



Understanding Solidarity in Society: Triggers and Barriers for In- and Outgroup Solidarity

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Introduction

As we have seen in the Introductory chapter, **solidarity** is essentially about common identity and sameness (Chap. 1, this volume). This collective identity forms the foundation for intragroup relations (Chap. 2, this volume). In this chapter, we take a closer look at *solidarity* (to *whom* do we owe) in relation to distributive *social justice* (*what* do we owe). We will do so on both the social and the individual level guided by two main questions: (1) Why do people express solidarity with ‘the other’ (**inclusionary outgroup solidarity**), see also intergroup solidarity in Chap. 2, this volume) in addition to, or instead of, with ‘the same’ (**exclusionary ingroup solidarity**)? (2) What does solidarity imply at the macro-meso level of society, and what are social-psychological triggers of solidarity? In reviewing psychological and sociological literature, the chapter will highlight (a) the way solidarity can be inclusive as well as exclusive, and (b) triggers and barriers of solidarity between different identities, groups and communities. The chapter will conclude that new forms of inclusive

outgroup solidarity are a reaction to the absence of civic solidarity (within and between groups, sometimes referred to as collective solidarity) by including marginalized people. These new forms of solidarity challenge existing boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, requiring new modes of identification and classification. The ambiguity inherent to solidarity practices of including and excluding others also asks for a revision of solidarity theory.¹

Forms of Solidarity: To Whom Do We Owe?

According to Bayertz (1999), solidarity implies a mutual attachment between individuals on both a factual (i.e., in practice) and a normative (i.e., expected) level. The basic assumption of solidarity theory, then, is that individuals are not solidaristic with just anyone. Bayertz distinguishes four forms of solidarity, highlighting what solidarity is and whom solidarity concerns: (1) **Human solidarity**, which focuses on the ties between human beings, and which originally had a naturalistic ground (family ties, blood relations); (2)

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Social solidarity, which refers to solidarity as the ‘cement’ for the cohesion of society. Solidaristic feelings are in this perspective related to a shared history or a shared culture; (3) **Political solidarity** has a more active connotation and refers to a group of individuals standing up for their common interests; and lastly; (4) **Civic solidarity** reflects measures that are taken by welfare states to redistribute wealth and which forms the basic legitimation of the welfare state. In this latter instance, solidarity is not necessarily tied to a moral duty (on an individual basis) but is legally formalized through welfare state institutions (Bayertz, 1999; Scholz, 2007).

We signal two problems with Bayertz’ overview of solidarity forms. First, it does not distinguish between the subjects and the objects of solidarity – that is, the actors and the goods – thereby running the risk of confusing solidarity and social justice. Solidarity theory mostly focuses on the actors involved (to whom do we owe), while social justice, in particular distributive justice, is about what is redistributed (resources, goods, means). In Bayertz’ overview however, human and social solidarity refer purely to the actors involved: family members and the community. In contrast, political solidarity lacks such a unit of actors by only describing the goods that are the object of solidarity, namely interests of any kind. The definition of civic solidarity describes the actor, being the collective of citizens in a welfare state, as well as the goods that are the object of solidarity: the wealth to be redistributed. A second critique concerns the assumption of the exclusiveness underlying each of these forms of solidarity, which is also recognized by Bayertz. In his words: “One is solidary with those to whom one is close due to some common ground: a shared history, shared feelings, convictions or interests. In this sense, a particularistic – maybe even exclusive – dimension is inherent in the general use of the term solidarity” (Bayertz, 1999, p. 8). However, solidarity is not always exclusive; inclusionary outgroup solidarity also occurs.

