

# Tasks, occupations and slowbalisation: on the limits of fragmentation

Steven Brakman<sup>a</sup> and Charles van Marrewijk<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700AV, Groningen, The Netherlands, [s.brakman@rug.nl](mailto:s.brakman@rug.nl)

<sup>b</sup>Utrecht University School of Economics, PO Box 80125, 3508 TC Utrecht, The Netherlands, [j.g.m.vanmarrewijk@uu.nl](mailto:j.g.m.vanmarrewijk@uu.nl)

Received on September 16, 2021; editorial decision on March 24, 2022; accepted on April 25, 2022

Following the trade collapse in 2009, Globalisation has recovered but the growth rate slowed down compared to the preceding period of Hyper Globalisation. The persistence of this slowdown is remarkable. We argue that increased awareness of firms for the costs of involvement in global supply chains can explain the recent developments in trade flows. We formalise the existence, length and consequences of changes in fragmentation cost along global supply chains. From a theoretical point of view, we allow tasks to be a combination of different occupations while the model endogenises production fragmentation, allowing for multiple production stages in multiple countries, while remaining tractable. From an empirical point of view, the model explains both the period of Hyper Globalisation and the subsequent Slowbalisation in terms of changing fragmentation costs along global supply chains. The model is also consistent with developments regarding labour market polarisation associated with modern globalisation: the labour market position of medium-skilled workers in advanced countries has deteriorated relative to high- and low-skilled workers, which can be understood by changing global supply chains. Our model implies, however, that even with zero fragmentation costs the demand for certain occupations does not fall to zero for any country.

*Keywords:* slowbalisation, global supply chains, fragmentations

*JEL Classifications:* F12, F16

## Introduction

In January 2019 *The Economist* noted a trend reversal that it referred to as *Slowbalisation*, arguing that a previous period of *Hyper Globalisation*, is slowing down or has stopped.<sup>1</sup> The main contribution of our paper is to (i) develop a tractable model of occupations and tasks that endogenises fragmentation into multiple stages with sourcing from various

countries and helps understand (ii) the different phases of globalisation (see below), (iii) some related labour market phenomena (see Section 2), and (iv) the natural limits of fragmentation/ globalisation (even with zero fragmentation- and coordination costs) as the process involves a finite number of fragmentation steps only (the most important of which are taken at the early stages). This also implies that (even with zero fragmentation costs) the


demand for certain occupations does not fall to zero for any country.

Slowbalisation is remarkable given that economists routinely point out that the global division of labour is welfare increasing.<sup>2</sup> Despite these benefits, a long period of rapid growth of world trade flows has apparently come to an end, reducing the growth potential of the traditional gains from trade.

Figure 1 illustrates the slowdown of globalisation using the world exports of goods and services as a per cent of income (GDP). Antrás (2020) observes three trends related to a similar graph. First, since 1970 the ratio of world exports relative to world income has doubled (from 13.3 per cent in 1970 to 26.1 per cent in 2020). Second, most of this increase took place in what Antrás calls the period of *Hyper Globalisation* between 1986 and 2008 (just before the Great Recession). Third, a notable slowdown occurred after 2008. Goa et al. (2022) develop a methodology—based on input/output data—to distinguish between offshoring, re-shoring and re-offshoring. They apply this methodology to the period 2007–2014, which includes the financial crisis. They find that the top-5 re-shoring countries are China, USA, UK, South-Korea and Germany. This is further evidence of slowbalisation after 2008.

Figure 1 illustrates these phases using a spline regression with knots at 1986 and 2008. In phase 1 of Globalisation (1970–1986) relative exports rose by about 0.19 percentage points per year. In phase 2 of Hyper Globalisation (1986–2008) relative exports rose by about 0.52 percentage points per year. In phase 3 of Slowbalisation (since 2008) relative exports declined by 0.04 percentage points per year. If we exclude 2020 from phase 3 (the first Covid-19 year), relative exports rise by only 0.06 percentage points per year.

The trend change since 2008 is partly caused by political concerns related to globalisation (see The European Parliament, 2020 for a discussion). The American President Donald Trump (2016–2020), for example, translated his ‘America first’ slogan into import tariffs in order to protect US jobs. Trading partners retaliated by installing import tariffs of their own. This protectionist turn in international politics was reminiscent of the situation in the 1930s when nations increasingly relied on protectionist measures to isolate themselves from foreign competition. Inevitably, import tariffs affect world trade. It did so in the 1930s and does so again in the current period.<sup>3</sup> Baldwin and Tomiura, (2020) for instance, point out that even before the virus outbreak, the global



**Figure 1.** Globalisation and Slowbalisation; world export of goods and services (% GDP), 1970–2020.

Source: created using World Development Indicators, world exports of goods and services (% of GDP); dashed line is spline regression with knots at 1986 and 2008, which explains 96 per cent of the variance in export share of GDP.

economy was affected by disruptions and ‘supply chain contagion.’ Experiences with these disturbances stimulated a debate to consider a ‘decoupling’ or ‘repatriation’ of global value chains, especially those that involved China (Baldwin and Evenett, 2020). This discussion focused on the trade-off between efficiency and certainty of delivery.

One could argue that the trade effects of crises, such as the Great Recession of 2008/9 and the current Covid-19 pandemic, are only transitory and that trade will be ‘business as usual’ again. On the other hand, the slowdown of trade, as illustrated in Figure 1, might point towards a more fundamental change in world trade, even after the trade recoveries global trade growth remains low. Crises could affect the uncertainty and risk assessments of firms, consumers, and governments in a fundamental manner; the perceived fragmentation costs of long supply chains increase after disruptions. A disruption somewhere in the supply chain has severe consequences.

Carvallo et al. (2021), for example, analyse the consequences of the Fukushima earthquake in Japan, using a calibrated general equilibrium model, find that next to the direct effect of the earthquake, firms whose suppliers were affected by the disaster also suffered sales losses as were firms whose customers were hit. Their calculations suggest that total losses in Japan amounted to 0.47 percentage point reduction in GDP growth.

Grossmann and Helpman (2021) point out that although firms experience set-backs from supply chain shocks the government could step in because firms do not always take the social surplus of uninterrupted supply of products into account and invest too little in supply chain resilience. Case studies also illustrate the costs of disruptions. According to the news agency Reuters, for example, carmaker Toyota realised after the Fukushima disaster, that the supply chains were too long and vulnerable. Because of the disaster, it took six months

to restore normal production levels.<sup>4</sup> The response was to require suppliers to stockpile two months’ supply of chips—and reimburse part of the additional costs to its suppliers—in order to prevent future production disruptions. This raises the costs of fragmentation and a possible action following this reassessment could be the re-shoring of foreign production in order to reduce the reliance on foreign production in an attempt to lower supply chain costs, which was done by Toyota.

Covid-19 is not the only possible supply chain shock. McKinsey (2020) calculates the total costs of six major supply chain disruptions: Pandemics, Large scale Cyber attacks, Geophysical events, Heat stress, Flooding, and Trade disputes. The estimated total costs are expected losses of 24% of a year’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation in pharmaceuticals to 67% in aerospace, over a ten year period (Exhibit E5, p.12). McKinsey (2020, p.9) concludes: ‘*Practices such as just-in-time production, sourcing from a single supplier, and relying on customised inputs with few substitutes amplify the disruption of external shocks and lengthen companies’ recovery times. Geographic concentration in supply networks can also be a vulnerability. Globally, we find 180 traded products (worth \$134 billion in 2018) for which a single country accounts for the vast majority of exports.*’ It is this realisation that motivates our analysis and formalisation of global supply chains. Slowbalisation and the shortening of supply chains, could thus be a first sign of this re-assessment of the costs involved with international trade. This altered assessment of costs changes the international organisation of production processes and (global) supply chains.

We model the economic consequences of the rise in supply chain costs on the organisation of supply chains. The existence of supply chains enables firms to benefit from the international division of labour on a fine scale, but also increases the costs of disruptions along

the supply chain; the chain is as strong as its weakest link. Moreover, we highlight the consequences for the global division of labour. Our formalisation helps us to understand both, (hyper) globalisation as well as slowbalisation in terms of the development of the (perceived) fragmentation costs. The recent changes in fragmentation costs highlight important aspects of the structure of trade. Furthermore, changes in the supply chains have consequences for labour markets, in particular regarding labour market polarisation. Our model also sheds light on these developments. Together the model illustrates the importance of supply chains and helps to understand the consequences of changes in supply chains. In section ‘Globalisation and slowbalisation’, we discuss some related literature and empirical phenomena. The section ‘Details of the fragmentation example’ introduces our theoretical framework and provides intuition on the associated relationship between coordination costs, fragmentation, and the labour market. The section ‘Details of the fragmentation example’ explains the structure of the model and its outcomes in some more detail. The section ‘Possibilities and limitations of fragmentation/globalisation (even without coordination costs)’. The section ‘Evaluation’ concludes.

### Globalisation and slowbalisation

The evolution of global supply chains enables countries, especially emerging markets, to participate in the world economy by specialising in specific intermediate goods rather than building an entire industry from scratch. Traditionally, trade flows arise because of the geographical separation of production and consumption. The transport revolution in the 19<sup>th</sup> century made transportation over large distances possible and efficient. This boosted the global division of labour and increased trade flows. Continued improvements in transport methods, such as container shipping, still stimulate global trade up to this day (Hummels, 2007). A second

technological revolution, the ICT revolution starting in the 1990s, made international specialisation and the global division of labour at a finer scale possible. It introduced the possibility to fragment the production process globally. The result was a global *Great Convergence* in terms of income per capita since the 1990s (Baldwin, 2016, Rougoor and van Marrewijk, 2015). One reason is that participation in the world economy has become easier than it used to be; instead of creating a complete sector covering every step in the production process from raw materials to the final product specialising in only a fragment of a production process suffices to join the world economy. This happened on a grand scale from the 1990s onwards (Baldwin, 2016).

From a trade perspective, this period of fragmentation is accompanied by a rapid increase in trade flows. In particular, in the period 1986–2008, as illustrated in Figure 1. Intermediate products cross international borders many times, each time adding value to total trade flows. The ICT technology is crucial for enabling fragmentation as parts of the production processes can be monitored in real-time by headquarters on the other side of the world. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) analyse the consequences of dividing the production process into a variety of tasks, some of which are executed from abroad. The consequences of offshoring are—according to this model—threefold. First, offshoring has similar effects as technological progress making production factors more productive. Second, a price effect occurs that makes products less expensive because they are imported from low(er)-wage economies. Third, a labour supply effect arises because offshoring results in excess supply of labour that reduces the gains of fragmenting the production effect. The overall effect, due to a further global division of labour, seems positive (Baldwin, 2016). The key issue here is that changes in global fragmentation can have substantial labour market consequences.


