

‘To tolerate or not to tolerate?’

Reasons for tolerance of minority group practices among majority members in the Netherlands and Germany



Evi Velthuis

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‘To tolerate or not to tolerate?’

Reasons for tolerance of minority group practices among majority members in the Netherlands and Germany

‘Tolereren of niet tolereren?’
Redenen voor tolerantie ten aanzien van gebruiken van minderheden in Nederland en Duitsland

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Discussion

1.1 Research objectives

In October 2021, the Council of Europe launched a video campaign which pictured the headscarf as representing freedom, stating it is Muslim women's free choice to wear the headscarf, and advocating for respect for women who choose to veil. Immediately this led to strong negative responses especially in France, whose State Secretary for Youth claimed that the video "is the opposite of the values France is standing up for", and prominent French politicians construed the headscarf as a symbol of submission rather than free choice of women (BBC, 2021; Darmanin, 2021; Renout, 2021). Following this backlash, the Council of Europe withdrew the video and co-organizer Femyso's president[1] implied that these politicians' responses were intolerant, as "those who claim to represent or protect notions such as liberty, equality and freedom" were not protecting this freedom to the same extent for Muslim women (BBC, 2021).

This example illustrates the often heated debate that is taking place in many West European countries about (in)tolerance of minority practices such as the wearing of the Muslim headscarf (e.g., by teachers or civil servants working in public institutions) and the accommodation of Muslim minorities more broadly. The campaign and its responses reflect arguments both in favor and against the wearing of headscarves. On the one hand, the campaign puts forward reasons to accept the headscarf, such as understanding the wearing as a free choice ("my headscarf, my choice"; "freedom is in hijab"), and respect for Muslim women who veil ("respect hijab"). Femyso's president also positioned the debate about the headscarf as a broader issue about Muslim identity enactment and minority rights, arguing for equal coexistence of majorities and minorities. On the other hand, critical responses to the campaign involved reasons to reject the headscarf, such as claims that it would be at odds with national values, and that it would symbolize gender inequality and oppression, rather than freedom of women.

The debate around the campaign points to some of the reasons that have been used in public and political debates in Western Europe to argue for tolerance or for intolerance of minority group practices[2], such as the wearing of headscarves in public positions, ritual slaughter of animals, immigrants raising their children in their own cultural traditions, and the founding of religious schools. Such practices may put peoples' diverse ways of life to the test, and the question of tolerating each other's behaviors and beliefs is an everyday reality for many living in pluralistic societies. This makes it important to consider why and when people are (in)tolerant of dissenting minority practices that make cultural and religious differences salient and concrete.

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[1] Femyso is a forum of Muslim youth and student organizations across Europe (Femyso, 2022).

Tolerance in its classical sense entails that one accepts the freedom of dissenting others to lead the life that they want, thus abstaining from negative interference with practices and beliefs one disapproves of (Cohen, 2004; King, 2012; Norris, 2002). Refraining from acting upon one's disapproval makes tolerance a barrier against discrimination, as differences are endured rather than negatively interfered with (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), and equal rights are extended to all members of society (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). In contrast to political science, in which the topic of political tolerance of disliked ideological groups has been extensively discussed and examined (Gibson, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1981), social and behavioral scientists have paid little attention to the classical notion of tolerance in which dissenting cultural and religious practices and beliefs are endured. However, tolerance as forbearance is indispensable for peaceful plural societies in which it is inevitable that people may not always like or agree with one another (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017; Vogt, 1997). The need for tolerance in culturally diverse societies relates to people's general predisposition to endure other ways of life and concrete issues, actions and practices specifically (e.g., immigrants building places of worship or celebrating religious holidays in public). One may generally agree that everyone has the freedom to live their life, but this does not have to imply that one accepts concrete beliefs and practices that have everyday implications (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017).

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[2] In this dissertation, 'minorities' refer mostly to immigrant and immigrant-origin groups. Some studies focus exclusively on immigrant practices (e.g., immigrants raising their children in their own cultural traditions), and other studies focus on immigrant-origin minorities. For instance, many Muslims in the Netherlands are of immigrant-origin but not immigrants themselves, as the second and third generation are born in the Netherlands. Thus instead of writing 'tolerance of immigrant and immigrant-origin minority group practices', I consistently use the overarching encompassing term 'tolerance of minority practices' in this Chapter, and explicate per empirical Chapter (Chapters 2-5) on which type of practices and minority groups I focus (see also Table 1.1). Also, these are 'minority' practices and not defining of or essential to the majority of these groups. Importantly, I focus on specific minority practices because tolerance is about enduring dissenting ways of life rather than group-based 'prejudicial' attitudes (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017).

People can have different reasons to be tolerant of dissenting ways of life, but little empirical research has considered these reasons nor investigated factors that make these reasons less or more important for tolerance. This raises the question what reasons people have to be tolerant of minority practices, and where they draw the boundaries of what can be tolerated. In this dissertation I am specifically interested in *why* and *when* majority group members are tolerant of specific minority practices, and to what extent the reasons and conditions for tolerance depend on individual differences in *who* tolerates. Therefore, I pose the following overall research question: *Why and when do which majority group members less or more strongly tolerate minority practices?*

Accordingly, the first main question of this dissertation is about the reasons *why* people are in general inclined to tolerate dissenting ways of life[3]. There are many possible reasons at different levels of analysis for why majority members could be tolerant, including various personal characteristics (e.g., self-certainty; level of education; political orientation; Bansak et al., 2016; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003) and local and national circumstances (e.g., neighborhood diversity; local and national policies; e.g., Fasel et al., 2013; Savelkoul et al., 2012). In trying to make a novel contribution to the literature I focus on three broad ideological beliefs related to intergroup dynamics. In line with the social identity approach's proposition that how we react to outgroups is not only based on perceptions of the outgroup but also on how we see our ingroup, and how we perceive ourselves in relation to others (Reicher et al., 2010), I consider three aspects of intergroup dynamics that are likely to be important for understanding tolerance: 1) perspective on the *ingroup;* 2) perception of the *outgroup;* and 3) perception of the relationship between the *ingroup and outgroup*. I study the relation between tolerance and these three aspects by looking at the extent to which majority group members: 1) endorse a deprovincialized, nuanced perspective of their ingroup; 2) display outgroup respect for outgroup members as equal citizens; and 3) consider it important that the ingroup and outgroup harmoniously coexist.

---

[3] With the term 'reasons' I do not aim to imply causality, as these are mostly investigated in correlational studies as important correlates.

The second question of the dissertation is *when* people are less or more tolerant of dissenting minority practices. Here, I consider three main aspects which share the general proposition that majority group members will become less tolerant when the practices are perceived as having more negative sociocultural consequences. This general proposition is examined in terms of the context in which minority members engage in a specific practice, minority group members' motive for engaging in this practice, and the type of action involved (identity enactment versus persuading others). The theoretical reasoning is that some of these situations have more perceived negative sociocultural consequences than others. For instance, the wearing of religious symbols in a public (e.g., state institutional) context can be expected to be perceived as having more consequences in terms of social change and societal cohesion. Specifically, I will examine whether tolerance of minority practices depends on: 1) whether this practice is enacted in a public (versus private) context; 2) whether it is enacted for reasons of normative minority community pressures (versus personal choice motives); and 3) whether the enactment involves the mobilization of other minority group members to engage in the same action.

The third question of the dissertation connects the first and second one by examining whether both the why- and when-question depend on *who* is asked to tolerate a dissenting minority practice. That is, individual differences of majority group members may matter for the strength of the relations and effects that are examined. Thus, the third question of the dissertation is for *whom* the reasons to tolerate and the contextual influences on tolerance become less or more pronounced. I focus on individual differences in terms of being concerned about the continuity of one's ingroup cultural identity and normative conformity (i.e., identity continuity concern, and authoritarian conformism). Although various other individual differences might be relevant for tolerance (e.g., social dominance orientation, open-mindedness), I empirically examine identity continuity concern and normative conformity because these have been proposed to be particularly important as boundary principles for tolerance (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). Whether people tolerate a practice depends on what they believe is at stake (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017), and I investigate whether the above discussed relations and effects are particularly important for people who think that the continuity of their ingroup identity or their ingroup's normative conformity is at stake. For instance, people who are concerned about maintaining their cultural identity might be especially intolerant when religious symbols are worn in public institutional contexts.

These three questions are investigated mainly among Dutch, but also German, majority group members, and in relation to dissenting ways of life in general and various minority practices. Both countries have an ethnic majority population that is considered to be the dominant societal group. Non-Western immigrant-origin groups, and particularly those with a Muslim background, are generally perceived and framed as the most culturally dissenting minority groups in these societies (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Slootman & Duyvendak, 2015)[4]. As symbolic boundary drawing along these lines has become one of the main public and political frames and these categories are therefore likely meaningful to people (Mattes, 2018), I focus on majority group members' tolerance of immigrant-origin minority groups and a variety of cultural and religious practices of immigrant-origin groups living in Western Europe, such as immigrants who raise their children in their own cultural traditions, ritual slaughter of animals, or the wearing of headscarves as a teacher in a public school. Consequently, sometimes the focus is on immigrant groups in general and specific practices of these groups (e.g., raising children with own cultural traditions); sometimes on religious minority practices (e.g., ritual slaughter, which can be a Jewish or a Muslim tradition); and sometimes on Muslim minorities specifically (e.g., a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf). Each study has a particular focus which will be explained per chapter, but as a whole the dissertation covers a diversity of minority groups and practices in order not to limit the study of tolerance to one target-group and one practice only. This makes it possible to examine whether explanations for tolerance generalize across target-groups (i.e., Western immigrants, non-Western immigrants, Muslim immigrants: see Chapter 3) and different type of actions (e.g., enacting a practice or mobilizing others: see Chapter 4). In this synthesis I summarize these under the header 'minority practices', and will specify the focus in the respective chapters.

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[4] Although only about half of non-Western immigrant-origin group members (in 2014) see themselves as Muslim, reversely, Muslims in the Netherlands are almost exclusively of immigrant-origin (Aussems, 2016). In the Netherlands, approximately two third of Muslims are immigrant or immigrant-origin groups from Morocco and Turkey (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). Other Muslim immigrant groups are originally from Surinam, Afghanistan, Iraq, former Yugoslavia, and Somalia, and more recently also from Syria (Dagevos et al., 2018). In Germany the largest Muslim group is of Turkish descent, making up around 63% of German Muslims in 2008. Other Muslims stem from, for instance, southeastern European countries and the Middle East (Haug et al., 2009). Thus, although many Muslims are of immigrant-origin, and only 0.2% of Dutch adults without a migration background consider themselves to be Muslim (Huijnk, 2018), it should also be noted that majority group members and Muslims are not mutually exclusive or homogenous groups.

The remainder of this Introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, I will discuss the theoretical and empirical background of tolerance, and its relation to the explanatory and conditioning factors described above. Second, I will elaborate on the research contexts of the Netherlands and Germany, and third, I will present the data and methods used for the empirical studies in this dissertation. Fourth, I will synthesize the insights from the four empirical studies. Finally, the contributions of this dissertation, its implications, limitations, directions for future research and overall conclusions are discussed.

1.2 Theoretical and empirical background

1.2.1 Intergroup tolerance

Tolerance is a concept widely used and in various ways, as well as in different scientific fields. However, in the literature two main understandings of tolerance are proposed and examined. First, in the social psychological literature, starting with the seminal work of Allport (1954), tolerance is often understood in its *modern* sense as openness, and the full acceptance and appreciation of diversity: tolerance as the opposite of prejudice (Hjerm et al., 2021; Verkuyten et al., 2021). Much of the psychological and social science research on intergroup relations and many international policy documents consider modern tolerance, such as UNESCO's Declaration of principles on tolerance (1995), which describes tolerance as having an open mind to and appreciation of cultural diversity.

In contrast, political science and philosophy have conceptualized tolerance in its classical sense (Forst, 2004; Gibson 2006; Sullivan et al., 1981). As Bertrand Russell put it (in Freeman, 1959): ‘In this world, which is getting more and more interconnected, we have to learn to tolerate each other, we have to learn to put up with the fact that some people say things that we don’t like. We can only live together that way.’ *Classical tolerance* means forbearance, whereby negative feelings towards specific outgroup practices or beliefs do not translate into negative interference, as one puts up with something one disagrees with, dislikes or disapproves of (Scanlon, 2003; Verkuyten et al., 2021). Hence, the difference between modern and classical tolerance is that with the former one has positive feelings and appreciates different practices and beliefs, whereas with the latter one has objections and negative feelings but puts up with and tolerates a dissenting practice or belief (Forst, 2004). Political scientists have for instance analyzed whether disliked ideological opponents are granted the same civic rights and liberties (Erisen & Kentmen-Cin, 2017; Sullivan et al., 1982). It is vital for liberal democracies that one grants dissenting others or ideological adversaries not only equal freedoms to speak their mind but also to live the life that they want (Forst, 2004). This dissertation aims to advance the social scientific literature on tolerance and intergroup relations more specifically by focusing on the classical notion of tolerance as forbearance. I use the term *intergroup tolerance* to refer to group members tolerating sociocultural practices which reproduce social identities (Verkuyten et al., 2019), and to distinguish my topic of investigation from *political* tolerance (i.e., tolerance of political groups) and inter*personal* tolerance (i.e., between individuals). I study intergroup attitudes and behavioral intentions by examining majority members’ tolerance in general and of dissenting minority group practices and beliefs in particular.

Forbearance tolerance implies that one has reasons to object to a practice but that one balances those with reasons to nonetheless accept the practice, whereby acceptance outweighs objection (King, 2012). Importantly, acceptance in the tolerance process does not refer to an underlying attitude of approval, appreciation or liking, but rather to behavioral non-interference with a dissenting way of life (King, 2012; Verkuyten et al., 2021). Thus, acceptance refers to the outcome when reasons for showing forbearance outweigh those for objection in the process of tolerance. For instance, one may disagree with the practice of ritual slaughter of animals for reasons of animal welfare, but still accept – in the sense of condone – that others live their lives differently because of freedom of religion. This weighing process of tolerance has received empirical support in studies in which the prioritization of the value of individual freedom over social cohesion is associated with more tolerance (i.e., tolerating the wearing of distinctive dress) and reversely, considering the value of social cohesion more important than individual freedom is related to lower tolerance (i.e., refusing to shake hands with people of the opposite sex; Adelman et al., 2021a). In this dissertation, I conceptualize intergroup tolerance in terms of the 'acceptance' of dissenting ways of life and of specific minority practices (see Table 1.1 for focus variables and target-groups per Chapter). For tolerance there ought to be relatively strong reasons why one accepts dissenting practices (e.g., religious freedom being considered more important than animal welfare), whereas the boundaries of tolerance are drawn when the reasons to reject outweigh those to accept (e.g., animal welfare being considered more important than religious freedom; Forst, 2004, 2017).

The reasons to accept what one objects to can be more general, but can also vary per context and practice. Tolerance can be considered an underlying predisposition that implies a general tendency to accept what one disapproves of (to let others live their lives), but also as a situational judgment in which the nature of a specific dissenting practice and the context are considered (Verkuyten et al., 2021). Tolerance itself does not provide any substantive reasons (Forst, 2017), but rather specific values, principles and concerns become salient depending on the practice and context, thus providing reasons to be less or more tolerant. For instance, a reason to accept the founding of religious minority schools could be that one respects the religious freedom of all groups, while a reason to object to such schools may be the endorsement of secular values, or being concerned about the socially segregated consequences that separate religious schools might have. Different practices and specific contexts may provide or make salient different considerations and concerns for the tolerance process.

This implies that in analyzing the reasons (not) to tolerate, it is important to not only focus on underlying general predispositions but also to take the context and specific practices into account. Therefore, in this dissertation, I consider the social context and a range of concrete practices that are debated in society.

Tolerance and group-based feelings

The modern 'appreciation' understanding of tolerance equates it with group-based liking, and intolerance with prejudice or group-based dislike (Verkuyten et al., 2021). However, such a "prejudice-tolerance continuum" ignores that people can have other reasons than group-based (dis)liking for their (in)tolerance of minority practices. For instance, objecting against the founding of Islamic religious schools does not (only) have to be driven by prejudicial dislike of Muslims as a group of people, but can also be based on secular beliefs, i.e., holding that religion has no place in public education, independently of the religious group (Dangubić et al., 2020a; Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Van der Noll, 2014). Recent studies have demonstrated empirically that there are several ways in which group-based feelings can relate to (in)tolerance of specific practices (Dangubić et al., 2020b), and that, for example, people who are equally intolerant of similar Christian, Jewish and Islamic practices tend to endorse secular values (Dangubić et al., 2020a; 2022). Moreover, experimental work has demonstrated that intolerance of Muslim minority practices can depend more on concerns about strict religiosity that is perceived as being incompatible with Western values than on prejudicial group-based feelings towards Muslims (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018; Sleijpen et al., 2020).

The classical understanding of tolerance as forbearance acknowledges that (in) tolerance cannot be reduced to group-based (dis)like, and that other reasons and concerns need to be taken into account. In this dissertation I consider the reasons to tolerate on top of prejudicial outgroup feelings, to examine the role of these reasons for tolerance independently of the role of prejudice. This approach acknowledges that prejudicial feelings can, and often do, play a role in explaining (in)tolerance of specific minority practices (Helbling, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2009), but that there also can be other considerations and concerns for (in)tolerance of dissenting practices (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). Thus, I consider reasons to tolerate, over and above the statistical effect of minority outgroup prejudice. This is relevant because tolerance as a general underlying tendency to accept what one objects to should be empirically distinct from outgroup prejudice, and the acceptance of specific outgroup practices and beliefs should be based on other reasons than prejudicial feelings.

1.2.2 Reasons *why* people tolerate

Apart from group-based prejudice, research has considered various explanations for attitudes towards outgroups and towards specific outgroup practices and beliefs, such as liberal values (Gustavsson et al., 2016), secularism (Van Bohemen et al., 2012), religious beliefs (Saroglou et al., 2009), ideological beliefs like social dominance orientation (Sidanius et al., 1996) and cultural diversity beliefs (multiculturalism, assimilationism; Gieling et al., 2014; J. Thijs et al., 2021; Verkuyten et al., 2010), ingroup identification (Gieling et al., 2014), forms of perceived threat (McLaren, 2003; Van der Noll, 2010), as well as neighborhood, regional and country level characteristics such as the proportion of the minority population living in a certain area (Fasel et al., 2013; Savelkoul et al., 2012)[5]. Yet, little research has explicitly and empirically considered the general underlying reasons why people are inclined to tolerate dissenting others living the lives that they want (see Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013). It is relevant to investigate these general reasons for tolerating things one disapproves of because these provide the basis for allowing others to live their lives, and thus to avoid acting upon one's disapproval (Forst, 2013). In this dissertation, I address some of these reasons by asking *Why do majority group members tend to tolerate minority practices?* (**RQ1**). Informed by the social identity perspective, I focus on three main aspects involved in intergroup relations more generally: the perception of the ingroup, the outgroup and the relation between both groups.

The social identity perspective posits that people make a distinction between their ingroup and relevant outgroups, and engage in intergroup comparisons (Reicher et al., 2010). Intergroup comparisons inform people about the ingroup and the outgroup, as well as the relationship between the two. Importantly, the social identity perspective proposes that the way in which people respond to an outgroup (e.g., tolerance of outgroup practices and beliefs) depends not only on the perceived nature and features of that outgroup ('who they are'), but also on how the ingroup is understood and perceived ('who we are'), and on the specific relationship between the two ('the impact of them on us', and vice versa). Following this perspective, I examine tolerance of dissenting ways of life by focusing on people's general orientation towards their ingroup, the outgroup, and the ingroup-outgroup relation.

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[5] In the analyses in the empirical Chapters I control for some of those factors, such as group-based prejudice, national identification, political orientation, religious affiliation and level of education, in order to examine the unique contribution that the reasons to tolerate have on top of these factors.

Ingroup reappraisal

First, I consider the perspective on the ingroup and how this relates to tolerance in general and of minority practices in particular. Previous research has shown that the content of ingroup identity matters for outgroup attitudes (e.g., Reicher et al., 2006; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014). Social group membership provides an ingroup identity with shared understandings, norms and values. This implies that the content of identities determines whether the ingroup is more exclusive or inclusive towards outgroup members. For instance, Dutch majority members who interpret Dutch historical identity as one of religious tolerance are more accepting of Muslim minority practices (Smeekes et al., 2012), and a historical interpretation in terms of Christianity leads to lower acceptance (Smeekes et al., 2011). Importantly, however, it is not only the content of an ingroup identity (e.g., historically tolerant, or Christian, national identity) that matters for processes of exclusion and inclusion, but also the more absolute or rather nuanced orientation that one has towards the ingroup culture. Whether one adopts a nuanced perspective on the ingroup culture can have an impact on one's attitude towards outgroups and their practices (Verkuyten et al., 2022).

Specifically, the notion of deprovincialization – a nuanced appraisal of the ingroup (Pettigrew, 1997) – is likely to be important to consider in explaining tolerance of minority practices. Deprovincialization refers to adopting a nuanced and more complex perspective on the ingroup and its cultural values and norms (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). It involves an orientation in which the ingroup culture is not considered the only standard for evaluation, with the recognition that there are other ways for dealing with the world. Similar to perspective-taking and cultural nuance, a deprovincialized view implies that one's own taken-for-granted worldview is put in perspective.

Deprovincialization has been shown to relate to various positive outcomes, such as cognitive flexibility and openness to experience (Boin et al., 2020; Mepham & Martinović, 2018), as well as protesting against discrimination of immigrants (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2015), and less outgroup prejudice (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten et al., 2022). It implies a more multicultural orientation (Verkuyten et al., 2010), less ethnic boundary drawing (Green et al., 2018), as well as a more inclusive understanding of one's national community (Verkuyten et al., 2016). Taken together, a more nuanced perspective on the ingroup culture can also be expected to relate to higher intergroup tolerance. In examining deprovincialization as a reason to tolerate dissenting ways of life and minority practices, I try to extend the deprovincialization literature by focusing on its relation with tolerance, while simultaneously extending the social scientific tolerance literature by complementing a focus on the outgroup with a nuanced ingroup orientation as a possible explanation.

In Chapter 2, I investigate this ingroup aspect of people's outgroup tolerance by examining whether a stronger nuanced perspective of one's ingroup culture (i.e., deprovincialization) relates to higher tolerance of minority practices[6]. In doing so, I aim to answer the question: *To what extent is the endorsement of deprovincialization related to majority members' tolerance of minority practices?* (as part of RQ1).

Outgroup respect

Second, for understanding *why* people tolerate outgroup practices, it is also important to consider how they perceive the outgroup. Most research on outgroup attitudes has focused on negative attitudes, such as negative stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and negative emotions, either as aspects of prejudice or as specific factors driving discriminatory behavior (Blommaert et al., 2012; Kalkan et al., 2009; Kinder & Kam, 2009). This literature has so far not considered reasons that people might have to accept that others should be able to live the life that they want, and therefore I go beyond this literature by focusing on respect for outgroup members as co-citizens with equal rights.

---

[6] In this chapter, I discuss the overarching theoretical framework. The specific predictions are discussed in more detail in Chapters 2-5.

Outgroup respect refers to a principled belief that all citizens are autonomous individuals with equal rights (Simon, 2007). If minority group members are perceived as citizens with the same dignity, rights and civil liberties, it seems likely that their ways of life are more easily tolerated (Hjerm et al., 2019). Similarly, the Council of Europe campaign with its quote “respect hijab” (see 1.1) put forward respect for Muslim women who veil as a reason for acceptance of the headscarf. Likewise, in German debates about the building of minarets, a reason for tolerating these is respect and freedom of religion (Schiffauer, 2013). Although one may not fully agree with everyone’s behavior and beliefs, one can still accept that others practice these because one respects them as autonomous members of society with equal rights to live as they wish.

In examining the role of respect-based tolerance it is important, first, to empirically demonstrate that it differs form group-based prejudice. Respect for dissenting others as equal citizens should not simply imply a lack of outgroup prejudice, but rather is considered a specific reason for showing tolerance (Simon et al., 2018). Second, it is relevant to examine whether an abstract, principled notion of respect translates into tolerating concrete practices. Research has shown that there is a difference in the way people judge abstract reasons in comparison to concrete cases and specific situations (Dixon et al., 2017). It is one thing to agree with the general principle that minority group members as equal citizens have the freedom to live as they wish, but another to tolerate, for instance, that Muslim civil servants or teachers in public schools wear a headscarf.

Simon and colleagues (2018) have developed and empirically tested the disapproval-respect model of tolerance, in which equal respect for outgroups is identified as an important principled reason for tolerance because it counterbalances disapproval of specific outgroup practices (Zitzmann et al., 2021). It often is not feasible to remove the disapproval of dissenting ways of life, but respect for outgroups as fellow citizens can restrain or counterbalance the objections that one has, leading to tolerance. Although the respect-tolerance proposition has been tested in Germany, Poland, United States and Brazil (see Zitzmann et al., 2021), and also with slightly different conceptualizations of respect (Klein & Zick, 2013), it has not yet been systematically examined in the Netherlands or experimentally in relation to different minority groups. Therefore, in this dissertation I investigate whether respect towards multiple minority groups in the Netherlands (people one does not agree with; cultural minorities; Western and non-Western immigrants, Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants) differs from group-based prejudice and is related to tolerance of specific outgroup practices. In Chapter 3, I pose the question: *To what extent is the endorsement of equal respect related to majority members' tolerance of minority practices?* (as part of RQ1).

Intergroup coexistence

A third focus of the question *why* people tolerate minority practices is on perceptions of the relation between the ingroup and outgroup, and in particular the harmonious coexistence of majority and minority groups in society. Coexistence refers here to the majority group's perception of living peacefully together with dissenting minority groups. It is a more pragmatic reason for tolerating minority groups' practices, namely for maintaining peaceful cohabitation and avoiding conflict (Kirchner et al., 2011). It is the 'willingness to tolerate or accept persons or certain groups as well as their underlying values and behavior by means of a co-existence (even if they are completely different from one's own)' (Kirchner et al., 2011, p. 205). As the European Model Law for the promotion of tolerance and the suppression of intolerance (European council on tolerance and reconciliation, 2015, p.2) states, 'coexistence within a democratic society require[s] that individuals and groups make mutual concessions to each other'. The focus on avoidance of social conflict involves valuing peacefully living together and makes coexistence-based tolerance a more pragmatic consideration than the principled respect-based tolerance discussed in the previous section. When people want to avoid societal conflict and value social peace, they will likely be more willing to tolerate one another. Thus, one may more pragmatically refrain from negatively interfering with dissenting minority practices, because one thinks that intolerant responses might cause social conflict or possibly create greater social tensions than allowing it (Schiffauer, 2013). Although the coexistence-tolerance relation has been proposed theoretically (Forst, 2013) and there is some first empirical research in Germany (Klein & Zick, 2013), it has received scarce systematic attention. Most previous work has neglected this pragmatic adjusting in order to live together, while it seems likely that tolerance in order to avoid social conflicts is an everyday reality for many people. Also, it is not clear whether the general, abstract notion of peaceful coexistence differs from group-based prejudice and translates into accepting concrete minority practices. For instance, it might be that its pragmatic considerations and conditional nature makes that it is less clearly related to the acceptance of specific dissenting practices. Thus, I extend the focus on perceptions of the ingroup and of the outgroup, by investigating perceptions of coexistence of in- and outgroups, and whether this differs empirically from outgroup prejudice and relates to tolerance of concrete practices. I consider endorsement of coexistence towards several different minority groups: coexistence of people one does not agree with, of cultural minorities, of Western, and non-Western immigrants, as well as Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. I aim to answer the question: *To what extent is the endorsement of coexistence related to majority members' tolerance of minority practices?* (as part of RQ1).

Furthermore, almost no empirical research has considered various reasons for tolerance simultaneously and therefore I simultaneously examine the importance of the more principled notion of 'respect' and of the more pragmatic notion of 'coexistence', as two main reasons to tolerate minority practices.

1.2.3 *When* is tolerance less or more likely

Apart from the general reasons discussed, I consider situational factors that might impact tolerance of specific minority practices. Tolerance is likely to depend on the type of action and the context in which practices are enacted, because different practices and different contexts can raise different considerations and concerns (Forst, 2017). For instance, tolerance might depend on whether a practice (e.g., wearing of a headscarf) is enacted in a public or private context; on the motives that minority members have for engaging in that practice (e.g., personal choice or community pressure); and on the type of action (e.g., enacting the practice, or mobilizing others to do the same). In this dissertation I address these situational aspects by asking: *When do majority group members less or more strongly tolerate minority practices?* (**RQ2**).

The situational factors that I examine are based on the general proposition that majority group members will be less tolerant if dissenting practices are perceived to have stronger negative sociocultural implications (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). Specifically, people are likely to perceive more negative sociocultural consequences when a dissenting minority practice is enacted in a public rather than private context; when it includes mobilizing other minority members to also engage in the dissenting practice; and when the motive for enactment relates to normative expectations from minority members rather than involving a personal, free choice. Thus, I investigate the when-question in three ways: (1) the distinction between private and public contexts; (2) the distinction between minority identity enactment and collective mobilization; and (3) the distinction between motives of self-determination and minority community expectations. For this, I use between-subject experiments which focus specifically on Muslim minority identity enactment that is widely debated in society, such as the wearing of a headscarf, which is a key symbol in ongoing debates about the accommodation of Muslim minorities in western societies (see 1.1).

Private versus public contexts

The seminal work of Stouffer (1955) indicated that context-related variance in tolerance is common, as it involves a situational convergence of various considerations (e.g., situationally salient values, societal implications). Different situations can make different considerations salient and relevant for showing forbearance towards things one disapproves of. For instance, people may tolerate the practice of wearing religious symbols in some circumstances (e.g., on the street) for reasons of religious freedom, while not accepting it in other contexts (e.g., work context) for secular reasons.

Previous research has mostly investigated tolerance either in general (Van der Noll, 2014) or in one specific context (Helbling, 2014; Simon et al., 2018; Van der Noll et al., 2018). However, to my knowledge, no research has systematically examined situation-related variance in tolerance of particular practices across private and several public contexts. Yet, it can be expected that people take the context of minority identity enactment into account. This is because such enactment in the private sphere, compared to various public contexts, has less negative perceived sociocultural consequences and therefore is easier to tolerate. Research has shown that people are less accepting of practices that are considered to have a negative impact for themselves, their group, or society more generally (Bannister & Kearns, 2009; Chanley, 1994). They may fear that religious minority enactment in public situations can hamper social cohesion, invoke societal and cultural change, or undermine the secular nature of the state and its public institutions (Schiffauer, 2013). Thus, minority identity enactment in public contexts can be expected to be tolerated less than in the private sphere. I investigate whether tolerance is lower for the same minority practices enacted in public, versus private, contexts, by experimentally comparing four contexts: in the street; in a (general) work environment; at work as a civil servant; and in private, e.g., home environment. Thus, Chapter 4 addresses the question: *To what extent does the social context of minority identity enactment have an impact on majority members' tolerance?* (as part of RQ2).

Type of action: persuasion and enactment tolerance

In addition to context-related variance, there can be action-related variance in tolerance: a difference in the type of action that one is asked to tolerate (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Research has demonstrated that tolerance differs for dissenting beliefs, the behavioral expression of these beliefs, and the mobilization of others to also enact these beliefs (Gieling et al., 2010). For instance, majority members in the Netherlands were found to be more tolerant of Muslims wearing religious clothing (i.e., *tolerance of enactment*), than of Muslims trying to persuade other Muslims to engage in the same practice (i.e., *tolerance of persuasion*) (Gieling et al., 2010). Individual identity enactment and persuading others to act in a similar way may be perceived as having different sociocultural implications. For instance, mobilizing other minority members to engage in certain religious practices might be seen as having more negative consequences for social cohesion than individuals engaging in such practices. It is one thing to tolerate someone's religious identity enactment, but another to accept that others are being persuaded and mobilized to express their identity in the same way. Politicians' responses to the campaign outlined in section 1.1 (e.g., socialist senator Rossignol) put a limit to tolerating the alleged "promoting of the headscarf" (Darmanin, 2021), implicitly distinguishing between the act itself (i.e., wearing the headscarf) versus campaigning for it and trying to mobilize Muslim women to also wear a headscarf.

Research has demonstrated that the perception of the size of a minority group is related to its perceived threat (McLaren, 2003; Outten et al., 2011), and that 'threat in numbers' may predict negative attitudes towards minorities (Earle & Hodson, 2019). Trying to persuade others involves mobilizing fellow Muslims to engage in these practices, and majority group members may consider this as more threatening than a single individual enacting the practice. In this dissertation, I consider the type of action by experimentally investigating whether tolerance of enactment is higher compared to tolerance of persuasion in both public and private contexts. Thus, in Chapter 4, I examine whether there is a difference in tolerating the minority practice itself and the mobilization of other minority members to engage in the same practice: *To what extent is there a difference in tolerance of enactment of a dissenting minority practice and tolerance of persuasion*? (as part of RQ2).

