...des grundsätzlichen Seinsproblems. Seine Bearbeitung verlangt, in der rechten Weise den Äquivokationen 'nachzuspüren'; wer so etwas versucht, 'beschäftigt sich' nicht mit 'blossenen Wortbedeutungen', sondern muss sich in die ursprünglichste Problematik der 'Sachen selbst' vorwagen, um solche 'Nuancen' ins reine zu bringen". As I argue in this paper, one should interpret passages like this against the background of Husserl's theory on the analysis of the origin of meanings. It is no coincidence that Heidegger implicitly refers to Husserl, using the Husserlian phrase 'Sachen selbst'. The 'deep unity' Heidegger alludes to in WD is also to be explained as the 'Augustinian' conviction that we read off the meaning of words from the phenomena, so that an analysis of meaning without a study of the phenomena remains superficial. Therefore, the methodological decision to focus on Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* as a question concerning the meaning of 'is' leads to the heart of the matter, after all. See also note 58.

In this paper I shall focus on the approach to the question of being from ordinary language. My theme may now be specified as follows. Is it really the case, as Heidegger claims, that an analysis of the meaning of the verb 'to be' justifies the 'leap' (*Sprung*) towards the question of being in the authentic sense⁴⁵? It will be argued that it does so only for those who are held captive by the Augustinian picture of language. If this is correct, the complex unity of the question of being is illusory, and the unity of Heidegger's philosophical work turns out to be problematic. One may of course stick to the question of being as an important philosophical question. But one should give up the idea that it is somehow concerned with the ordinary uses of 'to be'.

In section 3.323 of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein mentions two frequent sources of misunderstanding about the meaning of a word. It may happen that the same word has different modes of signification, so that, according to the idiom of the *Tractatus*, it belongs to different symbols. It also frequently happens that two words which have different modes of signification are employed in the same way as far as surface-grammar is concerned. The verb 'to be' is adduced as an example of both sources of confusion. Of the first because 'to be' may be used as a copula, as sign for identity and as an expression of existence (Wittgenstein mentions these three uses only). And of the second because as far as its surface-grammar is concerned 'to be' in the sense of 'to exist' resembles intransitive verbs like 'to go'.

If one is misled by the similarity in surface-grammar between 'to be' in the sense of 'to exist' and intransitive verbs like 'to go', one will think that 'to exist' is some kind of *activity*. It may then appear that the sense of 'to be' has something to do with *time*. I am convinced that Heidegger during his *Denkweg* was beguiled in this manner, but I will not argue this point here.

As far as the first kind of misunderstanding is concerned, it may be thought that Heidegger is not taken in by it. Quite often conceptual distinctions taken from traditional philosophy serve as a starting point for raising the question of being, like the distinction between essence and existence. Such distinctions are not denied or overlooked. But according to Heidegger, they lead necessarily to the question of being. Let me quote, as a typical instance of this *transition* or '*Sprung*' to the question of being, a passage from his book on *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*:

"In each entity [Seiendes] 'there is' being-what [Was-sein] and being-there [Dass-sein], essentia and existentia, possibility and reality. Does 'being' ['Sein'] always mean the same here? If not, why is it that being [das Sein] is split into being-what and being-there? Is this too easily ac-

⁴⁵ See on the notion of *Sprung* for instance SZ, pp. 315 and 344; EM, pp. 4-5. More references are to be found in Hildegard Feick's *Index zu Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'*, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1980 (3rd. ed.), p. 81. One will remember that the concept of *Sprung* was one of the central notions of Kierkegaard's philosophy.

quired distinction—*essentia* and *existentia*—just like the distinction between dogs and cats, or is there a problem here which must at last be posed and which manifestly *can* be posed only if we ask what being [*das Sein*] as such is?⁴⁶

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, this transition from an analysis of the meaning of 'to be' to the question of being is problematic in at least three respects.

1. Heidegger assumes that the various meanings of the verb 'to be' must be rooted in one 'fundamental' sense, *being as such*. Instead of lingering among what is diverse, he thinks that we should finally search for the one and original sense of 'to be'. On this point there is a formal resemblance between Heidegger and Socrates. When Socrates' pupils attempted to answer his questions about justice, courage or wisdom by mentioning concrete examples of these virtues, Socrates would scold them and profess that he was interested in the one thing that makes a just man just, and not in the many particular instances. Similarly, Heidegger is not satisfied by the diversity of different uses of the verb 'to be'. He asks for the one original meaning and seems to exclude the possibility that there simply is no such unity of meaning⁴⁷.

According to the later Wittgenstein, the assumption that different uses of the same word *must* presuppose some deeper unity is one of the most fundamental mistakes of our philosophical tradition, the essentialist error. This error is an element of the Augustinian picture⁴⁸. Nouns, for instance, may just as well function on the basis of family resemblances, or in other more or less complex ways⁴⁹. Instead of postulating an underlying unity which would explain the diverse uses of an expression, we should rather make a survey of the ways in which it is in fact used. Such a survey will then liberate us from the temptation to raise metaphysical questions, a temptation which sprang from our entanglement in the network of our language.

⁴⁶ KM, p. 217. The German text reads: "An jedem Seienden 'gibt es' so Was-sein und Dass-sein, *essentia* und *existentia*, Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. Heisst hier 'Sein' je dasselbe? Wenn nicht, woran liegt es, dass das Sein in Was-sein und Dass-sein gespalten ist? Gibt es diesen allzu selbstverständlich aufgerafften Unterschied—*essentia* und *existentia*—so, wie es Hunde und auch Katzen gibt, oder liegt hier ein Problem, das endlich gestellt werden muss und das offenbar nur gestellt werden kann, wenn gefragt wird, was das Sein als solches sei?"

⁴⁷ In other words, Heidegger does not conceive of his postulate that there must be a unity of meaning which explains the diversity of uses of 'is' as an empirical hypothesis, which may be falsified by the facts.

⁴⁸ WMU, p. 6; cf. G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker (1980), *An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, vol. 1, Blackwell, Oxford 1983, pp. 125–26, 130–88.

⁴⁹ Cf. Friedrich Waismann (1976), *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*, ed. by G.P. Baker and B. McGuinness, Reclam, Stuttgart, Chapter IX.

We tacitly assumed, for example, that all words function according to one simplified grammatical model or picture. Studying the use of the verb 'to be' on this assumption, a verb which has various uses, none of which satisfies the implicit picture, we got the impression that the real meaning must be hidden, which is the impression of a deep philosophical problem. Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy would consist in showing that our questions were the product of a tension between the rules of usage of the verb 'to be' and the grammatical picture we tacitly presupposed.

2. Heidegger passes imperceptibly from a question concerning the sense of the verb 'to be' ("*Heisst hier 'sein' je dasselbe?*") to a question concerning *being as such* ("*...was das Sein als solches sei?*"). In the latter formulation the quotation marks are missing. The question of 'being' and the question of being alternate in Heidegger's works. On the one hand he seems to be concerned with the meaning of a verb, on the other hand he searches for a kind of phenomenon. The alternation of these two questions is not accidental or due to careless writing. It seems to be a crucial condition of the possibility of Heidegger's question of being. But how is it to be explained that for Heidegger these two versions of the question are identical?

The working hypothesis of this paper is that in asking the question of being Heidegger fell victim to the Augustinian picture of language. Notwithstanding his destruction of the ontology of presence and in spite of his official philosophy of language, Heidegger tacitly assumed that all words are referring expressions, although they do not always refer to things or beings. This hypothesis accounts for the alleged equivalence between the question concerning the sense of 'to be' and the question of being. If the reference to a phenomenon is an essential aspect of the meaning of a word, it may be thought that its meaning might be elucidated by some form of acquaintance with a phenomenon. We have the impression that we learn the meaning of the name 'John' when we are introduced to John. Similarly, Heidegger supposes that the meaning of 'to be' depends on some kind of experience of being. He thinks that we somehow will be able to 'read off' the meaning of the word from our acquaintance with the phenomenon of being⁵⁰. If so, the question concerning the meaning of 'to be' is equivalent to the search for being.

This hypothesis is confirmed by Heidegger's pronouncements on philosophical method in *Being and Time*. The question of being, Heidegger asserts in section 7, is the fundamental question of philosophy in general ("*die Fundamentalfrage der Philosophie überhaupt*"). This question should be dealt with by using the phenomenological approach. According to

⁵⁰ This is the basic error of the Augustinian picture. Cf. WMU, pp. 4-9, especially p. 7: "A person must be able to 'read off' from his acquaintance with this object the whole of the 'logical grammar' of the correlated word".

Heidegger, phenomenology is in the first place a method, which consists in "allowing things showing themselves to be seen as they show themselves and from their perspective" ("*Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen*")⁵¹. 'Phenomenon' in a primary and formal sense, Heidegger explains, is "what manifests itself in itself" ("*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende*")⁵². Applying this formal concept to the data of sense-perception, one obtains the 'vulgar' notion of a phenomenon, the notion of sensible phenomena. But Heidegger claims that this vulgar notion is not yet the phenomenological concept of a phenomenon. What is a phenomenon in the philosophical or phenomenological sense as Heidegger conceives it?