Exclusionary ingroup solidarity comes to the fore when the ingroup intentionally or unintentionally excludes others outside the group. Such

exclusionary ingroup solidarity can take on multiple forms: when welfare state politicians reserve – and are elected for – a welfare state aimed only at ‘our own people’ (i.e., welfare chauvinism, see Chap. 14, this volume); when mafia families protect their kin at all costs; and when neighbourhoods object against social housing for immigrants, for example. In contrast to exclusive ingroup solidarity, *inclusionary outgroup* solidarity comes to the fore in solidaristic expressions, behaviour and activities on behalf of people outside our ingroup. Examples include protests of men in India against the group rape of women, white people’s support for the Black Lives Matter movement, in the public welcoming of refugees, and in volunteer activities in food banks on behalf of the poor. Recent developments show multiple forms of outgroup solidarity that are currently disregarded in solidarity theories. In general, inclusionary outgroup solidarity does not take a prominent place in solidarity theory and is sometimes even assumed to be exceptional. Social justice theory can be a helpful addition for explaining inclusionary outgroup solidarity.

Social Justice: What Do We Owe?

Social justice concerns the distribution and allocation of resources for fulfilling needs of people who deserve support, and as such it is subject of contentious – often political – debate (see Chap. 4, this volume). A wider definition of social justice also includes procedural justice, that is, the way in which distributive justice is to be achieved (see Chaps. 1 and 4, this volume). However, procedural justice is also the subject of contestation. For reasons of clarity, we therefore focus only on redistributive social justice in this chapter.

Criteria of needs and deservingness are not easy to formulate. What do people need and what are legitimate grounds for claims? In general, resources could be distributed according to rights, demands, claims, or wants. However, framing social justice in a needs-discourse adds an important emotive element, thereby enforcing people to feel responsible (Woodhead, 1997). As Fraser

(1990) argues, groups of citizens with a shared trait or interest (the ingroup) politicize needs by framing their rights or demands in a needs-discourse. Expectations about who should fulfil those needs and for whom, differ across forms of solidarity (as described, for instance, by Bayertz, 1999). This redistribution of resources to fulfil needs relates to what we understand as social justice. In most cases we do not ask just any fellow citizen to provide housing for us if the welfare state fails to provide sufficient houses, nor do we expect our parents to secure our pensions, or our neighbours to assist us in taking care of our mother suffering from dementia. Conversely, we do not expect a civil servant to assist us in fixing our broken window if we failed to take out insurance for such situations. In short: we expect various needs to be accommodated by different social domains: the family, the community or the collectivity of citizens (the welfare state). This is part of a continuous redefinition of *to whom we owe* solidarity, and who can claim solidarity. Extending from this aspect of solidarity, *what we owe* to other people (and thus, what is just) depends on how we define needs, an important criterium of deservingness.

As outlined by van Oorschot (2000, see also Chap. 6, this volume), five criteria define the conditionality of deservingness: (1) Control; the less control people have over their neediness, the more deserving they are of solidary actions, (2) Need; when needs are high, people are more deserving, (3) Identity; the closer to ‘us’ people are, the more deserving they are, (4) Attitude; the more docile, grateful or compliant, the more deserving people are, and (5) Reciprocity; having earned support in earlier times, the more deserving people are of solidary support. Van Oorschot’s original research shows that of these five criteria, control appears to be the most important one, followed by needs and identity (van Oorschot, 2000). His research also shows that there are differences between two groups of people in the “strictness” with which they uphold these criteria; lower-educated, older people and those with lower socio-economic status (SES) appear to be stricter about the deservingness criteria than higher-educated, younger and higher SES peo-

ple. One explanation may be that people who are ‘better-off’ have more to gain from a more universalistic solidarity system. Another explanation may be that those ‘not-so-well-off’ see ‘others’ as more direct competitors for solidarity schemes (van Oorschot, 2000). Follow-up research on the CARIN criteria, however, shows that the hierarchy of deservingness criteria is less stable, depending upon (1) the target group (for instance migrants or lone mothers); (2) individual ideological perceptions or socio-economic status; and (3) context-specific factors (e.g., socio-economic conditions and welfare regime types (for an overview, see Chap. 6, this volume).

