HERE TO SAY?:

Understanding positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey



Şenay Yitmen

Here to stay?:

Understanding positive and negative attitudes
towards Syrian refugees in Turkey

Şenay Yitmen

Manuscript Committee:
Dr. S. Ç. Bağcı (Sabancı University)
Prof. dr. X. Chryssochoou (Panteion University)
Prof. dr. M. Lubbers (Utrecht University)
Prof. dr. T.F.M. Ter Bogt (Utrecht University)
Dr. J.T. Thijs (Utrecht University)

Printing: Ridderprint | ridderprint.nl
Cover: Anke Muijsers | www.visual-research.studio
Layout: Robbert de Vries | persoonlijkproefschrift.nl
ISBN: 978-94-6458-586-5
DOI: 10.33540/1419

Here to stay?:

Understanding positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey

Hier om te blijven?:

Positieve en negatieve attitudes tegenover Syrische vluchtelingen in Turkije (met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de
rector magnificus, prof.dr. H.R.B.M. Kummeling, ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 28 oktober 2022 des ochtends te 10.15 uur

door

Şenay Yitmen

geboren op 16 oktober 1986
te Istanbul, Turkije

Promotor:
Prof. dr. M.J.A.M. Verkuyten

Copromotor:
Dr. B. Martinovic

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

Synthesis

With the eruption of the conflict in Syria in 2011, Turkey started receiving Syrian refugees. Turkish people's reactions towards these refugees varied from negative to positive which continues to the present day. For instance, "I don't want Syrians in my country" (#Idontwantsyriansinmycountry) was a trending hashtag in Turkey on Twitter at the beginning of 2019. The hashtag was circulated after the post of a video that shows Syrians celebrating the new year in Taksim Square in İstanbul, waving flags of the Free Syrian Army, dancing, and chanting the name Syria. The hashtag reached 150,343 tweets in two weeks since its first use and elicited many negative reactions towards Syrian refugees (Erdoğan-Öztürk & Işık-Güler, 2020):

> #idontwantsyriansinmycountry being a guest is only OK for a certain period, I think everyone is happier in his/her land, it would be indecent for us as their host to push them out forcefully. But everyone should go home (Erdoğan-Öztürk, 2020, p.7).
> #idontwantsyriansinmycountry While sons of the Turks die as martyrs in Syria by fives, Syrians give birth by fives in Turkey (Erdoğan-Öztürk, 2020, p. 7)
> #idontwantsyriansinmycountry While I sit at home unemployed and think of my future, those men celebrate the new year, shame on them (Erdoğan-Öztürk, 2020, p. 6)

In contrast, there were also positive reactions from Turkish people. For instance, a Turkish woman described offering help after witnessing the deprived situation of a friendly Syrian women:

"Madina welcomed us in and offered us tea. I remember even now: all they had in the apartment was a couch, six tea glasses, a bag of clothes, and a kettle. They had nothing else! Nothing! We mobilized immediately and found everything they needed in a day or two" (Alkan, 2021, p.180).

Further, there was an increase in the number of Turkish families who applied to legal entities to adopt Syrian orphans (Uçtu, 2015). Additionally, various projects tried to foster positive relations between Turks and Syrians, and "Friendship Table" is one of these. Initiated by the Red Crescent, "Friendship Table" brings together Turkish and Syrian people to cook and share their traditional food. A Turkish participant in the initiative said: "I'm very happy and proud to cook with Syrians and to keep our culture alive" (Boztepe, 2021). Further, in the first years of the Syrian conflict, 64% of Turkish people agreed with the statement that "Admission of Syrians without any differentiation regarding their language, religion, and ethnical background is a humanitarian obligation on our part". In addition, 53% of Turkish people defined Syrian refugees as their religious, Islamic, brothers (Erdoğan, 2015), and this was also communicated by the Turkish state.

As the examples above illustrate, there were both negative and positive attitudes and behaviours of Turkish people towards Syrian refugees. My aim in this

dissertation is to describe and understand the variation in these positive and negative attitudes and the related behavioural intentions. Theoretically, I use the social identity approach (Reicher et al., 2010), intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954), and intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), and empirically I examine (1) attitudes towards Syrian refugees and whether Turkish people make a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions, (2) key correlates that can explain these attitudes and intentions, and (3) conditions under which people have more positive or rather more negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. These three research questions relate to the "what" "why" and "when" of the attitudes of Turkish people.

The "what" question concerns whether there is a difference in the feelings and processes behind attitudes towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities, as well as whether people differentiate between positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees: "Are feelings towards refugees target-specific or do they reflect more general minority group attitudes, and can a distinction be made between positive and negative attitudes (RQ1)?

The second key question is "why do people have positive or negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees?" (RQ2). The research on this question is concerned with identifying key social psychological correlates that are expected to be associated directly, and indirectly, with positive and negative attitudes of Turkish people towards Syrian refugees. Specifically, the focus is on national and religious identifications of Turkish people, their endorsement of multiculturalism, perceived outgroup threat and negative emotions, intergroup contact, and perceived similarities between Turkish people and Syrian refugees.

The "when" question relates to the qualifying (i.e. moderating) roles of some constructs in the associations that are investigated: "when are positive and negative attitudes of Turkish people more strongly or more weakly associated with key correlates?" (RQ3). Specifically, it is examined whether the association between endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings towards Syrian refugees depends on the strength of national commitment. Further, it is examined whether the association between outgroup threat and attitudes towards Syrian refugees depends on endorsement of humanitarian concerns, on perceived descriptive social norms, and on whether Syrian refugee settlement is perceived to be temporary or permanent. Furthermore, it is examined whether negative emotions towards Syrian refugees play a moderating role in the association between injunctive norms (what is morally right or wrong) and support for Syrian refugees.

In examining these three broad questions, I try to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, most of the existing research on attitudes towards newcomers is on voluntary migrants (e.g. Ceobanu, & Escandell, 2010; Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Voci & Hewstone, 2003; Ward & Masgoret, 2006), and research on attitudes towards refugees remains relatively scarce (e.g. Esses et al., 2017; Haslam & Holland, 2012; Pedersen et al., 2005). However, attitudes towards refugees and immigrants may

differ (De Coninck, 2020a; Gieling et al., 2011; Verkuyten et al., 2018a). For instance, research shows that host societies tend to have less favorable attitudes towards immigrants compared to refugees (De Coninck, 2020a; Hatton, 2016) because immigrants are perceived as less deserving than refugees (Meidert & Rapp, 2019). Furthermore, people having to flee their country is often considered a humanitarian crisis: refugees are perceived as a more vulnerable group than voluntary immigrants (Bansak et al., 2016) which could mean that humanitarian concerns are important for the way that host society members respond to refugees. My focus on attitudes towards refugees thus adds to our understanding of how this understudied and vulnerable group of migrants is perceived.

Second, the majority of the research on reactions of host society members towards immigrants and refugees focuses on negative attitudes (e.g., Landmann et al., 2019; Lee & Fisk, 2006; Rucker et al., 2019). Considering the positive-negative asymmetry – which indicates that positive evaluations and intentions tend to differ from negative ones (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000) – and the scarce studies on positive attitudes towards refugees, it is unclear whether the processes behind positive and negative attitudes are similar or not. Because there are both negative and positive reactions towards Syrian refugees in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2020; Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020), I seek to develop a broader understanding of attitudes towards refugees by investigating both types of reactions.

Third, the majority of the research on attitudes towards immigrants and refugees has been conducted in Western contexts (i.e., Western Europe, North America, Australia). There are only a few examples of research conducted in non-Western contexts such as the Middle East (e.g., Al-Srehan, 2020; Ceyhun, 2020; Tartakovsky & Walsh, 2016) and the Caucasus (Makashvili et al., 2018). Further, research conducted in Western contexts shows that perceived threat and a competitive setting (Landmann et al., 2019), strong national (Anderson & Ferguson, 2018) and ethnic majority group identifications (Vanbeselaere et al., 2006; Verkuyten, 2009a), economic decline (Coenders et al., 2008), and high numbers of immigrants are some of the important predictors of negative attitudes towards newcomers (McLaren, 2003; Semyonov et al., 2006; Kunovich, 2004). Additionally, frequency of contact (De Coninck et al., 2021a; Tropp et al., 2018), superordinate identities (Bassett & Cleveland, 2019; Hasbun-Lopez et al., 2019), and multiculturalism (Whitley & Webster, 2019) are some of the predictors of positive attitudes towards immigrants.

However, it is unclear whether these correlates of positive and negative attitudes towards immigrants generalize to non-Western settings, and the Turkish context in particular. Most of the literature on attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey is descriptive and only a few studies have focused on correlates of positive and negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, such as intergroup contact (Aktaş et al., 2021), perceived realistic threat (Uysal & Çakır, 2020), and national belonging (Koçak, 2021). Turkey differs from Western countries in having a relatively fragile

economy with very high numbers of Syrian refugees creating competitive social situations (De Coninck et al., 2021b), and in being a relative collectivist country (Mango, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002) with citizens having a particularly strong attachment to the Turkish nation and its self-defining national values (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2010). In addition, Turkey does not grant refugee status to non-European asylum-seekers (Adalı & Türkyılmaz, 2020) which means that there is not a permanent non-Turkish immigrant minority group, and there are many perceived similarities (Islamic religion and culture) between Turks and Syrians. Thus, I want to contribute to the limited research on attitudes towards refugees that has been mainly conducted in western societies, and thereby contribute to the Turkish public debate and policies concerning the relations between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees.

In this introductory chapter, I will first give an overview of Syrian refugees in the world, followed by a description of the Turkish socio-political context. Second, I will review the broader literature on attitudes towards immigrants and refugees that mainly focuses on the negative aspect of intergroup attitudes, and also review the mainly descriptive findings on the attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. Third, I will discuss the theoretical frameworks in relation to the what, why, and when questions. The 'what' question is concerned with the literature on generalized vs. target-specific prejudice and the positive-negative asymmetry; the 'why' question relates to the social identity approach, intergroup threat theory, endorsement of multiculturalism, intergroup emotions, contact, and perceived similarity. The 'when' question is also considered in terms of these theoretical approaches, and in addition to the endorsement of humanitarian concerns, group norms, and perceived temporary versus permanent residency of Syrian refugees. Fourth, I will give an overview of the empirical chapters in this dissertation and how these address the research questions. Finally, I will share my insights about the findings and the main lessons I attained from these empirical studies, and I will discuss some limitations and possible directions for future studies.

1.1. REFUGEES IN THE WORLD

Migration is a continuing process that at times comes with peaks and is considered an important and sensitive issue around the world. Currently, the number of international migrants is estimated at around 281 million (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2022). The terms 'migrants', 'immigrants' and 'refugees' are not always used in the same way, and the first term is sometimes used as incorporating the latter two. Migrant populations are extremely diverse, but all migrants have a place of origin. An immigrant is generally considered to be someone who "moves into a country other than that of his or her nationality or usual residence so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence" (United Nations Department

of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA], 1998). And a refugee is "someone unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion", and whose refugee status is approved (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2022a). An asylum-seeker is someone who migrates involuntarily and is waiting for approval of their refugee status (UNHCR, 2022b).

Every year there are around 4.1 million asylum-seekers in the world and as of mid-2020, there are currently 26.3 million refugees and 68% of these refugees come from Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar. Furthermore, refugees are concentrated in low and middle-income countries (DESA, 2021) and only less than 1% of the refugees worldwide are resettled in their country of origin (UNHCR, 2022c).

Since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, the number of Syrian refugees worldwide has reached 5.7 million (UNHCR, 2022d). There is a number of Syrians that resettled in third countries such as Germany, Sweden, Austria, Greece, and the Netherlands (UNHCR, 2022e). Resettlement to third countries means that Syrian refugees obtain legal status eventually and can become integrated into the host country (European Union Commission, 2021). However, the majority of Syrians live in the neighbouring countries Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq (UNHCR, 2022d), where they are not granted refugee status (Sadek, 2013), and also not the citizenship of the country they are living in.

Migration affects displaced people in various and profound ways and also has an impact on the relations between newcomers and members of the host societies. Various studies and reports indicate that negative stereotypes about refugees, discrimination against refugees, and conflicts between refugees and host society members occur (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2016, 2019; Nwabuzo, 2018), and even more so when the status and future of the refugees are not clear (Hartley & Pedersen, 2015). Yet, there are also many people with positive attitudes and who welcome immigrants and refugees (De Coninck et al., 2021b; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017), and these are equally important to consider and examine. For instance, a public survey conducted in 2017 shows that 52% of Europeans and 39% of Americans want immigration to decrease, but also that one in five people agreed that immigration had a positive impact on their country (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). Furthermore, substantial numbers of people are involved in efforts and initiatives to help, support, and accommodate refugees and migrants (Bermudez, 2020).

Hence, examining attitudes and behavioural intentions towards refugees is a societally relevant issue, especially in the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Turkey is one of the unique contexts due to the influx of Syrian refugees: the number of Syrian refugees has increased from 148,000 to 3,763,000 in almost 10 years (UNHCR, 2022f). In addition, Turkey is one of the countries where the majority of Syrian refugees neither has an official refugee status nor Turkish citizenship, and where

negative reactions are relatively widespread (Erdoğan, 2020). Yet, in Turkey there are also positive reactions towards Syrian refugees (Erdoğan, 2020; Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020). For instance, a national survey finds that 34% of Turkish people offered help to Syrians, 35% think that Syrians are victims who escaped from war/oppression, and 20% of Turkish people think that Syrians and Turks are Muslim brothers (Erdoğan, 2020). However, 75% of Turkish people do not believe that they can live peacefully with Syrians in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2020), and only 12% think that Turks should strive to help Syrians integrate into Turkey (Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020). In addition, although 48.7% believe that none of the Syrians will return to Syria (Erdoğan, 2020), 65% want Syrians to actually return (Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020). Furthermore, 66% of Turkish people are worried about Syrian refugees becoming Turkish citizens and thereby also being able to decide about the fate and future of Turkey (Erdoğan, 2020).

Thus, there is evidence that Turkish people perceive Syrian refugees as a threat. A recent public survey demonstrates that 74% of Turkish people worry that Syrians will have negative effects on the Turkish economy and 65% are worried that Syrians are taking away jobs from Turkish people (Erdoğan, 2020). A different poll indicates that 59% of Turkish people believe that Syrian tradesmen do not pay taxes, and 76% think that Syrians receive a salary from the state (Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020). Furthermore, 71% of Turkish people think that Syrian refugees undermine Turkish culture, 46% think that Syrians will not adapt to the Turkish way of living (Erdoğan, 2020), and 82% think that they do not have a cultural affinity with Syrians (Kınıklıoğlu, 2020).

1.2. THE TURKISH SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT

In order to understand people's reactions towards Syrian refugees, it is relevant to consider Turkey's refugee policies and its minority populations. According to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the official minority groups of Turkey are the non-Muslim communities (Türkmen & Öktem, 2013). Today there are around 2,500 Greeks, 60,000 Armenians, and 21,000 Jews who all have been living in Turkey for centuries (United States Department of State, 2014). There is an ongoing discussion about their rights and entitlements and in Turkey multiculturalism is discussed in relation to the rights of these groups (Heper, 2007; Kaya, 2013), as well as of Kurds (Keyman, 2012; Özkırımlı, 2014). However, more recent discussions about multiculturalism are also related to the accommodation of Syrian refugees (Gezer, 2019; Kirişçi, 2014; Koçak, 2021).

Turkey is at the crossroads of migration movements and historically has hosted various refugee populations (Kaya & Erdoğan, 2016). Yet, the asylum seekers that Turkey has hosted in the past either had Turkish kinship and were integrated into

the Turkish society or they were non-Turkish asylum-seekers who stayed in Turkey for a temporary period to be resettled to third countries or returned to their country of origin (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2016). As Turkey was part of the 1951 Geneva Convention and approved the 1967 Protocol on the Legal Status of Refugees with a geographical limitation, it granted refugee status and the right to asylum only to those coming from European countries (Adalı & Türkyılmaz, 2020). For instance, Turkey hosted 50,000 Kurdish refugees in 1988 and 500,000 refugees coming from Northern Iraq in 1991, but these people were not granted refugee status. The refugees that came from Northern Iraq returned to Iraq and only 14,000 of them stayed in Turkey and were eventually resettled to third countries (Kirişçi & Karaca, 2016). Today there are in total around 368,400 asylum-seekers coming mostly from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Somalia who are waiting to be resettled to third countries (Erdoğan, 2020). This implies that Turkey did not have a permanent, non-Turkish, large group of immigrants until the Syrian refugees arrived.

Turkey and Syria share a border of 911 km (Erdoğan, 2020) and Turkey hosts a very high number of refugees from Syria (3.7 million) (UNHCR, 2022d). Living for 400 years together during the Ottoman era, the two neighbouring countries have a long history of economic and cultural ties. Despite some conflicts such as the annexation of Hatay province in 1939 and water disputes, the two countries are similar in various ways. For instance, the great majority of the Turkish and Syrian populations are Muslim (Erdoğan, 2020). Additionally, in Turkey, there is an Arab population, especially in the cities close to the Syrian border who have family ties in Syria, and there is a Turkmen population in Syria (Sever, 2020). Furthermore, there are economic ties, especially on the Turkish – Syrian border. In the 2000s, Turkey and Syria established economic cooperation, initiated joint river water management, and increased trade and investment (Hinnebusch, 2015). Thus, there are similarities and connections between Turkey and Syria in terms of religion, culture, and economic interests.

When in 2011 the Syrian conflict started, Turkey accepted Syrian asylum seekers in trying to be an *ansar* ('helpers' in Arabic) and out of humanitarian concerns (Kaya & Kuyumcuoğlu, 2019). Turkey adopted an open-door policy that envisaged "acceptance to the country with an open border, no sending back to the country of origin, and the provision of emergent and fundamental needs of arrivals" (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016). Upon arrival, almost all Syrians were settled in refugee camps at first (İçduygu, 2015) where they were provided with education and health services and with no restrictions on travel within Turkey (Adalı & Türkyılmaz, 2020). Yet, the Syrian asylum-seekers did not have any legal status and were considered "guests", rather than "refugees" or "migrants" (İçduygu, 2015).

Although Turkey initially approached the Syrian refugee crisis as a temporary situation, later the country had to consider a more permanent approach to the reception of refugees (Adalı & Türkyılmaz, 2020). The number of Syrians fleeing to Turkey increased in 2012 and reached 660,000, of which 450,000 were living outside

the refugee camps. Therefore, in 2013 Turkey established the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMG) under the Ministry of Interior which became responsible for managing Syrian migration to Turkey, besides the DEMP. Furthermore, Turkey's regulations do not enable Syrian refugees to apply for Turkish citizenship. The Regulation on Temporary Protection defines them as:

> "The citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic, stateless persons, and refugees who have arrived at or crossed our borders coming from the Syrian Arab Republic as part of a mass influx or individually for temporary protection purposes due to the events that have taken place in the Syrian Arab Republic since 28 April 2011 shall be covered under temporary protection even if they have applied for international protection. Individual applications for international protection shall not be processed during the implementation of temporary protection" (Erdoğan, 2020, p. 6).

This means that Syrians have the right to stay in Turkey for an unlimited period of time and have the right to get an education, the right to work, and have access to health services, but do not in principle have a right to stay in Turkey as Turkish citizens. However, around 110,000 Syrian refugees were granted Turkish citizenship through 'exceptional citizenship' (Erdoğan, 2022) which is granted to those who make an economic, scientific, cultural, or technological contribution to Turkey (Directorate General of Population and Citizenship Affairs, 2020).

Despite the legal restrictions, the majority of the Syrian refugees have started a life in Turkey. For instance, almost 98% of the Syrian refugees are scattered mostly in the cities bordering Syria and in the major cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, İzmir, Adana, and Mersin (Erdoğan, 2020). Although the conflict in Syria has de-escalated and between January and June 2021 only around 40,000 Syrians who fled from Syria arrived, the number of Syrians in Turkey is still increasing. Every year approximately 100,000 Syrian babies are born (Erdoğan, 2020), which means that there is a new generation of Syrians who have never been to Syria, and around 684,800 Syrian children are enrolled in Turkish schools (only 13% of them attend temporary education centers; Erdoğan, 2020). Additionally, 31,185 Syrian refugees have been granted work permits (Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication, 2020), and approximately 1.2 million Syrians are working in the illegal labor market, like construction, production, and service sectors (Erdoğan, 2020). Overall, the very high numbers of Syrian refugees, their visibility, and their participation in Turkish society increase intergroup contact opportunities but might also fuel feelings of intergroup threat and competition. Indeed, a recent public survey shows a gradual change in the direction of more negativity in attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey (Erdoğan, 2022).

1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Many factors at different levels may be important for Turkish people's attitudes towards Syrian refugees, including political, economic, and cultural conditions, regional and city characteristics (e.g., diversity), intergroup settings (e.g., competition), and individual characteristics (e.g., open-mindedness). For example, more positive immigration attitudes may exist in larger cities compared to smaller cities because residents of smaller cities might perceive asylum seekers as a greater threat (Maxwell, 2019). Furthermore, males, lower educated people and politically right-wing oriented people tend to have more negative attitudes towards refugees (Cowling et al., 2019) than females, higher educated and those with a left-wing orientation (Albada et al., 2020).

It is not possible in the context of my research to empirically consider all these types of factors and conditions that can be conceptualized and examined at different levels of analysis. Rather, I will focus on the key social psychological constructs of national and religious identities, group interests, intergroup contact, values, and beliefs, and perceived normative influences. These constructs are likely to be relevant for understanding attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Theoretically, I will use various intergroup perspectives that can shed light on my three key questions of 'what, why, and when'. Specifically, I will refer to the generalized vs. target-specific prejudice literature (Akrami et al., 2011; Bergh & Akrami, 2017; Bergh et al., 2016; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), the positive-negative asymmetry in outgroup attitudes (Buhl, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000), the social identity approach (Reicher et al., 2010), intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2008), intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Dovidio et al., 2011; Pettigrew et al., 2011) and perceived similarity. Additionally, I will look at the role of endorsement of humanitarian concerns (Nickerson & Louis, 2008), multiculturalism (Whitley & Webster, 2019), and social norms (Cialdini et al., 1990).

The main reason for considering these various theoretical frameworks and focusing on various constructs is that my central aim is to try to provide a broad-ranging understanding of Turkish people's attitudes towards Syrian refugees, rather than to systematically test a particular theoretical model or set of theoretical propositions. In other words, the explananda of this dissertation are positive and negative attitudes that are studied from several social psychological perspectives and by considering various possible roles of several key constructs. In this way, I hope to contribute to an extensive understanding the diverse and complex ways in which Turkish people react to Syrian refugees, and when and why these reactions are less or more positive.

I will first discuss how I use the different intergroup perspectives for systematically examining my three questions. In doing so I will not discuss in detail the different theories or specific expectations. This will be done in the empirical chapters

and it would become repetitive to also do this here. So, in this introductory chapter, I will only introduce the different theories and related constructs and explain how I have used these in the different empirical investigations.

1.3.1. The what question

Concerning the 'what' question (RQ1) – whether attitudes towards Syrian refugees are target-specific or general minority attitudes - I examine in Chapter 2 if there is a difference in the attitudes and related correlates towards Muslim Syrian refugees and national non-Muslim minorities, and in Chapter 3 I examine the distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions.

1.3.1.1. Generalized vs. target-specific prejudice

Understanding attitudes towards refugees benefits from an investigation into whether these attitudes are more generalized minority attitudes or rather target-specific. According to the literature on generalized prejudice, someone who is prejudiced towards a specific target minority group tends to be prejudiced towards other minority groups as well (Allport, 1954; Bergh & Akrami, 2017; Bergh et al., 2016; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). However, generalized prejudice does not tend to explain all target-specific attitudes because of the differences between various minority groups (Akrami et al., 2011). For instance, a study conducted in New Zealand shows that people may feel less warmth towards a specific target group to the extent that they perceive this group as threatening, regardless of how much they dislike minority outgroups in general (Meeusen et al., 2017). Similarly, a study conducted in Belgium shows that there is a common denominator of prejudice towards immigrants, Muslims, Jews and homosexuals, but that each attitude also has unique aspects (Meuleman et al., 2019).

For my research, this means that it is useful to examine the attitude towards Syrian refugees in comparison to the attitudes towards other minority groups in Turkey. This allows me to assess whether the former attitudes are target-specific or rather (also) reflective of a positive or negative orientation towards ethno-religious minority groups in general. To my knowledge, no research has examined attitudes towards both refugees and established minorities, such as non-Muslims (Greeks, Jews, and Armenians). There are a few recent studies in Turkey that investigate attitudes towards Syrian refugees and also attitudes towards other minorities such as Alawites, Kurds, and LGBT members (Bağcı et al., 2020; Taşdemir, 2019). However, there is no comparative research on established non-Muslim ethnic minority communities in Turkey. Thus, I will examine whether the attitudes and their correlates are similar or rather different in relation to Syrian refugees and non-Muslim minorities.

1.3.1.2. Positive and negative attitudes

The literature on generalized prejudice focuses on the associations between the attitudes towards different minority groups. However, strong associations do not have to indicate similar negativity, but might also imply similar neutrality or similar positive attitudes towards the various minority groups (Vanbeselaere et al., 2006). Therefore, I examine in Chapter 3 the distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions as the conative aspect of attitudes. According to the positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup relations, positive evaluations may differ from negative ones (Buhl, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000), as these two involve different normative expectations and moralities. For instance, positive attitudes are concerned more with what one should do whereas negative attitudes may beget social concerns about the appropriateness of the attitude and tend to involve what one should not do (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). There are rather few studies that examine positive as well as negative attitudes towards refugees (e.g., Tartakovsky & Walsh, 2016; Thravalou et al., 2020). However, opinion polls indicate that Turkish people can have combinations of both positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees (Erdoğan, 2020), making it relevant to study both. Thus, I will examine whether people differentiate between positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees and whether important correlates of these attitudes differ.

1.3.2. The why question

In order to understand why Turkish people might have positive and/or negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, I will investigate both the correlates of these attitudes and constructs that as mediating mechanisms might account for the associations between these correlates and attitudes. Specifically, I will examine group identifications, endorsement of multiculturalism, frequency of contact, and perceived similarity as key social psychological correlates of attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Besides, I will examine national attachment, perceived threat, and negative emotions as mediators that may explain these associations.

1.3.2.1. Group identifications

First, in Chapter 2 I examine whether national and religious group identifications are associated with feelings towards Syrians refugees residing in Turkey, and towards national non-Muslim minorities. According to the social identity approach, group identification plays an important role in attitudes towards outgroups. People strive for a positive sense of social self and therefore are inclined to have a more favorable view of their ingroup compared to relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Furthermore, individuals with stronger group identification tend to view their ingroup more strongly as a reflection of themselves and will be more strongly committed to and emotionally involved in their group which can result in stronger intergroup bias (Ellemers et al., 2002; Hewstone et al., 2002).

Various studies find that stronger ingroup identification is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Finell et al., 2013; Espinosa et al., 2018). However, according to the social identity approach, people identify with a range of groups and the meaning attached to group identities may differ depending on the intergroup context (Reicher et al., 2010). In order to understand what kind of group identifications are associated with positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees, I will focus on the role of religious and national group identifications.

In one study it was found that a similar religious identity to refugees is associated with lower perception of economic and cultural threats among Muslims in West European countries (De Coninck, 2020b). Yet, studies examining attitudes towards an immigrant population with similar cultural values and beliefs are still scarce. I will examine whether stronger religious group identification is associated with more positive feelings towards Syrian refugees who are also Muslims.

Another important social identity relates to the national ingroup and there are several studies showing that higher national identification is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants, and refugees in particular (e.g. Cowling et al., 2019; Nickerson & Louis, 2008). There is also experimental research revealing that so-called blind patriotism is negatively associated with attitudes towards both refugees and immigrants, especially when the nation was made salient (Finell & Zogmaister, 2015). Yet, according to the social identity approach, the meaning attached to national identities may differ depending on the context (Reicher et al., 2010). In Turkey, there are a few studies that have examined the association between national identification and attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and the findings are contradictory. While one study shows that stronger Turkish national identification is associated with more positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees (Koçak, 2021), another study demonstrates a negative association (Aktaş et al., 2021). In order to contribute to the research on the association between national identification and attitudes towards refugees, I will examine whether stronger Turkish national identification is associated with more positive or rather negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees.

1.3.2.2. Endorsement of multiculturalism

In Chapter 2, I also examine the role of endorsement of multiculturalism as a possible correlate of attitudes towards refugees. Research shows that those who endorse multiculturalism tend to have more positive attitudes towards immigrant groups in western societies (e.g., Whitley & Webster, 2019), and also in non-Western contexts (See et al., 2020) especially when thinking about the broad goals of multiculturalism (Mahfud et al., 2018). As the main goal of multiculturalism is to affirm group identities, to accept outgroup members (Rattan & Ambady, 2013), and to create confidence among people living in a plural society (Berry, 2006), someone who endorses multiculturalist values is likely to be more open to minority outgroups. Research conducted in Turkey showed that the spirituality of the Turkish people – a sense of

closeness to God - was associated with less negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees through the endorsement of multiculturalism and social contact (Koçak, 2021).

This connection with 'spirituality' indicates that the meaning that is attached to multiculturalism in the Turkish context can differ from that in Western countries. The western discourse about multiculturalism can differ from how people in non-western countries understand what multiculturalism means (Guimond et al., 2014; Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2014) and whether it should be practiced in policies and everyday life, and in relation to immigrant groups. However, the endorsement of multiculturalism as a correlate of attitudes towards refugees has hardly been studied in Turkey and, therefore, I will examine whether Turkish citizens who more strongly endorse multiculturalism have more positive feelings towards refugees.

1.3.2.3. Intergroup threat theory

Chapter 3 builds on the second chapter by examining whether the association between national identification with behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees are explained by perceived intergroup threat. According to the group identity lens model, higher identifiers are more likely to see the world through the lens of their group identity (Turner et al., 1987; Verkuyten, 2009a). Further, according to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), feeling part of an ingroup may increase sensitivities about anything that might harm the ingroup. Thus, higher national identification may be associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants, via stronger perceived threats (Badea et al., 2018; Caricati, 2018).

Yet, the majority of the research on the strength of national identification and perceived threat has been conducted in Western countries and generally only focuses on negative attitudes towards outgroups (Landmann et al., 2019; Lee & Fisk, 2006; Rucker et al., 2019). There is little research on relatively more nationalistic non-Western countries like Turkey (Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017). Turkey is a country where people are relatively strongly committed to the Turkish nation and demonstrate strong national pride (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2010). This makes the Syrian refugee issue sensitive, as Turkish people may be concerned about preserving the Turkish culture and identity, especially while hosting Syrian refugees who are perceived by the majority of the Turkish population as competitors and culturally dissimilar (Erdoğan, 2020). Thus, based on the group lens model, I will examine whether perceived symbolic and security threats mediate the expected association between national identification and behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

1.3.2.4. Intergroup emotions

In Chapter 4, I further focus on the association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees by examining whether this threat elicits negative emotions with the related negative action tendencies. According to intergroup threat theory, the

presence of immigrant groups can lead to perceived realistic and symbolic threats. While realistic threat relates to a group's resources, welfare, and power, symbolic threat is concerned with a group's religion, cultural, moral values, and worldview (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Many studies show that both symbolic and realistic threats are associated with more negative attitudes towards minority groups including refugees (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2005; Silva et al., 2018), and with less support for granting refugees asylum (Von Hermanni & Neumann, 2019).

However, most of these studies have not examined threat-related emotions that are likely to be important for understanding why exactly perceived threat is associated with more negative outgroup attitudes. Perceived threat is likely to trigger negative emotional reactions such as feelings of anger, fear, anxiety (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Renfro et al., 2006), resentment, disgust (Mackie et al., 2000), and vulnerability (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992). According to intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2008), intergroup behaviours are driven by these sorts of emotions that are triggered by threatening outgroups. For instance, a study conducted in Germany shows that emotions that are elicited by perceived threats are correlated with more negative attitudes towards refugees (Landmann et al., 2019).

Yet, the associations between perceived threat, emotions, and attitudes are understudied in countries where there is an economic decline, high numbers of refugees, and high perception of competition over resources. In Turkey, there is to my knowledge only one study showing that negative emotions are associated with more prejudices towards Syrian refugees and higher support for policies opposing Syrian refugees (Erişen, 2018). There are no studies in Turkey that examine the mediating role of negative emotions in the association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees. Relying on intergroup emotions theory, I will examine whether higher perceived outgroup threat is associated with more negative emotions and, in turn, with less support for Syrian refugees.

1.3.2.5. Intergroup contact theory and perceived similarity

In Chapter 5, I further examine important correlates of attitudes towards Syrian refugees by considering whether intergroup contact and perceived similarity are associated with social acceptance of these refugees, and if these associations can be explained by reduced threat perceptions. According to intergroup contact theory, in positive contact situations - such as with equal status of groups, intergroup cooperation, common goal, and support from authorities (Allport, 1954) - intergroup contact is especially effective in fostering more positive intergroup attitudes (Dovidio et al., 2011; Pettigrew et al., 2011). There are, for example, studies showing that positive contact is associated with more support for granting rights to asylum seekers in Israel (Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017), and with less negative attitudes towards refugees (De Coninck et al., 2021a; Kotzur et al., 2018). Further, intergroup contact is found to improve attitudes towards refugees among Turks (Özaydın et al., 2021). Still, research examining the role of intergroup contact for positive attitudes is limited

and societal acceptance is not examined as a specific outcome. Hence, relying on intergroup contact theory, I will examine whether higher intergroup contact is associated with higher social acceptance of Syrian refugees.