In addition to technological developments, the global division of labour was further stimulated by a reduction of protectionist measures. Since the 1990s the number of regional trade agreements increased rapidly and, in addition, China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 (Kohl et al., 2016). Technological progress combined with reductions in protectionist measures thus stimulated world trade flows and contributed to global income convergence since the 1990s. In trade terms, these factors stimulated the hyper-globalisation in the period 1986-2008. Although the overall effects seem positive, the labour market consequences during the period of Hyper Globalisation are remarkable. The share in the total labour market of low-pay and high-pay occupations increased, but that of mid-pay occupations decreased. This so-called labour market polarisation shows that hyper-globalisation is at the expense of mid-pay occupations (see also Autor et al., 2016). This is consistent with Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) that fragmentation leads to an excess supply of specific types of labour.

In a later study Autor (2019) discusses the development of labour market polarisation from the 1960s until 2017. What is clear from the data he shows is that labour market polarisation is a salient characteristic of the US labour

market. What is also apparent from the data he provides (see for example, Figure 5, p.6) is that after the financial crisis in 2008/9 the speed of polarisation in the 2010-16 period slows down compared to the speed of polarisation in the 1990-2010 period. The heyday of polarisation is the 1990-2010 period followed by a slowdown of polarisation in the 2010-2017 period. This slowdown is consistent with our model of fragmentation costs increase after a global crisis.

Figure 2 indicates that the ICT revolution indeed potentially affects the mid-occupations more than occupations at the extreme end of the occupational distribution. The exposure to software developments is especially high for the mid-range of the occupational wage percentile. Note, that the exposure to ICT has two consequences. Domestic—ICT related technological progress and globalisation or offshoring both affect the labour market position of mid-pay jobs (see Terzidis et al. 2019 for a survey).

The recent global crises make clear that being part of a global supply chain can also make countries more susceptible to shocks. The World Trade Organisation (2009, p. 2), for example, notes with respect to the trade collapse of 2009: ‘...the magnitude of recent declines relates to the increasing presence of global supply




**Figure 2.** Exposure to software by occupational wage percentile; USA, 2016.

Source: based on Webb (2020); the figure shows the average of standardised occupation-level exposure scores for software by occupational wage percentile rank using a locally weighted smoothing regression (bandwidth 0.8 with 100 observations); wage percentiles are measured as the employment-weighted percentile rank of an occupation's mean hourly wage in the May 2016 Occupational Employment Statistics.

*chains in total trade... — goods cross many frontiers during the production process and components in the final product are counted every time they cross a frontier.* The evidence on the effects is mixed. Some studies show that the participation in supply chains slows down economic recovery after a major global shock and thus makes countries more vulnerable to economic shocks, while others only find a marginal effect. [Altomonte et al. \(2012\)](#), for example, observe that along a global supply chain the effects of shocks can be magnified due to ‘inventory’ effects (the so-called bullwhip effect). In contrast, [Wagner and Gelübcke \(2014\)](#) conclude for Germany that foreign multinationals are *not* relatively more severely hit than domestic firms following a negative economic shock. While [Behrens et al. \(2013\)](#) conclude that value chains play only a minor role in Belgium and, like [Bems et al \(2011\)](#), find a dampening effect of participation in supply chains to the sensitivity of the trade collapse in 2009. [Brakman and van Marrewijk \(2019\)](#) look at a large group of countries to analyse the heterogeneity of country experiences that participate in global supply chains. Their main conclusion is straightforward; the stronger the involvement in global supply chains, the slower the recovery of countries to recessions, which is in line with the findings of [Altomonte et al. \(2012\)](#).

The Covid-19 crisis has added to the increased cost awareness that affects trade. Two aspects of Covid-19 stand out: does the Covid-19 crisis increase the, so-called, liability of foreignness and what are the possible implications for the international division of labour? Anecdotal evidence suggests that the perceived liability of foreignness has increased. As an illustration, the [Peterson Institute for International Economics \(2020\)](#), notes that China, as a major supplier of medical equipment, has redirected Chinese-made supplies from exports to domestic usage. The result was that global prices for medical supplies increased substantially, as did global shortages of medical supplies. Governments and firms are confronted with unwanted international dependencies and vulnerabilities. The current shortage of electronic chips is a case in point as supply shortages affect the production of chip-intensive products ([Wall Street Journal, 2021](#)). Experiences like these indicate that becoming too dependent on global supply chains leads governments, firms, and consumers to re-evaluate the net benefits of long supply chains and the related costs ([Brakman et al., 2020](#)). A possible response could be re-shoring, in order to reduce these costs. This response contributes to slowbalisation. [Figure 3](#) is a first and suggestive indication. The (red) dashed line shows the Global Value Chain (GVC) share in



**Figure 3.** Globalisation and Slowbalisation; world exports (% GDP) and GVC share (% total trade).

Source: created using World Bank data; world exports of goods and services (% of GDP) from World Development Indicators; GVC = Global Value Chain; GVC share (% of total trade) from World Development Report (2020).




total trade. Following the crisis of 2008/2009, the GVC share in total trade decreased. So, not only trade stalled in terms of gross-exports (the solid [blue] line), but the GVC share actually declined, which is consistent with shorter supply chains. In a survey, conducted by McKinsey in May 2020, among supply chain executives a majority of 93% indicated that they plan to take steps to make supply chains more resilient. Notably, they consider (p.16) ‘*building in redundancy across suppliers, nearshoring, reducing the number of unique parts, and regionalising their supply chains.*’. In general, the supply chain executives indicate that they intend to (p.17), ‘*strengthen supply chain risk management. And change from just-in-time to just-in-case management.*’. Reshoring and shortening supply chains is part of this re-evaluated supply chain risk management. Also, governments could step in if firms do not take into account the social costs involved of supply chain disruptions (Grossman and Helpman, 2020). This could also result in shorter and less risky supply chains.

From a labour market perspective, the Covid-19 epidemic also has disruptive effects. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between income per capita in a country and the share of jobs that can be done from home. Human

Resources (HR) experts expect that Covid-19 will increase the potential of working from home (WFH), which has seen a steep learning curve, and the consequences will most likely persist even after the Covid-19 pandemic wears off (Kniffin et al., 2021). This raises the question what type of jobs can be done from home. Dingel and Neiman (2020), on which Figure 4 is based, classify the extent to which different types of jobs are teleworkable and use their classification to determine the extent to which different economies have teleworkable jobs. An example of a job that (mostly) *cannot* be done from home is cleaning. Jobs that (to a large extent) *can* be done from home include: computer and mathematical occupation, education, training, legal occupations, and business & financial operations. Figure 4 shows that the potential for working from home increases with income per capita (the regression line explains about 79 per cent of the variance in teleworkability).

The new experience could result in a new and more optimal mix between online working and working from the office. The consequences for globalisation are less clear. Once employers discover that online working is possible and efficient, there is no need to stop looking for new employees at the national border (Baldwin,



**Figure 4.** Teleworkable jobs (per cent of total) and income per capita.

Source: Own calculations based on data from Dingel and Neiman (2020) for teleworkable (percent) and World Development Indicators online for income per capita (GNI PPP in constant 2017 \$, most recent 2017-2018) and population (million, 2018); 86 countries included; circle size proportional to population; dashed line is a regression with slope 8.5454 which explains 79 per cent of the variance in teleworkability.

2019). Living at commuting distances from the office is no longer necessary. An increasing number of tasks will be performed and can be coordinated without the workers actually being located in the same building or in the same country. From the perspective of the international division of labour, the effective global labour supply for any given task performed by a firm may vastly increase if workers and the office are geographically separated from each other. Consequently, labour markets might become more global compared to product markets. For product markets, as discussed above, re-shoring could be a possible answer to an increased awareness of fragmentation risks, but for labour markets the opposite occurs, as labour markets become more global because of online working. Internationally oriented firms will increasingly continue to experiment with the newly discovered online options. Possible political responses could add to slowbalisation (Autor et al. 2020).

In the next section, we formalise and discuss the consequences of supply chains for global trade and the local labour market. The analysis builds on Kremer (1993) who models the organisation of production as a sequence of tasks in which the quality of output is paramount for the successful completion of the whole production process. A matching process leads to a sorting of skills and tasks; advanced tasks concentrate in advanced economies. As the number of tasks rise and the global supply chains become longer, the impact of uncertainty in the model rises, such that supply chains are re-organised and the traditional sorting breaks down. Less advanced tasks can concentrate in advanced economies. The increased risks affect trade along global supply chains for both emerging markets and advanced countries, as well as their vulnerability to shocks. Our approach explains both the period of (hyper) globalisation and slowbalisation as described in Figure 1 in terms of changes of fragmentation costs. Fragmentation also has labour


market consequences. During the period of Hyper Globalisation labour market polarisation became an important characteristic of labour markets. Our formalisation can explain this phenomenon. Moreover, we can explain slowbalisation based on the natural limits of fragmentation and globalisation within the structure of our model, see the section ‘Possibilities and limitations of fragmentation’.

### Occupations, tasks and fragmentation

Attention to the economic impact of fragmentation is not new. In the early 1990s it became clear that fragmentation of production was reducing the cost of production (see, for example, Jones and Kierzkowski, 2002, and Deardorff, 2001, who show the possible cost reductions in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework). The focus in these early contributions is on the consequences for factor prices if fragmentation of production is possible. In our model, we take factor prices as given. At the time, systematic data were lacking and to some extent contributions relied on case studies, as the empirical contributions in Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) also illustrate. Our model is related to theoretical work on supply chains that builds on Kremer (1993)—who also takes factor prices a given—by assuming that various stages in the production chain follow upon each other. These stages can have specific characteristics. In Costinot et al. (2013), for example, it is assumed that productivities of stages fall along the value chain. One of the consequences is that more efficient (high-skilled) countries specialise in downstream stages of the production process.<sup>5</sup> For a final product firm the challenge, in a multi-country, multi fragment world, is to minimise production costs along the supply chain (a major step forward in this respect is the contribution of Antràs and De Gortari, 2020).