Macro–/Meso-level Solidarity: Sociological Ideas About Social Justice and Solidarity

From a sociological (macro/meso) perspective, there are several triggers and barriers to solidarity and processes of boundary drawing which affect social justice principles. Civic solidarity, or what is also more commonly referred to as ‘collective’ solidarity (Bayertz, 1999; van der Veen, 2012) is situated at the macro level. There politicians and policymakers decide upon and implement social justice by measures relating to the redistribution of resources via a variety of institutions. Triggers for social justice refer to the ‘why?’ question (Blau & Abramovitz, 2004), such as: Why have higher education scholarships declined, elderly homes closed, and social assistance been made increasingly conditional in recent decades? This redistribution often follows politicized definitions of categorical needs and may thereby become a barrier to collective solidarity. For instance, pensions for older people versus higher education scholarships for younger generations (see also Chap. 10, this volume). Comparably, the current refugee crisis stirred heated debates about the protection of ‘native’ Europeans’ privileges over the rights of refugee newcomers (regarding housing and welfare benefits; see also Chap. 14, this volume). In response to such measures and debates, citizens may endeavour to fill the gaps left by politicians and policymakers,

thereby acting in either the interest of their ingroup – for instance by protesting an asylum centre – or in the interest, of outgroups by responding to the needs related to these gaps, for instance, supporting language training for refugees.

Post-war welfare states aimed to be inclusive by guaranteeing **citizenship rights**, i.e., citizens' rights to have basic needs fulfilled as a right of citizenship rather than charity. Marshall (1950) defined social citizenship rights as the right to income, work, healthcare, education, and housing (see also Chap. 5, this volume). The combination of these social rights allows citizens of a welfare state to fully participate in society. On the one hand, these rights aim towards economic prosperity (maximum employment and security), on the other hand, they include moral principles: social justice for all and solidarity between high-risk and low-risk groups (such as collective health insurance; van der Veen, 2012). These social citizenship rights suit the idea that more equal societies are beneficial for all people involved (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), as well as suiting more general ideas about the interdependency between individuals (van der Veen, 2012). Due to political, social and economic developments, however, moral principles underlying the welfare state as expressed in social justice are weakened, and solidarity faces increasing layers of conditionality since the 1980s (Kampen et al., 2020).

In general, solidarity becomes problematic when questions arise about the 'we' in the solidarity group. For instance, a national identity can become contested when there is a high influx of migrants, or when a higher-order identity is asked for (e.g., being Dutch versus being European; Hollinger, 2006; Hogg & Haines, 1996). Similarly, solidarity can become contested when new identities suddenly become prominent, such as 'generational identity' in a debate about pensions (see Chap. 10, this volume) or vulnerabilities during a pandemic (see Chap. 19, this volume). These contestations lead to **boundary drawing**, i.e., processes of inclusion and exclusion regarding the 'scope of justice', and this occurs across civic, social and familial solidarity. Classical sociological theories based on Durkheim's and Weber's

seminal work explain this boundary drawing through the functionality of the solidarity imperative, either on behalf of mutual interests and interdependency, or on behalf of cultural empathetical bonds. In the former, we are solidaristic with others who share the same interests but exclude those whose interests may counter ours. In the latter we are solidaristic with groups and individuals with whom we share social and cultural identities (see van Oorschot & Komter, 1998; van Oorschot, 2000, see also Chap. 1, this volume). In both cases, the issues of 'owing' to others and claiming one's 'due' represent the most stringent obligations regarding social justice. Ignoring these obligations might lead to exclusion from the civic, social and/or family spheres. At the level of civic solidarity (e.g., citizenship) Knijn et al. (2020) distinguish three additional criteria that simultaneously represent arguments for boundary drawing between citizen and non-citizens. **Territorial affectedness** assumes a political community whose members are equally affected by the community's decisions and therefore, have the claim to participate in making these decisions. This excludes all non-citizens who are affected by the community's decision making, for example, Afghani interpreters who served the Dutch government who are not involved in the decision of whether they were granted asylum when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. **Sedentariness** points to the idea that citizens have long-term ties to a specific territory, an argument that is challenged by the EU's labour migration policies (e.g., unprotected work migrants within the EU who are not sedentary but mobile). Finally, **national belonging** presupposes some form of ethnic belonging to the imagined community (Anderson, 1983) as the pre-condition for granting citizenship. Given the multi-cultural composition of populations all over Europe, such an argument is difficult to maintain.

