

DOES DELIBERATIVE THINKING INCREASE TOLERANCE? POLITICAL TOLERANCE TOWARD INDIVIDUALS WITH DUAL CITIZENSHIP

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A growing number of states permit dual citizenship, but continued fears about communitarian values and worries about divided loyalties of dual citizens frequently boil up, leading to forms of political intolerance against such individuals. Dual-process theories argue that tolerance is more likely when people engage in deliberative (vs. intuitive) thinking in which they recognize and consider the equal rights of all citizens. We used a survey experiment to manipulate deliberative versus intuitive thinking to test whether deliberative thinking increases political tolerance of immigrant-origin individuals with dual citizenship. Using a nationally representative sample of Dutch majority members, we found that deliberative thinking can indeed increase political tolerance. This finding was robust across demographic differences in gender, age, religiosity, educational level, political orientation, and authoritarianism.

Keywords: dual-process, deliberative, tolerance

Theoretically, it has been argued that tolerance is more likely when people engage in deliberative thinking in which they recognize and consider the equal rights of

The materials and data can be found online at https://osf.io/uqxsy/?view_only=74ece37bd49640f999743661f2f4de56

This research was supported by a European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 740788).

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all citizens (Verkuyten et al., 2022). Political judgments can be based on gut-level reactions or more considered thought (Kuklinski et al., 1991). This distinction corresponds to the body of cognitive research on dual-process theories. This research distinguishes between intuitive and deliberative thinking that refers to people's spontaneous "gut feelings" as opposed to reflective responses to contested issues (Evans, 2008; Greene, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). An increasing number of studies have examined the role of deliberative thinking for human sociality, such as cooperation, altruism, honesty, and positive and negative reciprocity (see Capraro, 2019). However, to our knowledge there is no experimental evidence that deliberative thinking does indeed lead to higher political tolerance.

In the present research, we examined the key question of whether deliberative rather than intuitive thinking influences people's political tolerance of immigrants with dual citizenship. This was tested with an online experiment among a nationally representative sample of Dutch majority group members. Citizenship status has profound implications for individuals and societies, making it a major topic of study in the social sciences. Together with ethnicity, race, class, and gender, citizenship status is a central axis of differentiation and stratification in democratic societies (Massey, 2007). Hence, it is understandable that citizenship is increasingly considered in social and political psychology (e.g., Andreouli et al., 2017; Borgida et al., 2009; Stevenson et al., 2015) as it impacts on people's daily lives in many ways, including the civil, social, and political rights of individuals (Marshall, 1964). Citizenship forms the basis for determining the rights, freedoms, and responsibilities of individuals, as well as their civic and political participation in society, and it provides the foundation of democratic governance.

In the last two decades, many countries have started to permit dual citizenship, which has led to "the age of dual nationality" (Harpaz & Mateos, 2019), but also to concerns about immigrants being denied fully equal standing and being treated as "second-class citizens" (Joppke, 2010). Questions of dual citizenship for immigrants and concerns about their host national belonging have arisen in different countries. The first thing that tends to come to mind when Western Europeans think about the word *citizen* is attachments to national values and feelings of solidarity and commitment (Conover et al., 2004; Tiemeijer, 2021). Experimental research has found that immigrants' dual citizenship (compared to host-country citizenship only) elicits suspicions of divided loyalties because they are perceived as being more loyal to the country-of-origin and are considered deviant cultural members who compromise national unity (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2020; Kunst et al., 2019). Negative reactions to dual citizens are fueled by fears that dual citizens threaten the cultural uniformity and social cohesion in society (e.g., Politi, Roblain, et al., 2020). The more intuitive communitarian understanding of citizenship and the related fears imply that dual citizens are routinely ignored and denied their equal standing (Booth, 1999; Conover et al., 2004). In the Netherlands, for example, a majority of the population (60%) is against dual citizenship (Vink et al., 2019). However, in addition to the feeling that dual citizens are not fully committed to the host society and do not fully belong culturally, people might also recognize and understand that naturalization implies equal citizenship (Conover et al., 2004;

