THE SOCIAL CONTRUCTION OF HOMOPHOBIA IN SENEGAL

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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOPHOBIA IN SENEGAL

DE SOCIALE CONSTRUCTIE VAN HOMOFOBI IN SENEGAL

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STATEMENT OF SUPERVISION

This research was co-supervised by professor Dr. Dina Siegel, professor of criminology at the Willem Pompe Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology of Utrecht University and Dr. Ágnes Kövér-Van Til, director of the Institute of Social Studies; program director of Gender Studies MA Program at ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary. With the accompaniment of Brenda Oude Breuil, lecturer in criminology at the Willem Pompe Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology of Utrecht University.

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I cannot finish without sending regards to all my friends in Senegal. This country that I loved so much. With you I was able to collect the material contained in this research. Special thanks to Raw material company in Dakar. Your contribution has been decisive.

DECLARATION UPON OATH

I declare that the research embodied in the thesis is my own work and has not previously been submitted for a degree at any other university. No commercial doctoral advisory services were used in conjunction with this research.

The first theoretical and conceptual reflections of this research have been presented at several conferences, including the days of the young researchers in African studies held in Paris in June 2017, the Kent Common Session in April 2018 and Utrecht Common session in April 2019. I also developed my reflections in several scientific papers.

Signed:

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Date:

ABSTRACT

There are 32 countries in Africa that criminalise same-sex sexual practices. Homosexuals are daily victims of state violence and discrimination. Still, homosexuality is not just a legal problem; it also suffers from social illegitimacy. In countries where homosexuality is decriminalised, homosexuals continue to be rejected by the population for religious, cultural or political reasons. Thus, the decriminalisation of homosexuality does not systematically end the violence against homosexuals, even if human rights organisations consider the decriminalisation of same-sex sexual practices to be the first step towards reducing violence and discrimination against this sexual minority.

Since the late 1990s, gay rights have become part of the human rights agenda in Africa. These "new rights" on the continent have sometimes been used to condition Western aid, a strategy that helped to reinforce the idea in Africa that homosexuality is a product of the Western world. Yet, as I present in this work, sexuality in Africa has always been diverse and varied. Nowadays, there is a strange consensus in Africa about homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice. This rhetoric has led to the proliferation of homophobic discourses, acts, and violence on the continent and in some countries the strengthening of the legal framework to criminalise homosexuality. Africa has since been described as a homophobic continent.

Based on the study of Senegalese society, my research does not intend to undermine arguments about the homophobic character of African societies but rather attempts to give a more systematic and in-depth analysis of a complex reality. Contrary to other research that has been conducted to date on homophobia, I suggest that to understand the predominantly refractory nature of Senegalese society towards homosexuality, it is necessary to produce a long-term analysis. By long-term analysis I mean a study that considers the entanglements and dynamics of the past and the present. This approach should integrate the changes introduced by colonisation in the field of sexuality, postcolonial influences, issues related to North-South relations, and the social and economic transformations of African societies. Therefore, homophobia cannot be apprehended as an innate trait of African societies, but a socio-historical construction fuelled by the internal and external contradictions of societies in permanent mutation.

This research employs a social constructionist approach, but also builds on theories on coloniality. A multiplicity of research methods – a literature study, content analysis of newspaper articles, and open interviews, legal analysis– was used to analyse the underlying dynamics that are present in the mediated representations of homophobia in Senegalese society.

One of the contributions of this thesis is to show that there is a close link between economic crisis, the recomposition of gender relations, and homophobia. Sexuality is not just a source of pleasure but a full component of the social, economic, and political organisation of Senegalese society where heterosexuality can be seen as a national project. Moreover, in this work I argue that it is possible to establish a link between French colonisation and homophobia in francophone postcolonial societies. Unlike in other African countries where the homophobic discourse is primarily a local production that benefited from foreign influences like Anglo-American Evangelism, in Senegal, the homophobic discourse was shaped by moral entrepreneurs who promote the demonisation of homosexuality and men who have sex with men, named Goor-jigeen. Today, homophobia has become, on the one hand, a medium through which politicians and spiritual leaders consolidate their old administrative alliances and political influence, established since the colonial period for the purpose of corruption and clientelism. On the other hand, it is a tool of resistance against globalisation and the international movement for the promotion of gay rights, named Gay International. Through this configuration, homosexuality can therefore be used as a scapegoat for the economic and social tensions that cross the country in a globalised world.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

LGBT : Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender

NASD : National Agency on Statistics and Demography

SAP : Structual Adjustment Programs

IMF : International Monetary Fund

SWAPO : South West Africa People's Organisation

ANRS : National Agency for Research on AIDS

MSM : Men who have sex with Men

CEPED : Center Population and Development

RENAPOC : National Key Populations Network

RADDHO : African Meeting for the Promotion of Human Rights

SCHR : Senegalese Committee for Human Rights

AFARD : Association of African Women for Development Research

OFPRA : Office Français pour la Protection des Refugiés

ILGA : International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association