The presence of fragmentation costs makes this problem complicated; an efficient location that is far away might be bypassed for a less efficient location that is nearby. Calculating





**Figure 5.** Example: tasks and occupations; fragmentation of the production process into two parts to country  $j$ . Note: see Appendix for details; occupation functions  $g_i(x|y)$  are stacked on top of each other to depict total employment.

an optimal path can thus become challenging. Simplifying assumptions are necessary to make the models tractable (see, for example, the canonical model of [Caliendo and Parro, 2015](#)). [Antras and De Gortari \(2020\)](#), make simplifying assumptions in a Ricardian model where tasks coincide with occupations to solve this problem of finding a cost-minimising path along supply chains; with an arbitrary number (which is exogenous) of countries and fragments, the calculations quickly become intractable. [Antrás and Chor \(2022\)](#) survey a wide range of models that deal with complications like these, and discuss the simplifying assumptions that have to be made. The literature on production networks also discusses how shocks propagate through supply chains. The type of shocks that are discussed are different from the crisis shocks that are central in this paper. As extensively documented by [Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi \(2019\)](#), the shocks in the literature usually involve: policy, productivity, preference and labour supply shocks. The large majority of applications using this model assume that there are

only two stages of production. This is a strong assumption, but necessary to derive analytical results. [Antras and De Gortari \(2020\)](#) is an example of a multi-stage extension, but as noted by [Antras and Chor \(2022, p.333\)](#), the computational restraints are large, which limits the number of stages in practice. A key characteristic of these models is often that the structure of the production network itself is given and that the length of the supply chains is not affected by shocks. Endogenising a network rapidly becomes unwieldy because the complexity of analysing all possible networks quickly becomes too large because of ‘the combinatorial nature of graphs’, see [Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi \(2019, p. 648\)](#).<sup>6</sup>

Our model is related to these models in the sense that we assume, as a simplifying assumption, a sequence (a continuum) of fragments that have to be executed one after the other and combined in the final stage of production. This makes the model tractable and enables us to endogenise fragmentation. A feature of the model is that we do not have to assume that the structure of the

production network is given; the number of fragments in the supply chain is endogenous.<sup>7</sup> This set-up also avoids that we run into prohibitively large calculation costs of analysing all possible networks, because we simplify supply chains as a sequence of production steps. Fragmentation is not necessary; depending on fragmentation costs, firms could decide to produce in-house. A benefit of our approach in contrast to some models in the literature, is that changes in fragmentation costs do not require a recalculation of the total sequence of production steps; only that part of the supply chain that comes after a specific fragment needs to be re-evaluated (see [Antras and Chor, 2022](#) for a discussion of this complication). Furthermore, we differ from the existing fragmentation models in one important aspect: each fragment in the production process represents a combination of occupations. The fragmentation in our model is endogenous and therefore the occupational composition of each fragment is also endogenous. Note, that our fragmentations costs are general and cover all aspects that involve or affect fragmentation costs, such as increases in fragmentation costs because of tariff wars, or reductions in fragmentation costs such as government subsidies. This implies that fragmenting the production process can have consequences for the labour market. Some occupations are more skill-intensive than others and if fragmentation occurs some occupations feel the consequences of offshoring more than others. This aspect of our model links our discussion to [Autor et al. \(2016\)](#). The relationship between tasks and occupations also relates our approach to [Autor et al. \(2013\)](#), who introduce a task-based approach to analyse changes in the labour market caused by automation. Cost increases of a particular supply chain can be incorporated in models like these by assuming that the fragmentation costs increase.

### Demand, profit and assumptions

This set-up is general in the sense that it encompasses various market forms and demand structures. It applies to all profit-maximising

firms with separable profit functions. A simple example is a firm that maximises profits  $\pi(y) = p(y)y - C(y)$ , where  $y$  is output,  $p(y)$  is the inverse demand function and  $C(y)$  is the cost function. If  $'$  denotes a derivative, the first-order condition is  $p'y + p - C' = 0$ , more commonly known as  $p(y)(1 - 1/\varepsilon(y)) = C'(y)$ , where  $\varepsilon(y) \equiv -p/p'y$  is the price elasticity of demand. Under perfect competition  $\varepsilon(y) = \infty$  and price must be equal to marginal cost, which leads to a specific optimal output level  $y^*$  under decreasing returns to scale ( $C'' > 0$ ). Under perfect competition and constant returns to scale ( $C'' = 0$ ), we have a borderline case in which firms either produce nothing or output  $y^*$  is determined by market conditions.<sup>8</sup> In all other cases, profit maximisation leading to output  $y^*$  can in principle also occur under increasing returns to scale ( $C'' < 0$ ). We can, of course, complicate the analysis. For example, if there is a range of output markets  $j$ , in which case we have  $\pi = \sum_j p_j(y_j)y_j - C(y)$  with  $y = \sum_j y_j$ , we determine optimal output  $y_j^*$  in each market and hence total output  $y^*$  as its sum. Alternatively, we can have a complicated game-theoretic setting in which a firm determines its output level  $y^*$ . In all cases, firms maximise profits by minimising total costs for the production of the given total output level  $y$ , which is the focus of our analysis. More specifically, we analyse the organisation of the production process for a given output level  $y$  as fragmentation costs fall. As always, changes in market forms or changes in exogenous variables, such as fragmentation costs, may affect the cost function and thus the chosen output level. It is, however, important to realise that the conclusions we derive below hold for any given output level, including the adjusted output level.

The main assumptions underlying our model are:

- The production of output  $y$  requires the sequential completion of a continuum of tasks  $x$ , ordered from 0 to 1.
- The completion of task  $x$  requires the combination of a finite number of occupations

$i \in I = \{1, \dots, \bar{I}\}$ . The employment of occupation  $i$  for task  $x$  (given output  $y$ ) is provided by the function  $g_i(x | y)$ . For ease of exposition, we assume the functions  $g_i$  to be differentiable.<sup>9</sup> Total employment for task  $x$  (given output  $y$ ) is, therefore:  $\sum_i g_i(x | y)$ . It is depicted in graphs like Figure 5 by stacking the functions  $g_i$ . We use  $G_i$  to denote the distribution function associated with  $g_i$ , such that  $G_i(x | y) \equiv \int_0^x g_i(z | y) dz$ . Its derivative (denoted by  $'$ ) is thus:  $G'_i(x | y) = g_i(x | y)$ . Total employment  $L_i$  for occupation  $i$  is thus  $L_i = G_i(1/y)$ . If the wage rate in the Home country for occupation  $i$  is  $w_i$ , then total cost of production at Home is:  $TC = \sum_i w_i L_i$ .

- There is a finite number of countries  $j \in J = \{0, \dots, \bar{J}\}$  with given wage rates  $\bar{w}_{ij}$  (where Home is country 0). There can be Hicks-neutral technology differences between countries, such that  $g_{ij}(x | y) = \lambda_j g_i(x | y)$ . We can express the costs  $\bar{w}_{ij} \lambda_j g_i(x | y)$  in terms of Home country efficiency units by defining  $w_{ij} \equiv \bar{w}_{ij} / \lambda_j$ , such that the costs are  $w_{ij} g_i(x | y)$ .
- Fragmentation occurs by producing a range of tasks sequentially in different countries.<sup>10</sup> Fragmentation into  $p + 1$  parts requires determining  $p$  fragmentation points  $x_s$ , where the first fragment is produced in country  $j_0 \in J$ , the second fragment in country  $j_1 \in J$ , and so on, up to fragment  $p$  in country  $j_p \in J$ . At each step  $s$  we must have different countries, so:  $j_s \neq j_{s+1}$ . We denote the sequence of  $p + 1$  countries  $j_0, j_1, \dots, j_p$  by  $\prod_{s=0}^p j_s$  and the  $p$  fragmentation points by  $x_s$  for  $s = 1, \dots, p$ ; with the convention that  $x_0 = 0$  and  $x_{p+1} = 1$ . The fixed fragmentation costs associated with this sequence are denoted by  $F_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s}$ . Firms that minimise the sum of production costs and fragmentation costs. We assume that the fragmentation costs rise rapidly as the number of fragments rises and also that these costs tend to fall over time, see the discussion in the section 'Intuition 1: coordination costs and fragmentation'. We

also analyse the limiting case of zero fragmentation costs, see section 'Infinite fragmentation and practical limits'.

As an example, the model is illustrated in Figure 5 using three occupations (see section 'Details of the fragmentation example' for further details, also on the fragmentation in two parts), where occupation 1 is more intensively used in the early stages of production (low task index), occupation 2 is more intensively used in the medium stages of production (medium task index), and occupation 3 is more intensively used in the later stages of production (high task index). For clarity, and without loss of generality, we label occupations 1, 2 and 3 as being low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled occupations, respectively. The Appendix A lists and briefly discusses the numerical specification for all examples in the paper. Note that in our example each task requires a combination of all occupations for completion, while each occupation is involved in the production of all tasks. Neither observation is required, so a task may involve employment of only one occupation and an occupation may be involved in only a sub-range of tasks, rather than being required for all tasks.

### Intuition 1: coordination costs and fragmentation

To illustrate the working of the model and provide some intuition we illustrate its key characteristics. We focus on changes in fragmentation costs, taking the rewards to factors of production (the wage rates for occupations in the different countries) as given. The main driving force of (hyper) globalisation is the decline in coordination and fragmentation costs due to the technological (ICT) revolution, which makes it easier to monitor and coordinate the cooperation and interaction of tasks incorporated in different fragments across a rising number of individual countries. Similar to Kremer's (1993) O-ring theory, we

can interpret the combination of fragments as a sequence of steps to be executed to produce a final product. Failing any singular step of the fragmentation process renders the final product as worthless and hence the emphasis on quality and reliability rises as the number of fragments rises, since we are dealing with a rapidly rising number of coordination costs as the number of fragments rises.

As noted previously, many issues play a role in determining the fixed fragmentation costs, including transport costs, cultural differences, legal systems, language barriers, regional trade agreements and so on. An important aspect of the fragmentation costs, however, is the coordination of the production process between the different fragments and the reliability and quality, as emphasised above. If there are  $p$  fragments, the number of different connections between the fragments is equal to  $p(p-1)/2$ . If we assume that the coordination and quality costs are a convex function of the number of connections, this implies that the coordination costs rise rapidly with the number of fragments. As a result, technological improvements are particularly important for lowering the coordination costs of more complicated production processes consisting of many fragments.


We illustrate the discussion and its main implications in Figures 6 and 7 (see section ‘Intuition 2’).<sup>11</sup>

Panel *a* of Figure 6 shows that the costs of coordination decline over time due to technological improvements (right scale of panel *a*). Panel *b* shows that the associated total fragmentation coordination costs (which in the example is proportional to the number of connections between the fragments) falls particularly fast if the number of fragments is larger (illustrated by the downward [green] arrows). Firms minimise total costs, which is the sum of production costs and fragmentation coordination costs. The optimal number of fragments is thus a trade-off in the gain from lower production costs and the loss in higher coordination

costs. Initially, as coordination costs are very high, fragmentation is too costly and the firm produces one fragment at Home only, see Figure 6a and the top part of Figure 7. As coordination costs fall, it becomes optimal to fragment the production process into two parts, where the first fragment is produced at Home and the second part in country 1, see the second part of Figure 7. This starts the process of globalisation in Figure 6a, which speeds up as coordination costs decline more rapidly during Hyper Globalisation leading first to fragmentation into three parts (Home—country 1—country 2) and then to fragmentation into four parts (Home—country 3—country 1—country 2), see Figure 7 and the discussion below. In the final phase of slowbalisation, coordination costs no longer decline or even rise (see Figure 6a,b), leading to a stagnation in the number of fragments or even a decline (see Figure 6a). This is in line with the GVC share information on the right-hand side of Figure 3.