Yet, boundary drawing also takes place on the basis of 'social' features such as income, educational level, or job status (Hollinger, 2006; Sandel, 2020). According to Putnam (2007, p. 173), people are able to create "new cross-cutting forms of solidarity and more encompassing identities" when confronted with outgroups.

Nonetheless, social identity is an important source for social power and exclusion; the categorization that takes place in the communication to form an ingroup can equally be used to form an outgroup (e.g., Chap. 2, this volume). In other words, the same elements can be used to ‘produce’ solidarity or antagonism. Overall, the perception is that solidarity inherently has inclusive and exclusive elements (Ross, 2010).

To establish social justice for all, a minority group, based on the construction of a shared identity, needs to revolt against the established authority (e.g., the government or executive boards). Here, the role of the majority population (usually silent about controversial topics) as well as the social-political context (dominant political parties, media, and social partners) needs to be considered (Subasic et al., 2008; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The majority population and people in positions of authority and power usually share values and interests, while the minority group tries to play into this alliance. In that process, a shifting is required between ‘me’ and ‘us’ and between ‘us’ and ‘them’ by influencing and persuading the majority population to alter their alliances (Subasic et al., 2008; Mouffe, 2005). For the authority to re-establish social stability, processes of re-categorization need to take place. From this perspective, “solidarity implies that people are united *not only despite group differences but precisely because we are different*” (Subasic et al., 2008, p. 337 (italics added); Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Solidarity has a fundamentally active character, and implies a transformative capacity (Ross, 2010). According to Simon and Klandermans (2001), expanding solidarity to marginalized groups assumes the formation of a “**politicized collective identity**”. Three steps are required to come to such a formation: an awareness of shared grievances, blaming an external “enemy” and involving or getting the support of society. Grievances often stem from issues like illegitimate injustice (for instance when legal rights are withheld from marginalized populations), violated principles (e.g., when the principle of equality is violated by disrespect for low income or LGBTI persons) or threatened privileges (e.g.,

when unemployment benefits are reduced) (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). The transformative capacity of solidarity may well take place on the grounds of the earlier-mentioned criteria of deservingness as formulated by van Oorschot (2000): lack of control, high needs, framing and classifying identities, or emphasizing attitudes and forms of reciprocity may establish a sense of solidarity in the ‘(silent) majority population.’ A lack of social change is mostly due to ‘failing’ to persuade the majority to change their alliances (Subasic et al., 2008). Such ideas about the development of solidary action are in line with the sociologist Tilly’s (1999, p. 256) argumentation that solidaristic movements are not coherent groups but rather “a cluster of performances.” Moreover, Tilly (1999) introduces the concept of *opportunity hoarding*, i.e., controlling access to resources by privileged groups, which is not so much motivated by outgroup antipathy to outsiders but mainly by *ingroup favouritism* expressed in protecting the vested interests of those already ‘in’ the group.