IGLHRC : International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission

CIRCOF : Islamic Committee for the Reform of the Family Code in Senegal

ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ACHPR : African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

INTRODUCTION

Homosexuality is criminalized in 33 African states (Amnesty International 2018)[1]. Among these states, four consider homosexuality a capital offence: Nigeria, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. In the other countries, the punishments for same-sex activities vary from forced labour to imprisonment, although most states punish through imprisonment. What the 33 states currently criminalizing homosexuality in Africa have in common, regardless of their respective former colonial power, is the fact that the terms homosexuality, gay or lesbian are not mentioned in their criminal codes, with two exceptions: Algeria uses the term "homosexual act", and the island of Zanzibar in Tanzania explicitly penalizes "lesbianism". The countries vary, as well, in the wording of the act forbidden by law[2], which complicates broad categorizations.

However, there are 21 countries in Africa where homosexuality is legal (Amnesty International 2018)[3]. It must be emphasized that decriminalization does not necessarily lead to a decrease in anti-homosexual feeling in a society. In South Africa, for example, gays and lesbians regularly experience violence despite the elimination of anti-homosexual laws. A Pew Research Center poll conducted in 2007 measured global opinions on contemporary social issues among 47,000 people in 47 countries, including eleven in North and sub-Saharan Africa. In nine of those eleven African publics, less than five percent of the respondents felt that society should accept homosexuality (Ireland 2013: 52). Only South Africa (28 percent) and Côte d'Ivoire (11 percent) showed more tolerance.

In a survey conducted between 2014 and 2015 in Africa, an average of 78 percent of respondents say they would "somewhat dislike" or "strongly dislike" having a homosexual neighbour (Afrobarometer 2016). Without judging the quality of the survey, it is one of the few, and the most recent, surveys on homophobic sentiment at the continental level. Countries

[1] Among the 33 countries where homosexuality is criminalized, we have : Nigeria, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

[2] I have attempted to list all the expressions used to punish homosexuals on the continent. We have: Acts against order of nature; Attempted carnal knowledge; Gross indecency; Sodomy; Unnatural act; Buggery; Prostitution; Intercourse with a person of the same-sex; Casting accusations of in chastity; Illicit sexual intercourse; Same sex act; Incitement to indecency; Scandalous act; Sexual relations with the same sex; Incitement to indecency; Practicing or incitement to debauchery; Unnatural carnal knowledge; Attempted acts against the order of nature; Zina; Limiting SOGI public expression; attempted unnatural offense. All these expressions, although formulated differently, refer to homosexual acts.

[3] Countries in Africa where homosexuality is legal: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and South Africa.

like Cape Verde, 74 percent; South Africa, 69 percent; Mozambique, 56 percent; and Namibia, 55 percent are considered the most tolerant countries on the continent regarding homosexuals. On the other hand, in countries such as Senegal, 3 percent; Guinea, 4 percent; Uganda, 5 percent; Burkina Faso, 5 percent; and Niger, 5 percent, the vast majority of the population does not tolerate homosexuals.

This last statistic shows that, out of the five countries in Africa where homosexuals are least tolerated, four are former French colonies. Unlike Uganda, a former British colony, there are no anti-homosexual laws in these former French colonies. O'Mahoney and Han (2014) show in their study that the situation for homosexuals is more complicated in former French territories than in former British colonies. They note that the former French colonies that have adopted laws criminalizing homosexuality post-independence are more reluctant to decriminalize homosexuality than former British territories (O'Mahoney & Han 2014).

It follows from the foregoing data that the criminalization of homosexuality (legal homophobia) and the social rejection of same-sex sexual practices (social homophobia) can act independently even if they could be intertwined. Changing laws does not mean transforming the hearts and minds of a population because, as we will see in this work, homophobia also stems from a social construction of gender and sexuality. Thus, beyond the law, there is a whole culture, an environment, a history, local dynamics and international politics which must be analysed to understand homophobic violence in a society. It is mainly from this perspective that this work takes place, a perspective that aims to go beyond the framework of the law to understand all the dynamics that participate in the social construction of homophobia in a postcolonial African society. While a comparative study of homophobia across African states would be insightful, I made the choice to focus my research on Senegal.

Why Senegal?

There are several reasons for the choice of Senegal as the setting of this study, from an academic point of view. First, a general question deserves to be asked: how can a country that is said to be democratic and open to human rights be homophobic? A mapping of places where homosexuality is criminalized in Africa shows that most countries that criminalize homosexuality are characterized by political systems bordering on authoritarianism. It is therefore necessary to understand the local contingencies that justify the criminalization of homosexuality in a so-called democratic country like Senegal. Subsequently, British

colonization and its laws criminalizing same-sex sexual practices were presented as one of the sources of homophobia in Africa. Senegal, however, was a French colony and these laws did not exist in the French colonies. What, then, explains the fact that Kenya, a former British colony, and Senegal can both be classified as homophobic states today, despite their different historical trajectories?