Minority group members' motives

It is likely that there is variation in tolerance of minority practices such as the Muslim headscarf, depending on the perceived motives that minority members have for engaging in the practices. In the instance of the campaign of the European Council (see 1.1), the headscarf was framed as a free and personal choice and something that therefore should be accepted by majority members. In contrast, others were against the campaign because the headscarf was considered a sign of religious community submission and oppression, justifying an intolerant response. This indicates that the perceived motive for wearing the headscarf might matter for majority members' tolerance. Muslim women may have various motives for the wearing of a headscarf, including autonomous motivations, following cultural traditions, enacting their religious identity, and complying with religious community norms (Droogsma, 2007; Howard, 2012; Legate et al., 2020; Ruby, 2006; Safdar & Jassi, 2021; Wagner et al., 2012; see also different motives in Afshar, 2008; Ruby, 2006; Zempi, 2016). Perceptions about these motives might resonate less or more strongly with liberal values of majority members in western societies (e.g., personal freedom and autonomous choice, Legate et al., 2020), and therefore may affect people's tolerance of the Muslim headscarf (Wainryb, et al., 1998). However, research on people's attitudes (e.g., Fasel et al., 2013; Gustavsson et al., 2016; Unkelbach et al., 2010; Van der Noll, 2010) has examined general tolerance or tolerance of a range of Muslim minority practices (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Gieling et al., 2010; Helbling, 2014; Van der Noll, 2014), but has not systematically examined whether the perceived motives that minority members have for engaging in particular practices have an impact on majority members' tolerance. Yet, such motive-related variance would indicate that possible objections to the headscarf are not solely based on, for instance, prejudicial feelings towards Muslims, but also depend on the motivation and reasoning that Muslim women are considered to have for wearing a headscarf. I experimentally examine four different motives that Muslim civil servants are perceived to have for wearing a headscarf (Droogsma, 2007; Motivaction, 2011; Zempi, 2016): reasons of personal choice, normative expectations from the Muslim community, cultural identity enactment, and religious identity enactment. In Chapter 5, I examine whether these motives influence tolerance (i.e., tolerance of the headscarf worn as a civil servant at work), addressing the question: *To what extent do the perceived motives that minority members have for engaging in a particular practice have an impact on majority members' tolerance?* (as part of RQ2).

1.2.4 For *whom* the reasons to be tolerant matter less or more

Even when majority members have general reasons to tolerate dissenting ways of life and minority practices, such as ingroup reappraisal, outgroup respect, and intergroup coexistence, tolerance is not without its limits. Not everything can boundlessly be accepted as if every belief and practice would be of equal value, and no moral boundaries would exist (Kim & Wreen, 2003). For instance, illiberal practices such as gender inequality, child marriage, or female circumcision may be perceived as morally unacceptable and as undermining the continuity of the ingroup culture and identity, and it might be hard to tolerate these even for people that endorse a deprovincial perspective or have high levels of outgroup respect (Verkuyten et al., 2022; Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). That one does not take the ingroup culture as the self-evident standard for evaluating the world (deprovincialization), does not imply that one disparages the ingroup's culture or does not value the ingroup's collective continuity. Similarly, if one respects minority members as equal citizens or values peaceful intergroup coexistence, one may still perceive continuity of the ingroup culture and identity to be relevant and important. Thus, it is likely that in relation to dissenting practices, the deprovincialization-tolerance, respect-tolerance and coexistence-tolerance relations are weaker for people who more strongly value the maintenance of the ingroup's identity and cultural continuity.

Tolerance depends on values and concerns which are more salient in certain situations as well as for certain individuals, as it depends on what people believe is at stake (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). Therefore, I examine whether people who are more strongly concerned about ingroup identity continuity (Chapter 2-4) or normative conformity (i.e., authoritarianism, Chapter 5), consider the reasons differently for their tolerance of specific minority practices. Thus, I examine individual differences with the question *for whom* the reasons (*why*, 1.2.2) and the expected situational influences on tolerance (*when,* 1.2.3) are less or more important (**RQ3**).

Previous research has demonstrated that perceived symbolic threat is a main predictor of negative outgroup attitudes and is also an important predictor of lower tolerance of (e.g., ideological and religious) minority practices (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Van der Noll, 2010; Van der Noll et al., 2010). The notion of symbolic threat has been conceptualized and operationalized in different ways, but generally the focus is on things that are perceived to threaten or undermine the cultural identity of the ingroup (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic threats have been studied extensively in the social and behavioral sciences (Branscombe et al., 1999), but here I adopt a specific focus on concern for identity *continuity* (i.e., being concerned about the continuity of one's ingroup cultural identity, see also Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015) and concern for *normative conformity* (i.e., the authoritarian concern for group norms and social cohesion, see Duckitt, 2006). I consider the role of individual differences in these two beliefs that have been proposed as being particularly important for tolerating dissenting outgroup practices and beliefs (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). I focus on how these two beliefs may affect (i.e., moderate) the various reasons for tolerance, rather than how these directly relate to tolerance.

A sense of group continuity – defined as the perception that one's group has temporal endurance (Sani, 2008), connecting the group members' past, present and future social selves – is psychologically important and is more strongly strived for when it is challenged, for instance by societal changes such as diversity resulting from immigration and globalization (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Research has demonstrated that concerns about the continuation of ingroup identity and threats to the cultural continuity of one's ingroup have negative implications for outgroup attitudes (Badea et al., 2020; Hutchison et al., 2006; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Although identity continuity has been theorized as a boundary principle for tolerance of minority practices (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), this has not yet been empirically examined. Therefore, throughout this dissertation, I investigate whether individual differences in concern for the continuity of the ingroup's cultural identity is a boundary condition for intergroup tolerance.

In a similar vein, people who are concerned about ingroup identity continuity or about normative conformity may respond differently to the situational importance of context, type of action and minority motive. They may, for instance, focus more on the context in which a practice is enacted, e.g., religious enactment in a public work context may raise stronger negative responses for people concerned about ingroup identity continuity. Also, authoritarian people who are concerned about normative conformity and social cohesion might be less likely to take minority group members' perceived motives for enacting a practice into account. That is, people who strongly endorse conformity values may perceive a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf as challenging dominant cultural values, no matter what the motivation is for wearing it.

Taken together, I address the question *for whom* the reasons and situational influences relate less or more strongly to tolerance, thus identifying possible individual boundary conditions of tolerance (RQ3). Specifically, in Chapter 2-4, I investigate individual differences in identity continuity concern, for the deprovincialization-tolerance relationship (Chapter 2), the respect-tolerance and coexistence-tolerance relation (Chapter 3), and the context-effect on tolerance (Chapter 4). Subsequently, in Chapter 5, I consider individual differences in concerns for normative conformity, and whether this matters for the expected motive-effect on tolerance.

1.2.5 Summary

To summarize, I examine three main questions on intergroup tolerance. First, I ask *why* in general majority members tend to tolerate minority members to live the life that they want as well as specific minority practices. I consider three main reasons following the social identity perspective: ingroup reappraisal, outgroup respect, and intergroup coexistence. Second, I examine *when* majority group members tolerate minority practices, and experimentally investigate the effect of social context, minority motives for enactment of the practice, and the type of action. Third, I address the question *for whom* these reasons and situational influences on tolerance are less or more pronounced, and I focus on individual differences in identity continuity concern and valuing normative conformity, which both are likely to matter for the degree of tolerance of minority practices. Taken together, this research is the first to systematically investigate some main reasons that people can have for tolerating dissenting minority group practices, as well as various conditions that may impact the relation between those reasons and tolerance.

1.3 Research contexts

The research questions are investigated among national samples of majority group members in the Netherlands and Germany, with Dutch samples in three Chapters and the final Chapter including both a Dutch and a German national sample. The Netherlands and Germany, in part, have similar ethnic and religious minority groups, yet also different regulations and accommodation of minority rights. On the one hand, both countries share a similar history of immigration, with 'guest worker' immigrants from Mediterranean countries such as Turkey arriving in the second half of the 20th century. Also, both countries are comprised of approximately 25% (first and second generation) immigrants (Destatis, 2022; Statistics Netherlands, 2021). Furthermore, the Netherlands and Germany have an ethnic majority population that is considered to be the dominant and powerful societal group, although there are obviously many differences within this population. In terms of religious diversity, the Netherlands and Germany are both historically Christian nations which increasingly have become secular (De Hart, 2014). Islam is the second largest religion with Muslims making up approximately 5% to 6%

of the two countries' populations (Hackett et al., 2019; Haug et al., 2009; Huijnk, 2018)[7].

In public and political debates, an emphasis on national identity and appeals to historical Judeo-Christian roots of Western European societies has become more common, often in contrast to Islam (Van den Hemel, 2014). There is a fairly widespread sentiment that the country's national identity would be threatened, specifically by alleged 'multicultural relativism', European integration, and Islam (Van den Hemel, 2014). For instance, previous research has shown that over 40% of the Dutch population feels that "the Western lifestyle and Muslims' way of life" collide (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). Such sentiments developed earlier in the Netherlands and somewhat later in Germany, but the presence of Islam and its religious practices in public space have been contested in both countries (Cinalli & Giugno, 2013) with, for example, a majority of the Dutch and Germans being in favor of a ban on headscarves in public contexts (Van der Noll, 2010). Also, in 2020 a motion was submitted (but rejected) to the Dutch House of Representatives which pleaded for a ban of the headscarf from Parliament and all other government buildings (Dutch House of Representatives, 2020). Overall, in both countries, prejudice towards ethnic minorities (P. Thijs et al., 2017) and Muslims in particular (Coenders et al., 2008; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Shaver et al., 2016; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008) has increased over the past decades.

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[7] In the Netherlands, the majority of Muslims is of immigrant-origin from Morocco and Turkey (Aussems, 2016). Of the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant(-origin) groups approximately 86% and respectively, 94% self-identifies as Muslim (Huijnk, 2018). Also in Germany a majority of the Muslims is religious, with 86% describing themselves as religious (Haug et al,, 2009; Spielhaus 2013). Obviously, in both countries those who actively practice their religion varies per subgroup. For instance, whereas almost all Moroccan-Dutch who self-identify as Muslims also practice Islam, among Turkish-Dutch who self-identify as Muslim about 80% practices Islam (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). Practicing also varies per immigrant generation and in terms of strictness and type of practices (e.g., eating halal food, wearing of headscarves, mosque attendance; see Huijnk, 2018). My research is about a range of practices and by no means I want to suggest or argue that all Muslims enact these practices, or that these are undebated within Muslim communities. Rather, I focus on the majority group's perspective and study tolerance of socially relevant and debated minority practices.

However, the countries also differ in certain regards. First, there is some evidence that the Dutch are more intolerant of Muslim immigrants than the Germans (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017), but other research finds the opposite (Adelman et al., 2021a). Second, the countries differ in terms of regulations and accommodation of minorities and their rights. For instance, the Netherlands has a history of 'pillarization' (i.e., the vertical organization of Dutch society along religious-political lines or 'pillars', roughly until the 1960s; Vink, 2007) and until recently had a relatively strong multicultural tradition of accommodating minority rights, enabling the formation of religious schools and Islamic political parties (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012). These social developments might have enabled a general tradition of accepting that people in different pillars may not always agree, but still respect each other as equal citizens. Furthermore, there are some differences in regulation with regard to the wearing of headscarves in public positions (e.g., working as a civil servant), which is investigated in Chapter 5 in both the Netherlands and Germany. In the Netherlands, people who work as civil servants are allowed to wear a headscarf (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014; Selby, 2015). However, in Germany, regional differences between the federal states exist, and half of the states (temporarily) banned the headscarf for government officials and teachers (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Lettinga & Saharso, 2014; Selby, 2015). This makes it relevant to investigate tolerance of the headscarf in those two national contexts. However, I do not hypothesize about country similarities or differences in terms of the degree of tolerance and its correlates, but rather as a robustness check will analyze whether the effect of the perceived motives for wearing a headscarf on tolerance generalizes across both countries (see Chapter 5).

1.4 Overview of the empirical Chapters

1.4.1 Data

For my dissertation research, I analyzed ten (sub)samples, which totaled to 8,842 ethnic majority adults (at least 18 years old and with both parents born in [the Netherlands/Germany]). Data were collected via (mostly online) surveys, and including survey-embedded experiments for (parts of) Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Data were collected by research agencies such as *Kantar Public* and *GfK* which hold large national databases (e.g., *NIPObase* of 124,000 Dutch respondents) that closely match the ethnic Dutch adult population in terms of sex, age, level of education, region and urbanity (according to the ‘golden standard’; Kantar, 2022). Participants were drawn from such databases and invited to participate in a survey, voluntarily and with informed consent. The response rate varied per study, with an average of 50% across studies (range of 44% to 54%), which is common in national surveys (Stoop et al., 2010).

In Chapters 2 and 3, I used correlational data, while in Chapters 4 and 5, I employed experimental designs. Most data stem from the Netherlands, but in Chapter 5 I included data from Germany, to be able to assess whether the findings are generalizable across national contexts. All surveys were designed by the research team and institute (European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations [ERCOMER], Utrecht University) and therefore included other measured constructs that were part of other research projects. The data and codebooks are stored in the archive of ERCOMER and at the special storage facility of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Utrecht University, and are available upon request. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the samples, data sets and analyses that were used and conducted to answer the specific research questions of each empirical chapter.

1.4.2 Overview of the empirical Chapters

In order to explain why, when and who tolerates minorities’ way of life and specific practices, I conducted four empirical studies, which are presented in Chapters 2 to 5 (see Table 1.1). I start off with examining *why* people are inclined to let dissenting others live the life that they want and to tolerate specific minority practices by focusing in Chapters 2 and 3 on deprovincialization, respect and coexistence as general reasons for being tolerant. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I focus on the perspective of the ingroup (i.e., deprovincialization), while Chapter 3 turns to perceptions of the outgroup (i.e., respect) and of the relationship between the ingroup and outgroup (i.e., coexistence). In both Chapters, I also analyze *for whom* these reasons matter less for tolerance, i.e., whether the three reasons are considered less important for majority group members who are more concerned about their ingroup cultural identity continuity.

Table 1.1 Overview of the empirical studies in this dissertation

Chap.	Questions	Samples	Country	Data and Method	Focus variable and target minority group
2	**RQ1**: *why* **RQ3**: *who*	3 samples: St.1: N = 563 St.2: N = 430 St.3: N = 798	Netherlands	Three surveys with correlational design incl. internal meta-analysis (N = 1,791). Multiple regression incl. moderation analyses.	**Study 2:** Tolerance of immigrant minority practices. **Study 1 + 3:** Tolerance of Muslim minority practices.
3	**RQ1**: *why* **RQ3**: *who*	4 samples: St.1a: N=1,046 St.1b: N = 210 St.2: N = 824 St.3: N = 411	Netherlands	Four surveys with correlational design (St. 1a, 1b, 3) and survey-embedded experiment (St. 2). Multiple regression incl. moderation analyses with latent variables in M*plus.*	**Respect- and Coexistence-based tolerance** towards dissenting people in general (**Study 1a**); cultural minorities (**Study 1b + 3**); Western, non-Western, Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants (experiment **Study 2**). **Acceptance** of concrete Muslim practices (**Study 3**).
4	**RQ2**: *when* **RQ3**: *who*	N = 826	Netherlands	Survey-embedded experiment. Multivariate analyses of (co)variance.	Tolerance of Muslim identity *enactment* and tolerance of *persuasion.*
5	**RQ2**: *when* **RQ3**: *who*	2 subsamples: N = 1,688 and N = 2,046	Netherlands + Germany	Survey-embedded experiment in the Netherlands and Germany. Analyses of (co)variance.	Tolerance of Muslim headscarf worn at work as a civil servant.

Subsequently, in the experimental Chapters 4 and 5 the focus is on *when* minority practices are less or more tolerated, again adding the question *for whom* these situational factors have a weaker or stronger effect. Chapter 4 zooms in on the impact of the situational context (private versus public) on tolerance, and also distinguishes between tolerance of minority identity enactment and minority persuasion. I investigate whether the expected context-effect on tolerance also exists for majority members who are concerned about their ingroup cultural identity continuity. Lastly, Chapter 5 focuses on the effect on tolerance of the perceived motives that minority members have for engaging in a practice, adding whether majority group members who are more concerned about normative conformity consider those motives differently.

1.5 Insights

1.5.1 Why and for whom

The results of the studies in this dissertation show, first, that the endorsement of deprovincialization, respect and coexistence are all three empirically distinct from group-based prejudice and relevant *reasons* to tolerate minority practices, although coexistence less clearly so (**RQ1**). In Chapter 2, the results of three correlational studies among Dutch majority members demonstrate that a stronger nuanced ingroup perspective is indeed associated with higher tolerance of minority (i.e., immigrant respectively Muslim) practices, also after taking into account prejudicial feelings, political orientation, national identification, religious identification, level of education, age and gender. Deprovincialization thus predicts tolerance on top of these well-known constructs that relate to outgroup attitudes, and an internal meta-analysis of the three studies confirms this overall positive relation. Yet, the relation is weaker, but still positive, for individuals *who* are more strongly concerned about the continuity of their ingroup identity (**RQ3**). Thus, deprovincialization appears to be an important reason for tolerance, and the deprovincialization-tolerance relation is generally robust. This implies that for outgroup tolerance, it is important to consider ingroup perceptions and its interplay with ingroup identity continuity.

Second, in Chapter 3, I find that the general *reasons* of outgroup respect and mutual coexistence are empirically distinct and also differ from group-based prejudice. Furthermore, both are positively related to tolerance of Muslim minority practices (e.g., accepting in the sense of forbearing the wearing of religious symbols in public schools), above and beyond prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group of people (**RQ1**). However, whereas respect for others as fellow citizens with equal rights is a strong predictor of tolerance, coexistence is not an independent statistical predictor of tolerating Muslim minority practices. This implies that respect, as a more principled reason, seems more important for tolerance of minority practices than valuing peaceful coexistence, which involves more pragmatic reasons of avoiding societal conflict. The importance of respect is further illustrated by the finding that the respect-tolerance relation is weaker, but still positive, for majority members *who* are more strongly concerned about the continuity of their ingroup culture and identity (**RQ3**). This means that even those majority members who feel that the continuation of their identity is important, still consider respect for minority members as co-citizens with equal rights a reason for tolerating minority practices.

Additionally, I find that respect and coexistence have a similar meaning and similar levels of endorsement in relation to Western, non-Western, Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants (experiment in Study 2). Taken together, this implies that especially respect for minority outgroups is important for tolerance – and interestingly, it does not seem to matter much towards which specific outgroup. A possible explanation for why mutual coexistence has no independent relation with tolerance is that its pragmatic nature may already imply a compromise of balancing majority's and minority's right to live as they wish, thereby not enhancing tolerance for minority practices. Pragmatically adjusting attitudes to avoid social conflict may be an everyday reality for people, but does not necessarily seem to be related to higher tolerance of minority practices.

1.5.2 When and for whom

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on *when* practices are (not) tolerated (**RQ2**), and *for whom* these situational factors matter less or more (**RQ3**). Using experimental designs, I find that the situational factors of social context (public-private), perceived motive (e.g., personal choice, community pressure), and type of action (enactment, persuasion) affect majority members' tolerance. In Chapter 4, I show that the situational context has an impact, with highest tolerance for

Muslim identity enactment (e.g., religious attire) in the private context, followed by the street context and then the two contexts of work (**RQ2**). Additionally, in all four contexts, tolerance of the persuasion of others to also wear religious clothing is lower than tolerance of enacting the practice itself. However, both enactment and persuasion tolerance differ only by context for majority group members who are relatively strongly concerned about the continuity of their ingroup culture (**RQ3**). Chapter 4 thus shows that there is context-related and action-related variance in tolerance of minority practices, and that tolerance only differs per context for those with relatively high identity continuity concern.

Lastly, in Chapter 5, I find, among Dutch and German majority members that tolerance is highest when Muslim civil servants are perceived to wear a headscarf out of personal choice, and lowest for reasons of normative community pressures, with reasons of religious and cultural identity enactment in between (**RQ2**). Yet, I also find that authoritarian people with high concerns for normative conformity are less likely to differentiate between these perceived reasons (**RQ3**). Thus, perceived motives for wearing a headscarf play a role in tolerance, but those who value normative conformity differentiate less between these motives. That authoritarians are intolerant of the headscarf independently of the minority motive is in line with authoritarian people prioritizing social conformity over personal autonomy (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005), and research showing that they display stronger intolerant responses in the face of perceived threats such as practices that challenge dominant cultural values (e.g., a civil servant wearing a headscarf) (Feldman, 2020; Kauff et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2019).

In conclusion, Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that tolerance of minority identity enactment, such as the wearing of a headscarf, is, in part, context-specific and depends on the perceived motive for engaging in it. However, individual differences in concerns about the continuity of the ingroup identity (Chapter 4) and normative conformity (Chapter 5) play a role in this: The effect of the context and of perceived motive on tolerance of minority identity enactment is weaker (Chapter 5) or even absent (Chapter 4) for people with high concerns about normative conformity and identity continuity. This means that these individual concerns about identity continuity and normative conformity are important limiting conditions to consider when studying situational influences on tolerance of minority practices.

1.6 Discussion

1.6.1 Main contributions

This dissertation extended the social scientific literature on intergroup relations by focusing on the classical conceptualization of tolerance as forbearance. Although the theoretical and practical relevance of forbearance tolerance has been put forward in previous research (Forst, 2004; Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), and has been examined in different fields (e.g., political tolerance in political science, Gibson, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1981), so far only a few intergroup studies have empirically investigated tolerance as forbearance (e.g., Adelman et al., 2021a). Thus, this dissertation made a novel contribution to the extensive intergroup literature that has largely ignored the important question of why and when people accept that dissenting others can live the life that they want. My work contributes to the emerging literature on intergroup tolerance in the social sciences and social psychology in particular (Simon et al., 2018; Verkuyten et al., 2020) by investigating some of the main reasons for tolerance as well as possible boundaries to tolerance. Little previous research has explicitly studied why people are generally inclined to tolerate dissenting practices, yet these reasons form the basis for allowing others to live their lives as they wish, since tolerance itself does not provide any substantive reasons (Forst, 2004). Therefore, I examined the reasons *why* and situations *when* people are tolerant, as well as *for whom* specific concerns may limit their tolerance. Although previous studies have considered some of these factors separately (Everett et al., 2015, Gieling et al., 2010; Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013; Verkuyten et al., 2014), I studied these in combination, as tolerance depends on principles and concerns which become salient in specific situations (Verkuyten et al., 2021). Each empirical Chapter identified a situational factor or reason(s) for tolerance, and a boundary mechanism by assessing for whom these mattered less or more. Thus, one of the main contributions of this dissertation is that both the reasons for and boundaries to tolerance were considered, which is necessary for a better understanding of intergroup tolerance.

First, I considered general reasons for *why* people tolerate. Going beyond a standard focus on prejudice and perceived threat as explanations for (in)tolerance (Saroglou et al., 2009; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), I contributed to the literature with a focus on three beliefs related to intergroup dynamics: The ingroup, the outgroup and intergroup perspective. In multiple studies among large national samples, I tested the importance of these three reasons for tolerance with correlational designs and an internal meta-analysis. For the ingroup perspective I studied deprovincialization, and extended the literature on this topic by focusing on its relation with tolerance of concrete minority practices, while simultaneously extending the tolerance literature by complementing a focus on the outgroup with an ingroup orientation. Additionally, the historically old but empirically relatively novel reason of coexistence was considered as a reason to tolerate, and I demonstrated experimentally that the reasons of respect and coexistence generalize across various minority target-groups.

Second, I experimentally investigated situational factors for considering *when* people tolerate particular minority practices, focusing on context-, action- and motive-related variance. Although there is some research that has investigated the social context (Yogeeswaran et al., 2011), the type of action (Gieling et al., 2010) and specific motives (Everett et al., 2015), I was the first to examine this experimentally among national samples, across private and several public contexts, and by considering diverse motives and various practices.

Third, I investigated the boundaries of tolerance in terms of individual differences in concerns for identity continuity and in valuing normative conformity. This extended the literature that identified identity continuity as a theoretical boundary principle for tolerance (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017) with an empirical evaluation. By assessing identity continuity concern in three Chapters, I offered a conceptual replication of this boundary condition to tolerance. Chapter 4 built on Chapters 2 and 3 by investigating identity continuity concern experimentally, and in Chapter 5 I also employed an experimental design to examine the role of valuing normative conformity. This enabled a systematic examination of whether, for instance, higher and lower authoritarian people respond differently to the various motives, rather than their valuing normative conformity causing different perceptions of why a headscarf is worn. Taken together, this research was the first to systematically investigate a combination of both reasons and contexts, as well as limits to tolerance, contributing to a more nuanced and detailed understanding of intergroup tolerance.

1.6.2 Limitations and directions for future research

Despite my novel contributions to the research literature, there are several limitations to the current study that provide directions for future research. First, my work is situated in particular contexts, and not all results may therefore generalize to other settings. For instance, I studied specific practices of specific minority groups, focusing mostly on practices associated with immigrant, immigrant-origin and Muslim minority groups. On the one hand, these specificities may limit the generalizability to other minority groups and practices. For instance, tolerance of various minority practices might vary according to the specific type of action (see Chapter 4) and target minority group (but see Chapter 3). On the other hand, the focus on these minority groups in specified situations (e.g., a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf in a public position) can also be considered a strength because studying concrete circumstances make the results more close to real-life situations (Steiner et al., 2016). Nonetheless, future research should try to replicate these findings across various minority groups and a range of minority group practices. For instance, until recently, much of the public and political debates about accommodating cultural diversity in the Netherlands has focused on practices and beliefs of immigrant groups and especially Muslim immigrant-origin groups. However, recent debates have also included gender and sexual minorities, as well as minority groups with a colonial history, and future research could investigate the tolerance process in relation to beliefs and practices of these groups.

In a similar vein, this research is situated within specific national (i.e., Dutch and German) contexts and focused on the perspective of the majority population. Although I studied large national samples from the Netherlands and Germany, and found no substantial differences between the countries in Chapter 5, this does not mean that the findings generalize to other (European) countries. Each country has a particular history of immigration and regulations with regard to managing diversity, embedded in specific minority-majority relations and power dynamics. Future research could also incorporate the minority perspective on tolerance (see Cvetkovska et al., 2020, 2021), and assess minority-majority interactions to examine how the identified reasons and concerns play out in social interactions.

A second limitation of the present research relates to the objection component of tolerance, which is not measured explicitly in some of the empirical studies. In Chapters 2 and 3, for example, I assessed tolerance (allowing minority members to live the life that they want, and accepting dissenting minority practices) while making it clear from the introduction to the survey questions that the practices are contentious and negatively debated in society[8]. Yet it is not clear to what extent participants themselves have objections. Consequently, strictly speaking I assessed the acceptance outcome of the tolerance process while assuming disapproval of the practice. I did not, for instance, filter out people with positive attitudes towards those practices, which would have meant that part of the sample is ignored. Thus, in Chapters 2 and 3, I did not examine explicitly to what extent one disapproves of the practices studied. Building on this, in Chapters 4 and 5, I therefore used a more specific measure which explicitly refers to accepting while objecting, i.e., forbearance tolerance (Forst, 2004; King, 2012; Verkuyten et al., 2021). Although this measure assessed tolerance more directly, technically it was still not possible to fully disentangle whether there are people who score high on acceptance without objecting.

In future studies, these measures could be compared to, or combined with, other ways of measuring tolerance. For instance, it could be assessed whether others should be allowed to live their lives the way they want to, only for those practices people strongly disapprove of (Simon et al., 2018). Or, similar to research on political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1981), a two-step disapproval-acceptance procedure could be used by first asking people to indicate which practices they disapprove of, and subsequently ask them whether they nevertheless will tolerate these. Another option is to have four answer categories which include all ('yes' versus 'no') combinations of disapproval and acceptance

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[8] For instance, in the research in Chapter 3, the introductory text was 'Imagine that the dissenting way of life of certain people is rejected by the majority of the population. Below are reasons why these people may still live their life as they wish – within the confines of the law'.

(cf., Gieling et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2019; Sleijpen et al., 2020). Similarly, combining feelings towards minority groups with acceptance or rejection of a range of practices can be used to identify person-centered profiles of tolerant and intolerant persons (Dangubic et al., 2020a; 2020b; 2022). Yet another possibility is to let people rank competing values (e.g., value individual freedom more than social cohesion as a reason to tolerate) in order to assess the balancing process and weighing of values for tolerance (Adelman et al., 2021a; Peffley et al., 2001). A final avenue for future research could be to study actual behavior or alternatively, behavioral intentions (e.g., signing petitions in favor or against a practice; cf. Adelman et al., 2021b). Altogether, using more diverse and detailed measures of tolerance remains an important suggestion for future research.

A third limitation is also of a more methodological nature. Although I studied large national samples of the Dutch and German population, most studies in Chapters 2 and 3 made use of correlational data and hence no causal inferences can be made. While I have theoretical reasons to assume that the reasons for tolerance (e.g., respect, deprovincialization) are more stable and general ideological beliefs that precede tolerance of actual practices (see Boin et al., 2020), it is possible that there are mutual directions of influence. Furthermore, it is possible that the public context, for instance, is used as a justification for intolerance by prejudiced people (see Chapter 4). For example, there are some indications for mutual directions of influence between deprovincialization (i.e., as predictor as well as consequence) and tolerance (Verkuyten et al., 2022).

In Chapters 4 and 5, I overcame this limitation about causal inferences by using experimental designs. Some of the findings in these chapters showed relatively small effect sizes (Lakens, 2013), which is likely due to the use of survey-embedded experiments that included relatively subtle manipulations: A fictitious interview in which only a few sentences per condition were different (Sniderman, 2018). Yet, the fact that our manipulation did show the expected effect (Chapters 4 and 5), and consistently in both countries (Chapter 5), suggests that even simple online information can influence tolerance judgements. Nonetheless, future research could include more vivid and extensive manipulations, such as videos rather than texts. Thus, in order to be able to make further causal claims, future studies would profit from more detailed experimental designs (e.g., Kuklinski et al., 1991), and especially also longitudinal designs (Jaspers et al., 2009). The latter could be very useful to study tolerance over time, and also because ideological beliefs such as outgroup respect are likely to be quite difficult to manipulate experimentally (Simon et al., 2018; Zitzmann et al., 2021).

1.6.3 Practical implications

The findings of this dissertation can be considered to have societal relevance, as they provide insight into the process of intergroup tolerance. As the results indicate, tolerance is a complex phenomenon because it involves, first, the acceptance of something that is disapproved of, and second, because it depends on many different factors (e.g., reasons to tolerate, and limits to tolerance) and varies by social context as well as type of action and minority motive.

Although there are situations in which tolerance may not be the preferred outcome (Cvetkovska et al., 2020, 2021) and there are various other ways of dealing with diversity (Verkuyten et al., 2019), tolerance is an indispensable ingredient for any diverse society in which different groups have meaningful different ways of life (Vogt, 1997; Walzer, 1997). People cannot be expected to agree with and approve of things that go against their own convictions and beliefs, but they should be able to accept that others have equal rights to live the life that they want. As this dissertation has shown, people in part tolerate others' behaviors because of reasons of outgroup respect and for avoiding societal conflict. Tolerance can function as an important barrier against discrimination and might often be more feasible than asking people to like, appreciate or even celebrate what they disapprove of, find misguided, or consider morally wrong.

The results of this dissertation suggest that a promising way to enhance tolerance is by promoting ingroup reappraisal and outgroup respect, for instance by trying to stimulate these orientations in educational settings. A first concrete step in line with my findings on outgroup respect could be to foster respect for the democratic equal rights of all citizens in educational programs and exercises. A second suggestion, in line with the findings on the deprovincialization-tolerance relation, is that citizenship and civic education could focus on stimulating perspective-taking and developing a culturally nuanced worldview. This way, students could learn that fellow students have different perspectives and that there are different ways of looking at the world (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; J. Thijs et al., 2021). However, my findings also indicate that such perspective-taking might be harder when people are concerned about the continuity of their cultural identity, which leaves an important role for teachers to moderate discussions in such a way that students do not feel threatened but rather encouraged to broaden their horizons. Wansink and colleagues (2018) suggest teachers to start with less controversial topics to train the skill of perspective-taking and genuine listening to fellow students. Third, such exercises should ideally not only be theoretical, but rather include actual contact and interactions with people who think differently or have different backgrounds, which implies that it would be of help if schools are not segregated (e.g., along religious or ethnic lines, or tailored to one educational level only) (J. Thijs et al., 2021). Fourth, as tolerance entails the weighing of reasons for acceptance and objection, in the case of strong objection, exercises with identifying additional reasons for acceptance could make tolerance more likely than intolerance (Verkuyten et al., 2019). For instance, if students have strong concerns about ingroup continuity and value normative conformity, they could be encouraged to reflect on possible reasons why minority practices should be accepted, such as respect for minority group members as co-citizens with equal rights. Together, this could benefit youngsters by learning to accept a diversity of beliefs and practices they encounter and which they do not have to agree with, eventually improving intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies.

1.6.4 Overall conclusions

The dissertation's main aim was to provide insight into the reasons why and situations in which majority group members less or more strongly tolerate minority members to live the life that they want and to tolerate the enactment of specific minority practices. My goal was to advance the social scientific literature on intergroup relations and to contribute to the emerging literature on intergroup tolerance by focusing on the classical notion of tolerance as forbearance which is put forward in political science and philosophy. Intergroup tolerance is especially relevant in increasingly diverse societies in which it is not feasible that we all like each other and agree on everything. I investigated tolerance among majority members in the Netherlands and, in Chapter 5, Germany, where there are ongoing debates about dissenting minority practices such as the ritual slaughter of animals, the founding of religious schools, and religious symbols in the workplace. The importance of tolerance is that despite disapproval and disagreement, one accepts that others should be able to live the life they wish.

