REJECTING MUSLIM MINORITY PRACTICES:

PRINCIPLES AND PREJUDICES

Marija Dangubić

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Cover design: S. Terwisscha van Scheltinga | www.persoonlijkproefschrift.nl
Layout design: S. Terwisscha van Scheltinga | www.persoonlijkproefschrift.nl
Printing: Ridderprint BV | www.ridderprint.nl
ISBN: 978-94-6458-403-5

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Rejecting Muslim minority practices:
Principles and prejudices

Weerstand tegen moslimminderheden:
Principes en vooroordelen
(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de

Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus,

prof. dr. H.R.B.M. Kummeling, ingevolge het besluit van het

college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen

op vrijdag 9 september 2022 des middags te 4.15 uur

door

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geboren op 11 februari 1990
te Dubrovnik, Kroatië

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This research has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (advanced grant agreement No 740788) awarded to Maykel Verkuyten.

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CHAPTER 1

Synthesis

1.1 Introduction

In October 2021, the Council of Europe's human rights organization launched a campaign to promote inclusion of Muslim minorities in European societies. As part of the campaign, a video and images showing a woman with a headscarf and slogans such as "Beauty is in diversity as freedom is in hijab", "My headscarf, my choice", and "Celebrate diversity & respect hijab", were released (Council of Europe, 2021, p. 1). The campaign was directly criticized on social media and among politicians, especially in France (BBC, 2021; Parrock, 2021). Whereas some considered the campaign to promote diversity and religious freedom, others saw it as promoting religious attire and oppression of women. Within days the campaign was stopped and reconsidered.

The campaign was released just several months after the Court of Justice of the European Union (2021, p.1) ruled that employers are allowed to prohibit the "expression of political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace" in order to "present a neutral image towards customers or to prevent social disputes". The decision was based on two independent court cases in Germany, both initiated by Muslim women who were required to stop wearing a headscarf at their respective workplace, and were suspended upon the refusal to do so. Although the ruling does not target any specific group but the general expression of any ideological stance or religious belief, it might disproportionally affect Muslim women who wear a headscarf making their participation in public life more difficult (Margolis, 2021). Thus, whereas some welcomed the ruling as a confirmation of neutrality and the freedom of entrepreneurship, others criticized it as fueling and legitimizing discrimination and Islamophobia (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2021).

The practice of wearing a veil is a highly symbolic and charged one but not the sole example of Muslim minority practices that are disputed in Western societies. In 2020, a Muslim man who passed the naturalization test was denied German citizenship upon refusing to shake hands with a female state representative at a naturalization ceremony (DW, 2021). Similar incidents about hand shaking occurred in educational, political and work contexts across Europe, and some of them were brought to court (e.g., Anderson, 2018; Bilefsky, 2016; Breeden, 2018). In 2018, Denmark even passed a law making the handshake mandatory at naturalization ceremonies (Sorensen, 2018), and in 2020 a ceremony had to be postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic when the public was strongly recommended not to shake hands

(Peltier, 2020). Explaining different meanings behind the practice of (not) shaking hands, Baumgartner (2019) notes that, for some Muslims, the refusal to shake hands is based on modesty and the belief that extramarital physical contact with someone of the opposite gender is morally wrong. In contrast, shaking hands is a standard greeting practice in Western societies regardless of gender. It is considered a sign of respect for the other person and, as such, is equally extended to everyone. The refusal to do so is considered as going against the principles of human respect and (gender) equality guaranteed in the constitution of European countries.

Islamic religious education is another example of a practice that evokes discussions in West European societies. In order to transmit Islamic learnings, culture and tradition to the following generations, some Muslim minorities establish educational facilities, organize extra-curricular classes in Islamic centers, or voice demands for Islamic religious classes in public schools. Islamic religious education is favorably received by those who emphasize the importance of minority rights, religious freedom and equal rights to education (Berglund, 2015). However, others voice concerns about state neutrality and teachings that are potentially in contrast to liberal and democratic values of Western societies, which sometimes results in Islamic schools being scrutinized (Driessen, 2021). For example, in 2019, The Haga Lyceum Islamic secondary school in the Netherlands has been subjected to thorough investigation due to alleged fundamentalist and undemocratic teachings (Gualthèrie van Weezel & Kuiper, 2019).

These and similar Muslim practices (e.g., the building of mosques/minarets, founding of Islamic political parties, method of slaughtering animals to produce halal food) exemplify what is often referred to as "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993; Inglehard & Norris, 2003) or "colliding ways of life" (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) between Islam and the West. These practices are at the heart of debates contrasting religious freedom, equal rights, and freedom of expression, on the one hand, and state neutrality, liberal values and the rights of others, on the other hand.

Much of the discussions regarding the inclusion and accommodation of Muslim minorities in Western societies evolve around the majority's and the minority's rights and liberties, the display of Islam in political rhetoric and the media (e.g., Kaya, 2020; Verkuyten, 2021), blatant hate speech on social media (e.g., Vidgen, 2019; Vidgen & Yasseri, 2020), and generally high levels of anti-Muslim hostility harbored by majority members (e.g., Ogan et al., 2014). These discussions raise the key question of whether and when criticism of specific Muslim practices is based on the endorsement of liberal democratic principles or rather constitutes another manifestation of Islamophobia.

It is this question that is central throughout my dissertation and that I examine empirically among majority members in different West European countries, and in Germany and the Netherlands in particular. I do so by using large-scale datasets and person-centered approaches that make it possible to develop a nuanced understanding of the different ways in which subgroups of majority members combine their group-based feelings towards Muslims with their evaluation of a range of Muslim minority practices.

1.1.1 Research aim

The aim of this dissertation is to examine whether and when the rejection of Muslim minority's practices reflects generalized prejudice (negativity across various minority groups) and target-specific prejudice towards Muslims (Islamophobia), or whether and when more principled, value-based, considerations are involved, such as concerns for liberal values of state neutrality and civil liberties. My main expectation is that there are different subgroups of individuals in the population, and that some people reject Muslim practices mainly out of prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (prejudice-based rejection) and others out of principled reasons (principle-based rejection). To distinguish these different subgroups of individuals, I use two approaches. First, in Chapters 2 and 3, I examine whether some majority members display generalized negativity towards Muslims and their practices, which would indicate prejudice-based rejection, whereas others differentiate between Muslims as a group of people and specific Muslim practices, which would be more indicative of principle-based rejection. Second, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examine whether some majority members display a double standard and discriminate against Muslims by more strongly rejecting their practices than similar practices of other religious groups (Jews and Christians), which would indicate prejudice-based rejection. In contrast, other majority members might consistently reject similar practice(s), regardless of the religious group involved, which would suggest principle-based rejection. To test further whether the rejection is based more on principles or prejudices, I additionally examine whether the different subgroups of individuals differ in terms of their support for liberal principles, such as civil liberties and secularism, as well as well-known correlates of prejudices, such as authoritarianism and national identification.

Examining different reasons for disapproval of specific Muslim practices is theoretically and practically important. Theoretically, it allows to go beyond generalized and target-specific prejudices as a predominant explanation of the rejection of outgroup practices. Although undoubtably critically important, a sole focus on prejudices might be limited and limiting for understanding the diverse and nuanced ways in which majority members can react to Muslim minorities and their practices. A broader focus allows to gain a more adequate, nuanced and full understanding of the complexities of intergroup relations and the questions and dilemmas that diversity can raise. Practically, a more detailed understanding might better inform targeted interventions aimed at ameliorating negative intergroup relations and point towards new directions for intergroup dialogue. The different ways in which people respond to Muslims and their practices—and people's related concerns—might have different implications for targeted interventions. For example, commonly applied strategies for prejudice reduction focus on (a) emphasizing positive societal contributions of Muslims, (b) providing opportunities for positive interactions with members of Muslim communities, and (c) establishing common goals (Abu-Nimer & Hilal, 2016). However, these strategies might not be effective—or can even backfire—among individuals whose concerns about Muslim minority practices are based on strongly endorsed liberal democratic values rather than outgroup antipathy. For these people, the objection to particular practices is not based on group prejudice but on genuine concerns about the liberal order.

In this dissertation, I draw insights from and contribute to several academic fields. First, I draw on social psychological literature on intergroup relations and prejudice (e.g., Brown, 1995; Stangor, 2016), as well as on literature regarding the role of psychological predispositions, such as open-mindedness and authoritarianism, in accepting and rejecting minority outgroups and their practices (Feldman, 2020; Marcus, 2020). I contribute to this literature by emphasizing the importance of taking into account other relevant practice-specific concerns which—in addition to prejudicial outgroup feelings—relate to disapproval of dissenting minority ways of life. I also suggest an alternative way of examining these topics empirically and demonstrate the benefits of using a person-centered approach (e.g., latent profile analysis) for social psychology (Osborne & Sibley, 2017).

In addition to social psychologists, my work is relevant for scholars in the field of social science (e.g., sociology and political science) more generally. Similarly to other studies in these disciplines, I examine how majority members within secular liberal democracies evaluate the presence of Muslim religious practices in the public domain, and how this evaluation relates to their prejudices (e.g., Strabac et al., 2016), values (e.g., Saroglou et al., 2009; Van der Noll; 2014), religiosity (e.g., Helbling, 2014) and, to some extent, whether these evaluations and accompanying concerns vary across countries (e.g., Statham, 2016).

Further, my work is relevant for scholars in the field of migration studies. The majority of Muslims in Western Europe is of immigration background (first or second generation; Forum Institute for Multicultural Affairs, 2008). In Western Europe, immigrants are often referred to in terms of their religious affiliation (Triandafyllidou, 2011) and "Islam has become (...) symbolic for problems related to immigrants and immigration" (Verkuyten, 2018, p. 13). The issues related to religious diversity and integration of religious minorities in mainstream society are increasingly examined within the field of migration studies (Pisarevskaya et al., 2020; Soroka & Roberton, 2010; Strabac et al., 2016) and I contribute to this literature by systematically examining the reasons that the public can have for rejecting or rather supporting Muslim minority practices.

Finally, by using large-scale surveys to examine public attitudes in West European countries, and in Germany and the Netherlands in particular, I contribute to public opinion research on attitudes towards Muslims and Islam (e.g., Bleich, 2009; Soroka & Roberton, 2010). By simultaneously examining attitudes towards Muslims as a group of people and towards a range of Muslim practices, together with comparing the attitudes towards other religious groups (Jews and Christians), I try to provide a more nuanced picture of various contested issues.

1.2 Theoretical and empirical background

1.2.1 Prejudices, principles and rejection of outgroup practices

Prejudice is conceptualized and examined in many different ways in the literature. There is a range of definitions that emphasize specific aspects but most of these indicate that prejudice refers to feelings of antipathy or negative attitudes "towards whole groups of people or towards individuals because of their membership in a particular group" (Brown, 1995, p. 6; see also Stangor, 2016). For example, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007, p. 45) define prejudice as "a readiness to belittle minorities, to dislike them, to shun them, to be contemptuous of them, and to feel hostility toward them". Several scholars emphasized and found empirical support for the idea that prejudicial attitudes generalize across different minority groups (generalized prejudice; Allport, 1954; Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Bergh & Akrami, 2016). In addition to generalized prejudice, scholars also emphasized the importance of taking group-specific prejudices into account (e.g., Akrami et al., 2011; Meeusen et al., 2017; 2018). Group-specific prejudice entails the notion that prejudicial feelings towards one minority group do not necessarily generalize across other minority groups, as different minorities can be targeted for different reasons (Meeusen & Kern, 2016; Meeusen et al., 2018; Zhirkov, 2021). For example, Meuleman and colleagues (2019) showed that homophobia, antisemitism and Islamophobia have different underlying causes.

There is vast empirical evidence that generalized and group-specific prejudices are associated with unfavorable treatment of the respective minority group and with dislike and disapproval of policies, beliefs and practices of that group. For example, research found that prejudice towards ethnic and racial minorities predict opposition to welfare policies (e.g., Ford & Kootstra, 2016; Fox, 2004) and that prejudice against sexual minorities relate to opposition to same-sex marriage (e.g., Van der Toorn et al., 2017). Similarly, several studies found support for the hypothesis that prejudice toward religious groups underlie opposition to religious practices (e.g., Blinder et al., 2019).

Although rejection of outgroup practices can reflect prejudicial feelings towards the group, it can also—in addition to or independently from prejudices—reflect other reasons, such as, for example, values endorsed by members in a society (e.g., Turgeon et al., 2019). Values are considered to be standards that guide one's behavior and form a base for evaluating behavior of oneself and others. According to Schwartz (2012, p.4), "values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values". Several studies indeed provided empirical evidence that values can be an additional and independent base of rejection of specific minority practices and policies. For example, studies in the United States of America showed that people can oppose race-oriented policies because of racist feelings but also because of endorsing values such as equity, fairness and merit (Reyna et al., 2005; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Similarly, Bobocel and colleagues (1998) showed that although some people reject affirmative action because they are prejudiced, others do so out of their genuine concern for the principle of procedural justice. Moreover, research on the relationship between antisemitism and critique of the state of Israel provides further evidence that not every form of disapproval or critique results from outgroup animosity (Beattie, 2017; Kempf, 2012). For example, Kempf (2012) showed that, although many anti-Israel critics harbor antisemitic attitudes, those particularly concerned about peace and human rights are likely to criticize the state of Israel without harboring negative feelings towards Jewish people. These studies demonstrate the importance of examining additional concerns people might have when rejecting specific outgroup practices and beliefs.

In the following two sections, I discuss the role of anti-Muslim prejudice and liberal principles in rejecting specific Muslim practices.

1.2.2 Prejudice-based rejection of Muslim practices

Prejudice-based rejection of Muslims and Islam is often referred to as Islamophobia (e.g., Runnymede Trust, 1997) or Islamoprejudice (e.g., Imhoff & Recker, 2012). Bleich (2011, p. 1582) defines Islamophobia as "indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims". Similarly to other scholars (e.g., Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), Bleich puts an emphases on the qualifier *indiscriminate* as a crucial aspect of Islamophobia. The term 'indiscriminate' (undifferentiated, unnuanced, consistent) implies that people who hold anti-Muslim prejudice will harbor negative feelings towards Muslims as a group of people, hold negative views of Islam as a system of religious belief, and reject the religious practices which are perceived as being associated with Muslims and Islam. As such, Islamophobia implies a generalized negative attitude towards any object related to Islam and Muslims, and is likely to manifest itself as a denial of Muslim rights or an "unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4; see also Elahi & Kan, 2017).

There is much empirical evidence that anti-Muslim prejudice is quite widespread in Western societies, with around one in three majority members having negative attitudes. For example, in 2008, a study showed that between 33% and 62% of the populations in Spain, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States held unfavorable views of Muslims (Ogan et al., 2014). More recently, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (Lipka, 2017) showed that around a third of respondents from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have unfavorable views of Muslims. In addition, a study using the European Values Survey data collected in 34 European countries between 1990 and 2017, showed that around one fifth of the European population holds negative attitudes towards Muslims, but that anti-Muslim sentiments are decreasing over time (Bell et al., 2021).

When it comes to Islamic symbols, such as religious clothing, the percentage of people objecting to it is much higher. For example, around three in four people in most Western European countries think that at least some restrictions should be introduced to Muslim women's religious clothing (Salazar & Gardner, 2018). These different percentages of people having negative attitudes towards Muslims and towards religious clothing indicate that there can be a difference between people's negative attitudes towards Muslims as a group of people and towards specific Muslim practices and beliefs. Similarly, Helbling (2014) found that while attitudes towards Muslims vary little across West European countries, there is a lot of variation in levels of opposition to the headscarf. However, these studies focus only on one aspects of Islamophobia, either by measuring attitudes towards the group of Muslims or towards a specific practice.

Several studies use multiple indicators to assess Islamophobia and, hence, provide more reliable estimates (Bleich, 2011; 2012). Using four different national samples, a study from the Netherlands found that between 13% and 22% of majority members have negative attitudes towards Turks and Moroccans (ethnic groups typically associated with Islam) and simultaneously object to Muslim rights to express their faith, wear a headscarf, celebrate Islamic holidays, build mosques and establish Islamic schools (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). A recent study from Australia showed that 13% of Australians display consistent anti-Muslim sentiments: they are negative towards Muslims as a group of people, would not like their relative to marry a Muslim, and would not support the building of a place of worship (Dunn et al, 2021). Similarly, a study in Switzerland found that 15% of the Swiss strongly agree with any argument against the Muslim practice of wearing a face veil and have negative anti-Muslim and anti-Islam attitudes (Eugster, 2021). Findings of these studies indicate that a minority of the public displays indiscriminately negative attitudes towards Muslims, and that the rejection of practices cannot be completely reduced to prejudicial feelings towards Muslims.

1.2.3 Principle-based rejection of Muslim practices

Unlike prejudice-based rejection, principle-based rejection is more nuanced and differentiated, in the sense that it is directed towards specific practices or beliefs, and not towards Muslims as members of a group. Heyder and Eisentraut (2016, p. 181), define criticism of Islam as "a cognitive belief about critical aspects with respect to rules, norms, and practices within parts (some groups, some states, etc.) of the collective community of Islamic peoples ("Ummah") but without using negative group-based stereotypes attributing these negative aspects to all the members of the whole community". Similarly, according to Modood (2020), reasonable Islam criticism, unlike Islamophobia, does not stereotype Muslims and it does not ignore or dismiss valuable characteristic of Muslims and Islam. Reasonable criticism is directed at specific practices and beliefs and does not target Muslims as a group of people. Moreover, reasonable criticism would not be used to justify anti-Muslim feelings.

Principled rejection is based on values that are considered to be important in general or in a particular society. In Western societies, some of these values are gender equality (e.g., Okin, 1999), state neutrality and secularism (e.g., Fetzer & Soper, 2003), physical integrity and the no-harm principle (e.g., Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013), personal autonomy (e.g., Parekh, 1996), and animal welfare (e.g., Kurth & Glasbergen, 2017). For example, objections to the practice of wearing veils are sometimes based on principles of gender equality and personal autonomy (Sarrasin, 2016), whereas objections to religious education in public schools can be based on concerns about state neutrality and secularism (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). Similarly, objections to the method of slaughtering animals in order to produce halal meat can be based on concerns for animal welfare (Bergeaud-Blackler, 2007; Kurth & Glasbergen, 2017; Zoethout, 2013).

Several studies provide empirical support for the notion that prejudice towards Muslims as a group of people can differ from criticism of Islam as a religious system of belief (Uenal, 2016; Uenal et al., 2021) with the two having different correlates and causes. Using two different samples, a study from Germany distinguished between Islamoprejudice and secular critique of Islam (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). The two attitudes were weakly or not at all related, and were distinctively associated with implicit and explicit prejudice, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and religiosity. However, both scales predicted opposition to, at the time, a newly built mosque in Cologne. Similar findings were reported by a study conducted in Italy (Tartaglia et al., 2019). Another study from Germany provided empirical evidence that Islamophobia is distinct from gender-based and secular-based critique of Islam (Heyder & Eisentraut, 2016). These three outcomes were weakly correlated and differently predicted by authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and anomia.

In addition to studies examining criticism of Islam as a system of belief, several studies examined objections to specific Muslim rights and practices. By analyzing data from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Van der Noll (2010) found that a negative attitude towards Muslims was only weakly ($r < .30$) associated with support of a ban on headscarves. In another study, Van der Noll and colleagues (2010) found that around 13% of those who do not have prejudicial feelings towards Muslims object to some of Muslims' political rights in the Netherlands. In another study in Germany, Van der Noll (2014) found that around a fifth of those who are positive towards Muslims as a group of people object to Islamic education, Islamic public holiday and the building of mosques. Further, a recent study in the Netherlands showed that between 17% and 30% of the population feel positive towards Turks and Moroccans and accept their rights, yet sometimes object to the wearing of the headscarf or the founding of Islamic schools (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Similarly, a study from Switzerland (Eugster, 2021) found that around 35% of the Swiss population was positive towards Muslims, yet objected to full face veil which was perceived as oppressive and going against self-determination of women.

The suggestion that rejection of religious practices can be based on principled concerns also comes from studies which showed that those who are against specific Muslim practices do not necessarily discriminate against Muslims but rather consistently reject the same practice when Christians are involved in it. For example, in a study in Germany, Van der Noll and Saroglou (2015) examined how the German public simultaneously evaluates Islamic and Christian religious education in public schools. The authors found that 38% of the population was against religious education in public schools regardless of the religious group concerned. Similarly, in a study in Quebec, Bilodeau and colleagues (2018) examined attitudes towards Muslim and Christian religious symbols in the public sphere and found that 24% of individuals were against religious symbols in public regardless of the religious group involved.

Findings of these studies demonstrate that there are substantial numbers of majority members who have objections towards specific Muslim minority practices without having to have anti-Muslim feelings. This indicates the importance of examining other reasons that underlie the rejection of Muslim minority practices in addition to prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group of people. In the following section, I describe the methodological and analytical approaches that I used and that are well suited for this purpose.

1.3 Methods for examining prejudice- and principle-based rejection

When a specific Muslim minority practice is rejected, three questions are important for examining whether the rejection is based on prejudice or rather on more principled considerations, and I present these next. Subsequently, I outline the person-centered approach as a suitable tool for examining these questions, and discuss relevant correlates.

1.3.1 Distinctions between acts and actors

Distinction between an act and an actor. When a specific act (for example, the practice of wearing veils) is negatively evaluated, it is important to know whether the negativity generalizes to the actor (for example, Muslims as a group of people), or whether people differentiate between the act and the actor by critically evaluating the former and respecting the latter (e.g., Uzarevic et al., 2020). When the rejection of a practice corresponds with negative feelings towards the group per se, it is likely that prejudicial feelings and not principled considerations underly the rejection. However, when the rejection of a practice is accompanied by positive feelings towards the group, it is more likely that more principle-based reasons underlie the rejection (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine whether some majority members reject Muslim minority practices while being well-disposed towards Muslims as a group of people.

Distinction between different acts. In addition to knowing whether negativity towards an act generalizes to the actor involved, it is important to know whether the rejection of a particular act generalizes to other acts of the same religious actor or whether people differentiate between different acts by accepting some and rejecting others: e.g., whether people consistently reject Muslim religious symbols and Muslim religious education, or rather accept one and reject the other (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Different practices likely evoke different concerns and an indiscriminate rejection of all practices of an actor is likely to indicate that the nature of the acts is not taken into account, and that prejudicial feelings towards the group of people are involved. In contrast, a differentiation between different practices implies that people take the nature of the practice into account and reject a practice due to practice-specific reasons rather than group-based negative feelings. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I examine whether the rejection of a specific Muslim practice generalizes to other Muslim practices or rather whether people differentiate between practices by rejecting some and accepting others.

Distinction between different actors. Another important question is whether people discriminate against Muslims relative to other religious groups, such as Christians or Jews: e.g., whether people more strongly reject Muslim practices compared to similar practices when Christians or Jews are involved in them. Comparing practices across 'similarly situated' groups is important for concluding that the rejection of a Muslim practice involves discrimination towards Muslims as a group (Sniderman, 2018; see also Petersen et al., 2011; Traunmüller & Helbling, 2022; Uzarevic et al., 2020; Van der Noll et al., 2018 for application of a similar design). People can apply a double standard by rejecting a practice for Muslims, but not a similar practice when other religious actors are engaged in it. However, people can also reject the practice regardless of the religious actor involved in it. Whereas in the former case, the discrimination against Muslims points towards prejudicial group-based feelings, in the latter case it is more likely that principled concerns (e.g., secularism, state neutrality) are involved. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine whether people differentiate between Muslim, Christian (Chapters 4 and 5) and Jewish (Chapter 5) practices, and whether Muslim practices are more strongly rejected than similar practices of these other religious groups.

1.3.2 Person-centered approach

The great majority of research on anti-Muslim attitudes uses a variable-centered approach in which the associations between various individual difference variables are examined (Bardi & Zentner, 2017). For example, research on prejudice towards Muslims and the acceptance of Muslim practices typically finds a positive relationship between anti-Muslim prejudice and rejection of a particular practice, indicating that the more prejudiced people are, the more likely they are to reject the practice. A variable-centered approach focuses on differences *between* individuals by typically assuming that individuals can be positioned on a linear continuum from stronger to weaker prejudice and that an increase in prejudice corresponds with a gradual (at a consistent rate) increase in rejection of Muslim practices (Laursen & Hoff, 2006; Meeusen et al., 2018). Although a variable-centered approach for examining outgroup attitudes is very useful and important for understanding related processes, it misses out on all those cases in which people's simultaneous evaluations of an outgroup and its practices are not linearly associated but rather are differently organized in distinct configurations *within* individuals.

Person-centered approaches assume that there are qualitatively different subgroups of individuals with different, not necessarily linear, combinations of attitudes and beliefs. A person-centered approach might show, for example, that there is a subgroup of individuals that combines their prejudice towards Muslims with the rejection of Muslim practices (e.g., Islamophobic) and a subgroup of individuals that has positive feelings towards Muslims and accept all Muslim practices. However, individuals might organize their attitudes and beliefs also in different ways that are typically not considered in a variable-centered approach: for instance, there might be a subgroup of individuals that combines prejudice towards Muslims as a group of people with acceptance of Muslim minority practices, and a subgroup of individuals that combines positive feelings towards Muslims with the rejection of specific practices (e.g., not shaking hands with someone of the opposite gender). Thus, a person-centered approach acknowledges that the population can be quite heterogenous and might consist of multiple subpopulations characterized by different subjective configurations of attitudes and beliefs (Howard & Hoffman, 2018; Kempf, 2012; Morin et al., 2016).

Several studies showed that a person-centered approach can be beneficial for understanding intergroup evaluations. For example, a study on political tolerance in the United States of America examined whether people are willing to grant three civil liberties (giving a speech, teaching in a college, and having a book available in the public library) to five different groups (atheists, militarists, racists, homosexuals, and communists). It was found that there are four different subgroups of individuals: two subgroups of individuals were consistently tolerant or intolerant of all rights for all groups, and two subgroup of individuals were intolerant of the groups on the left (e.g., communists) or right (e.g., racists) side of the political spectrum (McCutcheon, 1985). Similarly, a study in Germany examined antisemitism and critique of Israel using a range of people's attitudes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and found nine subgroups of individuals (Kempf, 2012). Among other subgroups, there were two pro-Israel subgroups of individuals—one harboring antisemitic sentiments and the other not—and two subgroups critical of Israel, again one harboring antisemitic prejudice and the other not. Further, research in the Netherlands simultaneously examined prejudice and acceptance of Muslim practices and found four different subgroups of individuals: two subgroups of individuals were consistently positive or negative towards Muslims and their practices, and two subgroups were positive towards Muslims but rejected some or all Muslim practices (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020).

In short, there are two main advantages of using a person-centered approach for examining whether people engage in prejudice-based or principle-based rejection. First, it allows to simultaneously consider the different combinations of multiple items measuring people's attitudes towards Muslims and a range of different practices that cannot easily be taken into account with other methods (Oberski, 2016). For example, in the variable-centered approach, multiple interrelated items are usually combined into a composite score, which can result in a loss of information. In contrast, a person-centered approach is less sensitive to multicollinearity (Spurk et al., 2020), and allows the simultaneous examination of multiple items without losing the items' specificity. Second, it enables a theoretically more nuanced understanding of the qualitative different ways in which individuals can simultaneously evaluate Muslims as a group of people and Muslim practices, and as such provides a more nuanced picture of the population's heterogeneity.

In this dissertation, I use the person-centered approach in all four empirical chapters. In Chapters 2, 3 and 5, I use latent profile analysis as an important form of the person-centered approach and in Chapter 4, where rejection of Muslim practices was measured on an ordinal scale, I use a more parsimonious classification of individuals into different subgroups based on whether they accepted or rejected specific Muslim and Christian practices.

1.3.3 Correlates of prejudice- and principle-based rejection

In order to validate that the subgroups of individuals identified with a person-centered approach are meaningful beyond the different ways in which subgroups of individuals evaluate Muslims and their practices, I examine whether and how these subgroups differ in their endorsement of liberal principles and feelings towards other religious and minority groups. I also examine differences in religious affiliation, as well as on psychological constructs typically examined in the literature on prejudice, such as authoritarianism, conservatism and national identification. In the following sections, I focus on the liberal principles only because the psychological constructs mentioned are well-known and discussed in the respective empirical chapters (Feldman, 2020; Mummendey et al., 2001; Stenner, 2005)

Civil liberties. Civil liberties refer to individual's freedom to think and act as they choose without governmental interference (Sullivan, 2004). The endorsement of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and freedom of conscience, is considered a core reason for accepting outgroup practices and beliefs (Gibson, 2006). There is much empirical support for the idea that recognizing the right of each citizen to express their views and live the life they want is related to tolerance in general and the acceptance of Muslim practices in particular. For example, a study from Germany showed that individuals who endorsed civil liberties were less opposed to the wearing of headscarves, following Islamic education, building mosques, and celebrating Islamic public holiday (Van der Noll, 2014). Similarly, a study from the Netherlands showed that support for liberal values was associated with more positive attitudes towards the practice of veiling (Gustavsson et al., 2016).

However, the relationship between civil liberties and acceptance of outgroup practices is not straightforward and mere endorsement of civil liberties in itself does not always imply that practices are accepted. Endorsement of civil liberties can also result in a rejection of outgroup practices when these are perceived as going against the freedom of others. For example, an experimental study in the Netherlands showed that people are less likely to accept a Muslim civil servant wearing a headscarf when she wears it because of normative community pressures rather than out of personal choice (Velthuis et al., manuscript submitted).

Unconditional respect. Unconditional respect entails the notion that every person has intrinsic moral worth and dignity, and deserves to be respected simply as a human being (Laham et al., 2009; Lalljee et al., 2007; 2009). As such, unconditional respect is a fundamental principle that governs relationships between citizens in liberal societies (Neufeld, 2005). Empirical research shows that the value of respect is positively associated with favorable attitudes towards minority outgroups (Lalljee et al., 2007; 2009; Sirlopú et al., 2019; Zitzmann et al., 2022) and with acceptance of outgroup's way of life (Hjerm et al., 2019; Simon & Schaefer, 2018; Simon et al., 2019; Velthuis et al., 2021).

However, valuing unconditional respect does not imply that all outgroup practices will be accepted, especially not if these are considered offensive and perceived to go against the dignity and integrity of others. For example, displaying particular religious symbols in public institutions may be considered offensive towards non-members of the faith. As Laborde (2005, p. 322) writes: "public agents have a 'devoir de réserve' (obligation of restraint): they must not display any sign of religious allegiance, so as to show equal respect to all users of public services". Similarly, those who value unconditional respect might be against cartoonish characterization of religious figures because this is seen as being disrespectful of religious followers. Additionally, those who endorse unconditional respect might feel strongly against the practice of not shaking hands with someone of the opposite gender or against unequal treatment of women among some Muslims, which both can be considered to go against the dignity and personhood of others (Gieling et al., 2010).

Open-mindedness. Open-mindedness entails the willingness and ability "to transcend a default cognitive standpoint in order to take up or take seriously the merits of a distinct cognitive standpoint" (Baehr, 2011, p. 152). In addition to being an intellectual ability, open-mindedness is also considered a civic virtue since it facilitates peaceful coexistence of different cultures and groups in pluralistic societies (Song, 2018). Research shows that being open-minded is associated with the willingness to build intercultural relationships (e.g., Van der Zee & Brinkmann, 2004), more positive attitudes towards minority groups (e.g., Genkova, 2016; Korol, 2019), more openness to religious difference (e.g., Price et al., 2015), and more acceptance of dissenting practices and beliefs (e.g., Butrus & Witenberg, 2015).

However, being open-minded does not imply that all principles and commitments should be abandoned and all differences unquestionably accepted. Open-mindedness does not have to imply a relativistic position but rather involves that all viewpoints are seriously considered and simultaneously critically evaluated (critical open-mindedness; Lambie, 2014). Therefore, although open-mindedness is related to more acceptance of an outgroup and its way of life, it can also be associated with 'reasonable rejection' of outgroup's way of life.

Secularism. Secularism entails the idea that religious interference in state and public affairs should be limited in order to preserve the neutrality of public institutions (Copson, 2017). Hence, secularism is related to favoring restrictions on religious expression in public institutions while supporting religious freedom in private contexts (Berg, 2019; Cohu et al., 2020; Imhoff & Recker, 2012). Several studies provided evidence that those who more strongly endorse secular values are more likely to reject Muslim religious practices, independently of prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (e.g., Aarøe, 2012; Breton & Eady, 2015). Further, endorsement of secularism was found to be associated with equal rejection of Muslim and Christian practices (Bilodeau et al., 2018; Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015).

1.4 Research contexts

In my empirical studies, I focus on majority members' attitudes towards Muslims in West European countries, and the Netherlands (four empirical studies) and Germany (three empirical studies) in particular. In this section, I will describe the two countries' similarities and differences when it comes to the population of Muslims in these countries, the integration policies, the way religion is accommodated by the state, and the way Islam and Muslims are portrayed by the media and politicians, and perceived by the public.

In the Netherlands and Germany, Muslims are the largest religious minority group, making up between 5% and 7% of the population (Hackett et al., 2019; Huijnik, 2018; Schmeets, 2019). The majority of Muslims in both countries is of immigration background, with Muslims in the Netherlands being mainly of Moroccan and Turkish origin (Huijnik, 2018), whereas those in Germany are mainly from Turkey and Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Syria; Pfündel et al., 2021). Muslims in Europe are linguistically, culturally, politically, and religiously a very heterogenous group (Anwar, 2008; Huijnik, 2018).

Based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the Netherlands and Germany score among the top 20 countries with most favorable integration policies, yet the policies in the two countries are evaluated as 'halfway favourable': "These countries provide immigrants with basic rights and equal opportunities, but not a secure future in the country. Policies in these countries encourage the public to see immigrants as their equals and neighbours, but also as foreigners rather than as potential citizens" (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2020, Temporary integration section).

Historically, Christianity is the main religious denomination in the Netherlands and Germany, but an increasing number of majority members is becoming unaffiliated with religion in both countries (Statista, 2019b; Fowid, 2021). The two countries differ in terms of the status that religion in general and Islam in specific have within the state. Due to the Dutch history of pillarization—a system that grants all religions equal freedoms and rights to found their own institutions—Islam has been granted an equal status comparatively to other religions. This facilitated the accommodation of Islam and enabled the building of mosques, establishment of Islamic schools, and allowed Muslim female teachers and students to wear a headscarf in schools (Carol et al., 2015). In the Netherlands, there are around 478 mosques (Van Tubergen et al., 2021) and 56 Islamic schools (Statista, 2019a), and around 60% of Muslim women wear a headscarf, although there is significant variation depending on the generation and country of origin (Brünig & Fleischmann, 2015; Huijnk, 2018). Although Islam is guaranteed an equal status as other religions, in reality, Muslim practices are not always accommodated. For example, although the state allows public schools to organize extracurricular Islamic religious classes, only a few schools in the Netherlands do so (Miedema, 2018).

Unlike the Netherlands, Germany is characterized by a cooperative state-church model whereby only Christian and Jewish denominations are considered legitimate partners of the state (Carol et al., 2015). Therefore, Islam in Germany is not granted the same rights as the cooperative religious denominations. The decision on how to accommodate, for example, religious education is left to the federal states, and in four out of the sixteen states, Islamic religious classes are offered, whereas other states introduced pilot projects (Wittmer & Waldhoff, 2019). In Germany, there are around 2,800 mosques and only around 300 of them have visible indications, such as minarets or cupolas (Statista, 2022). In 2015, teachers were not allowed to wear a headscarf in schools in eight states (Carol et al., 2015). However, in the same year, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the general prohibition on headscarves in schools is not justifiable (Jones, 2015). In the general population, it is estimated that around 30% of Muslim women wear a headscarf (Pfündel et al., 2021).

Both countries have seen heated political and public debates about immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular, as well as about the accommodation of Muslim minority practices. With the presence and rise of right-wing political groups in both countries, harshly negative displays of Muslims and requests for more restrictive immigration and integration policies are not uncommon. The negative anti-Muslim discourse among some politicians coexists with a negative portrayal of Muslims in some of the media. Among the public, Muslims are often perceived as the ‘other’ and their allegiance and loyalty to the state and country of residence is regularly questioned (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

Given the relatively favorable integration policies together with the generally less important role religion has in these countries, and the tensions between Muslim minorities and majority members in both countries, the Netherlands and Germany provide excellent cases to understand the role of principles and prejudices in rejecting Muslim minority practices.[1]

1.5 Empirical studies

In the four empirical chapters in this dissertation, I use large-scale national samples and person-centered approaches to identify qualitatively different subgroups of individuals that differ in the way they evaluate Muslims as a group of people and a range of Muslim practices.

Table 1.1 gives an overview of these chapters. In Chapter 2, I examine whether majority members can be inclusive (acknowledge the worth of Muslims as a group of people and endorse their equal civic rights) of Muslim minorities despite the perception that some Muslims engage in gender inequality practices. By using latent profile analysis, I examine whether some people display generalized negativity towards Muslims as a group of people, their expressive rights and gender-inequality practices whereas others are positive towards the group of Muslims and supportive of their expressive rights yet critical of Muslims engaging in gendered practices. I further examine how these subgroups of individuals differ in their unconditional respect for others, endorsement of civil liberties, open-mindedness, religious affiliation, and, importantly, in their (hidden) prejudice.

In Chapter 3, I further examine whether ethnic majority members differentiate between Muslims as a group of people and specific Muslim practices. I build upon the previous chapter by introducing a range of Muslim practices (e.g., the refusal to shake hands with someone of the opposite gender, the founding of Islamic schools, the wearing of veils) which allows a more detailed examination of whether people differentiate between different practices by accepting some and rejecting other practices. The differentiation between different practices provides evidence that people take the nature of the practice into account and that practice-specific concerns are involved. I further build upon the previous chapter by examining additional correlates. Next to unconditional respect for others and religious affiliation, I examine how the identified profiles differ in terms of psychological predispositions related to prejudice, such as authoritarianism and status quo conservatism, as well as the negative evaluation of other minority groups and other minority practices.

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[1] In this introductory chapter, I focus on the findings on the pooled samples as my results are largely comparable across countries. However, there are also some differences–such as a somewhat more positive orientation towards Muslims and their practices displayed by participants from the Netherlands compared to those from Germany–and I provide more details on these differences in Chapters 2, 4, and 5.

In Chapter 4, I build on the previous chapter by also taking into consideration Christian religious actors and examining whether majority members discriminate against Muslim minorities relative to the Christian majority. I do so by examining whether people more strongly reject the display of Muslim religious symbols and religious education compared to Christians engaged in these same practices. I further examine how people's responses relate to their endorsement of civil liberties and secular principles, prejudice towards Muslims, as well as their religious affiliation. In Chapters 2 and 3, group-based prejudices towards Muslims are used as an indicator of the latent profiles. However, in Chapter 4 (as well as Chapter 5) group-based prejudice measures are not used to create profiles but rather examined as a correlate of the different profiles. Whereas in Chapters 2 and 3, the focus is on examining whether people differentiate between Muslims and their practices, in Chapters 4 and 5, I examine whether people discriminate against Muslims by more strongly rejecting Muslim practices relative to Christian practices.

In Chapter 5, I add to the findings of Chapter 4 by examining additional religious practices and an additional religious minority group. Thus, I extend on the previous design by including other practices (e.g., the broadcasting time on national television) as well as Jewish religious actors. I further examine how the different constellations of attitudes relate to feelings towards Muslims, non-Muslim religious groups and non-believers, the endorsement of civil liberties and secular principles, open-mindedness, national identification, religious affiliation, as well as self-reported reasons for rejecting Muslim minority practices.

Data. In Chapters 2 and 5, I use data collected between the 27th of May and the 9th of June 2019 among majority members in Germany and the Netherlands. The data collection was carried out by a professional research agency that maintains a representative panel of members of the German and Dutch adult population. In Chapter 3, I used data collected between the 20th and the 28th of February 2018 among majority members in the Netherlands. The data collection was also carried out by a professional research agency. In Chapter 4, I used the existing EURISLAM (Hoksbergen & Tillie, 2012) data collected in 2012, in six West European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Table 1.1 An overview of empirical chapters

Chapter	Research questions	Latent profile analysis items	The main correlates	Data and sample
2	Does criticism of Muslim gender-inequality practices imply prejudicial feelings or can it coexist with inclusive attitudes towards Muslims?	Prejudice towards Muslims (2 items) Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights (4 items) Perception of Muslim gender-inequality practices (3 items)	Unconditional respect Endorsement of civil liberties Open-mindedness Indirect measures of prejudice Religious affiliation	Survey and survey-embedded experiments; 3,734 participants from Germany and the Netherlands
3	Does the rejection of Muslim minority practices imply prejudicial feelings towards Muslims or practice-specific concerns?	Prejudice towards Muslims (1 item) Acceptance of Muslim minority practices (7 items)	Unconditional respect Authoritarianism Status quo conservatism Prejudice towards other minority groups Acceptance of other minority practices Religious affiliation	Survey; 818 participants from the Netherlands
4	Do people discriminate against Muslims relative to Christians by rejecting Muslim and accepting Christian practices?	Acceptance of Muslim and Christian religious symbols and religious education in public schools (4 items)	Endorsement of civil liberties Endorsement of secular principles Prejudice towards Muslims Religious affiliation	Survey; 1,580 participants from Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland
5	Do people discriminate against Muslims relative to Christians and Jews by more strongly rejecting Muslim practices than Christian and Jewish practices?	Acceptance of Muslim, Christian and Jewish religious symbols, religious education and broadcasting time on national television (9 items)	Endorsement of civil liberties Endorsement of secular principles Open-mindedness Prejudice towards Muslims Prejudice towards other religious groups Prejudice towards non-believers Religious affiliation National identification	Survey; 3,703 participants from Germany and the Netherlands

Note. The number of participants refers to the participants who were considered in the analyses. For more details regarding the total number of participants and the selection criteria, please see the chapter in question.

1.6 Main findings

In four empirical chapters, I examined different research questions using different indicators and data from several European countries, and found different types of subgroups that meaningfully differ from each other in their main concerns related to Muslim minority practices. Across all four empirical studies, I consistently identified a subgroup of individuals whose rejection of Muslim practices reflects prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (prejudice-based rejection; Table 1.2) and a subgroup of individuals whose rejection of Muslim practices reflects more principled considerations (principle-based rejection). Further, across three empirical studies, I consistently identified a subgroup of individuals whose rejection of Muslim practices appears to be grounded in both principles and prejudices (predominantly principle-based rejection), and a subgroup of individuals who are supportive of Muslims in every sense (acceptance). In addition to these subgroups which consistently appear across chapters, I identified some specific subgroups which only appear in one or two of the chapters, reflecting differences in our research questions and measurement used, as well as the person centered approach's sensitivity to the indicators considered.