Politi, Roblain, et al., 2020). In Western societies, people tend to endorse in principle the core liberal ideal that all legal citizens have equal freedoms and rights regardless of their emotional commitments to the nation and their own culture (Wike & Simmons, 2015). From a liberal perspective unequal rights implies discrimination against dual citizens. Hence, reflecting on the position of dual citizens could interfere with spontaneous communitarian fears and make people more tolerant of these citizens exercising their political rights. However, existing research on dual citizenship and political tolerance has not examined this psychological process by testing whether deliberate thinking does indeed make people more politically tolerant of immigrants with dual citizenship.

DUAL-PROCESS THINKING AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Dual-process theories distinguish between intuitive and deliberative thinking (De Neys, 2021; Evans, 2008; Greene, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). At the core of various dual-process models lies the idea that reasoning, judgments, and decisions are a joint result of these two types of processes (Thompson, 2009). The default-interventionist model assumes that this dual process typically happens in sequence rather than in parallel (e.g., Evans, 2008; Sloman, 1996). When a problem arises, there is often a first intuitive reaction, which can be followed by a more deliberative process in which the initial evaluation may be endorsed, corrected, or overridden (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The intuitive process is considered the “default” mode for making judgments, since it costs the least motivation, time, and cognitive capacity (Smith & Collins, 2009).

Intuitive thinking can increase rejection of instrumental harm and thereby promote moral judgment (Capraro et al., 2019). However, deliberative thinking may help people change their minds about questions of justice and rights. For example, Caviola and Capraro (2020) found that promoting deliberative thinking decreases speciesism, which is associated with other forms of discrimination (Caviola et al., 2019), making it likely that deliberation decreases outgroup derogation. Asking people to reflect on moral issues (Paxton et al., 2012) and deliberative thinking can lead to less-emotion-based moral judgments (Pennycook et al., 2015) and higher social acceptance (Verkuyten et al., 2021). Similarly, adopting a mindful orientation can lead to higher acceptance of people with differing moral views (Baumgartner & Morgan, 2019). Experimentally, deliberative thinking (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Trémolière et al., 2017) might make people reconsider their intuitive negative reaction toward groups they dislike and practices they perceive as objectionable and wrong (e.g., Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Therefore, political tolerance is more likely when people engage in deliberative thinking that allows them to recognize and consider the importance of allowing all citizens the equal liberal rights to express their views and pursue their goals.

Thus, we expected that political tolerance of immigrants with dual citizenship would be higher when people were asked to engage in more deliberative and

reflective thinking compared to when people were asked to respond intuitively. This key proposition was tested in an online survey experiment conducted in the Netherlands. Online surveys tend to have relatively simple questions with short response scales that people tend to answer very quickly based on their first “gut feeling” (e.g., Krosnick, 1999; Meade & Craig, 2012; Presser & Krosnick, 2010). For the current research, this suggested that participants were likely to respond similarly if they were instructed to base their response on their intuition as when they received no instructions (control condition), which has been found previously in research on political tolerance (Kuklinski et al., 1991) and social tolerance (Verkuyten et al., 2021). We examined this suggestion by testing the statistical effect of the contrast between intuition and control. However, our key hypothesis was tested with the contrast between deliberative thinking versus intuitive thinking and control. Additionally, we examined whether the expected experimental effect of deliberative (vs. intuitive) thinking on political tolerance was similar and therefore robust across different demographic factors and individual differences variables including age, gender, educational level, religiosity, political orientation, national identification, and authoritarianism. These factors have been found to matter for the acceptance and tolerance of immigrants and dissenting others (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Dangubić et al., 2021; Sullivan & Transue, 1999), but this does not necessarily mean that they moderate the effect of deliberative versus intuitive thinking on political tolerance of dual citizens. Therefore, as an exploratory focus, the present research examined whether the above demographic and individual difference factors moderated the impact of deliberative versus intuitive thinking on the political tolerance of dual citizens.