One general reason to tolerate, as I have shown, is respect for minority group members as fellow citizens with equal rights, and a second reason is seeing one's ingroup culture in a more nuanced manner. Another, albeit less strong reason is wanting to avoid societal conflict and valuing harmonious intergroup coexistence. Although the respect-tolerance and deprovincialization-tolerance relations were weaker for individuals who are more strongly concerned about the continuity of their ingroup identity, they were generally robust, as the findings of multiple studies and an internal meta-analysis demonstrated. These findings demonstrate the importance of considering ingroup, outgroup and intergroup perceptions, as well as their interplay with individual differences in concerns about ingroup identity continuity for understanding intergroup tolerance. Furthermore, I also identified the relevance of situational influences by showing that tolerance is context-, motive-, and action-dependent, albeit with different effects for majority members who are highly concerned about the continuity of their ingroup culture or strongly endorse the value of normative conformity. In conclusion, considering the reasons *why* and situations *when* people tolerate, as well as *for whom* these aspects are more or less important, is relevant for a better understanding of intergroup tolerance in culturally diverse societies.

CHAPTER 2

Tolerance of minority practices: The roles of deprovincialization and identity continuity concern

A slightly different version of this chapter is published as:

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Velthuis wrote the draft chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea for the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

2.1 Introduction

There is a relatively large literature on prejudicial attitudes towards immigrant-origin groups and their cultural practices and rights. Research in various countries has demonstrated, for example, that feelings of threat, insecurity, endorsement of an ethnic view of nationhood, nationalism, lower levels of education, and a right-wing political orientation are related to negative attitudes and behaviors towards immigrants and the tolerance of immigrant practices and their expressive rights (see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Wagner et al., 2010). In addition to this work there is research focusing on people's positive attitudes and support for immigrants' rights, including research on the endorsement of multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2006; Whitley & Webster, 2019). There are many everyday examples of individuals and groups showing solidarity with immigrants, with a sense of shared humanity ("*br*others rather than others"), a common ingroup identity (Bansak et al., 2016; Kunst et al., 2015), and feelings of sympathy and empathy being important predictors of people's acceptance of immigrant practices and rights and their rights (Newman et al., 2013; Nickerson & Louis, 2008). We aim to go beyond this literature by considering the importance of how majority members understand their ingroup culture rather than that of immigrant-origin groups. We aim to demonstrate that how "we" perceive ourselves matters for how "we" respond to newcomers. Specifically, we focus on the notion of deprovincialization as put forward in social psychology (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). Deprovincialization signifies a reappraisal of the majority ingroup and a nuanced perspective on its traditions and ways of life. Using data of three studies conducted among national samples in the Netherlands, we examined whether deprovincialization is associated with tolerance of immigrant minority practices and rights, above and beyond the role of prejudicial feelings, national identification, level of education, political orientation, age, gender, and religious affiliation[9].

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[9] As explained in Chapter 1, this dissertation considers intergroup tolerance as non-interference with dissenting practices (King, 2012; Verkuyten et al., 2021), and focuses on tolerance of concrete practices of immigrant and immigrant-origin groups. In Chapter 2 the focus is on practices of immigrants in general (Study 2) and Muslim immigrants in particular (Studies 1 and 3). It is called 'tolerance of immigrant minority practices *and rights*' because some studies include items that refer to immigrants *having the right to* found their own schools, or for instance, Muslims having the right to found a political party.

Even though majority members with a more deprovincial worldview can be expected to be more open to other cultures and therefore more likely to tolerate immigrants, they may also want to maintain a sense of ingroup continuity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Therefore we also examined whether the expected positive association between deprovincialization and tolerance is weaker when majority members are concerned about the continuation of their ingroup culture and identity. Thus, in Studies 2 and 3 we investigated the moderating role of perceived concern about ingroup identity continuity in the relation between deprovincialization and tolerance of immigrant minority practices and rights.

2.2 Theoretical and empirical background

2.2.1 Deprovincialization

Pettigrew (1997, 1998) first proposed the deprovincialization construct in relation to the processes of intergroup contact and cultural change, to denote a less ingroup centric worldview without necessarily disparaging one's ingroup identity. A deprovincial view implies a widening of one's horizon by acknowledging and recognizing the value of other cultures and thereby putting one's own taken-for-granted cultural standards into perspective. Although deprovincialization does not have to imply emotional distancing from the ingroup, some studies have provided "at best a crude test" (Pettigrew, 2009, p. 59) of the deprovincialization process by inferring its presence from (reverse-scored) ingroup identification or higher social identity complexity (Brewer, 2008; Sanatkar et al., 2018; Schmid et al., 2014). Yet, low ingroup identification and high identity complexity can have different reasons and meanings, and do not necessarily imply a widening of social perceptions and ingroup reappraisal.

A more specific conceptualization of deprovincialization refers to 'not living in the provinces' and recognizing that ingroup traditions, norms and values are not the only way to deal with the social world. Hence, other researchers have operationalized and examined deprovincialization in terms of perspective-taking and cultural nuance (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten et al., 2014), and found high positive correlations with cognitive flexibility and openness to experience (Boin et al., 2020; Mepham & Martinović, 2018), and negative associations with social dominance orientation and right-wing nationalism

(Boin et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2016). Deprovincialization implies a more multicultural orientation (Verkuyten et al., 2010), less ethnic boundary drawing (Green et al., 2018), and a more inclusive understanding of the national community (Verkuyten et al., 2016). Further and similar to cultural humility (Hook et al., 2013) and intellectual humility (Hook et al., 2017), deprovincialization implies an openness to see things from other perspectives which has been found to be associated with intergroup positivity (Eller & Abrams, 2004; Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013; Tausch et al., 2010). Thus, we hypothesized that stronger deprovincialization is positively associated with higher tolerance of practices and rights of immigrant-origin groups (*Hypothesis 1*).

2.2.2 Identity continuity concern

Deprovincialization implies adopting a broader cultural horizon and not taking one's ingroup values and beliefs as the self-evident and absolute standards for evaluating the world, but without disparaging the culture or value of the ingroup (Boin et al., 2020; Pettigrew, 1997). Being more open towards other cultural standards and worldviews does not have to imply a relativistic view on one's own culture (Kim & Wreen, 2003), or not valuing the ingroup's cultural continuity. This is illustrated by the famous quote of Mahatma Gandhi: "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any" (Gandhi, 2008, p. 241). Thus, although a broader cultural horizon likely translates into tolerating others' cultural practices, this link may be weaker when one is concerned about collective identity continuity.

The literature on collective continuity denotes perceived collective continuity as the perception that one's group has temporal endurance (Sani, 2008), thereby connecting group members' past, present and future social selves (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Research has shown that a sense of collective continuity is a motivational principle for cultural identity construction (Vignoles, 2011) and that people want to maintain such a sense and more strongly strive for it when it is challenged (for a review see Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Perceived collective continuity provides a rooted sense of social self, especially when collective continuity is understood in cultural essentialist (rather than narrativist) terms (Sani, 2008; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Collective continuity can be challenged by societal changes such as immigration and globalization, resulting in an increased motivation to maintain a sense of collective continuity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011), as well as enhanced ingroup protectionism and outgroup rejection (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013, 2014). Concerns about ingroup identity and threats to the cultural continuity of one's ingroup may have negative implications for outgroup attitudes (Hutchison et al., 2006; Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Some immigrant cultural practices can be perceived as undermining the continuity of the majority culture and identity, also for majority members who have a more nuanced perspective on their own culture. For example, the increasing presence and visibility of Islam in Western societies can be unsettling and perceived as incompatible with the majority culture, even for individuals with a more deprovincial worldview (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Hervik, 2012). Thus, we expected that the association between deprovincialization and tolerance of immigrant practices is less positive for majority members who are more concerned about the continuity of their ingroup cultural identity (*Hypothesis 2*).

2.2.3 Overview of the present research

We investigated our predictions in three Studies using available datasets collected among national samples of Dutch majority members. The first hypothesis (i.e., a positive relationship between deprovincialization and tolerance) was tested in all three Studies, using different samples in order to examine whether the expected association replicates across samples, and for tolerating practices and rights of immigrant groups in general (Study 2) and Muslim immigrant-origin groups in particular (Studies 1 and 3). Additionally, we conducted an internal meta-analysis, examining this relationship across the three Studies. In Studies 2 and 3 we also examined the second hypothesis that perceived concern about ingroup identity continuity makes the expected positive association between deprovincialization and tolerance less strong.

For testing these predictions it is important to take various other factors into account. We examined the relative importance of deprovincialization for tolerance and the role of continuity concern by controlling statistically for factors that have been found to predict attitudes towards immigrants, namely level of education (e.g., Coenders & Scheepers, 2003), political orientation (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016), age (e.g., O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006), gender (e.g., Van

Doorn, 2014) and religious affiliation (e.g., Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). We also took prejudicial feelings into account, to rule out the possibility that the attitude towards immigrants' practices reflects outgroup prejudice rather than a less ingroup centric worldview. Further, we also considered national identification, since we wanted to rule out the possibility that the associations are driven by low levels of ingroup identification, which has been used as a proxy for deprovincialization (Pettigrew, 2009).

We conducted our research in the Netherlands, where similar to other Western countries, many majority members have negative views of immigrant(-origin) groups such as Muslims (Coenders et al., 2008; Pew, 2019; Savelkoul et al., 2012). For example, half of the ethnic Dutch population considers immigrants a burden on the country (Pew, 2019) and feel that "the Western lifestyle and Muslims' way of life" collide (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). In our studies, we considered tolerance of immigrant practices in general (Study 2, e.g., raising one's children within one's own cultural traditions) as well as tolerance of Muslim minority practices specifically (Studies 1 and 3, e.g., wearing religious symbols in public; founding religious schools).

2.3 Study 1

2.3.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

In total, 575 Dutch majority members participated in the study after they were drawn from a nationally representative database of the Dutch population. Data were collected with an online survey by research organization *Kantar Public* and all respondents participated with consent and on a voluntary basis. The survey also included other constructs that are not the focus of this research and included survey-embedded experiments for which there were no carry-over effects[10]. Twelve participants were excluded because one or two of their parents were born abroad, resulting in *N* = 563. Participants were between 18 and 91 years old (*M* = 51.08, *SD* = 17.52), and 50% was female, which closely matches the characteristics of the Dutch adult population (Statistics Netherlands, 2019).

Measures

The main constructs were measured by multiple items and using 7-point Likert-scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

Tolerance of immigrants' practices was measured in relation to Muslim immigrants and by using six items (see Table A2.1) taken from previous research in the Netherlands (e.g., Smeekes et al., 2015; Verkuyten et al., 2014). We combined the items into an average scale (α = .90), with a higher score indicating higher tolerance.

Deprovincialization was measured with six items (see Table A2.1) that were based on Martinović & Verkuyten (2013) who designed these items to measure the ingroup nuance aspect of deprovincialization. The items were combined into an average scale (α = .82), with a higher score indicating a more deprovincial orientation.

In addition to *gender* (0 = male, 1 = female), *age* (continuous), and *religious affiliation* (0 = not religious, 58%, 1 = religious, 42%), four other background characteristics were assessed. *National identification* was assessed on a 1-10 scale with a single item (Postmes et al., 2013): 'How strongly do you feel Dutch?'

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[10] Study 1 used correlational data to examine the deprovincialization-tolerance association. However, survey-embedded experiments were part of the broader survey. To ensure our results were not influenced by these experimental manipulations (possible carry-over effects), we performed additional analyses showing that none of the manipulations affected our results. We created a dummy variable for each of the three survey-embedded experiments (0 = control condition, 1 = experimental manipulation). Subsequently, we added the three dummy variables separately to the regression analyses, in a separate step. None of the experiments had a significant effect (β ranged from –.04 to .02, all *p*s > .429), and our results did not change: deprovincialization was still positively and significantly related to tolerance of immigrants' cultural practices.

(1 = *not at all,* 10 = *completely*). *Prejudicial feelings towards Muslims in the Netherlands* was measured with a well-known 'feeling thermometer' that ranged from 1-11 (0° to 100°). The scale was recoded so that a higher score indicates higher prejudicial feelings. *Political orientation* was measured with the well-known self-placement question (Jost, 2006). A 5-point scale was used ranging from politically left (15.1%), center-left (15.8%), center (41.4%), center-right (15.6%) to right (12.1%), and was in the analysis treated as a continuous variable (M = 2.95, SD = 1.20). For *level of education,* participants indicated their highest educational achievement on a scale ranging from 1 (*no/only primary school*) to 7 (*master degree at (applied) university level*). The distinction between these levels of achieved education is comparable to the international ISCED-measure which is used, for example, in the European Social Survey. Similar to other research in the Netherlands, education was treated as a continuous measure (M = 4.45, SD = 1.72), which has been found to reflect the total years of education and result in the same findings (e.g., Bot & Verkuyten, 2018; De Graaf et al., 2000).

Analyses

There were no missing values on the main dependent and independent variables, but there were missing values for political orientation (N = 72), which were imputed[11]. The proposed hypothesis was examined by means of multiple regression analysis, which allowed us to consider the added explained variance per step. We conducted a sensitivity power analysis by means of *G*Power* software (Faul et al., 2007) to determine the minimal detectable two-tailed effect, given the sample size (N = 563), α (.05), and desired power (.80). For the multiple regression, we determined that we achieved the sensitivity to consistently detect at least small R^2 changes (f^2 = .01).

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[11] *Little's MCAR test* was performed, which was significant (p < .001), indicating that the missing values were not completely at random [not MCAR]. Therefore, the missing values were imputed using the *Estimation Maximalization* [EM] strategy (IBM, 2013), estimating the missing values based on 64 items available in the dataset. A sensitivity analysis was performed (comparing results between complete case analysis; replace by mean method; EM imputation based on used variables only; and EM imputation based on all available items), and the results did not change when considering the different imputation procedures.

2.3.2 Results

Descriptive findings

We first performed a principal component analysis with oblique rotation on the twelve items of the two main variables. Results supported a two-factor structure, indicating that the two constructs deprovincialization and tolerance of immigrant practices are empirically distinct (see Table A2.1).

Descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables are shown in Table 2.1. The mean score of tolerance was significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(562) = 3.30$, $p < .01$. Further, the mean of deprovincialization was also significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(562) = 35.06$, $p < .001$, and both measures were positively correlated. The correlations with the other variables were in the directions that can be expected.

Predicting tolerance

To test the first hypothesis, deprovincialization and the seven control variables were included in a regression model, with scores for all continuous independent variables mean centered (Hayes, 2014), and the model explained 50% of the total variance in tolerance (see Table 2.2). As expected, deprovincialization was a unique, positive and relatively strong predictor of tolerance, above and beyond prejudicial feelings, national identification, political orientation, level of education, gender, age and religious affiliation.

Table 2.1 Intercorrelations, means and standard deviations of variables in Study 1 (N = 563), Study 2 (N = 430) and Study 3 (N = 798).

	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	***M (SD)***
STUDY 1										
1. Tolerance of practices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		4.19 (1.40)
2. Deprovincialization	.52***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		5.38 (0.93)
3. National identification	-.10*	-.03	-	-	-	-	-	-		8.43 (1.47)
4. Prejudicial feelings	-.60***	-.38***	.07	-	-	-	-	-		6.65 (2.37)
5. Political orientation	-.40***	-.28***	.04	.36***	-	-	-	-		2.95 (1.20)
6. Level of education	.30***	.24***	-.14***	-.19***	-.15***	-	-	-		4.45 (1.72)
7. Religious affiliation *(0 = none)*	-.00	.01	.11*	-.04	.08	-.00	-	-		0.42 (0.49)
8. Gender *(0 = male)*	-.00	-.01	.03	-.02	-.07	-.02	.02	-		0.50 (0.50)
9. Age	.07	.05	.15***	-.05	-.12**	-.02	.11*	-.14***		51.08 (17.52)
STUDY 2										
1. Tolerance of practices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.90 (1.20)
2. Deprovincialization	.42***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.55 (0.88)
3. Identity continuity concern	-.27***	.11*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.71 (0.74)
4. National identification	.01	-.03	.22***	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.33 (1.12)
5. Prejudicial feelings	-.50***	-.31***	.12*	-.01	-	-	-	-	-	6.27 (1.77)
6. Political orientation	-.28***	-.20***	.23***	.16**	.28***	-	-	-	-	2.89 (1.08)
7. Level of education	.31***	.31***	-.11*	-.04	-.22***	-.13**	-	-	-	4.46 (1.64)
8. Religious affiliation *(0 = none)*	-.01	-.01	.03	.16**	.06	.12**	-.15**	-	-	0.46 (0.50)

Table 2.1 *(Continued)*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	*M (SD)*
9. Gender *(0 = male)*	.02	.01	-.09	-.00	-.03	-.08	-.13**	.10*	-	0.52 (0.50)
10. Age *(cat.1 = 18-29 years)*	-.06	.08	.19***	.25***	.06	-.08	-.27***	.11*	.00	3.56 (1.31)
STUDY 3										
1. Tolerance of practices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.90 (1.37)
2. Deprovincialization	.55***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.37 (0.96)
3. Identity continuity concern	-.65***	-.50***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.96 (1.63)
4. National identification	-.25***	-.18***	.34***	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.55 (1.08)
5. Prejudicial feelings	-.54***	-.47***	.59***	.24***	-	-	-	-	-	6.74 (1.86)
6. Political orientation	-.26***	-.24***	.38***	.21***	.27***	-	-	-	-	2.92 (1.05)
7. Level of education	.35***	.28***	-.30***	-.23***	-.20***	-.08*	-	-	-	4.03 (1.68)
8. Religious affiliation *(0 = none)*	-.01	-.00	.01	.06	.03	.13***	-.08*	-	-	0.50 (0.50)
9. Gender *(0 = male)*	-.01	.02	-.06	-.09**	-.10**	-.10**	-.01	.06	-	0.50 (0.50)
10. Age	.06	.07*	.01	.20***	-.09**	-.08*	-.07*	.07	-.10**	50.64 (17.20)

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. All scales range 1-7, except *Age* (ratio); *Prejudice* (1-11); *Political Orientation* (1-5); and in Study 1 *Identification* (1-10).

Table 2.2 Standardized regression coefficients from multiple regression models predicting tolerance of immigrant practices, Study 1 ($N = 563$), Study 2 ($N = 430$) and Study 3 ($N = 798$).

	Study 1 Step 1 β	**Study 2** Step 1 β	**Study 2** Step 2 β	**Study 3** Step 1 β	**Study 3** Step 2 β
Age	.02	–.05	–.03	.02	.04
Gender (*ref.* male)	–.01	.01	.00	–.06*	–.05
Religious affiliation (*ref.* none)	–.01	.05	.04	.04	.02
National identification	–.04	.04	.08	–.07*	–.02
Political orientation	–.15***	–.13**	–.08	–.07*	.01
Level of education	.13***	.13**	.10*	.18***	.13***
Prejudicial feelings	–.41***	–.35***	–.33***	–.33***	–.18***
Deprovincialization	.28***	.25***	.31***	.31***	.23***
Identity continuity			–.25***		–.38***
Identity continuity * Deprovincialization			–.07 †		–.06*
F	69.24	29.96	30.00	80.11	89.48
R^2	.50***	.36***	.42***	.45***	.53***
ΔR^2			.054***		.084***

Note. Continuous independent variables were centered. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. When deprovincialization was added in a separate step (in Step 1), the added explained variance of deprovincialization was significant: in Study 1, $\Delta R^2 = 7$ %, $p < .001$; in Study 2, $\Delta R^2 = 5$ %, $p < .001$; and in Study 3, $\Delta R^2 = 7$ %, $p < .001$

2.4 Study 2

In Study 2 we tried to replicate the finding in relation to tolerance of practices and rights of immigrants in general. Furthermore, we tested the second hypothesis that perceived concern about ingroup identity continuity weakens the deprovincialization-tolerance link.

2.4.1 Method

Participants and Procedure

Study 2 was conducted among a different sample of Dutch majority members, again drawn from a nationally representative pool. Data were collected by research organization *GfK*, using an online survey ($N = 432$). The survey also included other constructs that are not the focus of this research. Two participants who indicated that both of their parents were born outside of the Netherlands were not considered, resulting in 430 respondents who participated with consent and on a voluntary basis. The sample was approximately 52 years, and 52% female, which again closely matched the characteristics of the Dutch adult population (Statistics Netherlands, 2019).

Measures

The constructs were measured on Likert-scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

Tolerance of immigrants' practices was measured with four of the six items ($\alpha = .83$) that were used in Study 1 but with a focus on immigrants in general (see items in Table A2.2).

Deprovincialization was assessed with three of the six items used in Study 1 (see Table A2.2; $\alpha = .82$).

Concern for identity continuity was measured by four general items that did not specify the target-group of immigrants (see Table A2.2). These items tapped into perceived normative continuity and cultural incompatibilities. The four items were averaged into a scale ($\alpha = .66$)[12] with a higher score indicating more importance attached to identity continuity.

In addition to *gender* (0 = male, 1 = female), *age* (1 = 18-29 years old, 2 = 30-39 years, 3 = 40-49 years, 4 = 50-64 years, 5 = 65-99 years old), *religious affiliation* (0 = not religious, 54%, 1 = religious, 46%), four other variables were considered. *Prejudicial feelings towards immigrants* was assessed with the same 'feeling thermometer' as in Study 1, ranging from 1 to 11, but now with six different immigrant-origin target-groups living in the Netherlands: Rumanians, Poles, labor migrants, Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese immigrants. The feelings towards these six immigrant(-origin) groups were combined into an average score ($\alpha = .91$) and subsequently recoded, so that a higher score indicates higher prejudicial feelings. *National identification* was measured with three items: 'I identify strongly with the Netherlands', 'To be Dutch gives me a proud feeling' and 'I feel very committed and connected to the Netherlands' ($\alpha = .90$). *Political orientation* was again measured with the self-placement question (Jost, 2006), ranging from politically left (12.8%), center-left (16.7%), center (48.4%), center-right (13.3%), to right (8.8%), and treated as a continuous variable in the analysis ($M = 2.89$, $SD = 1.08$). For *level of education,* participants again indicated their highest educational achievement on a scale ranging from 1 (*no/only primary school*) to 7 (*master degree or doctorate at (applied) university level*), which was treated as a continuous variable in the analysis ($M = 4.46$, $SD = 1.64$).

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[12] Although the alpha is acceptable, it is not very high. Some have argued that values below .7 can realistically be expected when dealing with psychological constructs (Field, 2009). Here, no items could improve the reliability of the scale if deleted.

Analyses

There were no missing values for the different items. Because we were interested in both main and moderation effects, hypotheses were examined by means of multiple regression analysis, which allowed us to consider the added explained variance per step. We again conducted a sensitivity power analysis to determine the minimal detectable two-tailed effect, given the sample size ($N = 430$), α (.05), and desired power (.80). For the multiple regression, we determined that we achieved the sensitivity to consistently detect at least small R^2 changes ($f^2 = .02$).

2.4.2 Results

Descriptive findings

First, we performed a principal component analysis on all eleven items of the three main variables. Results supported a three-factor structure, indicating that the three constructs are empirically distinct (see Table A2.2).

Descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables are shown in Table 2.1. The mean of tolerance of immigrant practices was around the mid-point of the scale, $t(429) = -1.76$, $p = .079$, and the mean of deprovincialization was significantly above the mid-point of the scale, $t(429) = 36.55$, $p < .001$. Participants reported quite a strong concern for ingroup identity continuity which was also significantly above the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t(429) = 47.85$, *p* < .001. Tolerance was again positively correlated with deprovincialization and also negatively with identity continuity concern. Deprovincialization and continuity concerns were positively but only weakly related. The other correlations were in directions that can be expected.

Predicting tolerance

The regression model in Step 1 explained 36% of the total variance in tolerance, and deprovincialization again turned out to be a unique and positive predictor of tolerance (see Table 2.2).

To test the second hypothesis, perceived concern about ingroup identity continuity and its interaction with deprovincialization were added to the model in the second step. The inclusion of these significantly added to the explained variance, and a total of 42% of the variance was explained in this model. Simple slope analysis was performed (Aiken et al., 1991) for probing the relation between deprovincialization and tolerance at low (-1 *SD*) and high levels (+1 *SD*) of identity continuity concern[13]. As expected, the positive relation between deprovincialization and tolerance was found to be weaker for participants who were more concerned about identity continuity ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$) compared to those who were less concerned about it ($\beta = .37$, $p < .001$).

The results of Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1 in relation to the tolerance of practices of immigrants in general. Deprovincialization was again a unique and relatively strong predictor of tolerance, above and beyond level of education, prejudicial feelings, national identification, political orientation, gender, age and religious affiliation. In addition, identity continuity concern weakened the deprovincialization-tolerance relationship, although the association remained positive for different levels of concern.

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[13] Simple slope analyses were performed both including and excluding the seven control variables. We reported the analyses including control variables in the text, because these compare to the reported statistics in Table 2.2 (Step 2). Additional simple slope analyses which excluded the control variables showed similar results, i.e., the positive relation between deprovincialization and tolerance was found to be weaker for participants who were more concerned about identity continuity ($\beta = .37$, $p < .001$) compared to those who were less concerned about it ($\beta = .55$, $p < .001$).

2.5 Study 3

The aim of Study 3 was to conceptionally replicate the findings from Studies 1 and 2 by using a larger sample and somewhat different operationalizations. First, for our dependent measure of tolerance, we again focused on Muslims rather than immigrants more generally. In public and political debates in the Netherlands, Muslims are relatively strongly portrayed as a threat to the continuation of the Dutch culture and identity (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009; Slootman & Duyvendak, 2015). Second, in Study 2 identity continuity concern was assessed in general terms, and although the items formed an acceptable scale and supported the theoretical prediction, it might be argued that some of the items did not directly tap into the notion of continuity concern. Therefore, in Study 3 we operationalized concern for identity continuity by using more explicit items that were target-specific and focused on Muslims (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013). That is, we measured to what extent Dutch majority members felt that Muslims in the Netherlands undermine the continuity of their ingroup identity.

2.5.1 Method

Participants and procedure

For Study 3, a sample of 810 Dutch majority members was drawn from a nationally representative database contained by consultancy organization *TNS NIPO* (currently *Kantar Public*). Data were collected with an online survey and respondents participated with consent and on a voluntary basis. The survey again included other constructs which were not the focus of this research. Two persons indicated that they adhered to Islam and were therefore removed from the analyses. Excluding nine missing values for level of education (1% of sample) and one outlier resulted in a sample of $N = 798$ for analyses. Participants were between 18 and 87 years old ($M = 50.64$, $SD = 17.20$), and 50% was female, which again closely matched the characteristics of the Dutch adult population (Statistics Netherlands, 2019).

Measures

The constructs were measured on Likert-scales (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

Tolerance of immigrant practices was measured in relation to Muslim immigrants, and with the same six items ($\alpha = .88$) as in Study 1, except for one item that was not included here: 'Muslims can just like everyone else found a political party' (see Table A2.3).

Deprovincialization was measured with the same items as in Study 2, and one additional item (see Table A2.3), $\alpha = .86$.

Identity continuity concern was measured with three items (see Table A2.3) based on previous research in the Netherlands (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014; Velasco González et al., 2008) and that directly tap into feelings of Muslims undermining Dutch cultural identity continuity ($\alpha = .91$).

In addition to *gender* (0 = male, 1 = female), *age* (continuous), *religious affiliation* (0 = not religious, 50%, 1 = religious, 50%), four variables were considered. *Prejudicial feelings towards Muslims* was measured using 'feeling thermometers' (0° to 100°) in relation to Turks and Moroccans as the two most prominent Muslim immigrant-origin groups ($r = .49$, $p < .01$), with higher scores indicating higher prejudicial feelings. *National identification* was assessed with five items, four of which were similar to Study 2, and one that was similar to Study 1 ($\alpha = .92$). *Political orientation* was again measured with the self-placement question ranging from politically left (11.0%), center-left (19.0%), center (44.5%), center-right (18.2%) to right (7.3%), and was treated as a continuous variable ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 1.05$). For *level of education* participants again indicated their highest educational achievement on a scale ranging from 1 (*no/only primary school*) to 7 (*master degree or doctorate at university level*), which was treated as a continuous variable in the analysis ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.68$).

Analyses

We conducted a sensitivity power analysis to determine the minimal effect size, given the sample size ($N = 798$), alpha (.05), and desired power (.80). For the multiple regression, we determined that we achieved the sensitivity to consistently detect at least small R^2 changes ($f^2 = .01$).

2.5.2 Results

Descriptive findings

We again performed a principal component analysis on all twelve items of the three main variables. Results supported a three-factor structure, indicating that the three constructs are empirically distinct (see Table A2.3).

Descriptive statistics and correlations for the main variables are shown in Table 2.1. The mean score for tolerance was significantly below the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t(797) = -2.16$, $p = .031$, whereas the mean for deprovincialization was significantly above the mid-point, $t(797) = 40.25$, $p < .001$. Identity continuity concern was around the mid-point of the scale, $t(797) = 0.61$, $p = .539$. All correlations were in the expected direction, with tolerance being correlated with both deprovincialization and identity continuity. Additionally, there was a negative association between deprovincialization and identity continuity concern.

Predicting tolerance

Step 1 of the regression analysis explained 45% of the total variance in tolerance of Muslim cultural practices and rights. Again, deprovincialization was a unique and relatively strong predictor of tolerance (see Table 2.2).

In order to test the second hypothesis, identity continuity concern and its interaction with deprovincialization were added to the model in the second step (see Table 2.2). The inclusion of this interaction significantly added to the explained variance in tolerance (53% of the total variance was explained in Step 2), and the interaction was significant. Similar to Study 2 but with a stronger effect, the relationship between deprovincialization and tolerance was weaker for people who were more concerned about the continuity of the ingroup identity ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$) than those who were less concerned ($\beta = .29$, $p < .001$).[14]

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[14] Again, simple slope analyses were performed both including and excluding the seven control variables. The analyses which excluded the control variables showed similar results as those reported in the main text including the control variables: The positive relation between deprovincialization and tolerance was found to be weaker for participants who were more concerned about identity continuity ($\beta = .24$, $p < .001$) compared to those who were less concerned about it ($\beta = .37$, $p < .001$).

2.5.3 Internal meta-analysis

As the three Studies (total $N = 1{,}791$) tested the same association between deprovincialization and tolerance of immigrant practices, we conducted a mini meta-analysis to integrate the results of the studies, following the procedure suggested by Goh et al. (2016). After calculating weighted mean effect sizes (i.e., weighted mean correlations), we computed combined z-scores which were then transformed to overall p-values drawn from the three Studies, using Stouffer's Z test. The results demonstrated a significant robust association between deprovincialization and tolerance, $M\ r_z$ (Fisher's z transformed) = .26, $Mr = .25$, overall $p < .001$.

2.6 Discussion

The main aim of the current research was to examine the importance of deprovincialization for majority members' tolerance of practices and rights of immigrant-origin groups. We examined deprovincialization in terms of a nuanced view on one's ingroup culture, and found in three studies among national samples clear and consistent evidence that deprovincialization is a unique and robust predictor of tolerance, independently of prejudicial feelings, level of education, political orientation, religious affiliation, gender and age. This demonstrates the general importance of a deprovincial orientation for tolerance of cultural practices of immigrants in general, and of Muslim immigrants in particular. Additionally, the results showed that deprovincialization differed from national identification – which has been used as a proxy and crude test (Pettigrew, 2009) of the deprovincialization thesis – and from outgroup prejudice, which indicates that on top of prejudicial feelings towards immigrant(-origin) groups, how people think about their ingroup culture matters for their tolerance of immigrant practices. Thus, also people who are negative towards immigrants tend to be more tolerant of dissenting practices when they have a more nuanced understanding of their ingroup culture.

A view that puts one's taken-for-granted cultural standards into perspective appears to be a unique and robust ingredient for the acceptance of immigrant rights and practices (Boin et al., 2020). This is further demonstrated by the fact that the association was also positive for individuals who were concerned about the continuity of their ingroup cultural identity (Studies 2 and 3). However, perceived concern about identity continuity did weaken the association between deprovincialization and tolerance. Deprovincialization is not the same as a cultural relativist ‘anything goes approach’, and it appears to be more difficult to support immigrants’ cultural practices and rights when the cultural continuity of the ingroup is considered to be at stake. Although identity continuity has been examined in relation to negative outgroup attitudes (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013), to our knowledge, this is the first research that examined identity continuity as a moderator of the link between deprovincialization and tolerance of minority cultural practices. Furthermore, we conceptually replicated the role of identity continuity by demonstrating the moderating effect of a general and a target-specific operationalization of identity continuity concern. Although the latter measure had a stronger moderation effect, both studies indicated that higher concern weakened the positive association between deprovincialization and tolerance.

2.6.1 Limitations and future directions

Some limitations of this research provide directions for future studies. First, although we used relatively large national samples, the cross-sectional nature of our data prevents us from making interpretations about the direction of influence. While we have theoretical reasons to assume that deprovincialization, as a more basic and general worldview, leads to tolerance of immigrants’ practices and rights, it is possible that there are mutual influences or that stronger tolerance leads to a less parochial view on one’s ingroup. However, longitudinal research does indicate that deprovincialization can drive more positive outgroup attitudes (Boin et al., 2020). Future experimental and longitudinal work should further examine the possible directions of influence.

Second, the current studies were all conducted among Dutch majority members and therefore it remains to be seen whether the results can be generalized across countries. Although the findings are quite robust and similar associations have been found in the context of Italy (Boin et al., 2020), there are many differences between countries that may affect these relationships. For instance, in culturally homogenous countries people may be less concerned about the continuity of the ingroup identity, and in countries with a more multicultural orientation the relation between deprovincialization and tolerance of immigrant practices might be even stronger (Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015; Verkuyten et al., 2010).