Power relations are an important aspect in boundary drawing by way of “choosing” solidarities; some (groups of) people have more authority over whom or what they want to identify with than others (Hollinger, 2006; Nadler, 2002). Theoretically, the **Social Dominance Theory (SDT)** explains the way in which both social discourse and individual and institutional behaviour contribute to and are affected by a (group-based) social hierarchy, reflecting differences in power. SDT relates this social hierarchy to the ‘profit’ some groups have regarding their social and economic value (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). From a political-economic perspective, solidarity raises questions about whose energies and resources can be claimed (Hollinger, 2006), or what Lindenberg (1998) calls ‘solidarity costs’. Although people are all capable of multiple solidarities and affiliations, a finite set of resources and energies limits people’s capacities for social justice and solidarity in terms of setting priorities (Hollinger, 2006). Consequently, the state must play a role in the issue of solidarity, and it does so by exercising power in a twofold way. First, by boundary drawing on the basis of a categorical

differentiation of individuals (i.e., their identities, nationalities, needs and rates of deservingness). Second, by considering the redistribution of resources in achieving social justice. Then, the state decides on who must take responsibility: will social justice be achieved through public responsibility? Or are responsibilities decentralized, to the local level, the community, or the family? With respect to the latter, a shift in responsibilities has taken place in Western welfare states in recent decades, downplaying the collective role of the state and increasing the role of decentralized local governments, markets and families (Knijn, 2000; Knijn & Hopman, 2015).

Micro-level Solidarity: Psychological Ideas on Solidarity

It is also possible to distinguish several triggers and barriers to solidarity and processes of boundary drawing regarding solidarity that affect social justice from a micro perspective. Solidarity is not only characterized by a political-economic structure, but also by a social-psychological structure (Hollinger, 2006). As noted above, triggers for social justice and solidarity ask for conscious commitment and are usually based on a shared interest or a shared trait (Hollinger, 2006, p. 24). Boundary drawing based on identification may indeed be a choice (see e.g., Benhabib, 1996) because humans have multiple, sometimes even overlapping, cross-cutting or conflicting, identities, and are capable of multiple solidarities. Whether or not a particular social identity becomes salient, depends upon both person-variables (i.e., 'readiness') and social context-variables (i.e., 'fit') (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Readiness and fit partly depend upon prior life circumstances, which can make people susceptible to specific issues (e.g., belonging to an ethnic minority group). They also partly depend upon intra-individual changes across the life course: changes in life can 'instigate' new susceptibilities (e.g., encountering gender discrimination or, in contrast, feeling insulted by gender equality). Next to this, an identity must be meaningful in the social con-

text; ethnic identity might be a relevant and salient issue in experiencing (a lack of) access to the labour market but may hardly be experienced on a more personal level, for instance in the context of family relations, while the opposite might be true for a religious identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Identification processes matter and they vary whether it relates to defining oneself and defining one's group membership. As Putnam (2007) points out, a religious identity might be important to someone personally, maybe even more so than his/her ethnic identity, but religious differences may not be a salient marker in defining the social identity. Religious identities have, for the most part, become permeable (Putnam, 2007). Ethnic identity in contrast, might be a more salient factor for social identity and consequently be more important in solidaristic practices, if only because of the state-based categorization of identities that either stimulate diversity or attempt to stipulate differences between natives and outsiders (Putnam, 2007). Moreover, Hogg and Haines (1996) have pointed out that high status groups often (incorrectly) perceive their status as stable and tend to believe their status is legitimate.

It could be argued that the difference between exclusionary ingroup and inclusionary outgroup solidarity is related to which 'factor' is triggered: exclusionary ingroup solidarity is triggered through opportunity hoarding and ingroup favoritism (Tilly, 1999), while inclusionary outgroup solidarity is triggered through a broader social justice scope, leaving room for defining a cause or a need (e.g., poverty) as 'unjust'. At the same time, it should be noted that an act of solidarity may include both forms of solidarity. For instance, the well-known group *Women on Waves* shows practices of exclusionary ingroup solidarity by fighting for the rights of women only (specifically related to abortion rights). At the same time, this group could be defined as inclusionary outgroup solidarity when taking into consideration elements such as nationality, religion, ethnicity, etc. Again, which identifying factor is salient may be decisive in determining which form of solidarity is evident. Therefore, solidarity definitions based on identity and identification

might be too static to explain inclusionary outgroup solidarity. Such definitions neglect to recognize that some people might also be triggered by deservingness and needs (social justice), no matter whom it concerns. Moreover, identity-based definitions of solidarity ignore multiple identities, the permeability of identities, and the legitimation of related statuses.