Table 1.2 An overview of labels used in different chapters

Identified subgroups	Chapter 2	Chapter 3	Chapters 4 and 5
Prejudice-based rejection	Critical exclusive	Negative rejecting	Discriminatory rejecting
Principle-based rejection	Critical inclusive	Positive partly rejecting	Equally partly rejecting
Predominantly principle-based rejection	-	Positive rejecting	Equally rejecting
Acceptance	-	Positive accepting	Equally accepting
Additional subgroups	Moderately critical exclusive; Moderate	Negative partly accepting	Equally moderate (only in Ch. 5)

In the following subsections, I will describe the four types of subgroups which I consistently identified across the chapters and what appears to be their main characteristics beyond the way they evaluate Muslims as a group of people and Muslim practices. I will also provide a summary of the remaining more specific subgroups and the additional insight these provide. To describe these types of subgroups, I use somewhat different labels in the different chapters (see Table 1.2 for an overview of labels used per chapter). For example, subgroups labelled as ‘critical exclusive’, ‘negative rejecting’ or ‘discriminatory rejecting’ in the corresponding chapters all point towards prejudice-based rejection. The reason for the different labels is that in the different chapters I used different analytical strategies to examine whether people reject Muslim practices out of prejudicial feelings or rather principled considerations, and some analytical strategies make certain labels more suitable than others. For example, examining Muslim practices in comparison to Christian practices in Chapters 4 and 5 allowed to label certain subgroups as ‘equal’ or ‘discriminatory’. However, this was not possible when Christian practices were not considered in Chapters 2 and 3. Similarly, the broader focus on inclusiveness—that encompasses positive feelings towards the group and acknowledgement of the group’s equal rights—allowed to label subgroups as ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ in Chapter 2, but this was not possible when only feelings towards Muslims were considered in Chapter 3. Thus, different labels reflect limitations and benefits of different approaches in terms of what can be concluded.

1.6.1 Prejudice-based rejection

My findings provide consistent evidence that a substantial proportion of majority members hold indiscriminately negative attitudes towards Muslims and their practices. In Chapter 2, this is represented by a subgroup of individuals that has negative feelings towards Muslims, does not acknowledge their expressive rights and perceives Muslims as engaging in gender-inequality practices (*critical exclusive*; 19%). In Chapter 3, there is a subgroup of individuals that harbors negative feelings towards Muslims and rejects all seven Muslim practices examined (*negative rejecting*; 28%). In Chapter 4, there is a subgroup of individuals who discriminate against Muslims by rejecting Muslim religious symbols and religious education while simultaneously accepting Christian religious education and religious symbols (*discriminatory rejecting*; 39-45%). Similarly, in Chapter 5, there is a subgroup of individuals that discriminates against Muslims by more strongly rejecting religious symbols, religious education, and broadcasting time on national television for Muslim than for Christian or Jewish actors (*discriminatory rejecting;* 16%).[2]

Subgroups of individuals that displayed prejudice-based rejection were more likely to hold authoritarian and conservative worldviews (Chapter 3), to more strongly identify with their nation (Chapter 5) and to be affiliated with Christianity (Chapter 4). They were also more likely to spontaneously emphasize the importance of maintaining the national culture and perceive Islam as a threat (Chapter 5). Unsurprisingly, they also were characterized by strong prejudices regardless of how these were measured (Chapters 2-5). Further, they were less likely to endorse liberal principles such as unconditional respect of others (Chapters 2 and 3) and to be open-minded (Chapters 2 and 5), but were not less likely to endorse civil liberties (Chapters 2, 4, and 5). These findings are in line with research that predominantly applies a variable-centered approach and emphasizes the role of prejudicial feelings in rejecting outgroup practices in general and Muslim practices particularly (e.g., Blinder et al., 2019; Saroglou et al., 2009), as well as the research that demonstrates that rejection of outgroups and their practices relates to authoritarian and conservative predispositions (e.g., Feldman, 2003; 2020), and national- and religious-ingroup bias (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Overall, the findings provide support for the generalized, indiscriminate nature of Islamophobia among a subsection of the population (Bleich 2011; 2012).

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[2] Although all the four groups represent generalized negativity towards Muslims and their practices, the percentages of these groups differ across the studies, especially in Chapter 4. In this chapter, a different measurement scale was used, and below I discuss how this might have affected the results.

1.6.2 Principle-based rejection

Across four studies, my findings provide consistent evidence that there is also a substantial group of majority members that reject Muslim minority practices for value-based reasons rather than (generalized) prejudice. In Chapter 2, principle-based rejection is represented by a subgroup of individuals that is well disposed towards Muslims and acknowledges Muslim expressive equal rights, yet at the same time is concerned about Muslims engaging in gender-inequality practices (*critical inclusive*; 33%). In Chapter 3, this is represented by a subgroup of individuals who are positive toward Muslims as a group of people, but not necessarily towards all Muslim minority practices, as they reject some (e.g., refusal to shake hands with a person of the opposite gender) and accept other practices (e.g., the building of mosques; *positive partly rejecting*; 12%). In Chapter 4, there is a subgroup of individuals that differentiates between practices by rejecting one (e.g., religious education) and accepting another practice (e.g., religious symbols) but does so without applying a double standard, as they respond in the same way to Christian and Muslim practices (*equally partly rejecting;* 27-29%). Similarly, in Chapter 5, there is a subgroup of individuals that differentiates between religious practices by rejecting broadcasting time for religious programs on national television, accepting religious education and being neutral towards religious symbols, and equally so for Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious actors (*equally partly* *rejecting;* 13%).[3] The subgroups of individuals that display principle-based rejection differ from subgroups that display prejudice-based rejection in three crucial aspects. First, they differentiate between an act (e.g., a Muslim practice) and the actor involved in the act (e.g., the group of Muslims), by critically evaluating the former and respecting the latter (Uzarevic et al., 2020). Second, they differentiate between different practices by accepting some and rejecting others. This indicates that they take the nature of the practice into account rather than the group of people involved in it. Third, they respond consistently across different groups and do not display a double standard whereby they discriminate against Muslims. These three aspects strongly suggest that for some majority members rejection is grounded in value-based principles evoked by specific practices.

Subgroups of individuals that displayed principle-based rejection were characterized by unconditional respect for others (Chapters 2 and 3), open-mindedness (Chapter 5), as well as endorsement of civil liberties and secularism (Chapters 4 and 5). These findings are in line with the literature that emphasizes the role of liberal principles in accepting and rejecting outgroup practices (e.g., Gustavsson et al., 2016; Turgeon et al., 2019). Further, an interesting feature of the principle-based subgroups is their simultaneous endorsement of principles that can be contrasted, such as civil liberties and secularism (Chapters 4 and 5). These subgroups' differentiation between different acts—acceptance of some and rejection of others—is likely an outcome of balancing between these different principles, which further suggests that for these individuals values and the way they are simultaneously subjectively organized matter (Peffley et al., 2001). This is also supported by the fact that they spontaneously emphasize the importance of equal treatment of different groups but also that acceptance or rejection of outgroup practices depend on circumstances and conditions (Chapter 5). Overall, these findings provide strong evidence that for some majority members, rejection of Muslim minority practices reflects genuine concerns about liberal principles, and that not every rejection is simply or only reflective of Islamophobic sentiments.

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[3] The share of the principle-based rejection subgroups in the studies varies between 12% and 33%. This variation can be expected, given that whether one shows 'principle-based rejection' depends on the type of practices one is asked about and the related values. Thus, similar to other research, conclusions about the exact number of 'principled' (or 'prejudiced') people in the population, in part, depends on the questions asked, the scales used and the type of analyses conducted.

1.6.3 Predominantly principle-based rejection

In three of my studies, I identified a subgroup of individuals that appears to reject Muslim minority practices mainly out of more principled considerations, but also shows some pattern of responses that points towards prejudicial feelings. In Chapter 3, this is represented by a subgroup of individuals (*positive rejecting;* 25%) that was neutral or slightly positive towards Muslims as a group of people, but nevertheless rejected all Muslim religious practices. In Chapter 4, there is a subgroup of individuals (*equally rejecting;* 8-15%) who did not discriminate against Muslims relative to Christians, but who nevertheless rejected all Muslim and Christian practices (religious symbols and religious education in public schools). Similarly, in Chapter 5, this is represented by a subgroup of individuals (*equally rejecting;* 17%) that, again, did not discriminate against Muslims, but nevertheless rejected all Muslim, Jewish and Christian practices (religious symbols, religious education and broadcasting time on national television).

Two aspects of these patterns of responses point towards more principle-based rejection. First, these individuals differentiated between Muslims as a group of people and Muslim minority practices, and rejecting the practices without harboring negative feelings towards the group. Second, these individuals did not apply a double standard in which they discriminated against Muslims, but rather responded similarly towards different religious groups. However, the fact that these individuals did not differentiate between different practices but rather showed indiscriminate rejection of all Muslim practices indicates the possibility that, at least to some extent, prejudicial feelings were involved.

This interpretation is also supported by the fact that individuals in these subgroups more strongly endorsed status quo conservatism (Chapter 3) and secularism (Chapters 4 and 5), but were less positive towards Muslims compared to individuals in the principle-based subgroups (Chapters 3 and 5), yet more positive than individuals in the prejudice-based subgroups (Chapters 3 and 5). They were also more negative towards religious groups in general (Chapter 5), less likely to be religiously affiliated (Chapters 4 and 5), and less open-minded (Chapter 5). The existence of these subgroups indicates that for some majority members, rejection of Muslim minority practices is not simply a question of principles versus prejudices but that the two sometimes might simultaneously play a role, for example in the form of prejudicial feelings towards religious people.

1.6.4 Acceptance

In contrast to the subgroups of individuals that reject Muslim practices, in three of the chapters, I identified a subgroup of individuals with a generalized positive orientation towards Muslims as a group of people and their practices. In Chapter 3, a subgroup of individuals (*positive accepting;* 16%) felt positive towards Muslims and accepted all of their practices. In Chapter 4, a subgroup of individuals (*equally accepting;* 17-19%) accepted religious symbols and religious education in public schools for Muslims and Christians alike. Similarly, in Chapter 5, a subgroup of individuals (*equally accepting;* 18%) accepted religious symbols, religious education and broadcasting time on national TV for Muslim, Jewish and Christian religious actors.[4]

Subgroups of individuals that displayed generalized acceptance are characterized by strong endorsement of unconditional respect for others (Chapter 3) and civil liberties (Chapters 4 and 5), as well as open-mindedness (Chapter 5) and generally positive feelings towards Muslims and other religious and minority groups (Chapters 3-5). This is in line with the literature which emphasizes the key role of liberal principles and positive outgroup feelings in accepting outgroup practices (e.g., Marcus, 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2019).

Although the existence of this accepting subgroup of individuals is often implied in the literature and research on prejudice, this literature mainly focuses on the negative side of intergroup relations and the people with generally positive orientations are often neglected. The person-centered approach makes it possible to identify a separate subgroup of individuals that is accepting of others in every respect and to examine which factors contribute to this positive outgroup orientation.

1.6.5 Additional subgroups

In addition to the subgroups described, I identified subgroups of individuals which only appear in one or two of the four chapters. First, in Chapters 2 and 3, I identified a subgroup of individuals that is generally negative towards Muslims and rejects most of their practices, but exceptionally accepts some Muslim practices (e.g., celebrating a holiday) or Muslim rights (e.g., to express faith). The existence of these subgroups demonstrates that even those who are generally prejudiced do not always limit the freedom of others (e.g., Mondak & Sanders, 2003; Gibson, 2005a). Second, in Chapters 2 and 5, I identified a subgroup of individuals that is rather neutral in their evaluation of Muslims and their practices. The existence of these profiles can reflect methodological issues, but might also indicate that some people are genuinely neutral when it comes to contested social issues.

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[4] In Chapter 2, this group was not identified as one of the most likely profiles. However, subsequent, more detailed analysis showed that a small percentage of individuals (2%) have this generally positive orientation. This subgroup of individuals was positive towards unequal gender arrangements among some Muslims, towards Muslims as a group of people, and towards Muslim expressive rights.

1.7 Limitations and future directions

Despite the very novel and relevant theoretical and empirical contributions, I like to point out four limitations of my research and suggest potential future directions.

First, although I found consistent evidence that some people reject Muslim minority practices more out of principled rather than prejudicial reasons, it is possible that some individuals strategically employ principles as a justification for their prejudice towards Muslims. Empirical research shows, for example, that the endorsement of human rights can foster anti-Muslim attitudes (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2014) and that people can employ liberal and democratic values in order to legitimize their prejudice (e.g., Crandall & Eshelman, 2003; Wang et al., 2021; White & Crandall, 2017; White at al., 2022). For example, two studies from France employed a variable-centered approach and showed that the principle of secularism can be strategically used as a justification to reject Muslim practices (Adam-Troian et al., 2019; Nugier et al., 2016). However, the fact that some people employ liberal principles for justifying their anti-Muslim sentiments and rejecting Muslim minority practices, does not imply that principles are always strategically used and that there are no people whose rejection is genuinely principle-based. By using a person-centered approach, I found that some people apply their principles consistently across different groups and do not appear prejudiced even when hidden measures of prejudice are used (see Chapter 2). However, several strategies could be employed in future research to further test whether and when the employment of principles is genuine or functions to legitimize one's prejudice. For example, it is worth examining whether people who strongly endorse a principle (e.g., secularism) reject practices only when these violate the principle (e.g., wearing religious symbols when performing a duty at a public institution) or also when these are aligned with the principle (e.g., wearing religious symbols at a private gathering; Velthuis et al., 2022). Similarly, it is worth examining whether people apply a principle (e.g., religious freedom) also when it goes against their self-interests or that of a group they identify with, and not only when an outgroup is negatively targeted. Another possible avenue of research is to examine whether people who reject practices for seemingly principled reasons are likely to show prosocial outgroup behavior, and equally so as those who are generally supportive of Muslims and their practices (Aidenberger & Doehne, 2021; Aranguren et al., 2021; Choi et al., 2021; Van der Noll et al., 2018). Finally, by using a mixed-methods design and conducting in-depth interviews with individuals classified within the principle-based profiles, future research might ask individuals to elaborate on their considerations and reasoning, and more closely examine how these are applied across various groups and practices.

Second, across four empirical studies I find consistent evidence that some majority members display prejudice-based rejection, but the percentage of people who do so varies across different chapters. For example, in Chapter 4, between a third and half of respondents discriminated against Muslims relative to Christians, whereas in Chapter 5 less than a fifth discriminated against Muslims relative to Christians and Jews. There might be substantial and methodological reasons for these differences. Substantially, it might mean that majority member's attitudes changed between 2011 and 2019 when the data used in these two studies were collected. However, it is difficult to say in which direction. One possibility is that with increasing secularization of European countries (e.g., Evans, 2019), people might have become more negative towards Christian practices. Another possibility is that, over time, majority members became more positive towards Muslim minorities and their practices (Bell et al., 2021; Storm et al., 2017). Methodologically, differences in percentages might reflect differences in measurement scales and analytical techniques. For example, in Chapter 5, unlike Chapter 4, the scales of the items measuring acceptance and rejection of religious practices included a neutral midpoint which was chosen by every third participant. It is possible that those respondents who are slightly biased in favor towards Christian practices opted for not responding in a biased way when the neutral midpoint was not included in Chapter 4. Future studies could compare different rating scales and also use longitudinal data to examine how attitudes towards Muslims and Christians change over time.

Third, despite its many benefits, latent profile analysis is not without disadvantages. The subgroups that emerge with this type of analysis depend on the number and type of the indicators used. My research focused mainly on practices that public opinion is divided about—with similar numbers of people accepting or rejecting them—and it is a relevant question for future studies whether the findings replicate when, for example, practices with low (e.g., Muslims taking part in religious praying meetings) or high normative dissent (e.g., allowing separate ruling for Muslims based on Sharia law; Adelman et al., 2021) are examined. Further, the analysis makes it difficult to detect smaller subgroups of individuals that have a less common way of subjectively combining their attitudes and beliefs. For example, some individuals might display positive outgroup discrimination by accepting Muslim and rejecting Christian practices or demonstrate practice-specific discrimination against Muslims that does not generalize across other practices. In latent profile analysis, such small profiles are usually not retained when the optimal model is chosen (Spurk et al., 2020). When these more specific combinations of attitudes are of theoretical interest, a manual classification of individuals who display a specific pattern of responses might be suitable. However, in my studies, I used large-scale national samples which is a strong advantage for this type of analysis as these allow to estimate the prevalence of identified subgroups in the population (Osborne & Sibley, 2017), and thereby to capture a substantial part—although certainly not all—of the population's heterogeneity.

Fourth, in this dissertation I exclusively focused on examining whether there are two distinct forms of rejection—one guided by prejudicial feelings and another one by more value-based, principled considerations—and there are two aspects to this distinction that future studies could take into account. The first aspect relates to the fact that the rejection of Muslim minority practices is often not simply a question of prejudices versus principles, and—as the example of the 'predominantly principle-based' subgroups indicated—there might be a thin line between the two. For example, some majority members might hold strong anti-religious beliefs and strongly endorse secular values, yet also perceive positive aspects of religion, acknowledge equal rights of religious believers, and be open to religious dialogue and debate. In contrast, others might hold strong anti-religious beliefs and rigidly endorse secular values making them dismissive of everything religious, dogmatic about religious differences, and prejudiced towards religious people (Kossowska et al., 2016). In this latter case the question of distinguishing between principles and prejudices is particularly challenging and relevant for scholars to consider. Strong secular beliefs should not simply be conceptualized as anti-religious prejudices but the nature of secular thinking is probably important: secular critique can be respectful and open-minded, or rather dismissive and dogmatic.

The second aspect relates to the possibility that the rejection of Muslim minority practices could be based on reasons other than principles and prejudices, such as pragmatic concerns related to, for example, the increased traffic and nuisance that accompanies the building of a mosque in a neighborhood (e.g., Bleich, 2011), or more general concerns about the maintenance of community cohesion (e.g., Eisenberg, 2020; Orgad, 2015). In Chapter 5, some people spontaneously mentioned similar concerns when explaining why they rejected a specific Muslim practice. A more detailed examination of these other reasons would further advance our understanding of intergroup attitudes and attitudes toward Muslim minorities in particular. For example, it would be beneficial to understand whether majority members have different understandings of what constitutes national culture, and how these understandings relate to the rejection or acceptance of Muslim minority practices. Further, the field would benefit from understanding how an emphasis on social cohesion and culture maintenance relates to liberal principles and prejudice. For example, a relevant question is whether liberal values that underlie the rejection of Muslim minority practices are considered to define and constitute the national culture or rather are understood as universal moral principles that are considered to apply everywhere. Similarly, future studies could examine whether and when an emphasis on national identity reflects outgroup prejudices versus 'reasonable' concerns about the continuation of national culture.

1.8 Conclusion

In this dissertation I sought to understand whether and when the rejection of Muslim minority practices reflects prejudicial feelings towards the group of Muslims and when it reflects (also) more principled, value-based considerations. I found that for some majority members, rejection of Muslim practices appears as an indiscriminate negativity towards Muslims, reflecting majority members' Islamophobic sentiments. For other majority members, however, rejection of Muslim minority practices is more differentiated whereby negativity is directed only towards some Muslim practices, reflecting majority members concerns for liberal principles, such as civil liberties and secularism. However, the rejection of Muslim practices is not always simply a question of prejudice or principles, as even those who appear prejudiced can sometimes be supportive of some Muslim practices and those who appear principled can indiscriminately reject all Muslim practices. Further, and in contrast to people who reject Muslim practices, a notable number of individuals is supportive of Muslims and all of their practices, whereas others have rather neutral and undifferentiated attitudes. These findings demonstrate the complexities of intergroup attitudes and the fact that these attitudes cannot always simply be conceptualized as a unidimensional positive or negative outgroup feeling. I showed that simultaneously considering multiple societally contested issues regarding the way of life of some Muslims, as well as considering these issues in relation to the way of life of other religious groups can be helpful in capturing and understanding these complexities. I also demonstrated that a person-centered approach can be beneficial for such a purpose and that it can be a valuable tool for social psychological research and social science research more generally.

Finally, my dissertation should not be read as implying that the rejection of some Muslim practices is justified and desirable when it stems from more principled reasons rather than prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group of people. Rather, I tried to provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the various considerations and reasons that people can have for accepting or rather (selectively) rejecting some practices and not others. The analysis allows to identify considerations which are used by majority members in liberal societies, and which serve as a standard for what should or should not be accepted.

CHAPTER 2

Critical inclusiveness: Gender values and the social inclusion of Muslim minorities[5]

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[5] A slightly different version of this chapter—co-authored by Dangubić, M., Verkuyten, M. and Stark, T. H.—is currently under review in an international journal. Marija Dangubić co-designed the study, performed the analyses and drafted the manuscript. Maykel Verkuyten and Tobias Stark contributed to the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

2.1 Introduction

"Islamic organizations strive for gender inequality.(...) This belief is at odds with our norms and values and affects the foundations of our country".

— (A Dutch participant in one of our studies)

In their empirical study on religion and politics worldwide, Norris and Inglehardt (2004) found a substantial cultural cleavage in social values toward gender equality[6] between the West and Muslim nations. This cultural fault line is also found between majority members and Muslim minorities in West European societies (Diehl et al., 2009; SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005). On average, majority members tend to have more egalitarian gender attitudes than Muslim minorities. This average difference in social values is reflected in majority members believing that Muslim women have fewer rights and liberties than Muslim men, and Muslim minorities believing that European women have too many rights and liberties (Andreassen, 2012; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For example, in four national representative surveys conducted between 1998 and 2009, ~90% of the Dutch majority agreed that Muslim men dominate their wives (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009), and in Germany around 80% of the population associated Islam with discrimination of women (Pollack, 2010).

For some majority group members, this perception can lead to feelings of threat that justify, or even increase, their dislike of Muslims and their opposition towards Muslim expressive and civil rights (see Verkuyten, 2021). The survey findings and quoted statement above can be read in this way: a focus on gender equality as a way to express one's negative attitudes towards Muslims and to justify one's exclusionary views (Kalla & Broockman, 2020; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). People who have negative feelings towards Muslims are likely to reject their expressive rights and disapprove of various Muslim practices and beliefs (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Uenal et al., 2021). Thus, for many individuals a focus on gender equality can reflect general '*critical exclusive*' orientation towards Muslims.

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[6] According to United Nations (2001, p. 1) definition, gender equality entails "equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men" and "implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration".

However, the survey findings and the quoted statement can also, partly, reflect a more principled orientation in which one disapproves of the perceived treatment of women among some Muslims, but without having negative feelings towards Muslims and rejecting their expressive rights. That nine out of ten Dutch majority members agree that Muslim men dominate women is unlikely to imply that nine out of ten have anti-Muslim prejudices. Some people might have a social inclusive attitude towards Muslim minorities while simultaneously being critical of perceived Muslim gender values and arrangements (*'critical inclusive'*). An inclusive attitude can be conceptualized as being well disposed towards Muslims as a group of people together with supporting their expressive rights as equal citizens (Ivarsflaten & Sniderman, 2017; Janmaar, 2014; Sniderman et al., 2014). Yet, being inclusive does not have to mean that one takes a cultural relativistic stance in which 'anything goes' and all Muslim values and beliefs are approved of. Rather, some people might be inclusive toward Muslims but also committed to their own liberal gender values and beliefs, and critical of practices that are considered to diverge from these.

However, those who express positive attitudes towards Muslims but are also critical about gender issues might be hiding their anti-Muslim prejudice behind more principled reasons (e.g., Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Fernandez, 2009). If this is the case, then this group of people would be quite similar to anti-Muslim individuals, except for not expressing their prejudice openly. There are at least two ways to examine this possibility which we use in the current research. A first one is to use the list experiment (see Blair & Imai, 2012) as an indirect measure of prejudice which allows to assess whether gender critical majority members harbor hidden negative feelings towards Muslims as a group of people and their practices. A critical inclusive orientation would imply that one has no hidden prejudices towards Muslims, but does have negative feelings towards gendered practices. The second one is to examine whether gender critical individuals positively differ from anti-Muslim individuals on liberal constructs, such as valuing unconditional respect for others (Lalljee et al., 2007), endorsing civil liberties (Gustavsson et al., 2016), and open-mindedness (Stanovich & West, 2007). Liberal constructs play a key role in accepting other groups and their practices (Gibson, 2006), and can be expected to be more important to those who are critically inclusive towards Muslims.

The aim of the current study, conducted among samples of German and Dutch majority members, is to use latent profile analysis (LPA) for identifying distinct subgroups of individuals who differ in the way in which they combine their evaluation of Muslim gender practices with their general feelings towards Muslim minorities and their support of Muslim expressive rights. By doing so, we go beyond the social psychological literature on prejudice by seeking to understand whether perceiving the lack of gender equality among Muslims is driven by anti-Muslim sentiments or a more general concern for liberal values. Whereas in the former case, the perception of Muslim gender inequality is combined with prejudice towards Muslims and lack of support for their rights, in the latter case it coexists with more positive feelings and the endorsement of their rights. Thus, a first step in our analysis is to test with the LPA whether there are subgroups of individuals: *critical exclusive*, *critical inclusive*, and also individuals who are supportive of Muslims in every respect (‘*non-critical inclusive’*). In a second step we use the list experiment as an indirect measure of prejudice to assess if gender critical inclusive individuals tend to present themselves in a more positive light and use their criticism as a justification for anti-Muslim sentiments that they do not express openly (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In the third step, we test whether the different subgroups of individuals differ in their support for unconditional respect for people, endorsement of civil liberties, and open-mindedness.

2.1.1 Possible subgroups of individuals

A substantial proportion of majority members in Western liberal societies is critical of Muslim gender arrangements and also has exclusionary attitudes towards Muslims. Various studies provide empirical support for the existence of widespread prejudices and hostility towards Muslims (e.g., Kalkan et al., 2009; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Strabac et al., 2014; Uenal et al., 2021), lack of support for Muslim rights (e.g., Carol et al., 2015), and an unwillingness to accommodate specific Muslim minority practices (e.g., Van der Noll, 2014). Further, research shows that the perception of Muslims as not valuing gender equality is associated with anti-Muslim sentiments and exclusionary attitudes (e.g., Døving, 2021; Moss, et al., 2019; Pedersen & Hartley, 2012).

It is also likely that some individuals are positive of Muslims in every regard, including their values and gendered practices. A study among Dutch majority members identified a subgroup of people who were positive towards Muslims and did not take exception to the way some Muslim men treat women (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Similarly, a study conducted among adolescents in Sweden showed that those who have more flexible perceptions of gender roles are more likely to hold positive attitudes towards Muslims (Bevelander & Otterbeck, 2010). Thus, some majority members can be expected to be overall positive towards Muslims and have a societal inclusive orientation.

However, being inclusive does not have to mean that one cannot be critical. Whether people are inclusive or not depends on how societal inclusion is understood and what being inclusive implies. In general, a societal inclusive orientation can be considered to have two main aspects (Ivarsflaten & Sniderman, 2017; Janmaar, 2014; Sniderman et al., 2014). First, it involves being unprejudiced and well-disposed towards Muslims as a group of people and respect them as Muslims. Second, it implies that one accepts that Muslims have the same rights as equal members of society, including the right to express their religious identity. Societal inclusion understood in this way, thus, implies thinking well of Muslims and treating them as full members of the common community.

However, it does not mean that people will not perceive group differences in norms, values and practices, nor that they will not engage in critical assessments of these differences. An inclusive attitude does not have to imply a cultural relativistic stance in which all practices and values are considered equally valuable and valid. It is likely that people are committed to their own liberal values and beliefs, which might make them disapprove of some Muslim minority values and practices. In liberal democracies, gender equality is considered a fundamental value and a general principle that is endorsed –although not always practiced– by the large majority of the population (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). It would be paradoxical to expect in a liberal society that a majority individual who is committed to gender equality will be positive towards unequal gender arrangements among some minority groups in society (Ivarsflaten & Sniderman, 2017). It would be nothing less paradoxical to require that majority members support the liberal principle of equality by accepting Muslims and their equal civil rights, but reject that very principle by accepting unequal treatment of women among some Muslims. It is thus likely that there is a subgroup of majority members that is critical of Muslim gender values and arrangements, but without having negative feelings towards Muslims as a group and rejecting their expressive rights.

To examine whether and how many people are *critical exclusive*, *critical inclusive* or *non-critical inclusive*, we simultaneously consider how they feel towards Muslims as a group of people, whether they endorse Muslims' expressive rights, and whether they perceive Muslims as engaging in gender inequality practices. We do so by applying latent profile analysis (Osborne & Sibley, 2017) as a person-centered approach which seeks to identify distinct subgroups of individuals (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Dangubić et al., 2020b; Meeusen et al., 2018). Prejudice research predominantly uses variable-centered approaches that focuses on individual differences and risk overlooking the possibility that people combine their evaluations, attitudes and beliefs in qualitatively different ways resulting in subgroups of individuals with distinct constellations of ratings (e.g., Adelman & Verkuyten, 2018; Meeusen et al., 2018). Although formulating hypothesis is not a common practice in LPA, based on previous research we can make three expectations explicit.

First, we expect to identify a subgroup of individuals that perceives Muslims to engage in unequal gender practices, harbor prejudicial feelings towards Muslims, and reject Muslim expressive rights (‘*critical exclusive*’). Second, we expect to identify a subgroup of individuals that does not perceive that Muslims engage in inequality practices, and that is positive towards Muslims, and accept their equal rights (‘*non-critical inclusive*’). Third, we further expect to find a subgroup of individuals that perceives that Muslims engage in gender inequality practices, but also feels positive towards Muslims as a group of people and supports their expressive rights (‘*critical inclusive*’). Given the exploratory nature of LPA, we also examine whether there are additional profiles.

2.1.2 Indirect measures of prejudice

Various scholars suggest that criticism of Muslim gender values and practices is based on anti-Muslim prejudice rather than more principled considerations (e.g., Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; Fernandez, 2009; Grillo & Shah, 2012). This raises the question whether those in the *critical inclusive* profile are genuinely concerned about gender equality or rather use perceived gender inequality as an acceptable form of expressing anti-Muslim prejudice which they are not willing to express openly. In order to examine this possibility, we use two list experiments as indirect measures of prejudices: towards *immigrants* and towards *immigrants wearing veils in public*. We used the term ‘immigrants’ because in many European countries Muslims are the prototypical immigrant outgroup and people tend to associate immigrants spontaneously with Muslims (Ivarsflaten & Sniderman, 2017; Ribberink et al., 2017; Sniderman et al., 2014; Spruyt & Elchardus, 2012; Wallrich, et al., 2020).[7] Further, we focused on ‘immigrants wearing a veil in public’ because this is a feature that is considered typical of Muslim women (Unkelbach et al., 2010) and often considered as an emblem of oppression of women and their individual autonomy (Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012). Assuming that a negative evaluation of Muslim gender practices reflects a genuine criticism of gender inequality rather than a justification for hidden prejudices, individuals in the *critical inclusive* profile are expected to be negative about the gendered practice of wearing veils, but not about immigrants as a group. In contrast, those who are *critical exclusive* are likely to be negative towards the gendered practice of wearing veils and towards immigrants, whereas those who are *non-critical inclusive* are not expected to be negative towards the gendered practice of wearing veils nor towards immigrants.

2.1.3 The endorsement of liberal principles

In addition to identifying different subgroups of individuals and examining indirectly their prejudicial attitudes, we examine whether they differ in a meaningful way on three liberal constructs related to the acceptance of minority groups and their practices: valuing unconditional respect, endorsing civil liberties, and open-mindedness.

Unconditional respect. Unconditional respect implies that all people have intrinsic moral worth and deserve to be respected simply for being human beings (Lalljee et al., 2007; 2009). Those who endorse unconditional respect are more likely to have positive attitudes towards minority groups and to be more tolerant (Lalljee et al., 2009). For example, respect for outgroup members has been found to foster tolerance in survey, longitudinal, and experimental research among different groups and in different countries (see Zitzmann et al., 2022). And a study in the Netherlands showed that those who value unconditional respect are more likely to be positive towards Muslims and a range of Muslim minority practices (Dangubić et al., 2020b). However, valuing unconditional respect does not imply that all values and practices will be accepted: it can also make people more likely to reject practices that are perceived to be disrespectful towards the dignity and integrity of others, such as the unequal treatment of women.

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[7] In agreement with this equation between immigrants and Muslims, our questionnaire also included an item measuring feelings towards the group of immigrants on the same feeling thermometer scale that was used to measure feelings towards Muslims. The intercorrelation of the two items was very strong (.83), indicating that also participants in our study associated immigrants with Muslims.

Given that those who value unconditional respect are more likely to have positive attitudes towards Muslims and accept Muslim expressive rights, but can also reject what is perceived to be disrespectful, we expect that the '*critical inclusive*' subgroup will endorse unconditional respect more than the '*critical exclusive*' subgroup. Further, those who are positive towards Muslims in every regard are expected to support unconditional respect more strongly than individuals in the other two subgroups.

Endorsement of civil liberties. Endorsement of civil liberties entails recognition that each individual has the freedom to live the life as they see fit, and this is one of the most important reasons to accept minority groups and their practices (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Several studies show that endorsement of civil liberties is associated with the acceptance of Muslim expressive rights (e.g., Dangubić et al., 2020a; Van der Noll, 2014). However, endorsement of civil liberties does not mean that everything will be accepted, as those who are more supportive of individual freedoms might be more likely to reject values, norms and practices that are perceived to go against the freedom of others. For example, Gustavsson and colleagues (2016) showed that emphasizing individual autonomy and choice is associated with more negative attitudes towards Muslim veiling.

We expect that those who are *critical inclusive* will more strongly endorse civil liberties than those who are *critical exclusive*. The reason is that those who value civil liberties are more likely to have positive attitudes towards Muslims and accept Muslim rights, but also to disapprove of practices that are considered to go against individual autonomy. Further, those who are positive towards Muslims in every regard are expected to endorse civil liberties more strongly than the other two subgroups.

Open-mindedness. Open-mindedness entails considering alternative perspectives regardless of one's own convictions and beliefs (Stanovich & West, 2007). Those who are more open-minded are more likely to accept others way of life even when it contradicts their own values and beliefs. Research shows that open-minded individuals are more likely to have unprejudiced attitudes towards different groups (Korol, 2017; Nesdale et al., 2011) and to accept dissenting practices and beliefs (Butrus & Witenberg, 2015). For example, a study in the Netherlands found a positive association between open-mindedness and the acceptance of Muslim minorities (Dangubić et al., 2022).

Given that open-mindedness makes individuals more likely to accept others and their ways of life even if these contradict one's own values and beliefs, we expect that those who are *critical inclusive* will be more likely to engage in open-mind thinking than those who are *critical exclusive*. Additionally, those who are positive towards Muslims in every regard are expected to be more open-minded than the other two profiles.

2.2 Method

2.2.1 Data and sample

Data[8] were collected in 2019 in the Netherlands and Germany by a professional survey company. In both countries, the sample of adult individuals with both ethnic Dutch/German parents was selected through stratification procedure to represent the population based on age, gender and education, as well as household size and region in the Netherlands. The population data were based on the annual report of the Statistics Netherlands and the MiniCensus in Germany. In total, 3,762 individuals participated by completing the online questionnaire. Individuals who mentioned Islam as their religious affiliation were not considered in the analysis (n = 28), which resulted in the final sample of 3,734 participants (2,046 from Germany). Half of the participants were female (49.8%) and participants' age ranged from 18 to 100 years (M = 50.65, SD = 16.5).

2.2.2 Measures

Feelings towards Muslims. Feelings towards Muslims as a group of people were measured with two items. First, respondents indicated on a 7-point scale their agreement with the item "In general, I have more negative than positive feelings towards Muslims" (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). The item was recorded so that higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards Muslims. Second, respondents indicated on the well-known 100-point 'feeling thermometer' scale how warm or cold they felt towards the group of Muslims in the Netherlands/Germany. For ease of comparison, the responses to the second item were recoded to range from 1 to 7, and higher scores indicate more positive feelings towards Muslims.[9] The two items were used in the LPA separately.

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[8] The data and analytic scripts reproducing our findings can be accessed via https://osf.io/3bdg8/?view_only=90136b30fc9c41f8a49a3adcfdb21f10.

[9] The transformation of the scale did not affect the results of the LPA.

Perception of Muslim gender-inequality practices. Respondents were asked to what extent they disagree (=1) or agree (=7) with a set of three items taken from previous research (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007): "Muslim men often dominate their wives", "Muslim men have too little respect for women", and "Muslims often treat their sons and daughters differently". The items were recoded so that a higher score indicates lower agreement with these inequality statements, and they were used in the LPA separately.

Acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. Respondents were asked to what extent they disagree (=1) or agree (=7) with a set of four items taken from previous research (Verkuyten et al., 2014): "Muslims in the Netherlands/Germany must be able to show and experience their own faith in public life", "Muslims in the Netherlands/Germany should be able to celebrate their Islamic holidays not only at home, but also in public", "Muslims must have the right to build mosques in the Netherlands/Germany", "Muslims must have the right to establish Islamic organizations in the Netherlands/Germany". The four items were used in the LPA separately.

Indirect measures of prejudices towards immigrants and immigrants wearing veils in public. Prejudices were measured indirectly using the list experiment (also known as the item-count technique; see Blair & Imai, 2012). This technique entails randomly dividing participants into two experimental conditions. In the control condition, respondents are presented with a list of items (groups or social issues) people can feel negative about. In the treatment condition, respondents are presented with the same list of items as in the control condition plus one 'sensitive' item added to the list. In both conditions, participants are asked to only indicate the number of items they are negative about and not which items these are. Assuming that respondents in the two groups, on average, do not differ in the way they respond to the control items,[10] the difference in means between the treatment and the control condition corresponds to the percentage of people who are negative about the sensitive item.

We used two list experiments as indirect measures of whether respondents are negative about respectively immigrants and immigrants veiled in public by adding one of these as sensitive item. Respondents were divided into two groups and each group served as a control or treatment group for the first or the second experiment (see Table 2.1 for the illustration of the design, the complete list of items, and the corresponding formulas).

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[10] For the explanation and tests of the list experiment assumptions, see Appendix 2.1.

Table 2.1 List experiment design, list of the items used and formulas to calculate estimates

Group 1 (N = 1,894)	**Group 2** (N = 1,840)	**Formula**
List experiment 1: Immigrants		
Control condition a. Housewives, b. Animal activists, c. Left-wing politicians, d. Right wing politicians.	**Treatment condition** a. Housewives, b. Animal activists, c. Left-wing politicians, d. Right wing politicians. *e. Immigrants.*	
Number of items negative about: I_c	Number of items negative about: I_t	**Negativity** = mean (I_t) – mean (I_c)
List experiment 2: Immigrants wearing veils		
Treatment condition a. Tax benefits for large companies, b. Increase in the price of petrol and diesel, c. Subsidy for electric cars, d. Top athletes who earn millions of euros, *e. Immigrants walking on the street wearing veils.*	**Control condition** a. Tax benefits for large companies b. Increase in the price of petrol and diesel c. Subsidy for electric cars d. Top athletes who earn millions of euros	
Number of items negative about: IV_t	Number of items negative about: IV_c	**Negativity** = mean (IV_t) – mean (IV_c)

Unconditional respect. Participants indicated to what extent they disagree (=1) or agree (=7) with four items adapted from Lalljee and colleagues (2007): "A person who has committed a terrible crime no longer needs to be treated decently" (reverse coded), " 'Condemn the sin, but respect the sinner' is an important principle to me", "I find it difficult to respect people who have very different views from myself" (reverse coded), and "You also have to respect people with morally wrong ideas as a person". The reliability of the scale was modest ($\alpha = .52$) and increased to $\alpha = .56$ upon excluding the third item. Therefore, the average score of the remaining three items was used.[11]

Endorsement of civil liberties. Participants indicated to what extent they disagree (=1) or agree (=7) with the following four items based on Gustavsson and colleagues (2016): "Individual freedom is the most important principle in society", "Freedom of expression is the foundation of an open society", "In society, everyone must have the freedom to be themselves", and "Individual rights, rather than group rights, should form the basis of society". The four items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .79$) and an average score was used.

Open-mindedness. Participants indicated to what extent they disagree (=1) or agree (=7) with the following four items based on Stanovich and West (1997) and used in previous research (Dangubić et al., 2022): "I usually try to understand beliefs and behaviors that I find wrong and reject", "I always try to consider whether there are good reasons for accepting cultural differences or not", "I usually try to find a balance between what I find unacceptable and the freedom of other people to live the way they want", and "I always try to understand why people sometimes do very different things from what I personally think is right and good". The items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .79$) and an average score was used.

Control variables. In the analysis we controlled for participants' political orientation, religious affiliation, education, age, and gender. Political orientation was measured on a 7-point self-placement scale (1 = strong left, 7 = strong right). In addition, respondents were offered not to reveal their political orientation by indicating "I do not want to say". In total, 12% of the respondents chose this option, which was treated as a missing value and subsequently imputed (see below). Religious affiliation was measured by asking participants to indicate whether they were religiously affiliated and with which religious denomination, and was recoded into a dichotomous variable (1 = affiliated with one of the Christian denominations, 0 = not affiliated or affiliated with a non-Christian denomination). One hundred thirteen (3%) participants chose not to reveal their religious affiliation, which was treated as a missing value and imputed (see below). Participants also indicated their highest level of completed education (1 = no formal education completed, 9 = PhD degree), which was used as a continuous variable in the analysis (e.g., Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Further, participants indicated their age and gender (1 = women, 0 = men and other). In addition, country was also considered as a control variable (1 = Germany, 0 = the Netherlands), and we further explored whether there were meaningful differences between the two countries.

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[11] As a robustness check, we ran multinomial logistic regression analysis using each of the three items separately and the same pattern of results emerged.

2.2.3 Analyses

In the first part of the analysis, LPA models with up to eight profiles were estimated to identify the optimal number of profiles based on the items measuring feelings towards Muslims, perceptions of gender inequality practices, and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights. The decision to estimate up to eight profiles was based on the fact that models with a smaller number of profiles already resulted in too many small profiles. We estimated the models with the most parsimonious parametrization, allowing only means to vary across profiles (variances were constrained to be the same across profiles and covariances to zero). In order to avoid local maxima solutions (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018), random starts and final stage optimizations were set to 5000 and 500, respectively.

