

Stakeholder power relations in Land Value Capture: comparing public (China) and private (U.S.) dominant regimes

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ABSTRACT

Understanding stakeholder power relations—such as between land sellers, land buyers, and local governments—is crucial to understanding Land Value Capture (LVC). While scholars have focused on stakeholder relationships through approaches such as stakeholder salience, stakeholder interaction, stakeholder value network, and stakeholder multiplicity, much research either places insufficient focus on power or only stresses partial attributes of power. As a result, the role of power relations among key stakeholders in LVC remains insufficiently explored. Our contribution is a new analytical framework for stakeholder power dynamics surrounding LVC. This provides an empirical analysis by comparing the public (China) and the private (U.S.) dominant regimes, through the perspectives of power direction, strength, and mechanism. To conceptualize the three perspectives of power in LVC, we constructed an analytical matrix and then categorized data in terms of stakeholder, space, and time perspectives. Based on empirical findings, four emerging dilemmas shed light on consequences for LVC policy making as well as areas in need of further research.

1. Introduction

As far back as the mid-1800s, observers have debated about the process of Land Value Capture (LVC): the practice of reforming the tax system to collect revenue on land that has increased in value as a result of *inter alia* public investments, land use change, or population growth (Walters, 2013). The international literature provides several discussions and rationales for LVC as well as proposes a theoretical distinction among three groups of LVC strategies: macro value capture embedded in broader land regimes, direct value capture and indirect value capture (Alterman, 2012; Suzuki et al., 2015). According to John Stuart Mill, this “accession of wealth, created by circumstances” is an issue of social justice: land value increases should benefit communities, not just landlords (Mill, 1884). International organizations have long advocated LVC as a means to fund public services and infrastructure projects (Chapman, 2017; Connolly and Wall, 2016; Eddie et al., 2004; Medda, 2012; Suzuki et al., 2015; Walters, 2013). Local governments are similarly eager to generate this “land revenue” (Du et al., 2015; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014; Han and Kung, 2015). However, existing conceptualizations of LVC are incomplete, as LVC is not just a formal tool used by governments. Rather, LVC refers to the process of materializing the distribution of land value in a broader sense, including formal and informal mechanisms and interactions. We know that processes of LVC,

which in a broader sense are used to indicate *who gets what part of the land value*, are characterized by *complex interactions and outcomes between various stakeholders*, including governments, land buyers, land sellers, and land speculators (Lepak et al., 2007; Slegtenhorst, 2013). These complex interactions between LVC stakeholders vary depending on stakeholder, space, and time perspectives. Consequently, the act of LVC attracts widespread public attention from political, social, and academic circles (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000; Boyd, 2011; Chapman, 2017; Lepak et al., 2007; Slegtenhorst, 2013; Smolka, 2013; Sun et al., 2017; Suzuki et al., 2015). In addition, stakeholder relationships can influence the outcomes of LVC (Hein et al., 2017; Merinero-Rodríguez and Pulido-Fernández, 2016; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005; Timur and Getz, 2008).

Stakeholder relationships can be explained from different perspectives, such as power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997). As Foucault posited, “power is everywhere” and “power comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1991, 1998; Gaventa, 2003; Rabinow, 1991). Power can be perceived as a key factor that expresses the complex relationships between stakeholders in LVC. Based on the general definition of “power” (Emerson, 1962; Hein et al., 2017; Meehan and Wright, 2011, 2012; Saito and Ruhanen, 2017; Shaw and Williams, 1994; Sheehan and Ritchie, 2005), we view a stakeholder’s power in LVC as the ability to capture land value that others wouldn’t have otherwise

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Table 1
Existing approaches to analyze stakeholder relations

Approach	Attributes
Stakeholder Salience (SS)	Stakeholders claim LVC through power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Stakeholder Interaction (SI)	Stakeholders use intertwining relationships within a complex network, which are viewed as either conflicting, complementary, or cooperative (Oliver, 1991).
Stakeholder Value Network (SVN)	Stakeholder power strength is measured by dependency, urgency, and value cycle length (Cameron et al., 2011; Feng, 2013; Hein et al., 2017; Rowley, 1997).
Stakeholder Multiplicity (SM)	Stakeholder power is measured by direction, strength, and synergies of stakeholder claims (Neville and Menguc, 2006).

captured.

Despite the significance of power, research problems still exist. From the theoretical aspect, a more comprehensive way to explore power is still missing in current research. From the empirical aspect, the complexity of power relations between LVC stakeholders are yet explored in terms of stakeholder, space, and time.

Previous studies have explored many ways to analyze stakeholder relations. A brief overview of current approaches is outlined in Table 1. These approaches outlined in Table 1 emphasize the significance of power, or different facets of power. For instance, the Stakeholder Salience approach (SS) recognizes the power from one of the three perspectives in exploring stakeholder relationships, while the Stakeholder Interaction approach (SI) focuses on power directions. Likewise, the Stakeholder Value Network approach (SVN) stresses the level of influence (power strength), while the Stakeholder Multiplicity approach (SM) put forth by Neville and Menguc (2006) concentrates on power direction and strength. Nonetheless, each approach insufficiently captures power or only stresses partial attributes of power. For example, besides the power, SS also concentrates on urgency and legitimacy. As SI solely considers the direction of power, it ignores the strength and mechanism of power. In comparison, SVN neglects the direction and mechanism of power. As a more comprehensive approach is still missing in current research, the power relations among key stakeholders in LVC remain insufficiently explored.