One should not be surprised to read that the *being* of beings is the phenomenon we are looking for⁵³. However, if there is a *phenomenon* which is called 'being' (in the verbal sense), the verb 'to be' is interpreted as a referring expression.

3. Heidegger assumes that it makes sense to suppose that, although we use the verb 'to be' without difficulties and although we are able to explain its various uses to others, we nevertheless might ignore its real or true meaning. This is the point of the passage in the first section of *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger affirms that our ordinary understanding of the verb only proves our lack of understanding. Similar texts occur often in his writings⁵⁴. Without this assumption, the question of being, to the extent that it is a question concerning the meaning of 'to be', would be superfluous. It would already be answered by the linguists.

But what does understanding the meaning of a word consist in, except in the capacity to use it correctly and the capacity to explain its use? As Wittgenstein stresses, these two capacities are the *criteria* for deciding whether someone understands a word. Should one not conclude that the central idea of Heidegger's thought, that we might be ignorant of the meaning of a word although we have mastered its ordinary use, is incoherent?

One will object that this situation is quite common. We all have mastered the meaning of 'gold' but only a few specialists really know what 'gold' means, because they are familiar with the relevant scientific conceptions. Our common use of 'gold' is parasitic on the use of the experts. If we want to know whether some piece of metal is really gold we consult them.

⁵¹ SZ, p. 34.

⁵² SZ, p. 31.

⁵³ SZ, p. 35.

⁵⁴ See note 43.

There is division of labour also within a linguistic community⁵⁵. Surely Wittgenstein's later philosophy does not exclude such a thing?

However, what Heidegger refers to when he speaks of our lack of understanding of the verb 'to be' is different from the linguistic division of labour. In the latter case, ignorance of the real meaning of a word one uses can only be a local phenomenon within a linguistic community. This kind of parasitic and derivative use of words presupposes that there are experts who decide what the word means. For Heidegger, on the contrary, ignorance of the meaning of 'to be' is a global phenomenon. And he thinks that logicians, who probably are the best candidates for being experts on the meaning of 'to be'—if the notion of an expert has a point here—are somehow fated to be ignorant of its true meaning. It follows that one cannot refute the Wittgensteinian criticism by reference to the notion of a linguistic division of labour. And surely one should also object to the idea that the rules of use in themselves might be called 'true' or 'not true'⁵⁶.

I think there is a deeper unity between these three assumptions of Heidegger's transition from a reflection on the verb 'to be' to the question of being: the unity of the Augustinian picture⁵⁷. If one tries to understand the verb 'to be' on the grammatical model of a referring expression, one will be tempted to think that the 'true' meaning of the verb will be known only if one has acquaintance with the phenomenon of being, which is the referent of the verb. This explains that Heidegger stresses on the one hand that the question of being is concerned with the meaning of 'to be', but denies on the other hand that it regards *merely* meanings of words: it is concerned with 'things themselves'⁵⁸. Further, because the senses of the verb have to be read off from this phenomenon of being, the meaning of 'to be' must be characterized by a fundamental unity which explains its diverse uses. Finally, one will not really know the meaning of the verb 'to be' in spite of one's perfect mastery of its diverse uses, if one does not experience, or does not experience any more, the phenomenon of being.

We may conclude, then, that Heidegger's most fundamental presupposition in raising the question of being consists in the interpretation of the verb 'to be' as a referring expression. This diagnosis will receive considerable support from an aetiological investigation concerning Husserl's influence on Heidegger. The hypothesis that Heidegger fell victim to the Augustinian picture will sound preposterous in view of Heidegger's critique of the ontology of presence, his doctrine of the ontological difference, and his exten-

⁵⁵ Cf. Hilary Putnam (1975), 'The meaning of "meaning"', in *Mind, Language and Reality*, *Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2, Cambridge UP 1986, especially pp. 227–29.

⁵⁶ Cf. Waismann, o.c. (note 49), chapter VII and passim; RGN, pp. 318–38.

⁵⁷ Cf. WMU, pp. 3–13.

⁵⁸ SZ, pp. 94–95 and passim in Heidegger's works. See also note 44.

diverse interpretations of traditional philosophical topics like the Kantian idea that 'being' is not a real predicate, the medieval distinction between essence and existence, or the various doctrines of the copula of e.g. Aristotle, Hobbes, J. S. Mill and Lotze⁵⁹. But it can be easily demonstrated that Husserl's theory of language exemplifies the Augustinian picture. And didn't Heidegger acknowledge that Husserl's theory of categorial intuition was essential to unfolding the question of being?

III. Heidegger's Way to Phenomenology and Husserl's Theory of Categorial Intuition

In 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie', a text published in 1963 and reprinted in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (1969)⁶⁰, Heidegger describes the birth of the question of being as the fruit of a combined reading of Aristotle and Husserl. Of course Heidegger came to philosophy through Brentano's dissertation *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (1862). But he knew that Brentano had had a decisive influence on Husserl's way of thinking. This is why Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* was lying on Heidegger's desk from his first semester in theology in 1909/10 onwards.

Heidegger hoped to get from the *Logical Investigations* a decisive stimulus for resolving the question suggested by Brentano's dissertation, namely: "if being is used in diverse senses, what is the guiding and fundamental meaning?" (*die leitende Grundbedeutung*). In short, "what does *to be* mean?". Heidegger was so deeply fascinated by Husserl's book that he read and re-read it without coming to understand the source of his fascination. "The spell emanating from this work spread out over its external aspect, its typography and its title page", Heidegger remembers in 1963⁶¹. And indeed Heidegger's way to phenomenology seems to have been paved with the *Logical Investigations*. According to 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie', Heidegger plunged into the recesses of the *Investigations* at least four times, in 1909, in 1911/12 (?), after 1913 and again after 1919.

It would be interesting to know why Heidegger hoped to bring the question of being to a resolution on the basis of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Which aspect of this complex book seemed to be of such overriding importance? Heidegger is relatively clear on this point. On page 86 of *Zur Sache des Denkens* he writes:

"When, from 1919 onwards, I began to practise the phenomenological manner of seeing, teaching and learning in proximity to Husserl, and at the same time tried out in the seminar a modified approach to Aristotle, my interest was once again drawn towards the *Logical Investigations*, especially the first edition of the sixth Investigation. The distinction worked

⁵⁹ Cf. GP.

⁶⁰ SD, pp. 81–90.

⁶¹ SD, p. 82.

out there between sensible and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in all its importance for the determination of the 'manifold signification of being'"⁶².

This quotation does not stand alone in Heidegger's works. During the seminar at Zähringen, which was held ten years after 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie' was published, Heidegger is somewhat more precise on the relevance of Husserl's theory of categorial intuition to the question of being:

"In order to be able to unfold the question concerning the meaning of being, being had to be given, so that one could inquire its meaning from it. Husserl's achievement consisted in this very presentation of being, which, as a category, is phenomenally present. Because of this achievement...I finally gained ground: 'being' is not a mere concept, not a pure abstraction, not the product of some derivation"⁶³.

What Heidegger says in 1973 is confirmed by the *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, his lectures in the summer term of 1925⁶⁴. These lectures are extremely important, not only because they contain an early version of *Being and Time*, but especially because here Heidegger amply discusses Husserl's phenomenology of the *Investigations* and of *Ideas I*⁶⁵. According to Heidegger's *Prolegomena*, Husserl's discovery of categorial intuition is one of the three fundamental discoveries of phenomenology, although he also notes that Husserl perhaps did not exhaust its real possibilities⁶⁶. The way Heidegger here characterises the importance of the discovery of categorial intuition conforms to what he says at Zähringen:

"In the discovery of the categorial intuition is of decisive importance: There are mental acts, in which ideal beings show themselves as they are, beings which are not products of these acts or functions of thought, of the subject. Further: the possibility of this kind of intuition and of what presents itself in it provides the ground for exposing to view the structures of these ideal

⁶² SD, p. 86. The German text reads: "Als ich seit 1919 selbst lehrend-lernend in der Nähe Husserls das phänomenologische Sehen einübte und zugleich im Seminar ein gewandeltes Aristoteles-Verständnis erprobte, neigte sich mein Interesse aufs neue den *Logischen Untersuchungen* zu, vor allem der sechsten in der ersten Auflage. Der hier herausgearbeitete Unterschied zwischen sinnlicher und kategorialer Anschauung enthüllte sich mir in seiner Tragweite für die Bestimmung der 'mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden'".

⁶³ VS, p. 116. The German text reads: "Um die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein überhaupt entfalten zu können, musste das Sein *gegeben* sein, um bei ihm seinen Sinn zu erfragen. Husserls Leistung bestand in eben dieser Vergegenwärtigung des Seins, das in der Kategorie phänomenal anwesend ist. Durch diese Leistung, fährt Heidegger fort, hatte ich endlich einen Boden: 'Sein' ist kein blosser Begriff, ist keine reine Abstraktion, die sich auf dem Weg der Ableitung ergeben hat".

⁶⁴ PGZ, pp. 63–97. See on the importance of these lectures: Theodore Kisiel, 'On the Way to *Being and Time*'; Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, *Research in Phenomenology* XV (1985), pp. 193–226.