In the second part of the analysis, we used the 3-step BCH method (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2021) to obtain profile specific estimates of the proportion of people who were negative about immigrants and immigrants wearing veils when asked indirectly with the list experiment. For this, an auxiliary regression model was estimated per profile, whereby the number of items respondents were negative about was regressed on the experimental condition variable. Thus, the estimated regression coefficient corresponds to the difference-in-means estimate. Subsequently, by using Wald tests, we tested whether there are between-profile differences in the number of people who were negative about immigrants and immigrants wearing veils. Using the same test, we also tested whether there are within-profile differences in being negative about immigrants versus immigrants wearing veils.

In the third part of the analysis, we used the automatic three-step multinomial logistic regression (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2013) to estimate how the identified profiles relate to unconditional respect, endorsement of freedom, open-minded thinking, and the control variables. This part of the analysis was conducted upon imputing missing values for political orientation and religious affiliation as no other variable contained missing values. For this, multiple imputation based on Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2022) was used, generating 10 different datasets.[12]

For all the main analysis, Mplus (version 8.2; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) software was used. For data preparation and testing the assumptions of the list experiment, R software (version 4.0.0; R Core Team, 2020), and the *MplusAutomation* (Hallquist & Wiley, 2018) and *list* packages (Blair et al., 2020) were used.

2.3 Results

2.3.1 Descriptive findings

Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of variables in our study. On average, respondents were significantly negative and cold towards Muslims as a group of people and perceived them as engaged in gender unequal practices, which corresponds with previous representative surveys (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). However, people were on average accepting of Muslims expressing their faith and celebrating holidays in public, but not of the building of mosques and establishing religious organizations. In addition, the participants strongly endorsed civil liberties, indicated that they tend to think open-mindedly, but did not endorse the notion that people should be respected unconditionally. On the indirect prejudice measures, more than a third of respondents (37%) was prejudiced towards immigrants and around half (48%) towards immigrants publicly wearing a veil.

The intercorrelations between the items measuring the perception of Muslim inequality practices and items measuring feelings towards Muslims were modest (ranging from $r = .23$ to $r = .43$). This provides a first indication that criticizing Muslim gender arrangements is not simply a question of one's prejudice towards Muslims as a group of people.

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[12] As a robustness check, we ran the same analysis whereby listwise deletion was used. The same pattern or results emerged (see Table A2.2.1 in Appendix 2.2).

Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of all the variables

	M/% (sig.)	*SD*	Intercorrelations													
			1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**
Country (Germany)	54.8%															
Women	49.8%															
Religiosity (Christian)	45.9%															
Negativity immigrants (indirect)	37.2%															
Negativity immigrants veils (indirect)	47.8%															
1 Education	4.93 (***)	1.95														
2 Age	50.65	16.54	**-0.09**													
3 Feelings towards Muslims (positive)	3.88 (***)	1.66	0.07	**0.00**												
4 Feelings towards Muslims (warm)	3.58 (***)	1.69	**0.10**	**0.01**	**0.45**											
5 Muslim men dominate women	2.50 (***)	1.35	**0.07**	**-0.14**	**0.39**	**0.26**										
6 Muslim men no respect for women	2.50 (***)	1.39	0.11	**-0.14**	**0.43**	**0.32**	**0.72**									
7 Muslims treat sons and daughters diff.	2.62 (***)	1.37	0.04	-0.13	**0.34**	**0.23**	**0.68**	**0.64**								
8 Right to express faith	4.12 (***)	1.67	**0.16**	-0.03	**0.42**	**0.44**	**0.20**	**0.26**	**0.17**							
9 Right to celebrate holiday	4.06 (*)	1.72	0.15	-0.01	**0.41**	**0.46**	**0.21**	**0.26**	**0.16**	**0.73**						
10 Right to build mosques	3.92 (**)	1.82	**0.20**	-0.02	**0.45**	**0.47**	**0.24**	**0.30**	**0.20**	**0.68**	**0.71**					
11 Right to found organizations	3.84 (***)	1.75	**0.23**	-0.03	**0.41**	**0.45**	**0.24**	**0.31**	**0.19**	**0.68**	**0.69**	**0.78**				
12 Right-wing	3.85 (***)	1.27	0.00	**0.00**	**-0.30**	**-0.26**	**-0.17**	**-0.21**	**-0.15**	**-0.27**	**-0.27**	**-0.29**	**-0.28**			
13 Civil liberties	5.44 (***)	1.01	**-0.01**	**0.13**	**0.01**	**0.04**	**-0.27**	**-0.25**	**-0.26**	**0.13**	**0.15**	**0.12**	**0.13**	**-0.05**		
14 Open-mindedness	4.83 (***)	0.97	0.10	**0.09**	**0.13**	**0.24**	**-0.04**	**-0.02**	**-0.08**	**0.34**	**0.34**	**0.33**	**0.42**	**-0.12**	**0.30**	
15 Unconditional respect	3.94 (**)	1.01	**0.20**	-0.03	**0.36**	**0.31**	**0.22**	**0.27**	**0.17**	**0.40**	**0.37**	**0.41**	**0.40**	-0.23	0.08	**0.28**

Note. Bolded correlation coefficients are significant at $p < .05$ level at least. The asterisk sign indicates significant difference from the neutral midpoint of the scale at levels as follows: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

2.3.2 Latent profile analysis

Table 2.3 shows the model fit indices and the percentage of people in each profile for all estimated models. In order to determine the optimal number of profiles, the following fit indices were considered: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test (LMR LRT). Lower values of the AIC and BIC indicate better fit of a model, whereas the significant p-value associated with the LMR LRT indicates that a k-profile solution improves the model fit compared to the k–1 profile solution (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018). In addition to these indices, we considered the size of the estimated profiles and their theoretical interpretability.

Models with an increasing number of profiles resulted in a decrease in AIC and BIC, whereas the p-value associated with the LMR LRT indicated that the seven-profile model did not significantly improve the model fit compared to the six-profile model. Further, the models with six and seven profiles resulted in profiles with a very small number of individuals (less than 10%) or profiles that were not theoretically interpretable. Therefore, we more closely considered the concurrent four- and five-profile models. The decrease in BIC from the three- to the four-profile model was higher than the decrease from the four- to the five-profile model. Also, whereas the additional subgroup of the four-profile model was qualitatively different from the subgroups in the three-profile model, the additional subgroup of the five-profile model was just a variation of one of the profiles of the four-profile model (i.e. a variation of the *critical inclusive* subgroup; see Figure A2.3.1 and Figure A2.3.2 in Appendix 2.3), and contained a relatively small number of participants (11%). In addition, the evaluation of profile separation (see Appendix 2.4) showed that the profiles of the four-profile model were better separated than the profiles of the five-profile model, which suggests that it is most appropriate to retain the four-profile solution. The entropy of the four-profile model was high (entropy = .836), indicating high precision in classifying respondents.

Table 2.3 Model fit indices and the percentage of people in each profile for models with up to eight profiles

	AIC	**BIC**	**Entropy**	***ΔBIC*** **(k-1)-k**	**LMR LRT (p)**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
One-profile model	126700.7	126812.8	-	-	-	100%							
Two-profile model	117069.5	117243.8	0.901	9569.0	$p < .001$	33%	67%						
Three-profile model	114238.0	114474.6	0.847	2769.2	$p < .001$	21%	44%	35%					
Four-profile model	112286.2	112585.0	0.836	1889.6	$p < .001$	19%	29%	20%	33%				
Five-profile model	110576.6	110937.7	0.850	1647.3	$p < .001$	16%	22%	22%	11%	28%			
Six-profile model	109113.9	109537.2	0.871	1400.5	$p < .001$	16%	22%	2%	24%	26%	10%		
Seven-profile model	108512.1	108997.6	0.874	539.6	$p = .064$	6%	15%	20%	22%	9%	1%	27%	
Eight-profile model	108005.3	108553.1	0.880	444.5	$p = .062$	15%	21%	5%	1%	20%	26%	2%	10%

Note. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LMR LRT = Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test. The p-value associated with the Bootstrap likelihood ratio test (BLRT) was significant with each increase in the number of profiles and hence not helpful in deciding upon the optimal number of profiles.

Figure 2.1 shows the means of the four identified profiles for all items on which the profiles were based, as well as the corresponding labels and percentages of respondents. First, we identified a subgroup of individuals that has *critical exclusive* views (19%). This profile consists of individuals who perceived that Muslims treat men and women differently, who were negative towards Muslims as a group of people, and who rejected all Muslim expressive rights. In addition and importantly, we identified a subgroup of individuals that is *critical inclusive* (33%). This subgroup encompassed one in three individuals in our sample who perceived Muslims as practicing gender inequality, but at the same time were positive towards Muslims as a group of people and endorsed Muslim expressive rights.

Contrary to our expectations, in the four-profile solution a subgroup of individuals who are positive towards Muslims in every respect did not emerge.[13] However, two additional profiles were identified. First, the *moderately critical exclusive* profile (28%) consists of people who were somewhat negative towards Muslims as a group of people and perceived that Muslims treat men and women differently, but did not reject all Muslim expressive rights. Second, the *moderate* profile (20%) consists of people who, on average, centered around the neutral midpoint of the scales for group feelings, gender perception and endorsement of expressive rights.

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[13] In order to see if this positive subgroup appears in our data, we visually examined solutions with more than four profiles (see Appendix 2.3). In the eight-profile solution (Figure A2.3.5), a relatively small (2%) subgroup of those positive towards Muslims in every regard emerged.



Figure 2.1 Means of the four profiles on perceptions of Muslim gender-inequality, feelings towards Muslims and acceptance of Muslim expressive rights

2.3.3 Indirect measures of prejudice

Table 2.4 presents the estimated percentages of individuals within the four profiles who were prejudiced towards immigrants as a proxy for Muslims and towards immigrant wearing veils in the list experiments.

As expected, individuals in the *critical exclusive* profile were the most negative towards immigrants (77%) and towards immigrants wearing veils (65%). The Wald test revealed that the difference in the proportion of people who were negative about immigrants and immigrants wearing veils was not significant. This pattern of findings indicates that individuals in the critical exclusive profile are indeed characterized by anti-Muslim prejudices and that participants associate immigrants with Muslims (Spruyt & Elchardus, 2012; Wallrich et al., 2020).

Table 2.4 Estimated percentages of individuals within the four profiles who were negative about immigrants and immigrants wearing veils in public

	Immigrants (A)	**Immigrants wearing veils (B)**	**Within-profile comparison (B-A)**
	proportion (SE)	proportion (SE)	Est (SE)
(1) Critical exclusive	0.77 (0.08)	0.65 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.13)
(2) Critical inclusive	0.00 (0.06)	0.36 (0.07)	0.36 (0.11)**
(3) Moderate	0.46 (0.10)	0.23 (0.11)	-0.23 (0.18)
(4) Moderately critical exclusive	0.57 (0.07)	0.51 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.12)
Between profile comparison	1 > 3 > 2; 4 > 2	1 > 2,3	

Note. The between and within profile comparisons were carried out using Wald test. Sign > indicates significant difference at $p < .05$ level at least. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Similarly high rates of negativity were recorded for those *moderately critical exclusive*. More than half of the individuals within this profile was negative towards immigrants (57%) and towards immigrants wearing veils (51%), with again no significant difference between the two. Despite the fact that individuals in this subgroup seemed to be critical of gender inequality rather than Muslims per se, this pattern of findings suggests that a substantial proportion of this subgroup is likely to have (hidden) anti-Muslim prejudice.

Importantly, individuals in the *critical inclusive* profile did not (0%) show negativity toward immigrants on the indirect measure of prejudices.[14]

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[14] The correlation between the items directly measuring feelings towards immigrants and feelings towards Muslims was also strong in this subgroup ($r = .77$) indicating that individuals in this subgroup, as in the whole sample, equated Muslims with immigrants.

However, a significant percentage (36%) of this subgroup was negative about the gendered practice of immigrants wearing veils in public.[15] This pattern of findings suggests that a substantial majority of individuals within the *critical inclusive* subgroup was genuinely critical of gendered practices without being prejudiced towards Muslim immigrants as a group of people.

Around half of the individuals within the *moderate* profile was negative towards immigrants (46%) and around a quarter towards immigrants wearing veils (23%). Although a smaller percentage of individuals was negative about the practice of wearing veils compared to immigrants, this difference was not significant.

2.3.4 Multinomial logistic regression

We further examined the validity and meaningfulness of the four profiles by considering the three measured liberal constructs. Table 2.5 shows the results of the multinomial logistic regression analyses, with the *critical exclusive*, *moderate*, and *moderately critical exclusive* as reference categories.[16] Overall, the results show that there are substantial differences between the four subgroups.

Individuals within the *critical inclusive* subgroup were more likely to score high on unconditional respect and open-mindedness compared to the other subgroups. They were also more likely to endorse civil liberties than the *moderate* subgroup, but did not differ from the two *critical exclusive* subgroups. Thus, unconditional respect for others and an open-minded thinking style seems to characterize individuals who are positive towards Muslims and supportive of their expressive rights while at the same time critical of gender-inequality practices.

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[15] This result remained even when we accounted for the possibility that some individuals might have underreported their negativity (see Appendix 2.1 and Table A2.1.1). The percentage of those who might have underreported their negativity was equal (15%) in the *immigrants* and *immigrants wearing veils* experiment. Thus, the difference in negativity towards the practice of wearing veils versus immigrants remains equally high.

[16] For the discussion concerning effects of the control variables, see Appendix 2.5.

Table 2.5 Results of the multinomial logistic regression predicting latent profile membership[17]

	Reference categories					
	Critical exclusive		**Moderate**		**Moderately critical exclusive**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Critical inclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-5.31***	(0.72)	-9.45***	(0.69)	-3.34	(0.58)
Unconditional respect	1.14***	(0.08)	0.26***	(0.07)	0.67***	(0.06)
Civil liberties	0.12	(0.08)	0.90***	(0.08)	0.13	(0.07)
Open-mindedness	0.92***	(0.09)	0.76***	(0.09)	0.47***	(0.07)
Right-wing	-0.82***	(0.07)	-0.27***	(0.06)	-0.46***	(0.05)
Religiosity (Christian)	0.37*	(0.14)	0.11	(0.14)	0.19	(0.12)
Education	0.23***	(0.04)	0.21***	(0.04)	0.14***	(0.03)
Age	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
Gender (female)	-0.55***	(0.13)	-0.19	(0.13)	-0.57***	(0.12)
Country (Germany)	-1.24***	(0.14)	-0.45**	(0.14)	-0.54***	(0.12)
Moderately critical exclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-2.01***	(0.64)	-6.11	(0.72)		
Unconditional respect	0.47***	(0.07)	-0.42***	(0.06)		
Civil liberties	-0.01	(0.07)	0.77***	(0.07)		
Open-mindedness	0.45***	(0.07)	0.29***	(0.08)		
Right-wing	-0.36***	(0.06)	0.18**	(0.06)		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.18	(0.12)	-0.08	(0.14)		
Education	0.08*	(0.03)	0.07*	(0.04)		
Age	0.01	(0.00)	0.03***	(0.00)		
Gender (female)	0.02	(0.12)	0.37**	(0.13)		
Country (Germany)	-0.69***	(0.13)	0.09	(0.14)		
Moderate (=1)						
Intercept	4.16***	(0.72)				
Unconditional respect	0.88***	(0.78)				
Civil liberties	-0.77***	(0.08)				
Open-mindedness	0.16	(0.09)				
Right-wing	-0.55***	(0.07)				
Religiosity (Christian)	0.26	(0.14)				
Education	0.01	(0.04)				
Age	-0.02***	(0.00)				
Gender (female)	-0.36**	(0.14)				
Country (Germany)	-0.79***	(0.15)				

Note. * *p* <.05, ** *p* <.01, *** *p* <.001.

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[17] For confidence intervals, see Table A2.7.1 in Appendix 2.7.

Individuals within the *moderately critical exclusive* subgroup were more respectful than those in the *critical exclusive* subgroup, but less so than the *moderate* subgroup. They were also more open-minded than the *critical exclusive* and *moderate* subgroups, and endorsed civil liberties more than the *moderate* subgroup. Stronger unconditional respect for people and being more open-minded compared to individuals in the *critical exclusive* subgroup seems to make those in the *moderately critical exclusive* subgroup less negative towards Muslims and more supportive of Muslim expressive rights. However, less respect towards others and stronger concern for civil liberties makes them more negative towards Muslims and more critical of Muslim value arrangements than the moderate subgroup.

Individuals within the *moderate* subgroup supported unconditional respect more strongly than individuals in the two *critical exclusive* subgroups. They also were less likely to endorse civil liberties than all the other subgroups and less likely to be open-minded than the *moderately critical exclusive* and the *critical inclusive* subgroups. Similar to items measuring attitudes towards Muslims, their gender arrangements and rights, individuals in the *moderate* subgroup centered around the neutral midpoint of the scales of these three constructs.

2.3.5 Cross country comparison

In order to explore whether there are meaningful differences between the Netherlands and Germany in terms of the pattern of profiles that emerges, we estimated the four-profile model in each country separately. The findings in Germany closely match those of the pooled sample, but in the Netherlands a somewhat different classification occurs with more positive attitudes in two subgroups. Specifically, Dutch individuals classified in the *moderately critical exclusive* profile were relatively more supportive of Muslim expressive rights, whereas those in the *critical inclusive* profile were relatively less critical of Muslim unequal gender practices (see Appendix 2.6). In both countries the four subgroups of individuals had largely similar patterns of associations with the two indirect prejudice measures and the endorsement of the three liberal constructs.

2.4 Discussion

Research has found strong differences in gender values and commitment to gender equality between majority members and Muslim minorities living in Western liberal democracies (Diehl et al., 2009; SCP/WODC/CBS, 2005). Further, a large majority of the majority public agrees that Muslim men dominate women (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). For some majority members this agreement can be an acceptable way for expressing and justifying anti-Muslim prejudice and the rejection of Muslim rights. However, the negative evaluation of gender-inequality practices might for others be based on more principled considerations. Thus, there might be distinct subgroups within the population that qualitatively differ in the ways in which they combine their evaluation of gender practices, feelings towards Muslims as a group of people, and support for Muslims' expressive rights.

Using latent profile analyses and national samples from two West European countries we found that around a third of our sample was gender-value critical yet inclusive towards Muslims. Individuals in this *critical inclusive* subgroup appear to have a more principled orientation in which they take exception to the treatment of women among some Muslims, but at the same time are well disposed towards Muslims as a group and supportive of Muslim expressive rights. The fact that they did not use an opportunity to express negativity towards immigrants indirectly but were only negative towards the gendered practice of wearing a veil, strongly indicates that there is a substantial subgroup of individuals that is genuinely critical of perceived gender inequality and not prejudiced or exclusionary towards Muslims. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that this subgroup of individuals endorsed unconditional respect for others and civil liberties, and also had an open-minded thinking style, all of which have an important role in accepting minority outgroups and their practices (Korol, 2017; Dangubić et al., 2022; Lalljee et al., 2009; Van der Noll, 2014). This '*critical inclusive*' subgroup was the largest one (one in three participants) but is typically ignored in prejudice research.

Whereas individuals in the critical subgroup were critical of perceived Muslim gender arrangements, only a third of them expressed negativity towards the gendered practice of wearing veils in public. There are two possible reasons for this. First, it is possible that individuals in this subgroup differ in the way they understand gender equality and the extent to which they think it should be imposed on others. Whereas some might perceive gender equality as a general moral principle to which everyone should commit, others might have a more social conventional understanding of gender equality allowing others to diverge from it. Second, it is possible that individuals within this subgroup differ in the way they perceive veils. Whereas some might perceive veils as oppressive and a symbol of gender inequality, others might perceive it more as an authentic personal choice and support Muslim women to dress as they like (Howard, 2012; O'Neill et al., 2014).

In line with previous person-centered research on prejudices towards Muslims (e.g., Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Dangubić et al., 2020b), one fifth of our sample was *critical exclusive*. These individuals perceived that Muslims treat men and women differently and also harbored prejudices towards Muslims as a group of people and rejected Muslims' equal expressive rights. A vast majority of them was also negative towards the practice of wearing veils in public on the list experiment. *Critical exclusive* individuals were also less likely to think that others should be respected unconditionally and more likely to be close-minded, which is in line with other findings (Dangubić et al., 2022; Lalljee et al., 2009; Zitzmann, 2022).

However, contrary to our expectations, individuals in the *critical exclusive* subgroup showed rather strong support for civil liberties. There are at least two possible interpretations of this. First, it is possible that they are strongly and genuinely concerned about civil liberties but do not apply these to support the rights of Muslims as a group they dislike. This interpretation is in line with research showing that prejudices towards minority groups can prevent people from living up to their principles (Dixon et al., 2017). Second, the endorsement of civil liberties among this subgroup might be a consequence of and a justification for preexisting prejudices towards Muslims. This interpretation is in line with research on forms of motivated reasoning that shows that people tend to provide socially acceptable reasons to justify their negative attitudes towards minority groups (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Stark et al., 2021). Either way, these findings indicate that for the *critical exclusive* subgroup, perceiving gender-inequality practices among Muslims seems to be another way to express their prejudices towards Muslims.

Around a third of our sample was *moderately critical exclusive*. Similar to those in the *critical exclusive* profile, these individuals perceived that Muslim treat men and women differently and they were negative towards Muslims as a group of people although to a lesser degree. Further, their lower unconditional respect for others and similarly high rates of negativity towards immigrants and immigrants wearing veils on the list experiments suggest a focus on gender equality as a socially acceptable way to express anti-Muslim sentiments. However, this subgroup's negativity did not always stand in the way of supporting Muslim expressive rights since they were rather neutral towards the rights of expressing the Islamic faith and celebrating Islamic holidays. Despite their prejudices, it seems that these individuals are sufficiently committed to civil liberties to at least sometimes not deny them to their disliked group of Muslims. Therefore, it is also possible that their negativity towards veils, at least partly, stems from more principled considerations. Thus, for these individuals, criticism of gender equality might be a combination of anti-Muslim sentiments and principled considerations.

Similarly to other studies examining attitudes towards minorities (e.g., Dangubić et al., 2022; Meeusen et al., 2018), around a fifth of our sample responded in a *moderate* way by neither expressing positive nor negative views towards Muslims, their expressive rights and gender practices. One possible reason for this is that these individuals do not have very strong views on Muslim minorities, which is in line with the notion that social attitudes are not always based on strong convictions or beliefs (Sturgis et al., 2014; Zaller, 1992). Another possibility is that these individuals were not sufficiently engaged when completing the questionnaire and settled for choosing the neutral midpoint (Chyung et al, 2017). The complete anonymity of online survey research can decrease participants motivation and cognitive engagement, and result in less careful responding and more frequent choosing of the neutral mid-point response categories (Krosnick, 1999; Lelkes et al., 2012).

Our expectation that a subgroup of those positive towards Muslims in every regards would exist as one of the three most common patterns of responses did not receive empirical support. In fact, the extraction of additional profiles showed that only two out of a hundred respondents had generally inclusive attitudes towards Muslims and did not agree that Muslims engage in gender inequality practices (see Footnote 13). This small number of individuals with an overall pro-Muslim orientation is understandable in light of the widespread perception of Muslim minority members as not following liberal standards of gender equality (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2009). Taking a more relativistic stance on gender equality appears to be difficult for most majority members in liberal societies.

2.4.1 Limitations

A number of limitations of our study provide directions for future research. First, our findings are not conclusive when it comes to the role that civil liberties play within the subgroup of *critical exclusive* individuals. These individuals might strategically use civil liberties to justify their preexisting prejudices towards Muslims or they might be genuinely concerned about these liberties. Future research considering different practices (liberal and illiberal), and different groups (Muslim and non-Muslim individuals; multiple-acts-multiple-actors design; Dangubić et al., 2020a) might provide a more nuance understanding of the role of civil liberties among those who are prejudiced towards Muslims. For example, a consistent rejection of illiberal practices regardless of the outgroup involved would indicate genuine concern for civil liberties, whereas a consistent rejection of only Muslim practices would indicate anti-Muslim prejudices.

Second, a list experiment provides average estimates of negativity and it is not possible to estimate for each individual how negative they are. Although the findings are useful to determine how many individuals within each subgroup are negative towards Muslims and Muslims wearing veils in public, using an indirect or implicit individual difference measure of prejudices might provide further nuances to the findings (Krosnick et al., 2021). This would be particularly interesting for the *moderately critical exclusive* group which seems to be, to some extent, concerned with gender equality in addition to having prejudicial feelings towards Muslims.

Third, our measures were part of a larger data collection in which several scholars participated, and we could only include a limited set of items and relevant constructs. To further validate that the subgroups of individuals differ in a meaningful way, future studies could examine additional constructs such as the endorsement of gender egalitarian values, cultural relativism, and intergroup threat (e.g., Moss et al., 2019; Velasco González et al., 2008). Further, in addition to indirect attitudes towards immigrants and immigrants wearing veils, future studies could also examine indirect attitudes towards immigrants' expressive rights to test the possibility that individuals might have presented themselves as more accepting of Muslim rights than they truly are.

In addition, it is worth testing to what extent our findings generalize beyond Germany and the Netherlands because there might be relevant country differences to consider. Our findings were largely comparable across the countries, but individuals from the Netherlands were somewhat more positive than those from Germany (see also Dangubić et al., 2022; Erisen & Ketman-Cin, 2017). One possible reason for this difference is that the Dutch are less likely than Germans to perceive Muslim minorities as a threat (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). Due to the Dutch system of pillarization, in the Netherlands all religions are, in principle, equally accommodated (Carol et al., 2015), and the Dutch might be more familiar with and more accepting of religious diversity.

2.5 Conclusion

Going beyond the social psychological literature on prejudices, and anti-Muslim prejudice in particular, we focused on gender-value based criticism of Muslim minorities. We used latent profile analysis to more closely consider whether the widespread perception that Muslim minorities engage in gender inequality practices reflects prejudicial feelings towards Muslims or more principled concerns about gender equality.

We found that a large majority of people is critical of Muslim gender arrangements. Many of them also have exclusionary attitudes with prejudices towards Muslims and rejecting Muslim expressive rights. However, around a third of the population is negative about the ways in which some Muslims arrange their gender roles, but without being negative towards Muslims as a group and rejecting their equal rights. This *critical inclusive* subgroup of individuals appears to be respectful of others as equal citizens and acknowledge their rights, but without taking an uncritical and relativistic stance in which everything is accepted.

It could be argued that it is prejudicial in itself to use liberal values such as gender equality as a standard for disapproval, but it is difficult to understand what this would mean in a liberal society. And it could be argued that the perception of gender inequality is a stereotypical generalization that ignores the many relevant differences between Muslims. However, the focus is on group differences in social values and research clearly shows that there is a strong average difference in gender values between the West and Muslim nations, and between majority members and Muslim minorities in Western societies (Diehl et al., 2009; Norris & Inglehardt, 2004).

The term 'inclusive' is increasingly used in academic, public and political debates but does not have to mean the uncritical acceptance of differences. People can have their own (liberal) beliefs and convictions which can make them critical of dissenting outgroup practices but without being prejudiced toward the outgroup per se and rejecting their equal dignity and rights. Our findings paint a more nuanced picture of the ways that majority members can perceive and evaluate Muslim minorities, which is theoretically and practically important. Theoretically, a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which multiple considerations are organized within individuals goes beyond prejudice-based explanations which offer an important but also limited understanding of the qualitative ways in which perceptions, attitudes and beliefs are integrated in the minds of individuals (Osborne & Sibley, 2017). Practically, a detailed understanding of majority members' considerations is useful for developing informed strategies for improving intergroup relations. For example, whereas strategies aimed at reducing prejudices are necessary for those with generalized anti-Muslim sentiments, these are not likely to be fruitful for those disapproving of specific practices because of the liberal principles that they endorse.

CHAPTER 3

Understanding rejection of Muslim minority practices: A latent profile analysis[18]

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[18] A slightly different version of this chapter is published as: Dangubić, M., Verkuyten, M., & Stark, T.H. (2020). Understanding (in)tolerance of Muslim minority practices: A latent profile analysis. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47*(7), 1517-1538. doi:.10.1080/1369183X.2020.1808450. Marija Dangubić co-designed the study, performed the analyses and drafted the manuscript. Maykel Verkuyten and Tobias Stark contributed to the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

3.1 Introduction

Muslim minority citizens in Western societies want to freely express and practice their religiosity, try to establish suitable institutions for educational and religious activities, and seek to politically promote their interests (Haddad & Smith, 2001; Helbling, 2012). These goals and the related demands receive mixed reactions from the general public. Majority members can agree with the general liberal notion that Muslims should be able to live the life they want, but not always accept Muslim practices, such as the founding of Islamic schools, the building of minarets, or the refusal to shake hands with someone of the opposite gender.[19] There is typically a difference in how people evaluate general principles in comparison to concrete issues. Yet it is around concrete issues and practices that ways of life collide and the need for acceptance of cultural diversity arises.

Rejection of Muslim practices has commonly been explained by how people feel towards Muslims as a group, with research indicating that people who reject Muslim practices tend to have anti-Muslim sentiments (e.g. Saroglou et al., 2009). For example, Blinder and colleagues (2019) found that Muslim prejudice is an important driver for opposing the accommodation of Muslim religious schools in Sweden, Norway, and Great Britain. Similarly, research showed that anti-Muslim sentiments underlie the support for banning the wearing of headscarves, Islamic education, and the building of mosques (Helbling, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2009; Van der Noll, 2014).

Yet, rejection and acceptance of specific Muslim practices does not always align with the way people feel towards Muslims (e.g. Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Van der Noll, 2014; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). For example, among national samples in four Western European countries, a substantial proportion of people with positive feelings towards Muslims supported a ban on headscarves (Helbling, 2014), and also objected to Islamic education in German public schools and the building of mosques (Van der Noll, 2014). In addition, some individuals with negative feelings towards Muslims have been found to be willing to support the appointment of a Muslim teacher (Van der Noll et al., 2010), the wearing of headscarves, Islamic education and the building of mosques (Van der Noll, 2014).

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[19] By using the term 'Muslim minority practice' we are not implying that these are typical for Muslims but rather indicating how these practices are often perceived in Western societies.

Whether people accept or reject particular practices can depend on the type of the practice rather than the specific group engaged in it (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2020; Hirsch et al., 2019; Sleijpen et al., 2020). People might reject a specific practice (i.e. founding of Islamic schools) because they are negative towards Muslims as a group or because they disapprove of that particular practice in general (i.e. religious education; Bilodeau et al., 2018; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). Similarly, people can accept a specific practice because of positive feelings towards the group or because of more practice-related reasons.

One way to examine these possibilities, and thereby go beyond the existing research, is to simultaneously consider group-based feelings and a range of Muslim practices (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Furthermore, existing research uses a variable-centered approach to assess between-individual difference in feelings and rejection of Muslim practices, and how these are associated. The aim of the current study is to provide an incremental contribution to the literature by using a person-centered approach which offers a different way of thinking about the interplay of various feelings and evaluations (e.g. Osborne & Sibley, 2017). This approach allows to examine whether there are distinct subgroups of individuals with different constellations of group-based feelings and rejection or acceptance of specific practices. This provides a more detailed understanding of how particular forms of rejection and acceptance simultaneously occur within individuals, and how these are combined with feelings towards Muslims as a group. We used data from a study among ethnic Dutch respondents, which allows us to examine whether, and how many, majority members have specific patterns of group-based feelings and rejection of practices. Furthermore, to validate the profiles' distinctiveness, we examine whether the various subgroups of individuals are characterized by differences in authoritarian and conservative predispositions (Stenner, 2005), as well as unconditional respect for persons (Lalljee et al., 2007). We focus on authoritarianism, status quo conservatism and unconditional respect because previous research has identified consistent links between these psychological constructs and acceptance or rejection of outgroups and their practices. However, they have not been examined simultaneously in relation to people's evaluations of Muslim minorities and their practices. Additionally, we examine whether the subgroups of individuals differ in their feelings toward other minority groups and in their acceptance of other controversial practices (i.e. use of gender-neutral language).

3.1.1 Possible subgroups of individuals

Social scientific research typically investigates associations between variables, such as between group-based feelings and the acceptance of specific practices. While these variable-centered analyses are extremely useful in their own right, a person-centered approach can make an additional contribution to social scientific research (Osborne & Sibley, 2017), and has found to be useful in investigating attitudes toward minority outgroups (e.g. Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Meeusen et al., 2018). In contrast to examining relations between variables, this approach seeks to identify unobserved subgroups of individuals that qualitatively differ in the particular ways in which they combine, for example, group-based feelings and the acceptance of practices. A shift to a person-centered approach is not simply a shift in methods but involves a different way of thinking about people's attitudes, feelings and beliefs. A person-centered approach does not focus on differences between individuals but rather on how configurations of attitudes and feelings are organized within subgroups of individuals. For example, research on political tolerance of different groups and different practices demonstrates that individuals can not readily be placed on a positive–negative continuum but rather formed four latent classes of tolerance (McCutcheon, 1985). In addition to subgroups of individuals who were consistently positive or consistently negative across practices and minority groups, there were also individuals who accepted some groups and some practices but rejected others (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020).

Thus, a person-centered approach allows to investigate whether feelings towards Muslims and the acceptance of a range of Muslim practices are combined in different ways within different subgroups of individuals, which is reflected in distinct latent profiles. In general, people can be positive or negative towards Muslims as a group, consistently accept or reject a range or practices, or accept some practices and reject others. Logically, this suggests six possible subgroups (Table 3.1) and there are reasons to assume that these are substantially meaningful subgroups of individuals that exist within the majority population, although some subgroups are more likely than others.

First and following the literature that links support for Muslim minority practices with group-based feelings, two subgroups of individuals are likely to exist. On the one hand, a subgroup of individuals with a generally positive orientation ('*positive accepting*') that has positive feelings towards Muslims as a group and accept the right of Muslims to live the life that they want by practicing all aspects of their religion. On the other hand, it is likely that there is a subgroup of individuals with a generally negative orientation (‘*negative rejecting*’) that has negative feelings towards Muslims as a group and consistently rejects all Muslim practices.

Table 3.1 Six possible subgroups of individuals

Profile	Feelings towards Muslims	Acceptance/rejection of Muslim practices
Positive accepting	Positive	Accepting all practices
Positive partly rejecting	Positive	Rejecting some practices
Positive rejecting	Positive	Rejecting all practices
Negative accepting	Negative	Accepting all practices
Negative partly accepting	Negative	Accepting some practices
Negative rejecting	Negative	Rejecting all practices

Two other likely subgroups consist of individuals that reject some or all Muslim practices without necessarily having negative feelings towards Muslims (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). A third subgroup might thus comprise of individuals who do not dislike Muslims as a group but rather object toward all Muslim practices because these are considered to go against, for example, the majority’s ways of life and therefore imply large societal change (‘*positive rejecting*’). A fourth subgroup of individuals is likely to not display negative feelings towards the group per se but reject some Muslim practices and accept other practices (‘*positive partly rejecting*’). These individuals object to certain practices but accept other practices because they take the nature of the specific practices into consideration. For example, a particular practice might raise specific moral concerns and therefore be rejected, not only when practiced by Muslims but also by other religious groups (Hirsch et al., 2019; Sleijpen et al., 2020).

The remaining two possible subgroups consists of individuals who accept some or all of the Muslim practices while harboring negative feelings towards Muslims as a group. Thus, a fifth possible subgroup could consists of individuals who are negative towards Muslims as a group, but accept all Muslim practices because, for example, they are strongly in favor of everyone having the freedom to practicing their own way of life (‘*negative accepting*’; Mondak & Sanders, 2003). However, some authors doubt the existence of such an absolutely tolerant group (Gibson, 2005a) and consider it more realistic that people accept only some practices of the group they harbor negative feelings towards (‘*negative partly accepting*’).

3.1.2 Validation of the possible subgroups

Beyond identifying subgroups of individuals among the majority population, we examined whether these subgroups differ in a meaningful way on the key psychological correlates of authoritarian and conservative predispositions as well as the endorsement of unconditional respect for persons, and in their feelings towards other minority groups and the acceptance of other controversial, non-Muslim practices. This is important to examine as a matter of construct validity of the possible latent profiles and their substantial meaning (Osborne & Sibley, 2017). If these profiles are meaningful beyond the way they evaluate Muslim minority and Muslim practices, they should relate to psychological constructs and attitudes toward other groups and practices in specific ways.

Authoritarian predisposition. There is a large literature that links the concept of authoritarianism to prejudice and intolerance toward minority groups. Following the original formulation of authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950) and its subsequent reconceptualization (Altemeyer, 1981), more recent conceptualizations are based on the notion of a tension that exists between the goals of personal autonomy and social conformity (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). Relating authoritarianism to Schwartz's values of self-direction versus conformity, Feldman (2003) shows that authoritarians are especially likely to prioritize conformity and obedience over self-direction and independence.

Authoritarians' striving for uniformity and conformity typically implies that they try to minimize cultural diversity and maximize similarity in beliefs, norms and values. As a result, they tend to feel aversion toward groups that are dissimilar to them in norms and values and thereby threaten the normative order of society (Stenner, 2005; Van Assche et al., 2019). Authoritarians reject diversity in general, and thus also oppose divergent practices that do not directly affect them personally. Research has shown that authoritarianism is associated with more negative attitudes towards Muslim minorities (Padovan & Alietti, 2012), with opposition toward Muslim minority practices (e.g. the building of mosques in American cities; Feldman, 2020), and with support of anti-Muslim policies (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2017). Given that authoritarianism entails an emphasis on uniformity and conformity and, hence, an aversion to diversity of people and beliefs, individuals who display negative feelings towards Muslims and consistently reject Muslim minority practices ('*negative rejecting*') are likely to be characterized by relatively high authoritarianism. In contrast, those who display positive feelings towards Muslims or acceptance of some or all of Muslim minority practices ('*positive accepting*', '*positive partly* *rejecting*', '*positive rejecting*', '*negative partly accepting*', and '*negative accepting*') are likely characterized by lower levels of authoritarianism.

Status quo conservatism. Whereas authoritarianism entails an underlying inclination to favor social conformity over individual autonomy and difference, status quo conservatism entails an "enduring inclination to favor stability and preservation of the status quo over social change" (Stenner, 2005, p. 86). Authoritarians value social uniformity and tend to favor normative conformity but are willing to gradually adopt new social norms as they evolve (Oyamot et al., 2017), whereas status quo conservatives favor social stability and have a general aversion to social change and the uncertainties that it entails. Research in different national contexts has demonstrated that authoritarianism and conservatism are distinct underlying predispositions that relate differently to various types of intolerance (Stenner, 2005; 2009).

Conservatives do not want to move towards an uncertain future and therefore want to avoid social change whatever the direction of the change is. This understanding of conservatism has similarities with the notion of cultural inertia that is defined as the desire to avoid and resist any change (Zárate & Shaw, 2010; Zárate et al., 2012). Change implies uncertainty and requires adapting to new situations which can produce resentment and negativity towards new developments and practices. One study found that the objection to Muslim minorities practices was associated with the endorsement of the value of traditionalism, which, just like status quo conservatism, reflects a preference to preserve the social world as it is (Van der Noll, 2014).

People who score high on status quo conservatism are more likely to reject all Muslims practices as these differ from the majority's way of life and might be perceived to indicate change. However, the rejection of these practices does not have to imply a dislike of Muslims as a group of people because for conservatives the issue is less about who is changing the status quo but rather whether in general the status quo is changed. Therefore, those who reject all Muslim practices ('*negative rejecting*' and '*positive rejecting*') are likely to be characterized by relatively high status quo conservatism. In contrast, those who differentiate between practices by accepting some and rejecting others ('*positive partly rejecting*' and '*negative partly accepting*') and those who accept all practices ('*positive accepting*' and '*negative accepting*') are likely to be characterized by lower levels of status quo conservatism.

Unconditional respect. Unconditional respect for persons forms the cornerstone of Kant's moral philosophy and entails the most fundamental form of respect for others, simply as a function of them being human beings (Lalljee et al., 2007; 2009). It is a general orientation towards all people having intrinsic and equal moral worth and involves the recognition of everyone's dignity and integrity. Unconditional respect for persons has been found to be negatively associated with right-wing authoritarianism (Lalljee et al., 2007) and can be expected to be associated with more positive attitudes towards minority groups.

Unconditional respect primary refers to others as human beings and is likely to include acceptance of others' practices. Research in different European countries has demonstrated that respect towards outgroup members is associated with acceptance of their way of life (e.g. Hjerm et al., 2019; Simon et al., 2019). However, being respectful towards a group of people does not necessary mean that one will accept all their practices, especially if these are construed as being disrespectful towards the dignity and integrity of others. An example is the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with people of the opposite gender, which has been debated in Dutch society as a form of disrespect for the personhood of others (Gieling et al., 2010). Thus, those who are positive towards Muslims and accept all or some of the practices ('*positive accepting*' and '*positive partly rejecting*') are likely to score higher on unconditional respect. In contrast, those who are negative towards Muslims or reject all Muslim practices ('*negative rejecting*', '*negative accepting*', '*negative partly accepting*', '*positive rejecting*') are likely to score lower on unconditional respect.

Other minority groups and other practices. As a matter of construct validity, we further examine how different subgroups of individuals feel about other minority groups (e.g. refugees, German and Polish people in the Netherlands) and evaluate other controversial practices (e.g. related to homosexuality and gender neutrality). If the identified profiles are meaningful beyond Muslims and their practices, then people who belong to these profiles should react to other minority groups and other controversial practices in specific ways.

The subgroup of individuals that displays positive feelings towards Muslims and accepts all or some Muslim practices ('*positive accepting*' and '*positive partly rejecting*') is likely to be characterized by a strong endorsement of unconditional respect and low scores on authoritarianism and conservatism. Therefore, these subgroups should also have positive feelings towards other minority groups and accept other practices. In contrast, the subgroup of individuals that displays anti-Muslim feelings and rejects all Muslim practices (‘*negative rejecting*’) can be expected to also harbor negative feelings towards other minority groups and reject other controversial practices. The reason is that this subgroup of individuals is expected to be characterized by a relatively strong authoritarian predisposition which has been found to be associated with prejudicial attitudes toward various minority groups (i.e. Duckitt & Sibley, 2007), and rejection of normatively dissenting practices, such as gay marriage and new gender norms (e.g. Oyamot et al., 2017).

Further, we have argued that the subgroup of individuals that rejects all Muslim practices without harboring negative feelings towards Muslims as a group (‘positive rejecting’), is likely to endorse status quo conservatism. They object to practices that imply social change rather than having negative feelings towards groups of people as such. Therefore, these individuals might also reject homosexual and gender-neutral practices that involve societal change, but without necessarily displaying negative feelings towards other minority groups.