Continually, power relations between LVC stakeholders are also diverse in terms of stakeholder, space, and time perspectives. **From the stakeholder perspective**, different LVC stakeholders may feature different power relations. For instance, land prices soar as buyers and speculators compete for land (Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Evans, 1983; Mills, 1969), and acute social tension occurs when rural collective organizations and local farmers receive insufficient compensation for their land (Ding, 2007; Lin and Zhu, 2014). **From the space perspective**, power relations between LVC stakeholders vary according to different countries and urban versus rural. Legal frameworks and institutional arrangements are already incorporated into public dominant countries (e.g. China) and private dominant countries (e.g. the U.S.). For example, stakeholders power relations in China are different than the U.S. (Du et al., 2014; Jaeger, 2013). Geographical contradictions also affect stakeholder power. For instance, stakeholder power relations in urban areas are different from those in rural area (Qian, 2015b). **From the time perspective**, power relations between LVC stakeholders may evolve in different stages. One example is that power relations between LVC stakeholders may change over China's rural land institutional reform (Wang and Hui, 2017; Zhang and Xu, 2017).

This paper aims at constructing a more complete approach to analyze the complex power relations between key LVC stakeholders, and the research question is "How can power relations between LVC stakeholders be analyzed in different space-time situations?". Additional questions were needed to unpack the main question: First, how do stakeholders interact in LVC scenarios? Second, how can the LVC outcomes be explained by the power approach? And lastly, how can stakeholders respond to power-relation changes in LVC? The relationship between these research questions and the theoretical aspects of the study are dealt with in the conceptual framework presented in section 3. In this paper, we mostly use literature cases from China and the U.S.,

because we want to contrast the differences between the two types of legal frameworks.

The remainder of this article is organized into four sections. A new holistic approach to analyze stakeholder power relations is established in section 2. Next, the conceptual framework is constructed in section 3. In section 4, power relations between LVC are analyzed in terms of space, stakeholder, and time perspectives. Finally, emerging dilemmas are discussed in section 5.

2. Theoretical framework

We know that certain factors influence the process of LVC. For instance, LVC is influenced by space and time: land value varies according to different spatial locations and land value may change over time. Moreover, because of the similarities in attributes between power and force, lessons can be drawn from the scholarly field of Mechanics (Wilcox, 2016). In fact, this study is anchored by research questions and attributes of force as outlined in Mechanics studies namely the three perspectives of power identified by Wilcox (2016) as direction, strength, and mechanism. By outlining each framework and discussing their relationships, we construct a new theoretical framework. The embedded three elements—stakeholder, space, and time—are reviewed in the new theoretical framework.

2.1. Directions of power

Previous research on stakeholder strategies offers three directions for elevating a stakeholder's influence: conflicting, complementary, and cooperative. First, stakeholders compete to maximize their value against the demands of others. Second, stakeholders may form strategic alliances to increase the persuasive power of their combined claims. Finally, these complementary claims can combine to enhance the power of each other (Frooman, 1999; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Oliver, 1991).

Each direction is valuable for LVC. Here we view stakeholder power direction in the context of LVC as to whom the land value goes to, which also contains the three directions: competition, cooperation, and complementary. **Competition** direction in LVC means that different stakeholders compete against in LVC. For example, competition between land buyers and land sellers plays a key role in showing opposite directions of LVC in the U.S. (Jaeger, 2013). **Cooperation** here can mean different stakeholders form alliances for LVC, such as when local governments and developers work in tandem to deprive land value from rural collective organizations and local farmers in China, concentrating on the same power direction in LVC (Du et al., 2014). **Complementary** joins the combined effects of different stakeholders claims in LVC. For example, local governments offer developers tax incentives for additional investment for LVC (Haberl, 2015; Rebelo, 2017; Zhang et al., 2017).

2.2. Strength of power

From strong to weak, previous studies have discussed four typologies of power: force, manipulation, persuasion, and authority (Wrong, 2017). Due to their vagueness, Wrong (2017) further conceptualized




Fig. 1. Relationships between the three perspectives of power.

them into coercive power, legitimate power, induced power, and competent power. **Coercive power** indicates that an authority can coerce others into taking certain actions (Saito and Ruhanen, 2017). **Legitimate power** describes how legitimate authority is employed to prescribe the actions of others (Ford and Johnson, 1998; Saito and Ruhanen, 2017). **Induced power** involves using material rewards such as financial remuneration to derive a power advantage (Beritelli and Laesser, 2011; de Bussy and Kelly, 2010; Saito and Ruhanen, 2017). **Competent power** refers to power held by specialists and experts, who possess the specific tools and traits necessary for solving difficult problems such as special skills, knowledge, and experiences (Hankinson, 2009; Saito and Ruhanen, 2017).