METHOD

DATA AND PARTICIPANTS

Data were collected by Kantar, a professional survey company that maintains a panel of respondents. The study utilized an experimental design that was embedded in a larger survey about cultural diversity and intergroup relations. Questions were only answered by adult Dutch majority members (i.e., both parents born in the Netherlands) in a representative sample based on gender (51.5% female), age ($M = 48.03$, $SD = 16.99$), educational level, region, and household size. Participants were invited to participate through e-mail and filled in the questionnaire online. As part of a large data collection that involved various researchers, 816 participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions of the current experiment. Based on the classification of low, moderate, and high education of Statistics Netherlands (2021), 23.3% of these participants had a low level of education, 41.6% were moderately educated, and 35.1% were highly educated. Further, 53.1% indicated that there were religiously affiliated, and 46.9% indicated no religious affiliation. The study was pre-registered and the materials and data can be found at https://osf.io/uqxsy/?view_only=74ece37bd49640f999743661f2f4de56.

MANIPULATION

An experimental design with three conditions was used.¹ Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the three short instructions before answering seven questions about political tolerance. In the intuitive condition, respondents were asked to respond on the basis of their first emotional reaction because the interest was in people's direct feelings and not their balanced judgment ("For the following we want to ask you to give your first, spontaneous reaction and thus not to think about it further. The reason is that we are interested in people's direct emotional response and not in their balanced judgment."). In the deliberative condition, respondents were asked to think carefully before answering because the interest was in people's balanced judgment and not their first emotional reaction ("For the following we want to ask you to think carefully about your answer and not to react spontaneously. The reason is that we are interested in people's balanced judgment and not in their first emotional reaction."). In the control condition, participants did not receive any instructions before answering the questions. Similar instructions have been used successfully in previous experimental research (e.g., Capraro et al., 2019; Ferreira et al., 2006; Ranganath et al., 2008; Usher et al., 2011; Verkuyten et al., 2021).²

MEASURES

Tolerance was measured by asking: "In the Netherlands, should people with dual citizenship be allowed to . . .". This was followed by seven items with 7-point scales (1 = certainly not, 4 = neutral, 7 = certainly yes): for example, "hold public demonstrations," "organize public meetings," "give public speeches," and "found their own political organizations" ($\alpha = .94$).

Political self-placement was measured by asking respondents to indicate their political orientation on a 7-point self-placement scale ranging from "strongly left" to "strongly right." In total, 28.5% placed themselves at the political left, 32.2% at the center, and 39.3% at the political right.

National identification was measured on a 7-point scale, with two items that were positively correlated ($r = .76, p < .001$): "I identify with the Netherlands," and "I feel connected to other Dutch."

Authoritarianism was conceptualized as an underlying disposition and assessed with an extended version of the "child-rearing preference" measure that has been used successfully in previous research (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Havermans &

1. We conducted sensitivity power analyses for the effect of the deliberative, intuitive, and control conditions on tolerance for the most conservative test of sensitivity. The sensitivity power analysis (three-level analysis of variance) revealed that, at a desired power of .80 and $\alpha = .05$, the present sample was sufficient to detect small to medium sized effects ($\eta_p^2 = 0.0117$).

2. Initially, we planned to use timestamps to check if the manipulations had been successful. Unfortunately, we were not able to check this because the survey company failed to provide this information. However, other research using these manipulations has found that respondents take on average more time in the deliberative condition compared to the intuitive and control conditions, with no difference between the latter two (Verkuyten et al., 2021).