Secondly, while exploring the literature on homophobia in Africa, I realized that Anglophone countries in Africa had been the subject of greater attention than their French-speaking counterparts. Yet homosexuals are also victims of state repression and face discrimination and violence in former French colonies. Except for a country like Cameroon, it is fair to say that homophobia in French-speaking Africa has been under-explored. This study on the situation in Senegal could contribute to filling this gap in the literature. This is even more important because the Senegalese themselves do not explore this issue directly, in light of religious or cultural considerations.

By choosing Senegal as the research setting, I was also able to explore the issue of homosexuality in a Muslim country in sub-Saharan Africa. Studies on homosexuals in Africa are predominantly focused on Christian countries, despite the existence of some work in Muslim countries (Broqua 2010; Igundunasse & al 2019). This situation could be due to the fact that the vast majority of Muslim countries criminalize homosexuality, but contexts and realities are different. It is therefore relevant to delve deeper into the dynamics of homophobia in a predominantly Muslim country because, as I maintain, criminalization is not the only factor in the societal rejection of homosexuals.

Finally, beyond these aspects, there is certainly a more personal dimension to choosing Senegal as the setting of this research. As a Cameroonian native, I noticed that in many African societies where homosexuality is criminalized, the label “homosexual” is systematically applied to the ruling government’s political opponents. This observation has also been made in Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. The use of homophobia as a political tool to discredit opponents demands further study; it urges academics to think beyond homosexuality as an individual and interpersonal, identity-related issue, and approach it on a broader, political level as well. The stake here is not only to examine how the phenomenon is declined, but also how it is constructed and deployed in the political debate. Senegal was a good case to conduct such a study as accusations of homosexuality were launched against

some candidates during the 2012 presidential elections. These accusations resurfaced in 2016 during the debates over a constitutional amendment.

The case of Senegal therefore is academically relevant because its specificities and differences compared to other African countries can strengthen our knowledge of homophobia in Africa, in Muslim countries and more particularly in former French colonies.

The Senegalese context

Senegal, the country of *Teranga* (land of welcome), is a country located on the West African coast. A former French colony, it obtained its independence in 1960. With a population of 15,020,945, it is a predominantly Muslim country (94 percent) with a Christian minority (5 percent) and some animists (1 percent). The two main languages are French (the former language of the colonizer) and Wolloff (37.1 percent) despite the presence of other ethnic groups, such as Pular (26.2 percent), Serer (17 percent), Mandinka (5.6 percent), Jola (4.5 percent), Soninke (1.4 percent), and other (8.3 percent) including Europeans and people of Lebanese descent (CIA 2018).

In a report released in August 2017, the National Agency of Statistics and Demography (NASD 2017: 4) points out that women represent 50.1 percent of the population, while men make up the other 49.9 percent. The proportion of people aged 60 and over remains relatively low (5.5 percent). The country is composed of 50.1% of women and 48.5% of men (NASD 2017: 4). In addition, young people under 30 represent 69.6 percent of the population (NASD 2017: 4). The electoral population (aged 18 and over) is 51.6 percent, with a slight majority of women voters (51.5 percent women versus 48.5 percent men). In addition, the school-age population (7-12 years) represents 15.6 percent of the global population with more boys than girls in this demographic (51.6 percent to 48.4 percent). The youth population (0-4 years) represents 15.8 percent of the population (NASD 2017: 5).

The distribution of the population presents important disparities across regions. Indeed, the Dakar region, the administrative and economic capital of the country, hosts 23.2 percent of the total population of Senegal. Dakar is followed by the regions of Thiès (13.2 percent) and Diourbel (11.1 percent). Meanwhile, the Kedougou region is the least populated (1.1 percent), followed by the regions of Sedhiou, Matam, Kaffrine, and Kolda, which hold less than 5 percent of the total population (NASD 2017: 6). The region of Dakar, which has the smallest area (542 km² or 0.3 percent of Senegal's surface area), is home to more than one in five

Senegalese (3,233,460 inhabitants in 2014, 23.2 percent of the population of Senegal), a density of 5922 inhabitants per km² (NASD 2017: 8).

Map 1: Map of Senegal

Thus, Senegal has a predominantly young population, with a greater number of women than men. Gender relations are under pressure due to an economic crisis that has afflicted Senegal since the end of the 1980s. Structural adjustment programs (SAP) from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have had a number of troubling effects: weakened social services, a decrease in state budgets, and massive unemployment among young people.