Each type of power strength is valuable for LVC. Stakeholder power strength in the context of LVC can be defined as to what extent certain stakeholders exert power over others, which may include coercive power, legitimate power, induced power, and competent power. **Coercive power** means government authorities may exert “political power” through policy-making and implementation to capture land value (de Bussy and Kelly, 2010; Wrong, 2017). For instance, local governments exert coercive power through compulsory land expropriation in Chinese context (Du et al., 2015; Tura, 2018). **Legitimate power** is stakeholders capture land value through employing laws or regulations. For example, developers can benefit from land more than others by obtaining land use right, when it is legitimately transferred from land sellers (Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995). **Induced power** means stakeholders capture land value from others by using rewards. For instance, local governments incentivize developers to invest in land by offering reduced taxation (Gao et al., 2017). **Competent power** means stakeholders have more power if they possess specific tools and traits. For example, a specialized company in the U.S. can profit more than others, by applying their entrepreneurship and advanced management skills (Haque and Asami, 2014).

2.3. Mechanisms of power

Previous research proposes two mechanisms in which stakeholders obtain power: market and administrative. Market mechanisms are the mechanisms by which the use of money tends to optimize the distribution of goods and services by supply and demand, such as price, supply and demand, and competition (Liu et al., 2016; Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie, 2017b). Administrative mechanisms, defined as legal instruments, government rules, and guidelines, depend on a government's system such as its administrative structure and legal regime (Cigdem and Wood, 2012; Floetotto et al., 2016; Lin and Zhu, 2014; Yan et al., 2014).

These two mechanisms are useful to analyze LVC. Here, the

stakeholder power mechanism in the context of LVC is viewed as in what way certain stakeholders benefit from land, which includes market and institutional mechanisms. **Market mechanisms** explain the ways that stakeholders obtain power by competing and cooperation (Capozza et al., 2002; Wendt, 1957). One example is that land buyers can benefit from land by controlling land supply and demand in the U.S. land market (Davis and Heathcote, 2007). **Administrative mechanisms** are a useful means to interpret local governments' compulsory land expropriation in China or the betterment of the land taxation system in the U.S. (Rebelo, 2017; Yan et al., 2014).

2.4. A new theoretical framework

As mentioned above, previous theoretical frameworks contribute to the analysis of stakeholders and power. The direction framework helps us to understand stakeholder strategies of capturing land value. The strength framework assists us in understanding the strength of stakeholder claims on LVC. The mechanism framework facilitates us in understanding their ways. However, the overall picture of power is difficult to grasp, as they focus according to their disciplinary and domain-specific components. In this research, we contribute a new theoretical framework for power analysis, by integrating them together (Fig. 1). The purpose of this figure is to visually illustrate the components of power and their interrelations. The three perspectives of power are not isolated from each other, and the relationships are part of the research.

To align with elaborate research questions and empirical analysis, the streamline of empirical data can be analyzed by the new theoretical framework in terms of three elements, i.e. stakeholder, space, and time. **1) The stakeholder element** is reflected in the theoretical framework. The new theoretical framework is used to explore complex power relations between LVC stakeholders. Different stakeholders' power in LVC varies, which can be analyzed by the direction, strength and mechanism of power. **2) The space element** is incorporated in the new theoretical framework, including geography and countries. First, the geographical contradictions between urban and rural features the complex power relations between LVC stakeholders, which can be analyzed by the holistic power approach. Second, the national differences between public dominant and private dominant countries formulate different power relations between LVC stakeholders, which can also be analyzed by the holistic power approach. These relations occur through the legal framework, the institutional framework and practical implementation. **3) The time element** is also embedded in the new theoretical framework. The evolution of power relations between LVC stakeholders, which is triggered by certain factors, adds to the complexity of the power research. The procedure can be divided into certain stages, and the power relations in each stage can also be analyzed by the holistic

power approach.

By integrating the three perspectives of power and by considering stakeholder, time, and space elements, power relations can be understood more comprehensively. In this way, our conceptual framework provides robust theoretical foundations to analyze stakeholder power relations in LVC.

3. Conceptual framework

To align with the three perspectives of the holistic power approach in the theoretical framework, we construct a conceptual framework to operationalize the empirical analysis (Table 3).

3.1. Framework structure

To narrow the research scope, we only considered land sales; other categories of interactions are excluded from this article, such as land renting, land pooling, land exchange, and land mortgage, among others (Czyżewski and Matuszczak, 2016; Ito et al., 2016; Jäger, 2009; Mathur, 2013). As the mainstream in land market, land sales provide an ideal terrain to simplify a power relationship analysis. The conceptual-framework structure, represented by Fig. 2, consists of relevant and important concepts, such as the stakeholders, the arena, and the components of power. The circle shows the stakeholder and the arena, while the triangle shows the three perspectives of power.

To elaborate on the complex interactions between key stakeholders, four overlapping arenas in Fig. 2, i.e. from arena I to arena IV, have also been considered in the study. Interactions within each area are complex and may feature different problems, because of the interactions between different stakeholders.

As far as key stakeholders, local governments, land sellers and land buyers are explicitly selected. First, government should be seen as a stakeholder, because part of the land value appreciates due to the

government's action, while the land market platform for land sales is created by the government. Furthermore, local governments are interesting because their role is quite different from the central government's role, as they focus both on public and private benefits. The interactions between local government and others are more frequent (Floetotto et al., 2016; Huang and Du, 2017; Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009; Tian and Ma, 2009; Tu et al., 2014; Yan et al., 2014). Second, land sellers were selected because land sellers benefit by transferring land to others (Lin and Zhu, 2014; Phuc et al., 2014). Finally, land sellers form a part of the analysis because they interact with others during land purchases (Lin and Zhu, 2014).

