

also probably limits her audience to graduate students and other historians (p. 6). They will find a lot to like, and build upon, here.

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***Projecting Imperial Power: New Nineteenth-Century Emperors and the Public Sphere.* By Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2021. 334 pp. £35.00 (hardback).**

The proclamation of the Prussian king Wilhelm I as German emperor on 18 January 1871 marked a watershed moment for the Hohenzollern monarchs: no longer just one of four kings in the German lands, they now held an additional title which elevated them above the German princes and put them on a par with other imperial sovereigns, including the Russian and Austrian emperors. But as Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly reminds us in this study, Wilhelm was not the only new emperor in a century marked by revolution and political upheaval which toppled numerous dynasties and gave rise to new ones. France, Austria, the United Kingdom, Mexico and Brazil all saw the creation of an emperor as their sovereign. How they projected and legitimized their office and public persona is explored in this study, spanning the period from the coronation of Napoleon I in 1804 to Indian independence in 1947.

Their power was, to a large extent, a social construct which, according to Watanabe-O’Kelly, depended on symbolic power communicated. Hence, an emperor had to make his audience—the population—‘believe, to confirm or transform the vision of the world’ (p. 4). This implies the possibility of the use of charisma, for which Watanabe-O’Kelly draws on Max Weber, Edward Berenson, Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils. She stresses the importance of forging an emotional bond between ruler and ruled and the former as the epitome of projections, aspirations and beliefs, though she rightly stresses that only the two Bonaparte emperors and Agustín I of Mexico qualify as charismatic figures (p. 5). More important for her argument is Erving Goffman’s notion of ‘front’, the importance of creating social distance to uphold a performance. In this way, emperors were able to cultivate and project tradition and modernity simultaneously (pp. 8–11).

What this entailed is detailed in eleven thematic chapters, which can be roughly divided into two groups, with the first six discussing visual aspects. The first three chapters outline how the various dynasties established themselves as imperial monarchies, utilizing coronation ceremonials, robes, uniforms, medals, courts and allusions to historical lineage to establish a socio-political hierarchy and forge relations with local elites and institutions. Chapter 4 shows what role consorts could play: although contemporary societal norms tasked them primarily with giving birth to an heir, many consorts actively engaged in charity to address social issues and exercise influence, which increased the more such undertakings institutionalized. Consorts also participated in cabinet meetings in the absence of their husband (Eugénie of France) or served as an informant of their husband (Elisabeth of Austria). Chapters 5 and 6 detail how visibility and religion were utilized: through stamps, coins, portraits and photography, as well as presenting themselves as custodians of either the Catholic or Protestant religion, emperors ensured their visibility, whilst—paradoxically, given the decline of the *droit divin*—religion remained an important strategy to legitimize their position.

The latter five chapters discuss the spatial and temporal settings for projecting imperial power. Chapter 7 details how emperors forged the cityscape through statues, museums and

monuments, whilst chapter 8 shows how exhibitions aided emperors in presenting themselves as harbingers of social, economic and technological progress. A separate chapter shows how India was presented and represented as an imperial polity. How traditions were fostered in an age of electoral democracy and emergent mass politics is narrated in chapter 10 through a discussion of the golden and diamond jubilees of Austria's Franz Joseph, stressing his reluctance vis-à-vis these celebrations, which only further fostered his image as a modest sovereign, and the cult Wilhelm II sought to create for his grandfather through monuments and pedagogic theatre plays. The final chapter discusses the physical remnants of these imperial projects, which have become a backdrop for the democracies that succeeded them, politically controversial monuments, or tourist attractions in the form of sites and museums.

Watanabe-O'Kelly's study is empirically rich, with a sharp eye for the differences between the imperial monarchies researched, but raises two interlocking conceptual questions, which it does not satisfactorily answer. First, the study reiterates the distinction made by an outdated political history between symbolic power and 'real' political power derived, for example, from constitutional prerogatives. Indeed, Watanabe-O'Kelly asserts that 'it could be argued that an emperor had to take more trouble to create symbolic power, the less actual political power he had' (p. 4). Additional evidence of this is her invocation of Walter Bagehot's well-known distinction between the 'dignified' and 'efficient' parts of the government (pp. 6–7). But as successive historians have shown, Bagehot's distinction did not describe monarchical practice, but was prescriptive, seeking to provide a model for constitutional monarchy after the death of Prince Albert. This distinction is untenable: Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has convincingly argued that all political actors, collectives and institutions require representation to become a tangible reality. Had this understanding been followed, it would have required an analysis of how every projection of imperial power addressed specific audiences. Instead, the public sphere of this study's subtitle denotes the population at large, but not, for example, cabinet ministers during audiences, to which this would equally apply.