Not only intergroup contact but also perceived similarity might play a role in outgroup attitudes. Many studies focus on the role of dissimilarity for negative intergroup attitudes (Brown & Lopez, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2003), and according to similarity–attraction theory people are attracted more to similar others as these people confirm their worldview (Montoya et al., 2008). Also, as belief-congruency theory suggests, similarity in beliefs between ingroup and outgroup members trigger more positive intergroup attitudes (Rokeach, 1960). Research that examines perceived similarity in attitudes towards refugees is mostly conducted in western countries where the host societies and refugee groups are typically quite different culturally and especially in terms of religion (De Coninck et al., 2021b). For example, a study conducted in the Netherlands shows that perceived dissimilarity is associated with less positive attitudes towards refugees (Reches & Feddes, 2019), and this has also been found in other countries in relation to attitudes towards immigrants (Ford, 2011; Heath & Richards, 2019; Rodriguez et al., 2017).

To my knowledge, in Turkey, there is only one study that has examined shared Muslim identity as a form of similarity and superordinate identity for both Turkish people and Syrian refugees (Güler et al., 2022). Yet, there is no research that examines the association between perceived similarity, specifically, and attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Considering the cultural proximity between Turkish people and Syrian refugees and their similar religion, perceived similarity may play a role in attitudes towards these refugees. Hence, I will examine whether higher perceived similarity is associated with more positive attitudes and behavioural intentions towards Syrians.

The reasons why intergroup contact and perceived similarities might be associated with attitudes towards Syrian refugees are examined in various studies. For instance, a recent study on intergroup contact revealed that having friends with a migrant background decreases perceived threat and therefore predicts more positive attitudes towards refugees (De Coninck et al., 2021a). Intergroup contact is also associated with less social distance and more positive attitudes towards refugees through lower perceived threat (De Coninck et al., 2021a), and similarly vicarious contact is associated with less social distance through lower intergroup anxiety (Koç & Anderson, 2018). Also, intergroup contact is associated with fewer prejudices towards Syrian refugees through reduced perceived realistic threat (Çırakoğlu & Demirutku, 2020). Yet, the mediating role of symbolic threat in the association between intergroup contact and attitudes towards refugees is little studied in Turkey. Relying on intergroup contact theory, I will examine whether perceived symbolic threat mediates this association.

Furthermore, for intergroup similarity it has been found that higher perceived similarity is associated with lower threat feelings and to more intergroup inter-

actions (West et al., 2014), and that interactions with similar others are associated with less stress than with dissimilar others (Dovidio et al., 2002; Pearson et al., 2008; Trawalter et al., 2009). Yet, it is not clear whether, and what type of, reduced threat mediates the association between perceived similarity and attitudes towards refugees. I will examine the mediating role of symbolic as well as realistic threat in the expected positive association between perceived similarity and favorable attitudes towards refugees.

1.3.3. The when question

Associations between social psychological constructs and intergroup attitudes indicate which factors are relevant and important for understanding these attitudes. But the associations will hardly ever be the same independent of, for example, situations, circumstances, social norms, and perceived intentions of outgroups. For instance, whether people who differ in perceived threats also differ in negative attitudes towards refugees might depend on the level of diversity in their neighbourhood, regional immigration policies, local integration initiatives, the social norms of their community and family members, whether immigrants are considered to want to stay permanently in the country, and how strongly one is concerned about and committed to society. In some contexts, and under some conditions (e.g. high ethnic diversity; assimilation policies; negative social norms) those who perceive higher threat may respond more negatively towards newcomers than in other contexts and conditions (e.g., low ethnic diversity; multicultural policies; positive social norms). There are many possible factors at various levels of analysis that are likely to have an impact on the associations proposed and found. In my research I focus on four intergroup constructs that might play a conditional role in the associations discussed above: national commitment, humanitarian concerns, perceived social norms, and perceived residence intentions. Considering the possible moderating roles of these constructs can improve our understanding of when and for whom negative and positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees are more likely.

1.3.3.1. National commitment

In general, commitment to national values and to Turkish culture is quite strong in Turkey (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2010). Turkish citizens tend to be proud of being a Turk and those who have a stronger sense of belonging and commitment are more focused on national interests and the value of Turkishness. National identification does not only function as a lens for perceiving the world but also as a form of group commitment that determines whether people are more likely to react more strongly towards outgroups (Verkuyten, 2009a). The 'lens' interpretation is in line with self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), while the 'commitment' one corresponds more with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In Chapter 2, I examine whether the association between the endorsement of multiculturalism and attitudes towards refugees depends on how strongly people feel committed to

the Turkish nation. This allows me to consider whether the role of endorsement of multiculturalism in the acceptance of newcomers differs for higher and lower national identifiers which contributes to the research that tries to understand for whom multiculturalism is related to positive or negative outgroup attitudes (Whitley & Webster, 2019). Various studies show that multiculturalism can be considered a source of threat to the status and self-defining values of the majority group (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Verkuyten, 2005), but other studies find that multiculturalism is associated with more positive outgroup attitudes (Berry, 2006; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). One possible reason for these different findings is that the participants in these different studies might differ in their sense of national belonging and commitment. I will therefore investigate whether the association between endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings towards refugees depend on the strength of Turkish national commitment.

1.3.3.2. Humanitarian concerns

The situation of refugees is often described and interpreted as a humanitarian crisis and research has shown that people who emphasize humanitarian concerns more, also tend to have more positive attitudes towards outgroups (McFarland et al., 2012). A stronger endorsement of humanitarian values appears to be an important reason for a more supportive and welcoming attitude. Additionally, a stronger endorsement of humanitarianism might interfere with the tendency of perceived threat to be associated with more exclusionary and rejecting attitudes towards refugees. In Chapter 3, I therefore examine the moderating role of endorsement of humanitarian concerns in the association between perceived threats and positive and negative behavioural intentions towards refugees.

According to the common ingroup identity model (CIIM), people may feel part of an overarching category which reduces intergroup bias and conflict (Gaertner et al., 1989; Gaertner et al.,1993). For example, people might identify with a superordinate human category with implies that outgroup members are perceived as similar human beings with the related moral responsibility to help them (Nickerson & Louis, 2008). Some studies show that identification with humanity is associated with less support for collective action against refugees (Hasbun-Lopez, et al. 2019), and more support to help refugees through feelings of compassion and a sense of moral obligation (Bassett & Cleveland, 2019). Yet, these studies do not investigate the moderating role of the human level of identity and the important possibility that the endorsement of humanitarian concerns makes that perceived outgroup threats are less likely to be translated into negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Therefore, I will examine this possible moderating role of endorsement of humanitarian concerns in the associations between perceived threats and positive and negative behavioural intentions.

1.3.3.3. Descriptive norms

In Chapter 4, I further examine the conditional relevance of perceptions of threat for attitudes towards Syrian refugees by considering the role of descriptive norms. According to group norms theory, descriptive norms describe the common or *norm*al actions of significant others and thereby indicate what is appropriate or effective (Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini et al., 1991; White et al., 2009). Some studies demonstrate the role of intolerant social norms on negative attitudes towards minorities and immigrants (Visintin et al., 2020), as well as the role of hateful comments on donation behaviour towards refugees (Ziegele et al., 2018) and asylum-seekers (Louis et al., 2007). However, there is to my knowledge no research on the role of descriptive norms conducted in Turkey as a society with relatively strong communal and family ties that are typical for a more collectivistic culture (Mango, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002). Considering the strong emphasis on the importance of close social relations in Turkey, I will therefore examine whether the association between perceived threat and feelings towards Syrian refugees depends on negative descriptive norms of significant others such as family members and friends.

1.3.3.4. Perception of temporary and permanent settlement of Syrian refugees

Finally, I examine in Chapter 5 whether the perception of Syrian refugee settlement matters for the association between intergroup threat and the social acceptance of these refugees. The settlement of Syrian refugees is a topic of societal debate with some Turkish people claiming that they will settle permanently in Turkey and others thinking that they will be temporarily located in the country (Erdoğan, 2020). It is likely that if Syrian refugees are considered permanent settlers they are more easily seen as long-term competitors for scarce resources as well as exerting more influence on the Turkish culture and society. Further, research shows that the associations between perceived similarity and positive attitudes towards outgroups depend on the competitive context that ingroup members experience (Brown, 1984, Gaertner et al., 1989; Gonzales & Brown, 2003; Grant, 1993). A more competitive context might trigger more negative attitudes towards outgroups (Blalock, 1967; Brown, 1984; Schuleter & Scheepers, 2010).

The high numbers of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the economic situation of Turkey and Turkish citizens' perception of Syrian refugee settlement as permanent or temporary make it relevant to study the possible moderating role of settlement perceptions. Thus, I examine whether perceived threat is more strongly associated with less social acceptance of Syrian refugees when these refugees are considered to stay permanently rather than temporary in the country.

1.4. EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS

In order to understand the positive and negative attitudes of Turkish people towards Syrian refugees, I conducted four empirical studies which are presented in Chapters

2 to 5 (for an overview, see Table 1.1). The three questions relating to the "what, why, and when" of the attitudes of Turkish people are examined in these chapters. The first question concerns the variation in attitudes: "Are feelings towards refugees target-specific or do they reflect general minority group attitudes and can a distinction be made between positive and negative attitudes?" (RQ1). The second question is "why do people have positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees?" (RQ2), and the third question is "when do the examined constructs show a stronger or weaker association with people's attitudes towards Syrian refugees?" (RQ3).

In Chapter 2, I examine attitudes towards Syrian refugees by comparing the feelings and correlates of these feelings towards Syrians and established minorities of Turkey: Jews, Armenians, and Greeks (RQ1). In doing so I investigate whether national and religious identifications are similarly associated with feelings towards refugees and towards these non-Muslim minorities (RQ2). I also investigate whether the strength of national commitment weakens or strengthens the association between endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings towards Syrian refugees and non-Muslims (RQ3).

Having found that national identification predicts more negative feelings towards refugees in Chapter 2, I investigate in Chapter 3 whether perceived threat explains this association (RQ2). Also, I examine whether endorsement of humanitarian concerns weakens or strengthens the association between national identification and positive and negative behavioural intentions (RQ3). By doing so, I further investigate the nature of attitudes towards Syrian refugees by comparing feelings towards them with the feelings towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey (RQ1), and whether there is a difference in the related correlates of positive and negative behavioural intentions (RQ2).

Chapter 3 shows that there is an empirical distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions, and in contrast to the large literature examining negative attitudes, I therefore focus on positive behavioural intentions in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, I investigate whether negative emotions explain why perceived threat is associated with lower behavioural support for Syrian refugees (RQ2). Also in Chapter 4, I examine whether descriptive norms strengthen the association between perceived threat and negative emotions (RQ3). In addition, I examine whether negative emotions explain why norms are associated with support for Syrian refugees (RQ2), and whether the association between norms and support for Syrian refugees depends on negative emotions (RQ3).

Table 1.1. Overview of the empirical studies for each chapter

Chapters	Research questions	Dependent variable	Sample
2	Is there a difference in the feelings and the correlates towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities (RQ1)? Are national and religious identifications, and endorsement of multiculturalism associated with feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities (RQ2), and does the association between endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings depend on the strength of national commitment (RQ3)?	Feelings towards Syrian refugees and non-Muslim communities	Survey (*N*=605)
3	Do people differentiate between positive and negative behavioural intentions (RQ1)? To what extent is national identification associated with positive and negative behavioural intentions (RQ2), can these associations be accounted for by perceived threat (RQ2), and do the associations depend on the endorsement of humanitarian concerns (RQ3)?	Positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees	Survey (*N*=605)
4	To what extent is perceived threat associated with support for Syrian refugees and can this association be accounted for by negative emotions (RQ2), and does it depend on descriptive norms (RQ3)? Are norms associated with support for Syrian refugees and does this association depend on negative emotions (RQ3)?	Support for Syrian refugees	Survey (*N*=605)
5	To what extent are intergroup contact and perceived similarity associated with social acceptance, can these associations be accounted for by perceived threat (RQ2), and does the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance depend on settlement perception (RQ3)?	Social acceptance of Syrian refugees (Study 1)	Survey (*N*=605) (Study 1)
		Helping intentions towards Syrian refugees, support for Syrian refugees' integration, and social acceptance of Syrian refugees (Study 2)	Survey (*N*=2564) (Study 2)
		Social acceptance of Syrian refugees (Study 3)	Survey (*N*=1949) (Study 3)

In Chapter 5, I present 3 studies. The first one investigates whether lower perceived threat statistically explains why intergroup contact is associated with social acceptance of Syrian refugees (RQ2). In the second study I investigate whether lower perceived threat explains why perceived similarity is associated with social acceptance, support for Syrian refugees' integration, and actual helping intentions (RQ2). In Study 3 I investigate whether perceived similarity is associated with more social acceptance via lower threat when Turkish citizens perceive Syrian refugees as temporary rather than permanent residents (RQ3). Also, Chapter 5 examines the correlates of Turkish people's social acceptance. While in Study 1, social acceptance - similar to positive behavioural intentions in Chapter 3 - refers to giving support and help to Syrian refugees as well as accepting them into one's wider social circle, in Studies 2 and 3 it relates to Turkish people' acceptance of Syrian refugees into their more private circles.

The data that I use in this dissertation are from surveys among self-identified Turkish adult citizens. The findings in Chapters 2 to 4 are based on a survey that we developed and for which the data have been collected by the research company 'Optimar' among 605 Turkish citizens. A two-stage cluster sampling method was used from six cities in Turkey that vary in terms of the ratio of the Syrian population. In Chapter 5, I additionally used national data collected by research company Konda with 2564 respondents as well as a survey conducted by Anar with 1949 respondents.

1.5. INSIGHTS

1.5.1. The what question

In Chapter 2, I examined the nature of feelings towards Syrian refugees by comparing these with the feelings towards the established minorities of Turkey: Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. The findings show that feelings towards refugees and these non-Muslim groups are negative and quite similar. Yet the feelings towards non-Muslims are slightly more negative than feelings towards refugees. Further, the associations between the feelings towards non-Muslim groups and Syrian (Muslim) refugees are substantial but not fully similar, because they share not more than 50% of the variance. This implies that the feelings towards Syrian refugees and towards the non-Muslim groups are connected but (in part) also empirically distinct. Additionally, both feelings differed in their associations with group identifications. While national identification was negatively associated particularly with feelings towards Syrian (Muslim) refugees, religious identification was negatively associated particularly with feelings towards non-Muslim minorities. These results show that Turkish people tend to make an intergroup distinction based on their social identities, namely national and religious. Overall, these findings further suggest that the attitudes towards refugees and established minority groups are connected but not fully similar: they are both negative but the processes behind these attitudes

appear to differ with different social identities playing somewhat different roles with respect to feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities.

I also investigated whether there is a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions. Findings in Chapter 3 show that Turkish people do indeed make such a distinction and suggest that the processes behind positive and negative behavioural intentions are distinct. For Turkish citizens who more strongly endorse humanitarian concerns perceived threat was translated into less negative behavioural intentions. However, interestingly, when endorsement of humanitarian concern was strong, perceived threat was associated with less positive behavioural intentions. These findings imply that there is a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

1.5.2. The why question

After finding out that higher national identification is associated with more negative feelings towards Syrian refugees in Chapter 2, I investigate whether it is also associated with behavioural intentions, and if so why. The study conducted in Chapter 3 revealed that stronger national identification was associated with more perceived threat and in return with more negative and less positive behavioural intentions. This indicates that Turkish people who have stronger national identification have a stronger tendency to perceive Syrian refugees as a threat which can translate into more negative and less positive behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

Chapter 4 shows that perceived threat was associated with negative emotions such as fear, anger, anxiety, and disgust, which, in turn, were associated with lower support for Syrian refugees' rights. This suggests that Turkish people's perception of Syrian refugees as spreading diseases, harming the Turkish economy, and threatening societal values are translated into negative emotions, but these emotions only partly explained why perceived threat was associated with attitudes towards Syrian refugees. This indicates that there are other factors that account for the association between perceived threat and attitudes towards Syrian refugees.

In order to find out which factors are important for positive feelings towards refugees, I examined whether intergroup contact and perceived similarity were associated with higher social acceptance of Syrian refugees (accepting Syrian refugees into their private sphere such as sharing the same table with them, becoming friends with them and adding them as a friend on social media). The first study of Chapter 5 revealed that intergroup contact between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees was associated with higher social acceptance of Syrian refugees through reduced symbolic threat. The second study of Chapter 5 showed that perceived similarity predicted not only social acceptance and support for Syrians' societal integration but also self-reported actual behaviour, namely helping Syrian refugees. In addition, perceived realistic and symbolic threats accounted for the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance. These three studies indicate that those who have more frequent contact and who perceive Syrian refugees as

culturally more similar tend to experience less threat from Syrian refugees and therefore tend to accept Syrian refugees more into their private sphere. Thus, even in a country with a fragile economy and very high numbers of Syrian refugees, intergroup contact, as well as perceived similarity, are associated with more social acceptance through reduced perceived threat.

1.5.3. The when question

Asking the 'why' question is important in understanding which relevant constructs are associated with positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Yet, it is also important to ask when these associations are weaker or stronger. For instance, findings in Chapter 2 show that endorsement of multiculturalism is associated with more positive feelings towards refugees, but only for Turks with a relatively low national commitment. This implies that endorsement of multiculturalism does not always foster more positive attitudes towards refugees but rather depends on the strength of national commitment of Turkish citizens. Additionally, high identifiers may be more sensitive about their national culture and might perceive endorsement of multiculturalism as a threat to the national culture and identity.

Furthermore, Chapter 3 shows that for Turkish citizens who more strongly endorsed humanitarian concerns, perceived threat was less strongly associated with negative behavioural intentions. However, interestingly, when endorsement of humanitarian concerns was strong, national identification was more strongly associated with positive behavioural intentions through perceived threat, than with negative behavioural intentions. This suggests that in a context of perceived threat, endorsement of humanitarian concerns may backfire and that the moderating role of the endorsement of humanitarian concerns may work out differently for positive and negative behavioural intentions.

Additionally, in Chapter 3 I found that perceived threat was associated with less support for Syrian refugees, but in Chapter 4 this association was found to depend on perceived descriptive norms. For Turkish citizens who think that their friends and family members do not support Syrian refugees (negative descriptive norms), perceived threat was more strongly associated with negative emotions and, in turn, with less support for Syrian refugees' rights. Furthermore, descriptive norms were not directly associated with negative emotions but moderate the association between perceived threat and negative emotions. This suggests that one's perceived threat from Syrian refugees is confirmed and validated by the perception that one's family and friends think the same, resulting in perceived threat being translated into more negative emotions towards Syrian refugees, and negative emotions being translated into less support for Syrian refugees.

In Chapter 5, I examined whether Turkish people's perception of Syrian refugee settlement weakens or strengthens the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance. The findings show that those who think that Syrian refugees will permanently stay in Turkey perceive Syrian refugees as less similar

to themselves, experience more threat, and accept Syrian refugees less to their social circles. This suggests that Turkish citizens who perceive Syrian refugees as permanent settlers in Turkey see them more strongly as competitors. Further, the indirect association of perceived similarity with social acceptance through perceived threat was stronger for Turkish citizens who think that Syrians will stay in Turkey temporarily. This implies that for temporary perceivers, perceived similarity matters more for reducing perceived threat, and threat matters more for social acceptance of Syrian refugees compared to the Turkish citizens who think Syrian refugees will stay in Turkey permanently.

1.6. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

My dissertation is one of the very first that has tried to provide a broad-ranging social psychological understanding of the positive and negative attitudes that Turkish people have towards Syrian refugees. The empirical chapters have made a much-needed contribution to the very limited research in Turkey, and to the literature on attitudes towards refugees more generally. However, as with all research, there are also some limitations that should be acknowledged and that provide directions for future research. Here I will briefly discuss three general issues. More specific limitations of the various studies and analyses are discussed in the different empirical chapters.

First, data for the four studies are based on surveys which has various strengths such as relatively large samples and suggesting plausible directions of influence as well as being able to examine the role of various possible correlates, mechanisms and conditions in attitudes towards refugees. The directions of influence that are tested were all theoretically based and in line with both experimental and other empirical research. Yet, using survey data has obvious limitations. For instance, it is not possible to make inferences about the Turkish population as most of the data (but see Chapter 5) is not based on random sampling but on a two-stage clustering method. Future studies could collect more representative data of the Turkish population. Furthermore, political ideology, educational and income level, region and various other demographic and sociological features were not considered. Future studies could include this sort of factors in the analyses and survey design, and examine their role in understanding Turkish attitudes towards Syrian refugees (e.g., Adam-Troian & Bağcı, 2021; Bağcı, et al. 2020; Koçak, 2021). In addition, experimental and longitudinal designs could further test the findings in this dissertation, in particular to develop a better understanding of the – probably – various mutual directions of influence.

Second, this dissertation is based on the perceptions of Turkish people and I did not examine the perceptions of Syrian refugees, and also not the possible role of local circumstances such as neighbourhood, city, or region. Future studies could examine Syrian refugees' perspectives and attitudes and use multilevel research

for examining situational features and their importance for intergroup relations between Turkish people and Syrian refugees. For example, differences in Turkish attitudes towards Syrian refugees at the neighbourhood or regional level could be investigated (Crawley et al., 2013; Gregurovic et al., 2019). In addition, cross-national comparisons between the Turkish context and similar non-western, as well as western, contexts could be made in order to assess how specific the Turkish context is for understanding positive and negative attitudes towards refugees, and Syrian refugees in particular.

Third, the literature on generalized vs. target-specific prejudice, the positive-negative asymmetry, the social identity approach, intergroup threat theory, intergroup contact theory, and group emotions theory are used in this dissertation. The main reason for using multiple theoretical frameworks is to try to provide a broad-ranging social psychological understanding of Turkish people's positive and negative attitudes towards Syrian refugees. My focus is on trying to understand these attitudes and not on systematically testing a particular theoretical proposition or single model.

Furthermore, these theoretical frameworks not only propose different roles for various constructs but also for the same construct, and this is reflected in my dissertation. For example, group identification, and also perceived threats, multiculturalism and social norms, are conceptualized in the literature on outgroup attitudes as predictors, mediators and moderators. For instance, group identification can function as a group lens determining perceptions and feelings (Turner et al., 1987), but also as a factor that makes people less or more sensitive and responsive to threatening circumstances (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Similarly, the literature indicates that the endorsement of multiculturalism can be directly associated with outgroup attitudes, can play a mediating role, and that its relevance for outgroup attitudes also depends on the degree of national commitment (Whitley & Webster, 2019). These different conceptualizations and empirical findings indicate that specific social psychological constructs can work out in various ways and can play different roles for people's attitudes. Higher group identification affects not only how one looks at the social world, but is also dependent on the intergroup setting, and further determines how one responds to specific situations.

Future research could also consider additional social psychological constructs and theoretical approaches that may further improve our understanding. Specifically, constructs such as social dominance orientation, open-mindedness, and authoritarianism might also be important for Turkish attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Thus, future research can consider these and other constructs to further investigate the diverse and complex ways in which Turkish people react to Syrian refugees and when and why these reactions are less or more positive.

1.6.1. Policy implications

The findings of this dissertation hopefully provide relevant input and even suggestions for public debates and policies in Turkey. First, this dissertation shows that although attitudes towards non-Muslim minorities and refugees are quite similar, the processes in the formation of these attitudes seem to be partly different as different group identifications - such as religious and national identifications - play different roles in these attitudes. Therefore, policies that aim to improve negative attitudes towards refugees will probably not simply transfer to improved attitudes towards non-Muslim minorities, and vice versa. Furthermore, Turkish people tend to make an intergroup distinction between "Turks" and "refugees" when they identify strongly with their national identity. In order to reduce the negative outcomes of this distinction – such as intergroup bias - policymakers may try to promote policies that aim to acknowledge cultural diversity and emphasize multiculturalism within a common Turkish nation. Yet, as this dissertation shows, endorsement of multiculturalism is associated with more positive feelings towards refugees only for lower national identifiers. For higher national identifiers, policymakers might take into consideration the possibility that emphasizing the positive aspects of cultural diversity and multiculturalism may not contribute to positive feelings towards refugees. Therefore, they may need to reassure higher identifiers that living together with refugees will not pose a threat to the Turkish people's national identity and to the country's unity.

Second, in order to reduce perceived threats from Syrian refugees, policymakers may want to try to foster a sense of commonality such as shared humanity that embraces both refugees and Turkish people. This dissertation shows that the endorsement of humanitarian concerns weakens the association between perceived threat and negative behavioural intentions. Additionally, the findings indicate that a factor that weakens negative attitudes does not necessarily mean that it also strengthens positive attitudes. In fact, endorsement of humanitarian concerns did not weaken the association between lower perceived threat and positive behavioural intentions, probably because positive behaviour requires more personal effort or investment. Besides, policymakers could take into consideration the positive-negative asymmetry and the different processes behind positive and negative attitudes, which means that a policy that aims to reduce negative attitudes does not lead to more positive behavioural intentions towards refugees.

Third, this dissertation shows that positive social norms are associated with more positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees, but this association depends on negative emotions. For this reason, in order for positive norms such as "We should be helping Syrian refugees" to be effective, policymakers could try to reduce negative emotions towards Syrian refugees, such as anger, fear, disgust, or anxiety. One way to do so is to reduce perceived threats about Syrian refugees, for example, by trying to question and challenge stereotypical perceptions of refugees spreading diseases, increasing the unemployment rate, or changing cultural values in Turkey.

Furthermore, this dissertation shows that perceived threat is translated into more negative emotions when there are strong negative social norms. Therefore, it seems important that these norms are addressed and replaced by more positive norms, for example, by presenting and discussing Syrian refugees as contributing to the Turkish society rather than posing a threat.

Lastly, this dissertation shows that perceived similarity is associated with more social acceptance, but less so in a competitive context. If people think that refugees will stay in Turkey permanently, they are likely to perceive more competition which may hamper the positive role of perceived similarity for social acceptance of refugees. Therefore, it seems important to be open and clear about the fact that a certain proportion of refugees is likely to stay in Turkey permanently, and in view of this, it is important to create policies that emphasize the ways in which Syrian refugees can make different and valuable contributions to Turkish society and its economy and culture. This is not only important in the context of Turkey but probably also in other national contexts that are faced with the question of how to accommodate increasing numbers of refuges that will settle permanently in the country.

CHAPTER 2

Comparing feelings towards Syrian refugees and non-Muslim minorities[1]

1 The data and related statistical syntax used in that chapter are stored in the faculty storage facility. A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Yitmen, Ş. & Verkuyten, M. (2017). Feelings towards refugees in Turkey: The roles of national and religious identifications, and multiculturalism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 48,* 90-100. Şenay Yitmen co-designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Maykel Verkuyten was involved in the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Worldwide there are currently some 21 million refugees who predominantly have fled to and live in neighbouring countries (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2022d). Hosting large numbers of refugees is a major challenge for receiving societies. It raises important political and policy questions and leads to strong public debates. Some sections of the public are likely to resist the accommodation of refugees, while other sections of the population will tend to support and help refugees to settle in. Various social psychological factors might underlie these individual differences such as intergroup contact (e.g., Cameron et al., 2006), perceived symbolic and realistic threat (e.g., Landmann et al., 2019; McKay et al., 2012), and shared humanity (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008). For example, authoritarian beliefs and perceptions of symbolic and realistic threats might drive unfavourable attitudes towards refugees (Murray & Marx, 2013; Nickerson & Louis, 2008; Schweitzer et al., 2005), whereas equality beliefs and the endorsement of cultural diversity might underlie more favourable attitudes (Anderson et al., 2015; Perry et al., 2015).

The arrival of a great number of refugees implies increasing cultural diversity and social psychological research has examined the intergroup consequences of ethnic, racial, and religious diversity in terms of social categorization processes (Dovidio et al., 2009), group identifications (Verkuyten, 2006), and diversity ideologies (Plaut, 2010). The social identity perspective provides a coherent theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of group identification and ideological beliefs in intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Based on this perspective, the current study examines among self-identified Turkish citizens the associations between feelings towards refugees with national and religious group identification and the endorsement of multiculturalism (Morrison et al., 2010; Quezada et al., 2012). In so doing, we want to make a contribution to the scarce literature on attitudes towards refugees and to the social psychological research on multiculturalism that predominantly has been conducted in North America and Western Europe (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Guimond et al., 2014; Whitley, 2016).

For understanding the nature of Turkish people's feelings towards refugees we make a comparison with their feelings towards national minority groups in Turkey. The reason is that feelings towards refugees might be specific or rather reflect more general feelings towards minority groups. Therefore, we compared the feelings towards refugees with those towards the three officially recognized non-Muslim minority groups in Turkey, namely the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians (Türkmen & Öktem, 2013).

2.1.1. Group identifications

Social identity theory argues that individuals tend to show intergroup bias in which they favor ingroup members over outgroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social

identities are defined in comparative terms and groups that differ on a particular categorization dimension (e.g., religion, ethnicity, nationality) are appropriate outgroups. Intergroup bias occurs within a specific category and in relation to a specific comparison group (e.g., nationals vs. non-nationals; religious vs. non-religious). Bias is especially likely for higher ingroup identifiers who view their group as an important reflection of the self and therefore are motivated to think and act in their group's best interest. And under conditions of perceived outgroup threat, group identifiers tend to show not only ingroup positivity but also outgroup negativity. There is a substantial body of research in support of this theoretical reasoning (see Ellemers et al., 2002; Hewstone, et al., 2002). Group members who more strongly identify with their ingroup are more likely to have negative attitudes towards relevant and threatening outgroups.

While some parts of the Turkish society are supportive towards Syrian refugees (Erdoğan, 2015; European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI], 2011; Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016), there also are intergroup tensions in communities hosting Syrian refugees (İdiz, 2015; Özden, 2013; Yalçın, 2014). Public surveys indicate that Syrians are often seen as a symbolic and realistic threat to the country (Orhan, 2014; Özden, 2013), and 86% of the Turkish people want the government to stop the intake of refugees and 30% support the view that refugees should be sent back to their home country (The Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies, 2014). Therefore, it can be expected that stronger national identification is associated with more negative attitudes towards non-national Syrian refugees, but not necessarily towards the established national minority g roups.

Research on the worldview-conflict and religious values conflict proposition demonstrates that dissimilar values, beliefs, and morals between groups contribute to outgroup rejection (Brandt et al., 2015; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). People seek to affirm the validity of their own beliefs and worldviews and therefore tend to reject groups whose beliefs and worldviews are dissimilar to their own. This has been found among individuals high and low on measures of religious identity (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017), but the rejection is stronger among those with stronger religious group identification. This leads to the hypothesis that higher Muslim identifiers will be more negative towards non-Muslim national minorities but not towards Muslim refugees.

Additionally, we explored whether the interaction between national identification and religious group identification predicts outgroup attitudes. Research on social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002) has shown that the combination of relatively strong ethnic and strong religious group identifications implies a simplified or exclusive identity structure that is related to less positive outgroup attitudes (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). Individuals with a relatively simplified structure perceive a strong overlap and interrelation among their identities which strengthens the distancing from outgroup members and increases the cognitive basis of ingroup bias (Brewer & Pierce, 2005).

2.1.2. Multiculturalism

Social identity theory emphasized from the start the role of ideological beliefs in relation to minority groups (Tajfel, 1978, 1981). The theory argues that an account of intergroup relations needs to examine the beliefs that people use "to make sense of, explain, justify, and rationalize their intergroup relations" (Turner & Reynolds, 2001, p. 147). Multicultural ideology is about group identities and intergroup relations and research has examined its intergroup consequences from a social identity perspective (e.g., Verkuyten, 2006). Yet, multiculturalism is a difficult and controversial issue and there are various understandings. In general, multiculturalism views cultural groups as a valuable source of difference between people which should not be ignored but rather celebrated (Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Multiculturalism combines the recognition of minority identities with the advancement of intergroup equality (Hahn et al., 2015), but there are country differences in the specific forms that multiculturalism takes (Guimond et al., 2014; Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2014).

In Turkey, multiculturalism is typically discussed with regard to the rights of the Kurds (Keyman, 2012; Özkırımlı, 2014) and of non-Muslim minority communities (Heper, 2007; Kaya, 2013). Furthermore, there is increased discussion about the equal rights of Syrian refugees in relation to employment, education, and cultural practices (Kirişçi, 2014). According to a survey research, 64% of the Turkish people agrees that cultural minorities in Turkey should be able to maintain their own traditions, and 70% indicates that newcomers should adapt to the majority's culture but should also be able to maintain their heritage culture (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2013). Majority members endorsing multiculturalism tend to be more accepting and positive towards minority outgroups (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Whitley, 2016, for reviews). Thus, we expected stronger endorsement of multiculturalism to be associated with more positive feelings towards both Syrian refugees and non-Muslim national minority groups. Yet, these expected associations are likely to differ for lower and higher national identifiers and for lower and higher religious identifiers.

Research has demonstrated that majority group members can perceive multiculturalism as a source of threat to their own values and dominant position (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Verkuyten, 2005). High ingroup identifiers are more likely to show group-level responses relative to the responses of low identifiers, especially under conditions of threat (Ellemers et al., 2002; Hewstone et al., 2002). For example, highly identified majority group members have been found to support hierarchical intergroup relations more when their perceived ingroup's interests, status, or core values are threatened (Morrison & Ybarra, 2009; Morrison et al., 2009). Multiculturalism calls for a more equal and culturally heterogeneous society and this might be threatening or relatively high national and high religious majority group identifiers (Morrison et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2005). Furthermore, in Turkey higher compared to lower national identifiers are more concerned about state unity and anything that might undermine this unity, such as minority cultural demands (Bilali, 2014; Çelebi,

et al., 2014). Additionally, for many Turkish people, there is a very strong association between Muslim group identification and Turkish identity (e.g., Bilali, 2014; Çelebi, et al., 2015). This means that for higher national identifiers and for higher religious identifiers, multiculturalism might not have beneficial effects on outgroups and thus is not associated with more positive feelings towards refugees and minority outgroups. In contrast, for lower national identifiers and for lower religious identifiers, stronger endorsement of multiculturalism can be expected to be associated with more positive outgroup feelings. Thus, we predicted that stronger support for diversity and preserving cultural identities (multiculturalism) will be relevant for feelings towards Syrian refugees and non-Muslim minorities for lower national identifiers and for lower religious identifiers, but not for higher national identifiers and higher religious identifiers.