Nevertheless, Senegal is one of the biggest economies in West Africa, after Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire. After some economic growth and structural reforms carried out between 1995 and 2005, the Senegalese economy fell back into a macroeconomic imbalance in the last decade. This imbalance was marked by a weak growth cycle, a decrease in job creation, and little progress in reducing poverty. During that same period (2000-2014), the youth population grew by 9 percent and reached more than 5 million people. According to the World Bank, Senegal's economic growth has been among the highest in Africa between 2014 and 2018, remaining above 6 percent annually. GDP growth was 5.3 percent in 2019, down from 6.3 percent in 2017. The services sector continues to be the largest contributor to GDP growth, while on the demand side, investment (+12.5 percent) and exports (+7.2 percent) were the strongest growth drivers.

Political parties believe that the statistics provided by the government are far from real. Estimates from the World Bank and the IMF show that the unemployment rate in Senegal is around 20-22 percent instead of 12 percent as declared by the Senegalese authorities. The unemployment rate of upper-level graduates is even more troubling. Between 2005 and 2014, it doubled from 16 to 32 percent. In other words, as paradoxical as it may seem, young Senegalese with higher educations are more likely to be unemployed than young people who did not go to school. During the period 2010-2014, almost 97 percent of the jobs created were in the informal sector where employers are generally small traders and entrepreneurs.

The tense economic and social climate did not give rise to a chaotic political context. On the contrary, Senegal is among the African states considered to be democratic. I was able to testify to the relative freedom of the press and civil society, despite some restrictions. Since its independence, unlike other French-speaking African countries, Senegal has had peaceful transitions of power since Leopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of the Republic of Senegal, through to President Macky Sall, who came to power in 2012.

Although Senegal might exhibit democratic openness and be seen as attractive to the outside, this masks violations of the rights of sexual minorities. Homosexuality is criminalized under the section 319 of the criminal law which states: “[s]hall be punished by one to five years and a fine of 100,000 to 1,500,000 francs, whoever has committed an indecency or unnatural act with an individual of his sex”. Even if the term ‘homosexuality’ does not appear explicitly in the criminal law, it is this section which is used to punish homosexuals. It has criminalized sexual practices between persons of the same sex since 1965, but the issue of homosexuality fully entered the public and political debate with "the case of homosexuals of Petit-Mbao" in 2008[4]. Today, Senegal is regularly cited among the countries that are unfriendly to homosexuals.

Recent events illustrate the homophobic violence in Senegal. On June 1, 2021, an official from the Senegalese ministry of education was dismissed for proposing a text that deals with the topic of homosexuality in English. The text was a passage from *More Tales of the City* "New Chronicles of San Francisco" by American writer Armistead Maupin, a gay rights activist, in which a character informs his mother about his homosexuality. The release of this

[4] The outbreak of this case, better detailed in Chapter 2, follows the publication by a newspaper of photos of an alleged gay marriage organized in a suburb of Dakar.

information sparked an uproar and resuscitated the debate on the criminalization of homosexuality in Senegal, against a backdrop marked by an increase in homophobic acts.

Between May 23 and June 10, 2021, at least four people were assaulted and arrested in Senegal. On June 6, a teacher was attacked by a group of individuals in Dakar. In a video of the incident, his attackers can be heard threatening to "cut his testicles" in order to "make him a woman". Also in Dakar, on June 7, a young man was assaulted after being seen with another man known in his neighbourhood to be gay. He fled, but the victim was beaten several times by his attackers, slapped and whipped. The same day, a man was also attacked as he got out of his car in Dakar. He wore a short boubou, which showed his legs. People started to call him "Goorjigéen", a term which means "man woman" in Woloff. A crowd formed, before the police intervened and arrested him.

Finally, on June 9, 2021, in Ziguinchor, a young man fell into the trap of a false date set by his attackers on social networks. In the video, four men and at least one woman attack him. We hear a woman's voice say that he must be undressed in order to cut off his testicles since he "cannot be a man like God made him". The men then take off his t-shirt, slap him on the head, in the face, before forcing him to do a series of push-ups. All this violence took place in the aftermath of a march organized in Dakar on May 23rd, 2021 by the Collective named "And Samm jikko yi" to call for the criminalization of homosexuality.

Main research question

There is a contradiction between the image of Senegal as a state governed by the rule of law, on the one hand, and the repeated acts of violence against its homosexual population, on the other hand. In a country where same-sex sexual practices have not always been criminalized and the legal repression of homosexuality is a recent phenomenon, the main question is: How can the contemporary legitimacy of homophobic violence in postcolonial Senegal be explained?

Secondary research questions

The main research question leads us to analyse the problem of homophobia in Senegal on the basis of historical, cultural, social and political factors, thereby prompting the following secondary research questions:

1- What is the role of colonialism in the criminalization of homosexuality in postcolonial Senegal?
2. Who are the relevant moral entrepreneurs in the repression of homosexuality and what is their impact on the postcolonial Senegalese state?
3. Why and how does the state perpetuate homophobia in Senegal?
4. How does the International context affect the debate on homophobia in Senegal?