3.1.3 The current study

Using latent profile analysis, we examine the different ways in which subgroups of majority members combine their general feelings towards Muslims with their acceptance of a range of Muslim practices that are debated in Dutch society. Specifically we examine whether six theoretically and logically possible configurations of how general feelings and the acceptance of practices are organized within individuals receive empirical support: *positive accepting*, *negative rejecting*, *positive rejecting*, *positive partly rejecting*, *negative accepting*, and *negative partly accepting* (see Table 3.1). To establish construct validity of these profiles, we examine if these subgroups differ in a meaningful way in their authoritarian and conservative predispositions, endorsement of unconditional respect for persons, positive feelings toward other out-groups, and the acceptance of other controversial practices.

We used data from a large sample of Dutch majority participants. In the Netherlands, Islam is the second largest religion with Muslims—mainly originating from Turkey and Morocco—comprising around 5% of the population (Schmeets, 2019; Huijnik, 2018). Identification with Islam among Muslims continues to be strong, an increasing number of Islamic organizations and schools have been founded over the years, and a growing number of Muslims engage in religious practices such as visiting a mosque and wearing a headscarf (Huijnik, 2018). As in other Western countries, the Dutch public tends to perceive Muslims as the typical 'other' which goes together with relatively strong anti-Muslim sentiments (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

3.2 Method

3.2.1 Data and sample

Data was collected in February 2019 by a survey company which maintains a representative panel of adult Dutch[20] majority members. Panel members were sampled to match the population of the Netherlands in terms of age, gender, education, and region, and 831 non-Muslim respondents completed the anonymous questionnaire online. Thirteen respondents who did not reveal their religiosity were excluded from the regression analysis. The participants were between 18 and 88 years old (*M* = 54.8, *SD* = 16.23, Table 3.2), and 51% of the sample was female.

3.2.2 Measures

Feelings towards Muslims. Respondents were presented a 'feeling thermometer' to indicate on an 11-point scale how warm or cold they felt towards the group of Muslims in the Netherlands. For the ease of interpretation, the variable was recoded to range from −5 to 5. Higher scores reflect more warm feelings towards Muslims, zero indicates neutral feelings, and lower scores reflect more cold feelings.

Acceptance of Muslims' practices. Respondents were presented with a set of seven practices which were based on previous research (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020), and which relate to issues that are or have been debated in the Netherlands: 'Immigrants walking on the street wearing veils', 'The building of mosques in the Netherlands', 'The ritual slaughtering of animals', 'The establishment of Islamic primary schools', 'Replacing the second day of Pentecost by the Islamic Sugar festival as a national holiday', 'The refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with people of the opposite sex', and 'The founding of political parties that are inspired by Islam'. Participants indicated on a 7-point scale to what extent these practices should (1) 'certainly not be tolerated', or (7) 'certainly be tolerated'. The scales were recoded to range from −3 to 3, with higher values indicating higher acceptance.

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[20] This is based on the definition of the Central Bureau for Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS, 2016) that considers everyone with both parents born in the Netherlands as belonging to the Dutch majority group.

Authoritarian predisposition. Authoritarian predisposition was measured with an extended version of the validated 'child-rearing preference' scale which makes no reference to any social groups or political actors. This measure was designed to tap into the underlying disposition by assessing a relative priority and therefore creates a trade-off between stimulating social conformity and obedience versus self-direction and autonomy in socializing children (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). Respondents were presented with four pairs of qualities children could be taught (for example, 'obeying parents' versus 'making one's own choices'). For each of the pairs, respondents were asked which one they would consider to be more important, and subsequently, to indicate how much more important they found this quality using a 3-point scale (slightly more important, more important, or much more important). The answers to these two questions for a given pair of qualities were recoded to a six-point scale so that a higher score indicates stronger authoritarian predisposition. The scores on the four items were averaged to create a scale ($\alpha = .72$).

Status quo conservatism. In order to have a similar relative measure as for authoritarianism, we designed four items that introduced a trade-off between a focus on the importance and benefits of social change in general versus a positive emphasis on stability (Stenner, 2005). We again made no references to any social groups or political actors. Each item represented a pair of opposing statements placed on the opposite side of the 7-point scale continuum; one side indicated resistance to change (status quo conservatism) and the other side indicated being in favor of change (for example, 'Traditional ways have to be cherished and preserved' versus 'You have to change and adjust habits to the new time') The items were averaged to create a scale ($\alpha = .62$) and a higher score indicates higher status quo conservatism.

Unconditional respect for persons. Unconditional respect was measured by six items (7- point scales) taken from Lalljee and colleagues (2007; for example, 'Also people with objectionable ideas should be respected as persons'). The six items were averaged to form a scale ($\alpha = .69$), and a higher score indicates higher unconditional respect.

Feelings towards other minority groups. Respondents indicated their general feelings towards Germans, Poles and refugees, as three other minority groups living in the Netherlands, on the same feeling thermometer scales.

Acceptance of gender-neutral practices. Using the same scale as for acceptance of Muslims' practices, respondents were asked whether the following practices should be tolerated: ‘Installing gender-neutral toilets in public buildings’, and ‘Replacing words such as ‘manpower’ and ‘ladies and gentlemen’ with gender-neutral names such as ‘human-power’ and ‘travelers’. The Netherlands saw a heated public debate about these practices in the year in which the data were collected, for example when the Dutch national railway company started addressing passengers with ‘dear travelers’ instead of ‘dear ladies and gentlemen’ in their announcements.

Acceptance of homosexual practice. Acceptance of homosexual practice was measured on the same scale by asking whether ‘Homosexual men kissing each other in public’ (Kuyper, 2016) should be tolerated. In the Netherlands, people are relatively tolerant towards homosexuality but many object to public expression of this sexual orientation and in particular to men kissing in public (Keuzenkamp & Kuyper, 2013).

Control variables. Four control variables were used in the analyses. In addition to age (continuous variable) and gender (0 = men, 1 = women), participants indicated the highest level of completed education using a 7-point scale (1 = no/only primary school, 7 = at least master degree). Similar to other research in the Netherlands (e.g. Van de Werfhorst & Van Tubergen, 2007), education was treated as a continuous variable in the analysis. In addition to standard individual-level control variables, we controlled for importance of religiosity because religious people may be more positive or more negative towards other religions. Religiosity was measured by asking respondent to indicate on a 7-point scale to what extent their faith was important to them (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important). In addition, respondents were offered not to reveal their religiosity by indicating ‘I do not want to say’. Since the variable was skewed (almost half of respondents indicated that they do not find religion important at all), it was recoded to a dichotomous variable (0 = important, and 1 = not at all important).

3.2.3 Analyses

We used latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify the optimal number of distinctive subgroups of individuals. The LPA is a model-based technique that offers more rigorous criteria for choosing the optimal number of profiles compared to traditional clustering techniques that also have been criticized as being too sensitive to the clustering algorithm and measurement scales, and as relying on rigid assumptions that do not always hold with real-life data (Vermunt & Magidson, 2002). In addition, in LPA various models can be specified in terms of how variances and covariances are estimated. All of our solutions were fitted under the model with class-invariant parametrization. In this model, the variances of the items are estimated to be equal across profiles and the covariances are constrained to zero. Therefore, the model considers the mean vectors for each profile. The choice of class-invariant parametrization was based on two considerations. First, we were interested in the average levels of the measures in each profile and not in the extent to which these measures vary or how they relate to each other within or across the profiles. Second, class-invariant parametrization yields the most parsimonious model. In order to avoid convergence of the likelihood function to local instead of global maxima solutions (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018), 5000 sets of random starts and 500 final stage optimizations were used.

LPA provides a series of fit indices to compare and identify the appropriate number of profiles. The Bayesian information criteria (BIC) and the Akaike information criteria (AIC) indicate how well a model with the selected number of profiles fits the data, with the lowest numbers indicating the best fit. Entropy scores indicate the precision with which respondents are classified into the profiles, and high entropy scores (> .8) indicate good precision of the classification (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018). Lastly, to determine the optimal number of profiles it is important to consider the substantive meaning and theoretical interpretability of the profiles. The number of participants within each profile should not be too small and the profiles should conform with theoretical understandings.

In the second part of the analysis, multinomial logistic regression analysis was used for the construct validity analysis. We predicted the likelihood of belonging to one of the identified subgroups as a function of authoritarianism, status quo conservatism, unconditional respect, and the control variables. In the last step, we examined whether the identified subgroups differed in their feelings towards other immigrant groups and their acceptance of other controversial practices. For this, we used one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and pairwise t-test with Bonferroni correction to control for Type I error rate across multiple comparisons.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Descriptive findings

Table 3.2 shows the descriptive findings.[21] On average, respondents indicated that Muslim practices should not be tolerated as the means of all practices were significantly below the midpoint of the scale, *p*s < .001. Further, respondents had negative feelings toward Muslims as the mean value also was significantly below the midpoint, $t(830) = -4.46$, $p < .001$. Unconditional respect was negatively correlated with authoritarianism and status quo conservatism, while authoritarianism was positively but not strongly associated with status quo conservatism, supporting the notion that both constructs are relatively independent (Stenner, 2005).

3.3.2 Latent profile analysis

Table 3.3 shows the findings for different profile estimates up to seven profiles. The fit statistics kept on improving with the addition of latent profiles, and the entropy values are high for all estimated models which suggests that the decision of how many profiles to retain should mainly focus on interpretability and the size of the profiles (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018; Marsh et al., 2009).

The inspection of the interpretability and size of profiles in all estimated solutions revealed that the solution with 5 profiles is the most appropriate one. Models with more than 5 profiles did not reveal additional subgroups that were substantively different from the first five (see Figure A3.1.1 in Appendix 3.1), and, importantly, the additional profiles had a very small sample size (for example, three of the profiles of the six-profile solution had less than 10% of classified individuals each). The 5 profile solution revealed profiles that were quantitatively different from each other and the closest to the theoretically discussed possibilities.

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[21] The data and analytic scripts reproducing our findings can be found at https://osf.io/d8qyj/.

Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of central variables used in the study

	***M* / %**	***SD***	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**	**15**	**16**
Woman	50.5%																	
Religiosity (not important)	45.1%																	
Education	4.76	1.69																
Age	54.8	16.2																
1. Veils	-0.95 (***)	1.89																
2. Mosques	-0.29 (***)	1.89	**0.50**															
3. Ritual animal slaughtering	-1.13 (***)	1.85	**0.27**	**0.37**														
4. Islamic schools	-1.21 (***)	1.78	**0.43**	**0.58**	**0.33**													
5. Islamic holiday	-1.04 (***)	2.09	**0.39**	**0.51**	**0.32**	**0.42**												
6. Refusal to shake hands	-1.71 (***)	1.64	**0.37**	**0.36**	**0.27**	**0.37**	**0.35**											
7. Islamic parties	-0.81 (***)	1.89	**0.48**	**0.62**	**0.37**	**0.56**	**0.45**	**0.37**										
8. Homosexual practice	1.38 (***)	1.75	**0.17**	**0.26**	0.06	**0.15**	**0.20**	**0.11**	**0.21**									
9. Gender neutral words	-0.49 (***)	2.02	**0.32**	**0.38**	**0.20**	**0.30**	**0.38**	**0.31**	**0.36**	**0.23**								
10. Gender neutral toilets	0.29 (***)	2.14	**0.29**	**0.32**	**0.11**	**0.28**	**0.26**	**0.23**	**0.27**	**0.33**	**0.51**							
11. Feelings towards. Muslims	-0.35 (***)	2.30	**0.40**	**0.57**	**0.27**	**0.38**	**0.40**	**0.27**	**0.46**	**0.17**	**0.30**	**0.24**						
12. Feelings towards Germans	1.72 (***)	1.91	0.00	**0.09**	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.02	**0.09**	**0.11**	-0.01	0.02	**0.26**					
13. Feelings towards Poles	0.14 (*)	1.98	**0.24**	**0.27**	**0.17**	**0.17**	**0.20**	**0.14**	**0.26**	**0.07**	**0.15**	**0.13**	**0.50**	**0.39**				
14. Feelings towards refugees	0.07	2.39	**0.39**	**0.53**	**0.24**	**0.33**	**0.37**	**0.23**	**0.42**	**0.14**	**0.28**	**0.25**	**0.78**	**0.28**	**0.50**			
15. Unconditional respect	4.51 (***)	0.85	**0.30**	**0.36**	**0.22**	**0.29**	**0.29**	**0.24**	**0.33**	**0.11**	**0.22**	**0.20**	**0.37**	**0.12**	**0.22**	**0.38**		
16. Authoritarianism	3.99	1.03	**-0.29**	**-0.34**	**-0.18**	**-0.24**	**-0.29**	**-0.17**	**-0.31**	**-0.23**	**-0.29**	**-0.24**	**-0.27**	-0.06	**-0.18**	**-0.26**	**-0.30**	
17. Status quo conservatism	3.83 (***)	0.93	**-0.19**	**-0.25**	**-0.18**	**-0.16**	**-0.24**	**-0.18**	**-0.23**	-0.05	**-0.21**	**-0.18**	**-0.21**	0.00	**-0.16**	**-0.27**	**-0.17**	**0.30**

Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Asterisks indicate that the mean is higher/lower than the neutral midpoint of the scale. Bolded correlation coefficients are significant at p <.05 level at least.

Table 3.3 Latent profile analysis: Model fit statistics and profile membership distribution

	AIC	BIC	Entropy	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
One-profile model	27465.5	27541.1	-	1.00						
Two-profile model	25671.7	25789.8	0.856	0.52	0.48					
Three-profile model	25267.7	25428.3	0.823	0.43	0.35	0.22				
Four-profile model	25092.6	25295.7	0.853	0.35	0.18	0.19	0.28			
Five-profile model	24961.9	25207.5	0.828	0.28	0.25	0.19	0.12	0.16		
Six-profile model	24823.7	25111.7	0.853	0.25	0.09	0.29	0.08	0.07	0.22	
Seven-profile model	24730.6	25061.2	0.871	0.08	0.30	0.23	0.14	0.10	0.06	0.09

Note. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LMR LRT = Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test.

Figure 3.1 displays the mean scores on feelings towards Muslims and acceptance of Muslim practices for each of the five subgroups with their respective labels. The first subgroup is characterized by general positive feelings towards the group of Muslims and acceptance of almost all of the Muslim practices (‘*positive accepting*’; 16% of respondents). In contrast, the second subgroup is characterized by negative feelings towards Muslims as a group and rejection of all practices (‘*negative rejecting*’; 28%). These two subgroups of individuals displayed consistent positive or negative reactions towards Muslims and Muslim practices, but this was not the case for the three other subgroups that comprised more than half of the sample. The third subgroup consists of individuals that, on average, reported neutral to slightly positive feelings towards Muslims, but nevertheless indicated that none of the seven Muslim practices should be accepted (‘*positive rejecting*’; 25%). The fourth subgroup was characterized by a similar pattern of responses, except that they accepted an Islamic holiday replacing a Christian holiday (‘*negative partly accepting*’; 19%). Finally, the fifth subgroup was characterized by positive feelings towards Muslims, and differential rejection of the practices (‘*positive partly rejecting*’; 12%). The latter two subgroups accepted some practices (e.g. mosques, Islamic holidays) but not others (e.g. refusal to shake hands), which suggests that for them, the nature of the practices matters. These five profiles are largely in line with what we discussed as theoretical possibilities.

Although theoretically possible, a subgroup that combines negative feelings towards the group with acceptance of all practices was not found. Thus, our findings provide no empirical support for tolerance in which people are willing to put up with practices and believes of groups they dislike, which is typical for political tolerance (Gibson, 2005a).



Figure 3.1 Centered mean scores of variables used to construct profiles

3.3.3 Validation of identified profiles

We further examined the meaningfulness of the five identified profiles by investigating how they differ on key variables as a matter of construct validity. Table 3.4 presents the results of the comparisons in which the *positive partly rejecting*, and subsequently the *positive rejecting* subgroup were the reference categories. The use of these two reference categories allows us to examine in which ways the various subgroups differ from the positive rejecting ones. Overall, the *positive partly rejecting* and the *positive rejecting* group appear to be distinct from the *positive accepting*, the *negative rejecting*, and the *negative partly accepting* group, and also from each other.

First, individuals within the *positive accepting* subgroup were more likely to endorse unconditional respect compared to the *positive (partly) rejecting* individuals. Further, individuals in the *positive accepting* subgroup were more likely to indicate that religion is not important for them compared to those in the *positive partly rejecting* group, and were less authoritarian, less conservative, and more educated compared to the *positive rejecting* subgroup. This pattern of findings supports the reasoning that the positive accepting profile is most clearly characterized by the endorsement of unconditional respect for persons.

Second, unconditional respect for persons was less likely for individuals belonging to the *negative rejecting* subgroup compared to the *positive (partly) rejecting* subgroups. In contrast, individuals in the *negative rejecting* subgroup were more likely to endorse authoritarian values, compared to the *positive (partly) rejecting* subgroups. Further, individuals in the *negative rejecting* subgroup were more conservative, indicated that religion is not important, and were less educated compared to the *positive partly rejecting* group, but not in comparison to the *positive rejecting* group. This pattern of findings supports the reasoning that especially a strong authoritarian predisposition is a distinctive characteristic of the *negative rejecting* subgroup of individuals.

Table 3.4 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis (N=818)

	Reference categories			
	Positive partly rejecting		**Positive rejecting**	
	B (SE)		B (SE)	
Positive accepting (=1)				
Intercept	-0.76**	(0.25)	-1.08***	(0.24)
Gender (female)	0.41	(0.28)	-0.07	(0.24)
Education	0.20	(0.18)	0.58***	(0.15)
Age	0.24	(0.14)	-0.15	(0.13)
Religiosity (not important)	1.05***	(0.30)	0.43	(0.25)
Unconditional respect	0.36*	(0.17)	0.66***	(0.15)
Authoritarianism	-0.29	(0.16)	-0.27*	(0.14)
Status-quo conservatism	-0.18	(0.16)	-0.52***	(0.14)
Negative rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	0.05	(0.22)	-0.28	(0.19)
Gender (female)	0.41	(0.26)	-0.08	(0.20)
Education	-0.57***	(0.16)	-0.20	(0.12)
Age	0.19	(0.14)	-0.20	(0.12)
Religiosity (not important)	0.93***	(0.28)	0.32	(0.21)
Unconditional respect	-0.70***	(0.15)	-0.40***	(0.11)
Authoritarianism	0.44**	(0.15)	0.46***	(0.12)
Status-quo conservatism	0.43**	(0.14)	0.09	(0.10)
Negative partly accepting (=1)				
Intercept	0.01	(0.21)	-0.31	(0.19)
Gender (female)	0.42	(0.26)	-0.06	(0.22)
Education	-0.26	(0.16)	0.12	(0.12)
Age	0.20	(0.13)	-0.18	(0.12)
Religiosity (not important)	0.77**	(0.28)	0.16	(0.23)
Unconditional respect	-0.09	(0.15)	0.21	(0.13)
Authoritarianism	-0.05	(0.15)	-0.03	(0.12)
Status-quo conservatism	-0.07	(0.14)	-0.41***	(0.12)
Positive rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	0.33	(0.20)		
Gender (female)	0.48	(0.25)		
Education	-0.37*	(0.15)		
Age	0.39**	(0.13)		
Religiosity (not important)	0.61*	(0.28)		
Unconditional respect	-0.31*	(0.15)		
Authoritarianism	-0.02	(0.15)		
Status-quo conservatism	0.34*	(0.14)		

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. All variables, except gender and religiosity, were standardized.

Third, individuals in the *positive rejecting* subgroup were more likely to have lower levels of formal education, to be older, and to indicated that religion is not important compared to individuals in the *positive partly rejecting* group. In addition, individuals belonging to the positive rejecting, compared to the *positive partly rejecting* group, were less likely to endorse unconditional respect and more likely to be conservative. This pattern of findings suggests that the *positive rejecting* group of individuals is characterized by status quo conservatism, without the strong authoritarian predisposition that characterizes the *negative rejecting* subgroup.

Fourth, those who belonged to the *negative partly accepting* group, rather than the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup, were more likely to indicate that religion is not important. Further, the *negative partly subgroup* was less conservative than the *positive rejecting* subgroup. Being less religious and having a less conservative orientation seems to make the *negative partly accepting* subgroup accept Islamic Breaking the Fast as a national holiday instead of the second day of Pentecost.

Overall, the strong endorsement of unconditional respect of the *positive accepting* and the *positive partly rejecting* subgroups, the authoritarian predisposition of the *negative rejecting subgroup* and the conservatism of the *positive rejecting* subgroup, support our expectations that the subgroups differ in a meaningful way.

3.3.4 Out-group feelings and acceptance of other practices

Table 3.5 presents the mean scores of feelings towards other minority groups and acceptance of other controversial practices of the five subgroups as an additional construct validity analysis.

One-way ANOVAs revealed that the *positive accepting* subgroup was more positive towards refugees and Poles than the *negative rejecting* subgroup, and more positive towards refugees than *negative partly accepting* and *positive rejecting* subgroups (see the last two rows of Table 3.5). Furthermore, they were more accepting of homosexual men kissing in public and gender neutral practices. This pattern of results is similar to the one the *positive accepting* subgroup displayed towards Muslims and their practices, and corresponds with the strong endorsement of unconditional respect for persons, and low authoritarian and conservative predispositions among this subgroup.

Individuals in the *negative rejecting* subgroup reported the most negative feelings towards refugees and Poles. In addition, they were significantly less accepting of homosexual men kissing in public and gender-neutral practices than the other subgroups. This pattern of responses is also similar as their responses towards Muslims and their practices, and in line with the relative strong authoritarian and conservative predisposition, and low endorsement of unconditional respect of this subgroup.

The *positive (partly) rejecting* subgroups were positive towards other minorities, and accepting of homosexual men kissing each other. However, the *positive rejecting* subgroup was less accepting of gender neutrality than the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup. This pattern of responses is also similar as their responses towards Muslims and their practices, and in line with the relatively stronger endorsement of unconditional respect of the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup, and the more conservative predisposition of the *positive rejecting* subgroup.

Overall, the generalized acceptance of the *positive accepting* subgroup, the generalized rejection of the *negative rejecting* subgroup, and the stronger acceptance of other controversial practices of the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup, support our expectations that individuals in the identified profiles respond in a similar way to Muslims and other minority groups.

3.4 Discussion

While some researchers argue that anti-Muslim feelings underlie the rejection of Muslim practices (e.g. Saroglou et al., 2009), others claim that it is more complex and that also people with positive feelings toward Muslims can reject certain practices, and people with negative feelings towards Muslims can accept specific practices (e.g. Van der Noll, 2014). We aimed to extend theory and research on anti-Muslim sentiments by examining the ways in which group-based feelings towards Muslims and rejection of a range Muslim practices are organized within individuals. We provide an incremental contribution to the literature by using a person-centered approach and identifying in a national sample five distinct profiles that are validated across various correlates (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020).

Table 3.5 Between-profile comparisons of feelings towards other groups and acceptance of controversial practices (mean values)

	Feelings towards other groups			Acceptance of controversial practices		
	Germans	**Poles**	**Refugees**	**Homosexual men kissing each other**	**Gender-neutral toilets**	**Gender-neutral words**
(1) Positive accepting	1.97	0.85	1.67	2.19	1.46	0.93
(2) Positive partly rejecting	2.15	0.70	1.21	1.57	1.00	0.19
(3) Negative partly accepting	1.50	0.23	0.53	1.54	0.55	0.00
(4) Positive rejecting	1.69	0.37	0.36	1.25	0.08	-0.85
(5) Negative rejecting	1.55	-0.80	-1.94	0.83	-0.69	-1.65
One-way ANOVA	F(826,4)=2.9*	F(826,4)=22.4***	F(826,4)=91.6***	F(826,4)=14.8***	F(826,4)=29.7***	F(826,4)=53.4***
Pairwise t-test (Bonf. cor.)	ns	1, 2, 3, 4 > 5	1, 2 > 4 > 5; 1 > 3 > 5	1, 2, 3 > 5; 1 > 3, 4	1 > 3, 4 > 5; 2 > 4 > 5	1 > 2, 3 > 4 > 5

Note. Sign > indicates significant difference at $p < .05$ level at least. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

First, we found two opposite subgroups of individuals: a *positive accepting* subgroup (16%) with a generally positive orientation towards Muslims and their practices, and a *negative rejecting* subgroup (28%) with a generally negative orientation towards Muslims and their practices. These subgroups are in line with the assumption that group-based feelings underlie the acceptance and rejection of Muslim practices (Saroglou et al., 2009). However, the feelings and acceptance or rejection of both subgroups appear not to be specific toward Muslims but rather reflect a more general positive or negative orientation towards minority groups (Polish immigrants, refugees) and controversial minority practices related to gender and sexuality.

For the positive accepting subgroup the general orientation seems to involve a relatively strong endorsement of unconditional respect for persons which is in line with research that shows that equal respect is an important ingredient for accepting controversial practices (Simon et al., 2019), and that respect-based tolerance is associated with a more positive attitude toward immigrants, homosexuals, and women (Hjerm et al., 2019). The negative rejecting subgroup is characterized by a relatively strong authoritarian predisposition. Authoritarians value social conformity and tend to reject anything that goes against conventions and common norms and values (Stenner, 2005; Van Assche et al., 2019) resulting in negative feelings towards different minority groups and the rejection of all controversial practices.

Less than half (46%) of the national majority sample belonged to the positive or negative subgroups which indicates that a small majority showed more complex responses in which their feeling towards Muslims and the acceptance of Muslim practices did not fully correspond. Two of these subgroups combined positive feelings towards Muslims with rejection of the practices. The *positive rejecting* subgroup (25%) consisted of individuals who reported neutral feelings towards Muslims but rejected all Muslim practices. And individuals in the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup (12%) reported positive feelings towards Muslims but rejected only some Muslim practices. These findings demonstrate that people can reject Muslim minority practices without necessarily having negative feelings toward Muslims as a group (Bilodeau et al., 2018). The two positive rejecting subgroups appear to represent relatively large sections of the public containing more than a third of the respondents. This indicates that researchers should be careful in assuming that rejection of Muslim practices is mainly motivated by anti-Muslim feelings.

Rather, the *positive rejecting* subgroup was characterized by a relatively strong conservative predisposition in which social change in and of itself is rejected and resisted. These individuals were less authoritarian than the negative rejecting subgroup and did not harbor clear negative feelings toward Muslims as a group, but rejected all Muslim practices that typically imply societal change. They were also not negative toward other minority groups, but they did reject societal changes related to practicing gender neutrality. This pattern of findings suggests that this subgroup of individuals prefers stability and continuity over change and uncertainty. It indicates that rejection of Muslim practices can stem from resistance to change in and of itself, rather than from anti-Muslim feelings. This relates to research on cultural inertia which demonstrates that the desire to avoid cultural change per se plays a role in negative reactions toward minority groups (Zárate et al., 2012).

The presence of the *positive partly rejecting* subgroup supports the proposition that rejection can be based on an objection to specific Muslim practice rather than negative feelings toward the group of people (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Van der Noll, 2014). This subgroup of individuals did not report anti-Muslim feelings and differentiated between Muslim practices by accepting some (i.e. building of Mosques) and rejecting others (e.g. refusal to shake hand with opposite gender). They also were not negative toward other minority groups and accepted gender-neutral adaptations. Compared to the *positive rejecting* subgroup, the *positive partly rejecting* group was characterized by a less conservative predisposition and a stronger endorsement of unconditional respect. The finding that this subgroup was negative about Muslims refusing to shake hands with people of the opposite gender also suggests that the endorsement of unconditional respect for persons can also lead to rejection of particular minority practices. In Western societies, such a refusal is typically construed and discussed as being disrespectful towards others and therefore as something that should not be accepted (Gieling et al., 2010). People tend to reject morally objectionable practices, independently of whether one likes or dislikes the group (Hirsch et al., 2019).

Whereas combining positive feelings towards the group with rejection of some, or all, practices was relatively common among majority members, combining negative feelings with acceptance of some, or all, practices appears to be more exceptional. The negative partly accepting subgroup (19%) consisted of individuals who did not harbor positive feelings towards the group, but accepted Islamic Sugar festival as an alternative national holiday. This subgroup was relatively less religious and also less conservative, which seems to make these individuals willing to accept an Islamic festivity as an alternative national holiday.

3.4.1 Limitations

Despite its important and novel contributions, our study has some limitations that provide directions for future research, and we like to briefly mention two of these. The findings of latent profile analysis are dependent on the number and type of practices that are considered. Therefore, different subgroups might emerge if other practices would be considered, such as practices that involve more demanding issues (e.g. gender segregation). Future research considering a broader range of Muslim practices could examine the robustness of the current findings. Furthermore, future research could also examine the acceptance of similar practices of different minority groups and whether people use a double standard in accepting the same practice for one group but not for another (Sleijpen et al., 2020).

Our results provide evidence that the rejection of Muslim practices without harboring negative feelings can stem from a conservative predisposition against change in and of itself. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that such a consistent rejection of the practices is (partly) the result of an unwillingness to express anti-Muslim feelings due to social desirability concerns. Yet, the questionnaire data used in the current study were collected via an online panel and the participants in these panels know that their answers will be completely anonymous. The provision of complete anonymity minimize social desirability pressures on self-report measures because there is no incentive to present oneself in socially desirable ways (Stark et al., 2019).

3.5 Conclusion

This study advances the literature on anti-Muslim sentiments by considering a range of Muslim practices and using a person-centered approach. Our findings provide greater nuance by identifying more complex constellations of people's feelings toward Muslim as a group and their acceptance of a range of practices. For some individuals, their acceptance or rejection of Muslim practices corresponds with their group-based feelings, but for others it does not. This indicates that an interpretation in terms of generalized prejudice is limited as it ignores that people can reject some practices and accept others. Rejection of a particular practice (e.g. refusal to shake hands) cannot simply be taken to indicate anti-Muslim feelings but might also express conservative predispositions and even the unconditional respect of persons.

In light of contentious societal debates about the acceptance of Muslim minorities in Western societies, it is critical to consider the different ways in which various subgroups of majority members think about this and to develop an accurate understanding or people's feelings and attitudes. Many majority members do not have a consistently positive or negative orientation but rather might be struggling with their group-based feelings and how they should respond to specific Muslim practices. We showed that a latent profile analysis makes it possible to identify subgroups of individuals who differ in how configurations of feelings towards Muslims and their acceptance of a range of Muslim practices are organized within individuals (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). These subgroups cannot be placed on a unidimensional attitude continuum but rather form categories of people who differ in understandable ways on their authoritarian and conservative predispositions, the endorsement of unconditional respect for others, and their feelings towards other minority groups and acceptance non-Muslim practices.

We identified five profiles that make theoretical sense which suggests that our findings provide a fairly accurate and meaningful representation of the types of profiles that are likely to exist in relation to majority members reactions toward Muslim minorities. In contrast to the variable-centered approach we focused on the different constellations of general feelings and acceptance of specific practices within individuals and therefore provide a more complete and integrated description of the relevant distinctions. Such a description is important for applied reasons because it makes a more targeted intervention possible. Interventions based on variable-centered analyses often lead to thinking about improving a particular attitude but without taking into consideration what this might do to other attitudes. Knowing that more than half of the public is not consistently negative or positive towards Muslim minorities implies the possibility of more targeted interventions that focus on the various reasons that people have for tolerating some practices but not others. For example, interventions targeting individuals who are concerned about societal changes in general could emphasize positive aspects of change, but these individuals might also perceive Muslim practices as being disrespectful which requires an additional focus on the societal importance of recognizing the personhood of everyone. An approach that takes the constellation of feelings and beliefs into account can contribute to finding productive ways for reducing negative attitudes and behaviors towards Muslim minorities in Western societies.

CHAPTER 4

Rejecting Muslim or Christian religious practices: A case of discriminatory rejection?[22]

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[22] A slightly different version of this chapter is published as: Dangubić, M., Verkuyten, M., & Stark, T.H. (2020). Rejecting Muslim or Christian religious practices in five West European countries: A case of discriminatory rejection? *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 43*(16), 306-326. doi:10.1080/01419870.2020.1792525. Marija Dangubić co-designed the study, performed the analyses and drafted the manuscript. Maykel Verkuyten and Tobias Stark contributed to the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

4.1 Introduction

Wearing of a headscarf in public schools or by civil servants, the building of mosques and the founding of Islamic schools are some of the controversial issues when it comes to accommodating Muslim religious practices[23] in West European societies (Fetzer & Soper, 2005). These practices tend to evoke much political and public debate and various studies have examined whether the public is willing to accept or rather reject them (e.g. Statham, 2016; Van der Noll, 2014). In this type of research, respondents are typically presented with two types of information: the group of Muslims and the specific religious practice. This means that people can respond to the group, to the specific practice, or a combination of the two. For example, one can resist the idea of the wearing of a headscarf by public servants because one feels negatively toward Muslims as a group or because one endorses secular principles and thinks that religion, in general, has no place among representatives of a secular state (Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Mouritsen & Olsen, 2013). When people apply a double standard by accepting the same or a similar practice from Christians but not from Muslims (*discriminatory rejecting*; Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002), this suggests negative feelings towards Muslims as a group. However, group-based negativity might be less relevant when people reject practices regardless of the religious group engaged in them (*equally rejecting*). Furthermore, rejecting a particular practice of a Muslim minority does not suggest that other Muslim practices are also rejected. For example, a person who rejects the wearing of veils might accept Islamic primary schools (Mondak & Sanders, 2003).

These possibilities make it necessary to take more acts and more actors into account when evaluating why people reject Muslim minority practices. Such an approach allows to simultaneously consider whether people are rejecting or accepting across religious actors and across acts. The current analysis aims to demonstrate the importance of taking two actors (Muslims and Christians) and two acts (religious symbols and religious education) into account for improving our understanding of how people respond to Muslim minority members. We try to show the benefits of such a multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach by analyzing data of a large-scale survey of majority members' attitudes towards Muslim minority citizens from five West European countries, and by considering the role of prejudice, the endorsement of civil liberties and secular principles, and religious affiliation.

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[23] By using the term "religious practices", we are not implying that these are typical for Muslims but rather indicating how these practices are often perceived in Western societies.

4.1.1 Anti-Muslim reactions

Various studies indicate that negative feelings towards Muslims are more widespread than negative feelings towards other immigrant and minority groups (e.g. Kalkan et al., 2009; but see Strabac et al., 2014). For example, research that distinguishes between people's attitudes towards Muslim and Christian immigrants (e.g. Creighton & Jamal, 2015), and towards Muslim and Christian religious practices (e.g. Carol et al., 2015), demonstrates that Muslims are evaluated less positively than Christians. Anti-Muslim feelings have been found to be connected to group-based prejudice and to negative attitudes towards dissenting Muslim practices (Kalkan et al., 2009). Experimental research has demonstrated that the latter is a more decisive factor than the former, which suggests that people tend to reject specific Muslim religious practices and do not per se view Muslim immigrants more negatively than Christian immigrants (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2020; Sleijpen et al., 2020). However, only a few studies examined the combination of different religious actors and acts for understanding anti-Muslim reactions. To address this limitation, we used a multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach that we will explain by contrasting it to three other approaches.

4.1.2 Different approaches

In a one-act-one-actor approach, people are asked if they would accept a controversial, but legal, practice when performed by Muslim minority members, such as the wearing of a headscarf. Several studies applying this approach conclude that the rejection of an act is associated with dislike of Muslims (Helbling, 2014). Erisen and Kentmen-Cin (2007) demonstrate that hostility towards Muslims increases intolerance of their political and social practices. Saroglou and colleagues (2009) conclude that subtle prejudices underlie the support for banning the wearing of the headscarf. Further, Van der Noll (2014) finds significant associations between the dislike of Muslims and the willingness to ban various civil rights (wearing headscarves, Islamic education, building mosques).

However, acceptance or rejection of Muslim religious practices does not always align with how people feel towards Muslims as a group of people. One can accept Muslim practices despite having negative feelings towards Muslims or reject Muslim practices without harboring negative feelings towards the group. For instance, Van der Noll (2014) found that 20% of the respondents rejected headscarves, Muslim symbols and minarets despite having positive attitudes towards Muslims. Similarly, Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) employed a covered measure of prejudices, and showed that rejection of Muslim practices can be based on more principled concerns, rather than dislike of the group.

A one-act-one-actor approach ignores the possibility that people might be opposed to the practice per se. Such a more general objection implies that individuals do not apply a double standard and would object to the same practice when, for example, Christians are engaged in it. Further, the objection might be act-specific and individuals might not reject other Muslim practices.

A multiple-acts-one-actor approach tries to address the latter limitation by taking more acts into account. People are asked whether they would accept several acts when performed by the same actor, such as Muslim teachers wearing religious symbols and the founding of Islamic schools. This approach offers insight into the depth of acceptance by differentiating between those who accept or reject all acts, and those who accept some acts but reject others. This improves the research by capturing the idea that acceptance may not be a global construct, but rather topic specific, as it depends not only on whom people are asked to accept but also on the nature of the dissenting practices (e.g. Gibson & Gouws, 2001; Petersen et al., 2011). For example, rather weak intercorrelations of acceptance of different Muslim practices (ranging from $r = 0.09$ to $r = 0.48$; Van der Noll, 2014) indicate that cross-practice consistency in acceptance is not common and that people take the nature of the practices into consideration.

This approach prevents equating rejection of a particular practice with prejudicial attitudes towards the group. Considering multiple acts might reveal that people differentiate between practices by rejecting some and accepting others, as different practices evoke different moral and normative concerns. For instance, people might object to the wearing of a headscarf due to concerns regarding gender equality (Sarrasin, 2016) but accept other practices where these concerns are not relevant, such as religious education in public schools. Yet, when people accept some practices and reject others, it is still possible that they do so because they dislike Muslims as a group. For example, Adelman and Verkuyten (2020) identified a group of people who rejected various Muslim practices without having prejudicial feelings towards Muslims, and a group of people who rejected the same Muslim practices but reported negative affect towards Muslims.

A one-act–multiple-actors approach entails asking people if they would accept the same act when performed by different actors, such as allowing Muslim and Christian teachers to wear religious symbols in public schools. This approach makes it possible to differentiate between individuals who reject a particular practice across groups and those who apply a double standard and reject the practice only when performed by Muslims. For example, in a study in Germany, it was found that negative attitudes towards Muslims contributed to the discriminatory rejection of Islamic education, whereas secular individuals were more likely to reject religious education for both groups (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). And in a study in Quebec (Bilodeau et al., 2018), a distinction was made between individuals who favored a ban of all religious symbols and those who favored a religious minority restriction. While the former group of individuals was motivated by secular and liberal values, the latter was motivated by prejudices and feelings of cultural threat.

The one-act-multiple-actors approach enables to identify whether rejection is more general anti-religion or rather discriminatory and reflecting dislike of Muslims as a group (Mondak & Hurwitz, 1998). If people are equally opposed to Muslims and Christians engaging in the same act (actor consistent; no double standard), it is more likely that they have general reasons for doing so. And if people apply a double standard and reject a particular act only for Muslims (actor inconsistent), it is more likely that negative feelings towards Muslims are involved.

However, this approach does not allow to assess whether the equal or discriminatory rejection is practice-specific. People might reject both Christian and Muslim civil servants wearing religious symbols, but accept Christian primary education and reject Islamic schools. Or they might be rejecting both Muslims and Christians across both practices. These possibilities indicate the need to simultaneously consider multiple actors and acts.

The multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach entails asking people if they would accept different acts when performed by different actors. For example, for two acts (religious symbols and education) and two actors (Muslims and Christians), there are sixteen logically possible combinations of acceptance and rejection. Nine of these combinations are presented in Table 4.1 (the remaining seven combinations of positive discrimination of Muslims will not be considered here, but see Table A4.1.1 in Appendix 4.1).

Table 4.1 Combinations for the multiple acts (symbols and education) and multiple actors (Muslims and Christians) approach with percentages of classified respondents

Combination	Symbols		Education		Interpretation	Percentages in the samples	
	Christian	**Muslim**	**Christian**	**Muslim**		**Five countries (N=1,580)**	**Three countries (N=739)**
C1.	Accept	Accept	Accept	Accept	Equally accepting	16.6%	19.4%
C2.	Reject	Reject	Accept	Accept	Equally partly rejecting	28.9%	27.3%
C3.	Accept	Accept	Reject	Reject			
C4.	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Equally rejecting	15.3%	8.4%
C5.	Reject	Reject	Accept	Reject	Discriminatory rejecting	39.2%	44.9%
C6.	Accept	Reject	Reject	Reject			
C7.	Accept	Accept	Accept	Reject			
C8.	Accept	Reject	Accept	Accept			
C9.	Accept	Reject	Accept	Reject			

With this approach, we can logically distinguish between subgroups of individuals with different patterns of responses. The first four patterns represent a more general position characterized by an equal rejection or acceptance of the acts (rows C1–C4). Regardless of whether they accept or reject practices, these individuals do not apply a double standard by making a distinction between Muslims and Christians. Within this equal position, we can logically distinguish between those who are consistently accepting the acts for both groups (C1 – *equally accepting*), those who are consistently rejecting the acts for both groups (C4 – *equally rejecting*), and those who are partly accepting/rejecting by displaying inconsistency across acts (C2 and C3 – *equally partly rejecting*). The remaining patterns reflect discriminatory rejection, characterized by a double-standard in which there is the rejection of act(s) when performed by Muslims but not by Christians (C5–C9 – *discriminatory rejecting*).

This approach gives a more detailed and nuanced understanding of people's responses toward Muslim minorities. It allows us to examine the proportions of those showing different forms of equal and discriminatory rejection (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). Additionally, the distinction between equal and discriminatory rejection can be further examined by testing whether the subgroups differ in terms of prejudices toward Muslims, endorsement of secular values and civil liberties, and religious affiliation.

4.1.3 The role of prejudice, principles and religious affiliation

Prejudice. The rejection of Muslim practices is often linked to prejudice, which is examined, for example, in terms of negative stereotypes (e.g. Saroglou et al., 2009), xenophobia (Helbling, 2014), outgroup hostility (Erisen & Kentmen-Cin, 2017), general feelings of dislike or feelings of cultural threat (Bilodeau et al., 2018). Regardless of the specific operationalization used, the findings are similar: prejudice is positively related to the rejection of Muslim religious practices (e.g. Bilodeau et al., 2018; Erisen & Kentmen-Cin, 2017), and increases the likelihood of rejecting Muslim compared to Christian religious practices (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). We expected that individuals with stronger prejudicial feelings towards Muslims (higher social distance and higher perceived cultural threat) will be more likely to display *discriminatory rejecting* (C5–C9, Table 4.1) than *equally rejecting* (C4) pattern or responses. We did not expect prejudicial feelings to have an effect on displaying different patterns of equal responses (C1–C4) as these patterns do not involve the use of a double standard at the disadvantage of Muslims.