2.1.3. Refugees and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey

For years, Turkey has been an attractive route for refugees and asylum-seekers who escaped conflicts and wars in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has declared an open-door policy for these refugees and provides them temporary protection since April 2011 (Krajeski, 2012). Currently, there are around 3.7 million Syrian refugees in the country, making Turkey the largest host of Syrian refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2022d). However, Turkey does not grant Syrians a refugee status which would imply legal rights (Başak, 2011). Turkey follows an open-door policy and for humanitarian reasons accepts Syrian refugees as guests upon their arrival (Orhan, 2014). Syrian refugees receive temporary protection status by which they are not required to get a visa to come to Turkey and will not be deported to Syria (Krajeski, 2012). Yet, these people are referred to as refugees in the media, in daily conversations, and in politics. It is estimated that no more than 1.5% of the Syrian refugees live in refugee camps and the others live in almost all the cities of Turkey (Erdoğan, 2022).

Public opinion research shows that the reactions of Turkish people towards Syrian refugees vary (Erdoğan, 2015; Orhan, 2014; Özden, 2013). Some studies indicate that Turkish people think that accepting Syrian refugees is a humanitarian duty (Erdoğan, 2015) and that some Turkish people have positive attitudes towards refugees (Erdoğan, 2015; ECRI, 2011; Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016). However, refugees themselves do not only indicate that they are thankful for the support and hospitality that they receive from Turkish people (International Crisis Group, 2016; Kocalar, 2017), but also report facing aggression, hostility, and a failure to take account of their specific needs (ECRI, 2011).

In order to understand the feelings of Turkish people towards (Syrian) refugees who are predominantly Muslim, we make a comparison with the feelings towards Greeks, Jews, and Armenians as the three main established non-Muslim minority communities of Turkey. According to the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, these three communities are the only officially recognized minority groups in Turkey (Türkmen & Öktem, 2013) and we used these target groups to be able to determine whether Turk-

ish people's feelings towards Syrian refugees are specific or rather more reflective of general minority feelings. Furthermore, multiculturalism in Turkey is discussed in relation to the rights of the non-Muslim minorities (Heper, 2007; Kaya, 2013) which makes it interesting to also focus on these minority communities. Since we focus on non-Muslim minorities and because the Kurdish question in Turkey is politically sensitive, we did not ask people about their feelings towards Kurds.

Examining the feelings towards Greeks, Jews, and Armenians allow us to assess whether the outgroup feelings are specific towards refugees or rather more general towards minority groups. It is possible that established minority groups living in Turkey elicit similar outgroup feelings, but it might also be the case that the feelings towards refugees differ. For example, familiarity with established minority groups due to mass media and actual contacts with these groups might make the feelings of Turkish people towards these groups more positive than towards refugees (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Moreover, this comparison allows us to examine whether similar processes of group identification are involved in the feelings towards refugees and minority communities. More specifically, Turks with relatively high national identification might be less positive towards non-Turkish refugees than towards established Greek, Armenian, and Jewish Turkish communities. In contrast, Turks with relatively strong Muslim group identification might be more positive towards Muslim refugees than towards the non-Muslim minority communities in Turkey. In addition, the endorsement of multiculturalism might differ in its importance for the feelings towards refugees and national minority groups that have a history of living in Turkey.

2.1.4. To summarize

Using survey data among a relatively large sample of Turkish people we will first examine to what extent feelings towards the predominantly Muslim refugees in Turkey are similar or different from the feelings towards the non-Muslim Greek, Armenian, and Jewish national minorities of Turkey. Second, we investigate whether the feelings towards refugees are related to national and religious group identifications and to the endorsement of multiculturalism and whether these associations are similar to the feelings towards the non-Muslim national minorities. Third, we examine whether the associations between the endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities are moderated by national or religious group identifications.

In our statistical analyses, we will control for regular demographic characteristics that might be associated with the different constructs and therefore might be responsible for the associations found. Specifically, we considered age, gender, ethnic group, and city, whereby the latter served as a proxy for the opportunity of intergroup contact with Syrian refugees. Intergroup contact is important to consider because it has been found to be associated with outgroup feelings (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Contact can be positive but also negative and therefore can result in

more positive or rather more negative attitudes (Graf et al., 2014). Thus, those who live in the cities where there is a relatively high number of Syrian refugees might have more positive or more negative feelings towards Syrian refugees because they have more opportunities for positive and negative contact.

2.2. METHOD

2.2.1. Participants

The study was conducted by the research company Optimar in May and June 2015 among 605 Turkish Muslim participants between 18 and 81 years of age (M = 39.6, SD = 14.4). The addresses of the participants were selected by the Turkish Statistical Institute from six cities in Turkey. There are seven regions in Turkey and the selected cities are the largest ones of the four regions that vary in the ratio of the Syrian population. The data are from community samples gathered by a two-stage clustering method. The first stage involved clusters that were composed of 100 addresses that were selected by applying probability proportional to size by taking into account the sample size and the number of addresses in each cluster. In the second stage, 10 addresses were selected by systematic sampling from each cluster in the sample. The respondents came from Istanbul (33.4% of participants), Antalya (22.3%), Gaziantep (13.7%), Adana (13.4%), Samsun (8.9%), and Kilis (8.3%). These cities differ in the ratio of the Syrian refugee population with Samsun and Antalya having a relatively low number of Syrian refugees (0.1% and 0.5%, respectively), Adana and Istanbul having a somewhat higher ratio of Syrian refugees (2.5% and 2.6%, respectively), and Gaziantep and Kilis having a relatively high number of Syrian refugees (14% and 41%, respectively) (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2017; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006). Of the participants, 43.6% were male and 56.4% were female. Furthermore, 87.6% self-identified as Turks, 6.9% as Kurds, 1.5% as Arabs, 0.8% as Zaza, and 3.1% was from other ethnic groups. The respondents participated in the survey voluntarily and after providing informed consent and a survey-taker administered the paper-and-pencil questionnaires in the houses of the participants. It took about 20–25 min to complete the questionnaire.

2.2.2. Measures

Outgroup feelings were measured with the well-known feeling thermometer that has been validated and used in many studies (e.g., Cairns et al., 2006; Verkuyten, 2005). The respondents were asked to indicate their feelings towards the different minority groups on a scale from 0 to 100. The introduction was:

Please use the feeling thermometer to indicate whether you have positive or negative feelings towards the Syrian refugees, the non-Muslim communities of Turkey (Greeks, Jews, and Armenians), and the refugees in Turkey other than Syrians. While 50 degrees represent neutral feelings, markings above 50 represent positive or warm feelings and markings below 50 represent cold or negative feelings.

Religious group identification was measured with three items that reflect the importance of religion for Turkish national identity: "I strongly identify with people of my religion", "My religion gives me the feeling that I am a member of the Turkish state", "My religion is what keeps Turkey united". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* and 5 = *certainly agree*). An average score of these items was computed (α = .85).

National identification was measured by three items that focus on Turkish citizenship and that have been used in previous studies (e.g., Çelebi et al., 2014; Verkuyten & Yıldız, 2007): "I am proud to be a citizen of Turkey", "Being a citizen of Turkey is an important part of who I am", "I strongly feel that I am a citizen of Turkey". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* to 5 = *certainly agree*). An average score of these items was computed (α = .91).

Table 2.1. Percentages, mean scores, and standard deviations for the thermometer ratings of the five outgroups

	Thermometer Ratings						
Outgroups	**0**	**10-40**	**50**	**60-90**	**100**	***M***	***SD***
Greeks	34.2%	30.2%	19.1%	13.9%	2.5%	27.8[a]	27.7
Jews	41.8%	34.5%	13.6%	8.3%	1.8%	22.1[b]	26.0
Armenians	42.5%	32.4%	13.7%	9%	2.3%	21.3[b]	26.9
Syrian refugees	31.3%	41.7%	15.4%	8.7%	2.8%	24.9[c]	26.6
Non-Syrian refugees	22.0%	46.6%	19.5%	9.1%	2.8%	28.9[a]	26.0

Note. Mean scores with different superscripts differ significantly ($p < .02$) from each other.

Factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation showed that the national identification and religious group identification items formed two distinct empirical constructs. National identification items loaded high on the first factor (> .78; on the second factor highest load = .09) that explained 55.7% of the variance, and the religious identification items loaded high on the second factor (> .70; highest load on the first factor = .06) that explained 25.8% of the variance.

Endorsement of multiculturalism was measured with three items taken from previous research (e.g., Levin et al., 2012): "Immigrant parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland", "A society with different ethnic and cultural groups can better address its societal problems", "We should help ethnic and cultural minorities to preserve their cultural heritage in Turkey". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* to 5 = *certainly agree*). An average score of these items was computed (α = .72).

2.3. RESULTS

A one-sample *t*-test showed that the mean score of national identification (M = 4.29, SD = .76) was significantly above the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t(597) = 41.66$, $p < .001$. The mean score of religious group identification (M = 3.87, SD = .91) also was above the neutral mid-point of the scale, $t(598) = 23.46$ $p < .001$. Thus, on average respondents had relatively strong national and religious group identifications whereby the former was stronger than the latter, $t(592) = 10.53$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, national and religious identifications were positively associated (r = .37, $p < .001$). The average endorsement of multiculturalism (M = 3.28, SD = .89) was around the midpoint of the scale, $t(590) = 7.77$, $p < .001$, and this endorsement was not associated with national identification (r = .01), and was associated negatively with religious group identification (r = -.10, p = .019).

2.3.1. Feelings towards different outgroups

Table 2.1 shows the percentages and mean scores for the feelings towards the different target groups. One-sample *t*-tests indicated that the feelings towards all target groups were significantly ($p_s < .001$) below the neutral mid-point of the scale (50), indicating quite strong negative feelings towards all outgroups. In general, around 64% to 76% of the sample reported negative feelings (< 50). More than 40% of the participants reported the strongest negative feelings (0 degree) towards Jews and Armenians, and this was the case for more than 30% in relation to Greeks and Syrian refugees.

A repeated measures analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with the five groups' ratings as a repeated measures factor. This analysis yielded a significant within-subjects effect for group ratings, $F(4, 598) = 18.523$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .030$. The least negative feelings were towards the non-Syrian refugees in Turkey. The second least negative feelings were towards the Greek community, followed by feelings towards the Syrian refugees, the Jewish community, and the Armenian community. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni) showed that there were statistically significant differences between the Syrian refugees and all the other target groups ($p_s < .02$). The feelings towards Syrian refugees were more negative than towards non-Syrian refugees and the Greeks, and less negative than the feelings towards the Armenians and the Jews. Furthermore, the feelings towards the non-Syrian refugees were less negative than towards the Jews and Armenians but similar as towards the Greeks. The feelings towards the Jews and Armenians were equally negative and significantly more negative than towards all the other groups.

Table 2.2. Correlations between outgroup feeling, national, and religious group identifications, control variables, and the endorsement of multiculturalism

Outgroups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Greeks	—															
2. Jews	.82**	—														
3. Armenians	.75**	.86**	—													
4. Syrian refugees	.22**	.26**	.34**	—												
5. Other refugees	.28**	.34**	.38**	.71**	—											
6. National identification	.00	-.08	-.14**	-.22**	-.21**	—										
7. Religious identification	-.17**	-.21**	-.27**	-.13**	-.14**	.37**	—									
8.Multiculturalism	.07	.09*	.17**	.25**	.19**	.01	-.10*	—								
9. Age	.04	.05	.01	.03	-.03	.08*	.12**	-.05	—							
10. Gender	.07	.04	.02	.05	.04	.04	-.08	.07	-.01	—						
11. Non-Turkish	-.11**	-.10*	-.13**	-.13**	-.14**	.26**	.13**	-.03	.03	-.02	—					
12. Adana	-.23**	-.11**	-.02	.05	.16**	-.31**	.04	-.14**	-.06	-.16**	-.13**	—				
13. Antalya	-.09*	-.14**	-.10*	.20**	.14**	.05	-.08*	.15**	-.03	.04	.12	-.21**	—			
14. Gaziantep	-.19**	-.16**	-.13**	.00	-.10*	-.08	-.08*	.01	.00	-.04	.00	-.16**	-.21**	—		
15. Kilis	.03	.03	-.03	.03	-.02	.01	.01	.00	.06	.05	.08	-.12**	-.16**	-.12**	—	
16. Samsun	.05	.08	-.08	.00	.05	-.19**	-.19**	.23**	-.09*	.02	.05	-.12**	-.17**	-.13**	-.09*	—

Note: Istanbul is the reference category for the city associations shown, $^{**}p < .01$. $^{*}p < .05$.

As shown in Table 2.2 there were relatively high correlations between the feelings towards the various target groups. In particular, the associations between the three non-Muslim national minority groups and the association between the two Muslim refugee groups were high (>.70). In order to reduce the number of outcome variables and because of these relatively high correlations, factor analyses with maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation were conducted. The feelings towards the three non-Muslim communities (Greeks, Jews, and Armenians) loaded on one factor (explaining 60.51% of the variance; lowest factor loading = .85; highest factor loading on the second factor = .10), and the feelings towards Syrian refugees and non-Syrian refugees loaded on a second factor (explaining 26.27% of the variance; lowest factor loading = .73; highest factor loading on the second factor = .09). The feelings towards the three non-Muslim communities formed a reliable scale (α = .93) and the average feelings were negative (M = 23.70, SD = 25.07) with 45% of the sample indicating very negative feelings (< 10) and 77.5% indicating negative feelings (< 50). The two items for the refugee groups also had high reliability (α = .83) and the average feeling towards these groups was also negative (M = 26.83, SD = 24.27) with 38% indicating very negative feelings (< 10) and around 3 in 4 respondents scoring on the negative side of the scale (< 50). The feeling scores for the two outgroups were moderately associated (r = .35, p < .001).

2.3.2. Feelings towards refugees

A sequential regression analysis was conducted with feelings towards refugees as the predicted outcome variable. In a first step the demographic control variables age, gender, ethnicity (Turkish as reference category), and city of residence (Istanbul as reference category) as a proxy for the opportunity of intergroup contact with Syrian refugees, were entered. In a second step national identification, religious identification, and endorsement of multiculturalism were entered (all centered scores). In a third step, the interactions between national identification and religious identification; national identification and endorsement of multiculturalism; and religious identification and endorsement of multiculturalism were added.

As shown in Table 2.3 the regression equation in Step 1 accounted for 11% of the variance. Self-identified non-Turkish respondents had more negative feelings than Turkish respondents, and residents of Antalya, Adana, Samsun, and Kilis had more positive feelings than the residents of Istanbul. The model in Step 2 accounted for an additional 7% of the variance. As expected, higher national identification was related to more negative feelings, whereas stronger endorsement of multiculturalism was independently related to less negative feelings towards refugees. Religious group identification had no independent statistical main effect. The entry of the interactions in Step 3 accounted for an additional 1% of the variance. The interaction between national identification and multiculturalism made a significant contribution to the prediction of feelings towards refugees, whereas the interaction between religious identification and multiculturalism was not significant.

Table 2.3. Sequential multiple regression analysis predicting feelings towards refugees in Turkey

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Variables	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***
Age	.04 (.07)	.05 (.07)	.05 (.07)
Gender	.06 (1.97)	.05 (1.91)	.05 (1.90)
Non-Turkish	-.18 (2.95)***	-.12 (2.97)**	-.12 (2.95)***
Antalya	.30 (2.61)***	.23 (2.63)***	.25 (2.68)***
Adana	.21 (3.14)***	.15 (3.22)***	.19 (3.37)***
Samsun	.13 (3.57)**	.05 (3.69)	.06 (3.70)
Kilis	.12 (3.82)**	.09 (3.71)*	.12 (3.76)**
Gaziantep	.05 (3.21)	-.01 (3.18)	.02 (3.28)
National identification		-.18 (1.43)***	-.16 (1.59)**
Religious identification		.00 (1.16)	.01 (1.19)
Multiculturalism		.22 (1.12)***	.24 (1.13)***
National Identification x Religious Identification			.00 (1.05)
National Identification x Multiculturalism			-.10 (1.66)*
Religious Identification x Multiculturalism			-.05 (1.35)
R^2	.11	.18	.20
ΔR^2	.11	.07	.01
ΔF	9.08***	15.65***	3.28*

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.



Figure 2.1. Interaction effect between endorsement of multiculturalism and strength of national identification on feelings towards refugees.

To examine the significant interaction and thereby the moderating role of national identification on the association between endorsement of multiculturalism and feelings towards refugees, simple slope analysis was performed. As expected, this analysis demonstrated that for respondents with a relatively low level of national identification (-1 *SD*) the positive association between multiculturalism and feelings towards refugees was stronger than for respondents with a relatively high national identification, $B = 9.32$, $SE = 2.27$, $t = 4.11$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [4.86, 13.78], and $B = 4.61$, $SE = 1.56$, $t = 2.96$, $p = .003$, 95% CI [1.55, 7.68], respectively. For the mean level of national identification there also was a significant positive association between multiculturalism and feelings, $B = 6.88$, $SE = 1.16$, $t = 5.91$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [4.59, 9.17]. Thus, as shown in Figure 2.1, for low, compared to high, national identifiers the endorsement of multiculturalism was relatively more important for their feelings towards refugees.

Although we had no theoretical reasons, we added in a fourth step the three-way interaction between national identification, religious identification, and multiculturalism to the regression equation. This explained an additional significant part of the variance 1% with $B = .12$, $SE = 1.37$, $t = 2.65$, $p = .008$. Furthermore, the findings

were substantially similar when the non-Turkish respondents were not included in the analysis. The only difference was that the interaction between national identification and multiculturalism was not significant ($p < .05$). Additionally, a regression analysis without the demographic control variables yielded somewhat stronger coefficients for the different social psychological constructs but a similar pattern of findings. In this analysis, the interaction between national identification and multiculturalism also was not significant.

2.3.3. Feelings towards non-Muslim minorities

A similar sequential regression analysis was performed for explaining the feelings towards non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. As shown in Table 2.4 the model in Step 1 accounted for 12% of the variance. Age and gender had no effects while non-Turkish respondents had more negative feelings than the Turkish respondents, and residents of Antalya, Adana, Samsun, and Gaziantep had more negative feelings than residents of Istanbul. The model in Step 2 accounted for an additional 9% of the variance. As expected, stronger religious identification was associated with more negative feelings towards the non-Muslim minorities, while stronger endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with less negative feelings. National identification was not associated with outgroup feelings. The model in Step 3 accounted for an additional 2% of the variance and indicates that only the interaction between national identification and multiculturalism contributed to the explanation of feelings towards the non-Muslim communities in Turkey.

Table 2.4. Sequential multiple regression analysis predicting feelings towards non-Muslim communities of Turkey

	Step 1	**Step 2**	**Step 3**
Variables	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***
Age	.03 (.07)	.06 (.07)	.06 (.07)
Gender	.01 (2.05)	-.02 (1.95)	-.03 (1.94)
Non-Turkish	-.12 (3.09)**	-.05 (3.07)	-.05 (3.05)
Antalya	-.23 (2.70)***	-.33 (2.68)***	-.29 (2.72)***
Adana	-.24 (3.25)***	-.28 (3.28)***	-.23 (3.42)***
Samsun	-.03 (3.70)	-.15 (3.77)***	-.13 (3.76)**
Kilis	-.07 (3.95)	-.10 (3.78)*	-.07 (3.82)
Gaziantep	-.27 (3.33)***	-.34 (3.25)***	-.30 (3.33)***
National identification		-.07 (1.47)	-.02 (1.62)
Religious identification		-.27 (1.19)***	-.25 (1.23)***

Table 2.4. Sequential multiple regression analysis predicting feelings towards non-Muslim communities of Turkey *(continued)*

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Variables	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***
Multiculturalism		.13 (1.14)***	.15 (1.15)***
National Identification x Religious Identification			.07 (1.07)
National Identification x Multiculturalism			-.12 (1.71)**
Religious Identification x Multiculturalism			-.04 (1.44)
R^2	.12	.21	.23
ΔR^2	.12	.09	.02
ΔF	9.33***	21.66***	5.11**

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

As shown in Figure 2.2, simple slope analysis showed that for respondents with a relatively low level of national identification there was a positive association between multiculturalism and feelings towards non-Muslim minorities, $B = 9.84$, $SE = 2.41$, $t = 4.09$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [5.11, 14.56], while for higher national identifiers there was no significant association between these two constructs, $B = -1.47$, $SE = 1.43$, $t = -1.03$, $p = .305$, 95% CI [-4.29, 1.34]. For the mean level of national identification there was a significant positive association between multiculturalism and feelings, $B = 3.99$, $SE = 1.24$, $t = 3.22$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [1.56, 6.42].



Figure 2.2. Interaction effect between endorsement of multiculturalism and strength of national identification on feelings towards non-Muslims.

The three-way interaction between strength of national identity, strength of religious identity, and endorsement of multiculturalism did not make a significant contribution to the feelings towards non-Muslims in Turkey. Furthermore, the findings were substantially similar when the non-Turkish respondents were not included in the analysis, including the significant interaction between national identification and multiculturalism. Also, an additional regression analysis without the demographic control variables yielded a similar pattern of findings, including the significant interaction between national identification and multiculturalism.

2.3.4. Feelings towards different outgroups

We further examined the differences in strength of the associations of national and religious identification with feelings towards Muslim refugees and national minorities. We found that the association between national identification with feelings towards Muslim refugees was significantly stronger compared to the association with feelings towards national minorities, z-value = 1.936, $p = .026$. Similarly, religious identification was more strongly associated with the feelings towards national minorities compared to feelings towards Muslim refugees, z-value = 4.618, $p < .001$.

2.4. DISCUSSION

Turkey is hosting many refugees from neighbouring countries and from Syria in particular. The current research is one of the very few studies examining attitudes towards refugees outside of North America, Western Europe, and Australia, and one of the first on people's feelings towards refugees from a neighbouring country. In order to assess whether these feelings are specific or rather more similar to the ways in which national minority groups are perceived, we made a comparison between people's feelings towards Muslim refugees with their feelings towards established non-Muslim national minority communities of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews.

Overall, the feelings towards the different target groups were very negative and this might result in negative outgroup behaviour, depending on the social, economic, and political circumstances. Thus, although refugees and national minority communities are in many ways very different outgroups, the feelings towards these groups were quite similar. Yet, the participants did make a distinction between their feelings towards refugee groups and national minority groups. Their feelings towards the two refugee groups were strongly associated, as were their feelings towards the three national minorities. Thus, although the average outgroup feelings were quite similar, a distinction between the two categories of outgroups could be made. This indicates that similar negative feelings can have different underlying meanings and reasons.

In support of this interpretation, we found that higher national identification was significantly associated with more negative feelings towards the non-national refugees, and higher religious group identification was significantly associated with more negative feelings towards non-Muslim minority groups. Furthermore, national identification was more strongly associated with feelings towards non-national refugees than towards national minorities, whereas religious identification was more strongly associated with feelings towards non-Muslim national minorities than towards Muslim refugees. This means that national and religious group identification played a different role in the feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities. These findings are in line with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) which argues that higher ingroup identifiers are inclined to make an intergroup distinction towards a relevant outgroup, that is to say, an outgroup on the same categorization dimension (nationality or religion). This pattern of findings further suggests that the difference in feelings between the non-Muslim national minorities and the Muslim refugees is not simply due to the distinction between co-nationals and other-nationals, or co-believers and other-believers. If that were the case then national identification could be expected to be associated with more positive feelings towards co-nationals and religious identification with a more positive attitude towards co-believers (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Social identity theory further emphasizes the importance of ideological beliefs for understanding intergroup relations (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). The endorsement

of multiculturalism was found to be associated with less negative feelings towards both Muslim refugees and non-Muslim minorities. This finding is in line with survey research and experimental studies in other countries that have found that multiculturalism has positive implications for attitudes towards minority outgroups (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Whitley, 2016). However, this research also has shown that majority members sometimes see multiculturalism as threatening to their own cultural identity and dominant position (e.g., Morrison et al., 2009; Verkuyten, 2005). We found that the positive association between endorsement of multiculturalism and outgroup feelings predominantly existed for lower national identifiers and not, or less strongly, for higher national identifiers (see also Morrison et al., 2010). Higher national identification implies stronger sensitivity to anything that could harm the unity of the nation, while multiculturalism calls for a more heterogeneous society (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Takaki, 1993). In Turkey, high national identifiers are less tolerant of ethnic groups that they view as "the other" (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2012) which is difficult to reconcile with cultural diversity and minority rights (Çelebi et al., 2015). For lower national identifiers, multiculturalism probably is less of a threat to the nation and to their national identity. As a result, the beneficial role of multiculturalism for outgroup feelings exists most clearly for lower national identifiers. Religious group identification was not found to moderate the positive role of endorsement of multiculturalism for outgroup feelings. A possible reason for this is that multiculturalism is typically understood in relation to ethnic and cultural differences rather than religious group differences (Rattan & Ambady, 2013), and this is reflected in the items we used to measure multiculturalism. So, the emphasis was on the importance of the recognition of ethnic and cultural minorities within the country and not on the recognition of religious differences.

However, it should be noted that the interaction effect between national identification and multiculturalism was robust in explaining the attitude towards non-Muslim minorities but not in explaining the attitude towards refugees. Additional analyses without non-Turkish respondents and also without the demographic control variables did not show a significant interaction effect for the latter attitude. This pattern of findings might indicate that the issue of national belonging with the recognition of cultural diversity is more meaningful in relation to non-Muslim minority groups than towards refugees. It might also indicate that especially non-Turkish minority group respondents find it difficult to reconcile national identification with the acceptance of minority rights for refugees. One reason might be that non-Turkish minority members perceive the cultural recognition of refugees as threatening to their own minority position.

2.4.1. Limitations

Some study limitations should be mentioned. First, the survey research does not allow to determine directions of influence. In principle, it is possible that more pos-

itive outgroup feelings lead to weaker group identifications. However, this seems less likely compared to the direction of influence that we examined and that was theoretically derived.

Second, it should be acknowledged that there is a possible confound in the study because a comparison of attitudes towards Muslim refugees versus non-Muslim minority groups corresponds to the distinction between non-established and established minority outgroups. This latter distinction might be more important than the religious one. However, and in line with the social identity perspective, we found that stronger national identification was associated with more negative feelings towards non-national Muslim refugees, and stronger religious group identification was associated with more negative feelings towards non-Muslim national minorities. This suggests that the non-Turkish national background of the refugees and the non-Muslim background of the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians were the relevant intergroup differences. This is further suggested by the finding that the interaction between religious and national identification as an operationalization of social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012) was not associated with outgroup feelings. Low social identity complexity means that different social identities are embedded in a single ingroup representation making an individual who is an outgroup member on one dimension also an outgroup member on another dimension. This increases the ingroup-outgroup distinctions and thereby strengthens the distancing from outgroup members. In the current study, however, we found that the different group identifications were independently associated with specific outgroup targets.

Third, we were able to collect data from a variety of cities by using a two-stage cluster sampling but we do not know how far the current findings reflect the situation in Turkey as a whole. Turkish cities differ in various respects (e.g., geographical location, size, ethnic composition) and it is unclear how far these differences are relevant for people's attitudes towards minority groups. Further, it might be argued that the presence of a survey-taker raises social desirability concerns. However, the feelings towards the different target groups were very negative which suggests that respondents did not have any difficulties in expressing their views.

Fourth, there are other possible factors and moderating conditions that we did not consider, such as perceived threats that might play a role in the feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim communities. And although the ratio of Syrian refugees in the different cities can be seen as a proxy for intergroup contact opportunities, we did not have information on actual contacts. Additionally, there are various economic, political, and sociological factors that could be examined. For example, household income, political ideology, and education level of the respondents were not asked in the survey and these might play a role in people´s feelings towards refugees and non-Muslim communities.

2.5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the current research shows that the Turkish respondents had very negative feelings towards (Syrian) refugees, similar to the negative feelings that they had towards established minority groups in Turkey. Further, higher national identifiers were more negative towards non-national refugees, and higher Muslim group identifiers were more negative towards non-Muslim minorities. Stronger endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with less negative feelings towards refugees and minority groups, but predominantly among lower national identifiers. Thus, an emphasis on cultural diversity and multicultural values might lead to more positive feelings towards refugees and other minority groups. Yet, for strong national identifiers, the intergroup benefits of multiculturalism were weaker or did not exist. In general, the current findings indicate that in Turkey there are important intergroup tensions and that it is a real challenge to develop future positive relations between the Turkish majority and the different minority groups, including refugees. Endorsement of multiculturalism was found to be associated with less negative attitudes both towards refugees and non-Muslim minorities but especially for low identifiers. Thus, promoting multiculturalism might be a way to improve these outgroup feelings for some sections of the population. Yet, research has shown that multiculturalism might be perceived as a threat for high identifiers (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Verkuyten, 2005), and further studies could investigate other factors that are related to why endorsement of multiculturalism is not associated with less negative feelings towards outgroups for high identifiers. If multiculturalism is indeed perceived as a threat, then we suggest that both civil society organizations and government officials can foster public campaigns about the positive sides of living together with people with culturally different backgrounds. Also, future studies should investigate what other factors might be important for reducing the negative feelings of high identifiers.

CHAPTER 3

Understanding the distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees: A different interplay of national identification, threat, and humanitarian concern[2]

2 The data and related statistical syntax used in that chapter are stored in the faculty storage facility. A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Yitmen, Ş., & Verkuyten, M. (2018). Positive and negative behavioural intentions towards refugees in Turkey: The roles of national identification, threat, and humanitarian concern. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 230–243. Şenay Yitmen co-designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Maykel Verkuyten was involved in the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the number of people who are forced to flee their homes because of conflicts and wars (Edwards, 2015). The resulting adaptation challenges for both host societies and refugees have become a crucial issue that receives increasing attention in the social and behavioural sciences, including social psychology (see Esses et al., 2017). Research has reported that some members of the hosting societies perceive refugees as a symbolic, security, and economic threat and as a result have negative attitudes towards refugees (Cowling et al., 2019; Landmann et al., 2019; Schweitzer et al., 2005). Yet, other host society members endorse humanitarian concerns that make them care about the fate of the innocent victims of conflict and disaster (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008).

This study, conducted in Turkey, examines among self-identified Turkish citizens positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees and whether these intentions are associated with national identification, perceived threat, and endorsement of humanitarian concerns. It is investigated whether stronger humanitarian concern is associated with more positive behavioural intentions and less negative behavioural intentions. Additionally, we examined whether perceived threat mediates the relationship between national identification and positive and negative behavioural intentions and whether the role of threat depends on endorsement of humanitarian concerns. This allows us to find out whether national identification is related to positive and negative behavioural intentions because of perceived threat, and whether this is conditional upon endorsement of humanitarian concerns (moderated mediation model; see Figure 3.1). The test of the conditional effect is based on the reasoning that feelings of threat will be less likely to be associated with (negative) behavioural intentions when there are at the same time humanitarian concerns about the welfare of Syrian refugees.



Figure 3.1. Moderated mediation model being tested.

3.1.1. Refugees in Turkey

The conflict in Syria escalated rapidly in 2012 especially when efforts to negotiate a ceasefire failed (İçduygu, 2015). As a result, the number of Syrian refugees increased dramatically from 8,000 to 2.7 million in 5 years (UNHCR, 2022f). Although legally, the Syrians were not refugees and did not benefit from refugee rights because of Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Turkey granted temporary protection status that included three main principles: an open-door policy to Syrian refugees, no forced return to Syria, and unlimited length of stay in Turkey (Kaya, 2016). Turkey settled refugees in camps neighbouring the Turkish-Syrian border (Kaya & Kıraç, 2016), but by late 2014 the vast majority of the Syrian refugees moved to the bigger cities (İçduygu, 2015). Today, Syrian refugees live across Turkey and only 1.5% of the Syrian refugees live in refugee camps (Erdoğan, 2022).

In the beginning of their arrival to Turkey, Syrian refugees were welcomed and considered as "guests" (Kaya, 2016; Orhan, 2014). Turkey enacted a new Temporary Protection Legislation in 2014 which grants Syrian refugees a legal stay in Turkey until safe return is possible, and entry to social services like health, education, and labor market (İçduygu, 2015). Yet, there are also political and public discussions about the challenges that refugees pose and the possible naturalization of Syrian refugees fuels negative reactions among the Turkish public (Erdoğan, 2015). Reflecting these developments there are people having a more welcoming attitude towards Syrian refugees and people having a more negative attitude (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016; Erdoğan, 2015). For example, there are many Turkish citizens who view Syrian refugees as an economic and as security threat. In a public opinion survey, 60% of the respondents indicated that "Cities are less secure because of the presence of refugees", 58% of the respondents agreed with "Refugees are affecting Turkish economy negatively", and 61% thought that "There are fewer employment opportunities because of the presence of refugees." (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016). However, there are also more positive attitudes based on humanitarian principles. For example, a public opinion survey showed that 46.6% of Turkish respondents agreed with the statement that "Admission of Syrians without any discrimination regarding their language, religion, and ethnic background is a humanitarian obligation on our part." Another public survey revealed that around 56% agreed that it is a humanitarian duty to accept Syrian refugees and that there shouldn't be any discrimination against them (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016).