Conceptual clarifications

Some conceptual clarifications are needed to make contemporary descriptions and labels of same-sex relationships in Africa more understandable. The category of homosexuality is itself contested. Researchers argue that it does not account for the complexity of sexual identification in the African context. The problem posed by these critics is the existence of a sexual category in Africa that could be described as homosexuality, because precolonial sexual practices do not refer to an identity and even less to a specific category of the population (Amory 1997). Even today, sexuality and sexual orientation tend to be fluid. For example, in Senegal, recent studies have shown that the majority of people who have engaged in same-sex relations have also had heterosexual relationships (Larmarange 2009). Thus, even though they may be motivated by desire, same-sex practices do not necessarily imply a feeling of belonging and identification with a sexual category (Broqua 2012: 130).

The term "homosexuality" is used today to refer to same-sex sexual relations, but it is a relatively recent term that refers to a specific cultural experience and the transformations which occurred in Europe. Homosexuality, just like sexuality, is an invention (Mottier 2012). Despite the fact that same-sex relations have long existed in Western societies, as well as elsewhere in the world, the term did not appear until the end of the 19th century (Tamagne 2002). From this period, "Homosexuality moved from being a category to a psychosocial disposition" (Week 2000: 26).

As Foucault (1990: 43) notes, "the sodomite had been a temporary aberration; The homosexual was now a species". One consequence of the invention of homosexuality in European societies has been the construction of an identity and the institutionalisation of a category. The appearance of the homosexual was part of a more global dynamic of control of the population and the defining of social roles. McIntosh (1968:184) argues that "[t]he creation of a specialized, despised, and punished role of the homosexual keeps the bulk of

society in the same way that the similar treatment of some kinds of criminals helps keep the rest of society law-abiding". It was this investment in bodies and populations for purposes of regulation and control that will give rise to the figure of the homosexual according to Foucault. Western societies did not just witness the establishment of norms, or the punishment of people perceived as deviant, but the making of individuals in species or categories, the discovery of perversions, the consolidation of norms and the creation or organisation of social control agencies (Halperin 1998: 98).

Whether in the past or present, for some ethnographers and anthropologists who have conducted studies on sexual practices between women in Africa, these same-sex relations have always been situational, even contextual, and were not based on a binary conception of sexuality around heterosexuality and homosexuality (Morgan & Wieringa 2005:19). Potgieter (2005) discusses strategic agency to describe the diversity of sexual interactions based on time and age. In Ghana and Senegal for example, sexual relations among women do not lead to the development of a subculture but unfolds in the form of secrecy (Dankwa 2009: 192; Loes 2018). Kendall (1999) shows in her work that many young women involved in relationships and practices that are now described as lesbian do not consider their sexual activities to be sex because it does not involve a penis: "no *koai* (penis), no sex". They refuse to be locked into categories that are imposed on them. Sex is equated with vaginal intercourse between a man and a woman.

These representations of sex give some credibility to discourses on the continent that describe homosexuality as an imported sexual practice, insofar as those who are concerned do not identify with this sexual category. In his *The Construction of Homosexuality*, David Greenberg remarks: "The kinds of sexual acts it is thought possible to perform, and the social identities that come to be attached to those who perform them, vary from one society to another" (Greenberg, 1988: 3). He continues:

"When used to characterize individuals, it implies that erotic attraction originates in a relatively stable, more or less exclusive attribute of the individual. Usually it connotes an exclusive orientation: the homosexual is not also heterosexual; the heterosexual is not also homosexual. Most non-Western societies make few of these assumptions. Distinctions of age, gender, and social status loom larger. The sexes are not necessarily conceived symmetrically" (Ibid: 3-4).

It appears therefore that the question of naming or categorizing is central to the construction of identity. From this perspective, the lesbian label – which refers to women involved in

same-sex relationships – and the meaning attributed to it do not reflect how women understand their sexuality. Allotey notes:

"Can 'Western' labels be appropriately used in African contexts? Why do participants refuse such labels? Is it for the fear of being persecuted? It also raises the question of labeling sexual identities as individuals who do not fit into what is seen as 'normal heterosexuality' are seen as deviance. What is considered to be negative in the case of homosexuality" (Allotey 2015: 19).

But the problem of labelling is also linked to the understanding of sex. With regards to sexual practices in Africa, anything related to non-heterosexuality is not only regarded as taboo but also falls outside of what is deemed to be sexual. Therefore, in some societies, homosexuality is perceived as being part of witchcraft (Geschiere 1995: 2000). Sexuality is essentially viewed as a practice that involves a heterosexual exchange.

Despite this critical debate, even if there were no homosexual subcultures before colonization, this does not mean that there were no same-sex sexual encounters which would be defined today as homosexual. We can therefore think that the term 'homosexual' makes it possible to give meaning to a diffuse category whose common point is the erotic link maintained by two individuals of the same sex.