To align with the classifying empirical data, the three elements embedded in conceptual framework, i.e. stakeholder, space and time, will show up in the data set section below.

As power relations between different stakeholders are concrete and specific in practice, these overlapping arenas in this figure could abstract the concrete complex relationships between key LVC stakeholders into visible generalized classifications. There are two angles that stakeholder power relations can be researched from in these overlapping arenas. First, it could be researched from a stakeholder perspective, as each key stakeholder is engaged in different power relations with regard to other stakeholders. Second, stakeholder power relations can be explored from an arena perspective: each arena provides a distinct platform in which LVC and stakeholder power relations materialize. In Fig. 2, arena I represents the interactions between local governments and land sellers; arena II displays interactions between land sellers and land buyers; arena III exhibits the interactions between local governments and land buyers; and arena IV represents the interactions between local governments, land sellers, and land buyers. These overlapping arenas could add value to existing body of literature by providing new insights in understanding stakeholder power relations in LVC.




Fig. 2. Conceptual framework.

Remarks:

- 1) The circles show the stakeholders and the overlapping arenas.
- 2) The triangle shows the three perspectives of power: direction, strength, and mechanism.

Table 2
Analytical matrix: concepts, indicators, and variables of power

Concepts	Indicators	Variables	Authors
Direction	Competition	Competition for LVC	(Lin and Zhu, 2014; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Venkatraman, 1989)
	Cooperation	Cooperation for LVC	
Power strength	Complementary	Complementary actions for LVC	(Cameron et al., 2011; Feng, 2013; Hein et al., 2017; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Rowley, 1997; Venkatraman, 1989)
	Coercive	Forces others to sell land	
	Legitimate	Prescribes others' actions	
	Induced	Provides financial remuneration	
Mechanism	Competent	Possesses knowledge, skill or experience	(Cigdem and Wood, 2012; Floetotto et al., 2016; Lin and Zhu, 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie, 2017b; Yan et al., 2014)
	Market	Land transactions	
	Administrative	Taxation or expropriation	

3.2. Method

By narrowing the research scope, incorporating key stakeholders, and identifying overlapping arenas, this conceptual framework, along with the indicators and variables in Table 2. In align with the theoretical framework, we contribute an analytical matrix, facilitating an empirical analysis of stakeholders power relations between public and private dominant regimes.

3.3. Data

3.3.1. Data source

The analysis was based on empirical data that was sourced from peer-reviewed journal articles published in Land Use Policy, Habitat International, Cities, and Land Economics, among others. Databases, including ProQuest, EBSCO and Science Direct, facilitated the search through the following keywords: Land Value Capture, land expropriation, betterment taxation, local governments, land owners/land seller, developers/land buyers, and land revenue. Additional data was located through respective article references. In sum, 70 empirical cases were selected out of a total of 173, based on three standards: 1) Research scope: Only land sales are considered; other land transactions are excluded, 2) Key stakeholders: Only local governments are considered; central government is excluded, and 3) The three perspectives of power: legitimacy and urgency are excluded.

3.3.2. Data profile

Additionally, empirical data were categorized in terms of the following three perspectives:

3.3.2.1. The stakeholder perspective. Empirical data were categorized into overlapping arenas, as the power relations in LVC are generally unique to each arena. For example, local governments interact with land sellers in arena I, and interact with land buyers in arena II.

3.3.2.2. The space perspective. A) land ownership. Empirical data are classified in terms of countries under public and private land-ownership arrangements. For instance, public dominant countries such as China, Vietnam, and the Netherlands are largely categorized as a public legal framework, while private dominant countries such as the United States feature private legal framework (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). Legal frameworks are incorporated into the empirical cases. To contrast differences between institutional arrangements and legal frameworks, China and the U.S. were chosen as typical countries for empirical analysis in this study. **B) Rural-urban.** Empirical data were categorized in terms of rural-urban differences. There are strict distinctions between urban and rural areas, and the rural land market does not really exist in public land ownership countries. Local governments expropriate land from rural communities in arenal, and transfer land to developers in arena III.

3.3.2.3. The time perspective. Empirical data are categorized in terms of the time element. One example is that the empirical data are classified into three stages—before rural land transactions, during rural land transactions, and after rural land transactions—taking into consideration that China is now piloting rural land institutional reform on rural land transactions.

3.3.3. Data quality

The quality of empirical data are assessed from four aspects: a) completeness, b) accuracy/validity, c) comparability, and d) timeliness (Larsen et al., 2009). **First from the completeness aspect**, empirical data cover countries with both public and private land ownership situations, and encompass the three types of stakeholders: local governments, land sellers, and land buyers. **Second from the accuracy/validity aspect**, empirical data are derived from published journal articles, and the accuracy of the qualitative data are reviewed already in quality journals. **Third from the comparability aspect**, empirical data show differences in stakeholder power between public and private land ownership situations, and the comparability is based on the holistic power approach. **Last, from the timeliness aspect**, the time frame of empirical data are from 1957 until 2017, considering both the historical changes and the timeliness.

The study contributes to the literature by narrowing the research scope, further conceptualizing the abstract nature of power, and providing a useful tool—the analytical matrix—to better explore stakeholder power relations. The next section presents the findings of the empirical analysis.

4. Empirical results: Power relations analysis

To align with the research design, power relations between key stakeholders in LVC are analyzed from the stakeholder, space, and time perspectives.