Verkuyten, 2021; Stenner, 2005). This measure is based on the conceptualization of authoritarianism as a predisposition to prioritize group authority over individual autonomy (Duckitt, 1989; Stenner, 2005). The measure therefore creates a trade-off between stimulating social conformity and obedience versus self-direction and autonomy in socializing children. Hence, the items do not reference any social groups, or political events and actors, which means that the scale is not tautological with the outgroup attitudes and behaviors that one wants to explain (Stenner, 2005). Respondents were presented with four pairs of qualities children could be taught (e.g., obeying parents versus making one's own choices) and for each of the pairs they were asked which one they considered to be more important. Subsequently, they were asked to indicate how much more important they found this quality using a 3-point scale (slightly more important, more important, or much more important). The answers to the questions for a given pair of qualities were recoded to a 6-point scale so that a higher score indicated stronger authoritarian disposition ($\alpha = .68$).

RESULTS

The experimental randomization was successful because there were no significant differences ($ps > .15$) between the three conditions for age, educational level, being religious, political orientation, national identification, and authoritarianism. This means that any differences found in political toleration between the three experimental conditions cannot be explained by condition differences in these variables.

The average political tolerance across the three experimental conditions was significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale, indicating that in general respondents were rather intolerant toward people with dual citizenship ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 1.77$, $t = -5.15$, $p < .001$).

Analysis of variance showed a significant effect of experimental condition on political tolerance, $F(2, 814) = 4.96$, $p = .007$. Subsequently, regression analysis with contrast coding was used for further analyzing the data. One contrast tested the central hypothesis on the difference in tolerance between the deliberative condition (+2) versus the intuitive and control conditions (-1, -1). The second contrast examined whether the intuitive (1) and control (-1) conditions differ from each other or rather lead to the same spontaneous online response (deliberative = 0). Table 1 shows the results of this analysis with a small total effect size (Cohen, 1988). As expected, the findings indicate that participants in the deliberative condition were more tolerant ($M = 3.91$, $SD = 1.85$), compared to participants in the intuitive ($M = 3.57$, $SD = 1.75$) and the control ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.67$) conditions together (contrast 1). Further, the means of tolerance in the control condition did not differ significantly from those in the intuitive condition (contrast 2), which supports the notion that in online surveys participants tend to respond to Likert-type questions based on their "gut reactions" and without much reflection (e.g., Krosnick, 1999; Meade & Craig, 2012). Further, we tested with an additional contrast whether the difference between the deliberative (+1) and intuitive (-1) conditions was significant, and this was found to be the case, $\beta = .11$, $SE = .09$, $t = 2.72$, $p = .007$.

TABLE 1. Political Tolerance: Standardized Effects With Standard Error for Two Contrasts

Source	β (SE)	p
Deliberative vs. intuitive/control	.095 (.043)	.007
Intuitive vs. control	.054 (.077)	.119
Multiple R^2	.012	.007
Cohen's d	.22	

ROBUSTNESS CHECK

Although our central question was whether being asked to engage in deliberate thinking leads to higher political tolerance, we also proposed examining the robustness of this effect by testing whether it varied by demographic and individual difference factors, including age, gender, religiosity, educational level, political orientation, national identification, and authoritarianism. This meant that we had to test whether these variables moderated the difference in tolerance between the deliberative condition and the other two conditions (contrast 1).

We first conducted a regression analysis with the different variables and the two contrasts entered as predictors simultaneously. The findings (see Appendix) show that older age, lower education level, lower national identification, more right-wing political orientation, and higher authoritarianism were associated with lower political tolerance. In addition, the difference between the deliberative condition and the two other conditions is still significant, with again no significant effect for the second contrast. However and more importantly, in further analyses no significant interaction effects emerged between any of the variables and the first contrast ($ps > .168$), and also not for any of the variables in interaction with the second contrast. This indicates that deliberative thinking (compared to the combined group) led to higher tolerance similarly for older and younger participants, religious and nonreligious affiliated individuals, higher and lower educated people, those with a more left-wing or right-wing political orientation, higher and lower national identifiers, and those with a stronger and weaker authoritarian predispositions.