A further critique of identity-based definitions of solidarity is that being aware of a social problem and identifying with that social problem does not necessarily mean people come into action to address the problem, nor that they uphold a long-term alliance to it. For instance, Kawakami and colleagues showed that what people think or believe might not be congruent with how they act and may thus not be enough to overcome (or recognize) implicit attitudes (Kawakami et al., 2007; Kawakami et al., 2009). According to Thomas et al. (2009, p. 195) a sustainable commitment to action is “a process of crafting a social identity that has a relevant congruent pattern of norms for action, emotion and efficacy”. Social action will only take place when group norms relating to action, emotion and efficacy align.

Individuals come to such an alignment of norms by deducing identity and norms through various information sources, as well as inductively through ingroup communication, negotiation, and the resulting consensus building. Communication about the group simultaneously helps to establish funding, increase membership et cetera, thereby solidifying a group’s base (Thomas et al., 2009). According to these authors, efficacy is not so much related to actual change (“effectiveness”), but rather to a group’s belief in change and the probability that things *can* change. Thomas and colleagues therefore claim that “empowerment is the outcome of the alignment processes” (Thomas et al., 2009: 213). Efficacy is also related to the expected efficacy of the form of help that is offered (Lepianka, 2012). Emotion, or even outrage, plays a central role in motivating people for action (see e.g., Thomas et al., 2009; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Hogg & Haines, 1996). However, an important distinction needs to be made between emotion on behalf of the self (**defensive anger**) and emotion on behalf of a (political) collective (**moral anger**; (Mouffe,

2009; Ruitenberg, 2009; compare also to group-based relative deprivation, Chap. 2, this volume)). Defensive anger is not necessarily solidaristic as it usually stems from a threat to one’s own privileges (exclusionary ingroup solidarity). Moral anger, in contrast, stems from feelings of injustice and inequality – which may be related to one’s own group or to other groups – and may consequently lead to exclusionary ingroup or inclusionary outgroup solidarity.

Superordinate goals, support for intergroup contact and equal group status are decisive factors in establishing exclusionary ingroup cooperation and solidarity (Sherif, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998). Power relations, however, can also have a detrimental effect on social justice and solidarity: the profit of some ingroups (economically and/or socially) helps maintain a social hierarchy, for instance through social discourse and institutional behaviour (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). This social hierarchy also affects the choices that are made regarding the redistribution of resources (Hollinger, 2006), where a scarcity of resources means a struggle over these resources between antagonistic groups. In order to gain a fair share of resources, a minority group needs to ally with the majority population. (Subasic et al., 2008). Failing to persuade this majority creates a barrier to social justice given a lack of inclusionary outgroup solidarity.

Conclusion: Social Justice and Solidarity

Solidarity has always been a contested subject. As Ross has argued, “solidarity is the periodic specifications of social bonds in a political perspective” (2010, p. 8). Social identity might bind people together (exclusionary ingroup solidarity) and also offers options for inclusionary outgroup bonding (Putnam, 2007). Framing solidarity in a social justice-based needs-discourse helps establish solidary feelings and actions (Fraser, 1990, but see also van Oorschot, 2000).