3.1.2. Positive and negative behavioural intentions

Most studies examine people's (prejudicial) beliefs and feelings towards refugees and immigrants (Esses et al., 2001; Esses et al., 2017; Plener et al., 2017; Schweitzer et al., 2005) and do not consider behavioural intentions. Yet, these intentions are closest to people's actual behaviour and research has demonstrated, for example, that protest intentions and actual behaviour tend to be associated (Van Zomeren

et al., 2008). Refugees receive various sorts of assistance but often they also face discrimination and social exclusion. Thus, both positive and negative behavioural intentions are important to study and people might demonstrate a mixture of both. The positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup relations indicates that positive evaluations and intentions differ from negative evaluations and intentions (Buhl, 1999; Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). A less positive orientation towards an outgroup compared to the ingroup is consistently found on evaluation dimensions and behaviour with positive connotations, but not on negatively valued dimensions or negative behaviour. One reason for this is that, in general, the differential evaluation of negative traits and behaviour is socially less acceptable than the differential evaluation of positive traits and behaviour (see Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). Wenzel and Mummendey (1996) showed that negative valence increases the social concern with the legitimacy and appropriateness of unequal group distinctions. Furthermore, the domains of positive and negative actions and behavioural intentions have been found to involve different moralities with distinct motivational and regulatory systems (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Positive behaviour that focuses on advancing others' well-being raises questions of prescriptive morality which indicates what one should do, whereas negative behaviour involves proscriptive morality which indicates what one should *not* do. Prescriptive morality is abstract, commendatory, and discretionary, whereas proscriptive morality is concrete, condemnatory, and duty-based resulting in greater moral blame (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). This means that negative actions and behavioural intentions against disadvantaged people are likely to be morally more difficult than not assisting or helping them. In the present study and considering the normative and moral implications we expected that Turkish respondents make a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

3.1.3. National identification and the mediating role of perceived threat

There is substantial empirical literature that shows that stronger national identification is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants and minority groups (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003; De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Esses et al., 2004; Esses et al., 2006). Higher compared to lower national identifiers are more focused upon and concerned about their national ingroup. According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), group identity functions as a group lens which increases the sensitivity of people to anything that could harm their ingroup. Higher identifiers tend to view the social world in terms of their group membership and therefore are more focused upon and stronger inclined to perceive possible threats. For example, a research among native Dutch participants found that national identification was positively associated with perceived outgroup threat and via threat to a stronger rejection of cultural rights for immigrant minorities (Verkuyten, 2009a). Further,

in the context of Israel and Germany, it was found that perceived socio-economic threat fully mediated the association between national identification and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants (Hochman et al., 2016). Following self-categorization theory and these empirical findings, we expected that higher national identifiers will perceive Syrian refugees as more threatening to Turkish security and identity, and as a result will have more negative and less positive behavioural intentions towards these refugees.

3.1.4. Humanitarian concerns

People can not only feel threatened and demonstrate prejudicial reactions towards refugees, but they also can act favourably towards this group. There are many examples of assistance and help being provided to refugees and, as indicated by the Turkish opinion polls discussed, these acts can be based on humanitarian concerns. Endorsement of humanitarian concerns involve a sense of compassive care and moral responsibility for the welfare of fellow human beings, especially when they are in need. These concerns have been found to be associated with stronger support for refugees (Verkuyten et al., 2018) and are based on shared humanity. The human level of identity defines Turks and Syrian refugees as forming part of the same humanity. The common ingroup identity model (CIIM, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) suggests that a superordinate identity makes subgroup boundaries less salient and that former outgroup members will be part of the ingroup resulting in more favourable attitudes and behaviours (e.g. Beaton & Deveau, 2005). There is extensive empirical evidence supporting this model in a range of settings and among various groups (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), including the positive effect of shared humanity on attitudes towards asylum seekers (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008). Endorsement of humanitarian concerns reflects an identification with other human beings with the related moral responsibility to help them in times of need. Shared humanity has been found to be associated with the endorsement of human rights, intergroup empathy, and providing humanitarian aid and relief (e.g., McFarland et al., 2012; Reysen & Katzarka-Miller, 2013). Thus, it can be expected that stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns is associated with stronger positive behavioural intentions towards these refugees and weaker negative behavioural intentions.

In addition to endorsement of humanitarian concerns being expected to be associated with behavioural intentions towards refugees, we also examined whether these concerns moderate the association between feelings of outgroup threat and positive and negative behavioural intentions. In relation to the so-called refugee crisis, host societies often struggle with finding a balance between humanitarian considerations and societal interests (Verkuyten et al., 2018b). People might not only be concerned about the threats that refugees can pose to the unity and safety of society but can also feel a sense of compassion and moral responsibility towards refugees. This could mean that the expected link between perceived threats and behavioural intentions depends on the level of endorsement of humanitarian con-

cerns. The perceived threat might be less strongly associated with behavioural intentions among individuals with stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns. Research has demonstrated that moral norms can influence the expression or suppression of prejudices (Crandall et al., 2002). When people feel threatened by an outgroup but also consider members of this outgroup as fellow human beings, this might increase the intention to act positively towards them and suppress the intention to act negatively. Endorsement of humanitarian concerns makes it possible that feelings of threat are less likely to translate into lower positive behavioural intentions and into higher negative behavioural intentions. Thus, the negative association between perceived threat and positive behavioural intentions can be expected to be weaker for Turkish participants with stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns. Correspondingly, for these respondents, the positive association between threat and negative behavioural intentions can be expected to be weaker.

3.1.5. The current study

We examined whether the perceived threat mediates the association between national identification and negative and positive behavioural intentions of Turkish citizens towards Syrian refugees and whether the role of threat depends on the level of endorsement of humanitarian concerns. First, Turkish respondents were expected to differentiate between positive and negative behavioural intentions. Second, higher national identification was expected to be associated with more negative and less positive behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees and perceived threat was expected to mediate this relationship, because higher identifiers will perceive Syrian refugees more strongly as a threat to the Turkish identity and security. Third, Turkish respondents with stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns were expected to have more positive behavioural intentions and less negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees. Fourth, these concerns were expected to moderate the association between perceived threat and behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

3.2. METHOD

3.2.1. Participants

This study was conducted with 605 Turkish citizens (43.6% male and 56.4% female) between 18 to 81 years of age (M = 39.6, SD = 14.4). The addresses of the participants were selected by the Turkish Statistical Institute from six cities in Turkey which vary in terms of the ratio of Syrian refugees to the population of the city. The selected cities were: Istanbul (33.4% of participants), Antalya (22.3%), Gaziantep (13.7%), Adana (13.4%), Samsun (8.9%), and Kilis (8.3%). Of the participants, 87.6% ethnically self-identified as Turks, 6.9% as Kurds, 1.5% as Arabs, 0.8% as Zaza, and 3.1% were from other ethnic groups. The ratio of the Syrian refugee population to the population of the cities they reside differs with Samsun and Antalya having a relatively

low number of Syrian refugees (0.1% and 0.5%, respectively), Adana and İstanbul having a somewhat higher ratio of Syrian refugees (2.5% and 2.6% respectively), and Gaziantep and Kilis having a relatively high number of Syrian refugees (14% and 41% respectively) (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2017; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016). The study was conducted by the research company Optimar in May and June 2015. The respondents participated in the survey voluntarily in their homes and it took about 20-25 minutes to complete the survey. A survey-taker administered the paper-and-pencil questionnaires.

3.2.2. Measures

The dependent variable – *positive behavioural intentions* - was measured by asking the respondents to indicate the likelihood (5-point scale, 1 = *very unlikely* and 5 = *very likely*) of engaging in eight positive behaviours: "Help a Syrian refugee when I am asked to", "Share the same table with a Syrian refugee", "Become friends with a Syrian refugee", "Add a Syrian refugee on Facebook as friends", "Participate in a protest in favour of Syrian refugees", "Sign a petition infavour of Syrian refugees", "Donate money for improving the living conditions of Syrian refugees", and "Try to get other people helping Syrian refugees."

The other dependent variable - *negative behavioural intentions* - was measured in terms of the likelihood of engaging in two forms of negative behaviour: "Participate in a protest against Syrian refugees", and "Sign a petition *against* Syrian refugees." All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *very unlikely* and 5 = *very likely*).

Table 3.1. Correlations, means and standard deviations of the main constructs

Constructs	1	2	3	4	*M*	*SD*
1. National identification	—				4.29	.76
2. Perceived threat	.19**	—			3.65	1.04
3. Humanitarian concerns	-.04	-.38**	—		3.10	1.08
4. Positive behavioural intentions	-.17**	-.59**	.57**	—	2.21	1.07
5. Negative behavioural intentions	.06	.32**	-.37**	-.22**	2.05	1.41

***p* < .01.

We expected that the respondents make a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions. Factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation showed that the positive behavioural intentions and negative behavioural intentions items loaded on two separate factors. Positive behavioural intentions items loaded high on the first factor (> .71; on the second factor highest load = .18) that explained 54.12% of the variance. The two negative behavioural intentions items loaded very high on the second factor (> .96; highest load on the first

factor = -.02) that explained 19.70% of the variance. An average score for positive behavioural intentions was computed (α =.93) and also an average score for negative behavioural intentions (r = .95, p < .001) with a higher score indicating more negative behavioural intentions. As shown in Table 3.1 both measures were negatively but not strongly (r = -.22, p < .001) associated which further supports their empirical distinctiveness.

Turkish national identification was measured with three items that did not focus on ethnicity but rather on Turkish citizenship which includes various ethnic groups. These items have been used in previous studies in Turkey (e.g., Çelebi et al., 2014): "I am proud to be a citizen of Turkey", "Being a citizen of Turkey is an important part of who I am", "I strongly feel that I am a citizen of Turkey". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* and 5 = *certainly agree*) and an average score of these items was computed (α = .92).

Perceived outgroup threat was assessed by focusing on symbolic and security threats using items that were adapted from previous studies (Stephan & Stephan, 1996a; Stephan et al., 2000): "The cultural identity of Turkey is being threatened by the increasing number of Syrian refugees", "The norms and values of Turkey are being threatened due to the presence of Syrian refugees", "The Syrian refugees are undermining the culture of Turkey", "I worry that violent conflicts between Syrian refugees and people living in Turkey may happen", "I worry about the rise of stealing, begging, and attacking of the people living in Turkey", and "I worry about Syrian refugees spreading diseases". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* and 5 = *certainly agree*). An average score of these items was computed (α = .91).

Humanitarian concerns were measured in relation to Syrian refugees and with three items that focused on compassive care and felt moral responsibility: "I pity Syrian refugees because they are also humans", "I should help Syrian refugees because they are also humans", and "As a human being I feel responsible for taking care of Syrian refugees". All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *certainly not agree* and 5 = *certainly agree*) and an average score was computed (α = .85).

3.3. RESULTS

3.3.1. Descriptive findings

As shown in Table 3.1, the mean scores of positive and negative behavioural intentions were similar, t(590) = 1.91, p = .056, and both were significantly below the neutral mid-point of the scale t(592) = -18.12, p < .001 and t(601) = -16.51, p < .001, respectively. This indicates that Turkish respondents reported no clear inclination for positive behaviour but also not for negative behaviour towards Syrian refugees. One sample t-test showed that the mean scores of national identification, humanitarian concerns, and perceived threat were significantly above the mid-point of the scales t(597) = 41.66, p < .001, t(603) = 2.29, p = .022, and t(594) = 15.10, p < .001, respectively.

National identification and perceived threat were negatively correlated with positive behavioural intentions. Humanitarian concern was positively correlated with positive behavioural intentions. As shown in Table 3.1, higher national identification and stronger perceived threat were associated with more negative behavioural intentions, whereas humanitarian concern was negatively associated with negative behavioural intentions.

3.3.2. Positive behavioural intentions

To test the moderated mediation hypothesis presented in Figure 3.1, we used Model 14 in process macro (Preacher et al., 2007) with 10,000 bootstraps. However, we first conducted a regression analysis to examine whether the demographic variables age, gender, city, and ethnicity (Turkish versus non-Turkish) should be included as control variables.[1] This analysis indicated that gender, city, and ethnicity were significant predictors and therefore these demographics were added as control variables in the moderated mediation analysis.

Table 3.2. Multiple regression analyses predicting positive and negative behavioural intentions

	Positive behavioural intentions	**Negative behavioural intentions**
Variables	**β *(SE)***	
Gender	.14 (.07)*	-.02 (.11)
City	-.08 (.02)***	-.03 (.04)
Non-Turkish	-.14 (.10)	-.68 (.16)***
National identification	-.07 (.05)	.08 (.07)
Humanitarian concern	.40 (.03)***	-.33 (.05)***
Perception of threat	-.41 (.03)***	.34 (.06)***
Perception of threat x humanitarian concern	-.07 (.03)*	-.15 (.05)**
R^2	.51	.20

*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Results of this analysis showed that higher national identification was associated with stronger perceived threat, $B = .21$, $SE = .06$, $t = 3.48$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.091, .327] and as shown in Table 3. 2 higher threat was associated with lower positive behavioural intentions, $B = -.41$, $SE = .03$, $t = -11.94$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.474, -.340], while stronger humanitarian concern was associated with more positive behavioural intentions, $B = .40$, $SE = .03$, $t = 12.64$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.338, .463]. The direct effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions was not significant

B = -.07, *SE* = .05 , *t* = -1.51, *p* = .132 with a 95% CI [-.157, .021], but the indirect effect of national identification through perceived threat on positive behavioural intentions was -.015 which is significant as the 95% CI [-.034, -.003] does not contain zero. This mediation effect was qualified by a significant interaction between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, *B* = -.07, *SE* = .03, *t* = -2.47, *p* = .014 with a 95% CI [-.126, -.014]. Unexpectedly, however, and as shown in Figure 3.2 simple slope analyses of the interaction effect indicated that the conditional indirect effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions through perceived threat was somewhat stronger for relatively high level of humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) *B* = -.10, *SE* = .03, *p* = .007 , 95% CI [-.171, -.038], compared to low level of humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) *B* = -.07, *SE* = .03, *p* = .007 , 95% CI [-.127, -.027]. Thus, although the difference in association is small, higher perceived threat tended to have a stronger association with less positive behavioural intentions for those participants who had stronger humanitarian concerns compared to those with weaker humanitarian concerns.



Figure 3.2. Interaction effect between perception of threat and endorsement of humanitarian concerns on positive behavioural intentions.

3.3.3. Negative behavioural intentions

In a regression analysis gender, city, and ethnicity were significant predictors of negative behavioural intentions and the different variables explained a lower amount of the total variance than for positive behavioural intentions. We added the demographic variables as controls in the moderated mediation analysis. Findings of this analysis indicated that higher national identification was associated with stronger perceived threat, $B = .23$, $SE = .06$, $t = 3.97$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.116, .343] and as shown in Table 3.2 higher perceived threat was associated with more negative behavioural intentions, $B = .34$, $SE = .06$, $t = 5.99$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.227, .449]. Stronger humanitarian concern was associated with lower negative behavioural intentions, $B = -.33$, $SE = .05$, $t = -6.38$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.434, -.230]. Furthermore, perceived threat was found to mediate the relation between national identification and negative behavioural intentions. The direct effect of national identification on negative behavioural intentions was not significant $B = -.08$, $SE = .07$, $t = 1.11$, $p = .266$, whereas the indirect effect of national identification through perceived threat was -.034 which was significant as the 95% CI [-.069, -.011] does not contain zero. This mediation was again qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, $B = -.15$, $SE = .05$, $t = -3.10$, $p = .002$ with a 95% CI [-.238, -.054]. As expected and as shown in Figure 3.3, the conditional indirect effect of national identification on negative behavioural intentions through perceived threat was less strong for high humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) $B = .04$, $SE = .02$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [.016, .088], compared to low humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) $B = .11$, $SE = .04$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [.050, .201].



Figure 3.3. Interaction effect between perception of threat and endorsement of humanitarian concerns on negative behavioural intentions.

3.3.4. Additional analyses

Although we had theoretical reasons for testing our moderated mediation model we conducted two additional analyses to investigate alternative models. Table 3.1 shows that national identification was not associated with endorsement of humanitarian concerns which means that the latter does not mediate the effect of the former on behavioural intentions. However, endorsement of humanitarian concerns might moderate the relationship between national identification and perceived threat. The test of this model (Model 7, Preacher et al., 2007) showed that the interaction between national identification and humanitarian concern on perceived threat was not significant (B = -.01, SE = .05, p = .818 for positive behavioural intentions and B = -.02, SE = .05, p = .715 for negative behavioural intentions).

Additionally, we used Model 2 (Preacher et al., 2007) to examine whether endorsement of humanitarian concerns and perceived threat both moderate the direct link between national identification and positive and negative behavioural intentions. Results showed that perceived threat moderated the association between national identification and positive behavioural intentions (B = .10, SE = .04, p = .02), whereas humanitarian concern did not moderate the association between national identification and positive behavioural intentions (B = -.01, SE = .04, p = .760). Fur-

thermore, there were no significant interaction effects with national identification for negative behavioural intentions (with perceived threat, B = .10, SE = .07, p = .123; with humanitarian concern, B = -.03 SE = .06 p = .689).

3.4. DISCUSSION

The so-called "refugee crisis" has led to fierce societal debates and many people have ambivalent feelings about the refugee question. On the one hand, people tend to sympathize and empathize with the difficult plight of refugees and there are many voluntary and organized initiatives to offer help and support. On the other hand, the arrival of refugees makes people insecure and feel threatened leading to opposition. Turkey is at the forefront of the "refugee crisis" hosting around 3 million Syrian refugees and our research is one of the first to assess Turkish citizens' positive and negative behavioural intentions towards these refugees.

We found that participants make a distinction between positive and negative behavioural intentions and that higher national identification was associated with more negative behavioural intentions and less positive behavioural intentions. In addition, these associations were explained by perceived threat. These findings are in line with previous studies (Hochman et al., 2016; Verkuyten, 2009a) and with self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). This theory argues that group identity – in this case, national identification – functions as a group lens that increases the sensitivity of people to anything that could harm their ingroup. This pattern of findings suggests that Turkish citizens who have higher national identification perceive Syrian refugees as more threatening to the national identity and security and as a result have more negative and less positive behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees.

In contrast to research on the importance of national identification and threat to outgroup attitudes, few studies have examined the role of humanitarian concerns (Nickerson & Louis, 2008; Verkuyten et al., 2018b). The findings of the current study show that stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns was associated with less negative behavioural intentions and more positive intentions towards Syrian refugees. Endorsement of humanitarian concerns implies identification with other human beings with the related moral responsibility, which is likely to translate into more positive behavioural intentions and less negative ones. This is especially likley in the early periods of a refugee crisis, but humanitarian concerns might become less important for positive behavioural intentions when the numbers of refugees continue to increase and feelings of threat become more prominent over time. This possibility could be examined in, for example, future longitudinal research.

In addition to the direct effect of humanitarian concerns, we examined the possibility that these concerns make perceived threat less important for one's behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees. For negative behaviours, the results indeed show that endorsement of humanitarian concern has a small buffering

effect on the association between threat and behavioural intention. This indicates that when people feel threatened by refugees but at the same time also have a sense of compassive care and moral responsibility for the welfare of Syrians as fellow human beings, this reduces their intention to act negatively towards this outgroup. Thus, Syrian refugees can be perceived as a threat but when people also feel a humanitarian concern they are less inclined to protest and rally against them.

Surprisingly, however, we also found that higher perceived threat is more strongly associated with lower positive behavioural intentions when endorsement of humanitarian concerns was relatively strong. Thus respondents who felt more threatened and also more strongly felt pity and a moral responsibility towards Syrians as fellow human beings indicated a lower inclination to help and assist these refugees. This is an intriguing finding that might indicate that under conditions of perceived threat an appeal to humanitarian concerns can backfire. Humanitarian considerations have been found to be especially important for the support of refugees among those who do not find the topic of immigration very important (Verkuyten et al., 2018b). People who feel threatened by refugees can be expected to be concerned about immigration and for them, a humanitarian appeal might lead to reactance. Yet, another, perhaps more likely, interpretation is to understand the interaction effect in the reversed way. What our findings then show is that feelings of threat can reduce the positive behavioural intentions that endorsement of humanitarian concern implies. However, such a reversed interpretation cannot explain the interaction found for negative behavioural intentions. Thus, the pattern of findings for positive and negative behavioural intentions suggests that the interaction between perceived outgroup threat and endorsement of humanitarian concerns can work out differently and future studies should examine the different moralities involved in positive and negative behaviour in relation to refugees more closely (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Helping behaviour raises questions of prescriptive morality whereas proscriptive rules underlie the blameworthiness of harmful or unfair behaviour. Although harming someone is almost always blameworthy, not helping others is not. Furthermore, it might be easier to reduce negative behavioural intentions because people view negative behaviour as socially less acceptable, especially when humanitarian concerns are involved (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). In contrast, stimulating positive behaviour might be more difficult because it implies personal costs, such as time, effort, and investment.

3.4.1. Limitations

There are some limitations to the current study that we want to draw attention to. First, the data was collected from a variety of cities through a two-stage clustering sampling method which means that the findings cannot be generalized to the whole population of Turkey. Yet, we managed to collect data across the country and in a society that, as a neighbouring country, hosts many Syrian refugees. Furthermore, we examined theoretically derived associations between key social psychological

constructs. Future studies should try to collect more representative data and could use a longitudinal or experimental design (see Verkuyten et al., 2018b) for systematically testing the proposed directions of influence.

Second, we measured behavioural intentions so we do not know whether these translate into actual behaviour. Additionally, the fact that positive behavioural intentions were measured with seven items and negative behavioural intentions with two items and that the kind of behaviours differs means that we cannot compare the mean levels of intention. However, for a comprehensive understanding, it is important to consider both positive and negative behavioural intentions. Furthermore, the pattern of associations can be examined and these were central in our reasoning and statistical tests.

Third, we measured endorsement of humanitarian concerns specifically with regard to Syrian refugees and not in general terms. This could mean that there is some overlap with the questions on the intentions to help these refugees. However, we found associations with both positive and negative behavioural intentions. Further, additional analyses without the humanitarian concern item that mentioned helping ("I should help Syrian refugees because they are humans") yielded exactly the same results (see Appendix).

Fourth, there are other possible processes and moderating conditions that might have an impact on the behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees that we did not examine. For example, level of income, educational level, political ideology, and intergroup contact might be important factors and conditions to consider. Furthermore, individual differences in for example social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and perceived competition for scarce resources are likely to be important (Esses et al., 2017).

3.5. CONCLUSION

In contrast to the existing research on (negative) beliefs and feelings towards refugees (Esses et al., 2017) we focused on both positive and negative behavioural intentions. Furthermore, we examined these intentions in relation to national identification and perceptions of threat as well as endorsement of humanitarian concerns. We conducted our study in an underresearched national context that is highly relevant for understanding how people react towards the arrival of refugees. It was found that stronger national identification was associated with more negative behavioural intentions and less positive behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees via perceived threat. Additionally, stronger endorsement of humanitarian concerns was associated with a stronger intention to help and support refugees and a weaker intention to protest against them. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the combination of perceived threat and endorsement of humanitarian concerns can work out differently for positive and negative behavioural intentions towards Syrian refugees. This could mean that when people feel threatened by refugees,

an emphasis on humanitarian concerns might not always have beneficial consequences for refugees: it might reduce negative behavioural intentions but also the inclination to offer help and support. This possibility has practical implications. Public campaigns and social policies that appeal to humanitarian concerns for improving intergroup relations between Syrian refugees and Turkish people should be managed cautiously. People might understand these campaigns and appeals as ignoring their genuine feelings of threat and as implying a moral accusation of failing to meet humanitarian standards. Thus, to them, these campaigns and appeals might be threatening their sense of moral self which leads to justifications for their behaviour (Ellemers, 2017). This means that people's feelings of threat should be taken seriously and not dismissed as being misguided and prejudicial. An appeal to humanitarian concerns might be more effective when feelings of threat are considered and reduced, This means that future studies should investigate the correlates and causes of feelings of threat and the ways in which these hamper the inclination to offer help and support. In doing so it is important to develop a more detailed understanding of the similar as well as different processes involved in positive and negative behavioural intentions.

NOTES

Additional analyses without the control variables did not change the findings of the moderated mediation model for both the positive and negative behavioural intentions. For example, the direct effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions was significant B = -.11, SE = .04, t = -2.52, p = .012, whereas the indirect effect of national identification through perceived threat was -.018 which is significant as the 95% CI [-.037, -.005] does not contain zero. This mediation was again qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concerns, B = -.08, SE = .03 , t = -2.67, p = .008 with a 95% CI [-.133, -.020].

CHAPTER 4

Why and when is perceived threat associated with support for Syrian refugees?: The qualifying roles of descriptive and injunctive norms[3]

3 The data and related statistical syntax used in that chapter are stored in the faculty storage facility. A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Yitmen, Ş., & Verkuyten, M. (2020). Support to Syrian refugees in Turkey: The roles of descriptive and injunctive norms, threat, and negative emotions. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology,23,* 293-301. Şenay Yitmen co-designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Maykel Verkuyten was involved in the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In 2022, the number of Syrian refugees reached to 5.7 million (UNHCR, 2022d) and 3.7 million of them live in Turkey (UNHCR, 2022f). Public surveys have shown that some Turkish people tend to welcome and help Syrian refugees (Erdoğan, 2015; Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016), but others perceive Syrian refugees as a threat (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016; Taştan et al., 2017; Topal et al., 2017). Research has indicated that perceived outgroup threat is associated with less support for refugees and immigrants more generally (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stansfield & Stone, 2018; Unnever & Cullen, 2012). Yet the questions of why and when exactly perceived threat is associated with less support for refugees remains largely unexplored.

In this study, we investigate among self-identified Turkish citizens the "why" question by examining the mediating role of negative emotions in the association between perceived threat and support for social provisions and the rights of Syrian refugees. The "when" question is examined by considering the role of perceived negative descriptive ('what is') and positive injunctive norms ('what ought to be') from one's family and friends in the associations between threat, negative emotions, and support for refugees (Cialdini et al., 1991). We expected the association between threat and negative emotions to depend on perceived descriptive norms, and that the association between positive injunctive norms and support to depend on negative emotions towards Syrian refugees. Furthermore, we expected negative emotions to play a mediating role in the relationship between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees. Also, we expected injunctive norms to be associated with more support for Syrian refugees.

4.1.1. Perceived threat and emotions

There is much evidence for the association between perceived outgroup threat and rejection of refugees and immigrants (e.g., Semyonov et al., 2004; Stansfield & Stone, 2018; Verkuyten, 2009a). However, research has focused less on why exactly threat is associated with negative attitudes. One likely reason is that threat elicits negative emotions that influence how people think and act. Studies on people's attitudes towards refugees have found that negative emotions such as anger predict less support for refugee groups and immigrants (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Verkuyten, 2009b).

According to appraisal theories (Ellsworth, 2013; Frijda, 2007; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 2013; Scherer, 2009) emotions are reactions to specific situations or events and imply action tendencies (Frijda, 2007; Roseman & Smith, 2001). People interpret a situation or event in terms of whether it is harmful or dangerous and whether one is able to cope with it. This cognitive appraisal triggers an emotional experience (Ellsworth, 2013; Moors, 2014) with the related tendency to act (Frijda, 2007; Roseman, 2013). For example, anger towards an outgroup may result in a desire to confront

the outgroup by opposing governmental policies that benefit that group (Mackie et al., 2008).

Perceived threats can elicit specific emotions depending on the threatening outgroup (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg et al., 2000), but a particular outgroup can also trigger a range of negative emotions. For instance, an outgroup can be perceived as forming a realistic, symbolic and security threat and can also evoke feelings of intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1996b, 2000). We examine whether the perception of Syrian refugees as posing a threat to Turkish society is associated with various negative emotions such as anger, annoyance, hatred, fear, and disgust and whether these negative emotions, in turn, are associated with less support for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Thus, we expected negative emotions to mediate the relation between perceived outgroup threat and support for Syrian refugees.

4.1.2. Roles of descriptive and injunctive norms

Feelings of threat and the related negative emotions are likely to play a role in attitudes and behaviours, but so are social norms (Mackie et al., 2008). Norms can have different implications when they are situationally salient (Jacobson et al., 2011) and can function, for example, to suppress the expression of prejudicial attitudes (Crandall et al., 2002; Crandall et al., 2013; Paluck, 2009). However, in contrast to research on collective action tendencies towards refugees and immigrants (e.g., Saab et al., 2017; Schmid et al., 2014), there is very little research examining whether and how norms are related to responses to refugees (e.g., Schindler & Reese, 2017). In considering normative influences it is relevant to distinguish between descriptive norms (what is done) and injunctive norms (what ought to be done) because both have separate motivational implications. Thus, for a proper understanding of normative influences, it is important to consider them separately, especially in situations where both might be simultaneously meaningful. Furthermore, we focus on negative descriptive norms and positive injunctive norms. What is commonly done in relation to refugees can be negative, whereas what is morally approved tends to be positive. Additionally, we examine the importance of perceived descriptive and injunctive norms of significant others (family and friends) rather than in society in general because Turkey is considered a more collectivistic society in which people tend to rely on family and close friends (Mango, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002).

Descriptive norms describe what most people actually do and, thus, what is the typical or *normal* reaction. These norms provide information about what in a specific situation or towards a particular event is the likely and common reaction and thereby help to make sense of one's own experiences. When people feel a certain way and their significant others have similar feelings, this provides evidence for the adequacy and appropriateness of their feelings. Descriptive norms provide input for adequate information processing and personal decision-making (Cialdini et al., 1990; Cialdini et al., 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Hence, we argue that the extent to which family and friends are perceived to feel threatened by Syrian refugees has an

impact on the negative emotions that one experiences, particularly on the association between one's own perceived threat and negative emotions. More specifically, the feeling of outgroup threat is expected to be more strongly associated with negative emotions when people perceive that more family members and friends also feel threatened by Syrian refugees. In that case, the descriptive norm validates one's own feeling of threat with the related negative emotions, making these normal and understandable: "I feel threatened, my family and friends also feel threatened, so it is understandable that I have negative emotions".

Injunctive norms do not specify what others actually do but what ought to be done. They refer to rules and beliefs of what constitutes morally (dis)approved conduct and entail the promise of social and moral sanctions. Injunctive norms serve the interpersonal goal of maintaining social relationships (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) and tend to relate to moral issues such as harm and fairness (Haidt, 2013; Turiel, 2002). These norms stipulate what is morally right and wrong, and although they have an all-or-nothing quality (Aramovich et al., 2012; MacCallum et al., 2002), their impact in terms of sanctions can be expected to be stronger when more family members and friends subscribe to them. Thus, the injunctive norm to help refugees is probably stronger when a higher number of one's friends and family members consider it a moral duty to help and support refugees. A stronger injunctive norm can be expected to be associated with stronger personal endorsement of support for Syrian refugees.

Negative emotions towards Syrian refugees might undermine the positive impact of injunctive norms. Due to their negative emotions, people cannot live up to the moral demands of injunctive norms. The negative emotions might overpower their moral concerns and justify their lack of support. Social concerns about one's moral image are taxing, and moral lapses are likely when people feel emotionally involved (Ellemers, 2017). This is more likely for the refusal to support and help someone, which as an omission rather than a commission, may be perceived as less blameworthy compared to actively engaging in harmful and unfair behaviour (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).

4.1.3. Refugees in Turkey

Turkey has been a hot spot for refugees for decades, with people arriving mainly from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria (Turkish Grand National Assembly, 2018). However, the refugee issue became particularly controversial with the flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey starting in 2011. As Turkey is part of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees, Syrian refugees were not considered refugees in legal terms and hence did not benefit from refugee rights. Yet, as a neighbouring country, Turkey granted temporary protection status to the Syrian refugees with an open-door policy, no forced return to Syria, and an unlimited length of stay in Turkey (Kaya, 2016). Additionally, although refugee camps were built specifically

for the Syrian refugees, today the majority of them live in various parts of Turkey, leaving only 1.5% of the refugees in camps (Erdoğan, 2022).

With the increasing number of Syrian refugees, the debates on their integration and permanent stay in Turkey increased as well. One debate evolved around the question of whether the support provided to Syrian refugees is at the expense of the state's support to Turkey's citizens (Taştan et al., 2017). Today, Syrian refugees can work legally, can get treatment at state hospitals, can get an education at state schools or in temporary education centres, and can establish their own businesses. Additionally, municipalities organize activities for supporting refugees and provide food, clothing, and blankets. Although the Syrian refugees do not have the right to apply for Turkish citizenship, 110,000 of them benefited from the 'exceptional' citizenship right – which is granted to those who made an economic, scientific, or academic contribution in Turkey – and obtained Turkish citizenship (Erdoğan, 2022). In light of these developments, the perception of Turkish people regarding the support given to Syrians tends to be rather negative (İçduygu, 2015). According to a public opinion survey, 56% of the Turkish public indicated to be not in favour of giving any support to the Syrian refugees, neither directly nor through a relief foundation (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016). Public opinion surveys also revealed that there is a significant percentage of Turkish people had perceived Syrian refugees as a threat. For example, a recent study showed that 87% of the respondents agreed that unemployment had increased in Turkey after the arrival of Syrian refugees and 62% agreed that crime had increased (Taştan et al., 2017). Other research that investigates the representation of Syrian refugees on social media showed that the majority of people view Syrian refugees as a threat to the future and welfare of Turkey (Özdemir & Özkan, 2016).

4.2. METHOD

4.2.1. Participants

The current study was conducted by the research company Optimar in 2015 (May-June). A survey-taker administered the paper-and-pencil questionnaire. The respondents participated voluntarily and it took about 20-25 minutes to complete the survey. This study was conducted with 605 Turkish citizens (43.6% male, 56.4% female). The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 81 years (M = 39.6, SD = 14.4). Addresses of the respondents were selected by the Turkish Statistical Institute from the following cities which vary in terms of the ratio of Syrian refugees to each city's population: Istanbul (33.4% of participants), Antalya (22.3%), Gaziantep (13.7%), Adana (13.4%), Samsun (8.9%), and Kilis (8.3%). Samsun and Antalya have a low number of Syrian refugees (0.1% and 0.5%, respectively), Adana and İstanbul have a somewhat higher ratio of Syrian refugees (2.5% and 2.6% respectively), and Gaziantep and Kilis have a relatively high number of Syrian refugees (14% and 41% respectively) (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2017; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016).