4.1. Analysis from the space perspective

Based on the overlapping arenas from Fig. 2, stakeholders' power relations in LVC are analyzed from the space perspective in terms of legal frameworks (countries under public and private land ownerships) and the geography between urban and rural, as can be shown in Table 4.

By comparing countries under different land ownership settings (legal frameworks) and the geographical distinctions between urban and rural, the analysis revealed that stakeholder power relations in public dominant countries and in rural areas feature unique characteristics, namely:

4.1.1. In arena I, local governments have more power than land sellers

In private dominant countries, local governments, as market entities, don't have an advantage power over land sellers, because of the

Table 3
Profiles of empirical data

Category1	Category 2	Journal	Article (#)	Timeframe	Keywords	Cited author
Public land-ownership	(Arena I) Local governments and land sellers	Land Use Policy, Habitat International, Journal of Development Economics, Cities, etc.	16	1998-2017	LVC; local governments; land owners; land sellers; expropriation; livelihoods, etc.	(Bao et al., 2017; Bao and Peng, 2016b; Ding, 2007; Du et al., 2015; Friis and Nielsen, 2016; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014; Han and Kung, 2015; Huang et al., 2017; Hui et al., 2013; Pils, 2016; Qian, 2015b, a; Scoones, 1998; Shan et al., 2017; Small, 2007; Suhardiman et al., 2015)
Private land-ownership	(Arena III) Local governments and land buyers	Land Use Policy, Journal of Development Economics, Urban Studies, etc.	16	2008-2017	LVC; local governments; developers; land supply monopoly, etc.	(Cai, 2017; Cao et al., 2008; Chen and Kung, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Hu and Qian, 2017; Leeper et al., 2010; Pan et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2015a; Qun et al., 2015; Tao et al., 2010; Tian and Ma, 2009; Wang and Ye, 2016; Wang and Hui, 2017; Ye and Wang, 2013; Zhang and Xu, 2017; Zheng et al., 2014)
	(Arena I & III & IV) Local governments and land sellers	Land Use Policy, Habitat International, etc.	24	1991-2017	LVC; local governments; land sellers; land buyers; betterment taxation, etc.	(Altes, 2009; Batt, 2001; Chi-Man Hui et al., 2004; Coleman and Grimes, 2010; Garza and Lizzeri, 2016; Ingram and Hong, 2012; Medda, 2012; Mittal, 2014; Rebelo, 2017; Smith and Ghring, 2006; Wang et al., 2015; Wenner, 2016) (Alexander, 2014; Baker et al., 2006; Beaton, 1991; Cheshire, 2013; Czyzewski et al., 2017; Evans, 1999; Gleeson, 1994; Jones, 2014; Lerman and Shagaida, 2007; Moroni, 2010; Obeng-Odoom, 2012; Weersink et al., 1999)
	(Arena II) Land sellers and land buyers	Land Use Policy, Cities, Urban Studies, Land Economics, etc.	14	1957-2016	LVC; land owners; land buyers; land market; supply and demand, etc.	(Alonso, 1960; Asabere and Harvey, 1985; Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Capozza et al., 2002; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Choumert and Phélinas, 2015; Colwell and Munneke, 1997; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; Davis and Palumbo, 2008; Evans, 1983; Jaeger, 2013; Mills, 1969; Needham, 1992; Wendt, 1957)

market mechanism. For instance, state governments in the U.S. often buy land from land sellers at market prices (Bao et al., 2017; Bao and Peng, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Qian, 2015; Scoones, 1998; Small, 2007; Suhardiman et al., 2015). On the contrary, local governments operating under public land schemes have more power than land sellers because of their administrative competencies. For instance, local governments in China frequently expropriate rural land from rural land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) which is detrimental to their interests (Bao and Peng, 2016; Ding, 2007; Du et al., 2015; Friis and Nielsen, 2016; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014; Han and Kung, 2015; Hui et al., 2013; Pils, 2016; Qian, 2015; Shan et al., 2017). In most articles, we found that local governments have more power than land sellers in public dominant countries, but in other situations such as between cities, there might be some differences.

4.1.2. In arena II, compared to the practices in market dominant situations, this arena exists only in theory in public dominant situations

In market dominant countries, land buyers and land sellers compete on land value with legitimate or competent power, because of the market mechanism. For example, land sales in the U.S. are negotiated by land buyers and land sellers in a land market (Alonso, 1960; Asabere and Harvey, 1985; Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Capozza et al., 2002; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Choumert and Phélinas, 2015; Colwell and Munneke, 1997; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; Davis and Palumbo, 2008; Evans, 1983; Jaeger, 2013; Mills, 1969; Needham, 1992; Wendt, 1957; Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie, 2017a). However, this arena only exists in theory in public dominant situations. Generally, there are no land transactions due to prevailing land administration systems. For instance, a rural land market does not exist in China, and rural land cannot be legally transferred between rural land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) and land buyers (developers) (Borras, 2003; Boucher et al., 2005; Sikor and Müller, 2009).