Third, support for immigrant practices and rights might vary according to the specific practice and target-group that is being investigated. In our studies, we focused on the target-groups of immigrants (Study 2) and Muslims (Studies 1 and 3). Also, we examined support for seven different practices. Although the results are cross-validated in three studies with different types of practices and different target-groups, future research should try to replicate these findings across target-groups, practices and contexts.

2.6.2 Conclusion

To conclude, the current research shows that deprovincialization is a relevant predictor of majority members' tolerance of practices and rights of immigrant-origin groups. With three studies using national samples, different target-groups, and taking various factors into account, the findings convincingly show that a less provincial view of one's ingroup is associated with stronger tolerance of immigrants being able to enact their cultural practices. One implication is that stimulating perspective-taking and a more nuanced view on one's own ingroup culture can help to improve intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies. Although it appears to be more difficult to tolerate immigrant practices when the cultural continuity of the ingroup is considered to be at stake, it is possible to increase tolerance by stimulating a less ingroup-centric perspective. This further indicates that majority members' tolerance of immigrants' practices does not only depend on how they perceive and evaluate immigrants ('them'), but also on how they perceive and evaluate their ingroup ('us'). Immigration brings to the fore the question of majority group identity, and tolerating practices of immigrant-origin groups is also about how majority members see their ingroup identity and the extent to which they have a (de) provincial view of themselves. The focus in trying to improve attitudes towards immigrant and minority groups is often on addressing the stereotypical and negative ways in which majority members perceive these groups. However, how people evaluate newcomers has not only to do with who those newcomers are considered to be, but also with the way in which people evaluate and interpret their ingroup. A less provincial, culturally more open worldview appears to be a key ingredient for moving towards a more harmonious plural society.

CHAPTER 3

The different faces of tolerance: Conceptualizing and measuring respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance

A slightly different version of this chapter is published as:

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Velthuis wrote the draft chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea and design for the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

3.1 Introduction

Tolerance is increasingly promoted in national, international, and organizational settings for establishing multicultural justice and peaceful coexistence. Leaders from various countries, the European Union, the United Nations (UN), and non-governmental organizations have all emphasized the importance of policies that promote tolerance which, among others, has resulted in the UN *International Day for Tolerance* and a '*European model law for the promotion of tolerance and the suppression of intolerance*' (European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation, 2015). Similarly, religious and civic associations as well as schools worldwide promulgate intergroup tolerance as a critical aspect of social life, often as a response to increasing diversity resulting from continuing immigration. In western societies, tolerance is frequently discussed in relation to the accommodation of immigrant-origin groups and Muslim minorities in particular (Verkuyten et al., 2019).

Tolerance is a counteracting force against suppression and negative interference, allowing dissenting others the right to lead the life that they want (Norris, 2002). It is a particular type of liberty that requires the application of a notion of freedom to those who are disliked or to practices and beliefs one disapproves of (Cohen, 2004; King, 2012). However, people can have different reasons for being tolerant: for *why* they accept that dissenting others can affirm their views and live their life accordingly. Yet, little empirical research has explicitly considered these general reasons to tolerate (see Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013). Two main reasons are, first, avoiding societal conflicts and, second, respecting the equal standing and rights of others (Verkuyten et al., 2019). These reasons have been put forward as two forms of tolerance in a historical and conceptual analysis by Forst (2013), and can be considered in society and by individuals simultaneously: Coexistence-based tolerance and respect-based tolerance[15]. These reasons to tolerate differ in how strongly they are based on pragmatic rather than principled concerns – corresponding to principled and pragmatic ways of reasoning about societal issues (e.g., Colombo, 2021) – and therefore might have different implications for intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies.

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[15] Forst (2013) also distinguished *esteem-based* and *permission-based tolerance* which we did not examine here (see Klein & Zick, 2013). *Esteem-based tolerance* with its emphasis on valuing and celebrating diversity is very similar to full recognition (Klein & Zick, 2013) or 'modern appreciation tolerance' (see Chapter 1), while *permission-based tolerance* refers to the societal hierarchical intergroup context of tolerance rather than an underlying reason for being tolerant.

The aim of the current research is to advance the study of intergroup tolerance by examining these two reasons to tolerate among four national samples of majority group members in the Netherlands. We examined the meaning and distinctiveness of both reasons in relation to dissenting others in general, towards different types of minority and immigrant target-groups, in relation to concrete practices of Muslims (Study 3), and in relation to prejudice (Studies 1 to 3). As tolerance entails accepting others' freedoms that one dislikes or objects to, it can be expected to be distinct from group-based prejudice. However, previous studies have found mixed results for the tolerance-prejudice relation (e.g., Crawford, 2014; Helbling, 2014; Van der Noll et al., 2010). Therefore, it is relevant to consider whether respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance differ empirically from group-based prejudice and to examine the relations with prejudice (Gibson, 2006; Fairlamb & Cinnirella, 2020). Moreover, we investigated whether the general beliefs about reasons for tolerating that others have the freedom to live their lives, also translate into the acceptance of concrete and specific minority practices (e.g., the building of a mosque in one's neighborhood)[16]. Additionally, also majority members who endorse respect and coexistence as reasons to tolerate minority and immigrant practices might want to maintain a sense of ingroup continuity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Therefore, in Study 3, we also examined whether the expected positive association between these two reasons to tolerate and acceptance of concrete practices is weaker when majority members are more concerned about the continuation of their ingroup culture and identity.

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[16] Thus, throughout this Chapter, 'tolerance' refers mainly to the two general reasons to tolerate which are more abstract beliefs about why one tolerates minority members to live the life they want, while 'acceptance' refers to accepting (in the sense of condoning and forbearing, see 1.2.1) concrete and specific practices of minority group members.

3.2 Theoretical and empirical background

3.2.1 Two reasons to tolerate

Tolerance implies the notion that dissenting others, and minorities in particular, should be able to live the life that they want (Norris, 2002). In general, people might have more principled or more pragmatic reasons for putting up with what they dislike or object to (Verkuyten et al., 2019). *Respect-based tolerance* is based on the principled belief that all citizens are autonomous individuals who have equal rights. Although there are sometimes ‘deep’ cultural differences in ways of life, minority members are tolerated because they are respected as equal, autonomous citizens with the same dignity, rights and civil liberties (Hjerm et al., 2019; Simon, 2007).

Coexistence-based tolerance implies a more pragmatic acceptance of minority groups’ ways of life in order to avoid conflicts and to find and maintain peaceful cohabitation (Kirchner et al., 2011). Here the focus is not so much on the rights of minority groups but rather on living together as a reason to tolerate. Coexistence-based tolerance is considered instrumental to the attainment of the value of maintaining social harmony and peace, and things that go against this should not be tolerated.

Going beyond initial empirical research in Germany (Klein & Zick, 2013), we examined these two reasons for tolerance in relation to various minority target-groups, and empirically tested the prediction that these are distinct considerations among the public (*Hypothesis 1a*). Furthermore, using an experimental design, we examined whether both reasons have a similar distinctive meaning in relation to different immigrant groups. The two represent general reasons for why people tolerate minorities and do not refer to specific immigrant groups or specific practices and lifestyles. This should make comparisons across groups possible (Hjerm et al., 2019). If people think that minority members should be allowed to live the life that they want for pragmatic or more principled reasons, they are likely to distinguish these two reasons consistently across groups. This means that we expected that respect- and coexistence-based tolerance can be empirically distinguished in relation to different types of immigrant groups, with each reason having a similar meaning in relation to these groups (*Hypothesis 1b*).

Distinguishing the two reasons in relation to different immigrant target-groups does not have to mean, however, that the level of endorsement is similar across the groups. For example, the endorsement of coexistence-based tolerance might be stronger in relation to immigrant groups that are perceived to be culturally more different and as posing a greater challenge to societal cohesion than other immigrant groups. This could mean, for example, that Dutch majority members emphasize the importance of coexistence more strongly in relation to Muslims and non-Western immigrants, as compared to non-Muslim and Western immigrants. Yet it is also possible that the different reasons for being tolerant are not immigrant group-specific. Some research suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes are quite similar towards different groups of migrants (e.g., Kinder & Kam, 2009; Sniderman et al., 2004), because these attitudes would be driven by underlying psychological predispositions and ideological beliefs. The same might be true for respect- and coexistence-based tolerance, which both emphasize – although for different reasons – the general importance of minorities being able to live the life that they want. Therefore, we explored whether the level of endorsement of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance depends on the particular type of immigrant target-group.

3.2.2 Relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice

Tolerance and prejudice are theoretically and empirically distinct phenomena (e.g., Gibson, 2006; Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013; Verkuyten et al., 2020). People can have negative beliefs and feelings about a group but nevertheless support the civil liberties of that group to live the life that they want. They are capable of accepting practices and beliefs of those whom they dislike, disapprove of, or disagree with. Furthermore, people can reject specific practices (e.g., ritual slaughter of animals) of a group (e.g., Jews, Muslims) to whom they have neutral or even positive feelings (Dangubic et al., 2022; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002; Van der Noll, 2014). However, previous research has found mixed results for the relation between tolerance and prejudice (e.g., Fairlamb & Cinnirella, 2020). Thus it is relevant to examine to what extent the different reasons for tolerance do or do not reflect group-based prejudice, and to test whether these are empirically distinct. For instance, tolerating minorities out of respect for them as equal citizens should not only imply a lack of prejudice, but actually form a specific reason for showing forbearance (Simon et al., 2018).

As tolerance can be driven by various reasons to allow minority groups to live their own way of life, the association between tolerance and prejudice might actually depend on the specific reason for tolerance. This could further validate the meaningfulness of making a distinction between the two reasons to tolerate, and shed light on the extent to which tolerance and prejudice co-occur (Gibson, 2006; Fairlamb & Cinnirella, 2020).

Respect-based tolerance focuses on the civic status of minority members as autonomous members of society. When people respect members of another group as equals, it is likely that they are not strongly negative towards this group. In research among Tea Party supporters (Simon et al., 2018), it was found that respect for homosexuals and Muslims as equal fellow citizens goes together with more positive attitudes towards those outgroups. Furthermore, a study in Sweden found respect tolerance to be associated with lower prejudice towards immigrants (Hjerm et al., 2019; but see Klein & Zick, 2013). Therefore, we expected that stronger endorsement of respect-based tolerance is associated with lower prejudice towards (immigrant) minorities (*Hypothesis 2*).

The coexistence conception focuses on societal harmony and the peaceful functioning of society. Its instrumental and more conditional nature makes it morally less imperative than respect-based tolerance. Coexistence-based tolerance is a question of societal risks and opportunities in a given time and place, and emphasizes that majority and minority groups live together in society. This might imply a less clear and robust association with prejudice towards minorities. For instance, Klein and Zick (2013) found no independent relation between coexistence tolerance and prejudice. In some situations also people with prejudicial feelings might be willing to accept others in order to prevent conflicts and secure peaceful coexistence. They may think that in given circumstances it is in society's best interest to tolerate minorities and let them live the life that they want. However, in other situations prejudiced people might feel that suppression and exclusion rather than tolerance is in the best interest of society. Thus, we will explore how coexistence-based tolerance relates to prejudicial feelings, and whether it is associated with prejudice independently of respect-based tolerance.

Additionally, we examined whether the relations between the two reasons for tolerance and prejudice are similar for four types of immigrant target-groups (Western, non-Western, Muslim, non-Muslim). It is possible, for example, that the coexistence-prejudice association is more pronounced for immigrant groups that are considered culturally more dissimilar, than for other groups for instance accepted for pragmatic reasons. However, for the more principal respect-based tolerance, the relations with prejudice are likely to be the same across different types of immigrant groups.

3.2.3 General reasons for tolerance and the acceptance of specific minority practices

Research has shown that there often is a difference in the way in which people judge abstract reasons and general notions in comparison to concrete cases and specific situations (Dixon et al., 2017). It is one thing to agree with the general notion that minority members have the freedom to live the life that they want, but another to accept, for example, the ritual slaughter of animals or Muslim teachers in public schools wearing a headscarf. It is around concrete issues (e.g., dress code, religious education, language use, dietary requirements, mosque building, parenting styles) that ways of life collide and the need for acceptance of cultural diversity arises. Therefore, it is important to examine whether the two general reasons to tolerate are associated with the acceptance of concrete minority practices, above and beyond group-based prejudice. Study 3 focuses on tolerance of Muslim minority practices[17], as the immigrant-origin group that is most strongly and most negatively debated in Dutch society (Andriessen, 2016). Demonstrating that the two reasons to tolerate are independently related to the acceptance of these practices would provide further support for the meaningfulness of the distinction between respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance.

With regard to respect-based tolerance, people may think that some controversial minority practices (e.g., Muslim public school teachers wearing a headscarf) are without merit, but still accept that others practice these because they respect them as autonomous members of society with equal rights. Simon and Schaefer (2018) found that accepting dissenting practices and beliefs is likely when there is respect for others as fellow, equal citizens (Simon et al., 2018). Thus, respect-based tolerance can be expected to be associated positively with the acceptance of Muslim minority practices, above and beyond prejudicial feelings (*Hypothesis 3a*).

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[17] With the term “Muslim minority practices”, we refer to practices linked to Muslim minorities in Western Europe and frequently debated in those societies, such as teachers wearing a headscarf in public schools. This is not to say that the practices are defining of, or undebated within Muslim communities.

Coexistence-based tolerance focuses on the values of peace and societal harmony, which might be a reason for allowing minority members to live the life that they want (Haidt, 2012). A pragmatic tolerant person may prefer to refrain from negatively interfering with dissenting minority practices because they think that an intolerant reaction might cause social tensions, resistance and conflicts. Thus, coexistence-based tolerance also can be expected to be associated positively to the acceptance of concrete Muslim minority practices, on top of prejudicial feelings (*Hypothesis 3b*).

3.2.4 The role of identity continuity concern

Tolerance differs from indifference ('who cares') and relativism ('anything goes') since there are boundaries to what can and should be accepted (Cohen, 2004; Fairlamb & Cinnirella, 2020; King, 2012). Perceived ingroup continuity has been discussed as an important boundary principle to tolerance (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), but has so far not been examined empirically. Things that threaten or undermine the continuity of the ingroup culture and identity are difficult to accept. This means that the expected positive associations between the two general reasons for tolerance and the acceptance of specific minority practices might depend on concerns about ingroup identity continuity.

Research indicates that people want to maintain a sense of ingroup continuity and more strongly strive for or are more concerned for preserving it when such a sense is challenged, for instance by societal changes due to immigration and increasing cultural diversity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Vignoles, 2011). Some immigrant cultural practices and expressive rights can be perceived as undermining the continuity of the cultural identity, also for majority members who endorse the general notions of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance.

Experimental research has shown that people reject minority practices which are considered to contradict society's normative and moral ways of life (e.g., Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018; Sleijpen et al., 2020). Thus, general beliefs about tolerance might not always translate into acceptance of concrete practices if people are concerned about the continuity of their ingroup's identity. All in all, we expected that the associations of the endorsement of (a) respect-based tolerance and (b) coexistence-based tolerance with the acceptance of Muslim minority practices is less strong for majority members who are more concerned about the continuity of their ingroup's cultural identity (*Hypothesis 4a and 4b*).

3.2.5 Overview of the present research

We investigated our predictions in three studies using four datasets collected among national samples of Dutch majority group members. *Hypotheses 1a* and *2* were tested with all four samples in order to examine whether the expected empirical distinction between respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance exists. Additionally, we investigated whether the expected differential associations with prejudice replicates across samples, and towards dissenting others in general (Study 1a), towards cultural minorities (Study 1b), towards different immigrant groups (Study 2), and towards Muslim immigrants (Study 3).

In Study 2, we used an experimental design to test whether the meaning and endorsement of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance are immigrant-group specific or rather similar across immigrant groups (*Hypothesis 1b).* Specifically, we varied the immigrant category about which participants answered the respect- and coexistence-based tolerance questions across conditions, comparing Western versus non-Western immigrants, and Muslim versus non-Muslim immigrants. Also, we explored whether the relations of the reasons with prejudice are similar across these four target-groups. Lastly, in Study 3 we examined whether the two general reasons to tolerate are positively associated with the acceptance of concrete Muslim minority practices (*Hypothesis 3a/b*), and whether these associations are less strong for people who are more concerned about ingroup identity continuity (*Hypothesis 4a/b*).

In testing these predictions, we included several control variables that have been found to be associated with tolerance and prejudice: Level of education (e.g., Coenders & Scheepers, 2003), political orientation (e.g., Bansak et al., 2016), national identification (e.g., Gieling et al., 2014), religious affiliation (e.g., Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015), age (e.g., O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006) and gender (e.g., Van Doorn, 2014). When examining the relationships with acceptance of minority practices in Study 3, we additionally included prejudicial feelings as a control variable, to assess the unique statistical associations of respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance with the acceptance of specific practices over and above prejudicial feelings.

3.3 Study 1

The aim of Study 1 was to test whether respect- and coexistence-based tolerance can be empirically distinguished and are independently related to prejudice. We tested these predictions in relation to tolerance of other people in general who 'have a dissenting way of life' (Study 1a) and subsequently referring to 'the way of life of cultural minorities' (Study 1b). This allowed us to assess the generality of the distinction between the more principled and pragmatic forms of tolerance and their relation with prejudice.

3.3.1 Method

Data and Participants

In Study 1a, a sample of 1,050 Dutch majority members participated with consent in an online survey. Potential respondents were selected from the *Kantar Public* consumer panel for fieldwork in the Netherlands (response rate 51%). From this online panel, a national sample of the ethnic Dutch population aged 18 years and older was compiled via a stratification procedure based on gender, age, education, household size and region. Four participants who identified as Muslim were excluded ($N = 1{,}046$). Approximately half of the sample (51%) was female, and participants were between 18 and 85 years old ($M = 47.00$, $SD = 15.67$).

In Study 1b, a different sample of Dutch majority members was selected by *Kantar Public* from the *TNS NIPO* database to complete an online survey, consisting of eight version that were randomly presented to the participants (response rate 48%). Two versions of the survey contained the tolerance measures, which resulted in $N = 218$. Eight participants were excluded from the analyses because they indicated that their parents were not Dutch, resulting in an analytical sample of 210. Approximately half of the sample (51%) was female, and participants were between 18 and 85 years old ($M = 51.47$, $SD = 16.71$).

Measures

In Studies 1a and 1b, the *two reasons to tolerate* were measured with three items each, using 7-point Likert-scales for answering (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*). Some of the items were adapted from Klein and Zick (2013), who used items that showed relatively low reliabilities ($\alpha = .50$ to $\alpha = .62$). Therefore we developed additional items that focused more directly on the different reasons for tolerance by using a similar stem (see Table A3.1). In Study 1a, the items were measured in relation to no specific group, and were preceded by the following introductory text: 'Imagine that the dissenting way of life of certain people is rejected by the majority of the population. Below are reasons why these people may still live their life as they wish (within the confines of the law). To what extent do you agree or disagree with these reasons?'. In Study 1b, respect- and coexistence-based tolerance were measured in relation to cultural minorities in the Netherlands and the items were preceded by: 'Below are several reasons for tolerating dissenting ways of life of cultural minorities. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these reasons?'. A sample item for *respect-based tolerance* is '…because they have the equal right to live their own life' ($\alpha = .96$ in Study 1a, and $\alpha = .91$ in Study 1b), and a sample item for *coexistence-based tolerance* is '… in order to avoid social conflict' ($\alpha = .93$ in Study 1a, and $\alpha = .90$ in Study 1b).

Prejudicial feelings were measured with the well-known 'feeling thermometer' that ranged from 1 (0°, *very cold feelings*) to 11 (100°, *very warm feelings*), with 50° explicitly indicated as neutral feelings. Using feeling thermometers with wider ranges of responses than Likert-type scales generates a more reliable measure (Alwin, 1997), and these explicit measures tend to correlate with subtler methods of assessing prejudice (Dovidio et al., 2001). In Study 1a, respondents indicated their warm or cold feelings towards nine minority groups in the Netherlands: immigrants, refugees, Muslims, Poles, Rumanians, Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese in the Netherlands, and the combined items formed a reliable scale (α = .94). In Study 1b, the minority target-groups were: Rumanian, Bulgarian, Polish, Turkish, Moroccan and Muslim, refugees and asylum seekers in the Netherlands (α = .93). All items were recoded so that a higher score indicated higher prejudice.

Besides *age* (continuous variable), *gender* (0 = men, 1 = women) and *religious affiliation* (0 = no affiliation, 1 = religiously affiliated), we measured three other constructs that were used as control variables. *National identification* was assessed in Study 1a with two items ('I identify with the Netherlands' and 'I feel connected to other Dutch people'; *r* = .57) on 7-point scales, and in Study 1b with a single item that has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure: 'How strongly do you feel Dutch?' (1 = *not at all,* 10 = *completely*) (Postmes et al., 2013). *Political orientation* was assessed with the well-known self-placement question (Jost, 2006) with a scale (7-point in Study 1a, and 5-point in Study 1b) ranging from a (strongly) left orientation via a center to a (strongly) right orientation, and was treated as a continuous variable in the analyses. Last, for assessing *level of education*, in both studies, participants indicated their highest educational achievement on a scale ranging from 1 (*no/only primary school*) to 7 (*master degree at (applied) university level*). The distinction between these levels of achieved education is comparable to the international ISCED measure that is used, for instance, in the European Social Survey. Similar to other research in the Netherlands (e.g., Van Tubergen & Van de Werfhorst, 2007), education was treated as a continuous variable in the analysis.

Analytic strategy

We first used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in M*plus* version 7.3 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012) to examine whether the items load onto the three latent constructs coexistence- and respect-based tolerance, and prejudice. Subsequently, for examining the associations between the variables – without making any claims about a direction of influence – we specified a structural equation model in M*plus* in which prejudice was regressed on the two tolerance forms, and we controlled for the (manifest and mean-centered) control variables. Descriptive statistics and correlations were retrieved from SPSS 24.0.

There were no missing values on the key variables of interest, but in Study 1a there were missing values on the control variables political orientation (*N* = 144) and religious affiliation (*N* = 20). In Study 1b, there were only missing values for political orientation (*N* = 30). The missing values were dealt with in Mplus by using full information maximum likelihood (FIML; Graham, 2003).

3.3.2 Results

Two reasons to tolerate

In Study 1a, results of the CFA demonstrated that a three-factor model had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(86) = 644.40$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.96; TLI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.08 [0.07-0.09]; SRMR = 0.03. The model included one modification, letting the errors of two prejudice items covary, and all factor loadings were above .68 (Kline, 2016)[18]. Subsequently, we tested a series of alternative models, which fitted the data significantly worse than the proposed model (see Table A3.2).

In Study 1b, results of the CFA showed that the proposed three-factor structure needed modifications for the prejudice items to reach an acceptable fit to the data. We maintained the two forms of tolerance as first-order factors, and used a second-order factor for prejudice, with three meaningful lower-order factors loading onto the second-order factor (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). The three lower-order factors clustered the minority groups that were similar in origin, religion or migration background: Muslims, Turkish and Moroccan immigrants formed one factor[19]; Rumanian, Bulgarian and Polish immigrants formed another; and refugees and asylum seekers formed a third factor. The second-order factor allowed us to use a single latent score for prejudice towards all eight immigrant minority groups, while accounting for the covariance within the factor. This resulted in an acceptable fit: $\chi^2(71) = 202.89$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.09 [0.08-0.11]; SRMR = 0.06. All standardized factor loadings were above .75 (Kline, 2016)[20]. For this model, items were permitted to load only on the constructs they were proposed to measure. Subsequently, we tested a series of alternative models, which fitted the data significantly worse than the proposed three-factor structure (see Table A3.3). Thus, in line with *H1a*, in both Study 1a and Study 1b, respect- and coexistence-based tolerance were empirically distinct constructs that were also distinct from prejudice.

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[18] A measurement model with only the respect- and coexistence-based tolerance items (two-factor structure) was also examined, and had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 15.07$, $p = .058$; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.03 [0.00-0.05]; SRMR = 0.01. The model included no modifications and all standardized factor loadings were above .90.

[19] Although this mix of background in terms of religion and immigrant-origin may appear to be odd, note that in the Netherlands, approximately two third of Muslims are of immigrant-origin from Morocco and Turkey (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012), and of the Turkish and Moroccan immigrant-origin groups in the Netherlands, approximately 86% and respectively, 94% self-identifies as Muslim (Huijnk, 2018). Apparently this overlap is also perceived by the public when asked for their group-based feelings.

Descriptive findings

Descriptive statistics for the main variables of both samples are shown in Table 3.1. On average, participants in Studies 1a and 1b endorsed respect-based tolerance more strongly than coexistence-based tolerance, $t(1045) = 23.17$, $p < .001$ (Study 1a) and $t(209) = 9.96$, $p < .001$ (Study 1b). Further, in both samples, respect- and coexistence-based tolerance were positively associated, and both related negatively to prejudice.

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[20] A two-factor measurement model with only the tolerance items had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(7) = 9.36$, $p = .223$; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.04 [0.00-0.10]; SRMR = 0.02. The model included one modification (letting the errors of two coexistence tolerance items covary), and all factor loadings were above .73.

Table 3.1 Means, standard deviations and correlations of continuous variables in Study 1a ($N = 1{,}046$), Study 1b ($N = 210$), Study 2 ($N = 824$), Study 3 ($N = 411$).

STUDY 1	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	***M (SD)***	***M (SD)***
1a (*above*) + 1b (*below diagonal*)								*Study 1a*	*Study 1b*
1. Respect	-	.42***	–.26***	–.15***	.04	.12***	–.04	5.05 (1.54)	4.81 (1.22)
2. Coexistence	.56***	-	–.09**	–.06	.09**	–.05	.05	3.86 (1.56)	3.99 (1.32)
3. Prejudice immigrants	–.46***	–.24***	-	.34***	–.07*	–.29***	–.03	6.24 (1.93)	6.18 (1.66)
4. Political orientation	–.35***	–.24***	.42***	-	.10**	–.09**	–.13***	4.11 (1.49)	2.87 (1.14)
5. National identification	–.08	.07	–.01	–.06	-	.07*	.09**	5.20 (1.12)	8.43 (1.61)
6. Level of education	.41***	–.11	–.25***	–.12	–.08	-	.03	4.37 (1.59)	4.41 (1.72)
7. Age	.03	.06	–.18*	–.20**	.09	–.06	-	46.99 (15.67)	51.47 (16.71)
STUDY 2	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**		***M (SD)***
1. Respect	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		5.13 (1.20)
2. Coexistence	.55***	-	-	-	-	-	-		4.06 (1.35)
3. Prejudice immigrants	–.49***	–.34***	-	-	-	-	-		6.29 (1.98)
4. Political orientation	–.36***	–.26***	.40***	-	-	-	-		4.04 (1.40)
5. National identification	–.07*	–.05	.09**	.14***	-	-	-		8.55 (1.74)
6. Level of education	.22***	.08*	–.20***	–.16***	–.14***	-	-		4.76 (1.70)
7. Age	.01	.03	–.05	–.03	.17***	–.33***	-		54.94 (16.21)

Table 3.1 *(Continued)*

STUDY 3	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	***M (SD)***
1. Respect	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.70 (1.32)
2. Coexistence	.57***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.42 (1.30)
3. Prejudice Muslims	–.41***	–.27***	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.88 (2.35)
4. Tolerance of practices	.55***	.37***	–.54***	-	-	-	-	-	3.35 (1.08)
5. Identity contin. concern	.01	–.03	.16**	–.25***	-	-	-	-	5.62 (1.23)
6. Political orientation	–.25***	–.17**	.30***	–.37***	.27***	-	-	-	3.06 (1.17)
7. National identification	.03	–.06	.08	–.03	.33***	.15**	-	-	8.51 (1.71)
8. Level of education	.21***	–.05	–.20***	.23***	–.18***	–.13*	–.15**	-	4.88 (1.64)
9. Age	–.08	.09	.06	–.06	.04	–.01	.15**	–.33***	52.21 (16.71)

Note. All scales range 1-7, except *Age* (ratio); *Prejudice* (range 1-11); *National identification* (range 1-10); and *Political Orientation* in Studies 1b and 3 (range 1-5). For descriptive statistics and correlations, observed mean scores were used, except for *Political Orientation* using FIML for missing values. Correlations for Study 1a are placed above the diagonal, while for Study 1b these are placed below the diagonal.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice

We regressed prejudice on the two reasons to tolerate (see Table 3.2). Adding the control variables to the analyses did not change the results (see Table A3.4 for Study 1a, and Table A3.5 for Study 1b). For both samples, the findings demonstrated that stronger respect-based tolerance was associated with lower prejudice (in line with *H2*) and that coexistence-based tolerance was not independently associated with prejudice.

Table 3.2 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with prejudice as dependent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, for all studies.

	Study 1a (*N* = 1,046)	**Study 1b** (*N* = 210)	**Study 2** (*N* = 824)	**Study 3** (*N* = 411)
Respect	–.28 (.03)***	–.52 (.08)***	–.47 (.04)***	–.40 (.05)***
Coexistence	.03 (.04)	.04 (.09)	–.09 (.04)*	–.05 (.05)
R^2	.07***	.25***	.28***	.18***

Note. *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

3.4 Study 2

Extending the findings of Study 1, the aim of Study 2 was to examine whether people consistently distinguish between and similarly interpret respect- and coexistence-based tolerance in relation to different immigrant target-groups (*H1b*). Additionally, we explored whether each reason for tolerance is equally endorsed in relation to these target-groups. We used an experimental design, manipulating the immigrant target-group in relation to which the questions about the reasons to tolerate were asked. Specifically, we made a distinction between four broad immigrant categories that are commonly used in Dutch public and political debates (Cinalli & Giugni, 2013; Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009): The distinction between Western and non-Western immigrants, and the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. Lastly, we explored whether the relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice were similar across the four immigrant categories.

3.4.1 Method

Data and Participants

This study used an online survey which was collected by research organization *Ipsos,* which used the *GfK* panel to approach a gross sample of 1,640 panel members (response rate 52%). Eighteen respondents were removed by *GfK* to assure data quality. Eight participants were excluded from data analysis because they indicated that they were Muslim or that both of their parents were not Dutch (resulting in $N = 824$). Half of the sample (51%) was female, and participants were between 18 and 88 years old ($M = 54.94$, $SD = 16.21$).

Design and Measures

For the survey-embedded experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions that differed from each other in terms of the immigrant target-group (Western, non-Western; Muslim, non-Muslim immigrants). In all four conditions, participants were presented with the same introductory text, tailored towards the specific category of immigrants that 'can (within the confines of the law) live as they wish'. The same set of items for measuring *respect-based tolerance* ($\alpha = .91$) and *coexistence-based tolerance* ($\alpha = .89$) were used as in Studies 1a and 1b.

For *prejudice towards immigrants* we again used the same 'feeling thermometer' which assessed feelings towards four immigrant groups: refugees, Muslims, and Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands ($\alpha = .90$).

We measured the same six control variables (level of education, national identification, political orientation, age, gender and religious affiliation) with exactly the same single item questions as in Study 1b. *Political orientation* was measured as in Study 1a, on a 7-point answer scale. Moreover, *level of education* had one different answer category than in Study 1b, creating a higher mean (see Table 3.1).

Analytic strategy

Analyses for the full sample (i.e., collapsing the four immigrant categories) were conducted first to test the same hypotheses as in Study 1. We used a CFA (in M*plus*) to examine whether respect- and coexistence-based tolerance and prejudice were empirically distinct constructs. Subsequently, we specified a structural equation model, regressing prejudice on the two reasons for tolerance.

Second, the data were analyzed across the four categories by testing multiple-group models. CFAs for all separate groups were conducted to examine whether the two reasons to tolerate each had the same meaning across the target-groups. Subsequently, measurement invariance analyses were performed to test whether the measures (e.g., meaning of items, means and regression coefficients) could be compared across the four target-groups. Furthermore, Wald-tests were used to compare the mean level of endorsement across groups. Lastly, we specified a structural equation model, regressing prejudice on the two forms of tolerance and comparing these relations across the four target-groups.

There were no missing values on the main variables, but there were missing values for the three control variables national identification ($N = 2$), religious affiliation ($N = 10$) and political orientation ($N = 92$). Again, those were dealt with in M*plus* by using FIML.

3.4.2 Results

Two reasons to tolerate

CFA for the full sample replicated the results of Studies 1a and 1b by showing that both forms of tolerance were empirically distinct (*H1a)*. The proposed three-factor structure (respect-based tolerance, coexistence-based tolerance, prejudice[21]) had a good fit to the data without modifications, $\chi^2(32) = 104.42$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.05 [0.04-0.06]; SRMR = 0.03, and all standardized factor loadings were above .74. The three-factor model fitted the data significantly better than various two- and a single-factor model (see Table A3.6).

Again, on average participants agreed more strongly with respect-based tolerance compared to coexistence-based tolerance, $t(823) = 25.00$, $p < .001$ (see

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[21] Also a measurement with only the tolerance items had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 9.32$, $p = .316$; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1,00; RMSEA = 0.01 [0.00-0.05]; SRMR = 0.11. The model included no modifications and all factor loadings were above .83.

Table 3.1). Similar to studies 1a and 1b, respect- and coexistence-based tolerance were positively associated, and again, both related negatively to prejudice.

Relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice

Table 3.2 shows the results of a structural model which regressed prejudice on the two reasons to tolerate. Both latent forms of tolerance had an independent significant relation with prejudice. Similar to studies 1a and 1b, stronger endorsement of respect-based tolerance was associated with lower prejudice (*H2*). Additionally, in Study 2 coexistence-based tolerance was also independently although weakly associated with lower prejudice, but this association was not significant (p = .074) after adding the control variables (see Table A3.7).

Two reasons to tolerate across four immigrant target-groups

To ensure that participants who were asked about the four different target-groups interpreted the questions on the reasons similarly, we tested for measurement invariance of the two-factor structure (respect- and coexistence-based tolerance). Measurement invariance was tested by means of a multiple-group CFA, consecutively testing metric, scalar, and full uniqueness invariance (Van de Schoot et al., 2012). The model in which full invariance is assumed had the lowest value for the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) index, indicating the best trade-off between model complexity and model fit (Van de Schoot et al., 2012). Moreover, CFI did not change more than 0.01 between the configural, metric, scalar and full invariance models, indicating that the threshold for full invariance was reached (Chen, 2007), which was confirmed by non-significant differences in χ^2 between the models (see Table A3.8). The other fit indices of this full invariance model also indicated a good fit. This means that the findings for the four immigrant target-groups can be meaningfully compared on the two latent tolerance constructs (e.g., mean scores, associations between the constructs across groups and with other variables across groups), which confirmed *H1b* (i.e., a similar distinctive meaning of each reason to tolerate in relation to different immigrant target-groups).

Comparing the mean tolerance scores between the four immigrant categories (see Table A3.9) indicated that there were no significant differences in mean scores for respect-based tolerance (*Wald*(3) = 0.53, p = .913), and for coexistence-based tolerance (*Wald*(3) = 6.50, *p* = .090). Thus, each reason to tolerate was equally endorsed in relation to the four immigrant target-groups.

Relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice across target-groups

In order to test whether the tolerance-prejudice relationships were the same across the four target-groups, we estimated a multiple-group comparison in our structural equation model (see Table A3.10). Wald-tests showed that there were no differences across the four immigrant categories in the respect-prejudice relation (*Wald*(3) = 2.19, *p* = .534) and the coexistence-prejudice relation (*Wald*(3) = 1.83, *p* = .608). This means that how respect- and coexistence-based tolerance relate to prejudice was not different across the immigrant categories, which illustrates that these are more general (rather than group-specific) reasons to tolerate.

3.5 Study 3

Study 3 specifically focused on Muslims as the immigrant-origin group that is most strongly debated and negatively evaluated in Dutch society (Andriessen, 2016). The first aim was to examine whether the two general reasons to tolerate are associated with the acceptance of concrete Muslim minority practices, independently of the level of prejudice (*H3a* and *H3b*). Additionally, we examined whether these associations depend on the degree of concern about ingroup identity continuity (*H4a* and *H4b).*

3.5.1 Method

Data and Participants

A total of 815 respondents participated in the study after being drawn from a representative pool of ethnic Dutch. Data were collected with an online survey by research agency *GfK*, with a response rate of 54%. One case was excluded because the person self-identified as a Muslim. Since the questions about acceptance of concrete practices were asked to only half of the sample, this resulted in an analytical sample of *N* = 411. Similar to the previous studies, the sample consisted of 50% women and participants were between 18 and 92 years old (*M* = 52.21, *SD* = 16.71).

Measures

Respect- (α = .90) and *coexistence-based* (α = .90) *tolerance* were measured with the same items as in Study 1b.

Prejudicial feelings towards Muslims was again measured with a feeling thermometer, but this time only towards Muslims in the Netherlands.

Acceptance of specific Muslim minority practices was measured with three items (7-point scales; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*) that involve practices which have triggered strong public debates and have been used in previous research in the Netherlands (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020): ritual slaughter of animals by Muslims, Muslim public school teachers wearing a headscarf, and the building of new mosques. A higher score indicated greater acceptance (α = .73).

Identity continuity concern was assessed with three items (on the same 7-point scales) that were adapted from previous research (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015), and reflect a concern about the maintenance of Dutch cultural identity. We focus on identity continuity concern as a possible boundary condition for tolerance and the items were formulated to reflect this: 'immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish as long as Dutch culture is preserved', '…if Dutch traditions continue to exist', and '…as long as Dutch identity is not affected'. These were combined into a mean score (α = .92), with a higher score indicating more concern for identity continuity.

The same measures as in the previous studies were used for the control variables *age* (continuous variable), *gender* (0 = men, 1 = women) and *religious affiliation* (0 = no affiliation, 1 = religious). For *national identification* and *political orientation* we again used the single item measures and scales as in Study 1b, and for *level of education,* the same question and answer scale was used as in Study 2.

Missing values (*N* = 109) for the control variable political orientation were dealt with by using FIML. For the moderation model, we included two (latent) interaction terms, and followed up with simple slope analysis (Aiken et al., 1991) using M*plus*.

3.5.2 Results

Two reasons to tolerate

We first used CFA for testing *H1a* and whether the two reasons to tolerate, continuity concern, and the acceptance of concrete practices represented empirically distinct constructs. The four-factor structure had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(47) = 163.29$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.97; TLI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.08 [0.07-0.09]; SRMR = 0.05. Modification indices suggested allowing the errors between two of the coexistence items to covary, and all standardized factor loadings were above .60[22]. Subsequently, we tested all possible alternative three-, two- and one-factor models and these fitted the data significantly worse than the proposed four-factor structure (see Table A3.11).

Descriptive findings

Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants more strongly endorsed respect-based tolerance than coexistence-based tolerance, $t(410) = 21.25$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, respect- and coexistence-based tolerance were again positively associated, and related negatively to prejudice (see Table 3.1).

Relations of respect- and coexistence-based tolerance with prejudice

The results from the structural equation model confirmed that respect-based tolerance was again negatively related to prejudice (*H2*, see Table 3.2). Similar to Study 1, coexistence did not independently relate to prejudice towards Muslims. Including the control variables did not change these results (see Table A3.12).

Relations of the general reasons for tolerance with acceptance of concrete practices

The findings from the structural equation model confirmed that respect-based tolerance was positively related to acceptance of Muslim minority practices ($\beta = .45$, SE = .06, $p < .001$), while controlling for prejudice towards Muslims (*H3a*). Coexistence-based tolerance did not independently relate to acceptance of concrete practices ($\beta = .05$, SE = .06, $p = .444$), although it did show a significant positive relation to acceptance in a separate model (including only coexistence-, but not respect-based tolerance, and controlling for prejudice), $\beta = .29$, SE = .05, $p < .001$. Including the control variables did not change these results (see Table A3.13).

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[22] Also a measurement model with only the tolerance items had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2(7) = 38.96$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.11 [0.08-0.14]; SRMR = 0.03. The model included one modification (letting the errors of two coexistence tolerance items covary), and all factor loadings were above .74.

Moderation of identity continuity concern

The findings from the moderation model with respect- and coexistence-based tolerance, continuity concern and their interactions[23], demonstrated that stronger concern about identity continuity was independently associated with lower acceptance (unstandardized $b = -0.22$, SE = .04, $p < .001$). More importantly, there was a significant interaction between respect and continuity concern, in line with *H4a* ($b = -0.07$, SE = .04, $p = .042$), but not between coexistence and continuity concern ($b = 0.02$, SE = .04, $p = .694$), controlling for prejudice towards Muslims.

As expected, simple slope analysis probing the respect by continuity interaction indicated that at high continuity concern (+1 *SD*), the relation between respect-based tolerance and acceptance of concrete practices was weaker ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$) than at low (–1 *SD*) continuity concern ($\beta = .49$, $p < .001$).

3.6 Discussion

Growing diversity and continuing immigration has led to an increased interest in intergroup tolerance among policy makers and within the public and academic community. However, there can be different reasons for people to be tolerant of immigrant and minority groups, and we have focused on conceptualizing and measuring two key reasons to tolerate: coexistence- and respect-based tolerance (Forst, 2013, 2017). Both emphasize that dissenting others should be able to live the life that they want, but for different reasons.

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[23] When analyzing two separate models this led to similar results: a significant interaction between respect and continuity, and no significant interaction between coexistence and continuity (controlling for prejudice).

Among four national majority samples in the Netherlands we clearly found that these reasons as two forms of tolerance are empirically distinct in relation to dissenting people in general and immigrant minorities in particular. Further, using an experimental design (Study 2), we demonstrated that each form had a similar meaning and similar levels of endorsement in relation to various immigrant categories that feature in public and political debates (Western, non-Western, Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants). This means that the measures can be used to examine and compare both respect-based and coexistence-based tolerance across different immigrant target-groups, and that both forms are more general beliefs rather than group-specific conceptions of tolerance.

The distinction between the two types of reasons to tolerate was further supported by their different relations with prejudice. As expected, across the four studies, we found a robust independent negative relation between respect-based tolerance and prejudice. Although coexistence-based tolerance was also negatively correlated with prejudice, this form of tolerance only had an independent and weak association with prejudice in Study 2. This pattern of findings demonstrates that tolerance is a phenomenon distinct from prejudice, which is in line with theoretical arguments in philosophy (Forst, 2013) and social psychology (Verkuyten et al., 2020), as well as other empirical research (Fairlamb & Cinnirella, 2020; Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013). Additionally, it indicates that the association between tolerance and prejudice differs for the two types of reasons to tolerate. This means that the distinction between the two forms of tolerance might help to explain why some studies have found a relatively strong (negative) association between tolerance and prejudice (e.g., Helbling, 2014), while others have found no or only a weak association (Crawford, 2014; Van der Noll et al., 2010). Considering the different type of reasons for tolerance allows for a more detailed understanding of the difference between tolerance and prejudice and the extent to which these co-occur.

Higher respect-based tolerance was found to be associated with lower prejudice and was endorsed relatively strong in the four national samples. Thus, majority members tended to agree with the principle that immigrants are autonomous citizens with equal rights who have the freedom to live the life that they want. Furthermore, stronger respect-based tolerance was not only a general abstract belief, but was also associated with the acceptance of concrete Muslim minority practices (Study 3). Thus, respecting immigrants as fellow citizens translated into higher acceptance of concrete practices, which is in line with research in other Western countries (Hjerm et al., 2019; Simon et al., 2018).

The importance of respect-based tolerance for the acceptance of concrete minority practices is further demonstrated by the fact that the association was also positive for individuals who were concerned about the continuity of their ingroup cultural identity. Yet, perceived concern about identity continuity did weaken the association between respect-based tolerance and acceptance. Tolerance is not without its boundaries and it appears to be more difficult to accept Muslim minority practices when the continuity of the ingroup identity is considered to be at stake (Verkuyten et al., 2019). Although identity continuity has been examined in relation to negative outgroup attitudes (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2013), to our knowledge, this is one of the first studies that demonstrated that identity continuity can be a boundary condition to tolerance of minority practices.

Coexistence-based tolerance was negatively correlated with prejudice (all studies) and positively associated with the acceptance of Muslim minority practices (Study 3). Higher coexistence-based tolerance was also quite strongly associated with higher respect-based tolerance (see also Klein & Zick, 2013). This indicates that people who consider it important to tolerate minorities for reasons of peaceful cohabitation and societal harmony, also tend to respect them as equal citizens. However, the latter appears to be more important than the former, because coexistence-based tolerance was not independently related to the acceptance of Muslim minority practices. One possible explanation is that the more instrumental, pragmatic nature of coexistence tolerance makes it less morally imperative than respect-based tolerance and therefore more contextual, resulting in a less strong relation with prejudicial feelings and the acceptance of concrete minority practices.

3.6.1 Limitations and future directions

Despite our novel contribution to the study of tolerance, there are several limitations to our research that provide directions for future studies. First, the studies were conducted among Dutch majority members and it remains to be seen whether the results can be generalized across countries (see Hjerm et al., 2019; Klein & Zick, 2013). Each country has its specific history of immigration and ways for dealing with diversity, and future research in other contexts should address to what extent context characteristics are relevant for the meaning and importance of the two types of reasons to tolerate.

Second, we have not examined our measures in relation to other ways of measuring intergroup tolerance (e.g. Hjerm et al., 2019), including tolerance of practices and beliefs that one explicitly dislikes or disapproves of (e.g., Sleijpen et al., 2020). This comparison was beyond the scope of our research and could be addressed in future studies (see also 1.6.2). Furthermore and similar to previous research (e.g., Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020), we investigated the acceptance of three Muslim minority practices, but the relation between general reasons to tolerate and accepting concrete minority practices might vary according to the specific type of practice (see also Chapter 4) and target minority group (e.g., sexual minorities), which could be examined in future research.

Third, it should be noted that in Study 2 the experimental manipulation about the different target-groups involved the use of four broad category labels. Although the distinctions between these broad categories are widely discussed in public and policy debates, all four may have triggered similar stereotypical beliefs about newcomers. Thus, it remains to be seen whether the findings are similar if more specific group labels would be used (e.g., Polish, rather than western immigrants, and Somali instead of non-western immigrants). Further, for the experimental manipulation, participants read a short introduction in an online survey, and it is possible that more extensive (personal narratives) and vivid (visual, auditive) manipulations would show target-group differences in the two forms of tolerance. However, simply mentioning these broad category labels is common in the media and in public and political debates and therefore close to empirical reality.

3.6.2 Conclusion

To conclude, we have tried to advance the study of tolerance by clarifying two main reasons to tolerate and demonstrating that these can be assessed in a reliable and valid way. We found that in relation to various groups, people make a consistent distinction between respect- and coexistence-based tolerance. Furthermore, these two forms of tolerance are relatively independent of group-based prejudice, and have different relations with the acceptance of concrete minority practices. Overall, respect-based tolerance was found to relate to more positive attitudes towards minority groups and their practices, while coexistence-based tolerance had no clear independent beneficial outcomes for minority groups. Although tolerating to avoid conflicts may in some situations be the best possible option, it remains a pragmatic and not a principled solution. Stimulating respect-based tolerance – for instance by emphasizing equal rights for all citizens in educational programs – might be particularly helpful for improving intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies.

CHAPTER 4

Tolerance of Muslim minority identity enactment: The roles of social context, type of action and identity continuity concern

A slightly different version of this chapter is published as:

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Velthuis wrote the draft chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea and design for the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

4.1 Introduction

In many European countries, societal debates evolve around various forms of Muslim identity enactment, such as the wearing of religious clothing that is often strongly connected with one's sense of identity. Muslim minorities face various social constraints that may compromise their ability to act upon their religious belief. For example, several countries have discussed, or adopted, legislative measures to ban teachers and civil servants from wearing a headscarf (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Furthermore, a majority of the Dutch, German and French population has been found to favor a ban on headscarves in public places (Pew Research Center, 2005; Van der Noll, 2010).

A negative attitude towards Muslim identity enactment is often considered to result from prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (Van der Noll, 2014). However, people can have various other reasons for opposing, for example, the wearing of headscarves (e.g., secular beliefs), and their opposition is likely to depend on the situation (e.g., more public or more private contexts). Starting with the seminal work of Stouffer (1955), research on tolerance of the enactment of dissenting beliefs indicates that context-related variance in tolerance is common, as it involves a situational convergence of various considerations (e.g., political orientation, situationally salient values). The classical conceptualization of tolerance implies the acceptance of practices and beliefs that one disapproves of, and depending on the situation different considerations for showing forbearance can be relevant (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). People are likely to allow the enactment of minority religious identities in some circumstances for reasons of religious freedom, while disallowing the same enactment in other contexts for secular reasons (Stouffer, 1955; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). For instance, people may accept the wearing of the headscarf in general but not in public institutions (e.g., at work as a civil servant).

Furthermore, context-related variance may be especially likely for majority members who are concerned about the continuity of their ingroup's cultural identity, as wearing a headscarf in public places, for example, may be perceived as undermining this identity. Yet, although various studies have investigated tolerance of the headscarf (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Van der Noll, 2010), to our knowledge no empirical research has considered tolerance across several public as well as private contexts, and whether the impact of the context on majority group members' tolerance of Muslim identity enactment depends on their cultural identity continuity concern.

The central theoretical proposition that we test in this study is that tolerance is lower when minority identity enactment is considered to have more negative sociocultural consequences (Capelos & Van Troost, 2012; Chanley, 1994). Using a national sample of Dutch majority members and an experimental design, we tested this proposition in three ways. First, we investigated tolerance of Muslim women enacting their religious identity, such as wearing a headscarf, in several contexts, reasoning that Muslim identity enactment has more negative sociocultural consequences in public contexts (street, work) as compared to private contexts. Second, we considered both people's tolerance of Muslims enacting their religious identity and tolerance of persuading others to enact their religious identity in a similar way. Trying to persuade co-believers to also wear a headscarf might be perceived as having more negative sociocultural consequences, and might therefore elicit lower tolerance compared to the wearing itself. Third, we examined whether the effect of context on tolerance of identity enactment is especially strong for majority group members who are concerned about the continuity of their group's cultural identity.

4.2 Theoretical and empirical background

4.2.1 Context of religious identity enactment

Empirical research on attitudes towards (Muslim) minority identity enactment has investigated these attitudes in general (Van der Noll, 2014), or in a specified social context such as in school (Helbling, 2014), in politics (Simon et al., 2018), or at work (Van der Noll et al., 2018). The findings of these studies are difficult to compare because there tend to be differences between tolerance in a general sense and tolerance in specific contexts, as well as between various contexts (Chanley, 1994). To our knowledge, no research has systematically examined situation-related variance in tolerance of Muslim identity enactment across private and several public contexts. Yet, such variance would indicate that people take the context into account and do not base their tolerance of

Muslim identity enactments only on, for example, anti-Muslim sentiments or principled considerations (e.g., secular beliefs).

One important reason to expect that the context matters for people's tolerance is that religious enactment in the private sphere, compared to various public contexts, has much less sociocultural consequences and therefore is easier to tolerate. Research has shown that people are less tolerant when a particular practice is considered to have negative implications for themselves, their group, or society more generally (Bannister & Kearns, 2009; Chanley, 1994). For instance, people may fear that religious minority enactment in public contexts may have negative consequences for social cohesion, invokes societal and cultural change, or threatens the secular nature of the state and its public institutions. Thus, identity enactment in public contexts can be expected to be tolerated less than in the private sphere (e.g., home environment, with family members),

However, there are different sorts of public contexts and we therefore additionally examined tolerance of Muslim identity enactment in three public contexts: on the street, in a general work context, and working as a civil servant. First, people are likely to be less tolerant of minority expression in the open space of the street than in private contexts, as private expressions are of little consequence for society at large, and people generally feel that one should not interfere in the private domain (Slater, 1998). Religious expression in the street is a visible form of minority identity enactment, and research in the United States has shown that minority groups are construed as less American when expressing their minority identity publicly versus privately (Yogeeswaran et al., 2011). Therefore, we expected to find lower tolerance for religious identity enactment in the street context than in the private sphere (*Hypothesis 1a*).

Second, we examined the difference between the street context versus the two work contexts (i.e., the general work context and working as a civil servant). Although the wearing of a headscarf is visible in the street, the consequences for majority members are less direct and obvious compared to the work context or in social interactions with civil servants. People may perceive the latter two settings as having to be 'color-blind' situations in which minority identity enactment is less appropriate, and research has found that such a perception can lead to lower minority group acceptance (Dovidio et al., 2015). Thus, it is expected that tolerance for religious identity enactment in both work contexts is lower than in the street context (*Hypothesis 1b).*

Lastly, we compared the level of tolerance in the work context and as a civil servant. The latter implies a role as state representative for which religious identity enactment can be considered as going against the principle of state neutrality. For example, employees in Dutch companies are generally allowed to wear a headscarf, while public officials at the court or police officers are not allowed to wear headscarves for reasons of state neutrality (Saharso & Lettinga, 2008). In line with the principle of state neutrality, we expected tolerance for religious identity enactment as a civil servant to be lower than in the work context (*Hypothesis 1c*).

4.2.2 Tolerance of enactment and of persuasion

In addition to context-related variance in tolerance, there might be act-related variance: variation in what people are asked to tolerate. Research has shown that tolerance levels differ for dissenting beliefs, the behavioral expression of these beliefs, and the mobilization of others to engage in the same practice (Gieling et al., 2010). For example, majority members in the Netherlands were found to be more tolerant of Muslims involved in practices such as the wearing of religious clothing and the refusal to shake hands with someone of the opposite sex (i.e., tolerance of enactment), than of Muslims trying to persuade other Muslims to engage in these practices (i.e., tolerance of persuasion) (Gieling et al., 2010).

Individual religious expression and persuading others to act in a similar way have different sociocultural implications. It is one thing to tolerate religious identity enactment, but another to accept that others are persuaded to express their identity in a similar way. Research has shown that the perception of minority group size is related to perceived threat (McLaren, 2003; Outten et al., 2011) and that ‘threat in numbers’ predicts negative attitudes towards minorities (Earle & Hodson, 2019). As such, trying to persuade others implies mobilizing fellow Muslims to engage in these practices, which majority group members may consider as threatening national identity and culture. Therefore, we expected tolerance of persuasion to be lower than tolerance of identity enactment (*Hypothesis 2*). This is particularly likely in public contexts, but might also extend to the private sphere because the mobilization of others to, for example, also start wearing a headscarf may be perceived as increasing the number of practicing Muslims in society.

4.2.3 Identity continuity concern

Apart from context-based and act-based variance in tolerance, tolerance might also depend on the extent to which majority members perceive Muslim minority identity enactment as undermining the continuity of their normative way of life. A sense of continuity has been conceptualized as an important identity need (Vignoles, 2011), and people will more strongly strive for cultural identity continuity when they perceive that it is challenged or threatened (see Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Research has demonstrated that concern for identity continuity can have negative implications for outgroup attitudes (e.g., Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015) and for the acceptance of Muslim minority practices (Velthuis et al., 2020). In contrast, majority members who are little concerned about the continuation of their normative way of life tend to support cultural diversity and societal change, with the related recognition and acceptance of minority identities in various domains of life (Verkuyten et al., 2020). Thus, we expected that stronger identity continuity concern is related to lower tolerance (*Hypothesis 3a*), and, more importantly, that the predicted context-related differences in tolerance are especially likely for majority members who emphasize the importance of ingroup identity continuity (*Hypothesis 3b*). Participants with higher continuity concern are more likely to consider situational differences in sociocultural consequences of religious identity enactment, and therefore, the situation in which it is enacted is likely to matter more for their tolerance judgements (both persuasion and enactment tolerance).

In testing the different predictions, we additionally examined tolerance among Dutch majority members who are religiously affiliated and those who are not. The reason is that religiously affiliated people, compared to non-religious people, may for example consider the specific context less relevant for the ability of religious groups to act upon their religious beliefs (e.g., Sleijpen et al., 2020)[24].

4.3 Method

4.3.1 Data and Participants

Initially, 850 respondents completed an online survey in 2019 after being drawn from a gross sample of 1640 panel members from the *GfK/Ipsos* panel of over 80.000 Dutch citizens. The response rate was 52%, which is common in the Netherlands (Stoop et al., 2010). All respondents participated with consent and the data collection was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Utrecht University (FETC18-063). Eighteen respondents were removed by research agency *GfK/Ipsos* to assure data quality. We additionally excluded five participants who indicated that both of their parents were not Dutch, and one participant who indicated they were Muslim, resulting in $N = 826$.

In total, 51% of the respondents was female. The mean age was 55 years ($M = 54.89$, $SD = 16.23$, range 18-88 years), and slightly less than half of the sample (43%) was religiously affiliated. In total, 26% had obtained lower levels of education (primary school or lower secondary education), 27% average levels (lower tertiary or higher secondary education), and 47% had obtained higher levels of education (higher tertiary education). The sample closely matches the general Dutch population in terms of demographic characteristics but with a slight overrepresentation of older people and higher educated.

4.3.2 Design and Measures

A between-subjects experimental design with four randomly assigned conditions was used to manipulate the context in which the identity enactment occurred. Vignettes with concrete and realistic situations were used in order to increase the ecological validity of the experiment (Steiner et al., 2016). Based on

[24] Following the classical conceptualization of tolerance, we additionally analyzed the same predictions on a subsample of participants with prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group ($n = 343$). This allowed us to investigate whether prejudiced people also show context-related and act-related variance in tolerance.

previous research in the Netherlands (e.g., Hindriks et al., 2017), the vignettes introduced a fictitious interview about "being Muslim in the Netherlands" that was "recently published in a well-known newspaper". The alleged interview was with a thirty-year-old Muslim woman called Fatma who was born in The Netherlands. In the interview, Fatma was first asked whether she finds it important that Muslims in the Netherlands can enact their religious beliefs. In the three public contexts and after her affirmative answer ("yes of course") she was asked for an explanation ("why?"). For making religious identity enactment salient, she explained her answer by stating, "because your religion is who you are, it is your identity which you should always be able to show, like with a headscarf and in your behavior". The headscarf was mentioned because of being often perceived as emblematic of Muslim identity. Subsequently and for manipulating the three public contexts, she gave an affirmative answer after being asked "so for example also if one is a civil servant at the municipality or as a police officer?" (*civil servant* condition, $n = 202$); "so for example also at work?" (*work context* condition, $n = 207$); "so also when one, for instance, goes shopping?" (*street* condition, $n = 208$). In the *private context* condition ($n = 209$), Fatma answered that she "does not really" find it important that Muslims in the Netherlands publicly enact their religious beliefs, because "one's religious belief is something private, that you experience when you are with your family or pray to God. You do not need to show that everywhere to other people" (see full text of vignettes in Appendix A4). After the experiment and answering all questions (see below), participants were debriefed about the nature of the study.

Manipulation check. The four contexts were expected to vary in the degree to which they evoke negative feelings because of the perceived sociocultural consequences. Therefore and following previous research (Adelman et al., 2021a; Sleijpen et al., 2020), we asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale from *very negative* (1) to *very positive* (7) how they felt towards Muslims like Fatma. Results of an ANOVA demonstrated that there were indeed significant differences in feelings, $F(3,822) = 30.25$, p

$< .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$, with a pattern of increasingly more negative feelings from the private context to working as a civil servant[25] (see Table A4.1).

Tolerance of identity enactment was assessed with two items on 7-point scales. The first item explicitly considered acceptance in spite of a negative attitude: 'To what extent do you think the way of life of Muslims like Fatma should be accepted, despite one being negative about it?'. The second item was: 'Do you think it is OK that Muslims like Fatma enact their religious identity this way?'. The latter was recoded in such a way that a higher score represented higher tolerance ($r = .48$ between the two items). *Tolerance of persuasion* was also measured with two items (7-point scales; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007) and counterbalanced with the other two items[26]: 'Do you think it is OK if Muslims like Fatma try to persuade other Muslims to engage with their religion in the same way?', and 'Do you think it is OK if Muslims like Fatma organize religious assemblies to spread their views?'. Both had an answer scale from 1 (*totally OK*) to 7 (*totally not OK*) and were recoded so a higher score meant higher tolerance levels of the mobilization of others ($r = .56$).

Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) was performed in M*plus* (version 7.3) to empirically examine whether enactment and persuasion tolerance were empirically separate constructs. Results demonstrated that the proposed two-factor structure had an acceptable fit to the data, $\chi^2\,(1) = 18.06, p < .001$; CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.88; RMSEA = 0.15 [0.09-0.21]; SRMR = 0.02, with standardized factor loadings above .64 (see Kline, 2016). Importantly, an alternative one-factor model had a worse fit, $\Delta\chi^2\,(1) = 25.37$, $p < .001$, indicating empirical support for examining enactment and persuasion tolerance as two separate dimensions. However, since it may be argued that RMSEA is relatively high and TLI relatively low (Hu & Bentler, 1999) – which is common in models with low degrees of freedom (Kenny et al., 2014) – we also performed additional robustness checks with single-item measures in assessing the context-effects[27] (see Table A4.2).

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[25] Tukey's post-hoc test revealed that feelings towards Fatma's religious identity enactment in all three public contexts were more negative than in the private context ($p < .001$). Moreover, feelings towards Fatma were marginally more negative in the work context ($p = .053$) and as a civil servant ($p = .002$) compared to the street context. The feelings in the former two work contexts were descriptively (but not significantly) different from each other (see Table A4.1).

[26] The two types of action were presented in a counterbalanced way in order to control for possible sequence effects. We created a dichotomous variable (0 = enactment tolerance questions before persuasion tolerance questions; 1 = persuasion tolerance questions before enactment tolerance questions), and found that there were no order effects for enactment tolerance, $t(824) = 1.26$, $p = .207$, and for persuasion tolerance, $t(824) = -0.79$, $p = .429$.

Identity continuity concern was measured with three items (7-point scales), all starting with the introductory sentence 'immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish' (Velthuis, et al., 2020). This was followed by three items that emphasized the importance of national cultural identity: '….as long as Dutch culture is preserved', 'if Dutch traditions continue to exist', and 'as long as Dutch identity is not undermined'. The three items were combined into a reliable scale ($\alpha = .91$), with a higher score indicating a stronger concern about the majority's cultural identity continuity.

Additionally, some variables were measured which we subsequently used to check whether the randomization of the experimental conditions was successful. We examined whether there were differences between the experimental conditions in terms of *gender, age, level of education* (seven categories comparable to the international ISCED measure), *religious affiliation* (0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*), *political orientation* (7-point self-placement question), and *national identification* (10-point single-item measure, Postmes et al., 2013). The randomization was successful because there were no significant differences (*p*s > .515) across the experimental conditions for these variables, also not for identity continuity concern.

4.3.3 Analytic strategy

Tolerance of enactment and of persuasion were investigated as multiple dependent variables using a one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) in

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[27] In addition to the main analysis with mean scores, the multivariate and univariate analyses were performed with single-item measures, i.e., four dependent variables. These robustness checks yielded similar results for the MANOVA and ANOVA analyses, with a significant multivariate effect of context on all four dependent variables (Pillai's $V = .17$, $F(12, 2463) = 12.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$), and largely similar patterns (*p*s < .01, see Table A4.2).

SPSS (version 24.0), with context as a between-subjects factor. There were no missing values on the constructs of interest, and assumptions for multivariate analyses of variance were met.

The multivariate analysis was followed up with univariate analyses of variance with planned contrasts to test our hypotheses *H1a-H1c*. A first contrast compared the private to the street context; a second contrast compared the street with both work contexts together; and the last contrast involved the work versus the civil servant condition[28]. Since the contrasts were three correlated comparisons, we applied the Bonferroni correction in order to have control over the (cumulative) Type I error, using a more conservative Bonferroni-adjusted α-level of .016 (α divided by the number of comparisons, i.e., 0.05/3 = .016, see Field, 2009). Moreover, since the contrasts tested directional hypotheses, one-tailed p-values were considered (Field, 2009)[29].

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Descriptive findings

Descriptive statistics for the main variables are shown in Table 4.1. As indicated by the overall mean scores across conditions, participants were relatively tolerant of identity enactment (significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(825) = 8.58$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.31$), while they were not so tolerant of trying to persuade others to engage in similar identity enactment (significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(825) = -10.53$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.37$). Moreover, identity continuity concern was endorsed relatively strongly (significantly above the neutral midpoint, $t(825) = 40.86$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.42$). Tolerance for the two types of action were positively associated, and negatively related to identity continuity concern.

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[28] The first contrast was coded: private = –1, street = 1, work = 0, civil servant = 0. The second contrast was coded: street = –2, work = 1, civil servant = 1, private = 0. The third contrast was: work = –1, civil servant = 1, private = 0, street = 0.

[29] One-tailed p-values imply more statistical power, which the Bonferroni correction actually lacks. Thus, combining the one-tailed p-values with the conservative Bonferroni correction created a balance between avoiding the Type I- and Type II-errors.

Table 4.1 Means, standard deviations and correlations of main variables (*N* = 826).

	1	**2**	***M (SD)***
1. Enactment tolerance	-	-	4.42 (1.39)
2. Persuasion tolerance	.57***	-	3.46 (1.47)
3. Identity continuity concern	–.23***	–.16***	5.73 (1.22)

Note. *** $p < .001$.
All scales range 1-7.

4.4.2 Context and tolerance

Figure 4.1 displays the means for tolerance of both types of action per experimental condition. Findings of the MANOVA demonstrated that there was a significant multivariate effect of context on enactment tolerance and persuasion tolerance, Pillai's $V = .10$, $F(6, 1644) = 14.91$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$. Separate univariate analyses of variance revealed significant effects ($ps < .001$) of context on enactment tolerance as well as on persuasion tolerance, with similar, medium effect sizes (see Table 4.2).



Figure 4.1 Mean levels of enactment and persuasion tolerance, per context.

Planned contrasts showed, as expected (*H1a*), that tolerance was significantly lower for religious expression in the street than in the private context, for both enactment ($t(822) = –5.62$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.56$), as well as persuasion tolerance ($t(822) = -5.17$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.49$). Also as expected (*H1b*), religious expression at work and as a civil servant (average of both conditions $M = 4.09$) elicited significantly lower enactment tolerance as compared to the street context ($t(822) = -2.37$, $p = .009$, $d = 0.20$), but only marginally for persuasion tolerance (average of both work conditions $M = 3.17$), $t(822) = -1.73$, $p = .043$, $d = 0.14$. Lastly, religious expression as a civil servant did not elicit lower tolerance than in the more general work context (*H1c*), neither for identity enactment ($t(822) = -1.06$, $p = .145$, $d = 0.10$), nor for persuasion tolerance ($t(822) = 0.57$, $p = .285$, $d = 0.06$).