⁶⁵ PGZ, pp. 28–182.

beings, i.e., for the explication of the categories. In other words, by means of the discovery of the categorial intuition one has gained for the first time the concrete method of a disclosing and real investigation of the categories"⁶⁷.

In order to understand these passages, one should answer the following questions. What is Husserl's theory of categorial intuition? What precisely is its relevance to Heidegger's question of being? In what sense can we say that according to Husserl being is given? And what is the relation between being and the categories as Husserl conceives it? Moreover, in order to corroborate the working hypothesis of this paper it has to be shown that Husserl's theory of categorial intuition exemplifies the Augustinian picture of language, and that the fact that Heidegger exploits this theory implies that his question of being is also informed by the Augustinian picture. It is the aim of the present and the next two sections to elucidate these crucial points.

In the sixth *Logical Investigation* Husserl distinguishes two kinds of categorial intuition. One of these is the famous intuition of essences or eidetic intuition (*Wesensschau*). Husserl's claim that philosophy is an *a priori* science and that, apart from a formal *a priori*, there also is a material *a priori*, presupposes the existence of this type of categorial intuition. Husserl calls the second type of categorial intuition 'categorial intuition in a strict sense'⁶⁸. In order to avoid confusion, I shall use the expression 'categorial intuition' for the second case only. The first kind of categorial intuition will simply be called eidetic intuition.

This distinction of course raises a preliminary question. Does Heidegger's claim that the discovery of categorial intuition was essential to unfolding the question of being refer to eidetic intuition or to categorial intuition in the strict sense? There are two reasons to opt for the second alternative. To begin with, there is some circumstantial support for this interpretation in the *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Where Heidegger discusses the three fundamental discoveries of (Husserlian) phenomenology, he devotes separate sections to intentionality (§ 5), categorial intuition (§ 6)

⁶⁶ PGZ, p. 93. See also VS, p. 116: "Der Punkt jedoch, über den Husserl nicht hinauskommt, ist der folgende: nachdem er das Sein gleichsam als Gegebenes gewonnen hat, fragt er ihm doch nicht weiter nach. Die Frage 'Was besagt Sein?' entfaltet er nicht".

⁶⁷ PGZ, pp. 97-98. The German text reads: "Das Entscheidende der Entdeckung der kategorialen Anschauung ist: Es gibt Akte, in denen ideale Bestände sich an ihnen selbst zeigen, die nicht Gemächte dieser Akte, Funktionen des Denkens, des Subjektes sind. Ferner: Die Möglichkeit dieser aufgewiesenen Anschauungsart und des in dieser Anschauung sich Präsentierenden gibt den Boden für die Hebung der Strukturen dieser idealen Bestände, d.h. für die Ausarbeitung der Kategorien. Mit anderen Worten: Mit der Entdeckung der kategorialen Anschauung ist zum erstenmal der konkrete Weg einer ausweisenden und echten Kategorienforschung gewonnen."

⁶⁸ *Sixth Investigation*, § 45 in finem; LU B II/2, p. 144.

and 'the original sense of the *a priori*' (§ 7). The last section is concerned with eidetic intuition, although Heidegger begins his summary of Husserl's view on eidetic intuition in section 6. Nevertheless, from the facts that Heidegger reserves a separate section—or at least a more or less separate part of his text⁶⁹—for his discussion of eidetic intuition and the *a priori*, and that this theme is singled out as a third 'fundamental discovery' of phenomenology, one may conclude that the second 'fundamental discovery' concerns categorial intuition in the strict sense.

The second reason is more important. Surely Heidegger endorses Husserl's claim that philosophy is in some sense *a priori*. According to Husserl, the empirical sciences receive an *a priori* foundation from 'regional' ontologies, which are founded in their turn on transcendental phenomenology⁷⁰. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger accepts this tripartite division. Regional ontologies precede the sciences, and the question of being aims at an *a priori* condition of the possibility of the sciences and of the ontologies on which they are founded⁷¹. This implies that Heidegger acknowledges the Husserlian eidetic intuition, although he adopts it in a profoundly transformed version, as is the case with everything Heidegger borrows from others. In *Being and Time* Husserlian eidetic intuition becomes hermeneutic analysis⁷².

Accordingly, if one looks for precursors of Heideggerian themes in Husserl's works, eidetic intuition belongs to hermeneutic analysis and 'understanding' (*verstehen*). It follows that Husserl's theory of eidetic intuition does not yet explain why Heidegger thinks that it is *being* which is understood and that *being* can be the object of hermeneutical analysis, in other words, why there is something like *Seinsverständnis*. To elucidate this latter point, we have to turn to Husserl's categorial intuition in the strict sense, or, on my terminological convention, simply to categorial intuition.

Husserl's theory of categorial intuition must be considered as an implication of his theory of meaning. I will first discuss four fundamental postulates of the theory of meaning of the *Logical Investigations*. In the next sec-

⁶⁹ The division into sections and the section headlines are added by Petra Jaeger, the editor of PGZ. See PGZ, pp. 446–47.

⁷⁰ This is Husserl's point of view in *Ideas I* and not yet in *LU A*.

⁷¹ SZ, p. 11. Accordingly, the main difference between Husserl's *Ideas I* and *ZS* can be localized with precision *within* this tripartite structure common to both philosophers: Heidegger replaces Husserl's analysis of the constituting activity of the transcendental ego by the question of being. Heidegger's justification for this move is that Husserl implicitly conceives of the transcendental ego as a present something, in spite of the latter's criticism of Descartes. In other words, Husserl did not ask the *Seinsfrage* in the proper way. Cf. PGZ, §§ 11–13.

⁷² PGZ, § 7; SZ, § 7 C. Cf. Th. de Boer (1985), 'Van Wezensschouw naar hermeneuse. Over de methode van de filosofie', in Th. de Boer, *Van Brentano tot Levinas, Studies over de fenomenologie*, Boom 1989, pp. 163–88.

tion I will then show how the theory of categorial intuition follows from the fourth postulate and Husserl's account of truth and verification.

1. The most obvious aspect of language, Husserl thinks, is its physical appearance. Linguistic expressions are in the first place physical phenomena, complexes of sounds, inscriptions, etc. But, Husserl observes, the meaning of these expressions is not one of their physical properties. One of the main objectives of Husserl's *Investigations* is to examine the nature of meaning. What is the meaning of linguistic expressions, if it is not a physical property? Arguing within a modified Cartesian tradition which he inherited from Brentano, Husserl answers: on the concrete level of expression-tokens, the meaning of an expression is a special kind of mental content, the so-called *Bedeutungserlebnis*. Husserl attempts to analyse this kind of mental content in the first, the fifth and the sixth *Investigations*. He carefully distinguishes between contents of signification and, for example, mental images. And he studies the relations between contents of meaning and other mental phenomena in considerable detail. Comparing the *Investigations* for instance to Russell's *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, one will be impressed by the greater subtlety of Husserl's analyses⁷³.

2. While the first postulate implies that the study of meaning is part of descriptive psychology or phenomenology (according to the first edition of the *Investigations* the two are identical)⁷⁴, one gets a different picture if one studies meaning from the point of view of logic. Husserl interprets (pure) logic as a science which is concerned with a domain of objects, the truths of logic being conceived of as truths about the objects of the domain⁷⁵. In the case of apophantic logic, the objects are meanings (concepts, propositions)⁷⁶. Husserl maintains that these meanings should be conceived of as ideal

⁷³ Bertrand Russell (1940), *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, Pelican 1962. Russell does not distinguish, as Husserl does, between a 'descriptive' and an 'explanatory' psychology. Moreover, he tries to reconcile a theory of mental contents in the tradition of British Empiricism with a Watsonian behaviourism. Perhaps one should rather compare Husserl's *Investigations* to John Searle's *Intentionality* (Cambridge UP, 1983). Searle's claim that he investigates the 'logical properties' of Intentional states (p. 14, cf. pp. 37, 160, 177, 180, 217) is not dissimilar to Husserlian *Wesensschau*, and there is a striking parallelism between the conceptual structures of the LU and *Intentionality*.

⁷⁴ LU A II, p. 18. This identity is rejected after Husserl's transcendental turn in 1903. See for an analysis of the development of Husserl's philosophy from LU to *Ideas I*: my FLH, §§ 16–17, and De Boer, DHT, chapters I.ii, II.ii, the *Intermezzo*, and part III.

⁷⁵ LU B I, §§ 41–51, 65–68; LU B II/1, first and second *Investigations*; LU B II/2, §§ 59–66. Cf. H. Philipse, 'Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic', *Grazer Studien* 29 (1987), pp. 13–33.

⁷⁶ LU B I, Chapter XI; II/1, first *Investigation*, § 29. Cf. Husserl (1929), *Formale und Transzendente Logik*, Husserliana, vol. XVII, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1974, §§ 1 ff., 12 ff., 37 ff.

objects, which exist outside space and time⁷⁷. For, like Frege and Karl Popper, he holds that one cannot avoid psychologism except by postulating a third realm of objects apart from the two traditional realms of Cartesian ontology⁷⁸. Logic is not an empirical science, as most psychologistic logicians believe. It is an ideal science which discovers *a priori* laws about ideal objects⁷⁹. In ordinary language we often say that two expressions have the same meaning. For Husserl, such a statement has a strictly metaphysical sense: the two expressions are associated with one and the same Platonic object, the ideal meaning.