4.1.3. In arena III, local governments have more power than land buyers in urban land markets

In private dominant countries, local governments and land buyers compete on land value with legitimate or competent power by market mechanism. For instance, land transactions often take place in a land market and state governments in the U.S. often sell their land at market prices. However, local governments operating under public land regimes have more power than land buyers; the supply of land in these cases is monopolized through administrative procedures. For example, local governments in China monopolize the supply of urban land in the primary land market which results in land being sold at a premium price (Cai, 2017; Cao et al., 2008; Chen and Kung, 2016; Choumert and Phélinas, 2015; Guo et al., 2015; Hu and Qian, 2017; Leeper et al., 2010; Pan et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2015a, b; Qun et al., 2015; Tao et al., 2010; Tian and Ma, 2009; Wang and Ye, 2016; Wang and Hui, 2017; Ye and Wang, 2013; Zhang and Xu, 2017; Zheng et al., 2014). Based on these articles, we found local governments in public dominant countries have more power than land buyers, but in other situations or cities, there might be some different results.

4.1.4. In arena IV, power differentials exist between rural land sellers and urban land sellers

Finally, arena IV shows that, different from countries with private land ownership, the administrative arrangement in public land schemes means that rural land sellers do not have the same power as urban land sellers. Unlike the U.S., strict distinctions between rural land and urban land still exist in China. Furthermore, rural land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) are prohibited from transferring land as urban land sellers (local governments) do (Alexander, 2014; Baker et al., 2006; Beaton, 1991; Cheshire, 2013; Czyzewski et al., 2017; Evans, 1999; Gleeson, 1994; Jones, 2014; Lerman and Shagaida, 2007; Moroni, 2010; Obeng-Odoom, 2012; Weersink et al., 1999).

There are different ways of transferring state-owned urban land use

Table 4
Power relations between key LVC stakeholders.

Dimension	Countries with public land-ownership	Countries with private land-ownership	Cited authors
Arena I Local governments and land sellers interact	Rural land expropriation • Local governments expropriate rural land from land sellers (rural land owners) √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Coercive/legitimate √ Mechanism: Administrative • Land sellers (Rural land owners and local farmers) are compensated √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate √ Mechanism: Administrative	• 1) Local governments buy land from land sellers √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/competent √ Mechanism: Market • 2) Land sellers sell land to local governments √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate √ Mechanism: Market	(Altes, 2009; Bao et al., 2017; Bao and Peng, 2016b; Batt, 2001; Chi-Man Hui et al., 2004; Coleman and Grimes, 2010; Ding, 2007; Du et al., 2015; Friis and Nielsen, 2016; Garza and Lizieri, 2016; Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2014; Han and Kung, 2015; Huang et al., 2017; Hui et al., 2013; Ingram and Hong, 2012; Medda, 2012; Mittal, 2014; Pils, 2016; Qian, 2015a, b; Rebelo, 2017; Scoones, 1998; Shan et al., 2017; Small, 2007; Smith and Gihring, 2006; Suhardiman et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Wenner, 2016)
Arena II Land sellers and land buyers interact	• <i>This arena exists only in theory. Land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) cannot legally transfer land to land buyers (developers). However, in urban areas, local governments are the actual land sellers; their power relations are analyzed in arena III.</i>	• 1) Land sellers sell land to land buyers √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimacy/induced √ Mechanism: Market • 2) Land buyers buy land from land sellers. √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/competent √ Mechanism: Market	(Alonso, 1960; Asabere and Harvey, 1985; Awokuse and Duke, 2006; Capozza et al., 2002; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Choumert and Phélinas, 2015; Colwell and Munneke, 1997; Davis and Heathcote, 2007; Davis and Palumbo, 2008; Ding and Zhao, 2014; Du et al., 2014; Eidelman, 2016; Evans, 1983; Jaeger, 2013; Mills, 1969; Needham, 1992; Wendt, 1957)
Arena III: Local governments and land buyers interact	Urban land market • As urban land owners, local governments lease out land use rights to land buyers. √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/induced √ Mechanism: Market • 2) Land buyers buy land from local governments. √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/competent √ Mechanism: Market	• 1) Local governments sell land to land buyers √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/induced √ Mechanism: Market • 2) Land buyers buy land from local governments √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Legitimate/competent √ Mechanism: Market	(Cai, 2017; Cao et al., 2008; Chen and Kung, 2016; Guo et al., 2015; Hu and Qian, 2017; Leeper et al., 2010; Pan et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2015a; Qun et al., 2015; Tao et al., 2010; Tian and Ma, 2009; Wang and Ye, 2016; Wang and Hui, 2017; Ye and Wang, 2013; Zhang and Xu, 2017; Zheng et al., 2014)
Arena IV: Local governments, land sellers and land buyers interact	• ——— Stakeholders cannot interact at the same time. The two interactions are separately analyzed in the above arenas.	• 1) Local governments tax land for funding public infrastructure/services √ Direction: Competition √ Strength: Coercive/legitimate √ Mechanism: Administrative • 2) Land sellers and land buyers transfer land in land market √ Direction: Cooperation/complementary √ Strength: Legitimate/induced/competent √ Mechanism: Market	(Alexander, 2014; Baker et al., 2006; Beaton, 1991; Cheshire, 2013; Czyżewski et al., 2017; Evans, 1999; Gleeson, 1994; Jones, 2014; Lerman and Shagaida, 2007; Moroni, 2010; Obeng-Odoom, 2012; Weersink et al., 1999)

rights in China's urban land market: Agreement-based Assignment, Bid Invitation, Auction, and Listing. By using these ways, their power relations are different according to the system in which the land is transferred. The auctioning system is one way in which institutional arrangements influence power relations. These regulations show the market characteristics in the urban land market, while the legal restrictions shows the institutionalized settings in the rural areas.