Thus, even if heterosexuality was the dominant sexual norm in precolonial Africa, there is no doubt that same-sex sexual practices were present on the continent and in some cases were features of social organization. It does not mean that they were accepted everywhere, but they were more or less tolerated. But what is important to emphasize is that these practices did not imply the same meaning as in Western contexts. In precolonial Africa, there was no category of the population whose sexual orientation constituted a separate identity. Hence the interest of a debate on the use of concepts.

Despite this academic discussion, the fact remains that it is the term homosexuality that is regularly used to describe same-sex sexual practices on the continent, just like the concept of homophobia is used to describe the forms of violence faced by homosexuals. The term homophobia was invented by Grégory Weinberg. The word was pronounced for the first time in 1965 when Weinberg was invited to give a speech for the East Coast Homophile Organizations (ECHO) banquet in the United States of America. He argues: "I coined the word homophobia to mean it was a phobia about homosexuals. It was a fear of homosexuals which seemed to be associated with a fear of contagion, a fear of reducing the things one

fought for—home and family. It was a religious fear and it had led to great brutality as fear always does". (Herek 2004).

It is from the 1970s onwards that the term became popular. Initially, homophobia referred to a mental illness, a negative attitude toward homosexuals or harm. Despite criticisms and the appearance of other concepts to designate the negative feelings and attitudes towards homosexuals, it is with the fight against HIV/AIDS in the 1980s that the term would settle in academia and public opinion to designate anti-homosexual fear, sentiment, ideology, belief, and attitudes (Wickberg 2000). This last definition is what I understand as homophobia in this thesis.

More specifically, homophobia must be understood as "prejudice, discrimination and violent situations against people who may be or may not be gay whose performances or gender expressions (tastes, styles, behaviours, etc.) do not fit the mainstream models" (Carvalho 2013). Pocahy and Nardi (2007) maintain that homophobia "represents all forms of disqualification and violence directed at everyone who does not correspond to the normative ideal of sexuality" (cited by Carvalho 2013). These two definitions are important because they place the problem of homophobia squarely within the criminal sciences through the study of violence, crime, and norms. Violence here comes in three forms: symbolic violence; institutional violence (state violence); and interpersonal violence (individual violence). In order to understand homophobia, one must analyse the relations of power in gender relations, structures of domination, the meanings of each type of violence in very specific situations and their structuring mechanisms.

The structure of the thesis

The work that follows has seven chapters that offer a look at homophobia in Senegal. The goal is not to deconstruct the dominant discourse on homophobic Africa, but to show the nuances, elaborate on the lines of rupture with respect to conventional representations, highlight the fractures, and to establish the boundaries of a productive discussion on homophobia in Africa. It also questions the place of geopolitics in the representations of homophobia, analyses the political instrumentalisation of homosexuality and forms entanglements between the past and the present to understand homophobia in Africa. Sexuality does not appear in this research as a field of expression of pleasures and desires or a place where the dynamics related to reproduction are simply played out. Sexuality is a total

phenomenon, encompassing other fields and issues. If Foucault (1976) demonstrated this for Western societies, it is also verifiable in African societies by examining the problem of homophobia.

The first chapter describes the theoretical perspectives that underly the reflections carried out in this research based on social construction theories of gender and sexuality and the social construction of postcolonial African societies. Chapter two is the state of research on the issue of homosexuality and homophobia in Senegal. This chapter allows me to situate the academic contributions of my research in the understanding of homophobia in Africa and, more specifically, in Senegal. Chapter three details the methodological approach I employed throughout my study and explores advances in the field of homophobia research in Senegal.

Chapter four has two objectives. The first is to discuss French colonial representations of gender and how French colonialism is tied to the construction of homophobia in Senegal. I show that legal homophobia in Senegal has its roots in the encounter between French colonization and Senegalese society. Whereas former academic studies have clearly established the link between homophobia and colonialism in Anglophone Africa, this is not the case for Francophone Africa. Gender and sexual norms around homosexuality have changed according to those in force in French society at the time. Thus, the criminalisation of homosexuality adopted in Senegal in 1965 and which currently justifies the legal violence against the LGBT community is deeply linked to the desire of the Senegalese political elites, after independence, to conform to the law in force in the former colonial power.

Chapter five deals with the issue of moral entrepreneurs. In Chapter four I highlighted the fact that heterosexual colonial norms were not accompanied by homophobic violence. I also stress that, despite the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegalese criminal law, homosexuality did not suffer from social illegitimacy for more than three decades after the country achieved independence. The change took place through moral entrepreneurs, in particular the media and Muslim clerics, who gradually constructed homosexuals as a threat to Senegalese society, starting in the 1980s. These moral entrepreneurs will force political actors and the state to act against homosexuals, but this strategy is also negotiated through an alliance between political actors and religious leaders within the framework of a clientelist relationship which allows political actors to benefit from the support of religious leaders in a predominantly Muslim country.