3. According to the first postulate, the meaning of an expression (token) consists in a special kind of mental content, which has a temporal existence. The second postulate, however, says that meanings are ideal objects, existing a-temporally. How to reconcile these different postulates? What is the relation between concrete mental contents of signification and meanings as ideal objects? As a good Platonist, Husserl decides that mental contents of signification are *instances* of ideal meanings, which are the *types* or *ideal species* of these mental contents. Accordingly, the relation between the two kinds of meanings, a relation which is supposed to bridge the ontological gap between the temporal and the timeless, is fixed as a relation of *methexis*⁸⁰.

This third postulate has far-reaching consequences. According to Husserl's theory of eidetic intuition, for instance, acquaintance with ideal species presupposes reflection on at least one of their instances⁸¹. This implies, as far as the logician is concerned, that he should reflect upon mental contents of signification in order to get acquainted with the objects of his science, the ideal meanings or meaning-types. Although it is mistaken to think that in Husserl's view the laws of logic are simply laws of descriptive psychology (for laws about ideal species are not laws about the instances of these species)⁸², the necessity of psychological reflection for the logician is one ingredient of the (very complex) answer to a central problem of interpretation concerning the *Investigations*, viz.: why did Husserl, who wrote a thorough refutation of psychologism in the first volume of the

⁷⁷ LU B I, pp. 76, 128 ("ewig", oder besser: ... überzeitlich"), LU B II/1, first *Investigation*, §§ 29–35 and the second *Investigation*.

⁷⁸ LU B I §§ 44–48; LU B II/1, p. 107, where Husserl says that 'idealism' (i.e. the view that there are ideal objects) is the only theory of knowledge which is possibly consistent.

⁷⁹ LU B I, §§ 44–48; LU B II/1, § 29.

⁸⁰ LU B II/1, first *Investigation*, § 31.

⁸¹ LU B I, pp. 128–29; LU B II/1, pp. 153–63; LU B II/2, sixth *Investigation*, § 52. Cf. FLH, § 7.

⁸² Cf. the view of Th. De Boer in DHT, Chapter II. vi, § 5 ii and my criticism in FLH, pp. 79–88.

Investigations, resort to descriptive psychology in order to lay the foundations of logic in the second volume⁸³?

4. Husserl's Platonism explains the necessity of assuming an eidetic intuition, an intuition by which the logician is acquainted with the ideal objects of his science. But Husserl also posits a categorial intuition in the strict sense. I argued that Heidegger refers to this latter type of categorial intuition where he says that categorial intuition is essential to unfolding the question of being. Why did Husserl postulate the existence of such a categorial intuition and what is its supposed nature?

In order to answer this question, a fourth postulate of Husserl's theory of meaning is needed. According to the first postulate, the meaning of expression-tokens resides in mental contents of a certain kind. Brentano thought that all mental contents are characterized by intentionality, so that intentionality was supposed to be the main criterion of the mental. Husserl differed from Brentano on this point. He argued that there are also non-intentional mental contents, like sense-impressions (*Empfindungen*) and various kinds of feelings⁸⁴. The fourth postulate of Husserl's theory of meaning in the *Investigations* concerns the question whether the mental contents of signification belong to the class of the intentional or to the class of the non-intentional contents.

Husserl decided that all mental contents of signification are intentional. Expressions are supposed to have meaning because of an intentional act of consciousness, which is their concrete meaning⁸⁵. Husserl defines an 'expression' as 'each meaningful part of speech', so that each morpheme counts as an expression⁸⁶. Moreover, intentionality is defined as the direction towards, or the reference to an object (which, of course, need not exist). Accordingly, Husserl's fourth postulate implies *that each expression, even each and every morpheme, is used to refer to something*⁸⁷.

⁸³ See for a discussion of this *crux interpretum* of the *Investigations* FLH, pp. 62–65, 79–90, 135–36, 150–51, 153–93.

⁸⁴ LU B II/1, fifth *Investigation*, § 15. According to Brentano's *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, sense impressions (*Empfindungen*) are intentional mental contents, whose objects, if they are secondary qualities, do not exist. According to Husserl *Empfindungen* are non-intentional parts of the stream of consciousness. Husserl, in criticising Brentano, reads his own view into Brentano's theory: LU B II/2, pp. 222 ff. Cf. H. Philipse, 'The Concept of Intentionality: Husserl's Development from the Brentano Period to the *Logical Investigations*', *Philosophy Research Archives* XII (1987), pp. 293–328.

⁸⁵ LU B II/1, first *Investigation*, chapter I and II; fifth *Inv.*, chapter II; LU B II/2, §§ 1 ff.

⁸⁶ LU B II/1, first *Investigation*, § 5.

⁸⁷ According to the traditional doctrine of, say, Occam, syncategorematical expressions lack a proper meaning and reference. Husserl, in §§ 4–9 of the fourth *Investigation* denies these two traditional theses. He claims that syncategorematical expressions have a proper meaning which, however, is incomplete in a determinate sense. They also are referring expressions: they refer to categorial aspects of complexes or states of affairs (cf. LU B II/1, pp. 306, 314–16, and FLH, pp. 136–51).

In some sense, the theory of meaning of the *Investigations* is not a referential theory. It is not a crude or naïve referential theory, because Husserl carefully distinguishes between the meaning of an expression and the referent (arguing, for instance, that the referent may not exist although the meaning does exist). But in another sense, Husserl's theory is indeed a referential theory, because the fourth postulate implies *that the reference to an object is an essential aspect of meaning in general*. Husserl was not at all blind to this implication of his fourth postulate. It is affirmed *expressis verbis* in sections 9 and 12 of the first *Investigation*.

Husserl's fourth postulate clearly qualifies his theory of meaning as a specimen of Augustine's picture of language. In the next section we shall see how this fourth postulate determines Husserl's theory of verification and his method of elucidation of the meaning of indefinables. I will argue that Husserl's theory of categorial intuition is a philosophical mirage, which merely reflects the postulate that all significant parts of speech are referring expressions.

IV. Categorial Intuition and the Question of Being

According to Apel, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is the culmination of the tradition of western philosophical logic, to the extent that this tradition is informed by the Augustinian picture⁸⁸. It is indeed plausible to interpret the *Tractatus* as an instantiation of the Augustinian picture of language⁸⁹. For it says that elementary propositions are concatenations of names and describe possible facts. Complex propositions are truth-functional combinations of elementary propositions, so that they also describe possible facts. Hence the general form of the proposition is: 'This is how things stand'. Because the meaning of a name is its object, the simple (logically proper) name functions as the paradigm of what it is for an expression to have a meaning (*Bedeutung*)⁹⁰.

However, one might equally well stress another aspect of the *Tractatus*. Its fundamental idea (*Grundgedanke*) is that logical constants are not representatives⁹¹. Whereas Russell still conceived of understanding logical form on the model of acquaintance with an object⁹², Wittgenstein liberated

⁸⁸ Apel, TPh, p. 254: "Die gesamte...Tradition der abendländischen Sprachlogik, die gewissermassen im *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* des frühen Wittgenstein gipfelt...".

⁸⁹ Cf. WMU, pp. 25–27. Surely Wittgenstein himself interpreted the TLP like that in his later work.

⁹⁰ Ibid. and TLP, sections 4.22 f.; 4.021 f.; 5 (also 4.2, 4.3, 4.4); 3.144 (also 4.01, 4.023, 4.024); 4.5 and 3.203, respectively.

⁹¹ TLP, section 4.0312.

⁹² Cf. Russell (1903), *The Principles of Mathematics* (Allen & Unwin, London 1979), p. xv: "The discussion of indefinables—which forms the chief part of philosophical logic—is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in

himself from the grip of the Augustinian picture on this point. The *Grundgedanke* of the *Tractatus* may be seen as the germ from which Wittgenstein's later critique of the Augustinian picture developed. Then the *Tractatus* emerges as a deeply ambiguous book. On the one hand the Augustinian picture is taken for granted as a correct characterisation of the deep structure of language. On the other hand the spell of the Augustinian picture is destroyed on a crucial point, the conception of a logical connective, and hence of logical truth.