4.2. Analysis from the stakeholder perspective

In this section, power relations between LVC stakeholders are analyzed from a stakeholder perspective and by comparing the related overlapping arenas.

First, when comparing arenas I, III and IV, where **local governments** interact with other stakeholders, the findings reveal that local governments exert more power over land sellers than over land buyers in countries characterized by public land ownership. This is because the local governments often use administrative mechanisms to deprive land value from land sellers; they also use market mechanisms to grab land value from land buyers. By comparing the institutional arrangements and legal frameworks, local governments in public dominant countries exert more power on other stakeholders than that of private dominant countries, largely because of their administrative powers. In arena I for example, and unlike state governments in the U.S., local governments

in China frequently expropriate rural land from land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) in the name of the public interest. After changing land usage from non-profit into for-profit purposes through land use planning, land is often transferred to land buyers (e.g. developers) in arena III.

Second, a comparison of arenas I, II and IV, where **land sellers** interact with other stakeholders, land sellers operating in public dominant countries have less power than local governments during land expropriation, due to administrative competence. On the other hand, land sellers do not have direct negotiations or power relations with land buyers because of institutional arrangements. By comparing the institutional arrangements and legal frameworks, land sellers in public dominant countries have less power in LVC processes than those operating under market dominant countries. Unlike the U.S., rural land in China can't be directly transferred in arena II. The original purpose was to protect the assets of land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) with land usage strictly limited to certain purposes. However, rural land can only be expropriated from land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) by local governments in arena I.

Finally, when comparing arenas II, III and IV, where **land buyers** interact with other stakeholders, land buyers in public dominant countries have less power than local governments, because local governments may adopt the method of induced power on land buyers,

while land buyers only have competent power to capture land value. On the other hand, land buyers have no power relationship with land sellers because of land institutional arrangements. It becomes clear that, when comparing institutional arrangements and legal frameworks, land buyers in public dominant countries have more power in LVCs than those working under private dominance, because of land institutional arrangements. For example, different from the U.S., land buyers (e.g. developers) in China are unable to directly buy rural land. In addition, in the urban sphere, local governments monopolize the supply of land in the urban land market. Because of intensive market competition in the demand for this land, the extravagant premium land price benefits local governments, yet may theoretically leave less profit for land buyers (e.g. developers), although in reality this depends on their connections with the government.

4.3. Analysis from the time perspective

Despite institutional arrangements and legal frameworks, power relations between LVC stakeholders are dynamic according to time elements. In this section, their dynamics are analyzed based on different stages. Compared to market dominant countries, we are more interested in public dominant countries, because they are now experiencing intense social-economic changes. For instance, the rural land institutional reform on land marketization has been piloted in China's rural areas.

Due to restrictions by laws and regulations to transfer rural land in public dominant countries before rural land institutional reform, rural land sellers (rural collective organizations and local farmers) are forbidden by law to transfer their rural construction land to land buyers (e.g. developers). Local governments in China exert power on other stakeholders by expropriating rural land. However, things change over time. Because of rural land institutional reform on marketization, rural land markets are created (Diamond, 1985; Ding, 2003; Feng et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Long, 2014; Weixin and Dongsong, 1990; Zhang, 1997). Rural land sellers' power in LVC will gradually equal urban land sellers' power. Local government power in LVC will gradually decrease into power only for the public. Land buyers will gradually participate in rural land value capturing. Local governments will reduce using coercive power, and increase using the market mechanism. For example, China is now piloting rural land transactions through rural land institutional reform.

Empirical analysis in terms of stakeholder, space and time perspectives reveals the complex power relations between LVC stakeholders, which lays the foundation for the emerging dilemmas in section 5.

5. Conclusion and discussion: Emerging dilemmas

As a result of this holistic approach to analyzing stakeholders power relations in LVC, four emerging dilemmas arise. **First, from a stakeholder perspective**, dilemmas are linked to the positions of stakeholders who interact with others in LVC, because of the power diversity between incorporated stakeholders. **Second, from a space perspective**, dilemmas are associated with the specifics of land tenure situations, governance structures, and urban-rural distinctions, but these differ greatly depending on contextual conditions. By comparing cases between two land tenure situations, it became empirically evident that stakeholders' power patterns in LVC are shaped by land institutional arrangements, e.g. the market and the planned approach (MirafTAB, 2004; Paik, 2014; Xiaoyan and Xiaoshu, 2014). Each approach uniquely shapes stakeholders' power patterns in LVC. Moreover, land institutions under different contexts may use different or mixed approaches. That local governments have more power than others in LVC shows that the present institution in countries such as China—the separation of rural and urban land types within a public ownership context—shaped current power patterns. The framework offers an analytical tool to research spatial and contextual variety. **Finally, from a time perspective**,

dilemmas are influenced by time elements, since over time stakeholders' power relations in LVC are subject to change. This applies at the level of a single land transaction that evolves over time, but also on a broader level: for instance, land institutional reform of marketization may reshape current stakeholders' power pattern in public land-ownership context. In contrast with the market dominant countries, such as the U.S., the following dilemmas emerge, particularly as public dominance is changing and land marketization policies are launching (e.g. China):

5.1. Dilemma of local governments in responding to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization - between acceptance and resistance

Due to policy changes such as land marketization, over time power patterns can be reshaped, which could reduce local government power. Existing research focuses on institutional incentives of "land revenue" (Floetotto et al., 2016; Huang and Du, 2017; Wang and Hui, 2017). However, the responses of local governments to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization are seldom discussed. Local governments may vary in their responses. They may reject it, as their power will be decreased and they won't benefit any longer; or they may accept or even promote it, if they can reshape their roles and still hold power in a different way. Alternatively their acceptance may be based on the premise that the current "land revenue" mode is unsustainable, and that land marketization can promote regional development. Naturally their responses may also vary according to different situations. Therefore, the emerging dilemma is how local governments respond to the reshaping of the power-pattern by land marketization.