In total, 87.6% of the participants ethnically self-identified as Turks, 6.9% as Kurds, 1.5% as Arabs, 0.8% as Zaza, and 3.1% was from other ethnic groups.

4.2.2. Measures

Perceived threat items measured realistic threat which is likely to elicit emotional reactions. The following items were used based on previous research (Stephan & Stephan, 1996a; Stephan et al., 2000): "Because of the Syrian refugees in Turkey, the people living in Turkey have more difficulties in finding a job," "Because Syrian refugees are taking jobs away from the people living in Turkey, unemployment will increase in Turkey," "Because of Syrian refugees the people living in Turkey have more difficulties in finding or renting a house," "I worry about the rise of stealing, begging, and attacking of the people living in Turkey," and "I worry about Syrian refugees spreading diseases." All items were rated on a 5-point agree-disagree scale (1 = *certainly not agree* and 5 = *certainly agree*) and an average score of these items was computed (α = .85).

Negative emotions were measured by asking participants about their feelings towards Syrian refugees using the following emotion terms: "Anger," "Annoyance," "Hatred," "Fear," "Disgust." All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *not at all* and 5 = *very much*) and an average score of these items was computed (α = .85)[4].

The dependent variable – *support for Syrian refugees* – was measured with five items: "Syrian refugees should be accepted as citizens of Turkey," "Syrian refugees can open Syrian stores, restaurants, real state agencies, and other business," "Syrian refugees need to be able to reside in Turkey permanently," "Syrian refugees need to be able to legally work in Turkey," and "Children of Syrian refugees should be allowed to go to regular schools." All items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *very unlikely* and 5 = *very likely*) and an average score of these items was computed (α = .86).

Descriptive norms were measured by asking participants how many of their friends and how many of their family members think that Syrian refugees in Turkey "Are working illegally in Turkey," and "Are affecting Turkish economy badly." These four items refer to negative views about Syrian refugees and were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = *none* and 5 = *all of them*; α = .86).

Injunctive norms were measured by asking participants how many of their friends and how many of their family members think that Syrian refugees in Turkey: "Ought to be helped," "Their children ought to be allowed to go to regular schools," and "Ought to be able to benefit from state hospitals" (5-point scale; 1 = *none* and 5 = *all of them*). An average score of these six items was computed (α = .91).

The items for the perceived descriptive norms and for perceived threat were similar in content; therefore, we examined whether these items formed two sep-

4 The 'fear item' showed the weakest load (.33) on the underlying factor of negative emotions.

arate factors. A factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation showed that the descriptive norm items loaded on the first factor (> .43; on the second factor highest load = .29) that explained 44.29% of the variance. Perceived threat items loaded on the second factor (> .51; on the first factor highest load = .03) that explained 24 % of the variance.

Further, we examined whether the items for perceived descriptive norms and injunctive norms loaded on two separate factors. This was found to be the case with the descriptive norm items loading on the first factor (> .53; on the second factor highest load = .25) that explained 43.72% of the variance and the injunctive norms loading on the second factor (> .65; on the first factor highest load = .11) that explained 28.62 % of the variance.

Last, because the items for injunctive norms and those measuring participants' own support for Syrian refugees were similar in content, we examined their empirical distinctiveness. Injunctive norms loaded on the first factor (> .56; on the second factor highest load = .29) that explained 51.23 % of the variance. Support for Syrian refugees' items loaded on the second factor (> .53; on the first factor highest load = .31) that explained 18.54% of the variance.

4.3. RESULTS

4.3.1. Descriptive findings

Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations of each construct as well as their intercorrelations. One sample *t*-tests indicate that perceived threat and the perception of descriptive norms are above the midpoint of the scales, $t(598) = 30.69$ and $p < .001$, $t(589) = 16.98$, $p < .001$, respectively, and that negative emotions, injunctive norms, and support for Syrian refugees are below the midpoint of the scales, $t(600) = -17.10$, $p < .001$, $t(591) = -4.12$, $p < .001$, and $t(597) = -.19.19$, $p < .001$, respectively. While perceived threat is positively correlated with descriptive norms and with negative emotions, it is negatively correlated with support for Syrian refugees. Descriptive norms are also positively correlated with negative emotions and negatively associated with support for Syrian refugees. Injunctive norms are negatively correlated with perceived threat and positively with descriptive norms. Negative emotions are negatively correlated with injunctive norms as well as with support for Syrian refugees. Perceptions of descriptive and injunctive norms are not significantly associated.

Table 4.1. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs

Constructs	1	2	3	4	5	*M*	*SD*
1. Perceived threat	—					4.08	.09
2. Descriptive norms	.30**	—				3.80	1.14
3. Injunctive norms	-.39**	.06	—			2.81	1.12
4. Negative emotions	.49**	.17**	-.42**	—		2.25	1.07
5. Support for Syrian refugees	-.59**	-.24**	.50**	-.45**	—	2.23	.99

*$^{**}p < .01$.

4.3.2. Descriptive norms and support for Syrian refugees

To test our model for descriptive norms and following recent recommendations for (moderated) mediation analyses (Yzerbyt et al., 2018), we first used stepwise regression analyses to examine the path from perceived threat to negative emotions, and then the indirect path from negative emotions to support for Syrians.

Table 4.2. Stepwise multiple regression analysis predicting negative emotions towards Syrian refugees in Turkey

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Variables	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***
Age	-.01 (.00)	-.02 (.00)	-.02 (.00)
Gender	-.10 (.09)*	-.04 (.08)	-.04 (.08)
Non-Turkish	-.05 (.13)	-.00 (.12)	-.01 (.12)
Antalya	-.21 (.12)***	-.11 (.11)	-.09 (.11)*
Adana	-.13 (.14)**	.02 (.14)	.04 (.14)
Samsun	-.26 (.16)***	-.19 (.14)***	-.19 (.14)***
Kilis	.00 (.17)	.02 (.15)	.03 (.15)
Gaziantep	-.02 (.14)	.02 (.13)	.05 (.13)
Perceived threat		.45 (.06)***	.48 (.06)***
Descriptive norms		.05 (.04)	.04 (.04)
Perceived threat x Descriptive norms			.13 (.05)**
R^2	.09	.29	.30
ΔR^2	.09	.19	.02
ΔF	7.32***	77.00***	11.81**

*$p < .05$. *$^{**}p < .01$. *$^{***}p < .001$.

First, in predicting negative emotions towards Syrian refugees we added in Step 1 age, gender, cities (dummy variables, with Istanbul as the reference category), and ethnicity (Turkish reference category) as demographic control variables. In Step 2, we added perceived threat and perceived descriptive norms, and in Step 3 the predicted interaction between threat and descriptive norms. As shown in Table 4.2, perceived threat predicts negative emotions, and this association was moderated by descriptive norms. As expected, and shown in Figure 4.1, simple slope analysis showed that the relationship between perceived threat and negative emotions is stronger when descriptive norms are stronger (+1 *SD*) $B = .78$, $SE = .08$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.625, .927], as compared to weaker descriptive norms (-1 *SD*) $B = .44$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.327, .561].



Figure 4.1. Interaction effect between perceived threat and descriptive norms on negative emotions.

Subsequently, we tested the full moderated mediation model by using the process macro (Model 7) with 10,000 bootstraps (Preacher et al., 2007). The results indicated that higher perceived threat is associated with more negative emotions, $B = .61$, $SE = .05$, $t = 12.23$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.507, .702] and that stronger negative emotions are associated with lower support for Syrian refugees, $B = -.18$, $SE = .03$, $t = -5.34$, $p < .001$,

95% CI [-.245, -.113]. The indirect statistical effect of perceived threat on support for Syrian refugees through negative emotions is significant (-.03), as the 95% CI [-.050, -.012] does not contain zero. The direct effect of perceived threat on support for Syrian refugees is also significant, B = -.50, SE = .04, t = -11.93, p < .001, 95% CI [-.583, -.419]. This means that there is partial mediation through negative emotions and that there are other factors that also explain the association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees. As expected, the mediation relationship was qualified by a significant interaction between perceived threat and descriptive norms, B = .15, SE = .04, t = 3.53, p <.001 with a 95% CI [.066, .233]. When descriptive norms are strong (+1 *SD*) the indirect statistical effect of perceived threat on support for Syrian refugees through negative emotions is stronger B = -.14, SE= .03, CI [-.203, -.083], than when descriptive norms are weak (-1 *SD*) B = -.08, SE= .02, CI [-.115, -.047].

Table 4.3. Stepwise multiple regression analysis predicting support for Syrian refugees in Turkey

	Step 1	**Step 2**	**Step 3**
Variables	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***	**β *(SE)***
Age	-.02 (.00)	-.01 (.00)	-.01 (.00)
Gender	.02 (.08)	-.06 (.06)**	-.07 (.06)*
Non-Turkish	.12 (.12)**	.09 (.09)**	.08 (.09)*
Antalya	.35 (.10)***	.22 (.08)***	.21 (.08)***
Adana	.38 (.12)***	.41 (.10)***	.42 (.10)***
Samsun	.20 (.14)***	.13 (.12)***	.13 (.12)***
Kilis	.09 (.15)*	.11 (.12)**	.18 (.10)***
Gaziantep	.12 (.12)**	.18 (.10)***	.18 (.10)***
Negative emotions		-.22 (.03)***	-.25 (.03)***
Injunctive norms		.45 (.03)***	.44 (.03)***
Injunctive norms x Negative emotions			-.11 (.03)***
R^2	.18	.48	.49
ΔR^2	.18	.30	.01
ΔF	15.56***	164.88***	12.96***

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

4.3.3. Injunctive norms and support for Syrian refugees

We conducted a regression analysis predicting support for Syrian refugees. In Step 1, we again added age, gender, cities, and ethnicity as demographic control variables.

In Step 2, we added negative emotions and injunctive norms, and in Step 3 the interaction between both smeasures. As shown in Table 4.3, stronger perceived injunctive norms are associated with higher support, whereas more negative emotions are associated with lower support for Syrian refugees. Additionally, negative emotions moderate the association between injunctive norms and support for Syrian refugees. As shown in Figure 4.2, simple slope analysis indicates that the relationship between injunctive norms and support for Syrian refugees is weaker when negative emotions are stronger (+1 *SD*) $B = .28$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.195, .365], compared to lower negative emotions (-1 *SD*) $B = .48$, $SE = .04$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.402, .559][5].



Figure 4.2. Interaction effect between injunctive norms and negative emotions on support for Syrian refugees.

5 The values of the confidence intervals differ a bit from the values reported in the published article.

4.3.4. Alternative models

We tested three alternative models to further investigate our predictions about the roles of descriptive and injunctive norms in the association between perceived threat, negative emotions, and support for Syrian refugees.

First, we used Model 8 (Preacher et al., 2007) to examine whether descriptive norms not only moderate the association between perceived threat and negative emotions but also the direct association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees. Results showed that the latter interaction is not significant $B = .05$, $SE = .03$, $p = .126$. Second, we used Model 14 and tested if descriptive norms moderate the association between negative emotions and support for Syrian refugees, and the interaction effect also was not significant $B = .02$, $SE = .03$, $p = .517$. Third, we used Model 7 and examined if injunctive norms moderate the association between perceived threat and negative emotions and this interaction was not significant $B = -.08$, $SE = .04$, $p = .062$. Furthermore, injunctive norms also did not moderate the direct association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees $B = -.05$, $SE = .03$, $p = .120$; Model 15 (Preacher et al., 2007).

4.4. DISCUSSION

The relatively high number of refugees residing in Turkey has led to debates about the extent to which there is societal support for Syrian refugees. While some Turkish people try to help Syrian refugees (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2016) others are more hostile and reluctant to do so (İçduygu, 2015). The aim of this study was to examine why and when Turkish people support Syrian refugees. The why question was examined in terms of perceived threat and the related negative emotions, and the when question in terms of the moderating roles that descriptive and injunctive norms might play in the association of threat-based negative emotions and support for Syrian refugees.

Regarding *why* perceived threat was associated with less support for Syrian refugees, our findings show that this association was partly explained by negative emotions. This is in line with previous research demonstrating that perceived threat is associated with more negative emotions towards outgroups (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Verkuyten, 2009b), and that, negative emotions are associated with less support for refugees and other minority groups (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg, et al., 2000). This pattern of findings suggests that the cognitive appraisal of Syrian refugees - as spreading diseases, affecting Turkish economy and social peace negatively - are associated with negative emotions that in turn is related to lower willingness to support Syrian refugees. However, the fact that there remains a significant direct effect of perceived threat on support for Syrian refugees indicates that not only negative emotions are responsible from this association. For example, negative beliefs and stereotypes about Syrian refugees might also be important for the association between perceived threat and support for Syrian refugees.

Regarding *when* perceived threat is associated with less support for Syrian refugees, we found that stronger descriptive norms were not associated with negative emotions but rather strengthened the association between perceived threat and negative emotions. This pattern of findings is consistent with research showing that descriptive norms provide information about the appropriateness of one's own feelings and help to provide input for decision-making (Cialdini et al., 1990, 1991; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Thus, the extent to which family and friends are perceived to feel threatened by Syrian refugees was not associated with one's own emotional reactions but rather moderated the association between perceived threat and negative emotions. For the Turkish participants, feelings of threat from Syrian refugees seem to be validated and normalized by the perception that family and friends also feel threatened by Syrian refugees. This perception confirms the appropriateness of their own negative feelings towards Syrian refugees.

We also examined the possibility that perceived injunctive norms - whether family and friends think that one ought to help and support Syrian refugees - is associated with people's support, and this was found to be the case. The stronger the perceived injunctive norms the more strongly people supported Syrian refugees. This suggests that people's own support is influenced by what friends and family find morally right, but it might also, in part, indicate that people believe that their friends and family have the same moral views as they do. However, perceived injunctive norms were less strongly associated with support when participants had more negative emotions towards Syrian refugees. This is an important finding that indicates that negative emotions towards refugees make it more difficult to follow positive injunctive norms of significant others.

4.4.1. Limitations

Some limitations should be considered. First, the data was collected through a two-stage cluster sampling method which means that it is not possible to generalize the results to the Turkish population. However, we collected data from six cities that vary in terms of the ratio between the hosting population of the city and the Syrian refugees who are being hosted, and we found theoretically derived associations between the constructs that were examined. Future studies could apply a longitudinal design and use more representative data. Additionally, the focus was on attitudes towards support for Syrian refugees in Turkey and future research could investigate the same model for attitudes towards other refugee groups and in other countries.

Second, we did not consider societal norms, positive emotions, and moral concerns that theoretically could also be relevant for people's responses to refugees. For example, not only significant others but also the perception of what is commonly done (descriptive norms) and commonly approved (injunctive norms) in Turkish society might be important for people's emotional reactions to Syrian refugees and their willingness to support them. Furthermore, the role of positive descriptive norms (i.e., information about helping initiatives) and whether these

motivate people to support refugees or rather lead to social loafing could be studied (Schindler & Reese, 2017). Additionally, future research could examine support for refugees in relation to other factors and processes such as intergroup contact, humanitarian considerations, and empathy, and also education, religiosity, and political orientation.

4.5. CONCLUSION

This study is the first to assess the associations between perceptions of threat, negative emotions, descriptive and injunctive norms, and support for Syrian refugees in a key geographical context that hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees. Our aim was to examine when and why perceptions of threat are associated with less support for Syrian refugees. The findings make three relevant contributions to the literature. One is that negative emotions are partly responsible for the association between perceived threat and less support for Syrian refugees. Second, perceived negative descriptive norms can normalize one's own perceived threat and its association with one's negative emotions. Third, the perceived moral norms of family and friends are important for people's support for refugees but one's negative emotions towards Syrian refugees reduce the importance of injunctive norms for support. In the light of these findings, a policy priority for civil society organizations and political campaigns trying to improve the relations between Turks and Syrian refugees is to address the threat perceptions of Turkish people about Syrian refugees. Additionally, people are sensitive to positive injunctive norms, meaning, for example, that policies emphasizing humanitarian concerns might stimulate people to care about the fate of the innocent victims of conflict and disaster (e.g., Nickerson & Louis, 2008; Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018). However, to be effective, these policies should address the negative emotions (anger, annoyance, disgust) that people can have because of feeling threatened by Syrian refugees.

4

CHAPTER 5

Attitudes and helping behaviour towards Syrian refugees: The roles of contact, similarity, and settlement intentions[6]

6 The data and related statistical syntax used in that chapter are stored in the faculty storage facility. A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Yitmen, Ş., Verkuyten, M., Martinovic, B. & Erdoğan, M. (2021). Acceptance of Syrian refugees in Turkey: The roles of perceived threat, intergroup contact, perceived similarity, and temporary settlement. Çakal, H. & Raman, H. Ş. (Eds.) Intergroup Relations in Turkey, Oxford, United Kingdom: Routledge. Şenay Yitmen co-designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Maykel Verkuyten and Borja Martinovic were involved in the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript. Murat Erdoğan was involved in data collection and corrected the manuscript.

5.1. INTRODUCTION

There are 5.7 million Syrian refugees worldwide and Turkey hosts the highest number of these refugees in the world (UNHCR, 2022d). The instability in Syria escalated especially after 2012 (İçduygu, 2015) and the number of Syrians in Turkey increased dramatically (UNHCR, 2022d). At the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey adopted an open-door policy in accepting Syrians into the country. In its 10th year, the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey raises many urgent questions, especially regarding Syrians' future stay in Turkey. It is still unclear whether most Syrian refugees will return to their country or stay in Turkey permanently. According to a recent survey among Syrian refugees (N = 1418), 57.7% want to have both Turkish and Syrian citizenship, and 51.8% think that they will not return to Syria. A survey among Turkish citizens (N = 2271) also shows that 48.7% believe that none of the Syrian refugees will return to Syria (Erdoğan, 2020).

Considering the forced stay of Syrian refugees and the uncertainty about their future presence in Turkey, an important question is whether Turkish people have an 'open-door' attitude towards Syrian refugees. Recent research shows that around three in five Turkish citizens are hesitant to accept Syrians into their own social circles (Erdoğan, 2020). And some reports reveal that Syrians are the new target group for hate speech in Turkey (Kaya & Kıraç, 2016). Research on how people react towards immigrants and refugees tends to focus on these sorts of negative reactions, prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour in particular (e.g. Landmann et al., 2019; Lee & Fisk, 2006; Rucker et al., 2019). In contrast, in this Chapter, we discuss our research that examines the willingness of Turkish citizens to accept Syrian refugees into their social circles, support their integration, and their intention to provide help.

Studying positive attitudes and behavioural intentions towards refugees is important because the well-known positive-negative asymmetry indicates that positive evaluations and behaviours differ from negative ones (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). For Turkish reactions towards Syrian refugees, researchers have found that positive attitudes and intentions are not simply the counter-image of negative attitudes and intentions (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018). Thus, studying only negative reactions and ignoring more positive ones is one-sided and does not present a fuller picture of how Turkish citizens respond to the presence of Syrian refugees (Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017). Furthermore, research shows that not all host-refugee dynamics are negative and that there are opportunities for positive interactions between members of both groups (e.g., Thravalou et al., 2020). For instance, intergroup contact can be important for more positive reactions and considering a host population that shares cultural similarities with Syrian refugees might help us to understand under what conditions cultural similarity predicts more positive attitudes. The perceived permanent or rather temporary stay of Syrian

refugees in Turkey might be especially important for understanding whether and why Turkish people tend to socially accept these refugees.

The aim of the current research, therefore, is to investigate whether intergroup contact and perceived similarity between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees are associated with social acceptance (Erdoğan, 2015), whether lower perceived threat accounts for this association, and whether the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance depends on Turkish citizens' perception of Syrian refugee settlement (permanent, temporary). We will explain the different theoretical propositions in the next sections and we tested these empirically by analyzing three large sample surveys.

5.1.1. Intergroup contact and perceived similarity

There are various reasons why people accept and support refugees, such as feelings of sympathy (Thravalou et al., 2020) and empathy (Glen et al., 2019; Vassilopoulos et al., 2020), and the endorsement of humanitarian values (Verkuyten et al., 2018b; Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018). In addition, intergroup contact and perceived intergroup similarities might be particularly relevant (Allport, 1954; Callens et al., 2019; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2010; Poslon & Lasticova, 2019). Syrian refugees increasingly live in urban areas where they have more contact with Turkish citizens (Erdoğan, 2020) and this might lead to more positive attitudes among the Turks (Bağcı et al., 2020). Additionally, perceived similarity is likely to be important because people might perceive Turks and Syrian refugees as sharing their Islamic religion with the related cultural values and practices (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2017). Focusing on both contact and similarity allows us to examine whether these two intergroup factors play a similar role in predicting social acceptance of Syrian refugees.

Most research to date has examined the role of intergroup contact in outgroup attitudes and these studies predominantly focus on the reduction of prejudice (Hewstone, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Turner et al., 2007). There are only a few empirical studies that show that intergroup contact can actually increase positive reactions such as outgroup helping intentions (Johnston & Glasford, 2018), support for migrants (Graf & Szcesny, 2019), and social acceptance (see Güler et al., 2022; Koç & Anderson, 2018). According to intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Hewstone, 2015; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011), contact enables group members to learn about each other and to improve outgroup feelings and beliefs In line with this reasoning, we expect that more frequent contact between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees will foster mutual understanding and acceptance and will therefore be associated with higher acceptance of Syrians in one's own social circles.

Similar to studies on intergroup contact, research on perceived similarity often focuses on the negative effect of dissimilarity on intergroup attitudes such as increased group distinctiveness (Brown & Lopez, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2003) and ingroup favouritism (Roccas & Schwartz, 1993). However, perceived similarity is also found to improve attitudes towards immigrants (Ford, 2011; Heath & Richards,

2019; Rodriguez et al., 2017) and more so than actual similarity (Mallett et al., 2008; Pinel & Long, 2012). One explanation for the association between perceived similarity and positive attitudes is offered by belief-congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960) which posits that similarity in beliefs between the self and others triggers more positive intergroup attitudes and behaviours. This is in line with similarity-attraction theory which suggests that similarity confirms our worldview which makes similar others more attractive (Montoya et al., 2008). Further, self-categorization theory posits that people expect to agree with those who are considered similar to the self (Turner, 1991). Therefore, we expect perceived similarity to be associated with Turkish citizens' social acceptance of Syrian refugees.

5.1.2. Perceived threats

Refugees typically need settlement services, affordable housing, access to healthcare and jobs and may require other scarce resources that can invoke feelings of threat in members of the host society (McLaren, 2003; Schneider, 2008). In addition, refugees might have a different cultural identity and other traditions and beliefs than members of the host community. Perceptions of threat are one of the most important predictors of negative outgroup attitudes (Croucher et al., 2013; Stephan et al., 2005; Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008), and different potential sources of threat (whether real or imagined) can affect people's attitudes and behavioural intentions towards refugees (Blinder, 2015; Landmann et al., 2019). For example, if members of the receiving society believe that immigrants take away jobs and other economic resources, they tend to have more negative attitudes towards newcomers (Card et al., 2005; Esipova et al., 2015). Thus, investigating whether intergroup contact and perceived similarity are associated with reduced feelings of perceived threat is relevant for understanding and fostering more positive attitudes.

Additionally, contact promotes mutual understanding and familiarity between groups (Hewstone, 2015) and reduces uncertainty and anxiety about how to behave towards outgroup members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). For example, a study by Koç and Anderson (2018) showed that (vicarious) contact increases social acceptance through reduced intergroup anxiety among Syrian refugees and American citizens. Another study found that intergroup contact between Turkish people and various outgroups in Turkey reduced perceived threat which in turn increased social acceptance of these outgroups (Bilali et al., 2018). Hence, we expect that intergroup contact will be associated with reduced feelings of threat from Syrian refugees which, in turn, will be associated with higher social acceptance.

Likewise, feelings of threat are less likely if one considers someone to be similar to oneself and thereby more familiar. For instance, one study revealed that perceived similarity led to group-level interactions by reducing feelings of anxiety (West et al., 2014). Other studies also found that intra-group interactions pose less stress and anxiety than inter-group interactions (Dovidio et al., 2002; Pearson et

al., 2008; Trawalter et al., 2009). In line with this reasoning, we expect perceived similarity to be related to lower feelings of threat which, in turn, will be associated with increased social acceptance of Syrian refugees, support for their rights, and helping intentions towards them.

5.1.3. The role of perception of refugee settlement

Research has examined if the associations between perceived similarity and contact with social acceptance of minority groups depend on whether the intergroup context is competitive or not (Brown, 1984, Gaertner et al., 1989; Grant, 1993; Gonzales & Brown, 2003; Kuchenbrandt et al., 2013). Intergroup contact theory suggests that when ingroup and outgroup members are not in a competitive relationship, contact is more likely to lead to more positive intergroup attitudes because of lower feelings of threat (Allport, 1954; Kalogeraki, 2019).

If Syrian refugees are seen as permanent residents of Turkey, Turkish citizens may view them more as long-term competitors for scarce resources, as having a greater cultural impact on Turkish society, and as being more likely to claim equal rights and challenge the social status of Turkish citizens. In contrast, if Turks believe that refugees are only temporarily in Turkey, they may not consider these refugees as long-term competitors, for example, on the labour market and for various provisions. Furthermore, when Syrian refugees are perceived as temporary residents, short term concerns – such as being hospitable and wanting to help Muslim brothers (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018) - may be more important than long term competitive considerations (Thravalou et al., 2020). And the perception of Syrian refugee settlement as temporary may go together with the belief that one's ingroup position and status is stable and that the group boundaries are not challenged.

This reasoning implies that we can expect Turkish citizens to show more social acceptance of Syrian refugees when they perceive these refugees as temporary rather than permanent settlers. Perceiving Syrians as temporarily or permanently settled is also likely to have an impact on the expected associations between similarity, threat, and acceptance. Specifically, perceived permanency of Syrian refugee settlement can imply that Turkish citizens view a more competitive future relationship with Syrians, compared to Turkish citizens who think that Syrians will only stay in Turkey temporarily. Therefore, it is likely that perceived similarity is more strongly associated with reduced feelings of Syrian refugee threat and therefore with higher social acceptance among Turkish citizens who think that Syrian refugees will stay temporary in Turkey, compared to those who think that they will settle permanently in the country. Thus, even though Turkish citizens might perceive Syrian refugees as being culturally similar, this may not translate into social acceptance if they perceive Syrian refugees as permanent settlers in Turkey.

5.1.4. The current research

We investigated whether intergroup contact and perceived similarity between self-identified Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees are associated with social acceptance through perceived threat and whether the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance depends on Turkish citizens' perception of Syrian refugee settlement. We empirically tested the different predictions with three large sample surveys. Study 1 (N= 605) focused on the frequency of contact between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees and whether contact predicts more social acceptance through perceived threat. Study 2 (N= 2649) goes beyond Study 1 and focuses on whether perceived similarity is associated with social acceptance, support for integration and actual behaviour (help). Study 3 (N= 1861) examines whether perceived similarity translates into less perceived threat which, in turn, relates to less social acceptance, especially for those who view Syrian refugees as temporary rather than permanent settlers.

5.2. STUDY 1

In Study 1 we examined whether more frequent contact with Syrian refugees is associated with higher social acceptance of these refugees and whether perceived outgroup threat accounts for the association between contact and social acceptance.

5.2.1. Method

5.2.1.1. Data and participants

Data were collected by the research company Optimar in 2015 (April and May) by means of face-to-face surveys that took about 20 minutes to complete. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from Utrecht University's ethical board. Respondents (N = 605), all of whom participated voluntarily, were Turkish citizens aged between 18 and 81 (M = 39.6, SD = 14.4) and 56.4% were female. A large majority (87.6%) ethnically self-identified as Turks, but other ethnicities were also represented (6.9% Kurds, 1.5% Arabs, 0.8% Zaza, and 3.1% other).

Participants were reached through a two-stage cluster sampling method and the addresses of the participants were obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute. In the first stage, clusters were formed that involved 100 addresses and in the second stage, 10 addresses were selected through a systematic sampling from each cluster. Data were collected in six Turkish cities, namely, Istanbul (33.4% of participants), Antalya (22.3%), Gaziantep (13.7%), Adana (13.4%), Samsun (8.9%), and Kilis (8.3%). These cities vary in terms of the ratio of the Syrian refugee population to the host population: Gaziantep and Kilis have a relatively high number of Syrian refugees (14% and 41% respectively), Adana and İstanbul have a lower ratio of Syrian refugees (2.5% and 2.6% respectively), and Samsun and Antalya have a much lower number

of Syrian refugees (0.1% and 0.5%, respectively) (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2017; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016).

5.2.1.2. Measures

Our data consisted of one single-item measure (frequency of contact) and two latent constructs (perception of outgroup threat and social acceptance of Syrian refugees). The questions were first formulated in English and then translated to Turkish. *Frequency of contact* was measured by the following item: "How often do you meet and get in contact with a Syrian refugee?" Participants responded to this item on a 5-point scale (1 = never, 2 = once, 3 = a few times, 4 = regularly, and 5 = often).

Perceived threat was assessed with the following items based on previous research and which assess the cultural dimension of threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1996a; Stephan et al., 2000;): "The cultural identity of Turkey is being threatened by the increasing number of Syrian refugees," "The norms and values of Turkey are being threatened due to the presence of Syrian refugees," "The Syrian refugees are undermining the culture of Turkey." Participants responded to the items on a 5-point agree-disagree scale ranging from (1) = certainly disagree to (5) = certainly agree, and an average score for these items was computed (α = .94).

The dependent variable *social acceptance* was measured by the following three items adapted from the social distance scale (Bilali et al., 2018; Bogardus, 1967; Koç & Anderson, 2018) to capture positive behavioural intentions: "I would share the same table with a Syrian refugee," "I would become friends with a Syrian refugee," "I would add a Syrian refugee on Facebook as a friend." Participants responded to the items on a 5-point agree-disagree scale ranging from (1) certainly disagree to (5) certainly agree, and an average score for these items was computed (α = .87).

Control variables were age, gender (1= male, 0 = female), city of residence (1= Istanbul, 0 = other cities), and ethnicity (1= Turkish, 0= other ethnicities) as these are found to be associated with contact and attitudes towards refugees and therefore might as third variables account for the associations found (e.g., Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2018).

5.2.2. Results

5.2.2.1. Measurement model

To check whether the items measuring perceived threat and social acceptance form separate latent constructs, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis using the Maximum Likelihood estimator in M*plus* version 8.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017). The two-factor model had a good fit: $x^2(8) = 14.872$; CFI =.997; SRMR = .013; RMSEA [90% CI] = .038 [.00, .067]. All items loaded on the designated factor with standardized loadings higher than .72. This shows that perceived threat and social acceptance are two empirically distinct constructs.

5.2.2.2. Descriptive results

The mean scores and correlations of the variables are displayed in Table 5.1. One sample *t*-tests showed that perceived threat of Syrian refugees was significantly above the mid-point of the scale $t(596) = 9.08$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, frequency of contact with Syrian refugees and social acceptance were below the mid-point of the scale $t(604) = -.18.16$, $p < .001$ and $t(596) = -.15.60$, $p < .001$, respectively. This means that participants on average had a low frequency of contact with Syrian refugees, that they perceived them as a cultural threat, and were reluctant to socially accept them. The correlations between the main constructs were significant and in the expected direction.

Table 5.1. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs, Study 1

Constructs	1	2	3	*Range*	*M*	*SD*
1. Frequency of contact	—			1-5	2.02	1.33
2. Perceived threat	-.17***	—		1-5	3.46	1.25
3. Social acceptance	.36***	-.46***	—	1-5	2.22	1.22

Note. The means of multiple-item measures were obtained based on averaged observed scores, ***$p < .001$.

5.2.2.3. Social acceptance

To determine whether frequency of contact is associated with social acceptance indirectly via perceived threat, we estimated a mediation model in M*plus* version 8.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017).

The standardized coefficients from the mediation model are shown in Figure 5.1. The total effect of frequency of contact on social acceptance was positive and significant. Furthermore, both the association between frequency of contact and perceived threat and the association between perceived threat and social acceptance were negative and significant. The indirect effect of frequency of contact on social acceptance through perceived threat was positive and significant, $B = .056$, $SE = .017$, $p = .001$, and the 95% confidence interval did not include zero [.024, .089]. The remaining direct effect of frequency of contact on social acceptance was still positive and significant. Thus, we found evidence for partial mediation of perceived threat in the association between frequency of contact and social acceptance.



Figure 5.1. Mediation model, Study 1 (N = 605).

Note. Standardized estimates are displayed, with standard errors in round brackets and the total effect in square brackets. Latent variables are displayed in ovals, ***p < .001.

5.2.3. Discussion

In line with the theoretical expectations, the findings demonstrate that Turkish citizens who have more frequent contact with Syrian refugees show more social acceptance of this group of refugees. This is partially explained by perceptions of outgroup threat: those with more contact tend to perceive Syrian refugees as less threatening to the Turkish culture, and in turn are more willing to welcome Syrian refugees into their social circle. Yet, we did not examine whether constructs that conceptually replicate frequency of contact also predict social acceptance of Syrian refugees.

5.3. STUDY 2

In Study 2 we tried to conceptually replicate these findings by, first, focusing on perceived similarity as a less examined construct compared to intergroup contact on which there is a very large literature (Dovidio et al., 2011; Hewstone, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). We expected that perceived similarity would also be positively associated with social acceptance via lower perceived threat. Second, we focused on realistic, rather than cultural, threat to examine whether the findings generalize to this form of threat. Furthermore, in Study 2 we considered social acceptance and support for refugee rights as measures of positive attitudes towards Syrian refugees, and we additionally focused on the provision of help to Syrian refugees as a self-reported retrospective behavioural measure.