In this chapter, we have theoretically distinguished between solidarity (to whom do we owe) and social justice (what do we owe), showing that both concepts are intertwined though separate,

and relate to macro-meso sociological and micro-psychological processes. On both levels, social identifications, interests, and socio-cultural contexts, such as power relations, the scarcity of resources and – media – (information), triggers or drives social justice and solidarity as well as boundary drawing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Moreover, we have indicated that at the macro-level, social institutions like the family, the community, and the state each have their own criteria for solidarity based on who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, as well as based on what resources are redistributed within the specific sphere. At the micro-level, we saw that identity-based solidarity only partly explains ‘to whom we owe’. This leaves room for inclusionary outgroup solidarity because identities are not fixed, can develop, or change during the life course, and because individuals are able to overcome self-interests if they observe injustice or violated principles. In sum, we have critically evaluated some solidarity theories that assume mainly exclusionary ingroup solidarity based on self-interest, functionality and ingroup identification. We have also challenged the assumption that social justice can only exist on the basis of exclusionary ingroup solidarity and have shown that other options are possible.

If we apply the theoretical insights to current debates and policies, we note that the past decades show quite a few examples of exclusionary ingroup as well as of inclusionary outgroup solidarity. As presented in this chapter, exclusionary ingroup solidarity occurs when people demonstrate against asylum seeker centres, while inclusionary outgroup solidarity occurs when volunteers help refugees by providing language training. Likewise, at the moment of writing, a cross-border European collective of journalists ‘Lost in Europe’² draws attention to the fact that during the last three years, 18,000 minors have disappeared from asylum centres that are legally

obliged to protect them (according to EU law). In the meantime, no coordinated police action nor EU-coordinated policy has been initiated to protect these children, most of whom are trafficked for drugs crime, prostitution, or equivalent slave labour. At the same time, we note that throughout Europe, volunteers and activists put effort into filling the gaps that the civic solidarity of welfare states leaves behind.

The state (as representative of the collective of citizens, i.e., the majority population) plays a role in the issue of solidarity by exercising power to discursively and institutionally categorize individuals (i.e., assign them with an identity that is not necessarily of one’s own choosing), partly and by setting criteria for the redistribution of resources such as education, income and health-care. On the one hand, the nation state tends to draw boundary lines between citizens on the basis of territorial belongings, sedentariness and ethnicity (see above), through institutionalized racism in tax policies, by policing ethnic minority neighbourhoods, or by withholding resources for minority education (Bugra & Akkan, 2020; Lepianka, 2019). These ‘state-based’ boundaries also make it harder – if not impossible – for people to show solidarity. At the same time, the collectivity of citizens has an interest in social cohesion and accommodating the social integration of all identities and social groups that partake in society. This results in a fluid and continuous debate about solidarity and social justice. A debate in which some will choose the option to align only with those with whom one can identify, and others will choose to be solidaristic with all, independent of age, ethnicity, ability or descent. A debate which also centres on what we should share, and what needs should be addressed to guarantee equal participation in society.

This debate on solidarity and social justice will continue. In this chapter we combined a review of sociological and psychological literature to better understand (a) the way solidarity can be inclusive as well as exclusive; and (b) the triggers and barriers of social justice and the way boundaries are drawn in solidarity between dif-

²See <https://lostineurope.eu/> (last accessed 24 July 2021). This team of investigative journalists from the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Germany, France, Greece, Romania and the UK, collaborate to find out what has happened to the disappeared children in Europe.

ferent groups and communities. A main conclusion is that theoretically, no strict division can be made between inclusionary and exclusionary solidarity. Institutional settings (family, community, or citizenry) as well as identities, are fluid entities that define the scope, meaning and significance of 'to whom we owe what'. New forms of solidarity developed in the past decades, that challenge the boundaries of 'us' and 'them', and which ask for new modes of identification and classification. They also ask for a revision of solidarity theory, which allows for the ambiguity of including and excluding others in solidarity practices.