Principles

Civil liberties. The endorsement of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom of expression, is a reason for accepting dissenting religious practices in the public domain (Verkuyten et al., 2019). Recognizing the right of each citizens to express their views and live the life they want is related to political and social tolerance (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). People who emphasize the importance of protecting individual rights and freedoms tend to be more accepting of minority practices (Helbling, 2014). For example, valuing civil liberties was associated with lower support for banning headscarves in Germany (Van der Noll, 2014). Further, Saroglou et al. (2009) showed that those who value freedom more tend to be more accepting of Muslim religious symbols. And those who emphasize that the state should not restrict individual choices, tend to express less negative attitudes towards veiling (Gustavsson et al., 2016). Therefore, we expected that stronger endorsement of civil liberties will be associated with higher likelihood of being classified in the *equally accepting* (C1) and *equally partly rejecting* (C2–C3), compared to *equally rejecting* (C4) subgroups.

Secularalism. Research has demonstrated that secularism predicts rejection of Muslim religious practices on top of negative feelings towards Muslims as a group (Van Bohemen et al., 2011). Secular critique involves an objection to religious interference in governmental affairs and public institutions, which can form the ground for rejecting Muslim minority practices (Imhoff &

Recker, 2012). In a German study, respondents were asked if public schools should offer only Christian education, both Christian and Islamic education or no religious education at all. It was found that secular principles play a role in rejecting Islamic education, net off negative attitudes towards Muslims (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). A study in Sweden comparing the willingness to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols (Aarøe, 2012) found that those who support secularism do not differentiate between the banning of Christians' and Muslims' symbols. Further, Breton and Eady (2015) showed that secular beliefs predicted support for a ban on religious symbols in Quebec, in addition to prejudicial feelings. Similar findings were reported in another study in Quebec, which compared the willingness to ban only Muslim religious symbols (by supporting the Charter of Values) to both Christian and Muslim religious symbols in public spaces (support for removing the crucifix from the National Assembly in addition to support for the Charter of Values; Bilodeau et al., 2018). Therefore, we expected that endorsement of secularism will be associated with higher likelihood of being classified in the *equally rejecting* (C4) compared to *equally accepting* (C1), *equally partly rejecting* (C2–C3) and *discriminatory rejecting* (C5–C9) subgroups.

Religious affiliation. Being affiliated with Christian religion might be another reason for rejecting Muslim religious practices. Social Identity Theory proposes that being a member of a group results in the tendency to favor members of one's in-group and discriminate against out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). There is a large amount of empirical evidence supporting this ingroup favoring pattern of intergroup relations. Therefore, individuals affiliated with Christian religion might be inclined to favor their own religion and religious in-group members. For example, a predominantly Christian sample in the US was found to have more positive attitudes toward Christians than Muslims (Rowatt et al., 2005). Thus, those affiliated with Christianity can be expected to be more accepting of Christians than of Muslims engaging in the same practices. In contrast, for religiously unaffiliated individuals both Muslims and Christians are religious out-groups and they might be more likely to reject the same practices for both groups. Therefore, we expected that, compared to Christians, religiously unaffiliated individuals will be more likely to display *equally rejecting* (C4) than *equal accepting* (C1), *equally partly rejecting* (C2–C3) and *discriminatory rejecting* (C5–C9) pattern of responses.

4.2 Method

4.2.1 Data and sample

Data for the study are from the majority members of the EURISLAM research project that focused on national identity, citizenship and the incorporation of Muslims in six European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK; Hoksbergen & Tillie, 2012). Participants were randomly selected members of the national majority older than 18 years. The data were collected over the course of 2011 and the first month of 2012 by professional poling agencies using computer-assisted telephone-interviewing. In total, 2,317 majority members participated. Response rates varied from 31% in the Netherlands to 92% in the UK.

For the descriptive analysis, we focused on national majority members who were either Christian or religiously unaffiliated and who provided an answer to all four items regarding Muslim and Christian religious practices (N = 2,097).[24] Further, the very small number of participants who accepted practices for Muslims but rejected these for Christians were excluded since they were not of interest in our study. In addition, we excluded the UK data from the analyses because in this country participants were asked about public rather than state schools. The former are selective private schools that are typically affiliated with or established by Christian denominations and therefore almost all British respondents displayed discriminatory rejection. This reduced the sample size to 1,580 respondents.

Finally, the explanatory analyses focused on respondents from Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, who provided information on all of the variables of interest (N = 739). Questions on several predictor variables were not asked in France and the Netherlands. Thus, these countries could not be considered in the explanatory analyses, although they were considered in the descriptive analyses.

4.2.2 Measures

Dependent variable. In order to classify people into the different subgroups (Table 4.1), we used the four items that assessed the acceptance of two religious practices for both Christians and Muslims: “Public schools should offer < Muslim/Christian > religious education for those who want it”, “Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear a veil" and "Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear visible Christian symbols such as a cross or a nun's habit." The items were presented in random order and respondents indicated on a 4-point scale whether they (strongly) agreed or (strongly) disagreed with each of the four items. For each of these, we computed a dichotomous variable indicating either acceptance or rejection. There were two main reasons for doing so. First, we are theoretically interested in the multiple-act-multiple-actors pattern of rejection versus acceptance, rather than the degree of rejection or acceptance. Second, using an ordinal variable with four categories as a continuous variable can lead to biased estimates (Rhemtulla et al., 2012). Thus, participants were classified into four groups: those who showed acceptance across the groups and across the acts (*equally accepting*; C1 in Table 4.1), those who consistently rejected across groups and acts (*equally rejecting*; C4); those who were consistent across groups but act inconsistent (*equally partly rejecting*; C2–C3) and those who responded in a double standard way in which they discriminated against Muslims (*discriminatory rejecting*; C5–C9).[25]

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[24] Analytic scripts can be found at https://osf.io/bjuey/.

Independent variables. Prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims were assessed with two measures: social distance and perceived cultural threat. Social distance was measured with six items. Four items were measured on 3-point scales (for example, "Imagine that you got a Muslim neighbor, would you find that pleasant, unpleasant or would it not make a difference to you?"), and two additional items were measured on 4-point scales (for example, "I try to avoid places where there are a lot of Muslims"). Responses to each item were normalized to range from 0 to 1 so that higher scores indicate higher social distance. The items formed a scale with an acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .76$) and were thus averaged ($M = 0.47$, $SD = 0.16$; for the estimates per country see Table A4.2.1 in Appendix 4.2).[26]

Cultural threat was calculated as the average score of four items measured on 4-point scales (for example, "Muslims are trying to destroy Western culture").

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[25] We explored an alternative way of clustering whereby within the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup we differentiated between those who consistently discriminated against Muslims (C9), those who discriminated against Muslims in one act but accepted the engagement in the other act (C7–C8), and those who discriminated Muslims on one act and rejected the engagement of both groups in the other act (C5–C6). Comparing abovementioned categories with the *equally rejecting* subgroup revealed similar findings as when all the discriminatory categories were merged (Table A4.3.2 in Appendix 4.3).

[26] An alternative way of coding based on standardized items revealed the same pattern of results (Table A4.3.3 in Appendix 4.3).

The four items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .77$) and a higher score indicates higher perceived cultural threat ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 0.67$, Table A4.2.1).

Secularism was measured on a 5-point scale by the following item: "It would be better for < country > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office." The response scale was reversed so that a higher score indicated stronger support for secularism ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 1.22$; Table A4.2.1).

Civil liberty was measured on a 5-point scale by the following item: "Everybody has the right to say whatever he or she wants in public." A higher score indicates higher agreement with civil liberty ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 1.09$; Table A4.2.1).

Being religiously unaffiliated refers to individuals who reported being atheist or not belonging to any religious affiliation (21%; Table A4.2.1), versus self-reported affiliation to a Christian (i.e. Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox) denomination.[27]

Control variables

Demographic characteristics. We controlled for age, gender and education. For age we subtracted respondents' birth year from the year in which the data were collected (2011; $M = 49.7$, $SD = 17.3$; Table A4.2.1). The per cent of female respondents in our sample was 54.5 (Table A4.2.1). Further, since the frequencies of those who completed only primary education or did not complete any education were low, the original variable was recoded into a bicategorical variable. Respondents who completed secondary education or lower were classified into a "low education" category, whereas those who completed tertiary education were classified into a "high education" category. The per cent of high education was 41.1 (Table A4.2.1).

Countries. The sample for the explanatory analyses consisted of citizens from Belgium, Switzerland and Germany. These countries differ in various respects. In 2010, a year before the EURISLAM fieldwork, the percentage of Muslim citizens living in these countries was 6%, 4.9%, and 4.1%, respectively (Pew Research Center, 2017). Most of Muslims living in Belgium are of Moroccan and Turkish origin (Manço, 2000), whereas those living in Switzerland or

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[27] Participants were also asked about their religious identification. However, the question was only asked to those who reported being religiously affiliated, which substantially reduced the sample size. Despite this, considering religious identification instead of religious affiliation (Table A4.3.4 in Appendix 4.3) revealed the same pattern of findings.

Germany come from Turkey or ex-Yugoslavia (Lathion, 2008; Thielmann, 2008). All three countries are characterized by a regime that entails cooperation between state and church, but differ in the extent to which they accommodate non-Christian religions, with Belgium being the most accommodating (Carol et al., 2015; Fox, 2012). Existing research does not provide consistent evidence about the extent to which these regimes influence individual level attitudes towards religious outgroups and their practices (Carol et al., 2015; Fetzer & Soper, 2003; Helbling & Traunmüller, 2020). Therefore, we controlled for country differences, with Belgium as the reference category. In addition, we examined the robustness of the findings across the countries to assess the generalizability of the pattern of "act-actor" responses and their correlates. For this, we conducted a multi-group comparison which indicates whether the associations found are similar across countries.

4.2.3 Analyses

In the first step of the analyses, descriptive statistics were computed for the different "act-actor approaches". In the second step, multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to estimate the likelihood of being classified in the *equally accepting*, *equally partly rejecting* or *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups compared to the *equally rejecting* subgroup. In the third step, multi-group multinomial logistic regression was performed to test if the effects were robust across countries.

4.3 Results

4.3.1 Descriptive findings

The one-act-one-actor approach indicates that 49% of the respondents did not approve of Muslim religious education (Graph A1 in Figure 4.1; see Figure A4.2.1 in Appendix 4.2 for the analytic sample), and 72% of Muslim teachers wearing religious symbols in public schools (Graph B1). These numbers should, however, not be interpreted as suggesting that a majority of respondents was biased against Muslims. When the Christian actor is taken into account (the one-act-two-actors approach), 56% of those who objected toward Muslim education also objected toward Christian education (Graph A2). Furthermore, 62% of those who rejected Muslim symbols also rejected Christian symbols (Graph B2). Thus, there are relatively high percentages of consistent responses towards Muslims and Christians, suggesting no double standard against Muslims for many of the respondents who rejected Muslim religious practices.



Figure 4.1 Percentages of rejection of Muslim religious practices (A1 and B1) and percentage of rejection of Christian practices among those who rejected Muslim practices (A2 and B2): the pooled sample from five countries (N = 1,580)

When both acts and actors are considered simultaneously (the multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach, Table 4.1), around 61% (55% in the three countries) of respondents belong to one of the equal subgroups with 17% (19%) *equally accepting*, 15% (8%) *equally rejecting,* and 29% (27%) *equally partly rejecting*. The remaining 39% (45%) respondents are *discriminatory rejecting* (for the percentages per country see Table A4.1.2 in Appendix 4.1). These percentages provide a nuanced picture of the different ways in which majority members evaluate Muslim practices, thereby demonstrating the benefits of the multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach over the other approaches.

4.3.2 The predictive analyses

The results of multinomial logistic models comparing the *equally rejecting* subgroup (C4, Table 4.1) with *discriminatory rejecting* (C5–C9), *equally partly rejecting* (C2–C3) and *equally accepting* (C1), respectively revealed, as expected, that social distance was associated with higher likelihood of *discriminatory* than *equally rejecting* (see Model 1 in Table 4.2 for results of the pooled sample; see Table A4.3.1 in Appendix 4.3 for odd ratios). However, perceived cultural threat did not predict higher likelihood of being in the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup compared to *equally rejecting* subgroup, but was associated with a lower likelihood of *equally accepting* than *equally rejecting*.

Our expectations were confirmed for civil liberties and secular values. Those who were less in favor of freedom of speech and those endorsing secularism were more likely to be in the *equally rejecting* subgroup compared to the *equally accepting*, *equally partly rejecting* and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups. Furthermore and also as expected, the religiously unaffiliated were more likely to be *equally rejecting* than *equally accepting* or *discriminatory rejecting*. However, religious affiliation did not significantly predict classification in the *equally rejecting* compared to *equally partly rejecting* subgroup.

4.3.3 Country comparisons

The country main effects indicated that respondents from Switzerland were more likely to display *equally rejecting* than *equally accepting* or *equally partly rejecting* pattern or responses compared to participants from Belgium. Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 4.2 show little variation in the estimates between countries. There were differences in the statistical significance of effects due to the smaller sample sizes but the direction of effects was mostly consistent. The one exception was a cultural threat, which was associated with a lower likelihood of equally rejecting compared to other forms of rejection/acceptance in Switzerland but not in the other countries. In order to examine whether the overall pattern of associations was similar across the three countries, we compared the model for the pooled sample (Model 1) to a model in which the effects of all the main predictors were constrained to be the same in all countries. There was no significant difference between the constrained and the unconstrained model, Wald $\chi 2$ (48) = 61.01, p = .098, which indicates that there is a similar pattern of associations between the different variables in the three countries.

Table 4.2 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (equal rejection as the reference category)

	Model 1 Pooled sample, N=739		**Model 2 Belgium, N=259**		**Model 3 Switzerland, N=234**		**Model 4 Germany, N=246**	
	Log odds (SE)		**Log odds (SE)**		**Log odds (SE)**		**Log odds (SE)**	
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	1.36	(1.14)	4.38*	(1.89)	-1.90	(1.64)	3.07	(2.74)
Country (ref. Belgium)								
Switzerland	-0.61	(0.39)						
Germany	0.14	(0.47)						
Gender (ref. male)	0.07	(0.30)	-0.28	(0.49)	0.67	(0.44)	-0.64	(0.71)
Education (ref. lower edu.)	-0.28	(0.33)	-1.00	(0.56)	0.53	(0.56)	-0.29	(0.73)
Age	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	-0.02	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.02)
Social distance	2.95*	(1.26)	1.89	(2.11)	2.60	(1.71)	6.98	(4.08)
Cultural threat	0.15	(0.26)	-0.35	(0.47)	1.05*	(0.41)	-1.45*	(0.64)
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.87*	(0.34)	-0.89	(0.57)	-0.21	(0.62)	-2.95**	(1.04)
Secularism	-0.63***	(0.16)	-0.74**	(0.27)	-0.52*	(0.24)	-0.82	(0.59)
Civil liberty	0.42**	(0.13)	0.16	(0.19)	0.52**	(0.20)	1.13*	(0.46)
Equally accepting (=1)								
Intercept	5.65***	(1.29)	10.32***	(2.22)	0.27	(2.18)	9.14**	(3.35)
Country (ref. Belgium)								
Switzerland	-1.36**	(0.44)						
Germany	0.36	(0.50)						
Gender (ref. male)	0.40	(0.33)	0.10	(0.57)	0.81	(0.54)	-0.16	(0.72)
Education (ref. lower edu.)	-0.51	(0.37)	-0.80	(0.64)	0.31	(0.70)	-0.88	(0.76)
Age	-0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.02)
Social distance	-0.51	(1.51)	-4.24	(2.75)	-0.08	(2.57)	4.11	(4.19)
Cultural threat	-0.96**	(0.30)	-1.97**	(0.59)	0.37	(0.49)	-2.66***	(0.73)
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.85*	(0.39)	-1.04	(0.63)	-0.32	(0.76)	-2.68**	(1.03)
Secularism	-0.80***	(0.17)	-1.02**	(0.31)	-0.68*	(0.27)	-0.98	(0.59)
Civil liberty	0.49**	(0.16)	0.33	(0.23)	0.57**	(0.22)	1.04*	(0.47)
Equally partly rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	3.33**	(1.19)	7.00***	(2.04)	-1.45	(1.77)	5.43	(2.91)
Country (ref. Belgium)								
Switzerland	-1.58***	(0.40)						
Germany	-0.39	(0.48)						
Gender (ref. male)	0.04	(0.31)	-0.23	(0.49)	0.50	(0.49)	-0.54	(0.70)
Education (ref. lower edu.)	-0.22	(0.34)	-1.03	(0.57)	0.79	(0.61)	-0.23	(0.73)
Age	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.02)	-0.01	(0.02)
Social distance	-0.21	(1.35)	-2.20	(2.27)	2.64	(2.00)	2.16	(4.05)
Cultural threat	-0.26	(0.27)	-0.76	(0.46)	0.31	(0.46)	-1.70**	(0.61)

Table 4.2 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (equal rejection as the reference category) (continued)

	Model 1 Pooled sample, N=739		**Model 2 Belgium, N=259**		**Model 3 Switzerland, N=234**		**Model 4 Germany, N=246**	
	Log odds (SE)		**Log odds (SE)**		**Log odds (SE)**		**Log odds (SE)**	
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.10	(0.34)	-0.09	(0.54)	0.47	(0.65)	-1.91	(0.97)
Secularism	-0.60***	(0.16)	-0.81**	(0.29)	-0.47	(0.26)	-0.75	(0.58)
Civil liberty	0.44**	(0.14)	0.27	(0.19)	0.42*	(0.21)	1.07**	(0.41)

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

4.4 Discussion

The current study examined the acceptance of Muslim practices that continue to be much debated in Western Europe, namely the wearing of a headscarf in public schools and Islamic public education. The aim of our study was to show that an approach that simultaneously considers different religious groups (actors) and different religious practices (acts) provides a nuanced understanding of the different patterns of rejection or acceptance of Muslim minority practices. Furthermore, by examining how different forms of rejection relate to prejudices towards Muslims, civil liberties and secular values, and religious affiliation, we tried to improve our understanding about why people reject or accept Muslim minority practices.

An important advantage of a multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach is that it makes possible to differentiate between discriminatory and equal rejection. Much of the previous research on anti-Muslim feelings has considered only Muslim practices which can lead to the misidentification of individuals as either having negative or positive feelings toward Muslims. For example, around half of the respondents in our sample who rejected Muslim practices also rejected the same practices for Christians. This indicates that half of those who rejected a Muslim practice were not applying a double standard in which Muslims are discriminated against. Furthermore, whereas half of the people responded in an actor-inconsistent way by rejecting only Muslim practices (*discriminatory rejecting*), around a third displayed actor-consistent rejection, either by rejecting all practices for both groups (*equally rejecting*) or only one of the practices for both groups (*equally partly rejecting*). These findings provide empirical support for the existence of general rejection in addition to the discriminatory rejection of Muslim minority practices (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). It is therefore likely that previous research has overestimated the role of antipathy toward

Muslims in explaining the rejection of specific Muslim practices, which is also suggested by experimental research (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018; Sleijpen et al., 2020).

The findings regarding the role of secularism, religious affiliation and prejudices toward Muslims further support this interpretation. Equal rejection is more likely to be based on secular values for which there is empirical support (Bilodeau et al., 2018; Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). In contrast, discriminatory rejection involves a pattern of Muslim specific opposition, and Christian affiliation (vs. non-religious) and higher social distance were found to be related to a higher likelihood of displaying discriminatory rejection of Muslim practices. These findings are in line with Social Identity Theory according to which group belonging promotes ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and with findings that feelings of antipathy can underlie the discrimination of Muslim minorities (Saroglou et al., 2009; Van der Noll, 2014).

Unlike social distance, perceived cultural threat was not significantly related to a higher likelihood of being classified in the *discriminatory rejecting* compared to *equally rejecting* subgroup. Although perceptions of cultural threat are related to anti-Muslim feelings (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), it might be that cultural threat reflects more general concerns about incompatible moral values that challenge social cohesion and the functioning of society. According to Mouritsen and Olsen (2013), one of the modalities of equal rejection is the perception that the national unity is undermined. Furthermore, in experimental research, it is found that practices that are considered to contradict society's normative and moral ways of life are rejected independently of the religious minority group engaged in them (Hirsch et al., 2019; Sleijpen et al., 2020). The notion that perceived cultural incompatibilities can drive equal rejection is further supported by our finding that higher cultural threat—but not social distance—was associated with a higher likelihood of displaying equal rejection compared to equal acceptance. While individuals who rejected both practices for both religious groups (equally rejecting) and those who accepted both practices for both groups (equally accepting) had similar social distance towards Muslims, the former perceived Muslim practices as more incompatible with the western way of life.

Another advantage of the multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach is the possibility to examine whether different forms of equal rejection are guided by different principles. While individuals who were *equally rejecting* endorsed secularism more strongly and those *equally accepting* endorsed freedom of speech, individuals who displayed equally partly rejecting pattern of responses were in-between. They were more in favor of freedom of speech than those equally rejecting and more in favor of secularism than those equal accepting (for the latter comparison see Table A4.3.5 in Appendix 4.3). Individuals with an equally partly rejecting pattern of responses (group-consistent and act-inconsistent) are particularly interesting for two reasons. First, these individuals demonstrate that rejection or acceptance does not have to generalize across different acts. This indicates that it is not very useful to think of acceptance as a concept that implies a positive attitude toward all forms of dissenting practices (Gibson, 2005a). Second, it suggests that people are not always clearly guided by a single principle or value but can follow different principles that might be conflicting. This raises the question for future research of how different principles and values are used in accepting or rejecting Muslim practices (e.g. Peffley et al., 2001).

4.4.1 Limitations

Four limitations of our study provide additional directions for future research. First, our multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach focused on two acts and two actors. This is an improvement compared to most of the research on people's attitudes towards Muslims in Western societies. However, it is still limited as it is possible to consider more religious groups and a wider range of practices, which might introduce further nuances in our understanding of the rejection of Muslim practices. Specifically, it offers the possibility to more fully examine the breadth (number of religious groups) and depth (number of practices) of rejection and acceptance (Mondak & Sanders, 2003).

Second, we cannot rule out the possibility that social desirability response tendencies affected the findings but it is difficult to estimate in what direction. Some people may perceive strong social norms in favor of Christians over Muslims and may thus feel obliged to express support for Christian but not for Muslim practices. In line with such social norms, U.S. researchers found that respondents favored Christian over Muslim immigrants in an explicit survey question but not in an unobtrusive measure of bias (Creighton & Jamal, 2015). Other people may perceive strong social norms of fairness that prevent the open expression of double standards. Asking the same question for different social groups in a survey, as it was the case here, can affect results if respondents favor one group over the other but do not want to violate fairness norms (Stark et al., 2020). Thus, it is possible that some people accepted Muslim practices because they just said that they accept the same practices by Christians or that they rejected Christian practices because they just rejected the same practices by Muslims. The role of social desirability concerns is likely to fluctuate not only between people but also in time and across contexts, which makes it difficult to assess whether and how exactly these concerns might affect the current findings.

Third, although our findings provide evidence that the rejection of Muslim religious practices among those in the equally rejecting subgroup is based on secular principles rather than prejudicial feelings towards Muslims, this does not imply that those equally rejecting are without prejudices. For example, it is possible that individuals who reject religious practices for all religious groups harbor more general form of prejudicial feelings, such as feelings towards religious people. In addition to examining feelings towards Muslims, future studies could examine how prejudicial feelings towards different religious groups (e.g., Christians, Jews), as well as feelings towards non-believers affect the rejection or acceptance of religious practices.

Forth, our findings show that being affiliated with Christian religion (vs. non-affiliated) had opposite effects: Christians were more likely to display equal acceptance as well as discriminatory rejection. These contrasting results might be explained by whether Christians endorse social inclusive versus exclusive religious beliefs and values (Schaffer et al., 2015). While the former are characterized by a more open and welcoming orientation toward minority groups, the latter involve the believe that minorities should be avoided and excluded. Future studies on the rejection of Muslim practices should distinguish between these different dimensions and forms of religiosity and religious belonging (Djupe, 2015).

4.5 Conclusion

We demonstrated that a multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of the rejection of Muslim minority practices in Western societies. The findings were similar across the different countries and indicate that there are different meaningful subgroups of majority members. People who reject Muslim minority practices can either reject or accept similar practices for Christians, and accepting a particular practice of both Muslims and Christians does not have to mean that other religious practices of these groups are also accepted. The distinction between equal and discriminatory rejection is important because it prevents us from making anti-Muslim attributions to those who have more general objections to religious practices in public life and thereby provides a further understanding of the public and political controversies over the accommodation of Muslims in Western societies.

The multiple-acts-multiple-actors approach can be applied to a wide range of societal issues and minority groups (e.g. Sniderman et al., 1989). Its usefulness is not limited to people's responses to Muslim minorities but can provide valuable insights about intergroup relations in culturally diverse societies more generally. In many situations, it is important to know whether people feel negative towards a particular minority group or toward specific practices of that group, or a combination of the two. The presented approach makes it possible to gain a more detailed insight into people's evaluations of (religious) minority groups and their practices which is important for finding productive ways for accommodating differences in our increasingly diverse societies.

CHAPTER 5

The rejection and acceptance of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian practices[28]

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[28] A slightly different version of this chapter is published as: Dangubić, M., Yogeeswaran, K., Verkuyten, M., & Sibley, C. G. (2022). The rejection and acceptance of Muslim minority practices: A person-centered approach. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/13684302211067967. Marija Dangubić co-designed the study, performed the analyses and drafted the manuscript. Kumar Yogeeswaran and Maykel Verkuyten contributed to the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript. Chris Sibley assisted with the analyses and critically reviewed the manuscript.

5.1 Introduction

Muslim religious practices[29], such as wearing a headscarf, building of minarets, ritual slaughtering of animals, or Islamic education in primary schools, are often rejected by the public in Western societies (Carol et al., 2015). Many studies have found Islamophobia or anti-Muslim prejudice as an important reason why majority group members reject such practices (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Oskooii et al., 2019; Saroglou et al., 2009). Theoretically, this explanation is in line with social psychological literature on target-group prejudices (e.g., anti-Muslim sentiments, anti-immigrant attitudes) underlying majority members' negative reactions towards specific minority practices and rights (Verkuyten, 2021; Wagner et al., 2021). However, people may reject specific practices for other reasons that are unrelated to group-based prejudice. For example, an atheist may reject Islamic primary schools, but simultaneously reject any kind of religious education. Similarly, an animal rights activist may not only reject ritual slaughter of animals among Muslims, but also among any other group based on their principled considerations about animal welfare. In such cases, focusing only on people's rejection of a certain practice can miss out on their nuanced responses to outgroup practices. Theoretically, this would make it difficult to understand those situations in which people disapprove of specific outgroup beliefs and practices, but not of the outgroup as a category of people (i.e., Muslims). In the current research, we use a person-centered approach to simultaneously consider majority group members' acceptance or rejection of multiple religious practices, and how these responses may vary depending on whether Christians, Jews, or Muslims engage in them.

5.1.1 Generalized prejudice

The literature on generalized prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; Bergh & Akrami, 2016; Hodson & Dhont, 2015; Meeusen et al., 2018) suggests that rejection of outgroup practices and rights often reflects a general dislike of minority outgroups, and can also be used to justify anti-minority feelings (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). The proposition of generalized prejudice was developed around the notion that prejudices towards different target outgroups have a common component, especially prejudices towards marginalized groups (Bergh et al., 2016; Zick et al., 2008). In addition to this shared aspect of prejudice, it has been argued that there is also a specific component unique to the target groups (Akrami et al., 2011; Meeusen et al., 2017). For example, in the U.S. context, an empirical distinction was found between people's attitudes toward categories that are defined by racial, ethnic, and religious background and their attitudes towards dissenting cultural groups, with anti-Muslim sentiments being connected to both attitudes (Kalkan et al., 2009; see also Petersen et al., 2011).

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[29] We use the term "Muslim religious practices" to indicate the way these practices are often perceived in society. We are not implying that these are defining of, or typical for, Muslims.

However, there are two main shortcomings of this literature that we consider in the current study. First, the work on generalized and target-specific prejudice focuses on attitudes towards outgroups as groups of people and tends to ignore how people evaluate different outgroup practices and beliefs. Seeing all rejection of dissimilar practices through the lens of prejudice can miss out on the practice-specific aspect of rejection and thus on the practice-related variance in outgroup attitudes (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Chanley, 1994; Dangubić et al., 2020a). Anti-Muslim sentiments might not only reflect generalized and target-specific prejudice, but also practice-based disapproval. Furthermore, practice-based disapproval does not have to reflect generalized or target-specific prejudice, because people might have other reasons for rejecting specific minority practices in society. Disapproval and rejection might arise from principled commitments and values that have little to do with prejudicial feelings. For example, rejection of Muslim minority practices might stem from the endorsement of liberal and secular principles (e.g., Bilodeau et al., 2018; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015; see also Bobocel et al., 1998). The antipathy of generalized and target-specific prejudice might differ from the negativity of practice-based disapproval, and the considerations behind rejection of specific practices might differ from the justifications to express prejudice (Verkuyten et al., 2020).

Second, research testing generalized prejudice theory predominantly uses a variable-centered approach in examining correlations between attitudes towards various targets and their underlying common (latent) factor (e.g., Akrami et al., 2011; Bergh et al., 2016; Meeusen et al., 2017). However, a strong correlation does not necessarily indicate generalized negativity but might indicate general positivity or an overall relatively neutral stance towards various target groups and their practices: "In other words, the [variable-centered] analyses are blind to the magnitude (or even existence) of prejudice across target groups" (Meeusen et al., 2018, p. 646). Furthermore, variable-centered approaches risk overlooking the possibility that people combine their evaluations in different ways, resulting in subgroups of individuals with distinct constellations of ratings (Dangubić et al., 2020b; Meeusen et al., 2018). A person-centered approach, such as latent profile analysis, enables a theoretically more nuanced and qualitatively different understanding of the ways in which outgroup prejudice and the disapproval of outgroup practices are organized within individuals (Osborne & Sibley, 2017). For example, generalized prejudice, anti-Muslim sentiments, and secular principles might all underlie disapproval and rejection of Muslim minority practices, but these factors might be combined in different ways within individuals. Therefore, we consider whether there are subgroups of individuals that differ not only on their prejudicial feelings towards various (non)religious groups, but also on their national identification, open-minded thinking style (Stanovich & West, 1997), and endorsement of secularism and civil liberties (Imhoff & Recker, 2012; Verkuyten et al., 2019). These constructs are central in many studies on attitudes toward Muslim minorities and (in)tolerance more generally, but have not been examined simultaneously in relation to people's evaluations of multiple religious groups and multiple religious practices. Additionally, using an open-ended format, we investigated subgroups' differences in self-reported reasons for rejecting Muslim minority practices.

The aim of the current study, conducted with national samples of German and Dutch majority group participants, is to go beyond the generalized and target-specific prejudice explanations for the rejection of specific outgroup practices by aiming to provide a more nuanced understanding of the rejection of Muslim minority practices. We use a multiple-acts-multiple-actors research design in which multiple religious groups and multiple religious practices are considered simultaneously (Dangubić et al., 2020a). Specifically, we examine acceptance of four religious practices enacted by Jewish minority members, in addition to Muslim minorities and the Christian majority. The rejection of both Jews and Muslims (but not Christians) engaging in similar religious practices might indicate a minority bias (Bergh et al., 2016) in which people apply a double standard by accepting the majority group (Christian) and rejecting minority groups (Jews and Muslims). In contrast, the rejection of only Muslims engaging in these practices might indicate anti-Muslim sentiments in which people apply a double standard by allowing religious practices for Jews and Christians while rejecting these practices for Muslims.

5.1.2 Multiple acts and multiple actors: Possible subgroups of individuals

Latent profile analysis is a person-centered approach that seeks to identify unobserved subgroups of individuals that qualitatively differ on the particular ways in which they combine or organize, for example, their evaluation of different groups and of different practices (Osborne & Sibley, 2017). For example, person-centered research examining people's attitudes towards various minority outgroups found five prejudice patterns that could not be organized along a linear continuum of a more-versus-less prejudiced dispositions (Meeusen et al., 2018). In addition to a general negative subgroup, there was a moderate subgroup, a general positive subgroup, and also a subgroup that was only prejudiced towards ethnic minorities and a subgroup that differentiated between ethnic outgroups. Further, research on political tolerance of various groups and various practices demonstrated that there are four latent classes of tolerance (McCutcheon, 1985). In addition to subgroups of individuals who were consistently positive or consistently negative across practices and minority groups, there were also individuals who accepted some groups and some practices but rejected others (see also Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Dangubić et al., 2020b; Mather & Tranby, 2014). Thus, a person-centered approach allows us to investigate whether the acceptance of different religious practices for different religious groups is combined in distinctive ways within various subgroups of individuals, which is reflected in distinct latent profiles.

When different religious groups are considered, it is possible to examine whether people respond to these groups in a consistent way by accepting or rejecting a specific religious practice (actor consistency), or rather apply a double standard by rejecting the practice for Muslim minorities but not for other religious groups (actor inconsistency). While an actor-inconsistent pattern of response indicates discriminatory evaluation of Muslims that likely reflects prejudice towards this group, an actor-consistent pattern of response suggests more general reasons for rejection or acceptance (Dangubić et al., 2020a; Mondak & Hurwitz, 1998). Additionally, when different religious practices are considered, it is possible to examine whether people evaluate various religious practices in a similar way (act consistency) or rather differentiate between these practices by accepting some and rejecting others (act inconsistency). Furthermore, considering both different religious practices (multiple acts) and different religious groups (multiple actors) allows us to assess whether an actor-(in)consistent pattern of responses generalizes across practices or is specific to a particular one. For example, it is possible that people use a double standard for one practice but not another: rejecting Muslim but not Christian and Jewish religious symbols, while accepting religious education in public schools for all religious groups.

When multiple acts and multiple actors are considered simultaneously, there are four possible logical combinations of responses depending on whether people display consistency or inconsistency across acts and actors. This results in the theoretical expectation that there are five different profiles (see Table 5.1). The first combination consists of responses in which people display consistency across actors and across acts by either rejecting all acts for all religious groups (*equally rejecting* profile) or rather accepting all acts for all groups (*equally accepting* profile). The former response pattern might, for example, be the result of concerns about the secular nature of public institutions or having a more general prejudicial or antireligious orientation, and the latter pattern might be due to endorsing civil liberties or having an open-minded and pro-religious orientation (Dangubić et al., 2020a).

The second possible combination consists of responses where people are inconsistent across acts but consistent across actors (*equally partly rejecting* profile). This pattern implies that some practices are rejected (e.g., religious education in public schools) and others accepted (e.g., wearing of religious symbols) but equally for all religious groups. Thus, people do not use a double standard by differentiating between actors but base their responses on the nature of the practices in question (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Petersen et al., 2011). As different practices can trigger different considerations and concerns, differentiation in the acceptance of these practices indicates that respondents take the specific act into account and that their response is not only driven by generalized or target-specific prejudice (Dangubić et al., 2020a).

The third possible combination consists of responses in which people are inconsistent across actors but consistent across acts (*discriminatory rejecting* profile). This use of a double standard indicates discriminatory rejection in which one is, for example, intolerant of practices by Muslim minorities but not by Christians or Jews. Thus, within this profile, individuals use a double standard to the disadvantage of Muslims, which suggests anti-Muslim rather than generalized prejudice (Dangubić et al., 2020a; Mondak & Hurwitz, 1998).

The fourth possible pattern of responses is when people display inconsistency both across acts and across actors (*discriminatory partly* rejecting). This pattern of a partial discriminatory rejection implies that individuals respond in a differential way to different religious groups depending on the specific practice. For example, it is possible that people discriminate against Muslims when asked about religious education in schools, but discriminate against Jews when asked about religious symbols, or even reject religious symbols for all three religious groups involved. In general, the existence of this subgroup suggests a complex interplay between generalized and group specific prejudices and other reasons.

Table 5.1 Possible combination of multiple acts-multiple actors approach and their interpretation

	Act (in) consistency	Actor (in) consistency	Possible profiles	Example
1	Act consistent	Actor consistent	Equally rejecting Equally accepting	Rejects/accepts religious symbols, religious education and broadcasting time for Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious actors
2	Act inconsistent	Actor consistent	Equally partly rejecting	Rejects religious symbols and religious education, but accepts broadcasting time for Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious actors
3	Act consistent	Actor inconsistent	Discriminatory rejecting	Rejects Muslim but accepts Jewish and Christian religious symbols, religious education and broadcasting time on national TV.
4	Act inconsistent	Actor inconsistent	Discriminatory partly rejecting	Rejects only Muslim and Jewish religious symbols and religious education, but accepts broadcasting time on national TV for Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious actors.

With a person-centered approach using national samples in two European nations, we examined whether the expected five profiles (*equally rejecting*, *equally accepting*, *equally partly rejecting*, *discriminatory rejecting*, and *discriminatory partly rejecting*) do indeed exist within the population, and how many majority members demonstrate these specific patterns of responses.

5.1.3 Validation of the possible subgroups

Beyond identifying various subgroups of individuals, and as a matter of construct validity (Osborne & Sibley, 2017), we further examine whether the subgroups differ in meaningful ways on several key variables, namely general feelings towards (non)religious groups, national identification, endorsement of secularism and civil liberties, open-mindedness, and religious affiliation. This further allows us to test the theoretical proposition that the rejection of Muslim minority practices does not have to reflect generalized or group-specific prejudice.

Feelings towards (non)religious groups. Prejudicial feelings towards religious groups in general and/or towards Muslims in particular can underlie the rejection of Muslim religious practices (e.g., van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). Research has found that those who harbor negative feelings towards Muslims are more likely to reject Muslim minority practices (e.g., Helbling, 2014) or use a double standard by rejecting Muslims engaged in specific practices but not Christians (e.g., Bilodeau et al., 2018). However, the reverse does not have to be the case and, to our knowledge, no study has empirically examined how feelings towards nonbelievers and other (non-Muslim) religious groups relate to the rejection of Muslim practices. By examining feelings towards these other groups alongside feelings towards Muslims, it is possible to determine if rejection of Muslim practices reflects anti-Muslim attitudes or general anti-religion attitudes. Positive feelings towards nonbelievers and negative feelings towards religious groups can reflect a negative view of religion per se (Bullivant & Lee, 2016). It is reasonable to assume that this will underlie the rejection of religious practices in general and not only of Muslims. In contrast, prejudicial feelings towards Muslims are likely to be associated with discriminatory rejection of Muslim practices only. Therefore, we expect that individuals who more strongly reject Muslims than Jews or Christians who engage in similar religious practices (*discriminatory rejecting* and *discriminatory partly rejecting* profiles) will be more likely to be characterized by relatively negative feelings towards Muslims as a group. In contrast, those who respond to the three religious groups in a consistent way by rejecting all practices (*equally rejecting*) are more likely to be characterized by relatively strong and generalized negative feelings towards religious groups, and positive feelings towards nonbelievers.

Religious affiliation. According to Social Identity Theory, being a member of a group tends to lead to favoring one's ingroup over relevant outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Religious affiliation might evoke this ingroup-favoring pattern of responses whereby, for example, West European majority members favor Christian religious practices and do not accept similar Muslim practices. In contrast, for individuals who are not religiously affiliated, all religious groups represent a religious outgroup and they might be more likely to reject religious practices regardless of the religious group. Therefore, we expect that individuals who are *discriminatory (partly) rejecting* Muslim practices are more likely to be affiliated with Christianity (the largest religious group in the sample). In contrast, those who respond to different religious actors in a consistent way, by *equally (partly) rejecting* all practices, are more likely to be religiously nonaffiliated.

National identification. There is a large literature that links identification with one's nation to negative attitudes towards minority outgroups, including Muslim minorities (e.g., Badea et al., 2018; Mummendey et al., 2001). For example, research in different countries has found that higher national identifiers are more likely to have negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims (e.g., Uenal et al., 2021), and that stronger national identification is related to stronger rejection of Muslim minority practices (e.g., Gieling et al., 2014). National identifiers tend to focus on the meaning, value, and continuation of the national culture, and Muslims can be perceived as the typical "other" and Islam as a religion that is incompatible with the Western way of life (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This makes it likely that individuals who demonstrate a (partial) discriminatory pattern of Muslim rejection are characterized by relatively high levels of national identification. In contrast, those who respond to different religious groups in a consistent way, by showing an equal pattern of (partial) rejection or acceptance, are more likely to be characterized by lower levels of national identification.

Secularism. Secularism entails the notion that religion should be separated from civic affairs and the state (Zuckerman et al., 2016). As such, secularism forms a basis for rejecting all religious practices in the public domain (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). There is empirical evidence that secularism predicts rejection of Muslim religious practices over and above anti-Muslim sentiments and negative feelings towards religious groups more generally (Aarøe, 2012; Breton & Eady, 2015; Van Bohemen & Kemmers, 2011). Also, those who more strongly endorse secularism are more likely to equally reject both Christian and Muslim practices (Bilodeau et al., 2018; Dangubić et al., 2020a; van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015). Given that secularism entails rejection of religious practices more generally, individuals who are *equally (partly) rejecting*—actor consistent and act (in)consistent—are expected to be characterized by relatively strong endorsement of secularism, compared to individuals who are *discriminatory (partly) rejecting*.

Civil liberties. The endorsement of civil liberties is one of the key reasons to accept minority groups and their practices, and there is empirical evidence that it is associated with acceptance of Muslim religious symbols (Saroglou et al., 2009), lack of support for banning headscarves (van der Noll, 2014), and positive attitudes towards the wearing of Muslim veils (Gustavsson et al., 2016). The endorsement of civil liberties entails a general acceptance of others to live the life as they see fit, which means that it is likely that individuals who show a group-consistent pattern of acceptance—actor consistent and act (in)consistent—are characterized by relatively strong endorsement of civil liberties, compared to individuals who show a (in)consistent pattern of rejection.