Compared to the *Tractatus*, Husserl's theory of meaning is a more perfect exemplification of Augustine's conception of language. Like the early Wittgenstein, Husserl compares an expression to a picture⁹³. His theory may be called a picture theory of meaning, where 'picture' is used in an abstract sense. In contradistinction to the *Tractatus*, however, Husserl interprets even logical connectives as representing expressions. He explicitly says that the proper name is the prototype of the relation between signification and perception, that is, of the relation between each and every expression and its referent⁹⁴. This Augustinian starting point naturally leads to difficulties.

order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple". See also his critical comment in the *Introduction* to the second edition of 1937, pp. xi-xii: "Logical constants, therefore, if we are to be able to say anything definite about them, must be treated as part of the language, not as part of what the language speaks about. In this way, logic becomes much more linguistic than I believed it to be at the time when I wrote the *Principles*. It will still be true that no constants except logical constants occur in the verbal or symbolic expression of logical propositions, but it will not be true that these logical constants are names of objects, as 'Socrates' is intended to be". Russell in his later work jumped to the conclusion that the logical constants, if they are not names of things in the world, must be expressions of psychological states. In other words, Russell accepted throughout his career the empiricist conviction that all indefinables must originate from sensation or reflection. Disjunction, for instance, is now said to correspond to a state of hesitation, which "arises when we feel two incompatible impulses, and neither is strong enough to overcome the other" (Russell 1940: *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* [Pelican Books, 1965], pp. 79-80). This state of hesitation is primarily a conflict of two motor impulses (p. 200). In general, the later Russell holds the position that "we cannot interpret these words (i.e. logical constants) except in reference to a state of mind" (p. 86). According to Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*, such a conception leads to psychologism and scepticism "in the strict sense". This is why he assumes a third source of indefinables apart from sensation and reflection.

⁹³ LU B II/2, p. 129: "Diesenfalls bestände also zwischen dem bedeutenden Meinen und dem erfüllenden Anschauen jener *Paralellismus*, den die Rede vom *Ausdrücken* nahelegt. Der Ausdruck wäre ein bildartiges Gegenstück der Wahrnehmung..."

⁹⁴ LU B II/2, p. 130: "Das Prototyp für die Interpretation des Verhältnisses zwischen Bedeuten und Anschauen wäre also das Verhältnis der Eigenbedeutung zu den entsprechenden Wahrnehmungen". Husserl's conception of epistemology in the *Investigations* (LU A) does not permit him to speak of the relation between expressions and their referents in the world. Therefore Husserl speaks instead of the relation between expressions and the 'fulfilling' perceptions. Cf. LU B II/1, *Introduction*, § 7 (pp. 19-22) on the principle of presuppositionlessness. Cf. also FLH, §§ 13-15 and H. Philipse, 'The Concept of Intentionality' (note 84).

But—and this is exemplary for the way the Augustinian picture functions as an *Urbild*—the prototype of the naming relation functions as the ‘guiding thought’⁹⁵ for resolving these difficulties. I shall now summarize how the Augustinian picture leads to problems in Husserl’s theories concerning verification and concerning the elucidation of meaning. On both points we shall see that his solution consists in a vindication of Augustine’s conception of language.

As far as verification is concerned, Husserl’s fourth postulate has the following consequences. If all meaningful parts of a statement are supposed to refer to objects or objective counterparts, an ‘atomized’ correspondence theory of truth will be the result⁹⁶. Husserl not only thinks that a statement or a proposition is true if a corresponding state of affairs exists. It should also be the case that this state of affairs contains *objective counterparts for each meaningful part* (morpheme) of the statement. Verification is characterised as the experience of truth. It is a mental act of transition (*Übergangserlebnis*), in which an ‘empty’ act of signification is ‘fulfilled’ by a perception. This mental act of transition is an act of identification. What is meant in the expression is identified with what is perceived, so that we experience the truth of the expression⁹⁷.

Clearly this theory of truth and verification, which itself is but a consequence of the fourth postulate of Husserl’s theory of meaning, implies the existence of something like a categorial intuition. Let me show this by taking the example Husserl discusses in Chapter 6 of the sixth *Investigation*. We agree that we are able to verify by perception the statement ‘this paper is white’. But how should we construe such a verification on the basis of Husserl’s theory? Surely there are objective counterparts to the expressions ‘paper’ and ‘white’, the piece of paper and its white colour, which are possible objects of sense perception. But Husserl’s fourth postulate implies that *there should also be objective counterparts to the expressions ‘this’ and ‘is’*, counterparts which are aspects or elements of the state of affairs that this paper is white. And his theory of verification implies that we should be able to *perceive* these objective counterparts in order to verify the statement ‘this paper is white’.

Husserl’s problem here is that *there are no objective counterparts to ‘this’ or ‘is’ which are possible objects of sensation or reflection*. Let me concentrate on the verb ‘to be’, since Heidegger’s question of being is the

⁹⁵ LU B II/2, p. 134 (6th *Investigation*, § 42, first paragraph): “Nachdem diese vorläufigen Betrachtungen uns die Schwierigkeit kennen gelehrt und uns sogleich einen leitenden Gedanken für ihre mögliche Überwindung an die Hand gegeben haben...”.

⁹⁶ ‘Atomized’ in the sense that there must be a relation of correspondence between *each meaningful part* of the expression and a part of the referent, and not in the sense that all these parts are ‘independent’ parts in the sense of the 3rd *Investigation*, which they are not.

⁹⁷ 6th *Investigation*, Chapters 1, 2 and 5. I omit technicalities.

theme of this paper. Husserl admits that there is neither a sensible nor a mental phenomenon to which the word 'is' refers. For this reason, he says, the Kantian dictum that being is not a real predicate applies not only to the 'is' of existence but also to the 'is' of predication⁹⁸. Nevertheless there *must* be a referent of the expression 'is', if Husserl's theory of meaning is correct. Accordingly, Husserl raises the question concerning the nature of the referent of the verb 'to be'.

One will expect that this peculiar question induced Husserl to doubt the fourth postulate of his theory of meaning, which implies that each and every meaningful part of speech is a referring expression. But apparently the magic of Augustine's picture was too strong. With unfaltering consistency he drew the consequences of his theory of meaning. If there is neither a mental nor a material objective counterpart to the word 'is', there must be a non-mental and a non-material counterpart. If we are able to verify by perception the statement that this table is white, there must be a kind of perception which is radically different from sense perception or reflection, a perception which enables us to experience the *is*. Husserl speaks of 'categorical objects' and 'categorical perception'. Reality is defined as the object of sensation or reflection in the Lockean sense. Accordingly, the word 'is', logical connectives, and categorical expressions in general refer to 'ideal' or non-real aspects of states of affairs⁹⁹. These ideal aspects of states of affairs are supposed to exist in time, in contradistinction to the ideal species which are the objects of eidetic intuition¹⁰⁰.

The seventh chapter of Husserl's sixth *Investigation* is concerned with a descriptive or phenomenological study of the mental acts of categorical perception. Husserl stresses that the expression 'categorical perception' is justified only if there is a structural resemblance between acts of sense perception and acts of categorical perception. Because sense perception is said to consist of *impressions* (*Empfindungen*) which are *interpreted* in some sense¹⁰¹, Husserl, in order to substantiate his theory of categorical perception, has to show that there are categorical impressions or representations. His theory of categorical representation is cumbersome and difficult to understand. Obviously the descriptive content of the theory is lacking, a seri-

⁹⁸ 6th *Investigation*, § 43. Heidegger repeats this Husserlian theme in PGZ, p. 78, cf. SZ, p. 94. It is further developed in GP, pp. 35 ff., where Heidegger implicitly criticises Husserl.

⁹⁹ LU B II/2, pp. 141, 145 ff., 155 ff. Husserl uses the word 'ideal' in many senses. In one sense, it is equivalent with categorical (*ibid.*, pp. 145, 155). Categorical moments of states of affairs are in time (*ibid.*, p. 144: "In dem engeren Sinn geht [kategoriale I, HP] Wahrnehmung nur auf individuelles, also zeitliches Sein"). In another sense of 'ideal', ideal objects are timeless: first *Investigation*, Chapter 3.

¹⁰⁰ LU B II/2, pp. 144, 152 ff.

¹⁰¹ LU B II/2, pp. 24–25. Cf. LU A II, pp. 496–97 and LU B II/1, pp. 30, 74–75, 348–51, 381–83; LU B II/2, pp. 57, 77–79, 175, 232–33, 237 ff. See also Philipse, FLH, pp. 173 ff.

ous defect for a philosopher who professes merely to describe, and to be free from theoretical presuppositions.

In the preface to the second edition of the sixth *Investigation*, Husserl casually remarks that he no longer endorses his theory of categorial representation¹⁰². This should not surprise us. Is this theory not merely a philosophical mirage, which reflects Husserl's blind adherence to the Augustinian picture of language? Is the scrupulous phenomenologist not bound to discover that the theory is a construction without a descriptive basis? But what Husserl does not tell us, is that the rejection of the theory of categorial representation, and the fact that it is not replaced by some other account, destroys his justification for assuming the existence of a categorial perception by means of which we might 'intuit' being.

Heidegger stresses in 'Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie' that it was the first edition of the sixth *Logical Investigation* which substantially contributed to the question of being. Even if one does not take into account the fact that the second edition appeared only in 1921, it is not difficult to see why he emphasizes this point. What Heidegger learnt from Husserl was that there is something like a categorial intuition which enables us to experience being. Being, if we may believe Husserl and Heidegger, is some kind of phenomenon, though it is not a sensible phenomenon, or a phenomenon in the 'vulgar' sense, as Heidegger prefers to say¹⁰³. As a consequence, Heidegger believed that the phenomenological method enables us to resolve the question of being, which had baffled philosophers since antiquity¹⁰⁴.