## Intuition 2: step-wise fragmentation

We discuss the step-wise fragmentation example formally in section ‘Details of the fragmentation example’. An important implication of our model is that it is *not* necessary to re-organise the entire production process as the next step is taken, because the previous fragmentation point is not affected if the same countries are involved in the range that includes this fragmentation point. Finding a new supply chain route—which involves a complete recalculation of the supply chain—is not necessary. We show this principle in Figure 7. Notation wise, when fragmentation is into  $p$  parts, we refer to these fragments as  $fr\ p_1, fr\ p_2, \dots, fr\ p_p$ , respectively. The optimal fragmentation points  $x$  depend on the number of fragments and the order of countries active at this fragmentation point, which we denote by sub-indices (see section Details of the fragmentation example’). In this notation for the optimal fragmentation point  $x_{2_1\ h\ j}$  the sub-index  $2_1$  indicates the first fragmentation



**Figure 6.** Technological improvement, coordination costs, and fragmentation.

Note: panel a depicts the number of fragments over time as the coordination costs parameter (= coord cost par) changes; panel b curves indicate total fragmentation coordination costs for different coordination cost parameters (consistent with panel a) with  $d_0 > d_1 > d_2 > d_3 > d_4$ , see the main text for details. If  $p$  is the number of fragments the number of connections is  $p(p - 1)2$ ; panel b makes the fragmentation coordination costs proportional to the number of connections for  $d_0 = 10$ ;  $d_1 = 8$ ;  $d_2 = 6$ ;  $d_3 = 5$ ;  $d_4 = 4$ . If we make the fragmentation coordinations costs a strictly convex function of the number of connections (see the main text), these costs rise even faster as the number of fragments rises.



**Figure 7.** Step-wise fragmentation.

Note: see Appendix for parameter details; # fr = number of fragments (inverse scale).

point of fragmentation into 2 parts, while the sub-index  $hj$  indicates that the first fragment is produced at home and the second in country  $j$ . Similarly for the other points.

*Step 1.* Initially, as fragmentation costs are high, the firm produces all goods in the Home country; there is then only one fragment  $fr1_1$ , produced in the Home country.

*Step 2.* As fragmentation costs are falling (because of lower coordination costs) it becomes feasible for the firm to fragment the production process into two parts. As discussed in the ‘Two-part fragmentation’ section, the firm then analyses the optimal fragmentation point of  $fr1_1$  relative to each country, determines the minimal total costs, and evaluates if these



costs are lower than production of all goods at Home. In the example, this implies the production of  $fr2_1$  in the Home country and the production of  $fr2_2$  in country 1, with fragmentation point  $x_{2_1 0 1} = 0.29$ . We assume at this stage that the coordination costs are too high to make fragmentation into three parts an attractive option.<sup>12</sup>

*Step 3.* As fragmentation costs continue to fall, it becomes feasible for the firm to fragment the production process into three parts. Evaluating different options (see section ‘Three-part and many-part fragmentation’), the firm fragments part  $fr2_2$  into two pieces at  $x_{3_2 1 2} = 0.83$ , thus producing  $fr3_2$  in country 1 and  $fr3_3$  in country 2. In this case, the first fragmentation point  $x_{3_1 0 1} = x_{2_1 0 1}$  is not affected as the first-order condition in this range between the Home country and country 1 is still fulfilled and the Home country thus continues to produce the same fragment:  $fr2_1 = fr3_1$ .

*Step 4.* As fragmentation costs continue to fall, Figure 7 illustrates a hypothetical continuation of the fragmentation process. We now assume that it is optimal for the firm to fragment the first part of  $fr3_2$  to country 3 and the second part to country 1 at fragmentation point  $x_{4_2 3 1} = 0.55$ . In this case, the last fragmentation point  $x_{4_3 0 1} = x_{3_2 0 1}$  is not affected as the first-order condition in this range between country 1 and country 2 is still fulfilled and country 2 thus continues to produce the same fragment:  $fr3_3 = fr4_4$ . In contrast, the first fragmentation point *is* affected as we now have to determine the optimal fragmentation point for the Home country relative to country 3 instead of country 1. We have assumed this to occur at  $x_{4_1 0 3} = 0.22$ . In this case, therefore, the expansion of fragmentation has squeezed a new fragment  $fr4_2$  in between the old fragments  $fr3_1$  and  $fr3_2$  without affecting fragment  $fr3_3$ .

As we continue this process it becomes clear that falling coordination costs will make it profitable for firms to step-wise fragment the production process into smaller parts. During this process it is in many cases *not* necessary

to revise the entire production process at each step, but rather to focus only on the part of the production process where continued fragmentation leads to lower costs, leaving the remainder of the production process unaffected. Obviously, the further firms are in this process, the larger the unaffected part and the smaller the re-organised part. Note, that changes in fragmentation costs affect the length of a supply chain, but only of that section for which the costs change. It is not necessary the re-calculate an entire new fragmentation route. If coordination costs rise again (see the right-hand part of Figure 6a or the upward arrows in Figure 6b) the process of step-wise fragmentation may come to a halt or might be partially reversed. However, rising coordination costs is *not* a necessary condition for the fragmentation process to stop as our model implies limits on the extent and impact of fragmentation even if coordination costs continue to decline, see the ‘Possibilities and limitations of fragmentation’ section.

## Details of the fragmentation example

### Two-part fragmentation

We first analyse the possibility of fragmentation of the production process into two parts: one part at Home and the other part abroad. The first fragment consists of all tasks from 0 to the point  $x_1$  and the second fragment consists of all tasks from  $x_1$  to 1, see Figure 5 for an illustration. Firms are free to decide on the range of tasks to be included in a fragment and thus choose the point  $x_1$  optimally. Fragmentation abroad can be relative to any country  $j \in J$ , with associated costs for task  $x$  equal to  $w_{ij}g_i(x | y)$ . The firm has an incentive to fragment part of the production process abroad if the wage costs in terms of home efficiency units are lower for *some* occupation, that is  $w_{ij} < w_i$  for some  $i$ . This condition is, of course, necessary but not sufficient as the fragmentation of tasks also involves other occupations which may be more expensive abroad than at Home in terms of

efficiency units. For ease of exposition, we assume that the Home country has a comparative advantage in the early stages of the production process (low task index), such that if fragmentation occurs Home produces fragment 1 and fragment 2 is produced abroad. Obviously, there are additional costs associated with fragmentation of the production process in terms of coordination, transport costs, cultural differences, legal systems, language barriers, regional trade agreements, and the like. In the case of fragmentation into two parts, we let  $F_{hj}$  denote these, fixed, fragmentation costs if the first fragment is produced in Home and the second fragment in country  $j$ .

In terms of cost minimisation, the firm now faces three decisions.

1. Given fragmentation into two parts relative to country  $j$ , what is the optimal fragmentation point  $x_{2_1 hj}$ ? In this notation, the sub-index  $2_1$  indicates the first fragmentation point of fragmentation into 2 parts, while the sub-index  $hj$  indicates that the first fragment is produced at home and the second in country  $j$ .
2. Determine what is the best country to fragment to if fragmentation is into two parts. This requires calculating the minimum total costs of fragmentation into two parts relative to all countries  $j$ .
3. Determine if fragmentation into two parts leads to lower costs than producing at Home only.

We address these questions in turn below.

Relative to point 1, we start by determining the fragmentation point  $x_{2_1 hj}$ , given that Home produces the first fragment and country  $j$  produces the second fragment. If fragmentation is into 2 parts, we refer to these fragments as  $fr2_1$  and  $fr2_2$ , respectively. Total employment for occupation  $i$  at Home if the fragmentation point is at  $x$  is given by  $G_i(x | y)$ . These workers are paid the wage rate  $w_i$ . Total employment for occupation  $i$  in country  $j$  in terms of Home

efficiency units if the fragmentation point is at  $x$  equals  $G_i(1 | y) - G_i(x | y)$ . These workers are paid the wage rate  $w_{ij}$ . Exclusive of the fragmentation costs  $F_{hj}$ , the variable costs  $c_{hj}(x)$  of fragmentation at point  $x$  in country  $j$  is given in equation (1), where the first term on the right-hand side reflects the costs of producing fragment 1 at Home and the second term reflects the costs of producing fragment 2 in country  $j$ .


$$c_{hj}(x | y) = \underbrace{\left[ \sum_i w_i G_i(x | y) \right]}_{\text{Home cost}} + \underbrace{\left[ \sum_i w_{ij} [G_i(1 | y) - G_i(x | y)] \right]}_{\text{country } j \text{ cost}} \quad (1)$$

If we differentiate equation (1) with respect to fragmentation point  $x$  and equate to zero, we get the first-order condition for the optimal fragmentation point given in equation (2), requiring orthogonality of the differences in wage rates using the density function  $g_i$  at the fragmentation point  $x_{2_1 hj}$ .

$$\sum_i (w_i - w_{ij}) g_i(x_{2_1 hj} | y) = 0 \quad (2)$$

If condition (2) is not fulfilled at any point in the domain of  $x$ , then there is no internal fragmentation point relative to country  $j$ . If there are multiple such points, these have to be evaluated to determine the point with minimum costs. This is illustrated in Figure 8 for the example with three occupations used above. The curve  $c_{hj}(x | y)$  depicts the costs of equation (1) throughout the domain. It has two points satisfying the orthogonality condition of equation (2), of which  $\bar{x}$  represents a local maximum and  $x_{2_1 hj}$  represents the cost minimum.

The minimum costs with two-part fragmentation relative to country  $j$  exclusive of the fragmentation costs  $F_{hj}$  are given by  $c_{hj}(x_{2_1 hj} | y)$ . Total costs relative to country  $j$  are thus given by  $c_{hj}(x_{2_1 hj} | y) + F_{hj}$ . Point 2 above is then choosing country  $j \in J$  with the lowest costs. Point 3 above involves choosing two-part fragmentation instead of production at Home if:  $F_{hj} + c_{hj}(x_{2_1 hj} | y) < TC$ , provided  $j$  is the



**Figure 8.** Determining the optimal fragmentation point  $x_{2_1, h, j}$ .  
 Note: see Appendix for parameter details.

optimal choice in point 2. Note that a decline in fragmentations costs in terms of a reduction of  $F_{h, j}$  does not affect the fragmentation point, but may affect the decision to fragment.