Table 4.2 Means, standard deviations and results of analyses of variance for enactment and persuasion tolerance of the four contexts ($N = 826$).

	1. Civil servant *M (SD)*	**2. Work** *M (SD)*	**3. Street** *M (SD)*	**4. Private** *M (SD)*	***F***	η_p^2
Enactment tolerance	4.03 (1.35)	4.16 (1.37)	4.36 (1.35)	5.10 (1.26)	26.52***	.09
Persuasion tolerance	3.21 (1.39)	3.13 (1.38)	3.38 (1.45)	4.10 (1.48)	20.07***	.07

Note. *** $p < .001$.
All scales range 1-7.
Multivariate analysis of variance demonstrated a significant effect of context on enactment and persuasion tolerance, Pillai's $V = .10$, $F(6, 1644) = 14.91$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$.

We performed a robustness check with religious affiliation as additional factor (in a two-way MANOVA), and with a subsample of participants with prejudicial feelings towards Muslims. First, the analyses with religious affiliation yielded similar results to the main analyses[30] (see Table A4.3). Thus, the effect of context on tolerance of religious expression was not different for religiously affiliated and non-religiously affiliated majority group members. Second, for the subsample of prejudiced participants, the pattern was largely similar, but with stronger effects of the context on tolerance[31].

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[30] Multivariate analysis of variance demonstrated a significant effect of context on enactment and persuasion tolerance (Pillai's $V = .10$, $F(6, 1614) = 13.90$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$), but no relation between religious affiliation and tolerance (Pillai's $V = .00$, $F(2, 806) = 0.24$, $p = .789$), and no interaction between religious affiliation and context (Pillai's $V = .01$, $F(6, 1614) = 1.45$, $p = .194$) (see Table A4.3).

4.4.3 Differences between two types of action

In order to assess *H2* about the mean difference between tolerance for the two types of action, paired-samples *t*-tests were performed, taking into account that both forms of action were measured within the same individual (Field, 2009). As expected, the findings showed that overall, tolerance of persuasion was significantly lower than tolerance of enactment, $t(825) = 20.67$, $p < .001$, $r = .58$ (see Table 4.1). This was found in all four experimental conditions: as a civil servant ($t(201) = 9.59$, $p < .001$, $r = .56$), in the work context ($t(206) = 10.63$, $p < .001$, $r = .60$), the street ($t(207) = 10.65$, $p < .001$, $r = .59$) as well as private context ($t(208) = 10.47$, $p < .001$, $r = .59$). Furthermore, results of an ANOVA showed that there were no significant differences in the difference between enactment and persuasion tolerance (*Δ*enactment-persuasion) between the four contexts, $F(3, 822) = 1.09$, $p = .351$. Thus, persuasion tolerance was lower than enactment tolerance in all four contexts.

4.4.4 Identity continuity concern

Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used to investigate *H3a* and *H3b* about the direct and moderating role of identity continuity concern (mean-centered variable). Results demonstrated that continuity concern was significantly and negatively associated with enactment and persuasion tolerance, Pillai's $V = .06$, $F(2, 820) = 23.69$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$. Separate univariate analyses revealed significant negative relations between continuity concern and enactment tolerance, $F(1, 821) = 45.89$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, as well as with persuasion tolerance, $F(1, 821) = 21.12$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. In line with *H3a*, majority members who were more concerned about ingroup cultural identity continuity were less tolerant of Muslim women enacting their religious identity and of persuading others to engage in similar practices.

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[31] *Prejudicial feelings towards Muslims in the Netherlands* was assessed with the well-known 'feeling thermometer', ranging from 1 (0°) to 11 (100°), with 6 (50°) explicitly indicated as neutral feelings. Participants indicated their cold or warm feelings towards Muslims in the Netherlands, and subsequently we used the scores 1 to 5 for prejudicial feelings ($n = 343$) in an additional analysis with the subsample of prejudiced participants, leaving neutral feelings (midpoint score 6 or 50°, $n = 192$) and positive feelings (scores 7 to 11, $n = 291$) out. The results indicate, first (*H1*), that among the subsample of participants with prejudicial feelings, the effect of context on tolerance was stronger, but the pattern was similar, albeit with generally lower tolerance levels especially in public contexts (see Table A4.4 and Figure A4.1). Second (*H2*), the pattern of differences between the two types of action was also similar. For this subsample.

H3 was not tested for the subsample because of power issues when including the interaction in the analysis. Overall, the pattern of tolerance scores for prejudiced participants were largely similar, with stronger effects of the context on tolerance.

Importantly, there also was a significant multivariate interaction effect between context and continuity concern on tolerance, Pillai's $V = .03$, $F(6, 1636) = 3.56$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Separate univariate analyses revealed significant interaction effects on both enactment tolerance, $F(3, 818) = 4.42$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$, and persuasion tolerance, $F(3, 818) = 4.12$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Thus, as expected, the effect of context on tolerance depended on individual differences in concerns about cultural identity continuity.

Follow-up analyses at high continuity concern (at +1 *SD* above the mean) and low continuity concern (at –1 *SD*; Aiken et al., 1991) demonstrated that the effect of context on enactment tolerance was only significant for high continuity concern, $F(3, 198) = 8.84$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .12$ (medium-sized effect), and not for low continuity concern, $F(3, 120) = 1.91$, $p = .132$. Similarly, the effect of context on persuasion tolerance was significant for high continuity concern, $F(3, 198) = 9.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$ (medium-sized effect), whereas it was not significant for low continuity concern, $F(3, 120) = 0.47$, $p = .706$. Specifically, when people were highly concerned about ingroup identity continuity, the pattern of tolerance differences between the contexts was similar to the findings for the whole sample, but with lower tolerance for enactment across all contexts ($M_{civil} = 3.61$, $M_{work} = 3.63$, $M_{street} = 4.26$, $M_{private} = 4.79$), and for persuasion across the three public contexts ($M_{civil} = 2.96$, $M_{work} = 2.75$, $M_{street} = 3.23$, $M_{private} = 4.17$). Participants who were not much concerned about identity continuity were more tolerant overall and for them no significant context-differences in tolerance were found.

4.5 Discussion

Increasing cultural diversity in western societies has made the question of tolerance of minority practices relevant and urgent. In particular the accommodation and acceptance of Muslim identity enactment, such as the wearing of a headscarf, in public and in work related settings has become a much debated issue in many European countries (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The aim of the current research was to examine the context-related and act-related variance in majority members' tolerance of Muslims enacting their religious identity, and whether situational variance in tolerance depends on people's concerns about the continuity of the majority's normative way of life. Our overall reasoning was that majority members are less tolerant if Muslim identity enactment is perceived to have a more negative sociocultural impact. We examined the related proposition in three ways: a comparison between four contexts, a focus on tolerance for two types of action, and by considering individual differences in concern about ingroup identity continuity.

First, using an experimental design, we found that majority members' tolerance of Muslim identity enactment was context-specific. This indicates that tolerance of Muslim minority practices is not only based on, for instance, general prejudice or secular beliefs. The context matters for tolerance judgments, with lower tolerance in contexts that have stronger sociocultural implications, such as on the street compared to private settings (e.g., home environment), and at work compared to the street context. However, tolerance of identity enactment at work was not significantly different from working as a civil servant. This was not in line with our expectations, but a similar finding was found in another study in the Netherlands (Sleijpen et al., 2020). One explanation is that practices such as wearing a headscarf was not seen as having different sociocultural implications in these two contexts, which corresponds to the finding that the manipulation check question did not elicit a clearly different response between these two experimental conditions (see Table A4.1). The two work contexts might not be distinct enough and trigger similar feelings about the sociocultural impact of Muslims enacting their religious identity working with colleagues or serving clients. As tolerance was lowest in the work contexts, one implication is that primarily the work context is an area to focus on when trying to improve negative attitudes towards Muslim minority identity enactment.

Second, the findings show that majority members were more tolerant of the identity enactment (e.g., wearing of a headscarf) than of trying to persuade other people to also express their religion in this way (e.g., also start wearing a headscarf). This finding corresponds with the reasoning that the mobilization of other Muslims is considered to have broader sociocultural consequences (Gieling et al., 2010; Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). The overall mean score for tolerance of persuasion was below the neutral midpoint of the scale, which further indicates that participants were rather *in*tolerant of trying to persuade other Muslims to express their religion in similar ways. Furthermore, lower tolerance for persuasion compared to enactment was found in all four contexts, including the private sphere. This might indicate that trying to persuade fellow Muslims to enact their religious identity is perceived by majority members as increasing the number of Muslims in society who enact their religion, which might be considered threatening to the ingroup cultural identity (McLaren, 2003; Outten et al,, 2011).

This interpretation is further supported by the role of ingroup identity continuity concern which was found to matter for tolerance and the context-related differences in tolerance. People low in continuity concern were generally tolerant and did not seem to consider the different sociocultural implications within the various contexts. In contrast, participants with higher continuity concern did consider the context of Muslim identity expression and demonstrated the discussed pattern of context differences in their enactment and persuasion tolerance. These findings indicate that identity continuity concern is an important factor to consider when empirically examining and trying to improve tolerance of majority group members towards Muslim minorities. Concerns about being able to maintain one’s cultural identity can be an important reason for the limits of tolerance (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017).

4.5.1 Limitations and future directions

Despite its novel contribution to the tolerance research and the understanding of majority members’ acceptance of Muslim identity enactment, there are several limitations that provide directions for future research. First, the vignettes were designed and presented in such a way that there was a clear demarcation between the four contexts, to ensure that the conditions did not overlap, which would have made the experimental manipulation unclear. However, as a consequence, the tolerance questions might not match all four vignettes equally well. Specifically, the private context might be more ambiguous (positive about enactment in private and/or negative about enactment in public) than the other three vignettes (positive about enactment in public). Thus, in the private context, the questions asked might be interpreted more in terms of 'only in private' or rather in terms of 'not in public', which is complementary but not exactly the same. Although it does not seem very likely that this possible ambiguity is responsible for the difference that was found between private and public contexts, it might be relevant for the interpretation of this difference.

Second, we investigated three public contexts that are not all 'public' to the same extent. Some work contexts might be considered 'semi-public', although empirically no differences between the two assessed work contexts were found. Further, a sharp distinction between private and public has been criticized because both domains are often interdependent (e.g., Modood, 2015). However, a distinction between private and public contexts and between, for example, situations on the street and at work are common in people's thinking (Slater, 1998). We focused on people's evaluation of Muslim identity enactment in these different contexts and our theoretical reasoning was based on the perceived negative sociocultural implications of the same enactments in different contexts. The pattern of findings is in line with this reasoning, but it should be noted that we did not directly assess the perceived sociocultural implications and possible related feelings of threat. Future research could examine whether Muslim identity enactment has a different impact on perceived sociocultural consequences in different contexts, or whether it triggers different levels of threat in various contexts.

A third limitation relates to the national context in which the study was conducted. It remains to be seen to what extent the findings generalize to other national contexts than the Netherlands. On the one hand, many Western European countries are quite secular which could mean that similar results will be found in other European countries. On the other hand, each national context has its own history and specific rules and regulations, which might influence social norms and attitudes towards, for example, the wearing of headscarves, especially in the public sphere. For instance, France is a strictly secular ('laïcité') society with the majority of the French supporting a ban on headscarves in public places, and the French are the least tolerant of the headscarf compared to other Western European countries (Helbling, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2005). In contrast, in countries with a more multicultural tradition such as the United Kingdom, there are quite liberal regulations and attitudes with regard to the wearing of headscarves in public institutions and by civil servants (Van der Noll, 2010). However, these country differences in the level of tolerance do not have to imply that majority members who are concerned about their ingroup identity continuity do not differ in their tolerance in private and various public contexts, or do not show lower tolerance for persuading fellow Muslims to also express their religion.

4.5.2 Conclusion

Using a well-powered survey-embedded experiment and a national sample, we found that tolerance of Muslim identity enactment shows context-related and act-related variance, with lower tolerance in public contexts and for trying to persuade fellow Muslims. Furthermore, the context of religious identity expression was found to have a medium-sized effect on tolerance among majority group members who endorsed high (versus low) levels of concern about the continuity of their ingroup's cultural identity. These findings demonstrate that tolerance of Muslim identity enactment (e.g., headscarf) depends on the context and on what people are asked to tolerate. The findings provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the complexity of people's attitudes towards Muslim minorities. Such an understanding is important for trying to improve intergroup relations and accommodating minority rights in culturally diverse societies.

CHAPTER 5

Tolerance of the Muslim headscarf: Perceived motives for wearing a headscarf matter

A slightly different version of this chapter is published as:

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Velthuis wrote the draft chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea and design for the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

5.1 Introduction

Over the past decades, many West European debates about the Muslim headscarf evolve around the question whether a secular state conflicts with Muslim women wearing a headscarf in public positions (e.g., civil servants, police officers, teachers). In these public and political debates, questions are raised about whether women wear a headscarf out of their own free choice or rather because of religious community pressures (Howard, 2012). For instance, liberals as well as some feminists have opposed the headscarf because it allegedly would symbolize gender inequality and Muslimas' lack of free choice (Everett et al., 2015; Fasel et al., 2013; Gustavsson et al., 2016; Lettinga & Saharso, 2014; Nussbaum, 2014). In addition to considerations of personal choice and community pressures, the debates also involve questions related to religious freedom and cultural traditions, as Muslim women are also considered to wear a headscarf for reasons of religious or cultural identity enactment (Howard, 2012).

The perception whether a headscarf is worn out of free choice, community pressure or for religious or cultural reasons is likely to matter for the public's tolerance or intolerance of the headscarf. However, research on people's attitudes toward the Muslim headscarf (e.g., Fasel et al., 2013; Gustavsson et al., 2016; Unkelbach et al., 2010; Van der Noll, 2010) has not systematically examined whether these motives have an impact on people's acceptance. Yet, such motive-related variance would indicate that anti-veil attitudes are not solely based on, for instance, prejudicial feelings towards Muslims, but also depend on the perceived motives that Muslim women have for wearing a headscarf.

Using a well-powered survey-embedded experiment among large national samples of German and Dutch majority group members, we examine their perceptions of four main motives that Muslim civil servants may have for wearing a headscarf (Droogsma, 2007; Motivaction, 2011; Zempi, 2016): motives of personal choice, normative expectations from their Muslim community, cultural identity enactment, and religious identity enactment. Considering the western liberal emphasis on individual autonomy and self-determination, we expected that perceiving the wearing of a headscarf as a personal choice will be tolerated the most and for reasons of normative pressure the least, with motives of cultural and religious identity enactment in between. Additionally, we examined whether the effect of the perceived motives for wearing a headscarf on tolerance depends on individual differences in authoritarian predisposition. Authoritarian individuals can be expected to generally be less tolerant of the headscarf as they are more likely to perceive it to be threatening to existing cultural norms and social cohesion, independently of what the perceived motive is for wearing the headscarf (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Duckitt, 2006). We thus expected that higher, compared to lower, authoritarians are less likely to differentiate between the perceived motives in their tolerance judgements.

This research aims to make a novel empirical contribution to the literature on intergroup tolerance and tolerance of Muslim minority practices in particular (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Gieling et al., 2010; Helbling, 2014; Van der Noll, 2014). This literature has examined general tolerance (Velthuis et al., 2021) as well as practice-related and situation-related variance in tolerance, showing that tolerance depends on the type of practice that people are asked to tolerate (e.g., the wearing of a headscarf, or not shaking hands with someone of the opposite gender; Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Dangubić et al., 2022) and the situation (e.g., public, private) in which a particular practice occurs (Stouffer, 1955; Velthuis et al., 2022). However, research has not investigated whether majority group members consider in their tolerance judgments the perceived motives that minority members have for engaging in particular practices. We focus on majority group members' perceptions of Muslim women as civil servants, because the wearing of a headscarf in public positions tends to be contested most in Western societies (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2005), and many majority members have negative feelings towards the headscarf and towards Muslims (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Strabac et al., 2016). For instance, the Netherlands has seen many debates on the national and local level about whether the headscarf should be allowed for police or investigating officers (Dutch broadcasting foundation, 2021). Therefore, the wearing of headscarves by civil servants provides a relevant context for investigating whether perceptions about the motives for wearing a headscarf matter for majority members' tolerance. Furthermore, this focus implies that we can make a novel contribution to the literature by systematically examining whether there is motive-related variance in tolerance while keeping the specific practice and situational context constant.

5.2 Theoretical and empirical background

5.2.1 Tolerance and perceived motive for wearing a headscarf

Muslim women tend to have different and often multiple reasons for wearing a headscarf. Qualitative research has shown, for example, that Muslimas indicate autonomous motivations as well as reasons related to cultural traditions, religious beliefs and community expectations (e.g., Hoekstra & Verkuyten, 2015; Howard, 2012; Legate et al., 2020; Ruby, 2006; Safdar & Jassi, 2021; Wagner et al., 2012). Our focus, however, is not on the perspective of Muslimas but rather on how motives for the wearing of the headscarf are presented in public and political debates and considered by majority group members. For example, politicians tend to emphasize one particular motive to frame the wearing of the headscarf, such as 'submissive' compliance with normative community pressures or in terms of self-determination and freedom of choice (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014). These perceived motives are also found among majority group members. For instance, an investigation in the Netherlands showed that 70% of Dutch young women think that Turkish-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch Muslimas wear a headscarf because it is "part of their Moroccan or Turkish culture" (Motivaction, 2011). Furthermore, they also think that it is obligatory within Islam or part of Muslimas' identity, and 30% of the Dutch women think that Muslimas are forced by their community to wear a headscarf (Motivaction, 2011). This indicates that majority members perceive different motives that Muslimas can have for wearing a headscarf and we systematically examined whether these perceived motives matter for their tolerance.

How majority group members in western societies evaluate these different motives might partly be based on whether these resonate less or more strongly with liberal values. Values such as personal autonomy and self-determination are key to liberal democracies (Gustavsson, 2015; Putnam, 2000; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008), and an alleged lack of individual autonomy is used in public debates to criticize the Muslim headscarf as a symbol of oppression of women (cf. Galeotti, 2015). Based on these liberal values and self-determination theory that argues for the critical importance of individual autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2012), we reason that people will accept the Muslim headscarf for a civil servant the most if it is considered to reflect personal freedom and autonomous choice (Legate et al., 2020). There are a few empirical studies which indicate the importance of perceived motives for the tolerance of Muslim minority practices. For example, Gieling and colleagues (2010) found that Dutch adolescents were more tolerant of minority practices which they interpreted in terms of personal autonomy (e.g., students in school wearing a headscarf) than those interpreted in terms of social conventions (e.g., the founding of Islamic schools). Further, Everett and colleagues (2015) found that wearing a full-face veil for reasons of self-expression led to more positive attitudes (i.e., rating communication and quality of imagined contact) among British students compared to when it was framed as a symbol of submission. In the current study we focused on different perceived motives for wearing a headscarf and we expected higher tolerance for the headscarf that is considered to be worn by a civil servant for reasons of personal choice compared to the other three motives (normative, cultural, religious; *Hypothesis 1a*).

In Western Europe, the Muslim headscarf is sometimes portrayed as a symbol of community oppression of women, and women being socially pressured into wearing a headscarf is a key argument put forward in favor of a ban on headscarves (Howard, 2012). People being pressured, controlled and sanctioned by community members goes against the liberal principle of individual autonomy and choice. Perceiving a headscarf to be worn because of community norms and sanctions can be expected to elicit relatively low tolerance because it most clearly involves a lack of personal self-determination. In contrast, wearing a headscarf for reasons of cultural or religious identity enactment implies the wish to express one's traditions or beliefs. Although this can also involve expectations of community members, it does not have to involve outward compliance and social sanctions. Thus, we expected lower tolerance for the headscarf considered to be worn by a civil servant because of normative community expectations than for reasons of cultural or religious identity enactment (*Hypothesis 1b*).

Lastly, we explored whether there is a difference in tolerating the wearing of a headscarf for perceived reasons of cultural or religious identity enactment. On the one hand, it might be that people are more willing to accept religious than cultural identity enactment because the former raises considerations of religious freedom, which is a key aspect of liberal democracy (Ahdar & Leigh, 2013). On the other hand, it might be the case that both religious and cultural identity enactment are evaluated similarly, because majority group members consider both to be comparable from the perspective of recognizing and celebrating diversity, inclusion and multiculturalism.

5.2.2 Authoritarian predisposition

There is a large literature that links the concept of (right-wing) authoritarianism to outgroup prejudice, intolerance of minority groups (e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Duckitt, 2006) and also anti-veil attitudes (Fasel et al., 2013). The literature on authoritarianism is broad and focuses on various dimensions and aspects (Stenner, 2005). However, recent conceptualizations of authoritarianism are based on the notion of a general underlying tension between the goals of personal autonomy on the one hand and social conformity on the other (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Specifically, authoritarians are considered to emphasize and value conformity and cohesion over personal autonomy and self-direction (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Their striving for conformity typically implies that they try to minimize diversity in beliefs, norms and values. Indeed research has shown that authoritarian individuals display stronger reactions in the face of events they perceive to be threatening, such as cultural diversity (Kauff et al., 2013). As a result, they tend to be intolerant of groups that are dissimilar to them in norms and values, and especially of minority groups that are considered to undermine social conformity and the normative order of society (Feldman, 2020; Kauff et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2019). Authoritarians are less concerned about personal autonomy and can be expected to perceive a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf as challenging dominant cultural norms and values (Gieling et al., 2010). This means that authoritarians might be less likely to take the specific motives that Muslim women can have for wearing a headscarf into account. They may thus be rather intolerant of the headscarf no matter what the perceived motives are for wearing it. We therefore expected that higher, compared to lower, authoritarians differentiate less in their tolerance of the different perceived motives for the wearing of a headscarf (moderation effect of authoritarianism; *Hypothesis 2*). Importantly, we tested this hypothesis using an experimental design which means that we can systematically examine whether higher and lower authoritarians respond differently to the various motives, rather than authoritarianism causing different perceptions of why Muslim civil servants wear a headscarf.

5.2.3 The two countries

The expectations were tested among majority group members in the Netherlands and Germany. In these neighboring countries there are Muslim minority groups that have a history of 'guest worker' migration originating, for example, from Turkey. Both countries are historically Christian nations that have increasingly become secular (De Hart, 2014), and Islam is the second largest religion with Muslims comprising approximately 5% to 6% of the population (Hackett et al., 2019; Haug et al., 2009; Huijnk, 2018). In political and public debates in both countries, reference to a Judeo-Christian national identity and tradition, especially in contrast to Islam, has become increasingly common (Van den Hemel, 2014). The presence of Islam and its religious practices in public spaces has been contested (Cinalli & Giugno, 2013). For instance, a majority of the public in Germany and the Netherlands has been found to favor a ban on headscarves in public places (Van der Noll, 2010).

However, there are also some differences between the countries with regard to citizenship regimes and regulations on the wearing of headscarves in public positions. Whereas in the Netherlands, civil servants are allowed to wear a headscarf (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014; Selby, 2015), in Germany there have been differences between the regional states, some of which (temporarily) banned the headscarf for teachers and government officials (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Selby, 2015). Such country differences in regulation make it especially relevant to explore whether there are differences between Dutch and German majority members in the relationships between perceived motives for the wearing of a headscarf and their tolerance levels. As a robustness check and for exploring country similarities and differences, we examined whether the effect of the perceived motives for wearing a headscarf on tolerance generalizes across both countries.

5.3 Method

5.3.1 Data and Participants

The measures used for this study were part of a large-scale survey in which a group of researchers was involved and different topics related to cultural diversity and intergroup attitudes were examined (e.g., attitudes towards disruptive protest actions, self-affirmation). After receiving approval from the Faculty of

Social and Behavioral Sciences at Utrecht University (FETC20-057), data were collected among majority members (i.e., both parents born) in the Netherlands (*N* = 1,688) and in Germany (*N* = 2,046). Twenty-eight people who indicated they were Muslim were removed from the data set, leaving *N* = 3,734 in total.

In the Netherlands, in 2019 initially 3,800 respondents were invited to take part in an online survey, of which 1,688 non-Muslims completed the survey. The response rate was 44% which is common in large scale survey research (Stoop et al., 2010). The sample was drawn from the *Kantar NIPObase* panel and was representative of the Dutch adult population in terms of gender, age, level of education, size of household and region. At the same time, a German sample was drawn from the *Lightspeed GMI's MySurvey* panel via a stratification procedure on the basis of population ratios of gender, age, and level of education. Participants were on average 51 years old (*SD* = 17; range 18-100), 50% female, and 47% was not religious. With regard to education, 30.5% of the participants was lower educated, 32.6% had an average level of education, and 36.9% was higher educated.

5.3.2 Design and Measures

To manipulate the perceived motives for wearing a headscarf, we used a survey-embedded experiment, which is recognized as a powerful mean for combining the internal validity of an experimental design with the possibility to draw generalizable conclusions about social attitudes and beliefs (Schlueter & Schmidt, 2010; Sniderman, 2018). A between-subjects experimental design with four randomly assigned conditions was used to manipulate the perceived motive why a headscarf was worn by a civil servant. Based on previous research (e.g., Hindriks et al., 2017), vignettes with concrete situations were used to enhance the ecological validity of the experiment (Steiner et al., 2016). Each vignette introduced a fictitious interview about "being Muslim in [the Netherlands/Germany], which was recently published in a well-known newspaper". The fictitious interview was with a thirty-year-old woman called Fatma who was born in [the Netherlands/Germany]. In the interview she indicated that she wears a headscarf and was asked to explain "why she always wears a headscarf, also at work as a civil servant at the municipality*"*. The vignettes differed in terms of the motive Fatma gave for wearing a headscarf (the full text of the vignettes can be found in Appendix A5). After completing the survey, participants were debriefed about the nature of the study.

In the *personal choice* condition (*n* = 945), the wearing of the headscarf was explained in terms of individual choice and self-determination: "That is a purely personal choice, my own choice. I just think it is beautiful and that it suits me. It is a part of who I am and want to be as a person, and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf".

In the *normative expectations* condition (*n* = 895), Fatma stated "That is because of the expectations in my community. If you do not wear a headscarf, people will gossip and talk bad about you. So that is why I wear a headscarf".

In the *religious identity enactment* condition (*n* = 933), Fatma emphasized that she wears a headscarf to express her religious identity: "That is because of my religion. Your religion teaches you what is good and bad, and shapes your identity. It is your identity and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf".

In the *cultural identity enactment* condition (*n* = 961) and for making the distinction with religious identity enactment clear, she explained that she wore a headscarf by answering "it is not because of my religion, but because of the traditions in my culture. Your culture defines who you are, is your identity, and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf".

Tolerance of the headscarf was assessed with two items based on previous research (e.g., Velthuis et al., 2022) which explicitly assessed tolerance as acceptance despite objection (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017): 'To what extent do you think that wearing a headscarf by civil servants for this reason should be accepted, even when one is negative about it?' (response scale ranged from 1 = *certainly not accept it* to 7 = *certainly accept it*). The other item was: 'Do you think it is OK that Muslim civil servants like Fatma wear a headscarf for this reason?' (response scale ranged from 1 = *totally not OK* to 7 = *totally OK*). The items were averaged into a single score (*r* = .82).

Authoritarianism was measured before the experimental manipulation with an extended version of the "child-rearing preference" measure (Feldman 2003, 2020; Stenner 2005; Velez & Lavine, 2017). This measure is a trade-off between stimulating the value of social conformity versus autonomy in socializing children (Feldman, 2003*)*. The items do not make reference to any social groups, events or actors, which means that the scale is not confounded with the attitudes towards minority groups and practices that one wants to explain (Stenner, 2005). Participants were presented with four pairs of qualities children could be taught (for instance, 'obey the rules' versus 'follow own conscience') and for each of the pairs they were asked which one they considered to be more important. Subsequently, participants ranked how much more important they found this quality on a 3-point scale (slightly more important, more important, or much more important than the other quality). Combining the answers to both questions for a given pair of qualities created a six-point response scale. The four items were averaged to create a scale ($\alpha = .69$) on which a higher score indicated a stronger authoritarian disposition.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 Preliminary analyses

First, we found that the four experimental groups of participants did not differ significantly (*ps* > .053) in gender, age, level of education (nine categories comparable to the international ISCED measure), religious affiliation (0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*), authoritarianism, and general feelings towards Muslims as a group of people (measured on a 'feeling thermometer' ranging from 0° to 100°, with 50° explicitly indicated as neutral feelings, Alwin, 1997). This indicates that the experimental randomization was successful and that any differences found in tolerance between the four experimental conditions cannot be attributed to condition differences in these variables, including general feelings towards Muslims.

Second, we conducted confirmatory factor analysis [CFA] in M*plus* (version 7.3, Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012) to check whether the items loaded on the respective constructs they were expected to measure: tolerance and authoritarianism. The proposed two-factor model had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 45$, $p <$

.001; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04 [0.03-0.05]; SRMR = 0.02. No modifications were made, and all standardized factor loadings were above .50 (Kline, 2016). An alternative one-factor model had a worse fit, $\Delta\chi^2$ (1) = 3967, $p < .001$.

Third, we tested for measurement invariance in M*plus,* to examine whether the constructs had a similar meaning in both countries. We consecutively tested for configural, metric, scalar and full uniqueness invariance by means of a multiple-group CFA (Van de Schoot et al., 2012). The model in which scalar invariance was assumed indicated a good fit (see Table A5.1). This implies that measures were similarly interpreted in both countries and that we could use a pooled sample (Germany and the Netherlands) for the analyses. Thus, the results below are reported for the pooled sample of Dutch and German participants.

5.4.2 Descriptive findings

On average tolerance of the headscarf ($M = 3.66$, $SD = 2.02$) was significantly below the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(3733) = -10.43$, $p < .001$, implying that people were generally *in*tolerant of a Muslim woman wearing a headscarf as a civil servant. Further, people were somewhat authoritarian in their orientation, as the mean ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 1.01$) was significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale, $t(3733) = 26.95$, $p < .001$. The correlation between tolerance and authoritarianism was negative but not very strong, $r = -.18$, $p < .001$.

5.4.3 Tolerance and perceived motive for wearing a headscarf

A one-way ANOVA was performed in SPSS (version 24.0) with ‘motive’ as an experimental between-subjects factor. The findings indicated that tolerance of the headscarf did significantly differ by the perceived motive for wearing the headscarf, $F(3, 3730) = 17.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ (see Figure 5.1). Subsequently and to test the specific hypotheses, we used three planned (orthogonal) contrasts. We first (*H1a*) compared the personal choice condition (+3) with all other conditions (three times, –1). Second (*H1b*), we compared the normative condition (–2) with the religious (+1) and cultural conditions (+1) combined (personal choice = 0). The last contrast explored the difference between the religious (+1) versus cultural (–1) condition (other two conditions = 0). Since the first two contrasts were planned and involve directional hypotheses, one-tailed *p*-values were considered (Field, 2009).



Figure 5.1 Mean levels of tolerance of the headscarf, per motive.

As expected (*H1a*), the wearing of a headscarf that was considered as a personal choice ($M = 3.94$, $SD = 2.11$) was tolerated significantly more than (the average of) the other three motives ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.97$), $t(1542) = 4.98$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.19$. Second, and also as expected (*H1b*), considering a headscarf to be worn out of normative community pressures ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.86$) led to lower tolerance compared to reasons of religious and cultural identity enactment ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 2.03$), $t(1895) = –5.46$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.22$. Lastly, there was no significant difference in tolerance between religious ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 2.04$) and cultural motives ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 2.01$), $t(1888) = –0.20$, $p = .840$, $d = 0.00$.[32]

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[32] Additionally, as a robustness check, we investigated whether the results for *H1* were different for religiously affiliated and non-affiliated participants, as the headscarf is a religious practice, which might be evaluated differently by both groups of people (Fasel et al., 2013; Sleijpen et al., 2020). The findings of a two-way ANOVA (including religious affiliation as an additional factor, and the interaction between religious affiliation and motive) indicated that the effect of motives on tolerance was not different for religiously affiliated ($n = 1{,}691$) compared to non-religiously affiliated participants ($n = 1{,}930$) (see Table A5.2).

5.4.4 The role of authoritarianism

We performed an ANCOVA to test the moderating role of individual differences in authoritarianism (mean-centered score). The experimental condition was entered as a between-subjects factor, and authoritarianism as a covariate. First, the findings showed that participants who had a stronger authoritarian disposition were less tolerant of a civil servant wearing a headscarf, $F(1, 3729) = 118.32$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. More importantly, adding the interaction term between experimental condition and authoritarianism demonstrated that there was a small but significant interaction effect between authoritarianism and motive, $F(3, 3726) = 4.39$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .00$ (see Figure 5.2). Simple slope analyses (Aiken et al., 1991), exploring the previously defined planned contrasts, demonstrated that there was a weaker effect of the perceived motive on tolerance for high (+ 1 *SD*) authoritarians, $F(3, 783) = 3.63$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, than for people low (–1 *SD*) in authoritarianism, $F(3, 563) = 7.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Thus as expected (*H2*), higher authoritarian individuals differentiated less in their (generally lower) tolerance of the perceived motives to wear a headscarf.



Figure 5.2 Mean levels of tolerance of the headscarf per motive, as a function of authoritarianism.