5.3.1. Method

5.3.1.1. Data and participants

Data were collected by the research company *Konda* in February 2016 by a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that took about 12 minutes to complete. Respondents

(*N* = 2649) were Turkish citizens aged between 17 and 88 (*M* = 41.02, *SD* = 14.7), 47% were female, and they all participated voluntarily. A large majority (80.9%) ethnically self-identified as Turkish, but other ethnicities were also represented (12.1% Kurds, 1.7% Arab, 1.6% Zaza and 2.6% other). For this national sample, twenty-seven cities and surrounding villages from 12 subregions of Turkey were selected and households were randomly selected by the interviewers. Participants were reached in 136 villages and neighbourhoods across these 27 cities.

5.3.1.2. Measures

Perceived similarity was measured by the following item (Ionnou et al., 2017): "I think Syrians have a similar culture as us." Participants responded to this item on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = partially disagree, 4 = partially agree, and 5 = agree, 6= strongly agree).

Perceived threat was a latent variable with the following items based on previous research (Stephan & Stephan, 1996a; Stephan et al., 2000) that tap into realistic threat, and specifically the economic and safety aspects of it: "Asylum-seekers are a threat to the economy in Turkey," "Employment opportunities decreased because of the Syrian asylum-seekers," "Cities are more insecure because of asylum-seekers." Participants responded to the items on a 6-point agree-disagree scale ranging from (1) = strongly disagree to (6) = strongly agree and they formed a reliable scale (α = .70).

Social acceptance was measured by the following four items based on previous research in Turkey (Bilali et al., 2018; Bogardus, 1967; Koç & Anderson, 2018): "Is it OK if there are Syrians in your city?" "Is it OK if there are Syrians in your neighbourhood, in your place of work or at your school?" "Is it OK if there are Syrians in your apartment building or in your friends' circle?" "Is it OK if there are Syrians in your household or in your family?" The response category was yes (1) and no (2). We counted the number of yes (1) responses and obtained a scale ranging from 0 to 4, they formed a reliable scale (α = .79).

The second dependent variable *support for refugee rights* was a latent variable and measured by the following items (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2019): "Asylum-seekers should be granted a work permit", "Asylum-seekers should be granted a residence permit", "Asylum-seekers should only dwell in the camps." Participants responded to the items on a 6-point agree-disagree scale ranging from (1) = strongly disagree to (6) = strongly agree and, after reversing the third item, they formed a reliable scale (α = .71).

The third dependent variable was *help*, which was a categorical variable measured by the following item (Thravalou et al., 2020): "Have you provided any assistance to Syrian asylum-seekers directly or through an organization?" The responses were: (1) = "I donated money, food, clothing via an organization", (2) = "I helped the Syrians whom I saw in my neighbourhood", (3) = "I did not offer any help". Participants could only select one answer and those who selected either the first or the

second answer were coded as (1) 'having provided help', whereas those who selected the third answer were coded as (0) 'not having provided help'.

We again controlled for age, gender (1= female, 0 = male), city of residence (1= Istanbul, 0 = other cities), ethnicity (1= Turkish, 0= other ethnicities). In contrast to Study 1, in Study 2 a measure of education was available and we additionally controlled for it as education is typically associated with attitudes towards immigrants (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2015).

5.3.2. Results

5.3.2.1. Descriptive results

The mean scores and correlations are displayed in Table 5.2. One sample *t*-tests showed that perceived threat of Syrian refugees was again significantly above the mid-point of the scale $t(2587)= 35.68$, $p< .001$. Perceived similarity with Syrian refugees and support for refugee rights were below the mid-point of the scale $t(2602) = -28.40$, $p<.001$ and $t(2578) = -13.71$, $p<.001$, respectively. These findings demonstrate that respondents on average perceived little similarity saw refugees as a realistic threat, and were not very supportive of their rights. Social acceptance of Syrians was rather low as well, with people on average accepting Syrians in less than two out of four given contexts. However, almost half of the participants said to have provided help to refugees. The correlations between the main constructs were significant and in the expected direction.

Table 5.2. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs, Study 2

Constructs	1	2	3	4	*Range*	*M*	*SD*
1. Perceived similarity	—				1-6	2.60	1.61
2. Perceived threat	-.31***	—			1-6	4.44	1.34
3. Social acceptance	.27***	-.42***	—		0-4	1.81	1.41
4. Support for refugee rights	.29***	-.47***	-.44***	—	1-6	3.11	1.46
5. Help	.11***	-.16***	.22***	.19***	0/1	.48	.50

Note. The means of multiple-item measures were obtained based on averaged observed scores, ***$p < .001$.

5.3.2.2. Explanatory results

We again estimated a mediation model by using Maximum Likelihood estimator in M*plus* version 8.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017) to investigate whether perceived threat mediates the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance, support for refugee rights, and helping intentions. We controlled for gender, city, ethnicity, age, and education in relation to the mediator and the de-

pendent variables. Due to missing values on observed variables, our final sample consisted of 2564 participants. We again estimated confidence intervals with 5000 bootstraps (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We also allowed for the dependent variables to correlate with each other. The model had a good fit $x^2(39) = 198.660$ $p < .001$; CFI = .935; SRMR =.034; RMSEA [95% CI] = .040 [.035, .046].

Figure 5.2 shows the standardized coefficients from the mediation model. The total effects of similarity on social acceptance, support for refugee rights, and help were positive and significant. Furthermore, the association between perceived similarity and perceived threat was negative and significant. The associations between perceived threat and social acceptance, support for refugee rights, and help were also negative and significant. The indirect effects of perceived similarity on social acceptance, support for refugee rights, and help through perceived threat were positive and significant and the 95% confidence intervals did not include zero, $B = .146$ [.123, .171], $SE = .012$, $p < .001$, $B = .164$ [.136, .194], $SE = .014$, $p < .001$, and $B = .046$ [.031, .063], $SE = .008$, $p < .001$, respectively. The mediation was only partial in relation to social acceptance and support for refugee rights as the remaining direct effects of perceived similarity on these two outcomes were positive and significant. However, perceived threat fully mediated the association between perceived similarity and help as evidenced by a non-significant remaining direct effect.

5.3.3. Discussion

Focusing on perceived similarity instead of contact we conceptually replicated the findings of Study 1. Turkish citizens who think that they are more similar to Syrian refugees perceive these refugees less as a threat to the economy and security of Turkey, and hence tend to show higher social acceptance of this group of immigrants. Importantly, we found the same pattern of results for another outcome measure, namely, support for refugee rights, showing that perceived similarity and threat guide not only attitudes about acceptance of Syrian refugees as neighbours, colleagues, and friends but also attitudes about their rights to get a permit and live in decent conditions. Furthermore, the findings also replicated to self-reported help offered to refugees, indicating that perceptions of similarity and threat are also relevant explanations for (self-reported) positive behaviour.



Figure 5.2. Mediation model, Study 2 (N = 2564).

Note. Standardized estimates are displayed, with standard errors in round brackets and the total effect in square brackets. Latent variables are displayed in ovals, ***p < .001.

5.4. STUDY 3

In Study 3 we examined whether the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance through perceived threat (both cultural and realistic threat) depends on whether people perceive Syrians' settlement in Turkey as temporary or permanent. We expected perceived temporary stay to be associated with higher social acceptance compared to the perception that Syrian refugees will stay permanently in the country. Furthermore, we expected that similarity would be particularly strongly related to social acceptance via lower perceived threat for Turkish people who perceive Syrian refugees' stay in Turkey as temporary. Thus, we expected the associations between the main constructs to depend on whether Syrian refugees were seen to settle temporarily or permanently in Turkey.

5.4.1. Method

5.4.1.1. Data and participants

Data were collected by the research company Anar in April 2017 by means of computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). Participants (N = 2089) voluntarily agreed to take part in the survey. They were adult Turkish citizens (18.9% aged 18-24, 27% aged 25-34, 23.7% aged 35-44, 17.9% aged 45-54, 8.1% aged 55-64, and 4.4% above 65) and 49.3% were female. A large majority (81.9%) ethnically self-identified as Turkish, 13.5% were Kurds/Zaza, and 2.9% belonged to other ethnic minorities. Data were collected in 26 cities located in 12 subregions of Turkey, and 19.6% of the participants lived in cities close to the Syrian border where Syrian refugees are more densely concentrated.

5.4.1.2. Measures

Perceived similarity was measured with the same item as in Study 2. *Perceived threat* was a latent variable and was assessed with the following items based on previous research (Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan & Stephan, 1996a) that tap into both cultural as well as economic and safety threats: "To what extent do you feel the following concern with respect to Syrian refugees: I think that they will harm me, my family and my kids", "I think that they are going to harm our society," "I think that they are going to harm Turkish economy," "I think that they are going to take away our jobs from us," "I think that they are going to harm the socio-cultural structure of Turkey," "I think that they harm societal morality and peace by engaging in crimes like violence, stealing, smuggling, and prostitution." Participants responded to the items on a 5-point scale (1 = I don't feel at all, 2 = I don't feel, 3 = I neither feel nor don't feel, 4 = I feel, 5 = I feel very much) and the items formed a reliable scale (α = .81).

To measure *social acceptance* and similar to Study 1 (Bilali et al., 2018; Bogardus, 1967; Koç & Anderson, 2018), participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following social distance questions regarding Syrians: "I could

marry a Syrian," "I would not mind if my brother/sister married a Syrian," "I'd allow my kid to get married to a Syrian," "I don't mind if Syrian families move to the neighbourhood I live," "I would not mind moving to a neighbourhood which is populated densely by Syrians," "I would not mind living in the same apartment with a Syrian," "I would not mind if Syrian children attended at the same school as my kids," "I would not mind working at the same place with a Syrian," "I could establish a business partnership with a Syrian." Participants responded to the items on a 3-point scale (1 = I agree, 2 = I partly agree, 3 = I disagree) and the items formed a reliable scale (α = .86).

Settlement perception of Syrians was measured by the following item: "Do you believe that the Syrians will go back to their country when the war is over?" Participants responded to the item on a 5-point scale (1 = None of them would return, 2 = Although some of them would return, the majority would stay in Turkey, 3 = Half would return, half would stay in Turkey, 4 = The majority would return, less than half would stay in Turkey, 5 = Almost all of them would return, very few would stay in Turkey).

We again controlled for age, education, gender (1= female, 0 = male), city of residence (1= Istanbul, 0 = other cities) and ethnicity (1= Turkish, 0= other ethnicities).

5.4.1.3. Analysis

To test our hypothesis that the path in the mediation model from similarity to threat differs depending on settlement perceptions, we grouped the participants into three categories: 1) people who think that none of the Syrian refugees will return to Syria ("permanent settlement perception"), (2) people who think that some or half of the Syrian refugees will return to Syria ("mixed settlement perception"), and (3) people who think that most or all of the Syrian refugees will return to Syria ("temporary settlement perception"). We first fitted a measurement model and then estimated a multiple-group mediation model. Next to testing the hypothesized moderation, this method allowed us to inspect whether the remaining two paths from similarity to acceptance and from threat to acceptance differ across the three groups of participants. In addition, we conducted two robustness checks, one with two alternative categorizations of the participants, and one with a latent interaction model in which settlement perception was used as a continuous scale. Due to missing values on observed variables (N = 140), our final sample for the multiple-group mediation model was reduced to 1949, with 767 participants in the permanent, 878 in the mixed, and 304 in the temporary settlement perception group.

5.4.2. Results

5.4.2.1. Measurement model

Perceived threat was again treated as a latent variable, and to find out whether this construct has the same meaning for the three groups of participants that differ in

their perception of Syrian refugee settlement, we constrained the loading of the items to be the same across the groups, thereby testing for metric invariance. Establishing metric invariance is a precondition for testing the structural paths for meaningful group comparisons (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). The metric model had a good fit $x^2(37) = 295.750$ $p < .001$; CFI = .971; SRMR =.034; RMSEA [95% CI] = .102 [.091, .113], and this fit was not significantly worse than the fit of the configural model in which the loadings were allowed to vary across groups ($\Delta x^2(10) = 14.567$, $p = .149$). So there is evidence of metric invariance, which means that the latent factor perceived threat has the same meaning across the three groups. Therefore, we use the metric model as a basis for estimating a multi-group mediation model.

Table 5.3. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of the main constructs presented for the whole sample as well as separately for the three subgroups that differ in settlement perception, Study 3

Constructs	**1**	**2**	**3**	***Range***	***N***	***M***	***SD***
All participants							
1. Perceived similarity	—			1-5	2023	1.84	.91
2. Perceived threat	-.39***	—		1-5	2077	3.31	1.05
3. Social acceptance	.41***	-.49***	—	1-3	2072	1.63	.63
4. Settlement perception	.28**	-.27**	.31**	1-5	2040	2.12	1.22
Permanent Settlement Perception	*1*	*2*	*3*	*Range*	*N*	*M*	*SD*
1. Perceived similarity	—			1-5	781	1.56	.78
2. Perceived threat	-.25***	—		1-5	789	3.27	1.23
3. Social acceptance	.29***	-.34***	—	1-3	793	1.41	.50
Mixed Settlement Perception	*1*	*2*	*3*	*Range*	*N*	*M*	*SD*
1. Perceived similarity	—			1-5	889	1.93	.89
2. Perceived threat	-.33***	—		1-5	913	3.00	1.27
3. Social acceptance	.36***	-.46***	—	1-3	913	1.65	.63
Temporary Settlement Perception	*1*	*2*	*3*	*Range*	*N*	*M*	*SD*
1. Perceived similarity	—			1-5	314	2.22	1.03
2. Perceived threat	-.47***	—		1-5	328	2.43	1.19
3. Social acceptance	.42**	-.57***	—	1-3	324	1.95	.69

Note. The means of multiple-item measures were obtained based on averaged observed scores, $^{**}p < .01.$, $^{***}p < .001$.

5.4.2.2. Descriptive results

One sample *t*-tests showed that perceived threat of Syrian refugees was again significantly above the mid-point of the scale $t(2076)= 13.473$, $p< .001$. In contrast, perceived similarity with Syrian refugees, social acceptance of Syrian refugees, and settlement perception were below the mid-point of the scale $t(2022)= -57.476$, $p< .001$, $t(2071) = -27.46$, $p<.001$, and $t(2039) = -32.60$, $p<.001$, respectively. These findings reveal that respondents on average had a low perception of similarity, that they perceived refugees as a threat, were not very willing to accept them and thought on average that most Syrian refugees will stay in Turkey permanently.

As shown in Table 5.3 the correlations between the main constructs are significant and in the expected direction. Importantly, participants who more strongly think that Syrian refugees will stay only temporarily in Turkey consider Syrians as being more similar, perceive less threat from Syrians, and accept Syrians more. We additionally compared the three groups of participants with different settlement perceptions with one-way ANOVAs and found significant differences in the means of perceived threat, perceived similarity, and social acceptance, $F(2, 2027) = 57.319$, $p < .001$, $F(2,2027) = 75.017$, $p < .001$, and $F(2,2027) = 90.698$, $p < .001$, respectively. Post-hoc Tukey's tests revealed that all three groups differed significantly from each other ($p_s < .001$). Perceived threat was highest whereas perceived similarity and social acceptance were lowest among those who believed that Syrian refugees would settle permanently in Turkey, followed by the group with mixed settlement perceptions, and then by those who believed that the refugees' stay will be temporary.

5.4.2.3. Explanatory results

We fitted a multi-group mediation model in M*plus* version 8.4 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017). We examined whether the indirect association between perceived similarity, perceived threat, and social acceptance differs in strength for Turkish respondents who perceive Syrian refugee settlement as permanent, temporary or a mixture of both. Perceived threat was a latent construct and social acceptance and perceived similarity were observed variables. We regressed social acceptance on perceived similarity and perceived threat, and we regressed perceived threat on perceived similarity. We controlled for age, education, gender, city, and ethnicity in relation to the mediator and the dependent variables. We estimated confidence intervals with 5000 bootstraps (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The model had a good fit $x^2(112) = 444.353$, $p < .001$; CFI = .964; SRMR =.031; RMSEA [95% CI] = .068 [.061, .074].

Figure 5.3 shows the standardized coefficients for the mediation model. For all three groups and similar to Study 2, the total effect of perceived similarity on social acceptance was positive and significant. Furthermore, the association between perceived similarity and perceived threat was negative and significant for all three groups, and so was the association between perceived threat and social acceptance.



Figure 5.3. A multi-group mediation model, Study 3.

Note. Standardized estimates with standard errors in round brackets and the total effect in square brackets are displayed separately for the permanent (N = 767) / mixed (N = 878) / temporary settlement perceptions (N = 304). Latent variable is displayed in an oval, ***p < .001.

However, when comparing the strength of the associations, we found that the negative path from perceived similarity to perceived threat was the weakest for participants who saw refugees as permanent settlers and the strongest for participants who saw them as staying temporary, while being in-between for participants who thought about half of the refugees would return home (the mixed settlement perception). Similarly, the negative path from perceived threat to social acceptance was the weakest for participants who saw refugees as permanent settlers and the strongest for the participants who saw them as staying temporary. The mixed settlement perception was again in-between.

The indirect effects of perceived similarity on social acceptance through perceived threat were positive and significant for all three groups, but the weakest for participants who saw refugees as permanent settlers B = .043, SE = .009, p < .001, and strongest for participants who saw them as staying temporary B = .162, SE = .025, p < .001, with the mixed settlement perception being in the middle, B = .090, SE = .012, p < .001. The 95% confidence intervals for these indirect paths did not include zero for any of the three groups, 95% $CI_{permanent}$ [.041, .097], 95% CI_{mixed} [.085, .149], and 95% $CI_{temporary}$ [.142, .267]. The mediation was only partial in relation to social acceptance as the remaining direct effects of perceived similarity on social acceptance were positive and significant for all three groups and these did not differ significantly from each other, as Wald test statistics indicate (Wald $_{permanent\ vs.\ mixed}$ = .003, p = .959, Wald $_{permanent\ vs.\ temporary}$ = .611, p = .434).

5.4.3. Discussion

Study 3 conceptually replicates the findings of Study 2 and demonstrated that higher perceived similarity is related to more social acceptance of Syrian refugees

through lower perceived outgroup threat. Furthermore, Study 3 also showed that the strength of this indirect association depends on Turkish citizens' perception of Syrian refugee settlement in Turkey. Thus, the indirect association between perceived similarity and social acceptance differed for the two perceived settlement groups. Even though the indirect path via threat was found also for participants who see Syrian refugees as permanent settlers, perceived similarity was particularly strongly related to less threat and hence to more social acceptance for those who believed that Syrian refugees would stay temporarily.

5.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Most of the studies that investigate attitudes towards immigrants and minority outgroups focus on the negative aspects (Landmann et al., 2019; Lee & Fisk, 2006; Rucker et al., 2019). The current research goes beyond this by focusing on the positive attitudes and behaviours towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. We argued that frequency of contact and perceived similarity would likely be important for these attitudes and behaviours as both are expected to be associated with lower perceived threat (Bilali et al., 2018; Koç & Anderson, 2018; West et al., 2014).

Our findings, first, show that higher intergroup contact predicted more social acceptance through reduced perceived threat. This is in line with research that shows that intergroup contact increases social acceptance (Bilali et al., 2018; Koç & Anderson, 2018). In support of the intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954) it seems that contact between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees weakens feelings of threat which in turn fosters social acceptance of Syrian refugees. These findings indicate that intergroup contact is a relevant predictor of social acceptance, also in a country with a fragile economy and with high numbers of Syrian refugees.

Second, and as a conceptual replication of our intergroup contact finding, we investigated whether cultural similarity is related to more positive attitudes via reduced feelings of threat. Our findings showed that stronger perceived similarity was indeed associated with more social acceptance, more support for the rights of Syrian refugees, and actual helping intentions through perceived threat. These results imply that perceived similarity not only explains intergroup attitudes such as social acceptance and support but also actual (self-reported) behaviour and support for refugee rights. The findings of Study 2 are in line with previous research that shows that perceived similarity matters for positive outgroup attitudes (Havekes et al., 2011; Rodriguez et al., 2017; West et al., 2014). Based on the belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960), similarity–attraction theory (Montoya et al., 2008), and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1991) we argued and found that perceived similarity between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees is associated with less perceived outgroup threat. This finding implies that perceived similarity might foster social acceptance in a country where there are religious and cultural similarities between the host society and the immigrant group.

We further examined the role of the perceived future stay of Syrian refugees in Turkey. When Syrian refugees are considered to become permanent residents of Turkey, they are more likely to be seen as cultural and economic competitors, which makes it more difficult to accept these refugees. The correlational findings show that higher perceived permanent settlement is indeed associated with lower perceived similarity, higher threat and lower social acceptance. Furthermore, the mean levels of perceived similarity and social acceptance were lower among participants who believed that Syrians will settle permanently in Turkey compared to those who believe that they will stay temporary, and the mean level of threat was higher. These findings suggest that Syrian refugees are more strongly seen as competitors if Turkish citizens believe that these refugees will settle permanently in Turkey.

However, in the mediation model, the negative associations between similarity, threat, and acceptance were found to be *weaker* among the group with 'permanent' compared to the group with 'temporary' settlement perceptions. This indicates that among the latter group of Turkish citizens similarity matters more for feelings of threat, and threat matters more for social acceptance. One reason might be that the belief that Syrian refugees are temporary in Turkey implies that they are guests who need to be taken care of and treated well, in line with the central value of positive host-guest relations in Turkish culture (Chemin, 2016). For participants who believe that Syrian refugees will settle permanently in Turkey other factors than perceived similarity are likely to be more important for feelings of threat, such as intergroup competition. Additionally, their social acceptance of Syrians might depend more strongly on beliefs about entitlements and having made societal contributions, rather than on threats per se. According to the threat-benefit model, immigrants could be considered as both posing a threat as well as contributing to the receiving society and these appraisals differently affect people's support for immigrant policies (Tartakovsky & Walsh, 2016).

5.5.1. Limitations

Some limitations need to be considered. First, we used correlational data. This means that the associations between perceived similarity and perceived threat as well as between intergroup contact and perceived threat do not demonstrate directions of influence. Lower perceived threat might also predict more intergroup contact and higher perceived similarity. Future studies could use longitudinal data to investigate the (mutual) directions of influence in Turkish citizens' social acceptance of Syrian refugees. In doing so, it would also be interesting to examine the role of people's political ideology which might have an impact on intergroup contact, perceived similarities as well as feelings of outgroup threat and the acceptance of refugees (e.g. Rowatt, 2019).

Second, for capturing the complexity of the different constructs more extended measures could be used instead of single measures of frequency of contact and perceived similarity. For example, also the quality of contact could be measured be-

cause contact quality might be especially important for outgroup attitudes and helping (e.g., Johnston & Glasford, 2018). Additionally, we examined perceived similarity in terms of culture but a sense of shared faith (Islam) might also be an important basis for the perception of similarity (Yitmen & Verkuyten, 2017). Also, we could not test intergroup contact and perceived similarity within the same study to see if they exert independent effects or influence each other. Future studies could investigate, for instance, whether intergroup contact is associated with less perceived threat through higher perceived similarity. In addition, perceived threat fully accounted for the relationship between perceived similarity and helping intentions towards Syrian refugees, while there could be other factors than perceived threat that explain the relation between similarity with social acceptance and support for Syrian refugee rights. Thus, future studies could consider other mediating constructs, such as perceived contribution, which could have an effect on the association between intergroup contact and perceived similarity and social acceptance (Thravalou et al., 2020).

5.6. CONCLUSION

In spite of these limitations, our research sheds light on the important and timely question of why and when Turkish citizens are more willing to socially accept and support Syrian refugees. The study has three important contributions to the literature. First, it shows that both intergroup contact and perceived similarity play similar roles in social acceptance through perceived threat. This implies that perceived similarity can probably be used as a way for Turkish citizens – who don't have the opportunity to have contact with Syrian refugees – to accept Syrian refugees into their social circles. Second, perceived threat plays an indirect role both in the associations between intergroup contact and social acceptance, as well as between perceived similarity and social acceptance. Furthermore, even when different measures of perceived threat are used, such as economic or cultural threat, intergroup contact and perceived similarity are, via lower feelings of threat, related to more social acceptance. This underlines the significance of perceived threat in attitudes towards refugees. Third, this research is the first to show that the association between perceived similarity and social acceptance through perceived threat is weaker for Turkish citizens who view Syrian refugees as permanent residents in Turkey. This indicates that attitudes towards Syrian refugees depend on Turkish citizens' perceptions of Syrian refugee settlement. Policymakers could take into consideration the changing attitude that Turkish citizens have towards Syrian refugees and that this change may be linked to the competitive context that Syrian refugees may present.

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR CHAPTER 3

In Chapter 3 additional analyses without the humanitarian concern item that mentioned helping ("I should help Syrian refugees because they are humans") yielded the same results. The mediation analysis without control variables for predicting positive behavioural intentions was qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, *B* = -.057, *SE* = .03, *t* = -1.98, *p* = .048 with a 95% CI [-.115, -.001]. The conditional indirect effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions through perceived threat was stronger for high humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) *B* = -.12, *SE* = .03, *p* = .050, 95% CI [-.189, -.056], compared to low humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) *B* = -.09, *SE* = .03, *p* = .050 95% CI [-.154, -.041].

The mediation without control variables for predicting negative behavioural intentions was qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, *B* = -.14, *SE* = .05, *t* = -2.91, *p* = .004 with a 95% CI [-.233, -.045]. The conditional indirect effect of national identification on negative behavioural intentions through perceived threat was less strong for high humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) *B* = .05, *SE* = .002, *p* = ., 95% CI [.019, .094], compared to low humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) *B* = .13, *SE* = .04, *p* = .002, 95% CI [.063, .213].

The mediation analysis with control variables for predicting positive behavioural intentions was qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, *B* = -.052, *SE* = .03, *t* = -1.79, *p* = .073 with a 95% CI [-.108, .005]. The conditional indirect effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions through perceived threat was stronger for high humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) *B* = -.10, *SE* = .03, *p* = .077, 95% CI [-.172, -.038], compared to low humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) *B* = -.08, *SE* = .03, *p* = .077, 95% CI [-.142, -.028].

The mediation with control variables for predicting negative behavioural intentions was qualified by a significant interaction effect between perceived threat and humanitarian concern, *B* = -.13, *SE* = .05, *t* = -2.81, *p* = .005 with a 95% CI [-.227, -.040]. The conditional indirect effect of national identification on positive behavioural intentions through perceived threat was less strong for high humanitarian concern (+1 *SD*) *B* = .05, *SE* = .02, *p* = .003, 95% CI [.020, .098], compared to low humanitarian concern (-1 *SD*) *B* = .12, *SE* = .04, *p* = .003 95% CI [.053, .206].

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING

De afgelopen tien jaar is de wereld getuige van een grote toename van het aantal vluchtelingen. Tegenwoordig woont het grootste aantal vluchtelingen, voornamelijk afkomstig uit Syrië, in Turkije, wat de vraag oproept hoe Turkse mensen reageren op deze groep nieuwkomers: of ze hulp en ondersteuning bieden of hen eerder afwijzen. Mijn doel in dit proefschrift is om de variatie in positieve en negatieve attitudes en de bijbehorende gedragsintenties te beschrijven en te begrijpen. Theoretisch gebruik ik de sociale identiteitsbenadering (Reicher et al., 2010), intergroep contact (Allport, 1954) en intergroep dreiging (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), en empirisch onderzoek ik (1) attitudes ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen en of Turken een onderscheid maken tussen positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties, (2) belangrijkste factoren die met deze attitudes en intenties samenhangen en daarmee eventueel kunnen verklaren, en (3) omstandigheden waaronder mensen een meer positieve of juist meer negatieve houding hebben ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen in Turkije. Deze drie onderzoeksvragen hebben betrekking op het "wat", "waarom" en "wanneer" van de houding van Turken tegenover vluchtelingen uit Syrië.

De 'wat'-vraag gaat over de vraag of er een verschil is in de gevoelens en houdingen tegenover vluchtelingen en tegenover niet-moslim minderheden, en of mensen onderscheid maken tussen positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties jegens Syrische vluchtelingen: "Zijn gevoelens jegens vluchtelingen groeps-specifiek of weerspiegelen ze meer algemene attitudes tegenover minderheden, en kan een onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen positieve en negatieve attitudes (RQ1)?

De tweede vraag is "waarom hebben mensen een positieve of negatieve houding ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen?" (RQ2). Het onderzoek naar deze vraag richt zich op belangrijke sociaal-psychologische constructen die naar verwachting direct en indirect verband houden met positieve en negatieve houdingen van Turkse mensen tegenover Syrische vluchtelingen. De aandacht gaat in het bijzonder uit naar nationale en religieuze identificaties van Turkse mensen, hun steun voor multiculturalisme, waargenomen dreiging en negatieve emoties, contact tussen groepen, en veronderstelde overeenkomsten tussen Turkse mensen en Syrische vluchtelingen.

De "wanneer"-vraag heeft betrekking op de kwalificerende (d.w.z. modererende) rol van sommige factoren in de onderzochte associaties: "wanneer houden de relevante constructen sterker of zwakker verband met positieve en negatieve attitudes tegenover Syrische vluchtelingen?" (RQ3). Specifiek wordt onderzocht of het verband tussen steun voor multiculturalisme en gevoelens jegens Syrische vluchtelingen afhangt van de sterkte van nationale verbondenheid. Verder wordt onderzocht of het verband tussen de waargenomen dreiging en de houding ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen afhangt van humanitaire overwegingen, beschrijvende sociale normen en van de vraag of de vestiging van Syrische vluchtelingen als tijdelijk of permanent wordt gezien. Verder wordt onderzocht of negatieve emoties

jegens Syrische vluchtelingen een modererende rol spelen in de associatie tussen morele normen en steun aan Syrische vluchtelingen.

Bij het onderzoek naar deze drie brede vragen probeer ik op drie manieren bij te dragen aan de literatuur. Ten eerste gaat het bestaande onderzoek meestal over de houding ten aanzien van 'vrijwillige' migranten (bijv. Ceobanu, & Escandell, 2010; Davidov & Meuleman, 2012), en er is relatief weinig onderzoek naar de houding ten aanzien van vluchtelingen (bijv. Esses et al., 2017). De houding ten opzichte van vluchtelingen en 'vrijwillige' immigranten kan echter verschillen (De Coninck, 2020a; Verkuyten et al., 2018a). Daarom draagt mijn focus op de houding tegenover vluchtelingen bij aan ons begrip van hoe deze onderbelichte en kwetsbare groep migranten wordt gezien.

Ten tweede richt het merendeel van het onderzoek zich op negatieve attitudes tegenover immigranten en vluchtelingen (bijv. Landmann et al., 2019; Rucker et al., 2019). Gezien de positief-negatieve asymmetrie – die aangeeft dat positieve evaluaties en intenties vaak verschillen van negatieve (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten & Mummendey, 2000) – en de schaarse studies naar positieve houdingen ten opzichte van vluchtelingen, is het onduidelijk of de processen achter positieve en negatieve attitudes vergelijkbaar zijn of niet. In dit proefschrift probeer ik een breder inzicht in de houding ten opzichte van vluchtelingen te ontwikkelen door beide soorten reacties te onderzoeken.

Ten derde is het grootste deel van het onderzoek naar de houding tegenover immigranten en vluchtelingen uitgevoerd in westerse contexten (d.w.z. West-Europa, Noord-Amerika, Australië), met uitzondering van enkele studies die zijn gedaan in niet-westerse contexten zoals het Midden-Oosten (bijv. Srehan, 2020; Ceyhun, 2020) en de Kaukasus (Makashvili et al., 2018). Het is echter onduidelijk of de gevonden verbanden ter verklaring van positieve en negatieve attitudes in westerse contexten generaliseren naar niet-westerse situaties, en de Turkse context in het bijzonder. Turkije verschilt van westerse landen doordat het een relatief fragiele economie heeft met zeer grote aantallen Syrische vluchtelingen die competitieve sociale situaties creëren (De Coninck et al., 2021b), en doordat het een relatief collectivistisch land is (Mango, 2004; Oyserman et al., 2002) met burgers die een bijzonder sterke band hebben met de Turkse natie en haar nationale waarden (Konda Research & Consultancy, 2010). Bovendien kent Turkije geen vluchtelingenstatus toe aan niet-Europese asielzoekers (Adalı & Türkyılmaz, 2020), wat betekent dat er geen permanent niet-Turks immigrantenminderheid is en ook zijn er veel overeenkomsten (bijv. islamitische religie en cultuur) tussen Turken en Syriërs. Met mijn onderzoek wil ik bijdragen aan het beperkte onderzoek dat buiten westerse landen is uitgevoerd en daarmee ook aan het Turkse publieke debat en beleid met betrekking tot de relaties tussen Turkse burgers en Syrische vluchtelingen.

INZICHTEN

In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik de aard van gevoelens jegens Syrische vluchtelingen onderzocht door deze te vergelijken met de gevoelens tegenover gevestigde minderheden in Turkije: Grieken, Armeniërs en joden. De bevindingen laten zien dat de overeenkomst tussen de gevoelens tegenover niet-moslimgroepen en jegens Syrische (moslim)vluchtelingen aanzienlijk is, maar niet volledig samenvallen. Dit impliceert dat de gevoelens jegens Syrische vluchtelingen en tegenover de niet-moslimgroepen met elkaar verband zijn, maar (deels) ook empirisch verschillend. Bovendien is het zo dat sterkere nationale identificatie verband houdt met meer negatieve gevoelens jegens Syrische (islamitische) vluchtelingen, terwijl religieuze identificatie vooral negatief verbonden is met gevoelens tegenover niet-islamitische minderheden. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat de houding tegenover zowel vluchtelingen en gevestigde minderheidsgroepen negatief is, maar de processen achter deze houdingen lijken te verschillen, aangezien verschillende sociale identiteiten verschillende van belang zijn voor de gevoelens jegens vluchtelingen en die tegenover niet-moslimminderheden.