**Result 1.** *Fragmentation costs can affect the decision to fragment; the higher the costs, the less likely fragmentation becomes.*


### Three-part and many-part fragmentation

The next step in our exposition of the model is to analyse three-part fragmentation, where the first part is produced at home, the second part in country  $j$ , and the third part in country  $r$ . As above, the first fragment consists of all tasks from 0 to the point  $x_1$ , the second fragment consists of all tasks from  $x_1$  to  $x_2$ , and the third fragment consists of all tasks from  $x_2$  to 1, see Figure 9. The firm chooses the fragmentation points optimally, taking into consideration the fixed costs of fragmentation and given the prices of occupations in the different locations. In the case of fragmentation into three parts, we let  $F_{h,j,r}$  denote the fixed fragmentation costs if the first fragment is produced in Home, the second fragment in country  $j$ , and the third fragment in country  $r$ . In our discussion we assume for simplicity that the order of fragmentation does not affect the fixed costs  $F$  of fragmentation; only the involved countries are important, but this can easily be relaxed.<sup>13</sup>

We start again with determining the optimal fragmentation points. Exclusive of the fragmentation costs  $F_{h, j, r}$ , the variable costs  $c_{h, j, r}(x_1, x_2 | y)$  of fragmentation at points  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  is given in equation (3). Note that  $0 \leq x_1 \leq x_2 \leq 1$ , where the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) reflects the costs of producing  $fr3_1$  at Home, the second term reflects the costs of producing  $fr3_2$  in country  $j$ , and the third term reflects the cost of producing  $fr3_3$  in country  $r$ . Appendix B provides a surface plot and contour plot for the associated costs.<sup>14</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 c_{h, j, r}(x_1, x_2 | y) = & \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_i G_i(x_1 | y) \right)}_{\text{Home cost}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_{ij} (G_i(x_2 | y) - G_i(x_1 | y)) \right)}_{\text{country } j \text{ cost}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_{ir} (G_i(1 | y) - G_i(x_2 | y)) \right)}_{\text{country } r \text{ cost}}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

If we differentiate equation (3) with respect to fragmentation points  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  and equate to zero, we get the first-order conditions for the optimal fragmentation points given in equation (4), implying orthogonality of the



**Figure 9.** Fragmentation of the production process into three parts to countries  $j$  and  $r$ .  
 Note: see Appendix for details; occupation functions  $g_i(x|y)$  are stacked on top of each other to depict total employment

differences in wage rates using the density functions  $g_i$  at the fragmentation point. Note that the first-order condition for the *first* fragmentation point  $x_{3_1 h j}$  is identical to equation (2), such that this fragmentation point *does not change*, as discussed in the section ‘Fragmentation and the labour market’. More specifically, as long as the order of the first two countries (Home—country  $j$ ) does not change, the first fragmentation point does not change and we are left to determine the optimal fragmentation point between country  $j$  and country  $r$  from then onwards.


$$\begin{aligned} \sum_i (w_i - w_{ij})g_i(x_{3_1 h j} | y) &= 0 \\ \sum_i (w_{ij} - w_{ir})g_i(x_{3_2 j r} | y) &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

We can analyse the behaviour of cost function (3) in two dimensions by extending Figure 8, which determines the optimal two-part fragmentation point, to also determine the optimal three-part fragmentation points for sub-parts

of the domain of  $x$ , see Figure 10. We do this in three steps.

Step 1 depicts the two-part fragmentation procedure by repeating the  $c_{h j}$  cost function of equation (1) as a solid blue line. The cost minimum is achieved at point  $x_{2_1 h j}$ , which leads to costs  $c_{h j}(x_{2_1 h j} | y)$ . As we argued above, two-part fragmentation lowers total costs relative to producing exclusively at Home only if the fixed fragmentation costs are sufficiently low:  $F_{h j} < TC - c_{h j}(x_{2_1 h j} | y)$ .

Step 2 is based on the observation that the optimal fragmentation point  $x_{3_1 h j}$  does not change if the order of countries does not change. To determine the optimal second fragmentation point  $x_{3_2 j r}$ , we, therefore, depict the three-part fragmentation cost function of equation (3) in the domain  $[x_{3_1 h j}, 1]$ , given the optimal choice for the first fragmentation, see the (orange) dashed curve  $c_{h j r}(x_{3_1 h j}, x | y)$ . Its minimum cost level is reached at point  $x_{3_2 j r}$ , which satisfies the second first-order condition of equation (4). The associated minimum cost level is  $c_{h j r}(x_{3_1 h j}, x_{3_2 j r} | y)$ , as depicted in Figure 10.



**Figure 10.** Determining the optimal fragmentation points  $x_{3_1 h j}$  and  $x_{3_2 j r}$ . Note: see Appendix for parameter details.

Step 3 confirms the optimal choice of the first fragmentation point for three-part fragmentation by depicting the three-part fragmentation cost function of equation (3) in the domain  $[0, x_{3_2 j r}]$ , given the optimal choice for the second fragmentation point, see the (red) long-dashed curve  $c_{h j r}(x, x_{3_2 j r} | y)$ . Its minimum cost level is reached at point  $x_{3_1 h j}$ , which satisfies the first first-order condition of equation (4). The associated minimum cost level is again  $c_{h j r}(x_{3_1 h j}, x_{3_2 j r} | y)$ , as shown in Figure 10.

$$\underbrace{(F_{h j r} - F_{h j})}_{\text{rise fragmentation costs}} < \underbrace{(c_{h j}(x_{2_1 h j} | y) - c_{h j r}(x_{3_2 h j}, x_{3_2 j r} | y))}_{\text{reduction variable costs}} \quad (5)$$

Finally, we note that three-part fragmentation leads to lower total costs of production if the rise in fixed costs relative to two-part fragmentation is lower than the variable cost reduction, as given in equation (5).

Appendix B briefly explains how this procedure can be extended to many-part fragmentation.

**Result 2.** With many-part fragmentation, falling fragmentation costs affect the geography of supply chains.

### Fragmentation and the labour market

We now briefly discuss the (employment) consequences associated with the fragmentation process using the examples discussed above. We summarise the implications in Table 1, which provides an overview of the distribution of employment over the three occupations associated with each fragment if production is organised in one, two, or three fragments, where the top part (panel a) is in absolute terms and the bottom part (panel b) in relative terms. It is illustrated in

The top-left part of Table 1 depicts absolute employment if there is no fragmentation, in which case there is one fragment produced in Home. Employment in occupation 1–2–3 is 0.267–0.433–0.133, respectively, which leads to 0.833 total employment and 0.833 variable costs (because all wage rates are normalised to



**Table 1.** Distribution of employment and per cent of employment for fragmentation example.

		a. Employment					
		Number of fragments					
Frag	Occ	1	2	2	3	3	3
		Home	Home	Country 1	Home	Country 1	Country 2
1	1 low	0.267	0.121		0.121		
	2 med	0.433	0.097		0.097		
	3 high	0.133	0.018		0.018		
2	1 low			0.145		0.125	
	2 med			0.336		0.294	
	3 high			0.115		0.061	
3	1 low						0.020
	2 med						0.043
	3 high						0.055
Total empl		0.833	0.236	0.597	0.236	0.480	0.118
Var costs		0.833	0.236	0.565	0.236	0.439	0.111
		b. Per cent of employment					
		Number of fragments					
Frag	Occ	1	2	2	3	3	3
		Home	Home	Country 1	Home	Country 1	Country 2
1	1 low	32	51		51		
	2 med	52	41		41		
	3 high	16	8		8		
2	1 low			24		26	
	2 med			56		61	
	3 high			19		13	
3	1 low						17
	2 med						36
	3 high						47
Total empl		100	100	100	100	100	100

Data are based on the example discussed in Appendix A; empl = employment; var = variable.

one in the Home country). The bottom-left part of Table 1 shows relative employment and indicates that 52 per cent is in medium-skilled occupation 2, followed by 32 per cent in low-skilled occupation 1 and 16 per cent in high-skilled occupation 3. These percentages indicate, of course, the average involvement of an occupation over the entire range of tasks.

The top-middle part of Table 1 depicts absolute employment for the fragments produced in Home and country 1 if fragmentation

is in two parts. We assumed that occupations 1 and 3 are more expensive in country 1 than in Home, whereas medium-skilled occupation 2 is cheaper. As a consequence, the Home country produces the first fragment  $fr_{2_1}$  and country 1 produces the second fragment  $fr_{2_2}$ . As the bottom part of Table 1 shows, fragment  $fr_{2_1}$  produced in Home is relatively more intensive in the use of low-skilled occupation 1 (namely 51 per cent compared to the overall average of 32 per cent) and relatively less intensive in the

use of medium-skilled occupation 2 (namely 41 per cent compared to the overall average of 52 per cent). The reverse holds for fragment  $fr_{2,}$  produced in country 1: it is more intensive in the use of medium-skilled occupation 2 and less intensive in the use of low-skilled occupation 1. Fragmentation thus allows countries to specialise according to their comparative advantage as medium-skilled occupation 2 is relatively cheap in country 1. Note that the bundling of occupations in fragments poses a limitation in this respect for high-skill occupation 3, as we discuss in Section 5.

The top-right part of Table 1 depicts absolute employment for the fragments produced in Home, country 1 and country 2 if fragmentation is in three parts. We assumed that low-skilled occupation 1 is more expensive in country 2 than in Home, while high-skilled occupation 3 is less expensive and medium-skilled occupation 2 is equally expensive. This gives country 2 a comparative advantage in the high-skill intensive end stages of the production process, which explains why Home produces fragment  $fr_{3,1}$ , country 1 produces fragment  $fr_{3,2}$ , and country 3 produces fragment  $fr_{3,3}$ . As the bottom part of Table 1 illustrates, there is no change in the relative composition of occupations for Home, which is still most intensive in low-skill occupation 1. For country 1, however, the intensity of medium-skill occupation 2 (which is cheapest in country 1) rises substantially for the fragment it produces (from 56 to 61 per cent), while the intensity of high-skill occupation 3 (which is dearest in country 1) falls substantially (from 19 per cent to 13 per cent). Similarly, country 2 produces a fragment which intensively uses high-skill occupation 3 (namely 47 per cent), which is cheapest in country 2. All countries thus specialise according to their comparative advantages.<sup>15</sup>

The discussion above shows that a fall in coordination costs, which allows deeper fragmentation (into more parts), provides countries with better opportunities to benefit from their

comparative advantages as reflected in the reward for a certain occupation. The driving force behind this process is the fact that fragments are more directly linked to a certain occupation as the fragmentation process continues. This raises the question if ever-continuing and more-detailed fragmentation will completely wipe out the demand for certain occupations in certain countries, as is widely argued. It does not. More-detailed fragmentation can lower the relative demand for certain occupations in certain countries compared to unfragmented production. In the example: for medium- and high-skill occupations in Home, for low- and high-skill occupations in country 1, and for low- and medium-skill occupations in country 2, while raising the relative demand for other occupations (low-skill occupations in Home, medium-skill occupations in country 1, and high-skill occupations in country 2). It is straightforward to construct a multi-product example in a general equilibrium setting in which fragmentation from the perspective of multiple countries raises the relative demand for both low-skill and high-skill occupations in Home as well as lowering the relative demand for medium-skill occupations (see Figures 2 and 4) while simultaneously raising the relative demand for medium-skill occupations in country 1. There are, however, both practical and theoretical limits to what fragmentation can achieve, as discussed next.