5.2. Dilemma of land sellers in responding to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization - between encouragement and inaction

Current stakeholders' power pattern is such that land sellers have less power than local governments, and have no interactions or power relations with land buyers. However, the current power-pattern may be reshaped over time in the context of land marketization. Existing research stresses the importance of adequate land-expropriation compensation (Huang et al., 2017; Scoones, 1998; Small, 2007). However, land sellers' responses to the reshaping of power-patterns in the context of land marketization are seldom investigated. Land sellers may vary in their responses. They may actively encourage it since their power will increase and they can benefit more, especially in areas with strong rural-urban linkages. Or they may remain passive and not act at all, because they can't benefit from rural land, especially in remote rural areas. Furthermore, their responses may be mixed based on different conditions. Therefore, the emerging dilemma is how land sellers respond to these reshaping power-patterns by land marketization.

5.3. Dilemma of local farmers in responding to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization - between acceptance and resistance

The existing stakeholders' power pattern is such that local farmers have less power than local governments and no power relations with developers. However, this may change in the context of land marketization. Current research focuses on the injustice of compensation and local farmers' livelihoods (Huang et al., 2017; Scoones, 1998; Small, 2007). However, their responses to the reshaping of the power-patterns in the context of land marketization are seldom investigated. These responses may vary widely: some farmers may accept changes because their power will be reinforced and they can benefit more from land assets, especially for wage-dependent farmers; others may resist it, because asset losses may endanger their livelihoods, especially for the agriculture-dependent farmers. Therefore, the emerging dilemma is how local farmers respond to these reshaping power-patterns by land marketization.

5.4. Dilemma of land buyers in responding to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization - buying land from urban or rural

The current stakeholders' power pattern is such that land buyers have less power than local governments and have no power relations with land sellers. This could also change under land marketization. Previous research focused on local governments' monopolizing land supply in the urban primary land market (Cai, 2017; Chen and Kung, 2016; Wang and Ye, 2016; Wang and Hui, 2017). However, little attention is paid to land buyers' (e.g. developers') responses to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization. Land buyers such as developers may buy land from rural areas, because it provides a new channel besides urban land market to obtain land. They may still buy land from urban areas, because they can't benefit from rural land. Therefore, the emerging dilemma is how land buyers respond to the power-pattern reshaping by land marketization.

The added value of this research are: from theoretical perspective, we contribute a holistic power approach into existing literature, while from empirical perspective, the empirical insights can be drawn from a comparative analysis. The research framework shows that the holistic power approach can provide understanding into stakeholders' power relations in LVC. While earlier research discussed the inter-relationships, either they didn't focus enough on power, or only focused on partial power perspectives. As a more comprehensive approach is still missing in current research, the power relations among key stakeholders in LVC remain insufficiently explored. This article builds on the existing body of literature that aims to understand power relations between LVC stakeholders. More specifically, this article builds on earlier research to offer a more holistic approach to analyzing stakeholder power and providing an effective way to understand stakeholders' power relationships in LVC. The holistic analytical tool can add new value in understanding the diverse and complex inter-relationships between stakeholders in LVC. This can also help us look further into the legitimacy and the urgency perspectives when assessing these stakeholder relationships.

The empirical insights show that this can be researched by using the holistic power approach. We compared the power relations between key LVC stakeholders in terms of the stakeholder, the space, and the time elements. By testing the designed research framework regarding the holistic power approach, it shows that this holistic power approach has wide empirical applications. These dilemmas are particularly acute in situations where public land ownership is making way for land marketization approaches. We paid specific attention to the time and space elements, as stakeholder power relations and land transactions are extremely dynamic and subject to change; and because contextual and spatial factors are key in understanding the variety of stakeholder power relations and outcomes of LVC processes. Pointing toward potential responses that stakeholders might choose, these systematic dilemmas can shed new light on complex behaviors, power relations, and patterns of stakeholder power in LVC. Additionally, in practice, these systematic dilemmas can provide a scientific basis for LVC policy making both in public and private dominant regimes.

The differences in power relations in varying situations can be shown in the empirical data. The empirical data are large both for China and the U.S.. The empirical cases also present a variety of situations. For the U.S., much of the variety comes from the market approach, so we can't totally answer all the power relations there, but we can have some first ideas based on the systematic literature review. The diversity also exists in private as well as public dominant countries.

Declaration of Competing Interest

No conflict of interest exists in the submission of this manuscript, and the manuscript is approved by all authors for publication. The work described is original research that has not been published previously, and not under consideration for publication elsewhere, in whole or in part.

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