Identity takes centre stage in sociological as well as social-psychological solidarity theories. These theories (van Oorschot, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Turner & Reynolds, 2012; see also Chap. 2, this volume) assume identification is restricted to the ingroup, sharing the same habits, norms, and values. At the same time, shared interests and power relations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tilly, 1999) explain acts and practices of solidarities based on ingroup identification. People might adhere to solidarity with those with whom they identify based on a single characteristic; being a woman, a farmer, a Moroccan-Dutch youngster, a queer, or a white pensioner. In the real world, however, such one-dimensional identifications are scarce. Therefore, an important amendment to the identification assumption is that social identity is neither fixed nor one-dimensional.

Interestingly, new forms of solidarity show that solidarity also goes in the opposite direction, through identification with 'the other': people from backgrounds varying in class, ethnicity or nationality. Inclusionary outgroup solidarity develops to resettle questions of social justice, driven by feelings of shame about the shortcomings of public policy, by superordinate goals (Sherif, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998) or by moral anger (Thomas et al., 2009) and informed by a needs-discourse (Fraser, 1990).

Nonetheless, ambiguity remains. Social justice-oriented solidarity initiatives confront nation

states and their populations with a tendency to confirm the status quo by making choices regarding the redistribution of resources and the recognition of identities (Hollinger, 2006; Fraser, 2009; Knijn & Lepianka, 2020).

Glossary

Boundary drawing: the process of including or excluding others based on social, economic, political and/or cultural lines between "us" and "them".

Civic solidarity: solidarity in the form of measures that are taken by welfare states to redistribute wealth. It forms the basic legitimation of the welfare state.

Defensive anger: an angry emotion on behalf of the self.

Exclusionary ingroup solidarity: solidarity between a group of people based on a shared identity, common interests and/or social-cultural or territorial heritage, thereby excluding those who do not share that identity, interest, or heritage.

Human solidarity: solidarity based on the ties between human beings, which originally had a naturalistic ground (family ties, blood relations).

Inclusionary outgroup solidarity: solidarity with groups/individuals who have different identities, interests and/or social-cultural or territorial heritage than oneself.

Moral anger: an angry emotion on behalf of a (political) collective.

National belonging: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the assumption of some form of ethnic belonging to an imagined community.

Political solidarity: solidarity between a group of individuals standing up for their common interests. It has a more activist connotation compared to other forms of solidarity.

Politicized collective identity: commitment of (a group of) people to address authority and majority norms in order to expand solidarity to marginalized groups.

Sedentariness: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the idea that citizens have long-term ties to a specific territory.

Social Dominance Theory (SDT): social scientific theory that explains the way in which both social discourse and individual and institutional behaviour contribute to and are affected by a (group-based) social hierarchy. SDT relates this to the ‘profit’ some groups have regarding their social and economic value.

Social justice: concerns the distribution and allocation of resources for fulfilling needs of people who deserve support and the way in which this distributive justice is to be achieved.

Social solidarity: solidarity as the ‘cement’ for the cohesion of society, it relates to a shared history or a shared culture between (groups of) people.

Solidarity: an agreement of feeling to *whom* do we owe.

Territorial affectedness: criteria for inclusion or exclusion of citizenship based on the assumption that there is a community whose members are equally affected by the community’s decisions and therefore have a claim to participate in making these decisions.

Comprehension Questions

1. What are potential justifications for exclusionary ingroup solidarity and what justifies inclusionary outgroup solidarity? Can you give some examples of both forms of solidarity that are not mentioned in the chapter?
2. Can you explain the process of boundary drawing and how this relates to the inclusion and exclusion of solidarity?
3. According to Simon and Klanderman, what kind of process needs to take place in order to expand solidarity to marginalized groups?
4. Can you explain the difference between sedentariness, national belonging, and territorial affectedness as criteria for the inclusion/exclusion of citizenship?

Discussion Questions

To what extent do you agree with the authors’ assumption that solidarity theories based on identity and identification are too static to fully explain the concept of solidarity? Why? Based on what you’ve learned in this chapter, do you think contemporary societies are characterized more by exclusionary ingroup solidarity or inclusionary outgroup solidarity? Why?

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