## Possibilities and limitations of fragmentation

### Possibilities of fragmentation

As already discussed in the ‘Details of the fragmentation example’ section a disadvantage of unfragmented production in one location is the inability to take advantage of variations in occupation intensity across the production process. The cost of production at any particular location reflects the price of occupations for the *average* use of that occupation

in the production process. In the example we discussed, this was 52 per cent for medium-skill occupation 2, followed by 32 per cent for low-skill occupation 1, and 16 per cent for high-skill occupation 3. This is illustrated in Figure 11 for the three occupations with the *av.* balls if fragmentation is not possible (the 1 *fr* lines). When deciding where to produce if fragmentation is not possible, firms evaluate the attractiveness of locations based on these averages. In our example, unfragmented production is cheapest in the Home country, followed by production exclusively in country 1, while exclusive production in country 2 is most expensive. We thus initially assume production takes place in the Home country.

The intensity with which occupations are used for producing the different tasks varies as the task ranges from 0 to 1. To provide an idea of this range, Figure 11 also provides the minimum and maximum employment share (as a percentage) of each occupation, as defined in equation (6). In general, the minimum will be larger than zero and the maximum will be smaller than 100, although both extremes are, of course, possible if an occupation is not necessary for a particular task or if a task requires only one occupation, respectively.

Figure 11 shows that the average without fragmentation is somewhere along this range (the *av.* balls).


$$\min_i = \min \left\{ \frac{g_i(x)}{\sum_r g_r(x)} \mid x \in X \right\}; \quad \max_i = \max \left\{ \frac{g_i(x)}{\sum_r g_r(x)} \mid x \in X \right\} \quad (6)$$

As fragmentation into two parts is possible (the 2 *fr* lines in Figure 11), the two fragments allow for a wider coverage of the range of intensities, although in discrete steps. For low-skill occupation 1, for example, the average intensity was 32 per cent without fragmentation, while fragmentation into two parts allows for an intensity of 24 per cent (in country 1) and 51 per cent (for Home), which is substantially closer to the minimum (of 16.7 per cent) and the maximum (of 71.4 per cent). Further fragmentation

further widens the range for occupations in three discrete steps, namely 17 per cent (in country 2), 26 per cent (in country 1), and 51 per cent (in Home). In short, as fragmentation continues a wider part of the range is covered, although in discrete steps. Similar observations hold for the other occupations. As discussed above, it allows countries to benefit from their comparative advantages in occupations. As a consequence, fragmentation creates *possibilities* to expand the relative demand for occupations with comparative advantage and reduce the relative demand for other occupations. The question arises if there are any *limits* to the possibilities created as fragmentation continues? Without such limits, we can expect an ever-rising demand for occupations with a comparative advantage at the expense of an ever-declining demand for other occupations. There are, however, clear limits to the possibilities of fragmentation in two different ways, as is clear from the visualisation of the possibilities created by fragmentation in Figure 11 as a wider coverage of the range in between minimum and maximum.

### Limitations of fragmentation

The first limitation of fragmentation is the extent of the range depicted in Figure 11 itself: no matter how detailed fragmentation, the relative demand for any occupation in any country cannot be lower than the minimum over the entire range of tasks, nor can the relative demand for any occupation in any country be higher than the maximum over the entire range of tasks. This minimum and maximum thus provide clear limits on the extent to which fragmentation can raise the relative demand of an occupation or lower the relative demand of an occupation, no matter how detailed fragmentation itself may be. Only if the minimum is zero for all occupations and the maximum is 100 for all occupations does the range not imply a limitation for fragmentation, but these are clearly special circumstances.



**Figure 11.** On the limits and possibilities of fragmentation.  
 Note: see Appendix for details; occ = occupation; fr = fragment(s); av. = average; min = minimum; max = maximum.

The second limitation of fragmentation focuses on the coverage of the range in between minimum and maximum. In the example, the range for an occupation is a continuum taking on all values in between minimum and maximum. As Figure 11 shows, rising fragmentation of the production process implies a better coverage of the range in between minimum and maximum, but this only takes place in discrete steps as fragmentation occurs in discrete steps only. The discretisation thus provides a limitation.

The second limitation is actually *much stronger* than one may realise at first sight. Surely, one might argue, as the fixed costs of fragmentation continue to fall towards zero, the fragmentation process continues indefinitely, covering the continuum in between the minimum and maximum more densely, and ultimately (without any fixed fragmentation costs) covering the entire range itself? Actually no, this is not true! As long as there is a finite number of countries, even with zero fixed fragmentation costs which allows for infinite fragmentation of

the production process, there is in general only a finite number of fragmentation steps to be taken before fragmentation is complete. In the three-country example provided in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 11, the fragmentation process is already completed after *two* steps (!), where the first step is from no fragmentation to two-part fragmentation and the second step is from two-part to three-part fragmentation. No matter how much the fixed fragmentation costs decline, all the way up to zero, there will be no more re-organisation of the production process as this is already complete with the three fragments only. The section ‘Infinite fragmentation and practical limits’ explains why.

### Infinite fragmentation and practical limits

Antras (2020) discusses slowbalisation. He observes that the increase in fragmentation cannot continue forever. Our model explains why. There are practical limits to fragmentation even if there are no fixed fragmentation costs at

all, which in principle makes infinite fragmentation possible. We assume (for this section only) that there are no fixed fragmentation costs ( $F \prod_{s=0}^p j_s = 0$  for all  $p$ ). The firm will produce task  $x$  in country  $r \in J$  if, and only if, production costs for task  $x$  are lowest in  $r$ . Let  $X_r$  denote the set of tasks for which this is the case, see eq. (7).

$$X_r = \left\{ x \in X \mid \sum_i w_{ir} g_i(x \mid y) \leq \sum_i w_{ij} g_i(x \mid y); j \neq r; j, r \in J \right\} \quad (7)$$

The problem is illustrated for our three-country example in Figure 12. For each country  $j$  and all fragments  $x$ , the figure depicts the costs of producing the fragment in that country. These functions are continuous in  $x$  since the density functions  $g_i$  are continuous in  $x$ . In Figure 12, the sets of lowest cost tasks are intervals:

$$X_0 = [0, x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1}]; \quad X_1 = [x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1}; x_{3_2 \ 1 \ 2}]; \quad \text{and} \quad X_2 = [x_{3_2 \ 1 \ 2}, 1].$$

These sets coincide exactly with the fragments  $fr_{3_1}$ ;  $fr_{3_2}$ ; and  $fr_{3_3}$  depicted in Figure 9 and illustrated in Figure 11. The reason is simple: at the borderline point  $x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1}$  in Figure 12, the costs for producing the task are the same in Home (country 0) and in country 1, such that from equation (7) we have<sup>16</sup>

$$\sum_i w_{i0} g_i(x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1} \mid y) = \sum_i w_{i1} g_i(x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1} \mid y) \quad (8)$$

This implies that  $\sum_i (w_{i0} - w_{i1}) g_i(x_{3_1 \ 0 \ 1} \mid y)$ , which is the first-order-condition for determining the first fragmentation point in the three-part fragmentation discussion of the section ‘Three-part and many-part fragmentation’, see equation (4). Similarly for the second borderline point in

Figure 12, which is equal to  $x_{3_2 \ 1 \ 2}$ . In this case, therefore, as soon as the fixed fragmentation costs are low enough to enable fragmentation into three parts, the production process is already optimally organised. Any further lowering of the fixed fragmentation




Figure 12. Task allocation with zero fragmentation costs. Note: see Appendix for parameter details.



costs will lower total costs, but will not cause any re-organisation of the production process. Infinite fragmentation in this case is equivalent to fragmentation into three parts.


Several observations are important regarding the limits of infinite fragmentation.

First, it is important to note that the optimal infinite fragmentation of tasks depends on the rewards to factors of production (in this case occupations) in each country. A change in these


rewards, in general, requires a change in the fragmentation of tasks.

Second, in the 3-country example illustrated in Figure 12 fragmentation is completed when there are 3 fragments, but there can obviously be both more fragments than countries and more countries than fragments. An example of the former is to consider a world consisting of only 2 countries, namely Home and country 1. In this case, infinite fragmentation is still in 3 parts, namely Home—country 1—Home, where the last fragment for Home is a little bit smaller than the equivalent for country 2, see Figure 12. An example of the latter can be easily constructed by maintaining three countries and adjusting the rewards for occupations to ensure there are only two fragments.<sup>17</sup>

Third, and most importantly, it is not hard to see that optimal infinite fragmentation requires only a finite number of steps. Given a finite number of countries  $J$ , the rewards to occupations  $w_{ij}$  in each country  $j \in J$ , and continuous density functions  $g_r$ , the optimal infinite fragmentation of  $X$  consists of a finite number of closed intervals and the set of tasks allocated to country  $r$  is a finite union of such intervals



**Figure 13.** Surface plot of costs  $c_{h j r}$  and  $c_{h i j}$  for three-part fragmentation.  
 Note: see Appendix for parameter details.



**Figure 14.** Contour plot of costs  $c_{h j r}$  and  $c_{h i j}$  for three-part fragmentation.

Note: see Appendix for parameter details; the horizontal and vertical lines are at minimum costs, see the section ‘Three-part and many-part fragmentation’.

(or the empty set if country  $r$  does not have the lowest cost for any task  $x \in X$ ). In general, therefore, there is only a finite number of fragmentation steps required before we reach the production process associated with infinite fragmentation. This poses clear practical limits to the implications of infinite fragmentation in terms of raising the relative demand of occupations with a comparative advantage and reducing the relative demand for the other occupations.