Open-mindedness. Open-mindedness entails a predisposition to consider alternative reasons and arguments that are typically not aligned with one's own beliefs (Stanovich & West, 1997). This type of thinking has been found to be associated with tolerance (Marcus, 2020; Witenberg, 2019). Open-minded individuals are more likely to accept different practices and beliefs (Butrus & Witenberg, 2015) and different cultural groups (Korol, 2017). Given that open-mindedness is associated with tolerance and the tendency to seriously consider alternative ways of life, we expect that the subgroup of individuals who show a group-consistent pattern of acceptance—actor consistent and act (in)consistent—is more likely to be open-minded compared to individuals who show (in)consistent patterns of rejection.

Self-reported reasons to reject Muslim practices. In addition to the aforementioned factors, majority members might also have their own subjective reasons for rejecting specific Muslim practices that do not fully correspond to the proposed theoretical constructs (Reja et al., 2003). Examining self-reported reasons is an additional way to investigate the meaningfulness of differentiating between separate subgroups in a latent profile analysis. Thus, we explored whether the subgroups of individuals differ in a meaningful way on their self-reported reasons for rejecting specific Muslim minority practices.

5.1.4 The current study

Using a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design and latent profile analysis, we go beyond the existing research on generalized and group-specific prejudice by examining the most common ways in which majority group members combine their acceptance or rejection of different religious practices (wearing religious symbols, following religious education, providing broadcasting time for religious organizations on national TV, and banning women from boards of religious organizations) for different religious groups (Christians, Jews, and Muslims). Specifically, we are interested in examining the approximate percentages of majority group members who show one of the five likely combinations of (in)consistency across the multiple acts and multiple actors. Additionally, and for further validating the profiles, we examine whether these subgroups of individuals differ in meaningful ways on several key constructs: feelings towards (non)religious groups, religious affiliation, national identification, endorsement of secularism and civil liberties, and open-minded thinking, as well as in terms of their self-reported reasons to reject Muslim practices.

We used data from large national samples of German and Dutch majority members. Germany and the Netherlands are historically Christian nations, but have increasingly become secular (De Hart, 2014; Evans, 2019). However, these countries also differ in important ways. Whereas in the Netherlands all religions are equally supported by the state, in Germany, only Christians and Jews are considered legitimate partners of the state (Carol et al., 2015; Kortmann, 2012). However, in practice, equal status is sometimes denied to Islam in the Netherlands, whereas in Germany, Islam is becoming more of a legitimate partner of the state (Carol et al., 2015). In both countries, Islam is the second largest religion, with Muslims comprising ~5% of the population, whereas Judaism is followed by less than 1% of the population (Haug et al., 2008; Schmeets, 2016). Whereas the Jewish minority has a long history in Europe and was traditionally perceived as a typical "other" (Nachmani, 2017), in recent political rhetoric and public debates in both countries, reference to the country's Judeo-Christian identity and tradition has become increasingly common, particularly in contrast to Islam (Kluveld, 2016). Muslims as an immigrant-origin group are predominantly perceived as the prototypical "outsider" (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Research demonstrates that prejudice towards Muslims is more widespread than prejudice towards Jews in these countries (Wike et al., 2019; Zick et al., 2011). Germany and the Netherlands are thus similar and different in various ways. Although West European country differences in attitudes towards religious groups and their practices are very small (Carol et al., 2015), we nevertheless controlled for country in the statistical analyses and also explored country similarities and differences.

5.2 Method

5.2.1 Data and sample

Data were collected in May and June 2019 by a professional survey company that maintains large representative panels of Dutch and German adult majority members. In the Netherlands, a sample was compiled via a stratification procedure based on gender, age, education, household size, and region. Population data for the selection criteria were derived from the annual report of the Central Bureau for Statistics in the Netherlands. In Germany, population data were derived from the MiniCensus (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016) and used to compile a national sample of the German majority population aged 18 years and older via a stratification procedure based on age, gender, and education. In both countries, only respondents with two ethnic Dutch/German parents were invited to participate. In total, 3,762 respondents completed the online anonymous questionnaire. Respondents who reported being affiliated with Islam or Judaism, or who indicated they had given a wrong response when asked to explain why they rejected one of the Muslim practices, were excluded from the analysis (n = 59). Our data did not contain any missing values. Thus, the analytical sample consisted of 3,703 respondents (54.7% German; see Table 5.3). Participants' average age was 50.65 years (*SD* = 16.52; see Table 5.3), and 49.8% were female.

5.2.2 Measures

Multiple-acts-multiple-actors design. Respondents were presented with a randomized set of 12 items to assess their acceptance of four broad religious practices enacted by Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Based on previous research (e.g., Dangubić et al., 2020b; Sleijpen et al., 2020), the selected religious practices are sufficiently publicly visible and much debated in Western Europe. Importantly, the selected practices were ones that apply to and are meaningful for all three religious groups (e.g., Karpov & Lisovskaya, 2008). The chosen practices were: "In public schools, teachers should be allowed to wear visible [Christian/Jewish/Islamic] symbols",[30] "Public schools should be able to offer [Christian/Jewish/Islamic] religious lessons for those who want them", "[Christian/Jewish/ Islamic] organizations should have their own broadcasting time on national TV", and "[Christian/Jewish/Islamic] organizations may refuse women on their board". Responses were given on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Feelings towards (non)religious groups. Participants indicated on the widely used 100-point feeling thermometer scale how they felt towards the groups of Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and nonbelievers in the Netherlands/ Germany. Respondents were instructed that higher scores reflect warmer feelings, a score of 50 indicates neutral feelings, and lower scores reflect colder feelings. Since intercorrelations between feelings towards the non-Muslim religious groups (Catholics, Protestants, and Jews) were strong (ranging from .68 to .78),[31] an average score was used (α = .89).

Endorsement of secularism. Participants indicated their level of agreement (7-point scales) with four items based on research by Breton and Eady (2015): "Religion should be limited to private life as much as possible", "The separation of church and state is of the utmost importance", "Society is better off when people are less religious", and "Society should not be based on religious principles". The items formed a reliable scale (α = .80) and were averaged.

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[30] The item concerning Christian practices included the following specification: "for example, a cross."

[31] The three items measuring feelings towards non-Muslim religious groups weakly correlated with the item measuring feelings towards Muslims (ranging from .26 to .33).

National identification. Participants answered (on 7-point scales) the following two items: “I identify with [Germany/the Netherlands]” and “I feel connected to other [Germans/Dutch]”. The two items were strongly correlated ($r = .70$), and an average score was used.

Open-mindedness. Participants indicated their level of agreement (7-point scales) with four items adapted from the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (Stanovich & West, 1997): “I usually try to understand beliefs and behaviors that I find wrong and reject”, “I always try to consider whether there are good reasons for accepting cultural differences or not”, “I usually try to find a balance between what I find unacceptable and the freedom of other people to live the way they want”, and “I always try to understand why people sometimes do very different things from what I personally think is right and good”. The items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .79$) and were averaged.

Endorsement of civil liberties. Endorsement of civil liberties was also measured (7-point scales) with four items based on Gustavsson and colleagues (2016): “Individual freedom is the most important principle in society”, “Freedom of expression is the foundation of an open society”, “In society, everyone must have the freedom to be themselves”, and “Individual rights, rather than group rights, should form the basis of society”. The items formed a reliable scale ($\alpha = .79$), and an average score was used.

Religious affiliation. Respondents were asked to indicate whether and with which religious denomination they were affiliated. Religious affiliation was recoded into a dichotomous variable (1 = religiously affiliated with a Christian denomination, 0 = not religiously affiliated, affiliated with a non-Christian denomination other than Islam or Judaism, or not revealing religious affiliation).[32]

Reasons to reject Muslim practice(s). Participants who disagreed (< 4 on the 7-point scale) with a particular Muslim minority practice being allowed were subsequently asked in an open-ended question to explain their reason for this: “Could you briefly explain why you do not agree that [a practice randomly inserted]?” When participants rejected several Muslim practices, they were randomly asked about one of the practices. In order to classify the answers into broader themes, first an inductive coding system was developed by rereading and discussing a random selection of the responses. This resulted in a coding scheme with seven categories, and two researchers independently classified the responses into these categories with an intercoder reliability coefficient (Cohen's kappa) ranging from 0.75 to 1.00.[33] For each of the codes, we created a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent mentioned a specific reason (1) or not (0). Table 5.2 shows the seven themes, with several examples and corresponding percentages.[34]

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[32] We examined two alternative ways of coding: (a) creating a dichotomous variable “affiliated with a denomination other than Islam or Judaism versus not religiously affiliated or not revealing religious affiliation” (see Table A5.3.1 in Appendix 5.3), and (b) excluding respondents who did not reveal their religious affiliation from regression analysis (see Table A5.3.2 in Appendix 5.3). Both alternatives revealed the same pattern of findings.

First, the neutrality/secularism category (mentioned by ~34% of respondents) entails explanations that refer to the secular nature of the state and that public education and the media must be religiously neutral. Second, the equality category (15%) entails explanations in terms of all religions having to be equally represented or having the equal right to their own schools/media. Third, the national culture category (22%) entails references to the Christian or ethnic Dutch/German nature of the country and the related demands on Muslims to assimilate. Fourth, the Islam threat category (~11%) contains explanations that criticize Islam and present Muslims as a security and symbolic threat to society. Fifth, the conditional category (~6%) entails answers explaining that one does not always reject the practice, because it depends on the circumstances and conditions. Sixth, the miscellaneous category (~9%) contains other, less frequently employed reasons for rejection that could not be classified in any of the previous categories. Seventh, the "other" theme (~11%) contains answers in which respondents expressed their uncertainty about why exactly they rejected a practice, did not respond, or provided an incoherent set of letters.[35]

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[33] As a robustness check, in the main regression analysis concerning themes, we examined both reviewers' codes. The same pattern of findings emerged (see Figure A5.5.2 in Appendix 5.5).

[34] Although all respondents who rejected at least one Muslim practice were asked to explain their reason for doing so, here, we considered only 1,922 responses related to rejection of religious symbols, religious education, or broadcasting time for religious organizations, as these were the practices used for the latent profile analysis. Thus, 1,322 reasons explaining the disagreement with religious organizations rejecting women were considered separately and were not included in the statistics presented here.

[35] As a robustness check, we reanalyzed our data excluding 72 participants who responded to the open-ended question by entering a random set of letters, numbers, or characters, assuming that these participants were not sufficiently engaged. The findings revealed similar patterns of responses although the size of the identified profiles somewhat changed. This was especially the case for the *discriminatory rejecting* profile whose size increased ~3%, and the *equally partly rejecting* profile whose size decreased to a similar extent (see Figure A5.6 and Table A5.6.1 in Appendix 5.6).

Table 5.2 Emerging themes from the mentioned reasons to reject Muslim practice, alongside percentages and example quotes (N=1922)

Theme (%)	Example quotes
Neutrality & secularism (33.8%)	"A public school is strictly neutral with regard to religion" "I believe that national television should not be based on any belief." "I would like to keep school and religion separate."
Equality (15.0%)	"Everyone is equal, exceptions need not be made for anyone. Not for faith or orientation" "This applies to all religions. No one should use symbols to show that they belong to a religion, otherwise differences of opinion can easily arise." "If there is airtime for Islamic organizations, then there must also be for the other religions. Otherwise I see that as a form of discrimination."
National culture (22.0%)	"The Netherlands is basically a Christian country" "I find that offensive. They want to be in the Netherlands, so they have to behave accordingly." "Islam does not belong to Germany"
Islam threat (10.8%)	"Because Islam sometimes represents radical and cruel ideologies" "Because this religion has brought a lot of harm to date and that should not be encouraged further." "I am afraid that Islam will prevail in Germany and impose its laws or culture on us Germans. (...)"
Conditional (5.9%)	"Public schools must be neutral. These lessons can be given outside schools/schooltime." "I don't see that for any of the religions. Anyone who wants to live their religion is looking for other ways to do it anyway, such as visiting a church. (...)" "It depends on what symbols. I think full face cover or traditional clothing goes too far; applies to me to all religions"
Miscellaneous (8.5%)	"It does not seem necessary" "Because we live in the 21st century and not in the Middle Ages, I therefore do not want classes that are no longer up to date!" "There are too many religions that do not respect and accept each other."
Other (11.2%)	"I do not know" No response An incoherent set of letters or characters

Control variables. Four control variables were used in the analyses. Three of these were standard, individual-level control variables: age (continuous variable), gender (1 = women, 0 = men and other[36]), and education (1 = without formal education, 9 = a doctorate degree), which was used as a continuous variable similarly to other research in the Netherlands (e.g., van de Werfhorst

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[36] Two individuals who self-identified as "gender other" were considered together with the category "men" within the statistical analyses. However, the findings do not change regardless of how they are categorized in the statistical analyses.

& van Tubergen, 2007). In addition, we controlled for possible country differences (1 = Germany, 0 = the Netherlands). Findings for the control variables are reported in Appendix 5.4, and country similarities and differences are also discussed in what follows.

5.2.3 Analyses

First, latent profile analysis (LPA) was used to identify the optimal number of distinct subgroups of individuals based on their acceptance or rejection of different religious practices for the three religious groups. Models from one to eight profiles were fitted. All the models were fitted under the most parsimonious parametrization, where item variances are estimated to be equal across profiles, and covariances are constrained to zero. Thus, only the mean vectors for each profile were considered. In order to ensure that the likelihood function converged to global, instead of local maxima solution (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018), 5,000 sets of random starts and 500 final stage optimizations were used.

Second, automatic, three-step multinomial logistic regression (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2013) was used to assess the likelihood of being classified into one of the identified profiles as a function of thermometer feelings towards Muslims, non-Muslim religious groups, and nonbelievers, religious affiliation, endorsement of secularism and civil liberties, national identification, open-minded thinking, and the control variables. In the automatic three-step approach, first, an unconditional model is estimated taking into account only latent profile indicators. Subsequently, profile membership is corrected for the classification error and predicted on the indicated correlates. For this part of the analysis, all continuous variables were standardized.

In the third part of the analysis, using the three-step approach for distal outcomes (Lanza et al., 2013), we tested if the profiles differed in terms of the self-reported reasons to reject Muslim practices. This approach also takes into account the uncertainty regarding each individual's true profile membership.

R software was used for data preparation (Version 4.0.0; R Core Team, 2020), and Mplus was used for the main analysis (Version 8.2; Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2017).

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 5.3 shows the descriptive findings for all the variables.[37] On average, respondents agreed that public schools should offer Christian religious education, and were neutral towards Christian religious symbols in schools. In contrast, all remaining practices were, on average, rejected as their means were significantly below the midpoint of the scale (*p*s < .001).

More than 90% of respondents were negative or neutral towards either Christian, Jewish, or Islamic religious organizations banning women from their boards (see Figure A5.1.1 in Appendix 5.1), which indicates a high degree of actor-consistent rejection. The great majority of respondents (75%) who were asked to subsequently explain their rejection in relation to Muslim organizations mentioned that the practice goes against the principle of gender equality.

The very small variances and high actor-consistent rejection means that the attitude towards this practice was more of a constant and, therefore, we did not consider it in the latent profile analysis.

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[37] The data and analytic scripts can be found at https://osf.io/9r4bg/.

Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the study (N=3703)

			Intercorrelations																			
	M/%	**SD**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**	**13**	**14**	**15**	**16**	**17**	**18**	**19**	**20**
Country (Germany)	54.7%																					
Woman	49.8%																					
Religiosity (Christian)	44.5%																					
1 Education	4.93	1.95																				
2 Age	50.65	16.52	**-0.09**																			
3 Christian symbols	4.00	1.86	-0.02	**-0.09**																		
4 Jewish symbols	3.62	1.87	**0.03**	**-0.13**	**0.73**																	
5 Muslim symbols	3.19	1.87	**0.06**	**-0.18**	**0.61**	**0.76**																
6 Christian education	4.49	1.81	-0.02	**0.04**	**0.51**	**0.38**	**0.29**															
7 Jewish education	3.83	1.85	0.03	-0.01	**0.36**	**0.50**	**0.42**	**0.66**														
8 Muslim education	3.66	1.92	**0.07**	-0.03	**0.32**	**0.45**	**0.55**	**0.59**	**0.77**													
9 Christian broadcasting time	3.42	1.75	-0.01	0.01	**0.42**	**0.41**	**0.36**	**0.39**	**0.38**	**0.34**												
10 Jewish broadcasting time	3.26	1.72	**0.03**	0.01	**0.35**	**0.50**	**0.44**	**0.31**	**0.48**	**0.42**	**0.76**											
11 Muslim broadcasting time	2.99	1.74	**0.06**	-0.03	**0.29**	**0.43**	**0.52**	**0.25**	**0.42**	**0.52**	**0.68**	**0.79**										
12 Chr. org. rej. women on board	2.16	1.48	-0.01	**-0.20**	**0.20**	**0.23**	**0.26**	**0.07**	**0.14**	**0.16**	**0.35**	**0.32**	**0.33**									
13 Jew. org. rej. women on board	2.30	1.49	**-0.04**	**-0.15**	**0.21**	**0.25**	**0.27**	**0.08**	**0.17**	**0.17**	**0.34**	**0.34**	**0.33**	**0.80**								
14 Mus. org. rej. women on board	2.29	1.54	-0.02	**-0.16**	**0.20**	**0.24**	**0.27**	**0.08**	**0.16**	**0.18**	**0.33**	**0.32**	**0.33**	**0.78**	**0.81**							
15 Feelings towards Muslims	42.99	28.17	**0.10**	0.01	**0.13**	**0.24**	**0.33**	**0.10**	**0.22**	**0.32**	**0.17**	**0.24**	**0.31**	0.02	**0.04**	0.03						
16 Feelings towards non-Muslims	59.23	25.75	**0.11**	**0.14**	**0.18**	**0.20**	**0.13**	**0.20**	**0.19**	**0.17**	**0.17**	**0.18**	**0.13**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	**0.33**					
17 Feelings towards non-believers	67.87	28.11	**0.10**	**0.09**	**-0.04**	-0.01	**-0.04**	0.01	0.01	0.03	**-0.08**	**-0.04**	**-0.05**	**-0.14**	**-0.13**	**-0.14**	**0.11**	**0.65**				
18 Secularism	5.07	1.30	**0.11**	**0.05**	**-0.26**	**-0.20**	**-0.18**	**-0.22**	**-0.15**	**-0.13**	**-0.29**	**-0.20**	**-0.17**	**-0.18**	**-0.19**	**-0.19**	**-0.09**	**-0.10**	**0.19**			
19 National identification	5.17	1.20	-0.02	**0.18**	**0.10**	-0.01	**-0.09**	**0.15**	0.01	-0.02	**0.08**	0.02	-0.03	**-0.08**	**-0.07**	**-0.07**	**-0.04**	**0.19**	**0.15**	**0.04**		
20 Civil liberty	5.44	1.01	-0.01	**0.13**	0.03	0.01	-0.02	**0.11**	**0.08**	**0.07**	**-0.08**	**-0.05**	**-0.05**	**-0.20**	**-0.18**	**-0.17**	**0.04**	**0.08**	**0.16**	**0.35**	**0.19**	
21 Open-minded thinking	4.83	0.97	**0.10**	**0.08**	**0.13**	**0.16**	**0.19**	**0.15**	**0.20**	**0.25**	**0.15**	**0.19**	**0.23**	0.00	0.00	0.01	**0.24**	**0.16**	**0.11**	**0.15**	**0.15**	**0.31**

Note. Boldfaced correlation coefficients are significant at $p < .05$ level at least.

5.3.2 Latent profile analysis

Table 5.4 shows model fit statistics and subgroup membership distributions for models with up to eight profiles. Eight profiles was chosen as the upper limit for parsimony reasons, as extracting too many profiles might result in spurious solutions (Osborne & Sibley, 2017). To determine the optimal number of profiles, three statistical criteria were used: Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and Lo–Mendell–Rubin likelihood ratio test (LMR LRT), which indicates whether a k-profile solution significantly improves model fit upon the k-1 profile solution (Lo, Mendell, & Rubin, 2001). In addition, the number of participants per profile and their theoretical interpretability were considered.

Each additional profile resulted in a decrease in AIC and BIC. However, the decrease in BIC from four to five profiles was higher (ΔBIC = 1603.91) than the decrease from five to six profiles (ΔBIC = 1501.74). Also, whereas the five-profile solution resulted in an additional, qualitatively different profile compared to the four-profile solution (see Figure A5.2.1), the six- and seven-profile model solutions contained additional profiles that were just a variation of one of the profiles of the five-profile model (i.e., a variety of the equally partly rejecting subgroup; see Figure A5.2.2 and Figure A5.2.3 in Appendix 5.2). In addition, LMR LRT indicated that adding the sixth or seventh profile did not significantly improve the model fit. Furthermore, the models with six and seven profiles contained a relatively small number of individuals (less than 10%). Based on statistical criteria, profile size and interpretability, as well as model parsimony, we opted for the five-profile solution. The entropy of the five-profile model was high (entropy = .88), which indicates high precision in classifying respondents into one profile and not another (Nylund-Gibson & Choi, 2018).

Figure 5.1 shows the five identified profiles along with their labels and percentages. The first profile (*equally accepting*, 18.3%) consists of individuals who tended to accept all religious practices for all three religious groups. The second profile (*equally moderate*, 35%) consists of individuals who tended to respond around the neutral midpoint by neither accepting nor rejecting any of the religious practices for all three groups. The third profile (*discriminatory rejecting*, 16.3%) consists of individuals who tended to respond in a discriminatory way by more strongly rejecting the three practices when enacted by Muslims compared to Christians or Jews.

Table 5.4 Latent profile analysis: Model fit statistics and profile membership distribution (N=3703)

	AIC	**BIC**	**Entropy**	***ΔBIC*** **(k - 1)-k**	**LMR LRT (p)**	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
One-profile model	134522.8	134634.7	-	-	-	1.00							
Two-profile model	124376.1	124550.2	0.874	10084.5	<.001	0.42	0.58						
Three-profile model	121257.1	121493.4	0.863	3056.9	0.166	0.27	0.52	0.21					
Four-profile model	118728.2	119026.6	0.884	2466.7	<.001	0.27	0.39	0.14	0.19				
Five-profile model	117062.1	117422.7	0.881	1603.9	0.007	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.35	0.18			
Six-profile model	115498.2	115921.0	0.898	1501.7	0.435	0.18	0.07	0.34	0.13	0.10	0.18		
Seven-profile model	114220.2	114705.2	0.900	1215.8	0.093	0.18	0.13	0.09	0.30	0.07	0.06	0.16	
Eight-profile model	113150.9	113698.0	0.909	1033.4	0.122	0.18	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.30	0.05	0.07	0.16

Note. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; LMR LRT = Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test. The p-value associated with the BLRT was significant with each increase in the number of profiles, and therefore not helpful in decided upon the optimal number of profiles. Therefore, it is not presented in the table.

The fourth profile (*equally rejecting*, 17.3%) consists of individuals who consistently rejected all practices for all three religious groups. The fifth profile (e*qually partly rejecting*, 13.1%) consists of individuals who rejected only one religious practice (broadcasting time on national television), but did so consistently for all three religious groups.

To summarize, the findings of the latent profile analysis show that around 1 in 5 majority group members applied a double standard by more strongly rejecting particular practices when Muslim actors were involved, which clearly suggests anti-Muslim prejudice. The other four subgroups of individuals responded in relatively consistent ways across the different actors. Two of these subgroups rejected some or all of the practices, but did so equally for the three religious target groups.

5.3.3 Validation of the profiles

We further examined the meaningfulness of the five profiles by investigating how they differ on several key characteristics. Table 5.5 presents the results of multinomial logistic regression model with the *equally moderate*, *equally partly rejecting*, *equally rejecting*, and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups as reference categories. Overall, the results show that the five profiles significantly and meaningfully differ from each other.

First, individuals within the *equally accepting* subgroup had more positive general feelings towards Muslims and non-Muslim religious groups, and more negative feelings towards nonbelievers, compared to all other subgroups. Further, they were more likely to score high on open-mindedness and more likely to be Christian than the *equally rejecting* subgroup. In addition, they were more likely to endorse civil liberties compared to the *equally moderate* and *equally rejecting* subgroups, but less so compared to the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup. Being religious and valuing civil liberties in combination with open-minded thinking and positive feelings towards Muslims and non-Muslim religious groups seem to characterize individuals who accept all practices for all three religious groups.



Figure 5.1 Latent profile analysis – five profile model (N=3703)

Second, individuals within the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup had more negative feelings towards Muslims and more strongly identified with the nation compared to all the other subgroups. Further, they were less likely to score high on open-mindedness compared to the *equally moderate*, *equally accepting*, and *equally partly rejecting* subgroups. Strong identification with one's nation and prejudicial feelings towards Muslims seem to make individuals within the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup apply a double standard by more strongly rejecting similar practices enacted by Muslims compared to Christians and Jews.

Third, individuals within the *equally rejecting* subgroup endorsed secularism more strongly, were less positive towards non-Muslim religious groups, and less likely to be affiliated with Christianity compared to all the other subgroups. Further, they were more positive toward Muslims than the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup, but less so compared to the remaining three subgroups. In addition, they had more positive feelings towards nonbelievers than the *equally accepting*, *equally moderate*, and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups, and were less likely to endorse civil liberties. Not belonging to a Christian denomination, having negative feelings towards Muslims and towards non-Muslim religious groups but positive feelings towards nonbelievers, and strongly endorsing secularism but not civil liberties seem to make individuals within the *equally rejecting* subgroup reject all practices for all three religious groups.

Fourth, individuals within the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup endorsed civil liberties more strongly than all the other subgroups. Further, they more strongly endorsed secularism than the *equally moderate*, *equally accepting*, and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups, but less strongly than the *equally rejecting* group. Also, they were more likely to score high on open-minded thinking than the *equally rejecting* and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups, but less likely to do so than the *equally accepting* subgroup. This pattern of findings suggests that individuals within the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup are simultaneously considering both principles of civil liberties and secularism, which makes them accept some but reject other religious practices, but in a similar way for all three religious target groups.

Fifth, individuals within the *equally moderate* subgroup had more positive feelings toward Muslims and were more likely to score high on open-mindedness than the *discriminatory* or *equally rejecting* subgroups, but less so than the *equally accepting* subgroup.

Table 5.5 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis (N=3703)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Equally accepting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.05***	(0.12)	0.57***	(0.16)	0.04	(0.15)	0.50**	(0.16)
Country (Germany)	0.04	(0.12)	-0.96***	(0.15)	-0.29*	(0.14)	-0.83***	(0.15)
Gender (female)	-0.25*	(0.12)	-0.26	(0.14)	-0.29*	(0.14)	-0.36*	(0.14)
Age	-0.28***	(0.06)	-0.25**	(0.08)	-0.37***	(0.07)	-0.26***	(0.07)
Education	0.03	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.07)	0.02	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)
Religiosity (Chr.)	0.25	(0.13)	0.25	(0.15)	0.66***	(0.16)	0.19	(0.16)
Feelings towards Muslims	0.23***	(0.06)	0.26***	(0.07)	0.59***	(0.08)	0.82***	(0.09)
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.43***	(0.10)	0.34**	(0.11)	0.81***	(0.12)	0.40**	(0.12)
Feelings towards non-believers	-0.35***	(0.10)	-0.48***	(0.11)	-0.61***	(0.11)	-0.36**	(0.11)
Secularism	-0.10	(0.07)	-0.45***	(0.09)	-1.07***	(0.11)	-0.17	(0.09)
National identification	0.14*	(0.07)	-0.07	(0.08)	0.04	(0.08)	-0.48***	(0.09)
Open-mindedness	0.78***	(0.08)	0.75***	(0.09)	1.03***	(0.10)	1.05***	(0.09)
Civil liberties	0.27***	(0.07)	-0.24*	(0.09)	0.27**	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.09)
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.55***	(0.14)	0.06	(0.18)	-0.46**	(0.17)		
Country (Germany)	0.87***	(0.14)	-0.13	(0.17)	0.54**	(0.15)		
Gender (female)	0.11	(0.13)	0.10	(0.15)	0.07	(0.15)		
Age	-0.01	(0.06)	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.10	(0.07)		
Education	-0.08	(0.06)	-0.21**	(0.08)	-0.08	(0.08)		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.06	(0.14)	0.05	(0.16)	0.47**	(0.17)		
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.60***	(0.09)	-0.56***	(0.10)	-0.23*	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.03	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.11)	0.40***	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-believers	0.01	(0.09)	-0.13	(0.11)	-0.25*	(0.11)		
Secularism	0.07	(0.08)	-0.29**	(0.10)	-0.91***	(0.12)		
National identification	0.61***	(0.08)	0.40***	(0.09)	0.51***	(0.10)		
Open-mindedness	-0.26***	(0.08)	-0.29**	(0.09)	-0.02	(0.10)		
Civil liberties	0.30***	(0.08)	-0.21*	(0.09)	0.31**	(0.10)		
Equally rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.10***	(0.13)	0.53**	(0.17)				
Country (Germany)	0.32**	(0.12)	-0.67***	(0.15)				
Gender (female)	0.04	(0.12)	0.02	(0.14)				
Age	0.09	(0.06)	0.12	(0.08)				
Education	0.00	(0.06)	-0.13	(0.07)				
Religiosity (Chr.)	-0.41**	(0.14)	-0.42**	(0.16)				
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.36***	(0.07)	-0.33***	(0.09)				
Feelings towards non-Muslims	-0.38***	(0.09)	-0.47***	(0.10)				

Table 5.5 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis (N=3703). (continued)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Feelings towards non-believers	0.26**	(0.09)	0.12	(0.10)				
Secularism	0.98***	(0.11)	0.62***	(0.12)				
National identification	0.10	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.08)				
Open-mindedness	-0.24**	(0.08)	-0.27**	(0.09)				
Civil liberties	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.51***	(0.10)				
Equally partly rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.63***	(0.15)						
Country (Germany)	1.00***	(0.14)						
Gender (female)	0.01	(0.13)						
Age	-0.03	(0.07)						
Education	0.13*	(0.06)						
Religiosity (Chr.)	-0.00	(0.14)						
Feelings towards Muslims	0.04	(0.06)						
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.09	(0.10)						
Feelings towards non-believers	0.14	(0.09)						
Secularism	0.35***	(0.09)						
National identification	0.21**	(0.07)						
Open-mindedness	0.03	(0.08)						
Civil liberties	0.51***	(0.08)						

Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. All variables, except country, gender and religiosity, were standardized.

Further, they endorsed secularism less strongly than the *equally (partly) rejecting* subgroups, but more strongly than the *equally accepting* subgroup. In addition, they had more positive feelings towards non-Muslim religious groups and more negative feelings towards nonbelievers when compared to the *equally rejecting* subgroup, whereas the opposite was the case when compared to the *equally accepting* subgroup. This pattern of findings indicates that the *equally moderate* subgroup responded to key characteristics in a "neutral" way, just as they did on the items about religious practices of the different religious groups.

5.3.4 Reasons to reject Muslim practices

To further examine whether the subgroups differed in a meaningful way, we examined the self-reported reasons for rejecting specific Muslim minority practices.

Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of individuals who mentioned a particular reason within the following four profiles: *discriminatory rejecting*, *equally rejecting*, *equally partly rejecting*, and *equally moderate*.[38] Individuals within the *equally moderate* and the *equally rejecting* subgroups were more likely than other subgroups to explain their rejection by mentioning that state institutions should be neutral or by referring to secular principles (neutrality or secularism, 80% and 50% respectively). These findings are in line with the strong endorsement of secularism of the *equally rejecting* subgroup found in the previous analysis.

Individuals within the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup were more likely than other profiles to explain their rejection in terms of the need to treat all religious groups equally and allow them to practice their own religion (equality, 31%), or that practices should be allowed only under certain conditions (conditional, 9%). These findings are in line with this subgroup's group-consistent rejection or acceptance of the practices for all three religious groups, and their open-minded thinking by weighing different principles.

Individuals within the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup were more likely than other subgroups to explain their rejection by making references to Dutch/German traditions and values (national culture, 51%) and by criticizing Islam (Islam threat, 14%). These findings are in line with this subgroup's relatively strong national identification and prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group.

5.3.5 Country comparison

The country main effects (see Table 5.5) indicate that German compared to Dutch participants were more likely to be classified in the *discriminatory* or *equally partly rejecting* subgroups, whereas Dutch participants were more likely to be classified in the *equally accepting* or *equally moderate* subgroup. To test for country differences in latent profile solutions, an unconstrained model allowing variances, means, and proportions to vary across the two countries and a model whereby means were constrained to be equal across countries were estimated (see Table A5.7.1 in Appendix 5.7). Although the BIC of the constrained model increased slightly, suggesting that there are differences in means between countries, both models were good in terms of distinguishing individuals (similar entropy > 0.9). To qualitatively examine possible country differences further, a model with five profiles was estimated for the Dutch (Figure A5.7.1) and German (Figure A5.7.2) samples separately. The model with five profiles for Germany is the same as the model with five profiles already discussed. In the Netherlands, a variation of the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup appeared instead of a *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup. Discrimination appears to be less strong in the Netherlands than in Germany, and Dutch participants were less likely to be classified in the *discriminatory rejecting* profile compared to people from Germany (12% vs. 20%; for more details see Appendix 5.7).

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[38] Respondents classified into the equally accepting subgroup, on average, accepted practices. However, 63 of these individuals rejected one of the Muslim practices and were asked to explain their rejection. Although they were included in the overall comparison, we do not present their results here (but see Figure A5.5.1).

5.4 Discussion

The acceptance of Muslim minority practices within Western liberal democracies remains a strongly contested topic. In line with theory and research on generalized prejudices that have proposed a distinction between a common negative component that can be generalized across outgroups and a target-specific component (Akrami et al., 2011; Bergh & Akrami, 2016; Meeusen et al., 2017), research demonstrates that prejudice and anti-Muslim sentiments are important explanations for the rejection of these practices (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Lajevardi & Oskooii, 2018). However, the antipathy of generalized and group-based prejudice might differ from the negativity of practice-based disapproval, and people might also demonstrate generalized positivity or relative indifference (Meeusen et al., 2018). We examined these possibilities with a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design and a person-centered approach. This allowed us to identify subgroups of individuals that differ on how they combine their evaluations of multiple religious practices for multiple religious groups (Muslims, Jews, and Christians), and to examine if these subgroups differ in meaningful ways on anti-Muslim prejudice and self-reported reasons for rejecting Muslim practices, as well as other key characteristics. The findings showed that there were five subgroups, which corresponds with previous person-centered research on attitudes towards religious minority group practices (Dangubić et al., 2020a,b) and towards different minority outgroups (Meeusen et al., 2018).



	Neutrality & secularism	Equality	National culture	Islam threat	Conditional	Miscellaneous	Other
Overall χ^2 test	143.66***	45.26***	147.11***	39.11***	32.39***	32.51***	16.00**
Pairwise comparison	4 > 2 > 3 > 1	3 > 2,4,1	1 > 2 > 3,4	1,3 > 4; 1 > 2	3 > 2,4; 1 > 2	3,1,2 > 4	1,2 > 4

Figure 5.2 Spontaneously mentioned reasons to reject Muslim practices per profile (N=1922)

In line with theoretical and empirical research that emphasizes the role of anti-Muslim prejudice in rejecting Muslim religious practices (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2009), about 1 in 5 people in the population displayed a discriminatory pattern of rejection. Specifically, these individuals demonstrated target-specific prejudice in employing a double standard by more strongly rejecting the same practices enacted by Muslims than by Christians or Jews. Individuals within this subgroup were characterized by prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group and showed strong national identification. In their self-reported responses, they criticized Islam and referred to the importance of maintaining national traditions and values. These findings correspond with research showing that a sense of national belonging and prejudicial feelings towards Muslims underlie intolerance of Muslim practices (Saroglou et al., 2009; Uenal et al., 2021).

However, a large majority of the population did not use a double standard but rather displayed actor-consistent and act-(in)consistent patterns of responses. This suggests that these individuals are guided by other reasons for rejection than anti-Muslim prejudice per se. About 1 in 6 individuals equally rejected all practices for all three religious groups, which suggests generalized or common religious prejudice. These individuals were characterized by negative feelings towards both Muslim and non-Muslim religious groups, and positive feelings towards nonbelievers. They were also less likely to be religiously affiliated and displayed strong endorsement of secular principles. Their strong endorsement of secularism was also reflected in the fact that individuals within this subgroup spontaneously mentioned neutrality and secularism as the main reasons for rejecting Muslim practices.

In contrast to subgroups that rejected various practices, around one fifth of the population accepted all practices (except banning women from religious boards) for all religious groups involved (*equally accepting*), which indicates a generalized tendency to value all religious groups. Individuals within this subgroup were more likely to be religiously affiliated, to have positive feelings towards Muslims as well as non-Muslim religious groups, to be open-minded, and to value civil liberties more than those who rejected all practices. These findings are in line with previous research showing that being religious and having positive feelings towards religious outgroups underlie acceptance of religious practices (Dangubić et al., 2020a). Further, these findings corroborate the proposition that endorsement of civil liberties and open-minded thinking are important aspects of intergroup tolerance (Marcus, 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2019).

However, two other findings suggest that a strong endorsement of civil liberties in itself is not a guarantee that all practices will be accepted, and that there are limits to what people tolerate (Gibson, 2005b; Verkuyten et al., 2021). First, around 1 in 7 individuals displayed a equally partly rejecting pattern of responses by accepting some practices and rejecting others, but equally for all three religious groups (*equally partly rejecting*). The existence of this subgroup most clearly indicates that there can be practice-based variance in ratings that does not reflect generalized or target-group-specific prejudice. Although individuals within the equally partly rejecting subgroup strongly endorsed civil liberties and accepted some religious practices (e.g., religious education in public schools), they were also strongly in favor of secularism which probably made them reject other practices (e.g., broadcasting time on national television). The two principles of civil liberties and secularism might be relevant simultaneously and combined in various ways in people's thinking (Dangubić et al., 2020a; Peffley et al., 2001).

Second, a large majority of the population rejected the exclusion of women from the boards of religious organizations, independent of religious group. Such a practice was perceived to go against the principle of gender equality and therefore considered unacceptable regardless of who engaged in it. This indicates that even those who are strongly in favor of individual freedoms do not accept practices that go against the equality principle (Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2017). Furthermore, it also indicates that those who discriminated against Muslims also used general moral principles for rejecting, for all groups, a practice that was considered unfair (Hirsch et al., 2019).

Around a third of the population responded in a neutral fashion by neither clearly rejecting nor accepting the practices, but this was similarly done for all three religious groups (equally moderate). There are several possible reasons for finding this relatively large subgroup, which was also found in person-centered research on the evaluation of seven minority target groups (Meeusen et al., 2018). Substantially, it might mean that many people do not have very strong views on whether specific religious practices should or should not be accepted. This corresponds to the notion that the social attitudes of some people are unstable and not clearly rooted in deep convictions or beliefs (Zaller, 1992). A substantial part of the population might genuinely not have strong views on these sorts of societal issues (Sturgis et al., 2014). Further, many people in the Netherlands and Germany are not, or not very, religious (Pew Research Center, 2018). In the *equally moderate* subgroup, secularism and state neutrality were the most prominent reasons for rejecting one of the Muslim practices. These findings suggest that highly correlated ratings of various target groups and practices do not have to reflect generalized prejudice but can also indicate indifference (Meeusen et al., 2018).

However, there might also be methodological reasons for the relatively large *equally moderate* subgroup. For example, it might indicate a tendency to respond in a socially desirable way (Nadler et al., 2015). The provision of complete anonymity in online surveys tends to minimize social desirability pressures on self-report measures (Lautenschlager & Flaherty, 1990; Stark et al., 2019), as was found in a survey-embedded experiment in Germany and the Netherlands (Bamberg & Verkuyten, 2021). However, complete anonymity might decrease participants' motivation to respond carefully and thoughtfully (Lelkes et al., 2012). The reason is that anonymity removes any sense of accountability for one's answers, and thereby the level of cognitive engagement, which can result in responding similarly on different questions and choosing midpoint response categories in particular (Krosnick, 1999). Furthermore, although the order of the questions was randomized, it is possible that participants gave similar average ratings for all groups and practices in order to appear consistent (Schuman & Presser, 1996).

We expected to find a *discriminatory partly rejecting* subgroup of individuals (inconsistency across acts and across actors), but this was not the case. There are many possible ways in which individuals can display a *discriminatory partly rejecting* pattern of responses, and there are probably not enough respondents displaying a similar pattern that is sufficiently distinct from the other subgroups identified in the latent profile analysis.

5.4.1 Limitations

Despite its unique design and novel contribution to the social psychological literature on generalized prejudice and attitudes towards Muslim minorities, we like to briefly mention four limitations of the current work with potential directions for future research. First, it might be that the discriminatory rejection of Muslims stems not only from anti-Muslim prejudice but also from prejudice toward religious minority groups. Individuals who showed discriminatory rejection not only rejected practices when engaged in by Muslims, but also showed this tendency in relation to Jews. A more detailed consideration of practices that are relevant only for Muslim and Jewish minorities (e.g., ritual slaughtering of animals; male circumcision) as well as for Christian minorities (e.g., Orthodox Protestants; Sleijpen et al., 2020) could provide more insight into whether majority group members harbor specific negative feelings towards

Muslims as a group, or negative feelings towards religious minority groups, or towards religious groups more generally.

Second, although we went beyond the existing research by using a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design, we asked about four religious practices. However, the findings of latent profile analyses are sensitive to the practices considered, and different profiles might emerge if different practices are considered. For instance, the consideration of more demanding issues (e.g., only halal food at schools; wearing of burqas) could result in skewed distributions of answers with different profiles as a consequence. However, here, we had to use practices that would map onto all three religious groups and which are not unique to any one group. Nevertheless, further research is needed to test whether the findings replicate across a range of other Muslim minority practices.

Third, to test whether people discriminate against Muslims or rather respond in an actor-consistent way, we focused on broad practices that are meaningful and relevant as well as sufficiently comparable across the religious groups. However, it is still possible that some participants perceived some religious practices differently depending on the religious group involved. This is especially likely when asked about religious symbols, whereby participants might for example have a burqa in mind for Muslims and a yarmulke for Jews. If this was the case, this might imply that those who rejected Muslim but accepted Jewish symbols did not discriminate against Muslims but rather evaluated different practices differently. However, on the open-ended question, only around 6% of respondents classified in the *discriminatory rejecting* group had some form of veiling in mind when rejecting Muslim religious symbols. Furthermore, additional analyses showed that the findings were robust when the items regarding religious symbols were excluded (see Figure A5.8.1 in Appendix 5.8). Yet, future research could aim to provide more details about the various practices or ask participants what they have in mind in relation to different groups. The open-ended question focused on the rejection of Muslim practices, and we do not know whether people have similar reasons for rejecting non-Muslim practices.