Related to this is the second unanswered conceptual question: despite the centrality of symbolic power to the study's argument, Watanabe-O'Kelly does not define exactly where new emperors' agency was located. Symbolic power entailed self-staging, and this often involved a range of officials, artists and the emperors themselves. Many of these are mentioned throughout this study, but an argument which would have elevated this to a conceptual level about the exact location of monarchical agency is not provided. Moreover, the study would have benefitted from drawing a more systematic distinction between the imperial office, including its constitutional prerogatives, and the holder of the office. This would have made clearer when the projecting of imperial power derived from its institutional basis—such as military or religious roles—and when the projection resulted from the holder's ideas or his or her persona—the charisma.

The study contains several statements about the Hohenzollern monarchy which run counter to recent scholarship. Watanabe-O'Kelly argues for example that 'Wilhelm I rated his status as king of Prussia far more highly than he did his role as the German emperor' (p. 140). But as Jan Markert and this reviewer have shown, Wilhelm not only wanted to become German emperor, but also actively forged this role after 1871. Watanabe-O'Kelly stresses the extent to which Austria's Franz Joseph identified with the military (pp. 140, 142), but this does not prevent her from claiming that 'the Hohenzollern Wilhelm I, his son Crown Prince Friedrich, [...] and Friedrich's son Wilhelm II identified even more strongly with the military' (p. 142). It is doubtful that the Hohenzollerns were that much more military-minded than other dynasties. Rather, as Volker Sellin has shown, a monarch's military role was a

common strategy of legitimacy throughout Europe in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Watanabe-O'Kelly argues that 'Wilhelm II [...], according to Benjamin Hasselhorn, [...] spent these years [in exile] neither embittered nor plotting his return' (p. 143). However, John Röhl and Stephan Malinowski have shown that Wilhelm II was nakedly antisemitic in blaming others for his abdication and exile, and actively planned a restoration to the throne.

As a contribution to German history, this study reminds us that much of the Hohenzollern monarchy's self-staging was far from unique and should always be seen within a wider European and global context. It adds to the works of Sellin, Dieter Langewiesche and Frank Lorenz Müller in detailing the means that dynasties utilized to ensure their political reinvention and therewith survival, and goes beyond these by taking a more global perspective, including critical discussion of the place the colonies were given in the staging of imperial power. However, this does raise the question of why existing imperial monarchies such as Japan, Russia and the Ottoman Empire were not included, given that these faced many of the same challenges as the new imperial dynasties. *Projecting Imperial Power* thus takes the study of monarchies an important step forward, but also leaves many questions unanswered.

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***Muslims and the Making of Modern Europe.* By Emily Greble. New York: Oxford University Press. 2021. ix + 354 pp. £26.99 (hardback).**

The study of modern Europe has undergone significant makeovers in recent years, particularly from the perspective of integrating histories of emigration, immigration and the uneasy place of minorities—however defined—into broader accounts of continental events. To date, much of the attention has focused on displacements from the break-ups of empires, be they voluntary migrations or forced population transfers, and the demographics of decolonization. That said, there are many aspects of these movements that we understand only dimly. Among them is the political fallout resulting from the dissolution of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires across south-eastern Europe, including the combustible cultural politics associated with integrating Ottoman Muslims into new 'successor states' after the First World War and beyond. The region played host to long-simmering tensions of state-making, community-building and religious resistance amid the ruins of empire.

Emily Greble's important new book analyses many of these themes, using the history of Muslims in south-eastern Europe—and later Yugoslavia—from the 'long post-Ottoman transition' through the Second World War as her case study. Historians too often have viewed Muslims as newcomers to twentieth-century Europe, but they were integral citizens of Europe long before the First World War. Muslim communities were at the sharp end of European state interventions since the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the caliphate in 1923, and Greble chronicles in absorbing detail the reactions and resistance of Muslims to these political upheavals over the decades. What to do with Muslim citizens was at the heart of European state-making in the region for over a half a century, not least because they made up between 10 and 15 per cent of Yugoslavians by the late 1940s. Hers is a story of cultural encounter and minority rights, which also pivots on deeper questions of who and what counted as European, and her book addresses the attitudes and actions of Muslim citizens faced with these fast-changing political regimes.