**Result 3.** *Even if the costs of coordination and fragmentation continue to fall, the fragmentation process for a product is completed in a finite number of steps. Upon completion of this process, the demand for all occupations in all countries associated with this production process is constant.*

### Evaluation

Recently and following a period of Hyper Globalisation, growth in trade has slowed down. This is remarkable given that economists routinely point out that the global division of labour is welfare increasing. Despite the benefits of trade and the division of labour, a long period of trade growth has come to an end.

Figure 1 illustrates these two periods of globalisation: a period of Hyper Globalisation from 1986 to 2008, followed by Slowbalisation from 2008 to present. In this paper, we explain both phenomena—Hyper Globalisation and Slowbalisation—by linking trade to the developments of fragmentation costs of global supply chains. We develop a simple model that endogenises fragmentation into multiple stages and sourcing from multiple countries. A feature of the model is that, while it endogenises fragmentation into many fragments and many countries, it remains tractable. This formalisation highlights important aspects of the current structure of trade. Central in the model are fragmentation costs that systematically

change over time. During the period of Hyper Globalisation fragmentation costs declined, but these costs increased following the financial crisis in 2008/2009 and the recent Covid-19 pandemic.

The model can also explain labour market consequences of these developments. Changes in fragmentation costs affect the length of supply chains and result in changes on the labour market. The reason is that each fragment represents a specific set of occupations, some of which are more skill-intensive than others. Importantly, the model answers the question if ever-continuing and more-detailed fragmentation can completely wipe out the demand for certain occupations in certain countries, as is widely argued. It does not. Fragmentation has a natural limit, even with zero fragmentation- and coordination costs, as the process involves only a finite number of fragmentation steps. This also implies that (even with zero fragmentation costs) the demand for certain occupations does not fall to zero for any country.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> ‘Slowbalisation: The steam has gone out of globalisation.’ *The Economist* (24 Jan.2019): <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/01/24/the-steam-has-gone-out-of-globalisation>.

<sup>2</sup> Fragmentation may have complex implications not only for welfare gains in total but also in the distribution and the degree to which it may compromise progress towards greater equality between nations and within nations. The distribution to a large extent depends on the value-added income that is created along supply chains, see [Bohn et al. \(2021\)](#).

<sup>3</sup> To this date, US president Biden has continued the import tariffs installed by former president Trump.

<sup>4</sup> See: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-fukushima-anniversary-toyota-in-idUSKBN2B100>

<sup>5</sup> If there is a continuum of stages, the model is reminiscent of the [Dornbusch et al. \(1977\)](#) model in which productivity differences are modelled as a continuum.

<sup>6</sup> A separate strand of research is the literature on supply chain management in Operations Research. In general, the models in this field minimise total facility/inventory costs (with fixed facility costs per facility) within a network; a larger network increases total facility costs, but reduces network costs because clients are served from the nearest facility. The mathematical heuristics that are developed often try to solve shortest paths within large networks which is computationally demanding (see for examples, Silva et al., 2021, or Jabbarzadeh et al., 2018). Antras and Chor (2022, p.351/2) point out that in future research the two strands of literature, the economics and supply chain management research, should join: ‘The economics literature has largely been focused on finding suitable environments in which these decisions can be qualitatively characterised or computationally simplified, but it is hard to envision at this point that this agenda will lead to successful unified quantitative models of the decisions of lead firms. Our sense is that, sooner or later, this literature will need to close the gap with the parallel literature in supply chain management in the Operations Research field, which has long adopted heuristic methods to guide the optimal design of supply chains.’

<sup>7</sup> Fujita and Thisse (2013, p. 453) develop a supply chain model in a New Economic Geography framework in which Headquarters can be split from production in a two-region setting. In their model, fragmentation depends on communication costs that affect the marginal cost of production. Depending on these communication costs fragmentation can occur. Their model illustrates that globalisation can have more extreme effects for regions and cities than for nations as a whole, which illustrates the importance of taking ‘space’ into account.

<sup>8</sup> The possibility of infinite profits is not economically viable.

<sup>9</sup> Most results hold, however, for well-behaved continuous functions  $g_r$ .

<sup>10</sup> Note, that we refer to countries. However, the regional aspects of fragmentation are also important, as is highlighted by Bole et al. (2022). They show that regional supply chains are not independent and that spatial spill-overs are important and affect the position of a region in a supply chain. We abstract from these complications.

<sup>11</sup> If  $p$  is the number of fragments the number of connections is  $p(p-1)2$ ; panel b makes the

fragmentation coordination costs proportional to the number of connections for  $d_0 = 10$ ;  $d_1 = 8$ ;  $d_2 = 6$ ;  $d_3 = 5$ ;  $d_4 = 4$ . If we make the fragmentation coordinations costs a strictly convex function of the number of connections (see the main text), these costs rise even faster as the number of fragments rises.

<sup>12</sup> The reader may wish to verify using the example in the Appendix that the optimal fragmentation point relative to country 2 for fragmentation into 2 parts would be around  $x = 0.72$ , which leads to substantially larger variable costs than fragmentation relative to country 1 (around 0.825 compared to 0.802). The ultimate optimal decision depends, of course, on the fixed fragmentation costs relative to these locations as well.

<sup>13</sup> In the discussion we thus have  $F_{hjr} = F_{hrj} = F_{jrh} = F_{jhr} = F_{rjh} = F_{rjh}$ .

<sup>14</sup> Note that in our discussion the order of countries is Home—country  $j$ —country  $r$ , while the illustrations in Appendix B include the order Home—country  $r$ —country  $j$  as well.

<sup>15</sup> Note that if there is no country 2 and with sufficiently low fixed fragmentation costs, fragmentation into three parts: Home—country 1—Home will occur, see also section ‘Possibilities and limitations of fragmentation.’

<sup>16</sup> In the example and the discussion we assume the set of borderline points has measure zero. This is, in general, the case, for example, if the rewards to occupations are different for all countries:  $w_{ij} \neq w_{ir}$  for  $j \neq r$ . Otherwise, we would have to determine an allocation mechanism in the case of ties, without affecting the outcome of our main arguments below.

<sup>17</sup> An adjustment in Appendix A of the reward for occupation 3 in country 1 from 1.3 to 0.8 would create only two fragments, the first in Home and the second in country 1, with country 2 not playing any role.

<sup>18</sup> Note that in our discussion the order of countries is Home—country  $j$ —country  $r$ , while in the illustrations of Figure 13 and Figure 14 we include the order Home—country  $r$ —country  $j$  as well.

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Anna Salomons for kindly providing some data and useful suggestions and references, Ruud Teunter for introducing us to the facility location and network design literature in Operations Research.

## References

- Altomonte, C., di Mauro, F., Ottaviano, G., Rungi, A. and Vicard, V. (2012) *Global Value Chains During the Great Trade Collapse: A Bullwhip Effect?* (Working Paper Series, No. 1412). European Central Bank.
- Antràs, P. (2020) *De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-Covid-19 Age*, NBER Working Paper 28115.
- Antràs, P. and Chor, D. (2022) Global value chains. In G. Gopinath, E. Helpman and K. Rogoff (eds.) *Handbook of International Economics: International Trade*, Vol. 5, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Antràs, P. and De Gortari, A. (2020) On the geography of global value chains, *Econometrica*, **84**: 1553–1598.
- Autor, D. (2019) Work of the past, work of the future, *American Economic Review; Papers and Proceedings*, **109**: 1–32.
- Autor, D., Dorn, D. and Hanson, G.H. (2013) The China Syndrome: local labor market effects of import competition in the United States. *American Economic Review*, **103**: 2121–68.
- Autor, D., Dorn, D. and Hanson, G.H. (2016) The China Shock: learning from labor-market adjustment to large changes in trade. *Annual Review of Economics*, **8**: 205–40.
- Autor, D., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. and Majlesi, K. (2020) Importing political polarization? The electoral consequences of rising trade exposure, *American Economic Review*, **110**: 3139–83.
- Baldwin, R. (2016) *The Great Convergence: Information Technology and The New Globalization*. Harvard, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Baldwin, R. (2019) *The Globotics Upheaval: Globalization, Robotics, and the Future of Work*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Baldwin, R. and Evenett, S. J. (2020) *COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won't Work*. London: CEPR Press.
- Baldwin, R. and Tomiura, E. (2020) Thinking ahead about the trade impact of COVID-19. In R. Baldwin and B. Weder di Mauro (eds.) *Economics in the Time of COVID-19*, pp. 59–71. London: CEPR Press.
- Behrens, K., Corcos, G. and Mion, G. (2013) Trade crisis? What trade crisis?, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, **95**: 702–709.
- Bems, R., Johnson, R. C. and Yi, K.-M. (2011) Vertical linkages and the collapse of global trade, *The American Economic Review*, **101**, 308–312.
- Bohn, T., Brakman, S. and Dietzenbacher, E. (2021) From exports to value added to income: accounting for bilateral income transfers, *Journal of International Economics*, **131**: 1–15.
- Bole, L., Duarte, R., Hewings, G. J. D., Jimenez, S. and Sanchez-Choliz, J. (2022) *The Role of Regions in Global Value Chains: An Analysis for the European Union*, Working paper (under revision).
- Brakman, S., Garretsen, H. and van Witteloostuijn, A. (2020) The turn from just-in-time to just-in-case globalization in and after times of COVID-19: an essay on the risk re-appraisal of borders and buffers, *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, **2**: 1–6.
- Brakman, S. and van Marrewijk, C. (2019) Heterogeneous country responses to the Great Recession: the role of supply chains, *Review of World Economics*, **155**: 677–705.
- Caliendo, L. and Parro, F. (2015) Estimates of the trade and welfare effects of NAFTA, *Review of Economic Studies*, **82**: 1–44.
- Carvalho, V. M. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2019) Production networks: a primer, *Annual Review of Economics*, **11**: 635–663.
- Costinot, A., Vogel, J. and Wang, S. (2013) An elementary theory of global supply chains, *Review of Economic Studies*, **80**: 109–144.
- Deardorff, A. V. (2001) Fragmentation across cones. In: S.W. Arndt and H. Kierzkowski (eds.) *Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dingel, J. I. and Neiman, B. (2020) How many jobs can be done at home? *Journal of Public Economics*, **189**: 1–8.
- Dornbusch, R., Fisher, S. and Samuelson, P. A. (1977) Comparative advantage, trade, and payments in a Ricardian model with a continuum of Goods, *American Economic Review*, **67**: 823–839.
- European Parliament (2020) *Slowing down or Changing track: understanding the dynamics of 'Slowbalization'*, report by, J. Titivskaia, V. Kononenko, C. Navarra, C. Stamegma, and K. Zumer, PE 659.383, December. Available online at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/659383/EPRS\\_IDA\(2020\)659383\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/659383/EPRS_IDA(2020)659383_EN.pdf) [Accessed 11 March 2022].
- Fujita, M. and Thisse, J. F. (2013) *Economics of Agglomeration: cities, Industrial Location and Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goa, X., Hewings, G. J. D. and Yang, C. (2022) Offshore, re-shore, re-offshore: what happened to global manufacturing location between 2007 and 2014, *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy & Society*, Forthcoming.
- Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2020) *When Tariffs Disturb Global Supply Chains*, NBER