DISCUSSION

The current research supports the theoretical prediction that deliberative thinking can lead to higher tolerance (Verkuyten et al., 2022). Specifically, political tolerance of immigrant-origin individuals with dual citizenship was higher when participants were invited to engage in reflective thinking compared to intuitive thinking or compared to a no-information control condition. Importantly, this finding was robust across demographic and individual differences in age, gender, religiosity, level of education, political orientation, national identification, and authoritarianism. In line with dual-process theories, this indicates that tolerance is more likely

when people engage in a deliberative cognitive process, which corresponds with previous empirical findings on the role of deliberative thinking for moral judgment (Marcus et al., 1995; Pennycook et al., 2014) and for social tolerance (Baumgartner & Morgan, 2019; Verkuyten et al., 2021).

To our knowledge, this research is the first to test the role of deliberative thinking for political tolerance of individuals with dual citizenship. Existing research focuses on perceived divided loyalty of dual citizens (e.g., Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2020) and communitarian fears about dual citizens threatening society's cultural identity and social solidarity (e.g., Politti, Chipeaux, et al., 2020). The focus of that research is on dual citizens being ignored and excluded, and being seen and treated as "second-class citizens" (Conover et al., 2004; Joppke, 2010; Vink et al., 2019). In line with these perceptions and fears our results show that in general respondents were rather intolerant toward immigrants with dual citizenship. However, going beyond the existing research we found that deliberative thinking can make people politically more tolerant. In addition to communitarian fears most people support the liberal principles of freedom and equality (Wike & Simmons, 2015) and these principles are likely to become more relevant when people reflect on the rights of dual citizens. Future research could examine further the role of thinking about these principles for tolerance.

Other possible directions for future research are provided by some limitations of our research. First, the results in terms of effect sizes were small (Cohen, 1988) and this is probably due to the use of survey experiments that tend to produce relatively weak experimental manipulations (Sniderman, 2018). Participants simply were instructed to either respond directly or rather to reflect before answering. However, compared to laboratory experiments, survey experiments with national sample are recognized as a powerful means for combining the internal validity of an experimental design with the possibility to draw ecologically valid and generalizable conclusions about social attitudes and beliefs (Schlueter & Schmidt, 2010; Sniderman, 2018). Furthermore, small effects can be of theoretical and practical importance (Götz et al., 2022) and similar low effect sizes have been found in experimental research on dual-process models of moral judgment (Capraro et al., 2019), intolerance (Baumgartner & Morgan, 2019), and social tolerance (Verkuyten et al., 2021). The fact that our manipulation showed the expected effect suggests that even simple online instructions can influence the degree to which individuals with quite different backgrounds and characteristics are willing to politically tolerate individuals with dual citizenship. It is likely that more extensive procedures in which people more deeply reflect on reasons for being politically tolerant toward immigrants with dual citizenship may yield stronger effects.

Second, it could be that deliberative thinking does not lead to a more careful consideration of reasons for tolerating the equal civil rights of dual citizens, but rather to socially desirable responding to appear egalitarian. However, previous experimental research using a similar experimental manipulation found that recognizing and reflecting on possible negative consequences that political adversaries can have on social cohesion and public order lead to lower tolerance (Kuklinski et al., 1991). Furthermore, the provision of complete anonymity in online surveys

has been found to minimize social desirability pressures on self-report measures (e.g., Lautenschlager & Flaherty, 1990; Stark et al., 2019), as was tested in a survey-embedded experiment in Germany and the Netherlands (Bamberg & Verkuyten, 2021). Complete anonymity is rather more likely to decrease participants' motivation to respond carefully and thoughtfully (Lelkes et al., 2012). The reason is that anonymity removes any sense of accountability for one's answers and thereby the level of cognitive engagement that might explain why in the intuitive and control conditions the level of tolerance was similar (Krosnick, 1999).