Subsequently, I demonstrate in chapter six that the making of state-sponsored homophobia is an endogenous process whose main objective is the affirmation of a patriarchal state. This is a pivotal chapter of the thesis insofar as it takes into account the institutionalisation of gender inequalities introduced by the colonial order, shows the entanglement between state norms around gender and how laws can be interpreted and manipulated for the consolidation of a dominant sexual class. I also describe how heterosexuality is part of the national project through the establishment of the boundaries of sexuality that challenge what pertains to masculinity and femininity. The criminal justice system then has the task of consolidating the national project by legitimising the institutions and strengthening cohesion around a group ideology. Finally, I show how the political actors in power have a vested interest in using homophobia to consolidate their legitimacy and destabilise their political opponents.

In the last chapter I show the entanglement between homophobia and inequalities between the global 'North' and 'South'. Given the failure of the promises of globalisation, the Gay International Campaign is seen in Senegal as an assimilationist and hegemonic project carried out by the West. The homophobic postcolonial subject is the product of an environment in which structural economic inequalities between Africa and the West frame discussions around sexuality. The intensification of Western mobilisations in favour of homosexual rights and the resistance that goes with it gives rise to a cultural war which is based on a conception of heterosexuality as a feature of African identity, in the face of the West which shares a homosexual identity. The pressure from international human rights organisations and Western governments to decriminalise homosexuality has accentuated homophobic feelings in Senegal and given rise to a cultural nationalism centred on heteronormativity. This cultural nationalism is rooted around two main axes: against France, the former colonial power, symbol of Western hegemony and perceived as responsible for the country's underdevelopment, and homosexuality as a new act of aggression by the West against the Muslim world.

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER AND THE POSTCOLONIAL SUBJECT

In the introduction, I pointed out that it was difficult to label Africa as a homophobic continent given that homosexuality is not criminalized across the continent. As we will see in the state of art, same-sex sexual practices have not always been repressed in Africa. These observations invite us to question the universality and the historicity of homophobia in Africa. They also suggest that representations of homophobia must be analysed in spatial and temporal terms. These considerations lead me to favour social constructionism as a theoretical framework in order to show that representations in a society are built on the basis of social interactions and influenced by the dynamics of power within a society.

What is social constructionism? Social constructionism argues that realities are socially constructed; realities are constituted through language; knowledge is sustained by social processes; and it emphasises the reflexivity in human beings (Gergen & Davis 1985; McNamee & Gergen 1992). What can appear as a reality is fluid and it only appears to us as real because we have learned to perceive it that way. Social constructionism problematises the claim that what we call knowledge, our current understandings of the nature of the world and its phenomena, is derived from objective, unbiased observation of events; rather, that what exists is what we perceive to exist (Burr 2015). Social constructionism asserts that individuals are embedded within broader cultural, political and historical evolutions, in specific times and places. Apart from the inherited and developmental aspects of humanity, social constructionism hypothesises that all other aspects of humanity are created, maintained and destroyed in our interactions with others through time (Galbin 2014).

Social constructionism examines “the process by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world in which they live" (Gergen 1985: 3-4). Cultural and social realities, norms, laws, social acts and practices are the result of collectively acquired interactions that are rooted in our representations of society and are generally taken for granted. The social conventions that result from norm-building create and shape our morality. They justify our behaviour and rationalise judgments.

In the context of this thesis, social constructionism is important because the criminalisation of homosexuality in Africa dates back less than two centuries. Social constructionists are

concerned with examining the words that people use and the ways in which people understand the world, the social and political processes that influence how people define words and explain events, and the implications of these definitions and explanations – who benefits and who loses because of how we describe and understand the world. The words and concepts we use "are products of particular historical and cultural understandings rather than being universal and immutable categories of human experience" (Bohan 1996: xvi).

From a social constructionist perspective, homosexuality in a given society must be understood not as a fixed practice or norm but rather as something which fluctuates over time. Homosexuals constantly play roles attributed to them (McIntosh, 1968) and there is a difference that is established between category and behaviour. It is this construction of homosexuals as sexual category that subsequently makes it possible to define homosexuality as a crime through a process of codifying the moral order around sexuality and labelling the group of homosexuals as a threat. In the African context, the social constructionism mixes with the hegemonic issues linked to the encounter with the West.

Despite the importance of social constructionism, African gender scholars influenced by liberal and Marxist approaches have long neglected the importance of colonisation in the process of transforming gender identities in Africa. The discourse on the universalism of gender inequalities fails to take into account the complexities of these societies, their historical transformations, but it also reflects forms of exclusion and the consolidation of Western hegemony (Mohanty 1988). Instead, it is necessary to understand contemporary African societies by examining the historical influences and interactions generated by the meeting between Africa and the West. Gender dynamics cannot be perceived as ex nihilo processes, but rather the product of historical constructions of power, logics of control, exclusion and domination. Thus, beyond analysing homophobia as a social construction, it is also important to examine the broader processes shaping the societies in which homophobia is constructed.