Fourth, the questions we used were part of a large-scale data collection in which various researchers cooperated. This inevitably meant that only a limited number of constructs could be considered. Future research could examine additional constructs to further validate the different profiles, such as authoritarianism, feelings of threat, and intergroup contact (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Meeusen et al., 2017; Uenal et al., 2021). Furthermore, future research could examine whether the five profiles found generalize to other countries and to other religious target groups. The profiles were largely similar in Germany and the Netherlands but there was also a notable difference with Dutch people being less likely to fall into the *discriminatory rejection* profile. One possible reason for this difference is that, compared to Germans, the Dutch are less likely to perceive Muslim minorities as a threat, which has been found in previous research (Erisen & Kentman-Cin, 2017). The Dutch might be more familiar with religious diversity because of their tradition of pillarization that encompassed the division of society along religious and cultural lines.

5.5 Conclusion

Plural societies face the challenge of accommodating diverse beliefs and practices. It is around concrete practices that debate and disagreement exist, and ways of life can collide. We tried to advance the theoretical and empirical literature on generalized prejudice and attitudes towards Muslim minorities by using a person-centered approach and considering multiple religious practices and multiple religious actors. Such a multiple-acts-multiple-actors design makes it possible to go beyond the generalized and group-specific prejudice explanations for the rejection of minority practices by providing a more nuanced understanding of the various reasons for accepting or rejecting Muslim minority practices harbored by different subgroups of the population. We identified five subgroups in two countries that were meaningfully different on various relevant characteristics. In contrast to the variable-centered approach, we focused on the different constellations of attitudes within individuals, and therefore provided a more complete and integrated description of the relevant considerations that individuals have. People have a general inclination to consistently (dis)like religious outgroups, differentiate their evaluation of these groups, and may also have reasons to disapprove of specific outgroup practices.

We found that, for the majority of individuals, the rejection of Muslim practices is not only, or simply, a reflection of generalized prejudice or prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group, and that other reasons such as concerns for the secular nature of the state and civil liberties can be involved. We also found that some practices that go against equal rights (e.g., banning women from boards) or that are potentially more publicly visible and influential (e.g., broadcasting time on national TV) are more readily rejected, independently of the religious target group.

Theoretically, understanding different forms of rejection and the associated reasons is important as it allows us to develop a more nuanced comprehension beyond the roles that generalized and group-based prejudice play. Thus, it would benefit the field to take its focus beyond prejudice as the predominant explanation for people's disapproval and dislike of minority practices and to recognize that there can be different motivating reasons and considerations that are differently organized within individuals.

Prejudiced people are likely to reject minority practices, but that does not mean that everyone who rejects practices does so out of prejudices. A focus on specific practices and people's reasons to accept or reject them makes more targeted interventions possible. For example, whereas an emphasis on the importance of civil liberties might result in more acceptance of Muslims among those who endorse secular principles and have antireligious attitudes (*equally rejecting*), such an intervention is not likely to be successful among those who reject Muslims despite their strong endorsement of civil liberties (*equally partly rejecting*). A focus on prejudice and prejudice reduction is clearly important but the disapproval of specific minority beliefs and practices can have other reasons that are not only theoretically relevant but also relevant for applied reasons. Taken together, this research provides a valuable approach for future research in the field of intergroup relations.

Appendices

Appendix Chapter 2

Appendix 2.1: List experiment assumptions

The list experiment technique relies on two assumptions: the *no design effect* and *no liars* assumption. The *no design effect* assumption implies that adding a sensitive item to the list of the control items does not affect the way people respond to the control items. To test the *no design effect* assumption, we applied statistical test developed by Blair and Imai (2012). We failed to reject the null hypothesis of no design effect, and concluded that adding the items *immigrants* and *immigrants wearing veils* to their respective lists of control items did not change the way people responded to the control items. Thus, difference-in-means can be used as an estimate of the percentage of people who are negative about the sensitive item. The same is the case when the *no design effect* hypothesis is tested separately for each of the four profiles, both for immigrants and immigrants wearing veils experiments.

The *no liars* assumption implies that people give true answers to the sensitive item. In the literature, two cases are discussed when this is potentially not the case: ceiling and floor effects (Asadullah et al., 2021; Blair & Imai, 2012; Imai, 2011). Ceiling effects occur when people are negative about all the control items and, therefore, in the treatment group, they do not admit being negative about the sensitive item since that would disclose their attitude. Thus, instead of answering that they are negative about all the items, they choose to report being negative about one item less. In contrast, floor effects occur when people are only negative about the sensitive item and none of the control items. Thus, they answer 0 out of fear that answering 1 would somehow disclose their negativity about the sensitive item.

It is possible to get an indication of potential ceiling and floor effects by looking at the percentage of people in the control group who reported being negative about all and none of the items, respectively. Table A2.1.1 shows the proportion of people (per profile) who potentially underreported being negative about immigrants and immigrants wearing veils due to the ceiling or floor effect.

Though an unlikely scenario, we assumed that all of them indeed avoided to report their negativity. Thus, we calculated adjusted estimates of proportion of people who are negative by adding percentages of the ceiling and floor effect to the difference in mean estimates presented in Table 2.4. The percentage of those who might have underreported their negativity in the critical inclusive subgroup was equal (15%) in the immigrants and immigrants wearing veils experiment. Thus, we can conclude that our results are robust to ceiling and floor effects.

Table A2.1.1 Estimated percentages of individuals who might have not reported their true answer (due to the ceiling or floor effect)

	Immigrants			Immigrants wearing veils		
	Ceiling effect	**Floor effect**	**Estimate adjusted for the ceiling and floor effect**	**Ceiling effect**	**Floor effect**	**Estimate adjusted for the ceiling and floor effect**
Critical exclusive	0.03	0.12	0.92	0.31	0.03	0.99
Critical inclusive	0.03	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.51
Moderate	0.03	0.19	0.68	0.17	0.09	0.49
Moderately critical exclusive	0.02	0.10	0.69	0.22	0.02	0.75

Appendix 2.2: Robustness check of multinomial logistic regression estimates

Table A2.2.1 Results of multinomial logistic regression predicting latent profile membership: listwise deletion instead of imputation (N=3,220)

	Reference category					
	Critical exclusive		**Moderate**		**Moderately critical exclusive**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Critical inclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-4.97***	(0.76)	-8.79***	(0.72)	-3.02	(0.59)
Unconditional respect	1.11***	(0.08)	0.28***	(0.07)	0.65***	(0.06)
Civil liberties	0.07	(0.08)	0.87***	(0.08)	0.11	(0.07)
Open-mindedness	0.95***	(0.09)	0.73***	(0.09)	0.47***	(0.08)
Right-wing	-0.81***	(0.07)	-0.26***	(0.06)	-0.45***	(0.05)
Religiosity (Christian)	0.31*	(0.14)	-0.04	(0.15)	0.18	(0.12)
Education	0.20***	(0.04)	0.15***	(0.04)	0.15***	(0.03)
Age	-0.01*	(0.00)	0.01**	(0.00)	-0.02***	(0.00)
Gender (female)	-0.51***	(0.14)	0.06	(0.15)	-0.54***	(0.12)
Country (Germany)	-1.30***	(0.15)	-0.49**	(0.16)	-0.59***	(0.12)
Moderately critical exclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-1.95***	(0.69)	-5.77***	(0.71)		
Unconditional respect	0.46***	(0.07)	-0.37***	(0.07)		
Civil liberties	-0.05	(0.07)	0.75***	(0.08)		
Open-mindedness	0.48***	(0.07)	0.26**	(0.09)		
Right-wing	-0.36***	(0.06)	0.19**	(0.06)		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.12	(0.13)	-0.22	(0.15)		
Education	0.05	(0.04)	0.00	(0.04)		
Age	0.01	(0.00)	0.04***	(0.01)		
Gender (female)	0.03	(0.12)	0.55***	(0.15)		
Country (Germany)	-0.72***	(0.13)	0.10	(0.17)		
Moderate (=1)						
Intercept	3.82***	(0.77)				
Unconditional respect	0.83***	(0.09)				
Civil liberties	-0.80***	(0.09)				
Open-mindedness	0.22*	(0.09)				
Right-wing	-0.55***	(0.07)				
Religiosity (Christian)	0.35*	(0.16)				
Education	0.05	(0.04)				
Age	-0.03***	(0.01)				
Gender (female)	-0.51**	(0.16)				
Country (Germany)	-0.82***	(0.18)				

*Note: *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.*

Appendix 2.3: Alternative models of latent profile analysis



Figure A2.3.1 Latent profile analysis: Three-profile solution



Figure A2.3.2 Latent profile analysis: Five-profile solution



Figure A2.3.3 Latent profile analysis: Six-profile solution



Figure A2.3.4 Latent profile analysis: Seven-profile solution



Figure A2.3.5 Latent profile analysis: Eight-profile solution

Appendix 2.4: Class separation

In order to evaluate the four- and five-profile model profiles' separation (Masyn, 2013), we calculated standardized difference in means (Cohen's distances) for each pair of profiles on each of the nine indicators used (Table A2.4.1). The larger the Cohen's distance between the indicators, the greater the separation between profiles, and distances above 0.8 can be considered large (Sawilowsky, 2009; Tein, 2013).

Overall, the evaluation of class separation shows that the profiles of the four-profile model are better separated than the profiles of the five-profile model. The five-profile model resulted in an additional profile (Profile 5; see the last four columns in Table A2.4.1) which was not sufficiently separated from the *moderate* and *critical inclusive* profiles, as indicated by presence of the Cohen's distances below 0.8. Also, the *moderately critical exclusive* and the *critical inclusive* profiles where less separated in the five-profile model compared to the four-profile model. These results indicate that the four profile model is better in terms of profile separation.

Table A2.4.1 Four- and five-profile models' class separation (Cohen's distance)

	Critical exclusive versus Moderately critical exclusive	**Critical exclusive versus Moderate**	**Critical exclusive versus Critical inclusive**	**Moderately critical exclusive versus Moderate**	**Moderately critical exclusive versus Critical inclusive**	**Moderate versus Critical inclusive**	**Critical exclusive versus Profile 5**	**Moderately critical exclusive versus Profile 5**	**Moderate versus Profile 5**	**Critical inclusive versus Profile 5**
Four-profile model										
Muslim men dominate women	**0.31**	2.47	1.23	2.16	0.92	1.24				
Muslim men have no respect for women	**0.34**	2.33	1.42	1.99	1.08	0.92				
Muslims treat sons and daughters differently	**0.23**	2.05	0.96	1.82	**0.73**	1.09				
Feelings towards Muslims (positive)	0.99	1.58	1.82	**0.59**	0.83	**0.24**				
Feelings towards Muslims (warm)	**0.70**	1.13	1.77	**0.43**	1.08	**0.64**				
Right to express faith	1.95	1.88	3.38	**0.08**	1.43	1.51				
Right to celebrate holidays	2.24	2.10	3.73	**0.15**	1.49	1.63				
Right to build mosques	2.13	2.28	3.96	**0.15**	1.83	1.68				
Right to organize politically	1.92	2.05	3.66	**0.13**	1.74	1.61				
Five profile model										
Muslim men dominate women	**0.28**	2.53	**0.71**	2.24	**0.42**	1.82	2.66	2.37	**0.13**	1.95
Muslim men have no respect for women	**0.30**	2.53	0.85	2.24	**0.56**	1.68	3.10	2.81	**0.57**	2.25
Muslims treat sons and daughters differently	**0.21**	2.04	**0.49**	1.83	**0.28**	1.55	2.09	1.88	**0.04**	1.60
Feelings towards Muslims (positive)	0.97	1.65	1.60	**0.68**	**0.63**	**0.05**	2.62	1.65	0.97	1.02
Feelings towards Muslims (warm)	**0.58**	1.16	1.58	**0.58**	1.00	**0.42**	2.17	1.59	1.01	**0.59**
Right to express faith	1.87	2.06	3.29	**0.19**	1.42	1.23	3.77	1.90	1.71	**0.48**
Right to celebrate holidays	2.12	2.28	3.66	**0.15**	1.54	1.38	4.14	2.02	1.86	**0.48**
Right to build mosques	1.78	2.45	3.95	**0.67**	2.17	1.50	4.45	2.67	2.00	**0.50**
Right to organize politically	1.67	2.22	3.64	**0.55**	1.96	1.41	4.16	2.49	1.94	**0.52**

Note. Cohen's distances lower than 0.8 in bold.

Appendix 2.5: The effects of the control variables

Critical inclusive individuals were most likely to identify with the political left, to be highly educated, younger, and from the Netherlands. They were also less likely to be female compared to the *critical exclusive* and *moderately critical exclusive* profiles, and more likely to be religiously affiliated compared to the *critical exclusive* profile. Those *moderately critical exclusive* were more likely to be highly educated compared to the *critical exclusive* and *moderate* profile. They were also more likely to be older, female and to identify with the political right compared to the *moderate* profile, and less likely to be from Germany and identify with the political right compared to the *critical exclusive* profile. Individuals in the *moderate* profile were less likely to identify with the political right, to be older, female, and from Germany compared to the *critical exclusive* profile.

Given that individuals from the Netherlands (compared to those from Germany) were more likely to display more positive patterns of responses, we further examined potential cross-country differences (see Appendix 2.6).

Appendix 2.6: Cross-country comparison and country-specific models

To further explore cross-country differences, we estimated a constrained model where all means were constrained to be the same across countries and an unconstrained model in which all means were allowed to vary across countries (see Table A2.6.1). Although in multigroup latent profile analysis, it is not possible to compute a loglikelihood test and associated p-value to compare if these models are significantly different, the BIC of the unconstrained model was somewhat lower indicating that there are differences between the two countries. Nevertheless, both models distinguished between individuals with high precision (entropy > 0.8).

Table A2.6.1 Fit statistics of multi-group latent profile analysis models

	BIC	**Entropy**
Constrained (means constrained to be the same)	117629	0.895
Unconstrained (means allowed to vary)	117187	0.897

In order to further explore differences between the Netherlands and Germany, we qualitatively compared the four profile model estimated on the sample of Dutch respondents (N=1,688; see Figure A2.6.1 below) with the four profile model estimated on the sample of German respondents (N=2,046; see Figure A2.6.2 below). The model estimated on the sample of individuals from Germany closely reflected the model estimated on the pooled sample. However, the model estimated on the sample of individuals from the Netherlands diverged from the model estimated on the pooled sample in two ways. First, individuals in the *critical inclusive* profile were somewhat less critical of Muslim gender inequality practices. Second, individuals in the *moderately critical exclusive* subgroup in the Netherlands were more accepting of Muslim expressive rights.

As a robustness check, we conducted country-specific analysis of the list experiments and multinomial logistic regression (see Table A2.6.2 and A2.6.3). The results are comparable to those obtained when the pooled sample is used.



Figure A2.6.1 Four profile model estimated separately on the sample from the Netherlands (N=1,688)



Figure A2.6.2 Four profile model estimated separately on the sample from Germany (N=2,046)

Table A2.6.2 Results of multinomial logistic regression estimated on the pooled sample (N=3,734), and separately in the Netherlands (N= 1,688) and Germany (N=2,046)

	Reference categories					
	Critical exclusive		**Moderate**		**Moderately critical exclusive**	
	The Netherlands	Germany	The Netherlands	Germany	The Netherlands	Germany
Critical inclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-8.05	-5.10	-8.71	-9.61	8.00	2.00
Unconditional respect	1.11***	1.24***	0.39***	0.24**	0.54***	0.68***
Civil liberties	0.29*	0.05	0.56***	0.92***	-0.07	0.02
Open-mindedness	0.92***	0.91***	0.79***	0.82***	0.32**	0.41***
Right-wing	-0.78***	-0.98***	-0.38***	-0.35***	-0.38***	-0.55***
Religiosity (Christian)	-0.06	0.41*	-0.35	0.23	-0.08	0.31*
Education	0.36***	0.11*	0.37***	0.12**	0.25***	0.04
Age	-0.02**	-0.01	0.00	0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02***
Gender (female)	-0.32	-0.69***	-0.36	-0.20	-0.24	-0.53**
Moderately critical exclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-4.97	-3.10	-5.62	-7.61		
Unconditional respect	0.58***	0.56***	-0.14	-0.45***		
Civil liberties	0.37**	0.03	0.63***	0.90***		
Open-mindedness	0.60***	0.51***	0.47***	0.41***		
Right-wing	-0.40***	-0.43***	0.00	0.20*		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.01	0.10	-0.27	-0.10		
Education	0.10*	0.07	0.12*	0.08		
Age	0.00	0.01	0.01*	0.04***		
Gender (female)	-0.08	-0.16	-0.12	0.28		
Moderate (=1)						
Intercept	0.66	4.51				
Unconditional respect	0.72***	1.01***				
Civil liberties	-0.26*	-0.87***				
Open-mindedness	0.13	0.10				
Right-wing	-0.40***	-0.62***				
Religiosity (Christian)	0.28	0.17				
Education	-0.01	-0.01				
Age	-0.01*	-0.03***				
Gender (female)	0.04	-0.45*				

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A2.6.3 Estimates of indirect prejudice estimated on the pooled sample (N=3,734), and separately in the Netherlands (N= 1,688) and Germany (N=2,046)

	Germany		**Netherlands**	
	Immigrants	**Veils**	**Immigrants**	**Veils**
Critical exclusive	0.77 (0.10)	0.49 (0.12)	0.79 (0.11)	0.85 (0.12)
Moderately critical exclusive	0.59 (0.09)	0.51 (0.11)	0.52 (0.10)	0.41 (0.12)
Moderate	0.38 (0.11)	0.17 (0.13)	0.47 (0.15)	0.51 (0.16)
Critical inclusive	0.01 (0.08)	0.34 (0.09)	-0.22 (0.11)	0.32 (0.13)

Appendix 2.7: Effect size and confidence intervals

Table A2.7.1 Results of multinomial logistic regression predicting latent profile membership

	Reference category					
	Critical exclusive		**Moderate**		**Moderately critical exclusive**	
	B^{sig}	[95% CI]	B^{sig}	[95% CI]	B^{sig}	[95% CI]
Critical inclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-5.31***	[-6.72, -3.89]	-9.47***	[-10.82, -8.12]	-3.30	[-4.42, -2.17]
Unconditional respect	1.14***	[0.98, 1.30]	0.26***	[0.13, 0.39]	0.67***	[0.56, 0.79]
Civil liberties	0.11	[-0.04, 0.27]	0.89***	[0.74, 1.04]	0.12	[-0.01, 0.25]
Open-mindednes	0.92***	[0.75, 1.09]	0.76***	[0.60, 0.93]	0.47***	[0.33, 0.61]
Right-wing	-0.84***	[-0.96, -0.70]	-0.27***	[-0.38, -0.14]	-0.45***	[-0.56, -0.36]
Religiosity (Christian)	0.33*	[0.06, 0.59]	0.10	[-0.18, 0.38]	0.18	[-0.05, 0.40]
Education	0.22***	[0.15, 0.29]	0.21***	[0.14, 0.28]	0.14***	[0.09, 0.20]
Age	-0.01*	[-0.02, -0.00]	0.01**	[0.00, 0.02]	-0.02***	[-0.03, -0.01]
Gender (female)	-0.54***	[-0.81, -0.28]	-0.19	[-0.45, 0.07]	-0.57***	[-0.79, -0.34]
Country (Germany)	-1.24***	[-1.52, -0.96]	-0.45**	[-0.73, -0.16]	-0.53***	[-0.77, -0.31]
Moderately critical exclusive (=1)						
Intercept	-2.01***	[-3.27, -0.75]	-6.17	[-7.45, -4.89]		
Unconditional respect	0.47***	[0.34, 0.60]	-0.42***	[-0.54, -0.29]		
Civil liberties	-0.01	[-0.14, 0.13]	0.77***	[0.63, 0.92]		
Open-mindedness	0.45***	[0.31, 0.58]	0.29***	[0.14, 0.45]		
Right-wing	-0.36***	[-0.48, -0.25]	0.18**	[0.08, 0.32]		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.14	[-0.08, 0.39]	-0.08	[-0.35, 0.19]		
Education	0.08*	[0.01, 0.14]	0.07*	[0.00, 0.14]		
Age	0.01	[0.00, 0.02]	0.03***	[0.02, 0.04]		
Gender (female)	0.04	[-0.21, 0.25]	0.37**	[0.12, 0.64]		
Country (Germany)	-0.69***	[-0.95, -0.45]	0.08	[-0.18, 0.38]		
Moderate (=1)						
Intercept	4.16***	[2.75, 5.57]				
Unconditional respect	0.89***	[0.73, 1.04]				
Civil liberties	-0.78***	[-0.94, -0.62]				
Open-mindedness	0.16	[-0.01, 0.32]				
Right-wing	-0.54***	[-0.71, -0.43]				
Religiosity (Christian)	0.22	[-0.05, 0.51]				
Education	0.01	[-0.07, 0.08]				
Age	-0.02***	[-0.03, -0.02]				
Gender (female)	-0.36**	[-0.62, -0.09]				
Country (Germany)	-0.77***	[-1.10, -0.50]				

Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.

Appendix Chapter 3

Appendix 3.1: Estimation of an alternative model



Figure A3.1.1 Latent profile analysis: Six profile solution

Appendix Chapter 4

Appendix 4.1: Possible combinations and shares of the multiple-acts-multiple-actors design

Table A4.1.1 All theoretically possible combinations for the multiple acts (symbols and education) and multiple actors (Muslims and Christians) approach

Combinations	Symbols		Education		Interpretation
	Christian	Muslim	Christian	Muslim	
C1.	Accept	Accept	Accept	Accept	Equally accepting
C2.	Reject	Reject	Accept	Accept	Equally partly rejecting
C3.	Accept	Accept	Reject	Reject	
C4.	Reject	Reject	Reject	Reject	Equally rejecting
C5.	Reject	Reject	Accept	Reject	Discriminatory rejecting
C6.	Accept	Reject	Reject	Reject	
C7.	Accept	Accept	Accept	Reject	
C8.	Accept	Reject	Accept	Accept	
C9.	Accept	Reject	Accept	Reject	
C10	Reject	Accept	Reject	Accept	Positively discriminating
C11	Reject	Accept	Accept	Accept	
C12	Accept	Accept	Reject	Accept	
C13	Reject	Accept	Reject	Reject	
C14	Reject	Reject	Reject	Accept	
C15	Reject	Accept	Accept	Reject	Positively and negatively discriminating
C16	Accept	Reject	Reject	Accept	

Table A4.1.2 Shares of all possible combinations for the multiple acts (symbols and education) and multiple actors (Muslims and Christians) approach by countries, N=2,097

	Belgium (N=369)	**Switzerland (N=331)**	**Germany (N=363)**	**France (N=316)**	**The United Kingdom (N=376)**	**The Nether-lands (342)**
Equally accepting	14%	13%	23%	3%	0%	21%
Equally partly rejecting	36%	17%	23%	26%	4%	30%
Equally rejecting	7%	10%	5%	39%	1%	12%
Discriminatory rejecting	35%	53%	42%	24%	92%	26%
Positively discriminating	7%	4%	6%	7%	1%	10%
Positively and negatively discrim.	1%	4%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Appendix 4.2: Descriptive statistics

Table A4.2.1 Descriptive statistics for the pooled sample and separately for Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany

	Pooled sample, N=739		**Belgium, N=259**		**Switzerland, N=234**		**Germany, N=246**	
	M / %	**SD**	**M / %**	**SD**	**M / %**	**SD**	**M / %**	**SD**
Female	52.5%		54.8		48.3		54.1	
Higher education	41.1%		61.0		17.9		42.3	
Religiously unaffiliated	21.1%		26.3		15.0		21.5	
Age	49.7	17.27	46.47	17.67	46.97	16.39	54.10	16.67
Social distance	0.47	0.16	0.47	0.15	0.47	0.16	0.48	0.17
Cultural threat	2.42	0.67	2.40	0.63	2.43	0.69	2.44	0.69
Secularism	3.54	1.22	3.71	1.15	3.65	1.19	3.27	1.27
Freedom of speech	4.19	1.09	3.56	1.23	4.33	0.98	4.72	0.62



Figure A4.2.1 Percentages of rejection of Muslim religious practices (A1 and B1) and percentage of rejection of Christian practices among those who rejected Muslim practices (A2 and B2): the pooled sample from three countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany), N=739

Appendix 4.3: Multinomial logistic regression

Table A4.3.1 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (equally rejecting as a reference category), N=739

	Log odds (SE)		Odds ratios [95% CI]	
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	-0.61	(1.14)	3.89	[0.41, 36.42]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	0.14	(0.39)	0.54	[0.26, 1.16]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.07	(0.47)	1.15	[0.46, 2.88]
Gender (reference male)	-0.28	(0.30)	1.07	[0.60, 1.91]
Education (reference lower education)	0.00	(0.33)	0.76	[0.40, 1.45]
Age	2.95*	(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.02]
Social distance	0.15	(1.26)	19.19	[1.64, 224.95]
Cultural threat	-0.87*	(0.26)	1.16	[0.70, 1.91]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.63***	(0.34)	0.42	[0.21, 0.82]
Secularism	0.42**	(0.16)	0.53	[0.39, 0.72]
Civil liberty	-0.61	(0.13)	1.52	[1.18, 1.97]
Equally accepting (=1)				
Intercept	5.65***	(1.29)	284.41	[22.62, 3575.68]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.36**	(0.44)	0.26	[0.11, 0.61]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.36	(0.50)	1.43	[0.53, 3.84]
Gender (reference male)	0.40	(0.33)	1.50	[0.78, 2.86]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.51	(0.37)	0.60	[0.29, 1.23]
Age	-0.02	(0.01)	0.98	[0.96, 1.00]
Social distance	-0.51	(1.51)	0.60	[0.03, 11.59]
Cultural threat	-0.96**	(0.30)	0.38	[0.21, 0.69]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.85*	(0.39)	0.43	[0.20, 0.91]
Secularism	-0.80***	(0.17)	0.45	[0.32, 0.63]
Civil liberty	0.49**	(0.16)	1.64	[1.20, 2.23]
Equally partly accepting (=1)				
Intercept	3.33**	(1.19)	27.99	[2.72, 287.51]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.58***	(0.40)	0.21	[0.09, 0.45]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	-0.39	(0.48)	0.68	[0.27, 1.72]
Gender (reference male)	0.04	(0.31)	1.04	[0.57, 1.90]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.22	(0.34)	0.80	[0.41, 1.56]
Age	0.00	(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.02]
Social distance	-0.21	(1.35)	0.81	[0.06, 11.47]
Cultural threat	-0.26	(0.27)	0.77	[0.45, 1.30]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.10	(0.34)	0.91	[0.47, 1.77]
Secularism	-0.60***	(0.16)	0.55	[0.40, 0.76]
Civil liberty	0.44**	(0.14)	1.56	[1.19, 2.04]

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table A4.3.2 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (different forms of discriminatory categories versus equally rejecting category), N=294

	Log odds (SE)		Odds ratios [95% CI]	
Discriminating and accepting (=1)				
Intercept	2.40	(1.39)	11.06	[0.73, 168.20]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.24**	(0.46)	0.29	[0.12, 0.70]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	-0.06	(0.53)	0.94	[0.34, 2.64]
Gender (reference male)	0.44	(0.34)	1.55	[0.80, 3.01]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.53	(0.38)	0.59	[0.28, 1.24]
Age	0.00	(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.02]
Social distance	1.99	(1.40)	7.33	[0.48, 113.06]
Cultural threat	-0.35	(0.30)	0.71	[0.39, 1.28]
Religiously unaffiliated	-1.12**	(0.42)	0.33	[0.15, 0.74]
Secularism	-0.65**	(0.17)	0.52	[0.37, 0.73]
Civil liberty	0.44**	(0.16)	1.55	[1.14, 2.10]
Discriminating and rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	0.11	(1.44)	1.11	[0.07, 18.57]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-0.29	(0.48)	0.75	[0.29, 1.90]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.10	(0.57)	1.11	[0.36, 3.37]
Gender (reference male)	-0.06	(0.36)	0.94	[0.47, 1.89]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.67	(0.41)	0.51	[0.23, 1.14]
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	0.99	[0.97, 1.01]
Social distance	2.93*	(1.42)	18.78	[1.17, 301.67]
Cultural threat	0.37	(0.31)	1.44	[0.79, 2.65]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.53	(0.42)	0.59	[0.26, 1.35]
Secularism	-0.54**	(0.18)	0.58	[0.41, 0.83]
Civil liberty	0.29	(0.16)	1.34	[0.98, 1.83]
Discriminating (=1)				
Intercept	-1.90	(1.49)	0.15	[0.01, 2.77]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	0.09	(0.50)	1.10	[0.41, 2.93]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.71	(0.57)	2.04	[0.66, 6.27]
Gender (reference male)	0.20	(0.36)	1.23	[0.60, 2.50]
Education (reference lower education)	0.08	(0.41)	1.08	[0.49, 2.42]
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	0.99	[0.97, 1.02]
Social distance	3.41*	(1.42)	30.15	[1.86, 489.41]
Cultural threat	0.66*	(0.32)	1.94	[1.04, 3.62]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.93*	(0.46)	0.39	[0.16, 0.97]
Secularism	-0.60***	(0.18)	0.55	[0.38, 0.78]
Civil liberty	0.34*	(0.17)	1.40	[1.01, 1.96]

Note. $^{*}p$ <.05, $^{**}p$ <.01, $^{***}p$ <.001.

Table A4.3.3 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (equally rejecting as a reference category; alternative way of coding social distance), N=739

	Log odds (SE)		Odds ratios [95% CI]	
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	2.67*	(1.17)	14.48	[1.47, 142.22]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-0.62	(0.38)	0.54	[0.25, 1.14]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.12	(0.47)	1.12	[0.45, 2.82]
Gender (reference male)	0.07	(0.30)	1.07	[0.60, 1.91]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.29	(0.33)	0.75	[0.39, 1.42]
Age	0.00	(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.02]
Social distance	0.64*	(0.29)	1.90	[1.08, 3.36]
Cultural threat	0.18	(0.25)	1.19	[0.73, 1.96]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.89**	(0.34)	0.41	[0.21, 0.81]
Secularism	-0.64***	(0.16)	0.53	[0.39, 0.72]
Civil liberty	0.43**	(0.13)	1.53	[1.18, 1.98]
Equally accepting (=1)				
Intercept	5.27***	(1.30)	195.01	[15.12, 2515.39]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.37**	(0.44)	0.26	[0.11, 0.61]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.35	(0.50)	1.42	[0.53, 3.81]
Gender (reference male)	0.40	(0.33)	1.49	[0.78, 2.84]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.51	(0.37)	0.60	[0.29, 1.22]
Age	-0.02	(0.01)	0.98	[0.96, 1.01]
Social distance	-0.24	(0.36)	0.79	[0.39, 1.58]
Cultural threat	-0.92**	(0.30)	0.40	[0.22, 0.72]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.87*	(0.39)	0.42	[0.20, 0.90]
Secularism	-0.80***	(0.17)	0.45	[0.32, 0.63]
Civil liberty	0.49**	(0.16)	1.64	[1.20, 2.23]
Equally partly rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	3.20**	(1.21)	24.49	[2.29, 262.05]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.58***	(0.40)	0.21	[0.09, 0.45]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	-0.39	(0.48)	0.68	[0.27, 1.72]
Gender (reference male)	0.04	(0.31)	1.04	[0.57, 1.89]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.22	(0.34)	0.80	[0.41, 1.56]
Age	0.00	(0.01)	1.00	[0.98, 1.02]
Social distance	-0.06	(0.31)	0.94	[0.51, 1.74]
Cultural threat	-0.25	(0.27)	0.78	[0.46, 1.31]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.10	(0.34)	0.90	[0.46, 1.76]
Secularism	-0.59***	(0.16)	0.55	[0.40, 0.76]
Civil liberty	0.44**	(0.14)	1.56	[1.19, 2.05]

Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.

Table A4.3.4 Findings of multinomial logistic regression analysis (equally rejecting as a reference category; religious identification instead of religious affiliation), N=583

	Log odds (SE)		Odds ratios [95% CI]	
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	2.33	(1.45)	10.31	[0.60, 175.59]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-0.84	(0.46)	0.43	[0.17, 1.07]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.33	(0.66)	1.39	[0.38, 5.04]
Gender (reference male)	0.29	(0.36)	1.33	[0.66, 2.69]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.30	(0.41)	0.74	[0.33, 1.68]
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	0.99	[0.96, 1.01]
Social distance	0.79*	(0.36)	2.19	[1.08, 4.47]
Cultural threat	-0.01	(0.31)	0.99	[0.54, 1.83]
Religiously unaffiliated	0.41*	(0.19)	1.50	[1.02, 2.20]
Secularism	-0.72***	(0.19)	0.49	[0.34, 0.71]
Civil liberty	0.56***	(0.15)	1.75	[1.31, 2.35]
Equally accepting (=1)				
Intercept	3.74*	(1.62)	42.27	[1.75, 1018.77]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.45**	(0.52)	0.23	[0.08, 0.65]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.54	(0.69)	1.71	[0.44, 6.68]
Gender (reference male)	0.64	(0.40)	1.89	[0.87, 4.14]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.53	(0.45)	0.59	[0.24, 1.43]
Age	-0.03*	(0.01)	0.97	[0.95, 1.00]
Social distance	-0.02	(0.42)	0.98	[0.43, 2.23]
Cultural threat	-0.90*	(0.36)	0.41	[0.20, 0.82]
Religiously unaffiliated	0.60**	(0.22)	1.82	[1.19, 2.79]
Secularism	-0.83***	(0.20)	0.43	[0.29, 0.65]
Civil liberty	0.61***	(0.18)	1.84	[1.30, 2.60]
Equally partly rejecting (=1)				
Intercept	3.34*	(1.52)	28.13	[1.44, 547.93]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	-1.61**	(0.49)	0.20	[0.08, 0.52]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	-0.04	(0.68)	0.96	[0.26, 3.61]
Gender (reference male)	0.35	(0.38)	1.42	[0.68, 2.97]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.03	(0.43)	0.97	[0.41, 2.26]
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	0.99	[0.96, 1.01]
Social distance	0.07	(0.39)	1.07	[0.49, 2.31]
Cultural threat	-0.36	(0.33)	0.70	[0.37, 1.34]
Religiously unaffiliated	0.22	(0.20)	1.24	[0.83, 1.85]
Secularism	-0.68***	(0.20)	0.50	[0.34, 0.74]
Civil liberty	0.51**	(0.16)	1.67	[1.22, 2.29]

Note. * *p* <.05, ** *p* <.01, *** *p* <.001.

Table A4.3.5 Findings of binomial logistic regression, N=345

	Equally partly rejecting			
	Log odds (SE)		**Odds ratios [95% CI]**	
Equally accepting (=1)				
Intercept	2.02*	(0.87)	7.52	[1.38, 43.03]
Switzerland (ref. Belgium)	0.34	(0.33)	1.40	[0.73, 2.70]
Germany (ref. Belgium)	0.67*	(0.31)	1.95	[1.06, 3.61]
Gender (reference male)	0.36	(0.24)	1.43	[0.90, 2.29]
Education (reference lower education)	-0.26	(0.26)	0.77	[0.47, 1.28]
Age	-0.01	(0.01)	0.99	[0.98, 1.00]
Social distance	-0.52	(1.20)	0.60	[0.05, 6.13]
Cultural threat	-0.72**	(0.23)	0.49	[0.31, 0.76]
Religiously unaffiliated	-0.80**	(0.29)	0.45	[0.25, 0.78]
Secularism	-0.21*	(0.10)	0.81	[0.66, 0.99]
Freedom of speech	0.10	(0.13)	1.11	[0.86, 1.44]

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix Chapter 5

Appendix 5.1: Descriptive statistics



Figure A5.1.1 Distributions of the 12 items measuring acceptance of different religious groups and practices (N=3,703)

Appendix 5.2: Alternative LPA models



Figure A5.2.1 Latent profile analysis: Four-profile model (N=3,703)



Figure A5.2.2 Latent profile analysis: Six profile model (N=3,703)



Figure A5.2.3 Latent profile analysis: Seven-profile model (N=3,703)

Appendix 5.3: Robustness checks: different coding of the religious affiliation variable

Table A5.3.1 Results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis: An alternative coding of religiosity (N=3,703)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Equally acceptaning (=1)								
Intercept	-1.06***	(0.12)	0.57***	(0.16)	0.04	(0.15)	0.50**	(0.16)
Country (Germany)	0.03	(0.12)	-0.96***	(0.15)	-0.29*	(0.14)	-0.83***	(0.15)
Gender (female)	-0.25*	(0.12)	-0.26	(0.14)	-0.28*	(0.14)	-0.36*	(0.14)
Age	-0.28***	(0.06)	-0.25**	(0.08)	-0.37***	(0.07)	-0.26***	(0.07)
Education	0.03	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.07)	0.03	(0.07)	0.11	(0.07)
Religiosity (affiliated)	0.27*	(0.13)	0.27	(0.15)	0.70***	(0.16)	0.19	(0.16)
Feelings towards Muslims	0.23***	(0.06)	0.26***	(0.07)	0.59***	(0.08)	0.82***	(0.09)
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.43***	(0.10)	0.33**	(0.11)	0.81***	(0.12)	0.41**	(0.12)
Feelings towards non-believers	-0.35***	(0.10)	-0.48***	(0.11)	-0.61***	(0.11)	-0.36**	(0.11)
Secularism	-0.10	(0.07)	-0.45***	(0.09)	-1.07***	(0.11)	-0.16	(0.09)
National identification	0.14*	(0.07)	-0.08	(0.08)	0.04	(0.08)	-0.48***	(0.09)
Open-mindedness	0.78***	(0.08)	0.75***	(0.09)	1.03***	(0.10)	1.05***	(0.09)
Civil liberty	0.27***	(0.07)	-0.24*	(0.09)	0.27**	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.09)
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.56***	(0.14)	0.06	(0.18)	-0.46**	(0.17)		
Country (Germany)	0.86***	(0.14)	-0.13	(0.17)	0.54**	(0.15)		
Gender (female)	0.11	(0.13)	0.10	(0.15)	0.08	(0.15)		
Age	-0.01	(0.06)	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.10	(0.07)		
Education	-0.08	(0.06)	-0.21**	(0.08)	-0.08	(0.08)		
Religiosity (affiliated)	0.08	(0.14)	0.08	(0.16)	0.51**	(0.17)		
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.60***	(0.09)	-0.56***	(0.10)	-0.23*	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.02	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.11)	0.40***	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-believers	0.01	(0.09)	-0.12	(0.11)	-0.25*	(0.11)		
Secularism	0.07	(0.08)	-0.29**	(0.10)	-0.90***	(0.12)		
National identification	0.61***	(0.08)	0.40***	(0.09)	0.51***	(0.10)		
Open-mindedness	-0.27***	(0.08)	-0.30**	(0.09)	-0.02	(0.10)		
Civil liberty	0.30***	(0.08)	-0.21*	(0.09)	0.31**	(0.10)		
Equally rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.10***	(0.13)	0.53**	(0.17)				
Country (Germany)	0.32**	(0.12)	-0.67***	(0.15)				
Gender (female)	0.04	(0.12)	0.02	(0.14)				
Age	0.09	(0.06)	0.12	(0.08)				

Table A5.3.1 Results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis: An alternative coding of religiosity (N=3,703) (continued)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Education	0.00	(0.06)	-0.13	(0.07)				
Religiosity (affiliated)	-0.43**	(0.14)	-0.43**	(0.16)				
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.36***	(0.07)	-0.33***	(0.09)				
Feelings towards non-Muslims	-0.38***	(0.09)	-0.47***	(0.10)				
Feelings towards non-believers	0.26**	(0.09)	0.12	(0.10)				
Secularism	0.97***	(0.11)	0.62***	(0.12)				
National identification	0.10	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.08)				
Open-minded thinking	-0.24**	(0.08)	-0.27**	(0.09)				
Civil liberty	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.51***	(0.10)				
Equally partly rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.63***	(0.15)						
Country (Germany)	1.00***	(0.14)						
Gender (female)	0.01	(0.13)						
Age	-0.03	(0.07)						
Education	0.13*	(0.06)						
Religiosity (affiliated)	-0.00	(0.14)						
Feelings towards Muslims	0.04	(0.06)						
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.09	(0.10)						
Feelings towards non-believers	0.14	(0.09)						
Secularism	0.35***	(0.09)						
National identification	0.21**	(0.07)						
Open-mindedness	0.03	(0.08)						
Civil liberty	0.51***	(0.08)						

Note. $^{*}p$ <.05, $^{**}p$ <.01, $^{***}p$ <.001.