Let me now turn to the second point. What are the implications of the fourth postulate of Husserl's theory of meaning as far as the elucidation of the meaning of 'indefinables' is concerned¹⁰⁵? If it is supposed that all

¹⁰² LUB II/2, p. v.

¹⁰³ Husserl's distinction between the sensual and the categorial (6th *Investigation*, Chapter 6) corresponds to Heidegger's distinction between 'vulgar' phenomena and 'phenomenological' phenomena (SZ, § 7A; cf. PGZ, § 9).

¹⁰⁴ One should, of course, not overlook the 'religious' connotations of the question of being. See for instance Karl Löwith, *Heidegger-Denker in dürftiger Zeit, Sämtliche Schriften* VIII, Metzler, Stuttgart 1984, p. 233: "Was aber allem von Heidegger je Gesagten hintergründig zugrunde liegt und viele aufhorchen und hinhorchen lässt, ist ein Ungesagtes: das religiöse Motiv, das sich zwar vom christlichen Glauben abgelöst hat, aber gerade in seiner dogmatisch ungebundenen Unbestimmtheit um so mehr diejenigen anspricht, die nicht mehr gläubige Christen sind, aber doch religiös sein möchten....". Heidegger himself says in 'Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache': "Ohne diese theologische Herkunft wäre ich nie auf den Weg des Denkens gelangt" (M. Heidegger (1959), *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Gesamtausgabe vol. 12, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 91).

¹⁰⁵ The idea that there are indefinables *per se*, the so-called simple terms, an assumption fundamental to the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserl and Russell, is criticised by Wittgenstein as being a delusion produced by the *Urbild* of the definition *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*.

meaningful parts of speech refer to objective counterparts, one is easily persuaded that these referents are, so to say, the *origin* of the meaning of words. This explains the idea, which Husserl endorses in § 16 of the first *Investigation*, that one must perceive the referent in order to grasp or elucidate the meaning of a word. The analysis of meaning, at least of the meaning of indefinables or 'simple' expressions¹⁰⁶, becomes a search for the origin (*Ursprung*) of the meaning, a notion which Husserl inherits from the empiricist tradition. Husserl accepts the empiricist conviction that all meaning derives from perception. However, as he sees that the supposition of a psychological origin of the meaning of logical expressions leads to psychologism, he enriches the empiricist framework with his theory of categorial intuition¹⁰⁷.

Husserl's notion of the analysis of origins of meaning is of course problematic¹⁰⁸. He thinks that we might 'read off' the meaning of an indefinable expression from its referent, as if acquaintance with the referent were a sufficient condition for mastering the use of an expression. It cannot be denied, however, that the *mise-en-scène* of Heidegger's question of being presupposes the framework of this Husserlian notion. If one construes the analysis of the meaning of an indefinable expression as the analysis of the origin, the question concerning the meaning of the verb 'to be' will be interpreted, as it is by Heidegger, as the search for an experience of being¹⁰⁹. The question of 'being' and the question of being will be one and the same question.

It was Husserl's theory of categorial intuition which provided Heidegger with the idea that being is somehow given, that it may be experienced by categorial intuition. This idea, and the corresponding notion that being has to be given in order that one may grasp the meaning of 'to be', which

¹⁰⁶ In the case of complex expressions it may occur that the referential dimension of their meaning explodes, because of the fact that the referential aspects of the simple component expressions are mutually incompatible. The complex expression would then be an instance of *Widersinn*, as for example 'a square circle'. Cf. the 4th *Investigation*, § 12.

¹⁰⁷ 6th *Investigation*, §§ 44 ff.

¹⁰⁸ See Philipse, FLH, pp. 124–51.

¹⁰⁹ Thus Heidegger says for instance in § 6 of SZ that the 'destruction' of the ontological tradition aims at the 'original experiences' from which the first articulations of being were derived: "We understand this task as the *destruction* of the traditional content of ancient ontology, *taking the question of Being as our cue*, continuing until we arrive at those original experiences from which the first and henceforth guiding determinations of Being were drawn". The German text reads: "Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die *am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage* sich vollziehende *Destruktion* des überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen, in denen die ersten und fortan leitenden Bestimmungen des Seins gewonnen wurden" (SZ, p. 22).

is expressed in the quotation from the seminar at Zähringen¹¹⁰, show that the question of being is informed by the Augustinian picture of language.

V. Some objections refuted

In the last two sections it has been argued that Husserl's theory of language, especially its fourth postulate, is informed by the Augustinian picture; that his theory of categorial intuition is nothing but a philosophical illusion necessitated by this picture; and that Heidegger, in endorsing the theory of categorial intuition, fell victim to the Augustinian picture as well.

This interpretation of Heidegger's question of being not only explains the quotations concerning the importance of categorial intuition for the question of being. It also enables us to understand why Heidegger thinks that being is a phenomenon in the non-vulgar sense—Husserl would have called it a categorial phenomenon—and that phenomenology is the method for answering the question of being. Furthermore, it explains why Heidegger thinks that the formal structure of the question of being consists of three elements: apart from what we want to know (*das Erfragte*) and the content of the question (*das Gefragte*) there is also *das Befragte*: a being "from which the...sense of being can be obtained and read off"¹¹¹. Finally, the interpretation is essentially critical, because I have assumed that 'to be' and categorial expressions in general are not used as referring expressions¹¹².

However, in spite of the explanatory power of the view that the question of being is informed by Augustine's conception of language, it may be objected that this interpretation is implausible because it conflicts with too many aspects of Heidegger's thought. Two points merit special attention. According to Husserl, the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity refer to aspects of states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*)¹¹³. But the being from which in *Being and Time* Heidegger wants to obtain the sense of being is not a state of affairs, it is *Dasein*. Husserl's theory of categorial intuition, one might argue, merely explains the idea that there are formal aspects of states of affairs which we are able to intuit. It does not at all imply that those formal aspects also inhere in individual beings or in *Dasein*.

¹¹⁰ VS, p. 116.

¹¹¹ "Welches Seiende ist es denn, an dem der mögliche Sinn von Sein gewonnen und abgelesen werden kann?" (PGZ, p. 195). See also SZ, § 2.

¹¹² Ernst Tugendhat has attempted to save Husserl's theory of categorial intuition in his book *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (1967), De Gruyter, Berlin 1970, pp. 119–29 and 135. But his interpretation is incompatible with the conceptual framework of Husserl's *Investigations*, as I argued in FLH, p. 149. In his later work *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1976, Tugendhat has rejected the theory of categorial intuition and the idea that logical constants are referring expressions (lectures 9 and 10).

¹¹³ LU B II/2, p. 141: "Gilt uns Sein als prädikatives Sein, so muss uns also irgendein *Sachverhalt* gegeben werden und dies natürlich durch einen ihn *gebenden Akt*...".

The second point is concerned with Heidegger's critique of the notion of intuition. In *Being and Time* the traditional idea that intuition is the primary source for knowledge is rejected as a symptom of the ontology of presence. Intuition, the kind of perception of a scientist, is a derivative and defective mode of understanding, based on a primary understanding of the world. Accordingly, we do not *intuit* being, but we *understand* it (*verstehen*). If so, how can one argue that Husserl's doctrine that we intuit being is an ancestor of Heideggerian *Seinsverständnis*? I shall discuss these two points in this order, arguing that instead of demarcating fundamental differences between Husserl and Heidegger, they in fact are concerned with issues on which Heidegger's position merely is a further development of Husserlian views.

One might simply dismiss the first objection by drawing attention to the fact that Husserl already recognizes categorial aspects of individual beings. He defines the categorial as what is formal or syntactical¹¹⁴. The opposite of this concept of categorial form is that of matter in the sense of each possible object of sensation or reflection¹¹⁵. Accordingly, in order to circumscribe the domain of the categorial, Husserl delimits those elements of language which do not refer to possible objects of sensation or reflection. As we saw, he thinks that the words 'this' and 'is' in 'This paper is white' refer to categorial aspects of the state of affairs that this paper is white. But in section 40 of the sixth *Investigation* he says that also an expression like 'white paper' implies reference to a categorial form, because it in fact means 'paper being white'. Then follows a very revealing passage:

"And does not the same form repeat itself also in the noun 'paper', although in an even more concealed fashion? Only the meanings of words for properties, which are united in the concept of paper, are fulfilled in sensation. Yet the whole object is recognised as paper. Here also we have a completing form, which contains being, although being is not the only form"¹¹⁶.

What Husserl wants to say here is clear provided that one takes in account the empiricist background of his philosophy. Paper is defined as a substance with a number of perceptible characteristics. Sensation is the origin of the concepts of these characteristics. But how can sensation be the origin of the concepts of a *substance* or a *thing* which *has* these characteristics? In other words, each noun implicitly contains the notion of 'being' (of an *x* be-

¹¹⁴ LU B II/1, p. 285; II/2, pp. 136, 141, 145, 180.

¹¹⁵ Sixth *Investigation*, §§ 42 ff.