Ik heb verder onderzocht of er een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat Turken inderdaad een dergelijk onderscheid maken en suggereren dat de processen achter positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties verschillend zijn. Voor Turkse burgers die humanitaire overwegingen sterker onderschrijven, ging de waargenomen dreiging gepaard met minder negatieve gedragsintenties. Interessant is echter dat sterkere humanitaire overwegingen er ook voor zorgde dat waargenomen dreiging geassocieerd was met minder positieve gedragsintenties. Deze bevindingen impliceren dat er een onderscheid is te maken tussen positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties jegens Syrische vluchtelingen.

De resultaten in Hoofdstuk 3 laten verder zien dat sterkere nationale identificatie samengaat met meer waargenomen dreiging en als gevolg daarvan met meer negatieve en minder positieve gedragsintenties. Dit geeft aan dat Turken met een sterkere nationale identificatie een sterkere neiging hebben om Syrische vluchtelingen als een bedreiging te zien, wat zich kan vertalen in meer negatieve en minder positieve gedragsintenties jegens Syrische vluchtelingen.

Hoofdstuk 4 laat verder zien dat waargenomen dreiging samengaat met negatieve emoties zoals angst, woede, en walging, en die gevoelens gaan op hun beurt samen met een lagere steun voor de rechten van Syrische vluchtelingen. Dit geeft aan dat de perceptie van Turkse mensen dat Syrische vluchtelingen ziektes verspreiden, de Turkse economie schaden en maatschappelijke waarden bedreigen, kan worden vertaald in negatieve emoties en verminderde steun. Maar deze emoties verklaarden statistisch gezien slechts gedeeltelijk waarom waargenomen dreiging verband hield met houdingen ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen: dit geeft

aan dat er meerdere factoren zijn die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het verband tussen waargenomen dreiging en houding ten aanzien van Syrische vluchtelingen.

Om erachter te komen welke factoren belangrijk zijn voor positieve gevoelens jegens vluchtelingen, heb ik onderzocht of intergroepscontact en gepercipieerde gelijkenis samenhangen met meer sociale acceptatie van Syrische vluchtelingen (het accepteren van Syrische vluchtelingen in de privésfeer en vriendschappen). De eerste studie van Hoofdstuk 5 liet zien dat meer intergroepscontact tussen Turkse burgers en Syrische vluchtelingen samengaat met een sterkere sociale acceptatie van Syrische vluchtelingen als gevolg van verminderde symbolische dreiging. De tweede studie van Hoofdstuk 5 toonde aan dat waargenomen gelijkenis niet alleen samengaat met sociale acceptatie en steun voor de maatschappelijke integratie van Syriërs, maar ook met zelf-gerapporteerd feitelijk gedrag, namelijk het helpen van Syrische vluchtelingen. Bovendien verklaarden realistische en symbolische bedreigingen het statistische verband tussen waargenomen gelijkenis en sociale acceptatie. Dus ook in een land met een fragiele economie en een zeer groot aantal Syrische vluchtelingen, zijn intergroepscontact en waargenomen gelijkenis, verbonden met meer sociale acceptatie door verminderde waargenomen dreiging.

Naast het 'waarom' is het ook belangrijk om te vragen wanneer deze associaties zwakker of sterker zijn. De bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat het onderschrijven van multiculturalisme samengaat met meer positieve gevoelens jegens vluchtelingen, maar alleen voor Turken met een relatief lage nationale identificatie. Dit houdt in dat instemming met multiculturalisme niet altijd een positievere houding ten opzichte van vluchtelingen bevordert en dat dit afhangt van de kracht van de nationale betrokkenheid van Turkse burgers. Bovendien kunnen hoge identifiers gevoeliger zijn voor hun nationale cultuur en zouden ze multiculturalisme kunnen zien als een bedreiging voor de nationale cultuur en identiteit.

Verder laat Hoofdstuk 3 zien dat voor Turkse burgers die humanitaire overwegingen sterker onderschreven, waargenomen dreiging minder sterk geassocieerd was met negatieve gedragsintenties. Interessant is echter dat wanneer de humanitaire overwegingen relatief sterk waren, nationale identificatie sterker werd geassocieerd met positieve gedragsintenties door waargenomen dreiging, dan met negatieve gedragsintenties. Dit suggereert dat in een context van gepercipieerde dreiging het onderschrijven van humanitaire overwegingen averechts kan werken en dat de matigende rol van het onderschrijven van deze overwegingen anders kan uitpakken voor positieve en negatieve gedragsintenties.

In Hoofdstuk 3 vond ik dat waargenomen dreiging verband hield met minder steun voor Syrische vluchtelingen, maar in Hoofdstuk 4 bleek dit verband af te hangen van beschrijvende sociale normen binnen de eigen familiare kring. Dit suggereert dat de waargenomen dreiging van Syrische vluchtelingen kan worden bevestigd en gevalideerd door de perceptie dat de meeste familieleden en vrienden dezelfde opvattingen hebben, waardoor de waargenomen dreiging wordt vertaald

in meer negatieve emoties jegens Syrische vluchtelingen en daarmee in minder steun voor Syrische vluchtelingen.

In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik onderzocht of de perceptie van Turkse mensen over de tijdelijke of permanente vestiging van Syrische vluchtelingen de samenhang tussen waargenomen gelijkenis en sociale acceptatie verzwakt of versterkt. De bevindingen laten zien dat degenen die denken dat Syrische vluchtelingen permanent in Turkije zullen blijven, Syrische vluchtelingen als minder overeenkomstig zien, meer dreiging ervaren en hen minder opnemen in hun sociale kringen. Dit suggereert dat Turkse burgers die Syrische vluchtelingen als permanente bewoners van Turkije zien, hen sterker als concurrenten ervaren.

Concluderend laat dit proefschrift zien hoe een zeer kwetsbare groep migranten (Syrische vluchtelingen) wordt gezien en beoordeeld in een weinig bestudeerde maar geopolitiek relevante (Turkse) setting; dat vergelijkbare negatieve attitudes nog geen vergelijkbare processen hoeft te impliceren; dat positieve en negatieve attitudes niet simpelweg de twee kanten van dezelfde medaille hoeven te zijn; dat belangrijke sociaal psychologische constructen direct en indirect samenhangen met de houding ten opzichte van Syrische vluchtelingen; en dat deze verbanden kunnen afhangen van verschillende overtuigingen, overwegingen en omstandigheden.

REFERENCES

REFERENCES

Adalı, T., & Türkyılmaz, A. S. (2020). Demographic data on Syrians in Turkey: What do we know? *International Migration*, *58*, 196-219. doi: 10.1111/imig.12614

Adam-Troian, J., & Bağci, S. C. (2021). The pathogen paradox: Evidence that perceived COVID-19 threat is associated with both pro- and anti-immigrant attitudes. *International Review of Social Psychology, 34*, 1–15. doi: 10.5334/irsp.469

Akrami, N., Ekehammar, B., & Bergh, R. (2011). Generalized prejudice: Common and specific components. *Psychological Science*, *22*, 57-59. doi: 10.1177/0956797610390384

Aktaş, V., Tepe, Y. K., & Persson, R. S. (2021). Investigating Turkish university students' attitudes towards refugees in a time of Civil War in neighboring Syria. *Current Psychology*, *40*, 553-562. doi: 10.1007/s12144-018-9971-y

Al-Srehan, H. S. (2020). The impact of social adjustment policy on Syrian refugees. *Journal of International Studies*, *13*, 85-97. doi: 10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-3/6

Albada, K., Hansen, N., & Otten, S. (2020). The boundaries of tolerance: How perceived cultural distance in values affects host society members' attitudes towards migrants. In *EASP 2020 General Meeting Krakow (postponed)*.

Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. *Reading*, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Alkan, H. (2021). The gift of hospitality and the (un) welcoming of Syrian migrants in Turkey. *American Ethnologist*, *48*, 180-191. https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1111/amet.13012

Anderson, J., & Ferguson, R. (2018). Demographic and ideological correlates of negative attitudes towards asylum seekers: A meta-analytic review. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, *70*, 18-29. doi: 10.1111/ajpy.12162

Anderson, J. R., Stuart, A., & Rossen, I. (2015). Not all negative: Macro justice principles predict positive attitudes towards asylum seekers in Australia. *Australian Journal of Psychology, 67,* 207-213. doi: 10.1111/ajpy.12085Aramovich, N. P., Lytle, B. L., & Skitka, L. J. (2012). Opposing torture: Moral conviction and resistance to majority influence. *Social Influence, 7*, 21-34. doi: 10.1080/15534510.2011.640199

Badea, C., Iyer, A., & Aebischer, V. (2018). National identification, endorsement of acculturation ideologies and prejudice: The impact of perceived threat of immigration. *International Review of Social Psychology*, *31*, 1-10. doi: 10.5334/irsp.147

Bağcı, Ç., Türnüklü, A. & Tercan, M. (2020). Positive intergroup contact decreases the likelihood that prejudicial attitudes become avoidant behavioral tendencies. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 50*, 597-613. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2646

Bansak, K., Hainmueller, J., & Hangartner, D. (2016). How economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers. *Science*, *354*, 217-222. doi: 10.1126/science.aag2147

Başak, C. (2011). *Mülteciler, sığınmacılar ve yasa dışı göçmenler,* Genel yayın No: 686. İçişleri Bakanlığı [*Refugees, aslyum-seekers and illegal immigrants,* General publication No: 686. Ministry of Interior Affairs] http://www.mulkiyeteftis.gov.tr/ortak_icerik/mulkiyeteftis/multeciler.pdf

Bassett, J. F., & Cleveland, A. J. (2019). Identification with all humanity, support for refugees and for extreme counter-terrorism measures. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 7*, 310-334. doi: 10.5964/JSPP.V7I1.678

Beaton, A. M., & Deveau, M. (2005). Helping the less fortunate: A predictive model of collective action. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35,* 1609-1629. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2005.tb02187.x

Bergh, R., Akrami, N., Sidanius, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2016). Is group membership necessary for understanding generalized prejudice? A re-evaluation of why prejudices are interrelated. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 111*, 367. doi:10.1037/pspi0000064

Bergh, R., & Akrami, N. (2017). Generalized prejudice: Old wisdom and new perspectives. In C. G. Sibley & F. K. Barlow (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of the psychology of prejudice* (pp. 438–460). Cambridge University Press.

Bermudez, S. (2020). *Refugees welcome? Cross-European public opinion on asylum seekers following the 2015 crisis* (ARI 119/2020). Real Instituto Elcano Royal Institute. https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ari119-2020-bermudez-refugees-welcome-cross-european-public-opinion-on-asylum-seekers-following-2015-crisis.pdf

Berry, J. W. (2006). Mutual attitudes among immigrants and ethnocultural groups in Canada. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30*, 719–734. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.06.004

Bilali, R. (2014). The downsides of national identification for minority groups in intergroup conflicts in assimilationist societies. *The British Journal of Social Psychology, 53,* 21–38. doi: 10.1111/bjso.12012

Bilali, R. Iqbal, Y., & Çelik, A. B. (2018). The role of national identity, religious identity, and intergroup contact on social distance across multiple social divides in Turkey. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 65,* 73-85. d*oi:* 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.04.007

Blalock, H. M. (1967). *Toward a Theory of Minority-Croup Relations*. John Wiley & Sons.

Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National identity in a united Germany: Nationalism or patriotism? An empirical test with representative data. *Political Psychology, 24,* 289-312. doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00329

Blinder, S. (2015). Imagined immigration: the impact of different meanings of "immigrants" in public opinion and policy debates in Britain. *Political Studies, 63*, 80–100. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12053

Bogardus, E. S. (1967). *A forty year racial distance study*. University of Southern California.

Boztepe, M. (2021, Apr 21). "Türk ve Suriyeli aileler yöresel yemeklerini birbirlerine ikram ederek 'dostluk sofrası' kuracak." [Turkish and Syrian families will serve their traditional food to each other and set a 'friendship table']. *Anadolu Agency.* https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/turk-ve-suriyeli-aileler-yoresel-yemeklerini- birbirlerine-ikram-ederek-dostluk-sofrasi-kuracak-/2224406

Brandt, M.J., & Van Tongeren, D.R. (2017). People both high and low on religious fundamentalism are prejudiced toward dissimilar groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 112,* 76-97. doi: 10.1037/pspp0000076.

Brandt, M.J., Chambers J.R., Crawford, J.T., Wetherell G., & Reyna, C. (2015). The effect of openness to experience on intolerance is moderated by target group conventionality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109,* 549-568. doi:10.1037/pspp0000055.

Brewer, M.B., & Pierce, K.P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31*, 428-437. doi: 10.1177/0146167204271710

Brown, R. J. (1984). The effects of intergroup similarity and cooperative vs. competitive orientation on intergroup discrimination. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 23*, 21-33. doi: 10.1111/J.2044-8309.1984.TB00605.

Brown, L. M., & Lopez, G. E. (2001). Political contacts: Analyzing the role of similarity in theories of prejudice. *Political Psychology, 22,* 279–292. doi:10.1111/pops.2001.22.issue-2

Buhl, T. (1999). Positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination: Meta-analytic evidence. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2*, 51-58. doi: 10.1177/1368430299021004

Cairns, E., Kenworthy J., Campbell, A. & Hewstone, M. (2006). The role of identification, religious group membership and intergroup conflict in moderating and outgroup affect. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 45,* 701-716. doi:10.1348/014466605X69850

Callens, M. S., Meuleman, B. & Valentova, M. (2019). Contact, perceived threat, and attitudes toward assimilation and multiculturalism: Evidence from a majority and minority perspective in Luxembourg. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 50,* 285–310. doi: 10.1177/0022022118817656

Cameron, L., Rutland, A., Brown, R., & Douch, R. (2006). Changing children's intergroup attitudes toward refugees: testing different models of extended contact. *Child Development*, *77*, 1208-1219. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00929.x

Card, D., Dustmann, C., & Preston, I. (2005). *Understanding attitudes to immigration: the migration and minority module of the first European social survey.* (Discussion Paper Series 03/05). Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, Department of Economics, University College London. https://davidcard.berkeley.edu/papers/euroimmig.pdf

Caricati, L. (2018). Perceived threat mediates the relationship between national identification and support for immigrant exclusion: A Cross-National Test of Intergroup Threat Theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *66*, 41-51. https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2018.06.005

Çarkoğlu, A., & Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2013). Uluslararası sosyal saha çalışmaları programı 2013 raporu: Turkiye'de ve dunyada milliyetçilik (International social survey program 2013 report: Nationalism in Turkey and in the world). Istanbul Policy Center, Sabancı University. Retrieved from http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/publication/issp-2013report-dunyada-ve-turkiyedemilliyetcilik

Çelebi, E., Verkuyten, M., Köse, T., & Maliepaard, M. (2014). Outgroup trust and conflict understandings: The perspective of Turks and Kurds in Turkey. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. *40,* 64-75. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.02.002

Çelebi, E., Verkuyten, M., & Smyrioti, A. (2015). Support for Kurdish language rights in Turkey: The roles of ethnic group, group identifications, contact and intergroup perceptions. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39,* 1-18. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2015.1103881

Ceobanu, A. M., & Escandell, X. (2010). Comparative analyses of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration using multinational survey data: A review of theories and research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *36*, 309-328. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102651

Ceyhun, H. E. (2020). Determinants of public attitudes towards immigrants: Evidence from Arab barometer. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, *39*, 100-121. doi: 10.1093/rsq/hdz016

Chemin, E. J. (2016). Guests-hosts relations in the context of the Syrian exodus: a study of Turkish and Syrian populations in two Turkish cities. *Middle East Journal of Refugee Studies, 1*, 49-74. doi: 10.12738/mejrs.2016.1.2.0003

Chiricos, T., Stupi, E., Stults, B. J., & Gertz, M. (2014). Undocumented immigrant threat and support for social controls. *Social Problems*, *61,* 673–92. doi: 10.1525/sp.2014.13137

Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 1015–1026. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.101

Cialdini, R.B., Kallgren, C.A., & Reno R. R. (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct: a theoretical refinement and re-evaluation of the role of norms in human behaviour. *Advanced Experimental Social Psychology, 24,* 201-234. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60330-5

Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (pp. 151–192). McGraw-Hill.

Çırakoğlu, O. C., Demirutku, K., & Karakaya, O. (2021). The mediating role of perceived threat in the relationship between casual contact and attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *34*, 2984-2999. doi: 10.1093/jrs/fez118

Coenders, M., Lubbers, M., Scheepers, P., & Verkuyten, M. (2008). More than two decades of changing ethnic attitudes in the Netherlands. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*, 269. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00561.x

Cottrell, C. A. & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to "prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88,* 770–789. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770

Cowling, M. M., Anderson, J. R., & Ferguson, R. (2019). Prejudice-relevant correlates of attitudes towards refugees: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *32*, 502-524. doi: 10.31219/osf.io/7yxae

Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O'Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82,* 359-378. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.82.3.359

Crandall, C. S., Ferguson, M. A., & Bahns, A. J. (2013). When we see prejudice: The normative window and social change. In C. Stangor & C. S. Crandall (Eds.), *Frontiers of Social Psychology: Stereotyping and Prejudice* (pp. 53-69). Psychology Press.

Crawley, H., Drinkwater, S., & Kauser, R. (2013). *Regional variations in attitudes towards refugees: evidence from Great Britain* (IZA Discussion Paper, No: 7647). Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA). https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/90047/1/dp7647.pdf

Croucher, S. M., Aalto, J., Hirvonen, S., & Sommier, M. (2013). Integrared threat and intergroup contact: An analysis of Muslim immigration to Finland. *Human Communication, 16*, 109-120. doi: 10.1080/03637751.2012.739704

Davidov, E., & Meuleman, B. (2012). Explaining attitudes towards immigration policies in European countries: The role of human values. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *38*, 757-775. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2012.667985

De Coninck, D. (2020a). Migrant categorizations and European public opinion: Diverging attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *46*, 1667-1686. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2019.1694406

De Coninck, D. (2020b). Fear of terrorism and attitudes toward refugees: An empirical test of group threat theory. *Crime & Delinquency*, *68*, 550-571. doi: 10.1177/0011128720981898

De Coninck, D., Rodriguez-de-Dios, I., & d'Haenens, L. (2021a). The contact hypothesis during the European refugee crisis: Relating quality and quantity of (in) direct intergroup contact to attitudes towards refugees. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *24*, 881-901. doi: 10.1177/1368430220929394

De Coninck, D., Ogan, C., & d'Haenens, L. (2021b). Can 'the Other'ever become 'One of Us'? Comparing Turkish and European attitudes toward refugees: A five-country study. *International Communication Gazette*, *83,* 217-237. doi: 10.1177/1748048519895376

De Figueiredo, R. J. P., & Elkins, Z. (2003). Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of ingroup pride. *American Journal of Political Science*, *47*, 171–188. doi: 10.2307/3186100

Deaux, K., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). The social psychology of multiculturalism: Identity and intergroup relations. In V. Benet-Martínez & Y-Y. Hong, (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Multicultural Identity: Basic and Applied Psychological Perspectives* (pp. 118-138). Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199796694.001.0001

Dempster, H., & Hargrave, K. (2017). *Understanding public attitudes towards refugees and migrants* (Working Paper 512). Overseas Development Institute & Chatham House. https://www.refugee-economies.org/assets/downloads/Paper_Dempster_and_Hargrave.pdf

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. E., Kawakami, K., & Hodson, G. (2002). Why can't we just get along? Interpersonal biases and interracial distrust. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 8*, 88–102. doi: 10.1037/1099-9809.8.2.88

Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S.L., & Saguy, T. (2009). Commonality and the complexity of "we": Social attitudes and social change. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13,* 3-20. doi: 10.1177/1088868308326751

Dovidio, J. F., Eller, A., & Hewstone, M. (2011). Improving intergroup relations through direct, extended and other forms of indirect contact. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14*, 147–160. doi: 10.1177/1368430210390555

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2007). Right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. *European Journal of Personality: Published for the European Association of Personality Psychology*, *21*, 113-130, doi: 10.1002/per.614

Edwards, A. (2015). *Global forced displacement hits record high.* UNHCR website: http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html

Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *53,* 161-186. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135228

Ellemers, N. (2017). *Morality and the Regulation of Social Behavior: Groups as Moral Anchors*. Routledge.

Ellsworth, P.C. (2013). Appraisal theory: Old and new questions. *Emotion Review, 5*, 125-131. doi: 10.1177/1754073912463617

Erdoğan, M.M. (2015). Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration. Istanbul Bilgi University Press, Istanbul, ISBN: 978-605-399-369-8. https://www.mmuraterdogan.com/raporlar?pgid=k8ypprcv-c68094cc-7da6-11ea-8 c85-12879e2400f0

Erdoğan, M. M. (2020). *Syrians Barometer: A framework for achieving social cohesion with Syrians in Turkey.* Turkish-German University Migration and Integration Research Center and UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2020/09/SB2019-ENG-04092020.pdf

Erdoğan, M. M. (2022). *Syrians Barometer 2020 - A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey.* https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91511

Erdoğan-Öztürk, Y., & Işık-Güler, H. (2020). Discourses of exclusion on Twitter in the Turkish Context:# ülkemdesuriyeliistemiyorum (# idontwantsyriansinmycountry). *Discourse, Context & Media*, *36,* 1-14. doi: 10.1016/j.dcm.2020.100400

Erişen, C. (2018). Causes and consequences of public attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Turkey. *Contemporary Research in Economics and Social Sciences*, *2*(1), 111-139.

Esipova N., Ray, J., Pugliese, A., & Tsabutashvili, D. (2015). *How the world views migration*. International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/how_the_world_gallup.pdf

Espinosa, A., Guerra, R., Sanatkar, S., Paolini, S., Damigella, D., Licciardello, O., & Gaertner, S. L. (2018). Identity inclusiveness and centrality: Investigating identity correlates of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. *Journal of Social Issues*, *74*, 674-699. doi: 10.1111/josi.12293

Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J.F., Jackson, L.M., & Armstrong, T.L. (2001). The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity. *Journal of Social Issues, 57,* 389-412 doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.00220

Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., Semenya, A., & Jackson, L. M. (2004). Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: The role of national and international identity. In D. Abrams, M. A Hogg, & J. M. Marques (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion* (pp. 317–338). Psychology Press.

Esses, V. M., Wagner, U., Wolf, C., Preiser, M., & Wilbur, C. J. (2006). Perceptions of national identity and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in Canada and Germany. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30*, 653-669. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.07.002

Esses, V. M., Hamilton, L. K., & Gaucher, D. (2017). The global refugee crisis: Empirical evidence and policy implications for improving public attitudes and facilitating refugee resettlement. *Social Issues and Policy Review*, *11*, 78-123. doi: 10.1111/sipr.12028

European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance [ECRI]. (2011). *ECRI report on Turkey* (Fourth monitoring cycle). Council of Europe. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/turkey/TUR-CBC-IV-2011-005-ENG.pdf

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA]. (2016). *Current migration situation in the EU: hate crime*. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2016-november-monthly-focus-hate-crime_en.pdf

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA]. (2019). *Protecting migrant workers from exploitation in the EU: workers' perspectives*. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-severe-labour-exploitation-workers-perspectives_en.pdf

European Union Commission. (2021, Mar 19). *Ten years into the conflict: Syrian integration in Europe.* https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/ten-years-conflict-syrian-integration-europe_en

Finell, E., Olakivi, A., Liebkind, K., & Lipsanen, J. (2013). Does it matter how I perceive my nation? National symbols, national identification and attitudes toward immigrants. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, *54*, 529-535 doi: 10.1111/sjop.12082

Finell, E., & Zogmaister, C. (2015). Blind and constructive patriotism, national symbols and outgroup attitudes. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, *56*, 189-197. doi: 10.1111/sjop.12193

Ford, R. (2011). Acceptable and unacceptable immigrants: How opposition to immigration in Britain is affected by migrants' region of origin. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *37*, 1017-1037. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.572423

Frijda, N. H. (2007). *The laws of emotion.* Erlbaum.

Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J., Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1989). Reducing intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*, 239. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.76.3.388

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *4*, 1-26. doi: 10.1080/14792779343000004

Gaertner, S. L. & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). *Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identity model*. Psychology Press.

Gezer, M. Ü. (2019). Looking through the multicultural glass: Re-examination of Syrian refugee children education in Turkey. *Eurasian Journal of Applied Linguistics*, *5*, 303-322. doi: 10.32601/ejal.599275

Gieling, M., Thijs, J., & Verkuyten, M. (2011). Voluntary and involuntary immigrants and adolescents' endorsement of multiculturalism. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *35*, 259-267. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2010.09.003

Ginges, J., & Cairns, D. (2000). Social representations of multiculturalism: A faceted analysis. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30,* 1345-1370. doi: 10.1111/j.1559- 1816.2000.tb02524.x

Glen, C., Taylor, L., & Dautel, J. (2019). Promoting prosocial behaviour toward refugees: Exploring the empathy attitude-action model in middle childhood. *In Children and Peace: From Research to Action,* (pp. 71-87), Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-22176-8_5

Gonzalez, R., & Brown, R. (2003). Generalization of positive attitude as a function of subgroup and superordinate group identifications in intergroup contact. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 195-214. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.140

Graf, S., Paolini, S., & Rubin, M. (2014). Negative intergroup contact is more influential, but positive intergroup contact is more common: Assessing contact prominence and contact prevalence in five Central European countries. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *44,* 536–547. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2052.

Graf, S., & Sczesny, S. (2019). Intergroup contact with migrants is linked to support for migrants through attitudes, especially in people who are politically right wing. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 73*, 102-106. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2019.09.001

Grant, P. R. (1993). Reactions to intergroup similarity: Examination of the similarity-differentiation and the similarity-attraction hypotheses. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/ Revue Canadienne des Sciences du Comportement*, *25*(1), 28.

Gregurovic, M., Kaufmann, P. R., Zuparic-Iljic, D., & Dujmovic, M. (2019). Are attitudes determined by location? Differences in perceptions of asylum seekers between residents of two Zagreb neighbourhoods. *Geoforum*, *104*, 244-258. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.05.004

Guimond, S., de la Sablonniere, R., & Nugier, A. (2014). Living in a multicultural world: Intergroup ideologies and the societal context of intergroup relations. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *25*, 142-188. doi: 10.1080/10463283.2014.957578

Güler, M., Ünver, H., & Çakal, H. (2022). Predicting Acceptance of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Group Norms and Competitive Victimhood as Mediators of Sub versus Common Ingroup Identity and Intergroup Contact. In Çakal, H. & Raman, H. Ş. (Eds.). Examining complex i*ntergroup Relations: Through the lens of Turkey*. Routledge. *(forthcoming)*

Hahn, A., Banchefsky, S., Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (2015). Measuring intergroup ideologies: Positive and negative aspects of emphasizing versus looking beyond group differences. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *41,* 1646–1664. doi:10.1177/0146167215607351

Haidt, J. (2013). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Penguin Books.

Hartley, L., & Pedersen, A. (2015). Asylum seekers and resettled refugees in Australia: Predicting social policy attitude from prejudice versus emotion. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3,* 142-160. doi: 10.5964/jspp.v3i1.476

Hasbun-Lopez, P., Martinovic, B., Bobowik, M., Chryssochoou, X., Cichocka, A., Ernst-Vintila, A. & Zezelj, I. (2019). Support for collective action against refugees: The role of national, European, and global identifications, and autochthony beliefs. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *49*, 1439-1455. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2608

Haslam, N., & Holland, E. (2012). Attitudes towards asylum seekers: The Australian experience. In *Peace psychology in Australia* (pp. 107-120). Springer.

Hatton, T. J. (2016). Immigration, public opinion and the recession in Europe. *Economic Policy, 31,* 205-46. https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1093/epolic/eiw004

Havekes, E., Uunk, W., & Gijsberts, M. (2011). Explaining ethnic outgroup feelings from a multigroup perspective: Similarity or contact opportunity? *Social Science Research, 40,* 1564-1578. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.06.005

Heath, A., & Richards L. (2019). *How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration? Findings from the European Social Survey 2002/03–2016/17* (Working Papers, No. 222). OECD Social, Employment and Migration. https://www-oecd-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/berlin/publikationen/How-do-Europeans-differ-in-their-attitudes-to-migration.pdf

Heper, M. (2007). *The state and Kurds in Turkey: The question of assimilation*. Palgrave MacMillan.

Hercowitz-Amir, A., Raijman, R., & Davidov, E. (2017). Host or hostile? Attitudes towards asylum seekers in Israel and in Denmark. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *58*, 416-439. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2021.2018005

Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. *Annual Review of Psychology, 53*, 575-604. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135109

Hewstone, M. (2009). *Living apart, living together? The role of intergroup contact in social integration* (Working Papers, WP 09-12). Max Planck Institute. https://www.mmg.mpg.de/58629/WP_09-12_Hewstone_Intergroup-contact.pdf

Hewstone, M. (2015). Consequences of diversity for social cohesion and prejudice: The missing dimension of intergroup contact. *Journal of Social Issues, 71*, 417–438. doi: 10.1111/JOSI.12120.

Hinnebusch, R. (2015). Back to enmity: Turkey-Syria relations since the Syrian Uprising. *Journal of German Orient Institute, 56* (1), 14-22.

Hochman, O., Raijman, R., & Peter Schmidt. (2016). National identity and exclusion of non-ethnic migrants: Germany and Israel in comparative perspective. In J. Grimm, L. Huddy, J. Seethaler, & P. Schmidt (Eds.), *Dynamics of National Identity: Media and Societal Factors of What We Are* (pp. 64-82). Routledge.

Human Development Foundation & Bilgi University Faculty of Communication. (2020). *Attitudes towards Syrians in Turkey.* https://ingev.org/raporlar/INGEV_Attitudes_Toward_Syrians_in_Turkey_May_2020. pdf

Ioannou, M., Hewstone, M., & Al Ramiah, A. (2017). Inducing similarities and differences in imagined contact: A mutual intergroup differentiation approach. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *20*, 427-446. doi: 10.1177/1368430215612221

İçduygu, A. (2015). *Syrian refugees in Turkey: The long road ahead*. Migration Policy Institute. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2019.09.001

İdiz, S. (2015, Nov 21). Attacks on Syrians in Turkey increasing. *Al-Monitor.* http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/originals/2015/05/turkey-attack-on-syrians-in-country-on-the-rise.html

International Crisis Group. (2016). *Turkey's Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence* (Europe Report No. 241). https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/241-turkey-s-refugee-crisis-the-politics-of-permanence.pdf

Jacobson, R. P., Mortensen, C. R., & Cialdini, R. B. (2011). Bodies obliged and unbound: Differentiated response tendencies for injunctive and descriptive social norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100,* 433-448. doi: 10.1037/a0021470

Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009). Proscriptrive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96,* 521-537. doi: 10.1037/a0013779

Jetten, J., & Spears, R. (2003). The divisive potential of differences and similarities: The role of intergroup distinctiveness in intergroup differentiation. *European Review of Social Psychology, 14*, 203-241. doi: 10.1080/10463280340000063

Johnston, B.M., & Glasford, D. E. (2018). Intergroup contact and helping: How quality contact and empathy shape outgroup helping. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 21*, 1185-1201. doi: 10.1177/1368430217711770

Kalogeraki, S. (2019). Opposition to Syrian Refugees and Immigrants during the Refugee Crisis in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 37*, 361-395. doi: 10.1353/mgs.2019.0021

Kaya, A. (2013). Multiculturalism: The culturalisation of what is social and political. *Perceptions, 18,* 63–91. http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Perceptions-Autumn20131.pdf

Kaya, A. & Erdoğan, M.M. (2016). Türkiye'ye kitlesel göçlerde son ve dev dalga: Suriyeliler (The last and massive migration to Turkey: Syrians). In A. Kaya & M.M. Erdoğan (Eds). *Türkiye'nin göç tarihi: 14. Yüzyıl'dan 21. Yüzyıl'a göçler. (The history of migration of Turkey: Migration from the 14th century to the 21st century)* (pp. 315-347). Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Kaya, A. (2016). *Syrian Refugees and Cultural Intimacy in Istanbul: 'I Feel Safe Here!'* (Research Paper No. RSCAS 2016/59). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870516

Kaya, A. & Erdoğan, M. M (Eds). 2016. Türkiye'nin Göç Tarihi: 14.Yüzyıl'dan 21. Yüzyıl'a Türkiye'ye Göçler [Turkey's Migration History: Migration to Turkey from 14th Century to 21st Century]. İstanbul: Bilgi University Press.

Kaya, A., & Kıraç A. (2016). Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Istanbul. Support to Life. NA_Report_Haziran_2016_Revize copy (bilimakademisi.org)

Kaya, A., & Kuyumcuoğlu, O. (2019). The limits of toleration towards Syrian refugees in Turkey: From guesthood to Ansar spirit. In *Spaces of Tolerance* (pp. 140-157). Routledge.

Keyman, F. (2012). Rethinking the 'Kurdish question' in Turkey: Modernity, citizenship and democracy. *Philosophy and Social Criticism, 38*, 467–476. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453711435655

Kınıklıoğlu, S. (2020). *Syrian refugees in Turkey: changing attitudes and fortunes.* (SWP Comment, 5/2020). Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2020C05_Kiniklioglu.pdf

Kirişçi, K. (2014). *Syrian refugees and Turkey's challenge: Going beyond hospitality.* Brookings Institution website: https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2016/06/Syrian-Refugees-and-Turkeys-Challenges-May-14-2014.pdf

Kirişçi, K. & Karaca, S. (2016). Hoşgörü ve çelişkiler: 1989, 1991 ve 2011'de Türkiye'yeyönelen Kitlesel mülteci akınları [Tolerance and contradictions: Massive migration flows to Turkey in 1989, 1991, and 2011]. In A. Kaya & M.M. Erdoğan (Eds). *Türkiye'nin göç tarihi: 14. Yüzyıl'dan 21. Yüzyıl'a göçler. (The history of migration of Turkey: Migration from the 14th century to the 21st century)* (pp. 315-347). Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Koç, Y., & Anderson, J. R. (2018). Social Distance toward Syrian Refugees: The Role of Intergroup Anxiety in Facilitating Positive Relations. *Journal of Social Issues, 74,* 790-811. doi: 10.1111/josi.12299.