Table A5.3.2 Results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis: An alternative coding of religiosity excluding those who did not reveal their religious affiliation (N=3,586)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Equally accepting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.07***	(0.12)	0.57***	(0.16)	0.04	(0.15)	0.49**	(0.16)
Country (Germany)	0.03	(0.12)	-0.99***	(0.15)	-0.32*	(0.14)	-0.87***	(0.15)
Gender (female)	-0.21	(0.12)	-0.27	(0.14)	-0.26	(0.14)	-0.32*	(0.14)
Age	-0.27***	(0.06)	-0.25**	(0.08)	-0.35***	(0.07)	-0.26***	(0.07)
Education	0.01	(0.06)	-0.11	(0.07)	0.01	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)
Religiosity (Christian)	0.25	(0.13)	0.28	(0.15)	0.73***	(0.16)	0.22	(0.16)
Feelings towards Muslims	0.24***	(0.06)	0.29***	(0.07)	0.61***	(0.08)	0.84***	(0.09)
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.38***	(0.10)	0.28*	(0.11)	0.76***	(0.12)	0.36**	(0.12)
Feelings towards non-believers	-0.30**	(0.10)	-0.43***	(0.11)	-0.55***	(0.11)	-0.33**	(0.11)
Secularism	-0.11	(0.07)	-0.48***	(0.09)	-1.06***	(0.11)	-0.19*	(0.09)
National identification	0.14*	(0.07)	-0.08	(0.08)	0.04	(0.08)	-0.47***	(0.09)
Open-mindedness	0.79***	(0.08)	0.77***	(0.09)	1.04***	(0.10)	1.09***	(0.09)
Civil liberty	0.25***	(0.07)	-0.25**	(0.09)	0.26**	(0.09)	-0.05	(0.09)
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.55***	(0.14)	0.08	(0.18)	-0.46**	(0.17)		
Country (Germany)	0.90***	(0.14)	-0.17	(0.17)	0.56**	(0.15)		
Gender (female)	0.11	(0.13)	0.05	(0.15)	0.06	(0.15)		
Age	-0.02	(0.06)	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.10	(0.07)		
Education	-0.09	(0.06)	-0.21**	(0.08)	-0.09	(0.08)		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.03	(0.14)	0.06	(0.16)	0.51**	(0.17)		
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.60***	(0.09)	-0.56***	(0.10)	-0.23*	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.02	(0.10)	-0.08	(0.11)	0.39***	(0.11)		
Feelings towards non-believers	0.02	(0.09)	-0.11	(0.11)	-0.23*	(0.11)		
Secularism	0.08	(0.08)	-0.29**	(0.10)	-0.88***	(0.12)		
National identification	0.61***	(0.08)	0.39***	(0.09)	0.50***	(0.10)		
Open-mindedness	-0.30***	(0.08)	-0.32**	(0.09)	-0.05	(0.10)		
Civil liberty	0.30***	(0.08)	-0.20*	(0.09)	0.31**	(0.10)		
Equally rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.10***	(0.13)	0.58**	(0.17)				
Country (Germany)	0.34**	(0.12)	-0.67***	(0.15)				
Gender (female)	0.05	(0.12)	0.01	(0.14)				
Age	0.08	(0.06)	0.10	(0.08)				
Education	0.01	(0.06)	-0.13	(0.07)				
Religiosity (Christian)	-0.48**	(0.14)	-0.45**	(0.16)				
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.37***	(0.07)	-0.33***	(0.09)				

Table A5.3.2 Results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis: An alternative coding of religiosity excluding those who did not reveal their religious affiliation (N=3,586) (continued)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Feelings towards non-Muslims	-0.38***	(0.09)	-0.48***	(0.10)				
Feelings towards non-believers	0.25**	(0.09)	0.12	(0.10)				
Secularism	0.95***	(0.11)	0.58***	(0.12)				
National identification	0.10	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.08)				
Open-mindedness	-0.25**	(0.08)	-0.27**	(0.09)				
Civil liberty	-0.02	(0.08)	-0.51***	(0.10)				
Equally partly rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.63***	(0.15)						
Country (Germany)	1.01***	(0.14)						
Gender (female)	0.06	(0.13)						
Age	-0.02	(0.07)						
Education	0.12*	(0.06)						
Religiosity (Christian)	-0.03	(0.14)						
Feelings towards Muslims	0.05	(0.06)						
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.10	(0.10)						
Feelings towards non-believers	0.13	(0.09)						
Secularism	0.37***	(0.09)						
National identification	0.22**	(0.07)						
Open-mindedness	0.02	(0.08)						
Civil liberty	0.50***	(0.08)						

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix 5.4: The effects of control variables as reported in Table 5.5 in the manuscript

Concerning the control variables, individuals within the *equally accepting* subgroup were older compared to all the other subgroups and less likely to be female compared to the *equally moderate*, *equally rejecting* and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups. Furthermore, individuals within the *equally partly rejecting* subgroup completed higher levels of education compared to the *equally moderate* and *discriminatory rejecting* subgroups. In addition, being from Germany was associated with higher likelihood of displaying *discriminatory or equally partly rejecting* pattern of responses, whereas being from the Netherlands was associated with higher likelihood of displaying *equally accepting or equally moderate* pattern of responses (for more details regarding country differences, see Appendix 5.7 below).

Appendix 5.5: Between profile comparison in terms of self-reported reasons for rejection



	Neutrality & secularism	Equality	National culture	Islam threat	Conditional	Miscellaneous	Other
Overall χ^2 test	143.66***	45.26***	147.11***	39.11***	32.39***	32.51***	16.00**
Pairwise comparison	4 > 2 >3,5 > 1	3 > 2,4,1,5	1 > 5,2 > 3,4	5 > 1,3 > 4; 1 > 2; 5 > 2	3,5 > 2,4; 1 > 2	1,2,3,5 > 4; 5 > 2	5 > 2 > 4; 1 > 4; 5 > 3

Figure A5.5.1 Spontaneously mentioned reasons to reject Muslim practices per profile (N=1,922)



	Neutrality & secularism	Equality	National culture	Islam threat	Conditional	Miscellaneous	Other
Overall χ^2 test	119.36***	53.51***	131.29***	35.62***	39.82***	51.95***	16.00**
Pairwise comparison	4 > 2 > 3,5 > 1	3 > 2,4 > 1; 3 > 5; 2 > 5	1 > 5,2 > 3,4	1,5 > 2 > 4; 3 > 4	5 > 1 > 2; 5 > 4; 3 > 2	5,3,2 > 4	5 > 2 > 4; 1 > 4; 5 > 3

Figure A5.5.2 Spontaneously mentioned reasons to reject Muslim practices per profile, coder 2 (N=1,922)

Appendix 5.6: Robustness check: excluding unengaged participants

Table A5.6.1 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis: excluding unengaged participants (N=3,631)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		Equally partly rejecting		Equally rejecting		Discriminatory rejecting	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Equally accepting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.08***	(0.13)	0.56**	(0.16)	0.11	(0.16)	0.39*	(0.17)
Country (Germany)	-0.19	(0.12)	-0.65***	(0.15)	-0.40**	(0.15)	-1.21***	(0.15)
Gender (female)	-0.15	(0.12)	-0.28	(0.15)	-0.27	(0.15)	-0.28*	(0.14)
Age	-0.51***	(0.06)	-0.02	(0.08)	-0.52***	(0.08)	-0.54***	(0.08)
Education	0.02	(0.06)	-0.16*	(0.07)	0.01	(0.07)	0.05	(0.07)
Religiosity (Christian)	0.33*	(0.13)	0.31	(0.16)	0.76***	(0.17)	0.23	(0.15)
Feelings towards Muslims	0.24***	(0.06)	0.15	(0.08)	0.61***	(0.09)	0.80***	(0.08)
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.43***	(0.10)	0.22	(0.12)	0.88***	(0.12)	0.50***	(0.12)
Feelings towards non-believers	-0.35***	(0.10)	-0.36**	(0.12)	-0.64***	(0.12)	-0.52***	(0.11)
Secularism	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.29**	(0.09)	-1.14***	(0.11)	-0.32***	(0.09)
National identification	0.11	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.08)	-0.04	(0.08)	-0.35***	(0.08)
Open-mindedness	0.79***	(0.08)	0.74***	(0.10)	0.96***	(0.09)	0.86***	(0.09)
Civil liberty	0.29***	(0.07)	-0.23*	(0.09)	0.26**	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.09)
Discriminatory rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.47***	(0.13)	0.17	(0.18)	-0.28	(0.17)		
Country (Germany)	1.02***	(0.13)	0.56**	(0.17)	0.81***	(0.16)		
Gender (female)	0.14	(0.12)	0.00	(0.16)	0.02	(0.14)		
Age	0.03	(0.07)	0.52***	(0.08)	0.02	(0.08)		
Education	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.21**	(0.08)	-0.04	(0.08)		
Religiosity (Christian)	0.10	(0.13)	0.09	(0.17)	0.54**	(0.17)		
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.55***	(0.08)	-0.65***	(0.09)	-0.19	(0.10)		
Feelings towards non-Muslims	-0.07	(0.10)	-0.28*	(0.12)	0.38***	(0.10)		
Feelings towards non-believers	0.17	(0.09)	0.16	(0.11)	-0.12	(0.10)		
Secularism	0.23**	(0.08)	0.03	(0.11)	-0.82***	(0.12)		
National identification	0.46***	(0.07)	0.34***	(0.09)	0.31***	(0.08)		
Open-mindedness	-0.07	(0.07)	-0.12	(0.09)	0.10	(0.08)		
Civil liberty	0.31***	(0.07)	-0.21*	(0.10)	0.29**	(0.09)		
Equally rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.20***	(0.13)	0.45*	(0.18)				
Country (Germany)	0.21	(0.12)	-0.25	(0.17)				
Gender (female)	0.12	(0.12)	-0.01	(0.16)				
Age	0.01	(0.06)	0.50***	(0.08)				
Education	0.00	(0.06)	-0.17*	(0.08)				
Religiosity (Christian)	-0.44**	(0.15)	-0.45*	(0.18)				

Table A5.6.1 Results of multinomial logistic regression analysis: excluding unengaged participants (N=3,631) (continued)

	Reference category							
	Equally moderate		**Equally partly rejecting**		**Equally rejecting**		**Discriminatory rejecting**	
	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)	B^{sig}	(SE)
Feelings towards Muslims	-0.37***	(0.08)	-0.46***	(0.09)				
Feelings towards non-Muslims	-0.45***	(0.09)	-0.65***	(0.12)				
Feelings towards non-believers	0.29**	(0.09)	0.28*	(0.11)				
Secularism	1.05***	(0.11)	0.85***	(0.13)				
National identification	0.15*	(0.06)	0.03	(0.09)				
Open-mindedness	-0.17*	(0.07)	-0.22*	(0.09)				
Civil liberty	0.02	(0.07)	-0.50***	(0.10)				
Equally partly rejecting (=1)								
Intercept	-1.65***	(0.15)						
Country (Germany)	0.46**	(0.14)						
Gender (female)	0.13	(0.14)						
Age	-0.49***	(0.07)						
Education	0.18**	(0.07)						
Religiosity (Christian)	0.01	(0.15)						
Feelings towards Muslims	0.10	(0.07)						
Feelings towards non-Muslims	0.21*	(0.10)						
Feelings towards non-believers	0.01	(0.10)						
Secularism	0.20*	(0.09)						
National identification	0.12	(0.07)						
Open-mindedness	0.05	(0.08)						
Civil liberty	0.52***	(0.08)						

Note. * *p* <.05, ** *p* <.01, *** *p* <.001.



Figure A5.6.1 Latent profile analysis: Five-profile model excluding unengaged respondents (N=3,631)

Appendix 5.7: Cross-country differences

To test for country differences in latent profile solutions, an unconstrained model (allowing variances, means and proportions to vary across the two countries) and a model whereby means were constrained to be equal across countries were estimated (Table A5.7.1). Although the BIC of the constrained model increases slightly, suggesting that there are small differences in means between the countries, both models are very good in terms of distinguishing individuals (similar entropy > 0.9).

Table A5.7.1 Multi-group latent profile analysis models

	BIC	Entropy
Unconstrained model	121319.0	0.934
Constrained model	122381.9	0.921

To further qualitatively examine possible differences, a model with five profiles was estimated for the Dutch (Figure A5.7.1) and Germany (Figure A5.7.2) samples separately. In Germany the model with five profiles is the same as the model with five profiles based on the pooled sample. However, in the Netherlands a variation on the equally *partly rejecting subgroup* appears instead of *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup. We therefore further examined which pattern of responses Dutch people displayed who were classified in the *discriminatory rejecting* subgroup in the pooled sample. For this, we plotted average scores of the Dutch and German participants classified in one of the five profiles obtained in the pooled sample (Figures A5.7.3. and Figure A5.7.4). Although the subgroup of individuals who display a discriminatory pattern of rejection does not spontaneously emerge when the model is estimated only in the Netherlands, those Dutch participants did indeed show a discriminatory pattern of response as found in the pooled sample. However, discrimination appears to be less strong in the Netherlands than in Germany (the black line on the graph is not as steep in the Netherlands as it is in Germany). Also, people from the Netherlands are less likely to be classified in the discriminatory rejecting profile compared to people from Germany (12% versus 20%).



Figure A5.7.1 Latent profile analysis: Five-profile model estimated on the sample of participants from the Netherlands (N=1,676)



Figure A5.7.2 Latent profile analysis: Five-profile model estimated on the sample of participants from Germany (N=2,027)



Figure A5.7.3 Latent profile analysis: Five profile model estimated on the pooled sample and presented for participants from the Netherlands (N=1,676)



Figure A5.7.4 Latent profile analysis: Five profile model estimated on the pooled sample and presented for participants from Germany (N=2,027)

Appendix 5.8: Robustness check: excluding the three items regarding religious symbols



Figure A5.8.1 Latent profile analysis: Five profile model estimated without the items concerning religious symbols (N=3,703)

Nederlandse samenvatting[39]

Inleiding

Praktijken van moslimminderheden[40], zoals het dragen van een hoofddoek, de weigering om iemand van het andere geslacht de hand te schudden en islamitisch religieus onderwijs, worden vaak betwist in West-Europese samenlevingen. Terwijl sommige mensen deze en soortgelijke praktijken aanvaarden, verwerpen anderen ze. De afwijzing van moslimpraktijken wordt over het algemeen verklaard door vooroordelen jegens moslims als groep. Voor sommige mensen kan de afwijzing van praktijken echter voortkomen uit meer principiële zorgen, zoals staatsneutraliteit en burgerlijke vrijheden, in plaats van vooroordelen. Mensen kunnen bijvoorbeeld tegen islamitisch religieus onderwijs op openbare scholen zijn omdat ze anti-islamitische vooroordelen hebben, maar ook omdat ze seculiere principes onderschrijven en vinden dat religie in het algemeen geen plaats heeft in openbare instellingen.

In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik of (en wanneer) de afwijzing van praktijken van moslimminderheden een weerspiegeling is van algemene en moslim specifieke vooroordelen of dat (en wanneer) meer principiële overwegingen met betrekking tot liberale waarden een rol spelen. Mijn belangrijkste verwachting is dat er verschillende subgroepen van individuen binnen de meerderheidsbevolking te onderscheiden zijn, en dat sommige mensen moslimpraktijken voornamelijk afwijzen op basis van vooroordelen jegens moslims (op vooroordelen gebaseerde afwijzing) en anderen uit principiële redenen (op principes gebaseerde afwijzing). Op vooroordelen gebaseerde afwijzing houdt in dat meerderheidsleden over het algemeen negatief zijn ten opzichte van moslims en hun praktijken. Het houdt ook in dat mensen moslims discrimineren ten opzichte van andere religieuze groepen (bijv. joden en christenen). Daarentegen houdt op principes gebaseerde afwijzing in dat mensen onderscheid maken tussen moslims als een groep mensen en specifieke moslimpraktijken door de praktijk te verwerpen zonder negatieve gevoelens jegens moslims als groep mensen te koesteren. Het houdt ook in dat mensen niet met twee maten meten, maar praktijken afwijzen, ongeacht de betrokken religieuze groep. Om onderscheid te maken tussen subgroepen van individuen die zich laten leiden door vooroordelen en die geleid worden door meer principiële overwegingen, pas ik een persoonsgerichte benadering (bijv. latente profielanalyse) toe op een reeks vragen die de houding van meerderheidsleden ten opzichte van moslims als groep, een scala aan moslimpraktijken en ook soortgelijke praktijken van andere religieuze groeperingen (zoals christenen en joden) meten. In mijn onderzoek heb ik gebruik gemaakt van gegevens die zijn verzameld onder nationale meerderheidsleden in Nederland en Duitsland, evenals in België, Zwitserland en Frankrijk.

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[39] I like to thank Lian van Vemde for translating the summary into Dutch and Maykel Verkuyten for his feedback.

[40] Ik maak gebruik van de term ‘praktijken van moslimminderheden’ om te verwijzen naar de manier waarop deze praktijken vaak worden gezien in westerse samenlevingen, zonder daarbij te impliceren dat deze praktijken typisch zijn voor of bepalend zijn voor moslims of de islam.

Op vooroordelen en op principes gebaseerde afwijzing van moslimpraktijken

Op vooroordelen gebaseerde afwijzing van moslims en de islam wordt vaak islamofobie genoemd, wat wordt gedefinieerd als "willekeurige negatieve attitudes of emoties gericht op de islam of moslims" [indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims] (Bleich, 2011, p. 1581). De willekeurige aard van islamofobie impliceert een algemene negatieve houding ten opzichte van elk 'object' dat verband houdt met de islam en moslims. Mensen die bijvoorbeeld anti-moslim vooroordelen koesteren, zullen negatieve gevoelens koesteren jegens moslims als een groep mensen, een negatieve kijk hebben op de islam als een systeem van religieus geloof en de religieuze praktijken verwerpen die worden geassocieerd met moslims en de islam.

Verschillende onderzoeken leveren empirische ondersteuning voor de willekeurige aard van islamofobie bij ongeveer een op de vijf meerderheidsleden. Met behulp van vier verschillende nationale steekproeven bleek uit een onderzoek uit Nederland dat meerderheidsleden een negatieve houding hebben ten opzichte van Turken en Marokkanen (etnische groepen die typisch worden geassocieerd met de islam) en tegelijkertijd bezwaar maken tegen moslimrechten, zoals het recht om hun geloof te uiten (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020). Een recente studie uit Australië toonde aan dat sommige Australiërs consistent anti-moslim sentimenten vertonen door negatief te zijn tegenover moslims als een groep mensen, door niet te willen dat hun familielid met een moslim trouwt en door de bouw van een gebedshuis niet te steunen (Dunn et al, 2021). In lijn hiermee vond een onderzoek in Zwitserland dat sommige Zwitsers het sterk eens zijn met elk argument tegen de moslimpraktijk van het dragen van een gezichtssluier en een negatieve anti-moslim en anti-islamhouding hebben (Eugster, 2021). Hoewel de bevindingen van deze onderzoeken ondersteuning bieden voor een algemeen negatieve houding ten opzichte van moslims, laten ze ook zien dat slechts een minderheid van het publiek een dergelijke houding heeft en dat de afwijzing van praktijken niet volledig kan worden gereduceerd tot vooroordelen jegens moslims.

In tegenstelling tot afwijzing op basis van vooroordelen, is afwijzing op basis van principes genuanceerder en gedifferentieerder, in de zin dat het gericht is op specifieke praktijken of overtuigingen, en niet zozeer op moslims als een groep mensen. Principiële afwijzing is gebaseerd op waarden die in het algemeen of in een bepaalde samenleving belangrijk worden geacht. In westerse samenlevingen zijn bezwaren tegen het dragen van een hoofddoek bijvoorbeeld soms gebaseerd op de principes van gendergelijkheid en persoonlijke autonomie (Sarrasin, 2016), terwijl bezwaren tegen religieus onderwijs op openbare scholen kunnen zijn gebaseerd op zorgen over staatsneutraliteit en secularisme (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015).

Verschillende empirische studies suggereren dat bezwaar tegen praktijken van moslimminderheden gebaseerd kan zijn op principiële redenen in plaats van bevooroordeelde gevoelens jegens de groep moslims. Zo bleek uit een recent onderzoek in Nederland dat tussen de 17% en 30% van de bevolking positief staat tegenover Turken en Marokkanen en hun rechten erkent, maar soms bezwaar heeft tegen het dragen van de hoofddoek of het oprichten van islamitische scholen (Adelman & Verkuyten , 2020). Verder onderzocht een studie in Duitsland de houding ten opzichte van islamitisch en christelijk religieus onderwijs op scholen en ontdekte dat ongeveer een derde van de bevolking tegen religieus onderwijs was, ongeacht de betrokken religieuze groep. De bevindingen van deze onderzoeken geven aan dat er een substantiële subgroep van meerderheidsleden is die bezwaar heeft tegen specifieke moslimpraktijken vanwege praktijkspecifieke zorgen die worden opgeroepen door verschillende principes die mensen hebben.

Methoden voor het onderzoeken van op vooroordelen en op principes gebaseerde afwijzing

Onderscheid tussen praktijken en groepen

Om onderscheid te maken tussen op vooroordelen en op principes gebaseerde afwijzing, hanteer ik drie verschillende benaderingen. Ten eerste onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 of mensen onderscheid maken tussen moslimpraktijken (bijv. het dragen van een hoofddoek) en moslims als groep mensen. Wanneer afwijzing van een moslimpraktijk overeenkomt met negatieve gevoelens jegens moslims als groep mensen, ligt het voor de hand dat bevooroordeelde gevoelens ten grondslag liggen aan de afwijzing. Wanneer afwijzing van de praktijk echter gepaard gaat met positieve gevoelens jegens de groep moslims, is de kans groter dat meer op principes gebaseerde redenen aan de afwijzing ten grondslag liggen (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). Ten tweede onderzoek ik in de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 of mensen onderscheid maken tussen verschillende moslimpraktijken: bijvoorbeeld of mensen consequent islamitische religieuze symbolen en islamitische religieuze opvoeding afwijzen, of juist de ene accepteren en de andere afwijzen. Een afwijzing van alle moslimpraktijken geeft aan dat er geen rekening wordt gehouden met de aard van de praktijk en dat er waarschijnlijk vooroordelen in het spel zijn. Differentiatie tussen verschillende praktijken houdt daarentegen in dat mensen rekening houden met de aard van de praktijk (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Gibson & Gouws, 2001) en een praktijk afwijzen vanwege praktijkspecifieke redenen in plaats van op groepen gebaseerde negatieve gevoelens. Ten derde, in hoofdstuk 4 en 5, onderzoek ik of mensen moslims discrimineren ten opzichte van andere religieuze groepen, zoals christenen of joden, door moslimpraktijken sterker af te wijzen en soortgelijke praktijken te accepteren wanneer christenen of joden daarbij betrokken zijn. Mensen kunnen een dubbele standaard toepassen door een praktijk voor moslims af te wijzen, maar een vergelijkbare praktijk niet afwijzen wanneer andere religieuze groepen zich ermee bezighouden. Mensen kunnen de praktijk echter ook afwijzen, ongeacht de religieuze groep die erbij betrokken is. Terwijl in het eerste geval de discriminatie van moslims wijst op negatieve gevoelens ten aanzien van Moslims, is het in het tweede geval waarschijnlijker dat er principiële overwegingen (bijv. secularisme, staatsneutraliteit) in het spel zijn.

Persoonsgerichte benadering

Het overgrote deel van het onderzoek naar anti-moslim attitudes maakt gebruik van een variabele-gecentreerde benadering waarbij de nadruk ligt op de associaties tussen verschillende variabelen. Dit type onderzoek vindt doorgaans een positieve relatie tussen vooroordelen tegen moslims en de afwijzing van een bepaalde praktijk, wat aangeeft dat hoe meer vooroordelen mensen hebben, hoe groter de kans is dat ze de praktijk afwijzen. Een variabele-gecentreerde benadering gaat ervan uit dat individuen kunnen worden geplaatst op een lineair continuüm van sterkere naar zwakkere vooroordelen en dat een toename van vooroordelen overeenkomt met een geleidelijke en evenredige toename van de afwijzing van moslimpraktijken (Laursen & Hoff., 2006; Meeusen et al., 2018). Dit betekent dat een op variabelen gerichte benadering kan voorbij gaan aan die gevallen waarin de attitude ten aanzien van de groep and tegenover verschillende praktijken niet parallel lopen, maar verschillend georganiseerd zijn binnen verschillende subgroepen van individuen.

Persoonsgerichte benaderingen gaan ervan uit dat er kwalitatief verschillende subgroepen van individuen zijn met verschillende, niet noodzakelijk lineaire, combinaties van attitudes en overtuigingen. Een persoonsgerichte benadering zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen aantonen dat er een subgroep van individuen is die hun vooroordeel jegens moslims combineert met de afwijzing van moslimpraktijken (bijv. islamofoob) maar ook een subgroep van individuen die positieve gevoelens heeft jegens moslims en alle moslim praktijken accepteert. Individuen kunnen hun attitudes en overtuigingen echter ook op verschillende manieren combineren: er kan bijvoorbeeld een subgroep van individuen zijn die vooroordelen jegens moslims als groep mensen combineert met acceptatie van praktijken van moslimminderheden, en een subgroep van individuen die positieve gevoelens jegens moslims combineert met de afwijzing van specifieke praktijken (bijv. geen handen schudden met iemand van het andere geslacht). Een persoonsgerichte benadering gaat er dus vanuit dat de populatie heterogeen kan zijn en uit meerdere subpopulaties kan bestaan die worden gekenmerkt door verschillende subjectieve configuraties van attitudes en overtuigingen (Howard & Hoffman, 2018; Morin et al., 2016).

Er zijn twee belangrijke voordelen van het gebruik van een persoonsgerichte benadering om te onderzoeken hoe vooroordelen en op principes gebaseerde afwijzing gecombineerd kunnen worden. Ten eerste is het mogelijk om tegelijkertijd rekening te houden met verschillende combinaties van meerdere vragen die de houding van mensen ten opzichte van moslims en een reeks verschillende praktijken meten en die niet gemakkelijk tegelijkertijd in ogenschouw kunnen worden genomen met een variabele-gecentreerde benadering (Oberski, 2016). Ten tweede maakt het een theoretisch meer genuanceerd begrip mogelijk van de kwalitatieve verschillende manieren waarop individuen tegelijkertijd moslims als een groep en moslimpraktijken kunnen evalueren: daarmee geeft het een meer genuanceerder beeld van de heterogeniteit van de bevolking.

Op vooroordelen en op principes gebaseerde afwijzing

Om te valideren dat de subgroepen van individuen die geïdentificeerd worden met een persoonsgerichte benadering betekenisvol, onderzoek ik ook of en hoe deze subgroepen verschillen in hun nadruk op liberale principes (burgerlijke vrijheden, onvoorwaardelijk respect voor anderen, ruimdenkendheid en secularisme) en gevoelens jegens andere religieuze en minderheidsgroepen. Ik onderzoek ook verschillen in religieuze overtuiging, evenals in psychologische constructies die typisch worden onderzocht in de literatuur over vooroordelen, zoals autoritarisme, conservatisme en nationale identificatie. Mijn belangrijkste verwachting is dat subgroepen van individuen die moslimpraktijken afwijzen uit principiële - op waarden gebaseerde – redenen, meer liberale principes onderschrijven, terwijl degenen die moslimpraktijken afwijzen als gevolg van vooroordelen eerder autoritaire en conservatieve denkbeelden zullen aanhangen, zich sterker identificeren met het land en eerder aangesloten zijn bij een van de christelijke denominaties.

Belangrijkste bevindingen

Afwijzing op basis van vooroordelen
Mijn bevindingen leveren consistent bewijs dat een aanzienlijk deel van de mensen uit de meerderheidsgroep een negatieve houding heeft ten opzichte van moslims en hun praktijken. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 wordt dit weergegeven door een subgroep van individuen (19-28%) die negatieve gevoelens hebben ten aanzien van moslims en die de expressieve rechten en praktijken van moslims afwijzen. In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 is er een subgroep van individuen die moslims discrimineert door islamitische religieuze praktijken (bijv. religieuze symbolen) af te wijzen, maar tegelijkertijd dezelfde religieuze praktijken wel te accepteren in het geval van christenen of joden (16-45%).

Mensen die afwijzend zijn op basis van vooroordelen hadden ook meer autoritaire en conservatieve denkbeelden (hoofdstuk 3), identificeren zich sterker met het land (hoofdstuk 5) en waren vaker christenen (hoofdstuk 4). Ze werden ook gekenmerkt door sterkere vooroordelen, ongeacht hoe deze werden gemeten (hoofdstukken 2-5). Deze bevindingen zijn in lijn met onderzoek dat de rol van vooroordelen bij het afwijzen van moslimpraktijken benadrukt (bijv. Blinder et al., 2019; Saroglou et al., 2009) en met onderzoek dat aantoont dat afwijzing van mensen die niet tot de eigen groep behoren en hun praktijken, te maken heeft met autoritaire en conservatieve denkbeelden (bijv. Feldman, 2003; 2020) en nationale en religieuze vooroordelen (bijv. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Over het algemeen bieden deze bevindingen bewijs voor de algemene aard en belang van islamofobie onder een deel van de bevolking (Bleich 2011; 2012).

Afwijzing op basis van principes
In vier van mijn studies leveren de bevindingen duidelijk bewijs dat er ook een substantiële groep meerderheidsleden is die praktijken van moslimminderheden afwijst om meer principiële - op waarden gebaseerde - redenen in plaats van vooroordelen. In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 wordt afwijzing op basis van principes weergegeven door een subgroep die niets tegen de groep moslims heeft, maar

tegelijkertijd sommige moslimpraktijken wel afwijst (bijv. het weigeren van handen schudden met iemand van het andere geslacht) en andere praktijken accepteert (bijv. de bouw van moskeeën; 12-33%). In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 is er een subgroep van individuen die onderscheid maakt tussen praktijken door de ene praktijk te accepteren (bijv. religieuze symbolen) en een andere te verwerpen (bijv. religieuze opvoeding). Maar dit doen ze zonder een dubbele standaard toe te passen, aangezien ze op dezelfde manier reageren op islamitische, christelijke en joodse groepen (13-29%).

De subgroepen van mensen die afwijzen op basis van principes, verschillen op drie belangrijke punten van de groep die afwijzend is op basis van vooroordelen. Ten eerste maken ze onderscheid tussen een praktijk (bijv. een moslimpraktijk) en de groep die er bij betrokken is (bijv. de groep moslims), door de praktijk kritisch te evalueren in plaats van de betreffende groep mensen. Ten tweede maken ze onderscheid tussen verschillende praktijken door sommige te accepteren en andere af te wijzen, wat er wederom op wijst dat de afwijzing van een praktijk gebaseerd kan zijn op de aard ervan en niet zozeer op de groep die erbij betrokken is. Ten derde reageren ze consistent over verschillende groepen heen en hanteren ze geen dubbele standaard waarbij ze moslims discrimineren. Deze drie aspecten suggereren dat afwijzing voor sommige meerderheidsleden gegrond zijn in op waarden gebaseerde principes die van betekenis zijn voor specifieke praktijken.

Subgroepen van individuen die afwijzend zijn op basis van principes, werden gekenmerkt door onvoorwaardelijk respect voor anderen (hoofdstuk 2 en 3), ruimdenkendheid (hoofdstuk 5) en instemming met burgerlijke vrijheden en secularisme (hoofdstuk 4 en 5). Deze bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming met de literatuur die de rol benadrukt van liberale principes bij het accepteren en verwerpen van praktijken van andere groepen (bijv. Gustavsson et al., 2016; Turgeon et al., 2019). Al met al leveren deze bevindingen sterk bewijs dat voor sommige meerderheidsleden de afwijzing van praktijken van moslimminderheden gebaseerd is op oprechte bezorgdheid over liberale principes en dat niet elke afwijzing eenvoudig of alleen een afspiegeling is van islamofobe sentimenten.

Additionele subgroepen

Naast op vooroordelen en principes gebaseerde subgroepen van individuen, identificeerde ik vier aanvullende subgroepen. Twee van deze laten zien dat voor sommige meerderheidsleden de afwijzing van praktijken van moslimminderheden niet alleen een kwestie is van principes versus vooroordelen, maar dat beide soms tegelijkertijd een rol kunnen spelen. Ten eerste heb ik in drie van mijn onderzoeken een subgroep van individuen geïdentificeerd die praktijken van moslimminderheden lijken te verwerpen, voornamelijk uit meer principiële overwegingen, aangezien zij moslimpraktijken afwijzen zonder negatieve gevoelens jegens moslims te koesteren en zonder moslims te discrimineren. Hun algemene afwijzing van alle moslimpraktijken wijst echter op vooroordelen, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van vooroordelen jegens religieuze mensen. Ten tweede heb ik in twee van mijn onderzoeken een subgroep van individuen geïdentificeerd die over het algemeen negatief is tegenover moslims en de meeste van hun praktijken verwerpt, maar tegelijkertijd sommige moslimpraktijken (bijv. het vieren van een feestdag) of moslimrechten (bijv. om geloof uit te drukken) accepteert. Hieruit blijkt dat zelfs degenen die over het algemeen bevooroordeeld zijn, de vrijheid van anderen niet altijd willen beperken (bijv. Mondak & Sanders, 2003; Gibson, 2005a).

In tegenstelling tot de subgroepen van individuen die moslimpraktijken afwijzen, vond ik ook twee subgroepen die de praktijken van moslimminderheden accepteren of neutraal zijn. In drie van de hoofdstukken identificeerde ik een subgroep met een algemene positieve houding tegenover moslims als een groep mensen en hun praktijken. Evenzo identificeerde ik in twee van mijn onderzoeken een subgroep van individuen die tamelijk neutraal is in hun evaluatie van moslims en hun praktijken.

Beperkingen en suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek

In deze sectie bespreek ik drie beperkingen van mijn onderzoek en stel ik mogelijke richtingen voor verder onderzoek voor. Ten eerste, hoewel ik consistent bewijs heb gevonden dat sommige mensen praktijken van moslimminderheden meer uit principiële dan uit bevooroordeelde redenen afwijzen, is het mogelijk dat sommigen strategisch principes toepassen als rechtvaardiging voor hun vooroordeel jegens moslims. Twee studies uit Frankrijk gebruikten bijvoorbeeld een variabele-gecentreerde benadering en toonden aan dat het principe van secularisme strategisch kan worden gebruikt als rechtvaardiging om moslimpraktijken af te keuren (Adam-Troian et al., 2019; Nugier et al., 2016). Dit betekent echter niet dat principes altijd strategisch worden gebruikt en dat er geen mensen zijn wiens afwijzing echt op principes is gebaseerd. Door een persoonsgerichte benadering te gebruiken, ontdekte ik dat sommige mensen hun principes consequent toepassen met betrekking tot verschillende groepen en niet bevooroordeeld lijken, zelfs wanneer verborgen maten van vooroordelen worden gebruikt (zie hoofdstuk 2). In toekomstig onderzoek kunnen echter verschillende strategieën worden gebruikt om verder te onderzoeken of en wanneer het gebruik van principes oprecht is of dient om vooroordelen te legitimeren. Het kan bijvoorbeeld onderzocht worden of mensen die een principe sterk onderschrijven (bijv. secularisme) praktijken alleen afwijzen wanneer deze het principe schenden (bijv. het dragen van religieuze symbolen bij het uitvoeren van een taak bij een openbare instelling) of wanneer dit juist niet het geval is (bijv. het dragen van religieuze symbolen op een besloten bijeenkomst; Velthuis et al., 2022). Daarnaast is het de moeite waard om te onderzoeken of mensen een principe (bijv. godsdienstvrijheid) ook toepassen wanneer dit indruist tegen hun eigenbelang of dat van een groep waarmee ze zich identificeren en niet alleen wanneer een andere groep negatief wordt aangevallen. Tot slot, door gebruik te maken van een *mixed-methods* design en door diepte-interviews te houden met individuen uit verschillende subgroepen, zou toekomstig onderzoek overwegingen en redeneringen kunnen onderzoeken en hoe deze worden toegepast ten aanzien van verschillende groepen en praktijken.

Ten tweede, ondanks de evidente voordelen, is een latente profielanalyse niet zonder nadelen. De subgroepen die bij dit type analyse naar voren komen, zijn afhankelijk van het aantal en het type gebruikte indicatoren. Mijn onderzoek richtte zich voornamelijk op praktijken waarover de publieke opinie verdeeld is - met een vergelijkbaar aantal mensen dat ze accepteert of verwerpt - en het is een relevante vraag voor toekomstig onderzoek of de bevindingen repliceren wanneer bijvoorbeeld praktijken nauwelijks normatief afwijkend zijn (bijv. in religieuze gebedsbijeenkomsten) of juist als sterk normatieve afwijkend worden gezien (bijv. afzonderlijke uitspraak voor moslims toestaan op basis van de sharia; Adelman et al., 2021). Verder maakt dit type analyse het moeilijk om kleinere subgroepen van individuen te detecteren die een minder gebruikelijke manier hebben om hun attitudes en overtuigingen te combineren. Sommige individuen kunnen bijvoorbeeld positieve discriminatie vertonen door moslims te accepteren en christelijke praktijken te verwerpen. Bij latente profielanalyse worden dergelijke kleine profielen meestal niet behouden wanneer het optimaal aantal profielen statistisch en inhoudelijk wordt vastgesteld (Spurk et al., 2020). Wanneer deze meer specifieke combinaties van attitudes van theoretisch belang zijn, zou een handmatige classificatie van individuen die een specifiek patroon van reacties vertonen geschikter kunnen zijn.

Ten derde heb ik me in dit proefschrift uitsluitend gericht op vooroordelen en principiële overwegingen als redenen om praktijken van moslimminderheden af te wijzen, maar er kunnen ook andere redenen zijn, zoals pragmatische zorgen in verband met bijvoorbeeld de toename van verkeer en overlast die gepaard gaat met de bouw van een moskee in een wijk (bijv. Bleich, 2011), of meer algemene zorgen over het behoud van de gemeenschapszin (bijv. Eisenberg, 2020; Orgad, 2015). Een meer gedetailleerd onderzoek naar deze andere redenen zou ons begrip van houdingen ten opzichte van moslimminderheden verder vergroten.

Conclusie

In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd te begrijpen wanneer en in welke mate de afwijzing van praktijken van moslimminderheden een afspiegeling is van vooroordelen jegens de groep moslims en of en wanneer het (ook) meer principiële, op waarden gebaseerde overwegingen weerspiegelt. Ik ontdekte dat voor sommige mensen de afwijzing van moslimpraktijken een algemeen negatieve houding ten aanzien van moslims weerspiegelt. Voor andere meerderheidsleden is de afwijzing van praktijken van moslimminderheden meer gedifferentieerd, waarbij alleen bepaalde moslimpraktijken worden afgewezen en andere niet. Dit weerspiegelt een overtuiging en bezorgdheid over liberale principes, zoals burgerlijke vrijheden en secularisme. De afwijzing van moslimpraktijken is echter niet altijd een kwestie van vooroordelen of principes, aangezien zelfs degenen die bevooroordeeld zijn sommige moslimpraktijken kunnen steunen en degenen die principieel lijken kunnen alle moslimpraktijken afwijzen. Daarnaast, en in tegenstelling tot mensen die moslimpraktijken afwijzen, is een opmerkelijk aantal individuen positief over moslims en ondersteunend ten aanzien van praktijken, terwijl anderen een vrij neutrale en ongedifferentieerde houding hebben. Als geheel wijzen de bevindingen op de complexiteit van hoe mensen over andere groepen en hun praktijken kunnen denken en dat attitudes niet altijd eenvoudig kunnen worden geconceptualiseerd als een eendimensionaal positief of negatief. Het gelijktijdig overwegen van meerdere maatschappelijk omstreden kwesties met betrekking tot de manier van leven van sommige moslims, en het beschouwen van deze kwesties in relatie tot de manier van leven van andere religieuze groepen, is bruikbaar om deze complexiteiten vast te leggen en te begrijpen. Ik heb ook aangetoond dat een persoonsgerichte benadering nuttig kan zijn voor een dergelijk doel en dat het een waardevol hulpmiddel kan zijn voor sociaal psychologisch onderzoek en sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek in het algemeen.

Tot slot, mijn proefschrift moet niet worden gelezen als implicerend dat de afwijzing van sommige moslimpraktijken gerechtvaardigd en wenselijk is wanneer het voortkomt uit meer principiële redenen, in plaats van bevooroordeelde gevoelens jegens moslims als groep mensen. Ik heb juist geprobeerd om een meer genuanceerd en gedetailleerd beeld te geven van de verschillende overwegingen en redenen die mensen kunnen hebben om sommige praktijken te accepteren of liever (selectief) af te wijzen, en andere niet. De analyse maakt het mogelijk om overwegingen te identificeren die door meerderheidsleden in liberale samenlevingen worden gebruikt en die als norm dienen voor wat wel of niet geaccepteerd moet worden.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my thanks to a number of people who contributed to this dissertation. First of all, to my supervisors, Maykel Verkuyten and Tobias Stark, for their continuous support and guidance throughout the past years. Maykel, thank you for giving me the opportunity to be a part of the project on (in)tolerance. It still puzzles and impresses me how you always so incredibly quickly found the time to answer all my questions, review my drafts or simply meet and discuss my work or any other topic. Your dedication, knowledge and ideas were nothing less impressive, and were a great resource for writing my manuscripts and for my professional development. I am grateful for your presence and understanding, and working with you was a truly unique experience. Tobias, your elaborate and constructive comments on my drafts taught me to think more critically myself and significantly improved my manuscripts. I also greatly benefited from teaching in your course and our more general discussions, as well as from your impressive methodological expertise and practical suggestions related to many different aspects of academic work. Your kindness and humor often made things easier for me. All of this I highly appreciate. Maykel and Tobias, thank you both for creating a space to express my thoughts and doubts over the past years. I am grateful that you helped me develop as a researcher, and that you often showed interest in how I was doing beyond this role. I learned a lot during our collaboration and I consider myself lucky to have worked with both of you.

During my research visit in New Zealand at the beginning of 2020, I was pleased to collaborate with Kumar Yogeeswaran and Chris Sibley, which resulted in one of the chapters of this dissertation. Kumar, thank you for being such a kind and welcoming host at the University of Canterbury and for the time and effort you dedicated to my research. Your comments always invited me to think about the bigger picture and improved the quality of my work. Also, knowing that I can count on your support during the lockdown in New Zealand was very comforting, and I am very grateful for that. Chris, thank you for finding the time to meet me at the University of Auckland and for answering all my questions then and at a later stage during our collaboration. Your feedback and opinion about my work were very helpful and appreciated.

Over the years, I discussed my research with and learned from many colleagues. Evi, Levi, Saptarshi, and Sara, thank you for insightful discussions, introducing enriching perspectives and raising relevant questions during our work together on the (in)tolerance project. I also appreciated occasional chats or coffee breaks with you, as well as with the fellow PhDs from the 'owners' project: Nora, Tom and Wybren. Nora, I am especially grateful to you for being supportive in so many different ways and for always reminding me that things have to be done "meter by meter". Your presence was invaluable to me. Femke, Lian, and Jessica, sharing an office with you was a very pleasant experience and thank you for our talks whether in the office or during breaks. I specifically thank Lian for translating the summary of my dissertation into Dutch. Ania, Ece, Diana, Marta, and Saja, I am happy that I have met you during my PhD, and that we discussed our work and shared interesting moments. In addition, I am thankful to all the members of the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations, as well as the members of the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology, for valuable exchanges and their comments on my research.

And finally, I am grateful to my closest ones, who were not directly involved in my work, yet had a substantial role. I thank my parents, my sisters, my partner, and my friends for being such a great source of support and encouragement throughout my studies, as well as for showing interest in and valuing my work.

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Muslim minority practices, such as the wearing of a headscarf, the building of minarets and Islamic religious education in primary schools, are often disputed in Western societies, and receive mixed reactions from the public. Whereas some majority members accept these and similar Muslim practices, others reject them. The rejection of Muslim minority practices is often based on prejudicial feelings towards Muslims as a group of people. However, for some majority members, the rejection might be based on more principled considerations, such as concerns for liberal values of state neutrality, secularism and gender equality. In this dissertation, Marija Dangubić examines how majority members evaluate a range of Muslim minority practices contested in Western societies, and whether rejection of these practices stems from prejudicial feelings towards Muslims or whether more principled considerations are also involved. The findings are discussed in light of the social scientific literature on prejudice, principles, and outgroup attitudes.

Marija Dangubić conducted the presentented research as part of her PhD program at the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).