¹¹⁶ LU B II/2, p. 131: "Und wiederholt sich diese Form nicht auch, obschon verborgener bleibend, bei dem Hauptwort Papier? Nur die in seinem 'Begriff' vereinten Merkmalbedeutungen terminieren in der Wahrnehmung, auch hier ist der ganze Gegenstand als Papier erkannt, auch hier eine ergänzende Form, die das Sein, obschon nicht als einzige Form, enthält". I have translated Husserl's 'Wahrnehmung' by *sensation* in order to stress that he means 'schlichte Wahrnehmung' and in order to avoid confusion with categorial perception.

ing F, G,...), so that each concrete entity also contains being itself (in the double sense of a being or entity being F, G,...). As the origin of this notion of being cannot be found in sensation or reflection, we have to admit of a third kind of perception, categorial intuition, which is somehow mixed with sense perception.

This quotation of Husserl's stands fairly isolated in the sixth *Investigation*. Yet Heidegger in his *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* repeatedly stresses that categorial intuition is implied in each and every experience and in the most common perception¹¹⁷. It is not difficult to see why he insists so much on this point. For it means that there is an implicit intuition of being in all experience, and that we might read off the meaning of being from each and every being, although, as he argues, *Da-sein* is privileged in this respect¹¹⁸.

Although the quotation from the *Sixth Investigation* suffices to refute the first objection, it merits some more consideration, for it points to an interesting tension in Husserl's conception of the categorial. On the surface of the text this tension shows itself as follows. In the above quotation, taken from section 40, Husserl says that empirical concepts like 'paper' implicitly contain categorial forms. Accordingly, on the basis of Husserl's theory on the origin of concepts, one would expect that the concept of paper originates from a combination of sense perception and categorial intuition. As a consequence it would be a 'mixed' concept, in contradistinction to 'purely sensual' concepts (*rein sinnliche Begriffe*) like 'red'. But when Husserl explicitly discusses the distinction between purely sensual, purely categorial, and mixed concepts in section 60, he says that *colour, house, judgement and wish* are purely sensual concepts¹¹⁹. Obviously, *house* is on a par with *paper*, so that there is a contradiction between section 40 and section 60. In the former Husserl says that a concept like paper contains implicit categorial forms, whereas this is denied in the latter section. Heidegger, we saw, stresses section 40, because it supports his view that one may read off the meaning of being from each and every being. Section 60 does not at all support this idea.

This tension in its turn refers us to an unresolved problem in Husserl's theory of perception. Like the British empiricists, Husserl thinks that all concepts originate from perception. Husserl's doctrine on the origin of concepts differs from the empiricist view mainly on two points. He rejects the

¹¹⁷ PGZ, pp. 64, 77, 81, 83, 95. Cf. also Theodore Kisiel, 'Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorical', o.c., p. 179.

¹¹⁸ PGZ, § 15; SZ, §§ 4-5.

¹¹⁹ LU B II/2, p. 184. I render the Husserlian 'sinnlich' as 'sensual' and not as 'empirical', because in a broad sense categorial concepts are also 'empirical' concepts: they originate from categorial perception. This wide concept of the empirical (we experience the categories and material essences) is one of the main differences between Husserl and Kant.

idea that formal concepts are abstracted from the data of reflection. Instead, he posits categorial forms as a special kind of objects, and categorial intuition in the strict sense as a special kind of perception. In other words, he assumes a third kind of perceptual origin of concepts apart from sensation and reflection. Secondly, Husserl rejects the empiricist theory of abstraction, and puts eidetic intuition in its place¹²⁰. Notwithstanding these modifications, the empiricist dogma that differences between (simple) concepts mirror differences in their perceptual basis is maintained. This is why the contradiction concerning the implicit categorial elements in concepts like *paper* necessarily reflects a tension in Husserl's theory of perception.

Husserl's theory of perception in the *Investigations* is a sophisticated type of sense datum theory. Sensations are conceived of as non-intentional elements of the stream of consciousness¹²¹. In perception there is a series of these sensations, which has a certain unity on the sensual level. As such, these sensations, being mental elements, do not represent an external object. Therefore, an interpretation or 'apperception' is needed in order to provide the sensations with an 'objective sense'. It is due to this apperception that an object appears to us as itself¹²².

Now the question arises whether this apperception contains categorial elements. Husserl nowhere discusses it, but one might speculate about the answer he would have given. On the one hand he wants to maintain a strict distinction between sense perception and categorial intuition. In the sixth *Investigation* he argues that the unity of an object of sense perception as it is given in a continuous series of perceptions is purely sensual¹²³. Accordingly, a concept like *paper* would not contain implicit categorial forms. On the other hand one might raise the Kantian question whether this sensual unity is sufficient to account for the unity of the objects of sense perception. Should one not admit of some categorial synthesis? Of course Husserl differs from Kant in that he holds that we are able to perceive categorial forms. Technically speaking, there must be a categorial representation. The categorial is not merely a construction of the subject. It is somehow given. Nevertheless, Husserl comes dangerously near to Kant where he argues, in

¹²⁰ It is not very clear how Husserl thinks that concepts originate from experience. See for a reconstruction of his theory Philipse, FLH, §§ 10, 11 and 15.

¹²¹ They are, as Husserl says, 'reell immanent': LU B II/1, pp. 198–99, 348, 382, and II/2, pp. 57, 59, 78–79, 117. See for the concept of 'reell immanent': *ibid.* II/1, pp. 397 ff., and on Husserl's theory of perception Philipse, FLH, pp. 174 ff.

¹²² See note 101. I have reconstructed the genesis of this theory in 'The Concept of Intentionality' (see note 84), §§ iii and iv. See for a more general reconstruction: H. Philipse, 'The Absolute Network Theory of Language and Traditional Epistemology. On the Philosophical Foundations of Paul Churchland's Scientific Realism', *Inquiry* 33 (1990), no 2, section iii.

¹²³ Sixth *Investigation*, § 47.

section 56 of the sixth *Investigation*, that the *categorial synthesis itself* functions as the representation he has to find in order to vindicate his claim that the categorial may be perceived¹²⁴.

We may conclude that Heidegger's doctrine that being is implied in all beings is not only informed by the Augustinian picture. It also presupposes a Husserlian sense datum theory of perception, even though Heidegger officially rejects such a theory¹²⁵. For only a sense datum theory of perception seems to require a categorial synthesis in order to account for the unity of the perceived object.

I now come to the second objection. How can one construe Husserl's categorial intuition as an ancestor of Heidegger's hermeneutics of being? Is the Heideggerian claim that we understand (*verstehen*) being not an implicit rejection of the Husserlian idea that we intuit or perceive being? Surely Heidegger argues that *verstehen* is more fundamental than perception or intuition. The directing-itself-toward of perception arises out of a more basic indwelling in which we are already familiar with the world¹²⁶. But even here it may be argued that there is continuity between both philosophers.

We have already seen that Husserl's sense datum theory of perception requires the assumption of an objectifying interpretation, which provides the sense data with an objective sense. In section 23 of the first *Investigation* Husserl compares this objectifying interpretation to the understanding of the signs of a language¹²⁷. Notwithstanding the differences between these two mental acts, he stresses that every apperception is in some sense a kind of understanding (*Verstehen*) or interpretation (*Deuten*)¹²⁸. This theory is repeated, in a somewhat modified form, in the first part of the sixth *Investigation*. Here one finds an even closer parallelism between understanding signs and interpreting sense data¹²⁹. This parallelism is crucial to Husserl's theory of verification, according to which the meaning of the expression to be verified is *identical* with the meaning which is implicit in the verifying perception¹³⁰. As a consequence, understanding (*verstehen*) is the

¹²⁴ LU B II/2, p. 173. See also Tugendhat's interpretation, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (o.c., note 112), pp. 119–20 and 135.

¹²⁵ PGZ, pp. 48–52, 96–97.

¹²⁶ SZ §§ 13, 31, 43–44, 69b; cf. PGZ, §§ 20 ff. and Theodore Kisiel, 'Heidegger (1907–1927): The Transformation of the Categorial', o.c., p. 180.

¹²⁷ Cf. also Kisiel, o.c., p. 183.

¹²⁸ LU B II/1, p. 74. See also note 101.

¹²⁹ According to § 23 of the first *Investigation*, the signitive act or apperception is 'founded on' an intuitive act, in which the sign is given as a physical phenomenon. In § 25 of the sixth *Investigation*, this theory is modified. Husserl now says that the signitive apperception is founded not on the intuitive act but on the *sensuous matter* or the representing content only (LU B II/2, p. 89).

¹³⁰ LU B, II/2, p. 95 (sixth *Investigation*, § 28); cf. pp. 32, 64, 87.

'intentional essence' even of a perceptual act¹³¹. In this sense, understanding is more fundamental than intuition. And if one assumes that categorial elements play a role in the objectifying interpretation of sensations in sense perception, one is already very close to Heidegger's conviction that an understanding of being precedes perception. In his summary of Husserl's conception of intuition and expression in the *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Heidegger very much stresses this point, even transposing it into his own jargon:

"In fact it is also the case that our most simple perceptions...are already *expressed*, even *interpreted* in a specific sense. Rather than that we primarily and originally see the objects and things, we in the first place speak about them. More precisely, we do not express what we see, but inversely, we see what one says about the matter"¹³².