- Working Paper No. 27722, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
- Grossmann, G. M., Helpman, E. and Lhuillier, H. (2021) *Supply Chain Resilience: Should Policy Promote Diversification or Reshoring?*, CEPR Discussion Paper, DP 16588, London : CEPR Press.
- Grossman, G. M. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2008) Trading tasks: a simple theory of offshoring, *American Economic Review*, **98**: 1978–1997.
- Hummels, D. (2007) Transportation costs and International trade in the second era of globalization, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **21**: 131–154.
- Jabbarzadeh, A., Haughton, M. and Khosrojerdi, A. (2018) Closed-loop supply chain network design under disruption risks: a robust approach with real world application, *Computers & Industrial Engineering*, **116**: 178–191.
- Kniffin, K. M., Narayanan, J., Anseel, F., Antonakis, J., Ashford, S. P., Bakker, A. B., Bamberger, P., Bapuji, H., Bhawe, D. P., Choi, V. K. and Creary, S. J. (2021) COVID-19 and the workplace: implications, issues, and insights for future research and action, *American Psychologist*, **76**: 63–77.
- Kohl, T., Brakman, S. and Garretsen, H. (2016) Do trade agreements stimulate international trade differently? Evidence from 296 trade agreements, *The World Economy*, **39**: 97–131.
- Kremer, M. (1993) The O-ring theory of economic development, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **108**: 551–575.
- McKinsey Global Institute. (2020) *Risk, Resilience and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains*, August. Available online at: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains>
- Peterson Institute for International Economics. (2020) *China Should Export More Medical Gear to Battle COVID-19. China Should Export More Medical Gear to Battle COVID-19 | PIIE* [https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/china-should-export-more-medical-gear-battle-covid-19?utm\\_source=update-newsletter&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=piie-insider](https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/china-should-export-more-medical-gear-battle-covid-19?utm_source=update-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=piie-insider), Accessed 21 July 2021.
- Rougour, W. and van Marrewijk, C. (2015) Demography, growth, and global income inequality, *World Development*, **74**: 220–232.
- Silva, A., Aloise, D., Coelho, L. C. and Rocha, C. (2021) Heuristics for the dynamic facility location problem with modular capacities, *European Journal of Operational Research*, **290**: 435–452.
- Terzidis, N., Brakman, S. and Ortega-Argiles, R. (2019) *Labour Markets, Trade and Technological Progress: A Meta-Study*, CESifo Working Paper, No 7719, Munich : CESifo.
- Wagner, J. and Gelübcke, J. P. W. (2014) Risk or resilience? The role of trade integration and foreign ownership for the survival of German enterprises during the Crisis 2008–2010, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, **234**: 757–774.
- Wall Street Journal. (2021) *Chip Shortage Reaches Smartphone Makers*. Available online at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chip-shortage-reaches-smartphone-makers-11626695523> [Accessed 11 March 2022].

## Appendix

### Example specification

The example graphs used for explaining the model are based on quadratic density functions  $g_i(x | y) = (a_i x^2 + b_i x + c_i) y$ , which leads to cumulative distributions

$$G_i(x | y) = \left( \frac{1}{3} a_i x^3 + \frac{1}{2} b_i x^2 + c_i x \right) y.$$

The constants  $a_i$ ,  $b_i$ , and  $c_i$  are chosen such that the density function is strictly positive in the domain of  $x$ , while  $y = 1$ .

For occupation 1 we have  $a_1 = 0.2$ ,  $b_1 = -0.6$ , and  $c_1 = 0.5$ ; this implies that the density function for occupation 1 is monotonically declining with task  $x$ , from 0.5 at  $x = 0$  to 0.1 at  $x = 1$ . We think of this as a reflection of R&D intensive tasks at the early stages of the production process.

For occupation 2 we have  $a_2 = -2$ ,  $b_2 = 2$ , and  $c_2 = 0.1$ ; this implies that the density function for occupation 2 is first rising and then declining in task  $x$ , starting at 0.1 for  $x = 0$ , reaching a peak of 0.6 at  $x = 0.5$ , and declining to 0.1 at  $x = 1$ . We think of this as a reflection of low-skilled labour intensive activities associated with assembly activities which are particularly important at the intermediate stages of the production process.

Finally, for occupation 3 we have:  $a_3 = 0.7$ ,  $b_3 = -0.4$ , and  $c_3 = 0.1$ ; this implies that the density

function for occupation 3 is first declining and then rising in task  $x$ , starting at 0.1 for  $x = 0$ , reaching a low point of about 0.043 at  $x = 0.29$ , and rising to 0.4 at  $x = 1$ . We think of this as a reflection of sales promotion activities, which are important at the later stages of the production process.

Total employment in the production process is 0.833; of this 52 per cent is for occupation 2, followed by 32 per cent for occupation 1, and 16 per cent for occupation 3. When analysing the fragmentation process, we normalise all wage rates to unity at Home, so  $w_1 = w_2 = w_3 = 1$ . We assume that country 1 has a comparative advantage in occupation 2 and country 2 has a comparative advantage in occupation 3; more specifically, for country 1 we have:  $w_{11} = 1.7$ ;  $w_{21} = 0.5$ ; and  $w_{31} = 1.3$ , while for country 2 we have:  $w_{12} = 1.2$ ;  $w_{22} = 1$ ; and  $w_{32} = 0.8$ .

### Three-part and many-part fragmentation

#### A. Three-part fragmentation

We start again with determining the optimal fragmentation points. Exclusive of the fragmentation costs  $F_{hjr}$ , the variable costs  $c_{hjr}(x_1, x_2 | y)$  of fragmentation at points  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  is given in equation (3). Note that  $0 \leq x_1 \leq x_2 \leq 1$ , where the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) reflects the costs of producing  $fr_3$  at Home, the second term reflects the costs of producing  $fr_2$  in country  $j$ , and the third term reflects the cost of producing  $fr_3$  in country  $r$ .<sup>18</sup>

$$c_{hjr}(x_1, x_2 | y) = \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_i G_i(x_1 | y) \right)}_{\text{Home cost}} + \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_{ij} (G_i(x_2 | y) - G_i(x_1 | y)) \right)}_{\text{country } j \text{ cost}} + \underbrace{\left( \sum_i w_{ir} (G_i(1 | y) - G_i(x_2 | y)) \right)}_{\text{country } r \text{ cost}}$$

Figure 13 provides a 3-dimensional surface plot of equation (3) for our example for the cost function  $c_{hjr}$  (if the first fragment is produced at Home, the second fragment in country  $j$  and the third fragment in country  $r$ ) as well as its counterpart  $c_{hrj}$  (if the first fragment is produced at Home, the second fragment in country  $r$  and the third fragment in country  $j$ ). Note that the function is continuous along the diagonal, but not differentiable. This is also visible in Figure 14, which provides the contour plots associated with Figure 13. Within the depicted domains, the firm wants to minimise costs, which happens approximately at fragmentation points  $x_{3_1 h 1} = 0.29$  and  $x_{3_2 1 2} = 0.83$ , as we now discuss.

#### B. Many-part fragmentation

To generalise our discussion of fragmentation into more than three parts, note that fragmentation into  $p + 1$  parts requires determining  $p$  fragmentation points. We assume that the first fragment is produced in country  $j_0 \in J$ , the second fragment in country  $j_1 \in J$  in country  $j_p \in J$ . At each step  $s$  we must have different countries, so:  $j_s \neq j_{s+1}$ . We denote the sequence of  $p + 1$  countries  $j_0 j_1 \dots j_p$  by  $\prod_{s=0}^p j_s$  and the  $p$  fragmentation points by  $x_s$  for  $s = 1, \dots, p$ ; with the convention that  $x_0 = 0$  and  $x_{p+1} = 1$ . The fixed fragmentation costs associated with this sequence are denoted by  $F_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s}$ .

$$c_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s}(x_1, \dots, x_p | y) = \sum_{s=0}^p \left[ \underbrace{\sum_i w_{ij_s} (G_i(x_{s+1} | y) - G_i(x_s | y))}_{\text{fragment } s+1 \text{ cost in country } j_s} \right] \tag{9}$$

$$\sum_i (w_{ij_{s-1}} - w_{ij_s}) g_i(x_{(p+1)_s j_{s-1} j_s} | y) = 0 \text{ for } s = 1, \dots, p \tag{10}$$



$$\underbrace{\left\{ F_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s} - F_{\prod_{r=0}^{p-1} j_r} \right\}}_{\text{rise fragmentation costs}} < \underbrace{\left\{ \begin{aligned} &c_{\prod_{r=0}^{p-1} j_r} (x_{p1\ j_0\ j_1}, \dots, x_{p(p-1)\ j_{p-2}\ j_{p-1}} | y) - \\ &c_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s} (x_{(p+1)1\ j_0\ j_1}, \dots, x_{(p+1)p\ j_{p-1}\ j_p} | y) \end{aligned} \right\}}_{\text{reduction variable costs}} \quad (11)$$

To determine the optimal fragmentation points  $x_s$ , we look at the variable costs  $c_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s} (x_1, \dots, x_p)$  exclusive of the fixed fragmentation costs as given in equation (9), where the term in square brackets reflects the costs of producing fragment  $s + 1$  in country  $j_s$  and we sum over all fragments. If we differentiate equation

(9) with respect to fragmentation points  $x_s$  and equate to zero, we get the first-order conditions for the optimal fragmentation points given in equation (10), implying orthogonality of the differences in wage rates using the density functions  $f_i$  at the optimal fragmentation points  $x_{(p+1)_s\ j_{s-1}\ j_s}$ . This leads to the minimum cost level  $c_{\prod_{s=0}^p j_s} (x_{(p+1)1\ j_0\ j_1}, \dots, x_{(p+1)p\ j_{p-1}\ j_p} | y)$  for fragmentation into  $p + 1$  parts. We conclude this discussion by pointing out that fragmentation into  $p + 1$  parts leads to lower total costs of production if the rise in fixed costs relative to fragmentation into  $p$  parts is lower than the variable cost reduction, as given in equation (11). We could illustrate this in an increasingly complicated 2-dimensional diagram similar to Figure 10.