Koçak, O. (2021). How Does the Sense of Closeness to God Affect Attitudes toward Refugees in Turkey? Multiculturalism and Social Contact as Mediators and National Belonging as Moderator. *Religions*, *12*, 568. doi: 10.3390/rel12080568

Kocalar, K. (2017, February 20). Syrian refugees in camps praise Turkey, express thanks. *Anadolu Agency.* http://aa.com.tr/en/middle- east/syrian-refugees-in-camps-praise-turkey-express-thanks/754305

Konda Research & Consultancy. (2010). *Milliyetçilik ve Ulusal Gurur Araştırması [Nationalism and National Pride Research].* Konda Research & Consultancy database (in Turkish).

Konda Research & Consultancy. (2012). *Gündelik hayatta "*öteki*" algısı (The perception of "the other" in daily life).* http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/GISI_ARASTIRMASI_TEMMUZ_2012.pdf

Konda Research & Consultancy. (2016). *Suriyeli sığınmacılara bakış (View towards Syrian asylum-seekers).* Konda Research & Consultancy database (in Turkish).

Kotzur, PF., Tropp, LR., & Wagner, U. (2018). Welcoming the unwelcome: how contact shapes contexts of reception for new immigrants in Germany and the United States. *Journal of Societal Issues, 74,* 812–32. doi: 10.1111/josi.12300

Krajeski, J. (2012). Taking refuge: The Syrian revolution in Turkey. *World Policy Journal*, *29,* 59-67. http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/summer2012/taking- refuge-syrian-revolution-in-turkey

Kuchenbrandt, D., Eyssel, F., & Seidel, S. (2013). Cooperation makes it happen: Imagined intergroup cooperation enhances the positive effects of imagined contact. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16,* 635-647. doi: 10.1177/1368430212470172.

Kunovich, R. M. (2004). Social structural position and prejudice: An exploration of cross-national differences in regression slopes. *Social Science Research*, *33*, 20-44. doi: 10.1016/S0049-089X(03)00037-1

Landmann, H., Gaschler, R. & Rohmann, A. (2019). What is threatening about refugees? Identifying different types of threat and their association with emotional responses and attitudes towards refugee migration. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 49,* 1401-1420. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2593

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and Adaptation.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lee, T. L., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Not an outgroup, not yet an ingroup: Immigrants in the Stereotype Content Model. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30*,751–768. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.06.005

Levin, S., Matthews, M., Guimond, S., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Kteily, N., Pitpitan, E.V., & Dover, T. (2012). Assimilation, multiculturalism and colorblindness: Mediated and moderated relationships between social dominance orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *48,* 207-212. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.019

Louis, W. R., Duck, J.M., Terry, D.J., Schuller, R.A., & Lalonde, R.N. (2007). Why do citizens want to keep refugees out? Threats, fairness and hostile norms in the treatment of asylum seekers. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37,* 53-73. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.329

MacCallum, R. C., Zhang, S., Preacher, K. J., & Rucker, D. D. (2002). On the practice of dichotomization of quantitative variables. *Psychological Methods, 7,* 19-40. doi: 10.1037//1082-989X.7.1.19

Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*, 602. doi: 10.1037/0022–3514.79.4.602

Mackie, D. M., Smith, E. R., & Ray, D. G. (2008). Intergroup emotions and intergroup relations. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*, 1866-1880. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00130.x

MacLeod, C., & Hagan, R. (1992). Individual differences in the selective processing of threatening information, and emotional responses to a stressful life event. *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, *30*, 151-161. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(92)90138-7

Mahfud, Y., Badea, C., Verkuyten, M., & Reynolds, K. (2018). Multiculturalism and attitudes toward immigrants: The impact of perceived cultural distance. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *49*, 945-958. doi: 10.1177/0022022117730828

Makashvili, A., Vardanashvili, I., & Javakhishvili, N. (2018). Testing intergroup threat theory: Realistic and symbolic threats, religiosity and gender as predictors of prejudice. *Europe's Journal of Psychology*, *14*, 464. doi: 10.5964/ejop.v14i2.1483

Mallett, R. K., Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2008). Expect the unexpected: Failure to anticipate similarities when predicting the quality of an intergroup interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94,* 265–277. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.2.94.2.265

Mango, A. (2004). *The Turks today.* The Overlook Press

Maxwell, R. (2019). Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in large European cities: Contextual or compositional effects? *American Political Science Review*, *113*, 456-474. doi: 10.1017/S0003055418000898

McFarland, S., Webb, M., & Brown, D. (2012). All humanity is my ingroup: A measure and studies for "identification with all humanity". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *103*, 830-853. doi: 10.1037/a0028724

McKay, F. H., Thomas, S.L., & Kneebone, S. (2012). 'It would be okay if they came through the proper channels': Community perceptions and attitudes toward asylum seekers in Australia. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *25,* 113-133. doi: 10.1093/jrs/fer010

McLaren, L. M. (2003). Anti-Immigrant prejudice in Europe: Contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants. *Social Forces, 81,* 909-936. doi: 10.1353/sof.2003.0038

Meeusen, C., Barlow, F. K., & Sibley, C. G. (2017). Generalized and specific components of prejudice: The decomposition of intergroup context effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *47*, 443-456. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2252

Meidert, N., & Rapp, C. (2019). Public attitudes towards refugees in Germany: What drives attitudes towards refugees in comparison with immigrant workers from European Union countries? *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *32*(Special_Issue_1), i209-i218. doi:10.1093/jrs/fez046

Meuleman, B., Abts, K., Slootmaeckers, K., & Meeusen, C. (2019). Differentiated threat and the genesis of prejudice: group-specific antecedents of homonegativity, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-immigrant attitudes. *Social Problems*, *66*, 222-244. doi: 10.1093/socpro/spy002

Ministry of Interior Affairs, Directorate General of Population and Citizenship Affairs. (2020). *Obtaining Turkish Citizenship.* Retrieved April 17, 2022 from https://www.nvi.gov.tr/turk-vatandasliginin-kazanilmasi

Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management. (2017). Geçici koruma kapsamındaki Suriyelilerin illere gore dağılımı (Syrians under temporary protection by provinces). Retrieved on October 20, 2017 from https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638 (in Turkish)

Montada, L., & Schneider, A. (1989). Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. *Social Justice Research, 3,* 313–344. doi: 10.1007/BF01048081

Montoya, R. M., Horton, R. S., & Kirchner, J. (2008). Is actual similarity necessary for attraction? A meta-analysis of actual and perceived similarity. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 25*, 889–922. doi: 10.1177/0265407508096700

Moors, A. (2014). Flavors of appraisal theories of emotion. *Emotion Review, 6*, 303-307. doi: 10.1177/1754073914534477

Morrison, K. R., Fast, N. J., & Ybarra, O. (2009). Group status, perceptions of threat, and support for social inequality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *45,* 204-210. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2008.09.004

Morrison, K. R. & Ybarra, O. (2009). Symbolic threat and social dominance among liberals and conservatives: SDO reflects conformity to political values. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 36,* 1039-1052. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.606

Morrison, K.R., Plaut, V. C., & Ybarra, O. (2010). Predicting whether multiculturalism positively or negatively influences white Americans' intergroup attitudes: The role of ethnic identification. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36,* 1648–1661. doi: 10.1177/0146167210386118

Mummendey, A., & Otten, S. (1998). Positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination. *European Review of Social Psychology, 9*, 107–143. doi: 10.1080/14792779843000063

Murray, K.E. & Marx, D.M. (2013). Attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants, authorized immigrants and refugees. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, *19,* 332-341. doi: 10.1037/a0030812

Muthen, L.K. & Muthen, B.O. (1998-2017). *Mplus User's Guide (Eighth Edition).* Muthen & Muthen

Neuberg, S. L., Smith, D. M., & Asher, T. (2000). Why people stigmatize: Toward a biocultural framework. In T. Heatherton, R. Kleck, M. Hebl, & J. Hull (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Stigma* (pp. 31-61). Guilford Press.

Ng Tseung-Wong, C., & Verkuyten, M. (2014). "I'd rather we be neighbours than lovers": The two-sidedness of multiculturalism. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations.* Advance online publications. doi:10.1177/1368430214546068

Nickerson, A. M., & Louis, W. R. (2008). Nationality versus humanity? Personality, identity, and norms in relation to attitudes toward asylum seekers. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *38*, 796–817. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00327.x

Nwabuzo, O. (2018). *Racist crime and institutional racism in Europe* (ENAR Shadow Report 2014-2018). European Network Against Racism. https://www.enar-eu.org/wp-content/uploads/shadowreport2018_final.pdf

Orhan, O. (2014). *The situation of Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries: Findings, conclusions and recommendations* (ORSAM Report No. 189). The Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies. http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/201452_189ing.pdf

Otten, S., & Mummendey, A. (2000). Valence dependent probability of in-group favouritism between minimal groups: An integrative view on the positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination. In D. Capozza, & R. Brown (Eds.), *Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research.* SAGE.

Oyserman, D., Coon, H.M., & Kemmelmier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin, 128*, 3-72. doi: 10.1037//0033-2909.128.1.3

Özaydın, T., Tanyer, D. K., & Akın, B. (2021). Promoting the attitudes of nursing students towards refugees via interventions based on the contact hypothesis: A randomized controlled trial. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *84*, 191-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2021.07.013

Özdemir, F., & Özkan, B. (2016). Social representations of social media users towards Syrian Refugees in Turkey. *Nesne, 4,* 227-244. doi: 10.7816/nesne-04-08-04. doi: 10.7816/nesne-04-08-04

Özden, Ş. (2013). *Syrian refugees in Turkey* (MPC Research Report 2013/05). European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Migration Policy Centre website: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/MPCRR-2013-05.pdf

Özkırımlı, U. (2014). Multiculturalism, recognition and the 'Kurdish question' in Turkey: The outline of a normative framework. *Democratization*, *21,* 1055-1073. doi: 10.1080/13510347.2013.782289

Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96*, 574-587. doi: 10.1037/a0011989.

Pearson, A. R., West, T. V., Dovidio, J. F., Powers, S., Buck, R., & Henning, R. (2008). The fragility of intergroup relations: Divergent effects of delayed audio-visual feedback in intergroup and intragroup interactions. *Psychological Science, 19,* 1272–1279. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02236.

Pedersen, A., Attwell, J., & Heveli, D. (2005). Prediction of negative attitudes toward Australian asylum seekers: False beliefs, nationalism, and self-esteem. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, *57*, 148-160. doi: 10.1080/00049530500125157

Perry, R., Paradies, Y., & Pedersen, A. (2015). Religious ambivalence: Suppression of pro-social attitudes toward asylum-seekers by right-wing authoritarianism. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, *25,* 230-246. doi:10.1080/10508619.2014.921473

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90*, 751–783. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751

Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2008). How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 38*, 922–934. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.504

Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L. R. (2010). How does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Meta-analytic tests of three mediators. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38,* 922–934. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.504

Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L. (2011). *When Groups Meet: The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact.* Psychology Press.

Pettigrew, T. F., Tropp, L. R., Wagner, U., & Christ, O. (2011). Recent advances in intergroup contact theory. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *35*, 271-280. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2011.03.001

Pettigrew, T.F., & Hewstone, M. (2017). The single factor fallacy: Implications of missing critical variables from an analysis of intergroup contact theory. *Social Issues and Policy Review, 11*, 8-37. doi: 10.1111/sipr.12026.

Pinel, E. C., & Long, A. E. (2012). When I's meet: Sharing subjective experience with someone from the outgroup. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38,* 296 –307. doi:10.1177/0146167211433878

Plaut, V. (2010). Diversity science: Why and how difference makes a difference. *Psychological Inquiry, 21,* 77-99. doi: 10.1080/10478401003676501

Plener, P. L., Groschwitz, R. C., Brähler, E., Sukale, T., & Fegert, J. M. (2017). Unaccompanied refugee minors in Germany: attitudes of the general population towards a vulnerable group. *European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 26*, 733-742. doi:10.1007/s00787-017-0943-9

Poslon, X. D., & Lasticova, B. (2019). The silver lining between perceived similarity and intergroup differences: Increasing confidence in intergroup contact. *Human Affairs, 29*, 63-73. doi: 10.1515/humaff-2019-0006

Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. *Multivariate Behavioural Research, 42*, 185–227, doi: 10.1080/00273170701341316

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods, 40*, 879-891. doi: 10.3758/BRM.40.3.879

Quezada, S.A., Shaw, M.P., & Zarate, M. A. (2012). Cultural inertia: The relationship between ethnic identity and reactions to cultural change. *Social Psychology, 43,* 243-251. doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000125

Rattan, A., & Ambady, N. (2013). Diversity ideologies and intergroup relations: An examination of colorblindness and multiculturalism. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *43*, 13-21. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.1892

Reches, L. H., & Feddes, A. R. (2019). Similarity attracts: The role of personality in similarity perceptions and children's attitudes towards refugees. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *37*, 447-460. doi: 10.1111/bjdp.12285

Reicher, S., Spears, R., & Haslam, S. A. (2010). The social identity approach in social psychology. *Sage Identities Handbook*, *2010*, 45-62. doi: 10.4135/9781446200889.n3

Renfro, C. L., Duran, A., Stephan, W. G., & Clason, D. L. (2006). The Role of Threat in Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action and Its Beneficiaries 1. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *36*, 41-74. doi: 10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00003.x

Reysen, S., & Katzarka-Miller, I. (2013). A model of global citizenship: Antecedents and outcomes. *International Journal of Psychology*, *48*, 858-870. doi: 10.1080/00207594.2012.701749

Richeson, J., & Nussbaum, R.J. (2004). The impact of multiculturalism versus color-blindness on racial bias. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40,* 417–423. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2003.09.002

Roccas, S., & Scwartz, S. (1993). Effects of intergroup similarity on intergroup relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 23*, 581-593.

Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6,* 88-109. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602_01

Rodriguez, L. L., Cuadrado, I., & Navas, M. (2017). I will help you because we are similar: Quality of contact mediates the effect of perceived similarity on facilitative behaviour towards immigrants. *International Journal of Psychology, 52*, 273–282. doi:10.1002/ijop.12212

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The Open and Closed Mind*. Basic Books.

Roseman, I. (2013). Appraisal in the emotion system. *Emotion Review, 5,* 141-149. doi: 10.1177/1754073912469591

Roseman, I. J., & Smith, C. A. (2001). Appraisal theory: Overview, assumptions, varieties, controversies. In A. S. K. R. Scherer & T. Johnstone (Ed.), *Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research* (pp. 3–19). Oxford University Press.

Rowatt, W. C. (2019). Associations between religiosity, political ideology, and attitudes toward immigrants: A mediation path-analytic approach. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 11*, 368–381. doi: 10.1037/rel0000206

Rucker, J. M., Murphy, M. C., & Quintanilla, V.D. (2019). The immigrant labeling effect: The role of immigrant group labels in prejudice against noncitizens. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 22,* 1139-1160. doi: 10.1177/1368430218818744

Saab, R., Harb, C., & Moughalian, C. (2017). Intergroup contact as a predictor of violent and nonviolent collective action: Evidence from Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 23*, 297-306. doi:10.1037/pac0000234

Sadek, G. (2013). *Legal Status of Refugees: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq*. Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1179540/1930_1391766387_2014-010156-rpt.pdf

Scherer, K. R. (2009). The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model. *Cognition and Emotion, 23*, 1307–1351. doi: 10.1080/02699930902928969

Schindler, S., & Reese, G. (2017). Social loafing in the refugee crisis: Information about existing initiatives decreases willingness to help. *Societies, 7*, 1-6. doi:10.3390/soc7020013

Schlueter, E., & Scheepers, P. (2010). The relationship between outgroup size and anti-outgroup attitudes: A theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group threat-and intergroup contact theory. *Social Science Research*, *39*, 285-295. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.07.006

Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., Küpper, B., Zick, A., & Tausch, N. (2014). Reducing aggressive intergroup action tendencies: effects of intergroup contact via perceived intergroup threat. *Aggressive Behavior, 40*, 250-62. doi: 10.1002/ab.21516

Schneider, S. L. (2008). Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived ethnic *threat. European Sociological Review, 24*, 53-67. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcm034

Schweitzer, R., Perkoulidis, S.A., Krome S.L., & Ludlow, C.N. (2005). Attitudes towards refugees: The dark side of prejudice in Australia. *Australian Journal of Psychology*, *57,* 170-179. doi: 10.1080/00049530500125199

See, Y. H. M., Lim, A. W. Q., & Pauketat, J. V. (2020). Values predict willingness to interact with immigrants: the role of cultural ideology and multicultural acquisition. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *51*, 3-24. doi: 10.1177/0022022119883018

Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., Yom Tov, A., & Schmidt, P. (2004). Population size, perceived threat, and exclusion: A multiple-indicators analysis of attitudes toward foreigners in Germany. *Social Science Research, 33,* 681–701. doi: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2003.11.003

Semyonov, M., Raijman, R., & Gorodzeisky, A. (2006). The rise of anti-foreigner sentiment in European societies, 1988-2000. *American Sociological Review*, *71*, 426-449. doi: 10.1177/000312240607100304

Sever, A. (2020). Regional power role and intervention: The Turkish case over Syria in the 2000s. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, *7*, 143-164. doi:10.1177/2347798920901870

Silva, R. L., Oliveira, J., Dias, C., Pinto, I. R., & Marques, J. M. (2018). How inclusive policies shape prejudice versus acceptance of refugees: A Portuguese study. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *24*, 296. doi: 10.1037/pac0000314

Stansfield, R., & Stone, B. (2018). Threat perceptions of migrants in Britain and support for policy. *Sociological Perspectives, 61,* 592-609. doi: 10.1177/0731121417753369

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1996a). *Intergroup Relations*. Westview.

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1996b). Predicting prejudice. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 20,* 409–426. doi: 10.1016/0147-1767(96)00026-0

Stephan, W. G., Diaz-Loving, R., & Duran, A. (2000). Integrated threat theory and intercultural attitudes: Mexico and the United States. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31,* 240–249. doi: 10.1177/0022022100031002006

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated theory of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), *Reducing Prejudice and discrimination: The Claremont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology* (pp. 23–45). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.

Stephan, W. G., Lausanne Renfro, C., Esses, V. M., White Stephan, C., & Martin, T. (2005). The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29,* 1-19. doi: 10.1016/J.IJINTREL.2005.04.011

Tajfel, H. (1978). Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between groups* (pp. 27-60). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (pp. 33-47). Nelson-Hall.

Tajfel, H. (1981). The social psychology of minorities. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Human groups and social categories: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 309-343). Cambridge University Press.

Takaki, R. (1993). *A different mirror: A history of multicultural America.* Little, Brown and Company.

Tartakovsky E., & Walsh, S. D. (2016). Testing a New Theoretical Model for Attitudes Toward Immigrants: The Case of Social Workers' Attitudes Toward Asylum Seekers in Israel. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 47,* 72-96. doi:10.1177/0022022115613860

Taşdemir, N. (2019). Sosyal Kimliğe Atfedilen Motivasyon Kaynakları ve Gruplar Arası Tutumlar [Motivations attributed to having a social identity and intergroup attitudes]. *Journal of Turkish Psychology*, *34*, 1-19.doi: 10.31828/tpd1300443320180124m000001

Taştan, C., Haklı, S. Z., & Osmanoğlu, E. (2017). *Suriyeli sığınmacılara dair tehdit algısı: Önyargılar ve gerçekler.* (Rapor No: 9). Polis Akademisi Başkanlığı Göç ve Sınır Güvenliği Araştırma Merkezi. (*Perception of threat toward Syrian refugees: Prejudices and realities* [Report No: 9]). Police Academy Presidency Migration and Border Security Research Center. https://www.pa.edu.tr/Upload/editor/files/2-SUR%C4%B0YEL%C4%B0%20SI%C4%9EINMACILARA%20DA%C4%B0R%20TEHD%C4%B0T%20ALGISI_ALGILAR%20VE%20GERCEKLER.pdf

The Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. (2014). *Reaction mounting against Syrian refugees in Turkey* (Public Opinion Surveys of Turkish Foreign Policy 2014/1). https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EdamAnket2014.1.pdf

Thravalou, E., Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2020). Humanitarian assistance and permanent settlement of asylum seekers in Greece: The role of sympathy, perceived threat, and perceived contribution. *International Migration Review*, 1-27. doi: 10.1177/0197918320949826.

Topal, M. H., Özer, U., & Dokuzlu, E. (2017). Public perception of Syrian refugees in Turkey: An empirical explanation using extended integrative threat theory. *Studiai Dyskusje, 38* (3), 35-58.

Trawalter, S., Richeson, J. A., & Shelton, J. N. (2009). Predicting behavior during interracial interactions: A stress and coping approach. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13,* 243–268. doi:10.1177/ 1088868309345850

Tropp, L. R., Okamoto, D. G., Marrow, H. B., & Jones-Correa, M. (2018). How contact experiences shape welcoming: Perspectives from US-born and immigrant groups. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *81*, 23-47. doi: 10.1177/0190272517747265

Turiel, E. (2002). *The Culture of Morality.* Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: UK.

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2006). *Population of provinces by years, 2000-2016.* http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2016). *Population of provinces by years, 2000-2016.* http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu Mülteci Hakları Alt Komisyonu. (2018). Göç ve Uyum Raporu: Uluslararası Koruma, Geçici Koruma, Suriyeli Sığınmacılar (Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Investigation Commission Refugee Rights Sub Commission. Migration and Adaptation Report: International Protection, Temporary Protection, Syrian asylum-seekers). https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/docs/2018/goc_ve_uyum_raporu.pdf

Türkmen, F., & Öktem, E. (2013). Foreign policy as a determinant in fate of Turkey's non-Muslim minorities: A dialectical analysis. *Turkish Studies, 14,* 468-482. doi:10.1080/14683849.2013.831257

Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D., & Wetherell, M.S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Basil Blackwell.

Turner, J. C. (1991). *Social Influence*. *Pacific Grove*. Brooks/Cole.

Turner, J.C., & Reynolds, K. (2001). The social identity perspective in intergroup relations: Theories, themes and controversies. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of social psychology: Intergroup processes* (pp. 133-152). Blackwell.

Turner, R. N., Hewstone, M., & Voci, A. (2007). Reducing explicit and implicit outgroup prejudice via direct and extended contact: The mediating role of self-disclosure and intergroup anxiety. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93*, 369–388. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.369

Uçtu, N. (2015, Sept 9). Suriyeli çocukları evlat edinmek istiyorlar. [They want to adopt Syrian children]. *Hurriyet Newspaper*. https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ege/suriyeli-cocuklari-evlat-edinmek-istiyorlar-30026004

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA]. (1998). *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration* (Revision 1, Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 59). https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [DESA]. (2021). *International Migration Highlights 2020*. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/international_migration_2020_highlights_ten_key_messages.pdf

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2022a). *What is a refugee?* https://www.unhcr.org/what-is-a-refugee.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2022b). *What is resettlement?* Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement.html#_ga=2.171068576.1469879470.1638353862-1410186281.1608028953

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] (2022c). *Refugee data finder*. Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2022d). *Syria emergency.* Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2022e). *Syria refugee crisis: Globally in Cyprus and in Europe*. Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://www.unhcr.org/cy/2021/03/18/syria-refugee-crisis-globally-in-europe-and-in-cyprus-meet-some-syrian-refugees-in-cyprus/

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2022f). *Syria Regional Refugee Response: Turkey*. Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR]. (2022). *About migration and human rights.* Retrieved on April 17, 2022 from https://ohchr.org/en/migration

United States Department of State. (2014). *2013 Report on International Religious Freedom Report – Turkey.* https://www.refworld.org/docid/53d906fb5.html

Unnever, J., & Cullen, F. (2012). White perceptions of whether African Americans and Hispanics are prone to violence and the desire to punish. *Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 49*, 519–44. doi: 10.1177/0022427811415533

Uysal, D. M., & Çakır, A. A. (2020). An Experimental Study on the Variation of the Attitudes towards the Syrian Refugees in Turkey. *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*, *8*, 274-296. doi: 10.14782/marmarasbd.699422

Van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. *Psychological Bulletin, 134*, 504-535. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504.

Vanbeselaere, N., Boen, F., & Meeus, J. (2006). The complicated relationship between national identification and acceptance of immigrants. In L. d'Haenens, M. Hooghe, D. Vanheule, & H. Gezduci (Eds). *New citizens, new politics* (pp. 57-68). Academia Press.

Vandenberg, R. J., & Lance, C. E. (2000). A Review and Synthesis of the Measurement Invariance Literature: Suggestions, Practices, and Recommendations for Organizational Research. *Organizational Research Methods, 3*, 4-70. doi:10.1177/109442810031002

Vassilopoulos, S.P., Brouzos, A., Kasapoglou, E., & Nikolopoulou, O. (2020). Promoting Positive Attitudes toward Refugees: A Prejudice-Reduction, Classroom-Based Group Intervention for Preadolescents in Greece. *The Journal for Specialists in Group Work, 45,* 292-306. doi: 10.1080/01933922.2020.1800878

Velasco Gonzalez, K., Verkuyten, M., Weesie, J., & Poppe, E. (2008). Prejudice towards Muslims in the Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory. *British Journal of* S*ocial Psychology, 47*, 667-685. doi: 10.1348/014466608X284443

Verkuyten, M. (2005). Ethnic group identification and group evaluation among minority and majority groups: Testing the multiculturalism hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88,* 121-138. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.1.121

Verkuyten, M. (2006). Multicultural recognition and ethnic minority rights: A social identity perspective. *European Review of Social Psychology, 17*, 148-184.

Verkuyten, M., & Yıldız, A.A. (2007). National (dis)identification, and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 1448-1462. doi: 10.1177/0146167207304276

Verkuyten, M. (2009a). Support for multiculturalism and minority rights: The role of national identification and outgroup threat. *Social Justice Research, 22*, 31-52. doi: 10.1007/s11211-008-0087-7

Verkuyten, M. (2009b). Emotional reactions to and support for immigrant policies: Attributed responsibilities to categories of asylum seekers. *Social Justice Research, 17*, 293-314. doi: 10.1023/B:SORE.0000041295.83611.dc

Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2012). Social identity complexity and immigrants' attitude towards the host nation: The intersection of ethnic and religious group identification. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38*, *1165-1177*

Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2015). Majority member's recognition and protest against discrimination of immigrants: The role of power threat, deprovincialization and common national identity. *Social Justice Research, 28*, 257–273. doi: 10.1007/s11211-015-0248-4

Verkuyten, M., Mepham, K., & Kros, M. (2018a). Public attitudes towards support for migrants: the importance of perceived voluntary and involuntary migration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *41*, 901-918. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1367021

Verkuyten, M., Altabatabaei, H. G., & Nooitgedagt, W. (2018b). Supporting the Accommodation of Voluntary and Involuntary Migrants - Humanitarian and Host Society Considerations. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *9*, 267-274. doi: 10.1177/1948550617737600

Visintin, E. P., Green, E. G., Falomir-Pichastor, J. M., & Berent, J. (2020). Intergroup contact moderates the influence of social norms on prejudice. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *23*, 418-440. doi: 10.1177/1368430219839485

Voci, A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Intergroup contact and prejudice toward immigrants in Italy: The mediational role of anxiety and the moderational role of group salience. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, *6*, 37-54.doi: 10.1177/1368430203006001011

Von Hermanni, H., & Neumann, R. (2019). 'Refugees welcome?' The interplay between perceived threats and general concerns on the acceptance of refugees–a factorial survey approach in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *45*, 349-374. doi: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1459183

Ward, C., & Masgoret, A. M. (2006). An integrative model of attitudes toward immigrants. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *30*, 671-682. doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.06.002

Ward, C., & Masgoret, A. M. (2008). Attitudes toward immigrants, immigration, and multiculturalism in New Zealand: A social psychological analysis. *International Migration Review*, *42*, 227-248. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00119.x

Wenzel, M. & Mummendey, A. (1996). Positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination: A normative analysis of differential evaluations of ingroup and outgroup on positive and negative attributes. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 35*, 493-507. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1996.tb01110.x

West, T.V., Magee, J. C., Gordon, S. H., & Gullett, L. (2014). A Little Similarity Goes a Long Way: The Effects of Peripheral but Self-Revealing Similarities on Improving and Sustaining Interracial Relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *107*, 81-100. doi: 10.1037/a0036556

White, K. M., Smith, J. R., Terry, D. J., Greenslade, J. H., & McKimmie, B. M. (2009). Social influence in the theory of planned behaviour: The role of descriptive, injunctive, and in-group norms. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *48*, 135-158. doi: 10.1348/014466608X295207

Whitley, B. E., Jr. (2016). *The relationship of intergroup ideologies to ethnic prejudice: A meta-analysis.* Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Psychological Science in Chicago, IL, USA.

Whitley, B. E. Jr., & Webster, G. D. (2019). The relationships of intergroup ideologies to ethnic prejudice: A meta-analysis. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *23*, 207-237. doi: 10.1177/1088868318761423

Yalçın, Z. (2014, July 21). Anti-Syrian protests sign of growing tensions in southern Turkey. *Daily Sabah*. http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/07/22/antisyrian-protests-sign-of-growing-tensions-in-southern-turkey

Yitmen, Ş., & Verkuyten, M. (2017). Feelings towards refugees in Turkey: The roles of national and religious identifications, and multiculturalism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 48,* 90-100. doi: 10.1002/casp.2354.

Yitmen, Ş., & Verkuyten, M. (2018). Positive and negative behavioral intentions towards refugees in Turkey: The roles of national identification, threat, and humanitarian concern. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 28,* 230–243. doi: 10.1002/casp.2354

Yitmen, Ş. & Verkuyten, M. (2019). Support to Syrian refugees in Turkey - The roles of descriptive and injunctive norms, threat, and negative emotions. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *23*, 293-301. doi: 10.1111/ajsp.12400

Yzerbyt, V., Muller, D., Batailler, C., & Judd, C. M. (2018). New Recommendations for testing indirect effects in mediational models: The need to report and test component paths. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Cognition, 115,* 929 – 943. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000132

Ziegele, M., Koehler, C., & Weber, M. (2018). Socially destructive? Effects of negative and hateful user comments on readers' donation behavior toward refugees and homeless persons. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, *62*, 636-653. doi: 10.1080/08838151.2018.1532430

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I'm deeply indebted to several valuable people who have given me extensive support during my PhD time. Although it is hard for me to find the right words to translate my intense emotions, I will try my best.

My special thanks go to my supervisor, Prof. dr. Maykel Verkuyten. I feel so blessed to have the opportunity to work with him. Throughout all these years I was so impressed by his patience and understanding, which may be why I did my PhD with pleasure. His guidance was so valuable for me as he introduced me to new thinking styles and perspectives but at the same time gave me a space to take my own steps. In other words, he didn't teach me how to simply fly but taught me how to use my wings.

I was also so lucky to work with Dr. Borja Martinovic as my second supervisor. I'm deeply grateful to Borja for her guidance with her eye-opening suggestions that gave me a wider vision and also for being a model for me to be neat and organized.

My family was always there for me during my PhD time and for this, I feel very fortunate. I'm grateful for my husband's understanding, support, and patience during my PhD time. I know it wasn't easy to listen, with patience, to theories, concepts, and findings which I was excited to share and discuss. He was the one who shared my joys as well as my concerns throughout these years. I also need to confess that it wasn't easy to be a full-time mother and at the same time do a PhD. If my husband was not supportive it would have been much more stressful for me to do both.

A few years later when my kids learn to read in English, I would like them to read these lines and be proud of themselves simply for who they are. I feel blessed and grateful for their presence as they created another world for me which made it possible for me to give short breaks and distance myself from my PhD studies so that I could refresh and restart with more enthusiasm.

My mom's empathy skills, patience, optimism, and the meaning she attaches to life have always kept me strong even on my toughest days. She was always supportive of me and she always made me feel that she understands me. Therefore, I'm indebted to her for reminding me of these values during my PhD studies.

And my father... He so much wanted to see me finish my PhD studies but unfortunately, he couldn't. He always had an interest in intergroup relations and he even dedicated much of his effort and time to fight against the prejudices he had faced. Therefore, I think this dissertation deserves to be dedicated to my father.

Writing acknowledgments was not very easy for me. I could not stop my teardrops from time to time. My teardrops meant gratitude, ending, beginning, longing, and hope for a better future. Similar to a drop in the ocean, I wish that this dissertation will contribute to improving group relations wherever possible all around the world.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Şenay Yitmen was born in İstanbul, Turkey and completed her Master's degree in International Relations at Koç University in 2010. She started her PhD at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer) at Utrecht University in September 2016. Her work has been published in the Asian Journal of Social Psychology, the Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, the Journal of Applied Social Psychology, and as a book chapter.

The world has witnessed a large increase in the number of refugees in the last decade. Today, the highest number of refugees, mainly coming from Syria, live in Turkey, which raises questions about how host society members react to this group of immigrants: whether they offer help and support or whether they reject them. Şenay Yitmen argues and shows that positive and negative reactions to Syrian refugees are not simply two sides of the same coin and that various social psychological constructs play a role in understanding the diversity and complexity of these reactions. Based on survey data conducted among self-identified Turkish adult citizens, this dissertation illustrates how a vulnerable group of migrants such as the Syrian refugees is perceived in an understudied yet geopolitically relevant (Turkish) setting.

Şenay Yitmen conducted this study as part of her PhD research at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at Utrecht University.