For people with a lower authoritarian orientation, the pattern of findings for the different planned contrasts was similar to that of the total sample. However, for high authoritarians, the pattern changed, with cultural identity enactment ($M = 2.92$) eliciting lowest tolerance and religious identity enactment ($M = 3.42$) eliciting highest tolerance (significant difference, $p = .010$). Perceiving a headscarf as a personal choice ($M = 3.39$) was tolerated only marginally more than for the other motives combined ($M = 3.10$, $p = .080$), and considering it a normative community motive ($M = 2.97$) was not tolerated less than for reasons of cultural and religious identity enactment together ($M = 3.17$, $p = .264$). Since the mean scores for all conditions were below the midpoint of the scale, higher authoritarian individuals were *in*tolerant of the headscarf in all cases.

The same interaction broken down reversely (i.e., authoritarianism-tolerance relation per condition) demonstrated that when the headscarf was perceived to be worn for religious reasons and out of normative pressure, the negative authoritarian-tolerance relation was weaker ($\beta = -.13^{***}$ and $\beta = -.11^{**}$ respectively) than when the headscarf was worn because of cultural traditions ($\beta = -.24^{***}$) or as personal choice ($\beta = -.24^{***}$). This implies that the degree of authoritarianism matters more for tolerance when the latter two motives (personal and cultural) are salient compared to the former two (normative and religious) motives.

5.4.5 Country comparison

As a robustness check we examined whether the results differed per country. First, we performed a two-way ANOVA with country and motive as factors and including its interaction term (exploring the previously defined contrasts). The findings showed, first, that there was no significant effect of country on tolerance, $F(1, 3726) = 0.63$, $p = .429$[33]. Importantly, the interaction between the experimental manipulation and country also was not significant, $F(3, 3726) = 1.53$, $p = .205$, which indicates that the effect of the perceived motives on tolerance was similar in both countries. The findings for the three contrasts were also the same in both countries. Thus both in the Netherlands and Germany, tolerance of the headscarf perceived to be worn for motives of personal choice was highest and tolerance was lowest for normative community expectations, with no significant differences between motives of religious and cultural identity enactment.

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[33] Thus, Dutch ($M = 3.63$, $SD = 1.88$) and German ($M = 3.68$, $SD = 2.13$) majority members endorsed similar overall tolerance levels.

Second, we conducted a two-way ANCOVA with country and motive as factors and authoritarianism as covariate, including all two-way interactions and the three-way interaction (country x motive x authoritarianism). The results demonstrated that there was no significant three-way interaction effect, $F(3, 3718) = 0.25$, $p = .861$, which indicates that the role of authoritarianism for tolerance of the different motives to wear a headscarf was similar in both countries.

5.5 Discussion

In many European societies, minority practices such as Muslim women wearing a headscarf in public positions have become hotly debated issues. In public and political debates the headscarf has often been either rejected as a symbol of community oppression or accepted as a sign of personal choice and self-determination (Everett et al., 2015). Furthermore, majority group members often think that Muslimas wear a headscarf because it is part of their cultural identity, or because of religious reasons, or rather that they do so for reasons of community pressures (Motivaction, 2011).

Using a well-powered experiment in two countries, the current study tried to provide a more nuanced understanding of majority group members' tolerance of the headscarf by examining the influence of perceived motives for a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf (personal choice, normative community expectations, religious and cultural identity enactment). Previous research has investigated people's attitudes toward the headscarf (e.g., Fasel et al., 2013; Gustavsson et al., 2016; Unkelbach et al., 2010; Van der Noll, 2010), and some research has considered motives to wear the headscarf and its effect on intergroup attitudes (Everett et al., 2015; Gieling et al, 2010; Legate et al., 2020). In the current study we experimentally examined the effect of four different motives for wearing a headscarf on tolerance of majority members in the Netherlands and Germany.

The findings revealed that on average people expressed low tolerance of a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf, which corresponds to the anti-Muslim feelings that exist in Western Europe (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Strabac et al., 2016). However, the perceived motive for wearing a headscarf had an impact on the degree of tolerance. Specifically, and as expected, a headscarf that was perceived to be worn out of personal choice was tolerated significantly more than for other motives, which is largely in line with Gieling and colleagues (2010) who found that Dutch adolescents were more tolerant of minority practices interpreted in terms of personal autonomy versus social conventions. Further, wearing a headscarf because of normative pressures from the community elicited significantly lower tolerance than for reasons of religious and cultural identity enactment. The finding that people were most tolerant of the headscarf when it was perceived as a personal choice and least accepting when it allegedly involved community pressures, is in line with personal autonomy being a central liberal value in western societies (Gustavsson, 2015; Putnam, 2000; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008) and with self-determination theory which posits that individual autonomy is a central concern for most people (Deci & Ryan, 2012). The motive-related variance in tolerance indicates that anti-veil attitudes are not solely based on, for instance, negative feelings towards Muslims (Dangubić et al., 2022) or the public or private situation in which women wear a headscarf (Velthuis et al., 2022), but also depend on the perceived motives that Muslimas have for wearing a headscarf. Thus, the findings demonstrate the importance of considering the perceived motives for engaging in specific minority practices for people's tolerance (Litchmore & Safdar, 2016). Dutch and also German officials (e.g., in government policy and regulation) tend to make claims about why Muslimas wear a headscarf. Also, in political and public debates and the media specific reasons are put forward (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014). Our findings show that these claims and the framing of these debates matter for majority members' tolerance.

However, there were no differences in tolerance between reasons of religious or cultural identity enactment. Apparently, participants perceived these two forms of identity enactment similarly, even though in the experimental manipulation both were explicitly contrasted. A likely reason is that both forms of minority identity enactment are perceived through the same lens of cultural diversity recognition. Yet, it is also possible that participants in the cultural identity enactment condition were responding more to the sentence "*that is not because of my religion…*", than specifically to "*…because of the traditions in my culture*". Thus we cannot be fully certain that the tolerance of the headscarf worn out of religious and cultural identity enactment is similar, or, partly, due to the experimental manipulation that made participants differentiate less between those two conditions. Nevertheless, we used this manipulation because this enabled us to clearly distinguish between the vignettes about cultural and religious identity enactment.

Furthermore, our results indicated that for authoritarian participants the difference between the two forms of identity enactment did matter for their tolerance. We found that high authoritarians were less tolerant of a headscarf for perceived motives of cultural identity enactment compared to religious identity enactment. The finding that authoritarians were more negative of minority practices that they perceive as cultural traditions potentially threatening social cohesion (versus religious practices), is in line with previous research showing that authoritarians value group cohesion, cultural conformity and tend to be religious (Feldman, 2020; Stenner, 2005). Furthermore, high authoritarian individuals were not less tolerant when the headscarf was perceived to be worn for normative community reasons compared to identity enactment. This is in line with the literature that shows that authoritarians are conventionalists who adhere to societal norms (Stenner, 2005). Also, authoritarians tolerated a headscarf as a personal choice only marginally more than the three other perceived motives to wear a headscarf, which is in line with their previously established preference of social conformity over personal autonomy (Feldman, 2003). Thus, in general and as expected, higher compared to lower authoritarians were not only less tolerant but also differentiated less in their tolerance of the perceived motives to wear a headscarf. These findings support the notion that more authoritarian people value social conformity and cohesion over diversity and personal autonomy (Feldman, 2020; Kauff et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2019). We built on this literature by using an experimental design which enabled us to systematically examine whether higher and lower authoritarians respond differently to the motives, rather than their predisposition causing different perceived motives why Muslims would wear a headscarf.

Additionally, we explored possible country differences in tolerance, in the effect of the motives on tolerance, as well as in the moderating role of authoritarianism. Since there were no significant country differences, it can be concluded that the Dutch and German majority group members endorsed similar tolerance levels, and similarly considered the motives for their tolerance of the headscarf and that authoritarianism played a similar role in both countries.

5.5.1 Limitations

The current study is the first to systematically examine the importance of various perceived motives for people's tolerance of a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf and thus makes a novel contribution to the literature. However, there are several limitations which may give directions for future research. First, the effect sizes of the findings were small (Lakens, 2013), which might be due to the use of survey experiments that have relatively subtle experimental manipulations (Sniderman, 2018). Participants simply were asked to read a fictitious interview in which only a few sentences differed per condition. However, compared to laboratory experiments, survey experiments with national samples are recognized as a powerful means for combining the internal validity of an experimental design with the possibility to draw generalizable conclusions about social attitudes and beliefs (Schlueter & Schmidt, 2010; Sniderman, 2018). Furthermore, small effects can be of theoretical and practical importance (Götz, et al., 2021). The fact that our manipulation showed the expected effects, and consistently in both countries, suggests that even simple online information about underlying motivations can influence the degree to which individuals tolerate Muslim civil servants wearing a headscarf. It is likely that more extensive procedures with more vivid (visual, auditive) manipulations yield stronger effects. However, small effect sizes also indicate that there are other factors at play. Future research could for instance examine the role of endorsing liberal and secular values, open-mindedness, as well as frequency and quality of the contacts one has with Muslim citizens, for tolerance of Muslim civil servants wearing a headscarf.

Second, the four experimental vignettes described four different motivations for wearing a headscarf, but in practice Muslimas can have multiple and possibly intersecting motives – including exhibiting modesty (Ruby, 2006), more political reasons (Afshar, 2008), or a sense of belonging to the transnational Muslim community (Zempi, 2016), which we did not examine. However, we studied the perceived motives from a majority perspective, focusing on the ways in which majority members respond to the different reasons. We concentrated on four main motives, informed by previous research among Muslimas (Droogsma, 2007; Ruby, 2006; Wagner et al., 2012; Zempi, 2016), as well as by public and political debates in which people typically present and consider one particular reason for making a claim or framing the issue about the wearing of a headscarf (Lettinga & Saharso, 2014; Motivaction, 2011). Our findings show that the different motives matter for majority members' tolerance, but we did not have a control condition in which no motives were mentioned. This means that we do not know whether mentioning a motive per se has an effect on people's tolerance compared to their tolerance of the headscarf regardless of the motives for wearing it. Furthermore, the vignettes specifically concentrated on a civil servant wearing a headscarf, which is an important but also specific situation. We focused on this situation because much of the heated public and political debate is about the wearing of a headscarf in these sorts of public positions and in similar institutions, and, moreover, it allowed us to systematically examine the importance of perceived motives without introducing context-variation (Velthuis et al., 2022). However, future research could examine whether the perceived motives for wearing a headscarf matter in a similar way for tolerance in other (e.g., educational) contexts.

Third, although we studied large national samples from the Netherlands and Germany and found no substantial differences between the countries, this does not have to mean that the findings generalize to other European countries. For example, the pattern of results could be different in countries such as France in which the debate on the Muslim headscarf in relation to liberal and secular values is especially strong, or in the United Kingdom in which the Muslim population has a different ethnic background and the emphasis is more on multicultural accommodation. Thus it is possible that in some countries there are less, or more, pronounced differences in tolerance depending on the perceived motives to wear a headscarf, and future research could examine country differences.

5.5.2 Conclusion

In an experimental study among large national samples from the Netherlands and Germany, we found that the perception of the motives that Muslim civil servants have for wearing a headscarf matter for majority members' tolerance of the headscarf. A headscarf perceived to be worn as a personal choice elicited highest tolerance and out of normative community pressure elicited lowest tolerance, with reasons of religious and cultural identity enactment in between. Furthermore, for higher (versus lower) authoritarians the perceived motives mattered less for their, generally lower, tolerance of the headscarf. The findings provide a more nuanced understanding of majority members' tolerance of the Muslim headscarf and thereby make a novel contribution to the research literature on attitudes towards Muslim minorities and the continuing debate about the accommodation of Muslim minorities in western liberal democracies.

APPENDICES

A2: Appendices to Chapter 2

Study 1: Principal component analysis

A principal component analysis was performed on all twelve items of the two main variables in Study 1, in SPSS 24.0. Oblique rotation (*direct oblimin*) was chosen to allow the factors to correlate, as is common in psychology (Field, 2009). As Table A2.1 shows, the analysis revealed a clear two-factor structure. The scree criterion indicated three different factors (1 = Tolerance, 2 = Deprovincialization), that together explained 62% of the variance. Thus, as expected, we used this two-factor structure to construct three scales.

Table A2.1 Principal component analysis revealing a two-factor structure, Study 1 (*N* = 563).

	Factor 1 (47.91 %)	**Factor 2** (14.55 %)
1. Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to express and experience their religion in public life	.80	
2. Muslim women should have the right to wear a headscarf everywhere in the Netherlands	.75	
3. Muslims in the Netherlands should be able to celebrate Islamic holidays not only at home, but also in public	.84	
4. Muslims should have the right to build mosques in the Netherlands	.89	
5. Muslims should have the right to found Islamic schools	.81	
6. Muslims can found a political party just like everyone else	.80	
7. One should always try to adopt a broader perspective than only the perspective of one's own country		.71
8. How we perceive the world in our country is just one of many possibilities		.78
9. One should always nuance one's own cultural worldview and not make it sacred		.63
10. One's own culture is certainly not better than other cultures		.75
11. Another culture's norms and values can only be judged from the perspective of that culture		.59
12. One cannot claim that one culture is better than another		.77

Note. Scores below .25 are not shown.

Study 2: Principal component analysis

A principal component analysis was performed on all eleven items of the three main variables in Study 2, in SPSS 24.0. Oblique rotation (*direct oblimin*) was chosen to allow the factors to correlate. As Table A2.2 shows, the analysis revealed a clear three-factor structure. The scree criterion indicated three different factors (1 = Tolerance, 2 = Identity continuity concern, 3 = Deprovincialization), that together explained 65% of the variance. Thus, as expected, we used this three-factor structure to construct three scales.

Table A2.2 Principal component analysis revealing a three-factor structure, Study 2 (*N* = 430).

	Factor 1 (32.76 %)	**Factor 2** (22.20 %)	**Factor 3** (9.83 %)
1. Immigrants should have the right to build their own places of worship in the Netherlands	.84		
2. Immigrants should have the right to found their own schools	.79		
3. Immigrants should be allowed to raise their children within their own culture and traditions	.78		
4. Immigrants should be allowed to not only celebrate their own religious holidays at home, but also in public	.77		
5. Regardless of cultural background, everyone should stick to the key norms and values of a country		.85	
6. There are moral values that all people should stick to, regardless of cultural background		.80	
7. Cultural differences are only to be accepted when they do not threaten your own identity continuity		.66	
8. A way of life that collides with the national culture of a country should not be accepted		.51	
9. How we perceive the world in the Netherlands is only one of many possibilities			-.86
10. One should always try to adopt a broader perspective than only the Dutch perspective			-.85
11. One should always nuance one's own worldview and not make it sacred			-.83

Note. Scores below .35 are not shown.

Study 3: Principal component analysis

A principal component analysis was conducted for all twelve items of the three main variables in Study 3, with oblique rotation (*direct oblimin*), in SPSS 24.0. As Table A2.3 shows, the analysis revealed a clear three-factor structure. The scree criterion indicated three different factors (1 = Tolerance, 2 = Deprovincialization, 3 = Identity continuity concern), that together explained 76% of the variance. Thus, as expected, we used this three-factor structure to construct three scales.

Table A2.3 Principal component analysis revealing a three-factor structure, Study 3 (*N* = 798).

	Factor 1 (54.08 %)	**Factor 2** (12.76 %)	**Factor 3** (8.91 %)
1. Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to celebrate their Islamic holidays not only at home, but also in public	.85		
2. Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to express and experience their religion in public	.85		
3. Muslim women should have the right to wear a headscarf everywhere in the Netherlands	.84		
4. Muslims should have the right to build mosques in the Netherlands	.78		
5. Muslims in the Netherlands should have the right to found Islamic schools	.74		
6. How we perceive the world in the Netherlands is just one of many possibilities		.91	
7. One should always nuance one's own worldview and not make it sacred		.89	
8. One should always try to adopt a broader perspective than only that of the Netherlands		.79	
9. Dutch culture is certainly not better than other cultures		.75	
10. The continuity of Dutch norms and values is being threatened by Muslims			.96
11. Muslims in the Netherlands undermine the original way of life			.95
12. Muslim's way of life threatens the continuity of Dutch identity			.92

Note. Scores below .40 are not shown.

A3: Appendices to Chapter 3

Table A3.1 Items used to construct the latent variables for respect and coexistence, Studies 1a, 1b and 3 (for Study 2, adapted versions of the below items were used in an experimental manipulation).

Introduction:

'Cultural diversity can be seen as enriching the Netherlands, but might also mean that ways of life collide. Below are several reasons for either accepting or rejecting immigrants' ways of life. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of these reasons?'

Respect

1. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish because they have the right to live their own life
2. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish because they should be able to enact their own identity
3. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish because they should be able to practice their own religion in freedom

Coexistence

4. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish in order to ensure that there are less social tensions
5. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish in order to avoid social conflict
6. Immigrants in the Netherlands can live as they wish in order to maintain peace in society

Table A3.2 Model fit indices of competing measurement models, Study 1a (N = 1,046).

Model	χ^2 (df)	$\Delta\chi^2$	CFI	TLI	RMSEA [CI]	SRMR
3 factors	644.40 (86)***	-	.96	.95	.08 [0.07-0.08]	.03
2 factors *(respect + coexistence combined)*	3750.00 (88)***	3105.60***	.74	.69	.20 [0.19-0.21]	.12
2 factors *(respect + prejudice combined)*	4197.14 (88)***	3552.74***	.70	.65	.21 [0.21-0.22]	.15
2 factors *(coexistence + prejudice combined)*	3314.64 (88)***	2670.20***	.77	.72	.19 [0.18-0.19]	.15
1 factor	6668.29 (89)***	6023.89***	.53	.44	.27 [0.26-0.27]	.19

Note. *** $p < .001$.
The one- and two-factor models were compared to the three-factor model.
CFI: comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis fit index; RMSEA: root-mean-square error of approximation;
CI: 90% confidence interval; SRMR: standardized root mean squared residual.

Table A3.3 Model fit indices of competing measurement models, Study 1b ($N = 210$).

Model	**χ^2 (df)**	**$\Delta\chi^2$**	**CFI**	**TLI**	**RMSEA [CI]**	**SRMR**
3 factors	202.89 (71)***	-	.95	.93	.09 [0.08-0.11]	.06
2 factors *(respect + coexistence combined)*	473.97 (73)***	271.08***	.84	.80	.16 [0.15-0.18]	.08
2 factors *(respect + prejudice combined)*	888.79 (76)***	685.90***	.68	.62	.23 [0.21-0.24]	.15
2 factors *(prejudice + coexistence combined)*	864.71 (76)***	661.82***	.69	.63	.22 [0.21-0.24]	.16
1 factor	1270.40 (77)***	1067.51***	.53	.45	.27 [0.26-0.29]	.17

Note. *** $p < .001$.
The one- and two-factor models were compared to the three-factor model (which used a second-order factor for prejudice).
CFI: comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis fit index; RMSEA: root-mean-square error of approximation;
CI: 90% confidence interval; SRMR: standardized root mean squared residual.

Table A3.4 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with prejudice as dependent latent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, including control variables, Study 1a (N = 1,046).

	Model 1: Model excluding control variables	**Model 2: Model including control variables**
	Prejudice	Prejudice
Respect	–.28 (.03)***	–.19 (.03)***
Coexistence	.03 (.04)	.00 (.03)
Control variables		
Age		.01 (.03)
Religious affiliation (ref: *no*)		–.03 (.03)
Gender (ref: *male*)		–.06 (.03)*
Level of education		–.24 (.03)***
Political orientation		.31 (.03)***
National identification		–.06 (.03)*
R^2	.07***	.23***

Note. *** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$.

Table A3.5 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with prejudice towards immigrants as dependent latent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, including control variables, Study 1b (*N* = 210).

	Model 1: Model excluding control variables	**Model 2: Model including control variables**
	Prejudice	Prejudice
Respect	–.52 (.08)***	–.40 (.09)***
Coexistence	.04 (.09)	.07 (.09)
Control variables		
Age		–.11 (.07)
Religious affiliation (ref: *no*)		–.07 (.06)
Gender (ref: *male*)		–.06 (.06)
Level of education		–.07 (.07)
Political orientation		.33 (.07)***
National identification		–.02 (.06)
R^2	.25***	.35***

Note. *** $p < .001$.
As the sample size was relatively small for structural equation modeling, additional analyses with manifest (rather than latent) variables were performed, which did not change the results.

Table A3.6 Model fit indices of competing measurement models, Study 2 (N = 824).

Model	**χ^2 (df)**	**$\Delta\chi^2$**	**CFI**	**TLI**	**RMSEA [CI]**	**SRMR**
3 factors	104.42 (32)***	-	.99	.98	.05 [0.04-0.06]	.03
2 factors *(respect + coexistence combined)*	1034.53 (34)***	930.11***	.83	.78	.19 [0.18-0.20]	.09
2 factors *(respect + prejudice combined)*	1620.99 (34)***	1516.57***	.73	.64	.24 [0.23-0.25]	.12
2 factors *(coexistence + prejudice combined)*	1548.03 (34)***	1443.61***	.74	.66	.23 [0.22-0.24]	.16
1 factor	2536.32 (35)***	2431.90***	.58	.46	.30 [0.29-0.30]	.15

Note. *** $p < .001$.
The one- and two-factor models were compared to the three-factor model.
CFI: comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis fit index; RMSEA: root-mean-square error of approximation;
CI: 90% confidence interval; SRMR: standardized root mean squared residual.

Table A3.7 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with prejudice towards immigrants as dependent latent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, including control variables, Study 2 (*N* = 824).

	Model 1: Model excluding control variables	**Model 2: Model including control variables**
	Prejudice	Prejudice
Respect	–.47 (.04)***	–.37 (.04)***
Coexistence	–.09 (.04)*	–.08 (.04)†
Control variables		
Age		–.07 (.03)*
Religious affiliation (ref: *no*)		–.06 (.03)*
Gender (ref: *male*)		.01 (.03)
Level of education		–.10 (.03)**
Political orientation		.24 (.04)***
National identification		.04 (.03)
R^2	.28***	.33***

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, † $p < .10$.

Table A3.8 Measurement invariance comparing the respect and coexistence items across the four experimental groups, Study 2 (*N* = 824).

	χ^2	df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	BIC	AIC
Configural invariance	61.95**	32	0.99	0.984	0.067	14299.97	13941.70
Metric invariance	67.61*	44[1]	0.993	0.991	0.051	14225.07	13923.36
Scalar invariance	83.89**	56[2]	0.992	0.991	0.049	14160.77	13915.64
Full invariance	109.13**	74[3]	0.990	0.992	0.048	14065.16	13904.88

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.

Four CFAs were also conducted separately for each experimental group (i.e., Western; non-Western; Muslim; non-Muslim immigrants), and the model had a good fit in all separate groups.

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

[1] $\Delta\chi^2$ (12) = 5.66, p = .932 indicates that there was no significant difference between the configural and metric measurement invariance models.

[2] $\Delta\chi^2$ (12) = 16.28, p = .179 indicates that there was no significant difference between the metric and scalar measurement invariance models.

[3] $\Delta\chi^2$ (18) = 25.24, p = .118 indicates that there was no significant difference between the scalar and full measurement invariance models.

Table A3.9 Mean scores and standard deviations for respect and coexistence, per type of immigrant group, Study 2 ($N = 824$).

	Western ($n = 202$)	**non-Western** ($n = 207$)	**Muslim** ($n = 208$)	**non-Muslim** ($n = 207$)
	M (SD)	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*
Respect	5.12 (1.19)	5.14 (1.16)	5.09 (1.32)	5.16 (1.15)
Coexistence	4.13 (1.38)	3.86 (1.36)	4.08 (1.37)	4.18 (1.30)

Note. Observed mean scores and standard deviations are reported.

Table A3.10 Standardized regression coefficients from multiple-group regression analyses (*constrained model*) with prejudice towards immigrants as dependent latent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, Study 2 (N = 824).

	Western (n = 202)	**non-Western** (n = 207)	**Muslims** (n = 208)	**non-Muslims** (n = 207)
Respect	–.46 (.05)***	–.44 (.05)***	–.50 (.05)***	–.43 (.05)***
Coexistence	–.11 (.05)*	–.11 (.05)*	–.10 (.04)*	–.10 (.04)*
R^2	.28***	.26***	.34***	.25***

Note. *** p < .001, * p < .05.

An unconstrained model (i.e., reasons-prejudice relations vary across the four immigrant categories) did not fit better than a constrained model (i.e., reasons-prejudice relations are forced to be equal across groups), χ^2 (6) = 6.55, p = .364. This indicates that there are no significant differences between the four groups on the reasons-prejudice relations, and thus the constrained model is reported here.

Table A3.11 Model fit indices of competing measurement models, Study 3 (N = 411).

Model	**χ^2 (df)**	**$\Delta\chi^2$**	**CFI**	**TLI**	**RMSEA [CI]**	**SRMR**
4 factors	163.29 (47)***	-	.97	.95	.08 [0.07-0.09]	.05
3 factors *(respect +coexistence combined)*	355.31 (50)***	192.02***	.91	.88	.12 [0.11-0.13	.07
3 factors *(respect + tolerance combined)*	335.80 (50)***	172.51***	.91	.89	.12 [0.11-0.13]	.08
3 factors *(tolerance + coexistence combined)*	420.38 (50)***	257.09***	.89	.85	.13 [0.12-0.15]	.08
3 factors *(coexistence + continuity combined)*	1113.73 (50)***	950.42***	.68	.58	.23 [0.22-0.24]	.16
2 factors *(coex.+ contin.; resp.+ toler. combined)*	1243.63 (52)***	1080.34***	.64	.55	.24 [0.23-0.25]	.16
2 factors *(coex.+ toler. ; resp.+ contin. combined)*	1340.96 (52)***	1177.67***	.61	.51	.25 [0.23-0.26]	.17
2 factors *(coex.+ respect + continuity combined)*	1305.25 (52)***	1141.96***	.62	.52	.24 [0.23-0.25]	.17
2 factors *(coex.+ respect + tolerance combined)*	525.97 (52)***	362.68***	.86	.82	.15 [0.14-0.16]	.10
2 factors *(resp.+ coex.; toler.+ contin. combined)*	772.63 (52)***	609.34***	.78	.73	.18 [0.17-0.20]	.19
1 factor	1431.98 (53)***	1268.69***	.59	.49	.25 [0.24-0.26]	.17

*** $p < .001$.

The one-, two-, and three-factor models were compared to the four-factor model.

CFI: comparative fit index; TLI: Tucker-Lewis fit index; RMSEA: root-mean-square error of approximation;

CI: 90% confidence interval; SRMR: standardized root mean squared residual.

Table A3.12 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with prejudice towards Muslims as manifest dependent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, including control variables, Study 3 (*N* = 411).

	Model 1: Model excluding control variables	**Model 2: Model including control variables**
	Prejudice	Prejudice
Respect	–.35 (.06)***	–.26 (.07)***
Coexistence	–.10 (.07)	–.13 (.07)†
Control variables		
Age		–.01 (.05)
Religious affiliation (ref: *no*)		–.13 (.05)**
Gender (ref: *male*)		–.09 (.05)
Level of education		–.15 (.05)**
Political orientation		.20 (.05)***
National identification		.03 (.05)
R^2	.18***	.25***

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, † $p < .10$.

Table A3.13 Standardized regression coefficients from regression analyses with tolerance of concrete practices as dependent latent variable and respect and coexistence as independent latent variables, including manifest control variables, Study 3 ($N = 411$).

	Model 1: Model excluding control variables	**Model 2: Model including control variables**
	Tolerance	Tolerance
Respect	.59 (.06)***	.39 (.07)***
Coexistence	.08 (.07)	.08 (.07)
Control variables		
Age		.02 (.05)
Religious affiliation (ref: *no*)		.02 (.04)
Gender (ref: *male*)		.04 (.05)
Level of education		.14 (.05)**
Political orientation		–.25 (.05)***
National identification		.02 (.04)
Prejudice towards Muslims		–.35 (.05)***
R^2	.42***	.59***

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$.

A4: Appendices to Chapter 4

Vignettes for experiment in Chapter 4, varying in the context of religious expression.

Introductory text to all conditions:
'Below you find an article from an interview about being Muslim in The Netherlands, which was recently published in a well-known newspaper. It is an interview with a thirty-year-old woman called Fatma, who was born in The Netherlands'.

Vignette in condition 1: Religious identity enactment as a civil servant
Question: Do you think it is important that Muslims in The Netherlands can enact their religious identity?
Answer: Yes of course.
Question: Why?
Answer: Your religion is who you are, it is your identity, which you should always be able to show, like with a headscarf and your behavior.
Question: So, for instance also when one is a civil servant at the municipality, or a police officer?
Answer: Yes, you should always show who you are, in the street and as a civil servant.

Vignette in condition 2: Religious identity enactment in work context
Question: Do you think it is important that Muslims in The Netherlands can enact their religious identity?
Answer: Yes of course.
Question: Why?
Answer: Your religion is who you are, it is your identity, which you should always be able to show, like with a headscarf and your behavior.
Question: So, for instance also at work?
Answer: Yes, you should always show who you are, in the street and at work.

Vignette in condition 3: Religious identity enactment in the street

Question: Do you think it is important that Muslims in The Netherlands can enact their religious identity?
Answer: Yes of course.
Question: Why?
Answer: Your religion is who you are, it is your identity, which you should always be able to show in the street, like with a headscarf and your behavior.
Question: So, also when one, for instance, goes shopping?
Answer: Yes, you should always show who you are, except at work, there things are different, there one has to adjust.

Vignette in condition 4: Religious identity enactment in private context

Question: Do you think it is important that Muslims in The Netherlands can enact their religious identity?
Answer: No not really.
Question: Why not?
Answer: One's religious belief is something private, that you experience when you are with your family or pray to God. You do not need to show that everywhere to other people.

Table A4.1 Means, standard deviations and results of analyses of variance for Feelings towards Muslims like Fatma, per context ($N = 826$).

	1. Civil servant	**2. Work**	**3. Street**	**4. Private**	***F***	**η_p^2**
	M (SD)	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*		
Feelings towards Fatma	4.12 (1.41)	4.26 (1.35)	4.59 (1.29)	5.25 (1.23)	30.25***	.10

Note. *** $p < .001$.
Scale ranges 1-7.

Table A4.2 Means, standard deviations and results of analyses of variance for enactment tolerance and persuasion tolerance (as four, single item dependent variables), per context.

	1. Civil servant	**2. Work**	**3. Street**	**4. Private**	***F***	η_p^2
	M (SD)	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*		
Enactment tolerance						
item 1 (*'OK if enacting religious identity this way'*)	4.00 (1.57)	3.96 (1.59)	4.11 (1.65)	5.24 (1.70)	29.50***	.10
item 2 (*'accept way of life, despite being negative'*)	4.05 (1.51)	4.37 (1.52)	4.62 (1.50)	4.95 (1.53)	13.27***	.05
Persuasion tolerance						
item 1 (*'OK if persuading others to engage with religion in same way'*)	3.17 (1.55)	3.03 (1.53)	3.38 (1.63)	4.45 (1.85)	31.91***	.10
item 2 (*'OK if organizing religious assemblies'*)	3.26 (1.55)	3.24 (1.56)	3.38 (1.57)	3.76 (1.66)	4.80**	.02

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$.
All scales range 1-7.

Table A4.3 Means, standard deviations and results of two-way MANOVA analyses (including religious affiliation, context and its interaction), *N* = 815 (due to 11 missing values for religious affiliation).

	1. Civil servant	**2. Work**	**3. Street**	**4. Private**	***F***	**η_p^2**
	M (SD)	*M (SD)*	*M (SD*	*M (SD)*		
Enactment tolerance	4.02 (1.35)	4.19 (1.37)	4.36 (1.35)	5.11 (1.26)	24.95***	.09
Persuasion tolerance	3.22 (1.39)	3.15 (1.37)	3.37 (1.45)	4.12 (1.47)	17.89***	.08

Note. *** $p < .001$.
All scales range 1-7.

Table A4.4 Means, standard deviations and results of analyses of variance for the two types of tolerance per context, for subsample of participants with prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (n = 343).

	1. Civil servant	**2. Work**	**3. Street**	**4. Private**	$\boldsymbol{F}$	η_p^2
	M (SD)	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*	*M (SD)*		
Enactment tolerance	3.35 (1.34)	3.51 (1.18)	3.69 (1.33)	4.78 (1.24)	23.00***	.17
Persuasion tolerance	2.58 (1.18	2.76 (1.23)	2.70 (1.34)	3.90 (1.46)	19.57***	.15

Note. *** $p < .001$.
All scales range 1-7.
Multivariate analysis of variance demonstrated a significant effect of context on enactment and persuasion tolerance in the subsample, Pillai's $V = .20$, $F(6, 678) = 12.62$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$.



Figure A4.1 Mean levels of enactment and persuasion tolerance per context, for participants with prejudicial feelings towards Muslims.

A5: Appendices to Chapter 5

Vignettes for the experiment in Chapter 5, varying in the motives for wearing a headscarf.