Third, on average people were rather intolerant toward immigrant-origin individuals with dual citizenship, but the current data did not allow us to filter out respondents who disliked such individuals. Theoretically, political tolerance implies accepting the equal rights of disliked groups (Gibson, 2006), and not being able to exclude respondents who have positive feelings toward immigrants might have resulted in reduced overall intolerance. However, since the experiment was randomized, differences in dislike of immigrants will not explain the differences in political tolerance that we found between the experimental conditions. Nonetheless, future research could examine whether and how people's feelings toward immigrants with dual citizenship affect their deliberative thinking and political tolerance. For example, it might be the case that the positive effect of deliberative thinking on tolerance differs for those who are somewhat negative compared to those who are strongly negative toward immigrants with dual citizenship. The latter might be more inclined to show a pattern of reactance when asked to think about political rights of dual citizens. In doing so, it might also be relevant to consider the reasons that immigrants give for wanting to have host national citizenship. Research has shown that majority members are more positive toward immigrants who want to have a host-country passport for symbolic-emotional reasons (e.g., sense of belonging and commitment) compared to strategic-instrumental reasons (e.g., insurance policy or as a premium passport; Dittmann et al., 2011). These reasons have been found to affect how people think about the naturalization of immigrants (e.g., Politti, Chipeaux, et al., 2020) and might also influence people's political tolerance.

Fourth, it is likely that situational conditions affect people's tendency to engage in deliberative thinking for tolerance. Specifically, situations and events that are construed as threatening will make tolerance more difficult and those who feel more threatened by others' conduct are less likely to tolerate them (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). According to the dual-process model, feelings of fear and anxiety decrease the availability of cognitive resources, and thereby interfere with reflective thinking (Trémolière et al., 2012). This makes reflective thinking about one's initial negative reaction less likely, irrespective of the values and considerations that one can have for being politically tolerant. We did not examine whether dual citizens are perceived as a threat, which would make intuitive intolerance more likely. Future work could examine the role of perceived threats in moderating the effects of intuitive versus deliberative thinking on political tolerance in general and of immigrants with dual citizenship in particular.

Finally, future work should examine the generality of the current findings in other national contexts. There are cross-national differences in the degree of tolerance in the social and the political domain (e.g., Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Weldon, 2006), even between neighboring countries such as Germany and the Netherlands (Erisen & Kentmen-Chin, 2017). These national differences may be grounded in political, legal, economic, and historical circumstances. For example, research has found that country differences in citizenship regimes (laws governing the acquisition and expression of citizenship) affect peoples’ tolerance of ethnic minorities via their national identification and satisfaction with democracy (Weldon, 2006). However, these differences in tolerance do not imply that the thinking processes underlying tolerance are different. Specifically, the difference between intuitive and deliberative thinking is unlikely to be culture specific (Yama, 2018), and neither is the need to weigh different reasons involved in political tolerance.

In conclusion, citizenship is a critical topic of interest in the social sciences because it is a major determinant of people’s rights and a force of justice, equality, and national cohesion. Turning immigrants into fellow citizens can promote their sociopolitical integration (Hainmueller et al., 2017), but it can also raise suspicions about divided loyalties. Dual citizenship can trigger multiple loyalty concerns (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2020) and dual citizens can intuitively be treated with “double standards” facing political intolerance. However, the current work reveals that this intolerance can be reduced by asking people to reflect on their views and try to give a balanced judgment on the political participation and rights of immigrant-origin individuals with dual citizenship. Future research should examine the positive effects of deliberate thinking on other forms of political and social tolerance, as well as when and why this positive effect is less and more likely (Verkuyten et al., 2022).

APPENDIX

TABLE A1. Political Tolerance: Standardized Effects (Betas) With Standard Errors and Significance for the Two Contrasts and the Different Measures

	β (SE)	<i>p</i>
Deliberative vs. intuitive/control	.069 (.043)	.046
Intuitive vs. control	.056 (.078)	.106
Age	-.119 (.004)	.001
Gender	.040 (.127)	.261
Religiosity	.034 (.033)	.331
Political orientation	-.275 (.047)	< .001
Educational level	.172 (.036)	< .001
Authoritarianism	-.238 (.070)	< .001
Multiple <i>R</i> ²	.260	

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