VI. Forgetfulness of Being

In the *Introduction* to *Was ist Metaphysik?*, which was published in 1949, Heidegger wrote:

"Philosophy could hardly provide a clearer proof of the power of the forgetfulness of being [*Seinsvergessenheit*], on which all philosophy has foundered,...than via the somnambulist certainty with which it ignored the real and only question of *Being and Time*. That is why it is not just a question of misunderstandings concerning a book, but of our forsaking by being"¹³³.

Twenty years later, in the only interview Heidegger ever gave to television, he was asked again what grounds he could adduce for his central thesis that we live in forgetfulness of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*). What are the symptoms of this fall (*Verfallen*)? Heidegger answered in 1969 in accord with the quotation above:

¹³¹ Sixth *Investigation*, § 28; cf. first *Investigation*, § 14.

¹³² PGZ, p. 75: "Faktisch ist es auch so, dass unsere schlichtesten Wahrnehmungen und Verfassungen schon *ausgedrückte*, mehr noch, in bestimmter Weise *interpretierte* sind. Wir sehen nicht so sehr primär und ursprünglich die Gegenstände und Dinge, sondern zunächst sprechen wir darüber, genauer sprechen wir nicht das aus, was wir sehen, sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen, was man über die Sache spricht". The text continues as follows: "Diese eigentümliche Bestimmtheit der Welt und ihre mögliche Auffassung und Erfassung durch die Ausdrücklichkeit, durch das Schon-gesprochen-und-durchgesprochen-sein, ist es, die nun bei der Frage nach der Struktur der kategorialen Anschauung grundsätzlich in den Blick gebracht werden muss". One sees in this passage how Heidegger transforms the Husserlian thesis that perception must contain an interpretation into his notions of *Verstehen* and *Entwurf* (cf. SZ, §§ 18, 31-32; cf. also §§ 35, 37, 68a).

¹³³ WiM, *Einleitung*, pp. 18-19. The German text reads: "Einen deutlicheren Beleg für die Macht der Seinsvergessenheit, in die alle Philosophie versunken ist,...konnte die Philosophie nicht leicht aufbringen als durch die nachtwanderische Sicherheit, mit der sie an der eigentlichen und einzigen Frage von *Sein und Zeit* vorbeiging. Darum handelt es sich auch nicht um Missverständnisse gegenüber einem Buch, sondern um unsere Verlassenheit vom Sein".

"The most characteristic mark of the forgetfulness by being [*Seinsvergessenheit*]*—and forgetfulness is here always to be construed as derived from the Greek, from *lethe*, i.e. from the fact that being conceals itself or recedes—that is, the most characteristic mark of the course of destiny in which we stand, is—as far as I can see at all—the fact that the question of being, which I pose, has not yet been understood*"¹³⁴.

Had Heidegger still been alive today, he would undoubtedly reaffirm that we do not understand the question of being.

In this paper I have attempted to show that the question of being, to the extent that it is concerned with the meaning of the verb 'to be', presupposes Husserl's theory of categorial intuition, or at least the main assumption on which this theory is based, the assumption that the verb 'to be', like all significant parts of speech, is a referring expression. Whereas Husserl, like Bertrand Russell in his *Principles of Mathematics*, still assumed that logical words like 'to be' and 'or' are referring expressions¹³⁵, the early Wittgenstein considered the idea that the logical constants are *not* representatives as the fundamental tenet of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In his later work, Wittgenstein came to see that the referential theory of logical expressions is but a symptom of a more fundamental and more pervasive philosophical delusion, the bewitchment by the Augustinian picture of language.

I shall not attempt to summarize Wittgenstein's subtle and ingenious critique of the Augustinian picture¹³⁶. Let me only conclude that, if Wittgenstein's criticism is correct, there may be an explanation of our failure to understand the question of being which is very different from Heidegger's. The fact that we do not understand this question, rather than proving that we live in forgetfulness of being, shows instead that there is nothing to be understood, because the question of being is not a real question. The alleged question of being is a philosophical delusion, a product of the spell of Augustine's picture of language¹³⁷.

¹³⁴ 'Martin Heidegger im Gespräch mit Richard Wisser', in *Antwort, Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*, G. Neske and E. Kettering eds., Neske Verlag, Pfullingen 1988, pp. 23–24. The German text reads: "Das am meisten charakteristische Merkmal für die Seinsvergessenheit—und Vergessenheit ist hier immer zu denken vom Griechischen her, von der *Lethe*, d.h. vom Sich-Verbergen, vom Sich Entziehen des Seins her—nun, das charakteristischste Merkmal des Geschicks, in dem wir stehen, ist—soweit ich das überhaupt übersehe—die Tatsache, dass die Seinsfrage, die ich stelle, noch nicht *verstanden* ist".

¹³⁵ See Husserl, 4th *Investigation*, § 9; Philipse, FLH, pp. 136–51; Bertrand Russell (1903), *The Principles of Mathematics*, Allen & Unwin, London 1979, p. xv. See also note 92.

¹³⁶ See for instance G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker, WMU, Chapters 1 and following. See for Wittgenstein's later conception of language the same authors, RGN.

¹³⁷ I should like to thank Prof. Dr. H.J. Adriaanse and Dr. J.W. MacAllister (Leiden University), Prof. Dr. Th. de Boer (University of Amsterdam), Dr. F. Dastur (University of Paris I), Dr. P.M.S. Hacker (St. John's College, Oxford), Professor Dr. G. Lock

ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in the notes to refer to Heidegger's works. Translations of quotations from Heidegger are mine. Translating Heidegger is notoriously difficult, and I have sometimes translated freely. In the notes I quote the German text, in order to enable the reader to check my translations.

- BP Heidegger 1919: *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, Vorlesungen Kriegsnotsemester 1919, Gesamtausgabe vol. 56/57, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1987.
- EM Heidegger 1953: *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 3rd edition, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1966.
- GP Heidegger 1927: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927, Gesamtausgabe vol 24, 2nd edition, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1989.
- H Heidegger 1943-44: *Heraklit*, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1943 und Sommersemester 1944, Gesamtausgabe vol. 55, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1979.
- KM Heidegger 1929: *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4th edition, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1973.
- PGZ Heidegger 1925: *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925, Gesamtausgabe vol. 20, 2nd edition, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1988.
- SD Heidegger 1969: *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Niemeyer, Tübingen.
- SZ Heidegger 1927: *Sein und Zeit*, 11th edition, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1967.
- VS Heidegger 1977: *Vier Seminare*, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M.
- WD Heidegger 1952: *Was heisst Denken?* Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1951-52 und Sommersemester 1952, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1971.
- WiM Heidegger 1929: *Was ist Metaphysik?*, 10th edition, V. Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 1949.

The following abbreviations are used for works by Husserl and by Wittgenstein. Translations of quotations from Husserl are mine. Wittgenstein is quoted in English from the editions indicated below.

- BB Wittgenstein 1933-35: *The Blue and Brown Books*, 2nd. edition, Blackwell, Oxford 1969.

(Nijmegen University), Dr. W.Th.C. Oudemans (Leiden Univ.), Prof. Dr. mag. K.J. Schuhmann (Univ. of Utrecht), Dr. B. Smith (Int. Akademie f. Philos., Liechtenstein), and Dr. G.T.M. Visser (University of Leiden) for comments on earlier versions of this paper. A French draft was presented at a *table ronde* on Wittgenstein and Heidegger at the Institut Néerlandais, Paris, on June 8th, 1989. I read an English version at the XIVth International Wittgenstein Symposium 1989 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria.

- Ideas I Edmund Husserl 1913, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, Husserliana vol III/1, Nijhoff, The Hague 1976.
- LU A Husserl 1900 and 1901: *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2 vols., Halle a.S. (first edition).
- LUB Husserl 1913, 1921: *Logische Untersuchungen*, second edition of vols. I and II/1, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1913.; second edition of the sixth *Investigation*, vol II/2, Tübingen 1921. I used the 5th edition from 1968, which is identical with Husserl 1913, 1921.
- PhU Wittgenstein 1953, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, with a translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, reprinted from the 3rd ed., Blackwell, Oxford 1968.
- TLP Wittgenstein 1921, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, with a new edition of the translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, reprinted from the 1971 edition, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1974.
- UG Wittgenstein 1951: *Über Gewissheit*, ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright with a translation by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Harper & Row, New York 1972.

Abbreviations for secondary literature:

- DHT Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, Nijhoff, The Hague 1978.
- FLH Herman Philipse, *De fundering van de logica in Husserls 'Logische Untersuchungen'*, Labor Vincit, Leiden 1983.
- RGN G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker 1985: *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity; An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations* Vol. 2, Blackwell, Oxford.
- TPh Karl-Otto Apel 1973: *Transformation der Philosophie, Band I, Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik*, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 164, Frankfurt a.M. 1976.
- WMU G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker 1980: *Wittgenstein, Meaning and Understanding, Essays on the Philosophical Investigations*, vol. 1, Blackwell, Oxford 1983.