Introductory text to all conditions:

'*Below is a piece of an interview about being a Muslim in [the Netherlands/Germany], which was recently published in a well-known newspaper. It is an interview with the 30-year-old Fatma who was born in [the Netherlands/Germany] in which she explains why she always wears a headscarf, also at work as a civil servant at the municipality.*'

Vignette in condition 1: Personal choice motive

'Question: *Could you explain why you always wear a headscarf?*
Answer: *That is a purely personal choice, my own choice. I just think it is beautiful and that it suits me. It is a part of who I am and want to be as a person, and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf.*
Question: *So also at work as a civil servant at the municipality?*
Answer: *Yes, you should always show who you are, also as a civil servant.*'

Vignette in condition 2: Normative community expectations

Question: *Could you explain why you always wear a headscarf?*
Answer: *That is because of the expectations in my community. If you do* not *wear a headscarf, people will gossip and talk bad about you. So that is why I wear a headscarf.*
Question: *So also at work as a civil servant at the municipality?*
Answer: *Yes, also there one should take into account what people say about you.*'

Vignette in condition 3: Religious identity enactment motive

‘Question: *Could you explain why you always wear a headscarf?*
Answer: *That is because of my religion. Your religion teaches you what is good and bad, and shapes your identity. It is your identity and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf.*
Question: *So also at work as a civil servant at the municipality?*
Answer: *Yes, you should always show who you are, also as a civil servant.*’

Vignette in condition 4: Cultural identity enactment motive

‘Question: *Could you explain why you always wear a headscarf?*
Answer: *That is not because of my religion, but because of the traditions in my culture. Your culture forms who you are, is your identity, and you should always be able to show that, such as with a headscarf.*
Question: *So also at work as a civil servant at the municipality?*
Answer: *Yes, you should always show who you are, also as a civil servant.*’

Table A5.1 Measurement invariance comparing six items (tolerance and authoritarianism) across the two countries (*N* = 3,734).

	χ^2	df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	BIC	AIC
Configural invariance[4]	57***	16	0.99	0.99	0.04	78193	77956
Metric invariance	77***	20[1]	0.99	0.99	0.04	78180	77968
Scalar invariance	131***	24 [2]	0.98	0.98	0.05	78200	78013
Full invariance	302***	30 [3]	0.96	0.96	0.07	78322	78173

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.

*** $p < .001$

[1] $\Delta\chi^2$ (4) = 20, $p < .001$ indicates that there was a significant difference between the configural and metric measurement invariance models.

[2] $\Delta\chi^2$ (4) = 54, $p < .001$ indicates that there was a significant difference between the metric and scalar measurement invariance models.

[3] $\Delta\chi^2$ (6) = 171, $p < .001$ indicates that there was a significant difference between the scalar and full measurement invariance models.

[4] Two CFAs were also conducted separately for each country, and the model had a good fit in both groups: For the Dutch sample (n = 1,688), the proposed two-factor structure had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 30$, $p < .001$.; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04 [0.03 - 0.06]; SRMR = 0.02 (AIC = 33979, BIC = 34082). All standardized factor loadings were above .56.

For the German sample (n = 2,046), the proposed two-factor structure had a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(8) = 28$, $p < .001$; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04 [0.02 -0.05]; SRMR = 0.02 (AIC = 43977, BIC = 44094). All standardized factor loadings were above .45.

Table A5.2 Means, standard deviations and results of two-way ANOVA (including religious affiliation dummy, reason and its interaction), *N* = 3,621 (due to 113 missing values for religious affiliation).

	1. Personal choice (n = 927)	**2. Normative expectations** (n = 864)	**3. Religious enactment** (n = 900)	**4. Cultural enactment** (n = 930)	F	η_p^2
Tolerance	3.93 (2.11)	3.27 (1.86)	3.70 (2.05)	3.68 (2.05)	16.43***	.013

Note. *** $p < .001$.

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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)

Inleiding

De Raad van Europa bracht in 2021 een videocampagne uit waarin de hoofddoek als vrije keuze van moslima's werd gepresenteerd ("mijn hoofddoek, mijn keuze") en waarin gepleit werd voor het respecteren van vrouwen die een hoofddoek dragen. Onmiddellijk leidde de campagne tot sterk negatieve reacties — bijvoorbeeld in Frankrijk, waar de staatssecretaris voor Jeugd stelde dat de video "het tegenovergestelde [is] van de waarden waar Frankrijk voor staat", en prominente Franse politici de hoofddoek een "symbool van onderwerping" noemden (BBC, 2021; Darmanin, 2021; Renout, 2021). Hierop volgend blies de Raad van Europa de campagne af, en stelde medeorganisator *Femyso* (een Europees forum voor moslimjongeren) dat bovengenoemde reacties intolerant waren omdat politici claimen dat ze de noties vrijheid en gelijkheid voor iedereen beschermen, terwijl zij dit niet op dezelfde manier voor moslima's zouden doen (BBC, 2021).

Dit voorbeeld illustreert het hevige debat in veel West-Europese landen over (in)tolerantie van eigen leefwijzen en *minderheidsgebruiken* zoals het dragen van de hoofddoek (bijv. door leraren of ambtenaren werkzaam in publieke instituties), alsook het bredere maatschappelijke proces van accommodatie van moslimminderheden. De campagne en de reacties weerspiegelen argumenten voor en tegen het dragen van de hoofddoek: Enerzijds redenen voor acceptatie, zoals de duiding in termen van vrije keuze, respect voor gesluierde vrouwen, en gelijke rechten van meerder- en minderheidsgroepen. Anderzijds worden redenen voor afwijzing genoemd, zoals claims dat de hoofddoek op gespannen voet zou staan met nationale waarden, of sekseongelijkheid zou symboliseren.

De discussie rondom de campagne legt een aantal redenen bloot die in het publieke en politieke debat in West-Europa gebruikt worden om te pleiten voor tolerantie of intolerantie van minderheidsgebruiken (bijv. het dragen van een hoofddoek in publieke posities, of het stichten van een religieuze school)[1]. Dergelijke gebruiken maken eventuele verschillen tussen groepen tastbaar, en de vraag of men elkaars praktijken tolereert of niet tolereert is voor velen in cultureel diverse samenlevingen een dagelijkse realiteit. Juist wanneer men het in een democratische samenleving niet altijd met elkaar eens is, is tolerantie in de zin van elkaar verdragen, onontbeerlijk (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017; Vogt, 1997). Tolerantie in de klassieke zin van *verdraagzaamheid* kan namelijk een barrière vormen tegen discriminatie, doordat men accepteert en niet interfereert met datgene wat men bezwaarlijk vindt[2]. Deze klassieke tolerantie houdt in dat men datgene waar men bezwaar tegen heeft, desondanks accepteert: Men aanvaardt dat anderen de vrijheid hebben om hun leven te leiden zoals ze willen, en gedoogt dit ondanks dat men de levenswijze of gebruiken niet volledig onderschrijft (Forst, 2004; Cohen, 2004; Gibson, 2006; King, 2012; Norris, 2002). Dit betekent dat tolerantie een afweging is tussen redenen voor het accepteren van hetgeen men bezwaarlijk vindt (redenen voor tolerantie) en voor het afwijzen van het bezwaarlijke (d.w.z. grenzen aan tolerantie; King, 2012): Zo kan iemand het ritueel slachten van dieren (d.w.z. voor koosjer of halal vlees) tolereren omdat de afweging het te accepteren vanwege vrijheid van religie zwaarder weegt dan de afkeuring ervan om redenen van dierenwelzijn.

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[1] De focus in dit proefschrift ligt op *intergroeps*tolerantie, d.w.z. tolerantie op intergroepsniveau waarbij groepsleden socioculturele praktijken tolereren die sociale identiteiten reproduceren (Verkuyten et al., 2019). Specifiek kijken we naar minderheidsgroepen met een migratieachtergrond, en daarbij wordt een variëteit aan culturele en religieuze gebruiken en praktijken onderzocht. In sommige hoofdstukken (bijv. hoofdstuk 3) betreft dit tolerantie van een eigen leefwijze in meer algemene zin, en in andere hoofdstukken van concrete gebruiken (bijv. het dragen van een hoofddoek als ambtenaar, in hoofdstuk 5). Elke studie heeft een specifieke focus, en in hoofdstuk 3 wordt ook onderzocht of tolerantie ten aanzien van verschillende groepen verschilt (bijv. Westerse en niet-Westerse immigranten; moslim- en niet-moslim immigranten). Er is hier gekozen voor een scala aan groepen zodat de studie van tolerantie niet beperkt wordt tot één groep of gebruik. Deze gebruiken worden natuurlijk niet door elk individueel lid van de minderheidsgroep uitgeoefend en definiëren die groepen niet als zodanig. In dit onderzoek worden een aantal concrete minderheidsgebruiken bestudeerd die in West-Europese landen veel bediscussieerd worden.

[2] Deze klassieke opvatting van tolerantie als verdraagzaamheid staat in contrast met de moderne opvatting van tolerante als openheid en waardering van verschillen, waarbij tolerantie gezien wordt als het tegenovergestelde van vooroordeel (Allport, 1954; Hjerm et al., 2021; Verkuyten et al., 2021). Bij verdraagzaamheid juist bezwaren of negatieve gevoelens ten aanzien van hetgeen men gedoogt. Daarmee kan in deze klassieke opvatting, (in)tolerantie niet gereduceerd worden tot op de groep gebaseerde af- of voorkeur, maar zijn er aanvullende redenen en overwegingen. In dit proefschrift bekijk ik deze redenen terwijl ik op de achtergrond steeds rekening houd met gevoelens ten aanzien van de betreffende groep.

Dit roept de vraag op welke redenen mensen hebben om minderheidsgebruiken te tolereren, en waar zij de grenzen van tolerantie trekken. Mensen kunnen allerlei redenen hebben om tolerant te zijn ten aanzien van uiteenlopende manieren van leven, maar deze onderliggende redenen zijn eerder nauwelijks empirisch onderzocht, terwijl zij wel de basis vormen voor het dulden van andere levenswijzen. Ook kunnen de waarden, overwegingen en principes variëren per situatie en praktijk (bijv. tolereert iemand een religieuze school niet vanwege de seculiere waarden die h/zij aanhangt, of omdat men zorgen heeft over de sociaal-gesegregeerde gevolgen van aparte religieuze scholen?). Daarmee is het dus belangrijk om die contexten en condities in ogenschouw te nemen. In dit proefschrift ben ik dan ook specifiek geïnteresseerd in de vraag ***waarom*** en ***wanneer*** men tolereert, en in de mate waarin deze redenen en condities voor tolerantie afhankelijk zijn van ***wie*** tolereert — d.w.z. individuele verschillen tussen degenen die tolereren. Ik poog hiermee bij te dragen aan de literatuur over intergroepsrelaties door tolerantie als verdraagzaamheid empirisch te onderzoeken, alsook aan de sociaalwetenschappelijke en sociaalpsychologische literatuur over intergroepstolerantie, door te onderzoeken waarom en wanneer welke mensen andere levenswijzen dulden.

In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik deze drie vragen (waarom, wanneer, wie) onder Nederlanders en, in hoofdstuk 5, Duitsers, met behulp van vragenlijsten en experimenten. In totaal zijn 8842 Nederlandse en Duitse volwassenen zonder migratieachtergrond bevraagd, waarvan de resultaten in hoofdstuk 2-5 worden besproken in de vorm van onderzoeksartikelen gepubliceerd in internationale vaktijdschriften. Ondanks dat er ook duidelijke verschillen bestaan tussen de twee landen — bijvoorbeeld in termen van regelgeving en institutionele inbedding van rechten voor minderheden — worden in beide landen ook dezelfde publieke en politieke debatten gevoerd. Deze debatten leggen regelmatig de nadruk op ‘de nationale identiteit’ welke veelal tegenover immigranten en specifiek moslims gepositioneerd wordt (Van den Hemel, 20014). Ook worden religieuze uitingen in publieke contexten in beide landen betwist (Cinalli & Giugno, 2013), en heeft eerder onderzoek laten zien dat een meerderheid van de Nederlanders en Duitsers bijvoorbeeld voorstander is van een verbod op de hoofddoek in publieke contexten (Van der Noll, 2010), wat het relevant maakt om tolerantie in deze twee nationale contexten te onderzoeken[3].

Waarom: Redenen voor tolerantie

Allereerst onderzoek ik *waarom* men minderheidsgebruiken tolereert, en breng ik daarmee redenen voor tolerantie in kaart in hoofdstuk 2 en 3. Gebaseerd op de sociale identiteitstheorie focus ik op drie groepsdynamieken: de perceptie van de *ingroup*, van de *outgroup*, en van de relatie tussen ingroup en outgroup (Reicher en collega's, 2010). Als eerste richt ik mij op de perceptie van de ingroup aan de hand van *deprovincialisatie*, wat een genuanceerde oriëntatie is waarbij de eigen groep en culturele waarden niet als enige standaard worden gezien, maar men het eigen wereldbeeld in perspectief plaatst (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). Voortbouwend op eerder onderzoek dat heeft aangetoond dat deprovincialisatie verband houdt met allerlei positieve uitkomsten zoals minder vooroordelen (Verkuyten en collega's, 2022), beredeneer ik dat wanneer men een genuanceerd perspectief op de eigen groep onderschrijft, men meer tolerant zal zijn ten aanzien van minderheidsgebruiken. In hoofdstuk 2 laat ik aan de hand van drie empirische studies en een interne meta-analyse zien dat een meer deprovinciale oriëntatie inderdaad verband houdt met meer tolerantie van gebruiken van minderheden (van bijv. immigranten), bovenop andere, voor tolerantie relevante factoren zoals vooroordelen, politieke oriëntatie, nationale en religieuze identificatie, opleidingsniveau, sekse en leeftijd.

Als tweede heb ik mij gericht op outgroup respect, wat verwijst naar de principiële overtuiging dat alle burgers gerespecteerd worden als autonome individuen met dezelfde rechten (Simon, 2007). Het voorbeeld uit de inleiding over de Raad van Europa brengt onder andere respect voor gesluierde vrouwen naar voren als een reden om de hoofddoek te accepteren. In die lijn en voortbouwend op het afkeuring-respect-model van tolerantie (Simon en collega's, 2018), beredeneer ik dat men — ondanks dat men bezwaar heeft tegen bepaalde gedragingen — toleranter is ten aanzien van minderheidsgebruiken als men leden van de minderheidsgroep ziet als gelijkwaardige burgers met gelijke rechten om te leven zoals zij willen. Ik bekijk daarbij niet alleen of tolerantie op basis van respect in algemene zin voorkomt, maar ook of dit abstracte principe zich vertaalt in de acceptatie van concrete gebruiken. Immers, dat iemand instemt met algemene principes dat anderen hetzelfde recht op hun levenswijze hebben, betekent nog niet automatisch dat men bijvoorbeeld ook tolereert dat ambtenaren of docenten in publieke functies een hoofddoek dragen. In hoofdstuk 3 laat ik aan de hand van vier empirische studies zien dat respect inderdaad een belangrijke reden is voor tolerantie: Wanneer men meer respect toont voor anderen als gelijke burgers, dan is men ook toleranter, hier bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van het dragen van religieuze symbolen op publieke scholen.

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[3] De meeste hoofdstukken richten zich op nationale steekproeven van Nederlanders, maar in hoofdstuk 5 vergelijken we ook of tolerantie (ten aanzien van een ambtenaar die een hoofddoek draagt) verschilt tussen Nederlanders en Duitsers.

Als derde analyseer ik de perceptie van de relatie tussen ingroup en outgroup, aan de hand van opvattingen over vreedzaam samenleven. Dit verwijst naar of iemand het belangrijk acht dat verschillende groepen harmonieus samenleven en intergroepsconflicten vermeden worden (Kirchner en collega's, 2011). Het vredig samenleven van verschillende groepen kan een reden zijn om anderen te tolereren, ook al is deze reden van conflictvermijding wat meer pragmatisch dan principieel: Iemand die een gebruik eigenlijk afkeurt, kan uit pragmatische overwegingen nalaten om negatief te interveniëren omdat h/zij denkt dat dit sociaal conflict veroorzaakt, of grotere sociale spanningen oplevert dan het toelaten ervan (Schiffauer, 2013). Tolerantie op basis van opvattingen over vreedzaam samenleven is theoretisch geïntroduceerd (Forst, 2013), maar nauwelijks met data getoetst. In hoofdstuk 3 laat ik aan de hand van vier empirische studies zien dat men inderdaad toleranter is als men het belangrijk vindt dat verschillende groepen vredig samenleven. Echter blijkt tolerantie op basis van respect belangrijker dan tolerantie op basis van samenleven, wat impliceert dat de meer principiële reden van outgroup respect relevanter is voor tolerantie dan de reden van vreedzaam samenleven. De laatste gaat meer over pragmatische conflictvermijding en is wellicht al een middenweg in het balanceren tussen verschillende groepen met hun eigen levenswijze. Ondanks dat deze pragmatische attitude van conflictvermijding een dagelijkse realiteit kan zijn voor mensen, lijkt deze niet zonder meer gerelateerd aan hogere tolerantie van minderheidsgebruiken.

Wanneer: Situaties wanneer men (in)tolerant is

Los van de algemene redenen die men heeft om te tolereren, is tolerantie situatieafhankelijk, omdat verschillende gebruiken en contexten andere overwegingen oproepen (Forst, 2017). Zo kan men het dragen van religieuze symbolen tolereren in de ene context (bijv. op straat), maar niet in de andere (bijv. de werkcontext). Vandaar dat ik in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 als tweede vraag bekijk *wanneer* men meer of minder tolerant is ten aanzien van religieuze uitingen (hier specifiek van moslims in Nederland en Duitsland), redenerend dat men meestal minder tolerant is als er meer negatieve sociaal-culturele consequenties worden waargenomen (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). Allereerst vergelijk ik verschillende contexten van religieuze identiteitsuiting (bijv. middels religieuze kleding of symbolen). Mensen ervaren bij religieuze uitingen in publieke (i.p.v. privé) contexten eerder negatieve consequenties, bijvoorbeeld omdat ze denken dat publieke religieuze uitingen sociale cohesie belemmeren, culturele verandering teweegbrengen, of de seculiere aard van de staat en haar publieke instituties ondermijnen (Bannister & Kearns, 2009; Schiffauer, 2013). Het kan hierdoor lastiger zijn om publieke religieuze uitingen te tolereren. Hoewel onderzoek laat zien dat er een verschil is in tolerantie tussen contexten (Stouffer, 1955), is er geen onderzoek dat systematisch allerlei contexten heeft vergeleken. Vandaar dat ik in hoofdstuk 4 experimenteel tolerantie ten aanzien van religieuze identiteitsuitingen in vier contexten vergelijk: In een privé/thuissituatie, op straat, op het werk, of op het werk als ambtenaar in een publieke functie bij de gemeente. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat tolerantie voor uitingen in de privécontext het hoogst is, gevolgd door op straat, en vervolgens in de twee werkcontexten. Daarmee blijkt tolerantie van religieuze uitingen inderdaad contextafhankelijk, en suggereren de resultaten dat het tolereren van zulke uitingen in publieke situaties (bijv. werkzaam in publieke institutionele functie) lastiger is.

In hetzelfde hoofdstuk bekijk ik daarnaast of tolerantie verschilt ten aanzien van welke actie men precies tolereert: De religieuze identiteitsuitdrukking zelf, of het overtuigen van anderen dat zij zich ook zo uiten (bijv. middels religieuze kleding of symbolen). Voorgaand onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat tolerantie verschilt tussen het dulden van afwijkende overtuigingen, het handelen op basis van deze overtuigingen, en de mobilisatie van anderen om deze overtuigingen uit te dragen (Gieling en collega's, 2010). Het overtuigen en mobiliseren van anderen kan gezien worden als meer consequenties hebbende voor sociale samenhang, dan dat een enkel individu zich uit. Het voorbeeld uit de inleiding over de Raad van Europa illustreert dat dit onderscheid gemaakt wordt: Politici reageerden door een grens aan tolerantie te stellen bij het vermeende "promoten van de hoofddoek" door de campagne. Het lijkt dus niet zozeer het dragen van de hoofddoek zelf, als wel de vermeende mobilisatie van de campagne die wordt aangedragen als grens van tolerantie. In hoofdstuk 4 toets ik dit onderscheid tussen tolerantie t.a.v. de uiting zelf versus het overtuigen van anderen, middels een experiment. Ik vind zoals verwacht dat tolerantie voor de uiting zelf hoger is dan voor het overtuigen van anderen, en dat dit bovendien zo is in alle eerder benoemde vier contexten (privé; straat; werk; ambtenaar).

Als laatste onderdeel van de *wanneer*-vraag bestudeer ik in hoofdstuk 5 of tolerantie ten aanzien van een hoofddoek van moslima's verschilt per waargenomen motief om de hoofddoek te dragen. Teruggrijpend op het voorbeeld van de Raad van Europa werd in de campagne de hoofddoek geportretteerd als een vrije en persoonlijke keuze, welke om die reden geaccepteerd zou moeten worden. In reactie hierop legitimeerden critici hun negatieve respons juist door te stellen dat de hoofddoek een "symbool van onderwerping" aan de normen van de religieuze gemeenschap zou zijn. Dit illustreert dat tolerantie afhangt van het waargenomen motief voor het dragen van een hoofddoek. Voorgaand onderzoek onder moslima's laat zien dat daarvoor een scala aan motieven bestaat, waaronder autonome motieven; culturele tradities; uiting van religieuze identiteit; voldoen aan religieuze gemeenschapsnormen (Howard, 2012; Legate et al., 2020; Safdar & Jassi, 2021). Hoe deze motieven en de perceptie ervan tolerantie beïnvloeden is echter niet onderzocht. Daarom vergelijk ik in mijn onderzoek bovengenoemde vier motieven voor het dragen van een hoofddoek middels een experiment. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat tolerantie voor de hoofddoek die door Nederlanders en Duitsers als persoonlijke, autonome keuze wordt gezien het hoogst is, en het laagst voor redenen van normatieve gemeenschapsdruk, met de culturele en religieuze motieven daar tussenin. Verder blijkt dit patroon niet te verschillen tussen Nederland en Duitsland.

Wie: Individuele verschillen in tolerantie

Zelfs als men duidelijke redenen heeft om minderheidsgebruiken te tolereren is tolerantie niet zonder grenzen. Niet alles kan grenzeloos geaccepteerd worden alsof alles dezelfde waarde heeft en er geen morele grenzen zouden bestaan (Kim & Wreen, 2003). Zo kunnen gebruiken zoals vrouwenbesnijdenis of kindhuwelijken onacceptabel en als mogelijke ondermijning van het voortbestaan van de eigen culturele identiteit beschouwd worden. Zelfs voor mensen met een deprovinciale oriëntatie die het wereldbeeld van de eigen culturele groep in perspectief plaatsen, is het niet zo dat zij de eigenheid en continuïteit van hun groepsidentiteit niet zouden waarderen. Soortgelijk kan men veel respect tonen ten aanzien van, en harmonieus samen willen leven met anderen, maar nog steeds belang hechten aan of bezorgd zijn over het voortbestaan van de eigen culturele identiteit. Daarom onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 of de relaties tussen deprovincialisatie en tolerantie; tussen respect en tolerantie; en tussen samenlevingsopvattingen en tolerantie zwakker zijn voor mensen die bezorgd zijn over de continuïteit van hun groepsidentiteit. Met het beschouwen van identiteitscontinuïteit als grens van tolerantie (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017), bouw ik voort op de literatuur die stelt dat het psychologisch belangrijk is voor mensen om hun verleden, heden en toekomstige 'ik' te verbinden, en dat negatieve reacties volgen als deze continuïteit bedreigd wordt (Badea et al., 2020; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015). Mijn resultaten laten inderdaad zien dat de relaties tussen deprovincialisatie en tolerantie, en respect en tolerantie — maar niet tussen samenlevingsopvattingen en tolerantie — zwakker (maar nog steeds positief) zijn voor mensen met zorgen over de continuïteit van hun culturele groepsidentiteit.

Soortgelijk bekijk ik in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 of de effecten van context en van motief op tolerantie afhangen van dergelijke individuele verschillen. Zo is het bijvoorbeeld denkbaar dat mensen die zich zorgen maken over identiteitscontinuïteit vooral intolerant zijn wanneer religieuze symbolen in publieke institutionele contexten worden uitgedragen. Omdat tolerantie afhangt van wat men denkt dat er op het spel staat (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017), bekijk ik niet alleen of het effect van context op tolerantie anders is voor mensen die bezorgd zijn over de continuïteit van groepsidentiteit (hoofdstuk 4), maar onderzoek ik ook of het effect van de motieven op tolerantie anders is voor mensen die bezorgd zijn over normatieve conformering (hoofdstuk 5). Dit laatste betreft een autoritaire oriëntatie met bezorgdheid over groepsnormen, conformisme, en sociale samenhang (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). Zo is het goed denkbaar dat autoritaire mensen voor hun tolerantie van de hoofddoek minder het motief voor het dragen ervan in ogenschouw nemen. Dat zou betekenen dat mensen die bezorgd zijn over normatief conformisme de hoofddoek hoe dan ook als bedreiging voor dominante culturele normen en waarden zien (Kauff et al., 2013; Van Asscche et al., 2019), grotendeels los van wat het motief is om deze te dragen. In hoofdstuk 5 vind ik inderdaad dat autoritair conformisme het effect van het motief op tolerantie verzwakt. In hoofdstuk 4 is de bezorgdheid over identiteitscontinuïteit zelfs een harde grens in die zin dat het effect van context op tolerantie (van praktijk en mobilisatie) alléén bestaat voor mensen die deze zorgen over het voortbestaan van hun culturele groepsidentiteit delen. Dit laat zien dat deze individuele verschillen belangrijke beperkende voorwaarden van tolerantie zijn die bij het bestuderen ervan in ogenschouw moeten worden genomen.

Discussie

Samenvattend heb ik in dit proefschrift allereerst laten zien dat respect, deprovincialisatie, en in mindere mate opvattingen over vreedzaam samenleven, redenen zijn om gebruiken van immigrantengroepen te tolereren. Deze redenen blijken minder belangrijk te zijn voor tolerantie als men bezorgd is over de continuïteit van de eigen groepsidentiteit. Dit betekent dat het voor een goed begrip van tolerantie belangrijk is om zowel houdingen ten aanzien van de ingroup, de outgroup, en hun onderlinge relatie, alsook het samenspel met identiteitscontinuïteit in ogenschouw te nemen. Daarnaast blijken de context van, en het motief voor religieuze uitingen invloed te hebben op de tolerantie ervan. Tegelijkertijd werd duidelijk dat deze effecten afhangen van individuele verschillen in identiteitscontinuïteit dan wel autoritarisme. Dit laat zien dat tolerantie afhangt van de context, het type actie, het waargenomen motief, alsook individuele disposities. Al met al heb ik in dit proefschrift als eerste een combinatie van redenen voor, en grenzen aan tolerantie systematisch onderzocht, om zo bij te dragen aan een meer diepgaand en genuanceerd begrip van intergroepstolerantie.

Implicaties voor de praktijk

Op basis van de studies zijn een aantal maatschappelijke implicaties en praktijkaanbevelingen aan te wijzen. Juist omdat mensen in diverse samenlevingen het niet altijd over alles eens zullen zijn en worden, is tolerantie in de hedendaagse wereld een onmisbaar ingrediënt: Men wordt niet gevraagd om verschillen volledig te waarderen of te vieren, maar om te accepteren dat anderen hetzelfde recht hebben om te leven zoals ze willen. De resultaten suggereren dat een eerste veelbelovende weg naar tolerantie is om respect voor gelijke rechten van alle burgers aan te moedigen bijvoorbeeld in het onderwijs, zoals bij burgerschapsonderwijs en maatschappijleer. Een tweede suggestie in lijn met mijn bevindingen over *deprovincialisatie* is om het innemen van verschillende perspectieven te oefenen, zodat mensen (leerlingen) leren dat anderen (medestudenten) andere perspectieven en wereldbeelden hebben (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Thijs et al., 2021). Een belangrijke kanttekening hierbij is dat onze bevindingen ook laten zien dat dit moeilijker is voor mensen die zorgen hebben over de continuïteit van hun culturele groepsidentiteit. Men zou in geval van sterke bezorgdheid en bezwaren, in het onderwijs kunnen oefenen met het reflecteren op (extra) redenen voor acceptatie — zoals respect voor minderheidsgroepen als medeburgers met gelijke rechten — om zo tolerantie waarschijnlijker te maken dan intolerantie (Verkuyten et al., 2019).

Beperkingen en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek

Ondanks bovengenoemde bijdragen, kent dit onderzoek een aantal beperkingen die richting geven voor toekomstig onderzoek. Zo is mijn onderzoek gesitueerd in een specifieke context, en is het goed mogelijk dat niet alle bevindingen generaliseren naar andere situaties. Ik heb een aantal specifieke gebruiken en minderheidsgroepen bestudeerd, en alleen vanuit meerderheidsperspectief in twee nationale contexten. Ondanks dat het winst oplevert om naar gespecificeerde situaties te kijken (bijv. een hoofddoek dragen als ambtenaar bij de gemeente) omdat deze de sociale werkelijkheid benaderen (Steiner et al., 2016), zal toekomstig onderzoek moeten uitwijzen of de resultaten te repliceren zijn voor andere minderheidsgroepen, -gebruiken, en in andere landen. Zo kan vervolgonderzoek kijken naar andere samenlevingen (bijv. landen met een andere immigratiegeschiedenis of machtsbalans); naar andere groepen (bijv. minderheidsgroepen in termen van gender of koloniale geschiedenis), alsook het minderheidsperspectief ten aanzien van tolerantie meer belichten (bijv. ervaringen met getolereerd worden; Cvetkovska et al., 2020, 2021). Echter, dat ik diverse minderheidsgroepen en gebruiken heb bestudeerd, en daarnaast geen verschillen vond tussen Nederland en Duitsland, sterkt het vertrouwen in de resultaten.

Een tweede beperking van het huidige onderzoek betreft de meting van het tolerantieconcept. Niet in alle studies was in de meting even expliciet de negatieve component van bezwaar verwerkt die onderdeel is van tolerantie als verdraagzaamheid (Forst, 2004; King, 2012; Verkuyten et al., 2021). In de eerste twee empirische hoofdstukken betrof het tolerantie in de zin van 'toestaan dat anderen hun leven leiden zoals zij willen', en het 'accepteren van alom bediscussieerde minderheidsgebruiken'. Daarop voortbouwend vroeg ik respondenten in de laatste studies meer expliciet of zij bepaalde praktijken zouden accepteren ondanks dat zij deze bezwaarlijk vinden. Desondanks blijft het moeilijk om volledig te ontwarren wie wat bezwaarlijk vindt (maar niettemin accepteerde). Vervolgonderzoek kan de gebruikte meting vergelijken of combineren met andere metingen. Ter illustratie zou een tweetrapsprocedure gebruikt kunnen worden waarbij men eerst aangeeft wat men afkeurt, en vervolgens pas gevraagd wordt of men het afgekeurde niettemin zou tolereren. Een andere optie is om mensen redenen voor tolerantie te laten rangschikken (bijv. de waarde van individuele vrijheid versus sociale samenhang), om zo het wegen van redenen voor en tegen tolerantie inzichtelijk te maken (zie Adelman et al., 2021a; Peffley et al., 2001). Al met al zijn in toekomstig studies aanvullende metingen wenselijk om het complexe concept van tolerantie verder te onderzoeken.

Conclusie

Het doel van dit proefschrift was om inzicht te bieden in de redenen waarom en de situaties waarin mensen (in)tolerant zijn naar minderheden die hun leven leiden zoals zij zelf willen, en ten aanzien van de uiting van specifieke gebruiken. Ik heb dit onderzocht in Nederland en in Duitsland, waar regelmatig debatten plaatsvinden over hoe samen te leven, en specifiek over gebruiken zoals de plek van religie op school en in publieke instituties. Tolerantie is in geval van onenigheid belangrijk, juist omdat men het niet altijd over alles eens is, maar desondanks accepteert dat anderen hun eigen levenswijze hebben. Met vier empirische studies heb ik redenen *waarom* en situaties *waarin* men tolereert geïdentificeerd, alsook individuele verschillen in *wanneer* deze beide aspecten meer of minder belangrijk zijn. De bevindingen zijn relevant voor een beter begrip van intergroepstolerantie, geven aanleiding tot vervolgonderzoek, en hebben implicaties voor de maatschappelijke praktijk in cultureel diverse samenlevingen.

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About the author

After obtaining a master's degree in social sciences as well as humanities, and having worked outside of academia as a research assistant in the social domain, Evi Velthuis worked as a lecturer at Interdisciplinary Social Science at Utrecht University. She taught and co-coordinated courses on migration and obtained her University Teaching Qualification.

Subsequently, in 2017 Evi started working as a PhD candidate at the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). As part of this PhD trajectory, in 2019 she was a visiting scholar at FernUniversität Hagen in Germany, to collaborate with Dr. Jolanda Van der Noll at the department of Community Psychology.

Evi has presented her work at international conferences such as the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). Her work has appeared in the *Journal of Applied Social Psychology,* in *Social Indicators Research*, the *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, and in the *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*.

Currently, Evi is a postdoctoral researcher at Wageningen University & Research.

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Many Western European countries have seen strong debates about minority rights and practices such as the founding of religious schools or the wearing of religious symbols in public spaces. In these increasingly diverse societies, tolerance of one another's practices and beliefs has often been put forward as an indispensable ingredient for harmonious intergroup coexistence. The classical notion of tolerance entails the acceptance of practices that one disapproves of – which implies that tolerance is a balance between reasons to accept and reasons to reject disapproved practices. In this dissertation, Evi Velthuis investigates those reasons for, and boundaries to, intergroup tolerance. Using large-scale surveys and experiments from the Netherlands and Germany, this dissertation presents four empirical chapters which consider three main aspects of tolerance: (1) reasons *why* minority practices are tolerated, (2) situational factors *when* practices are tolerated, and (3) individual differences in *who* tolerates minority practices. The findings and contributions are discussed in light of the social scientific literature on tolerance and intergroup relations.

Evi Velthuis conducted the studies presented in this dissertation as part of her PhD research at the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer) at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).