I-1-) Homophobia and social constructionism

Sexuality and gender are concepts at the heart of the constructionist perspective (Delamater & Hyde 1988). They do not depend on nature but on culture. While some essentialists believe that sex is a matter of biology and, in turn, has a natural character, it is not biology that dictates where, when, how and with whom a person engages in sexual behaviour. The

definition that an individual has of a sexual act is the result of a learning process. Berger and Luckmann (1966: 181) argue that "sexuality is channeled in specific directions socially rather than biologically, a channeling that not only imposes limits on these activities, but directly affects organismic functions".

What is true for sex is also true for gender. Gender categories are imposed from birth and gender roles gradually assimilated. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) noted that "[o]ne is not born a woman, one becomes one," explaining the formation of gender roles and the phenomenon of gender itself as a social construction. Gender is not an essence. It is created by culture which defines some behaviours and prescribes the learning of these definitions or scripts by its members. Meanings that come from learning are derived from language or discourse; each institution in society has a discourse about sex, a way of thinking and talking about the broad array of behaviours and actors who are involved in sexual expression.

The rejection of same-sex sexual practices is therefore the consequence of a negotiation in a society of what is and is not acceptable on a sexual level. This negotiation produces a sexual morality that makes it possible to categorize what is deviant or criminal and that which deserves to be punished.

I-1-a) Heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm

Sexual and gender norms exist in order to organise and regulate sexuality in a society. Heterosexuality is the dominant sexual norm in contemporary societies. According to Savin-Williams (2001: 38): "The parents who have been reared with myths and stereotypes about gay people and the kind of life they are 'condemned' to live, believe that homosexuality must play an exaggerated and central feature in their child's life, and are cut off from sources of support and images of positive gay role models". Parental representations of sexuality are transmitted from an early age to children who assimilate and internalise them. Cultural prescriptions that elevate heterosexuality to a natural sexual norm also form the ideological basis for rejecting homosexuality.

What is important to emphasize here is the fact that discourses on sexuality play a decisive role in the process of naturalisation of heterosexuality in society. The knowledge that subjects accumulate around sexuality derives from the discursive practices with which they are confronted in their daily environment (Foucault 1977). When one is born, grows up and becomes adult in an environment where we are constantly told that the only accepted form of union is between a man and a woman, heterosexuality appears to be natural. Socialised

individuals can only be perceived as exemplars, as standardised products, of some discourse formation (Habermas 1987), making discourses determinant in the formation of the heterosexual subject.

What follows from this permanent and continuous transfer of heterosexuality through discourses and socialisation as an accepted sexual norm in society is its domination in both the private and public sphere (Rich 1980). In this configuration emerges what Connell (2005) qualifies as "gender order" which gives rise to plural forms of affirmation of masculinities and femininities which complement each other but necessarily fall within the normative patterns of sexual interactions between the "Masculine" and the "feminine" subject. As Weeks argues: "the binary divides between masculinity and femininity, (…) positions sexual subjects, and organizes sexual desire" (Weeks 2010: 41-42). This "gender order" contributes to the sacralisation of sexual relations between men and women. This situation leads to a context of heteronormativity or heterosexual normativity.

The concept of heteronormativity was invented by Michael Warner in 1991 who introduced it in his essay *Fear of a queer planet*. But the latter does not offer a precise definition of the concept. According to Chambers (2007: 663): "Heteronormativity is a regulatory practice of sex / gender / desire that thereby alters or sometimes sets the conditions of possibility and impossibility for gender". This creates a mechanism of reciprocal expectations between man and woman, each playing a role. The repetitive sexual act produces and reproduces hegemonic heterosexuality.

Butler (1990) argues that, based on the heterosexual matrix where sex is viewed as a biological datum and gender as a cultural construct, heterosexuality becomes the institutionalized sexual orientation. Institutionalisation according to Berger and Luckmann (1989) is based on the reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors. Any reciprocal typification of habitualised action is therefore an institution. The typifications constituting institutions are always shared by the members of the group and the individual members of the group are at the same time typified by the institution. The law, marriage, and the incest taboo are institutions relevant for members of specific groups; the group members need to comply with what the institutions demand of them (Berger & Luckmann 1989: 54).

This institutionalisation of heterosexuality leads to its naturalisation in representations around sexuality and gender. It facilitates the construction of a system of representations and an

imaginary in which other forms of sexuality are rejected. Individuals are born and evolve in environments where they are instilled from an early age in the form of sexuality to which they must conform as well as those which they must reject. This value system around gender and sexuality has two main consequences. The first consequence is what Herdt & Koff (2000) call the "heterosexual family myth". This myth does not refer to a tradition or historical narrative, but to an intangible referent, a cultural ideal to which individuals must adhere. It reinforces the system of social expectations which suggests that the family is organised around a man, a woman and children.

The other consequence is the emergence of gender hierarchies. These hierarchies appear with rigid understandings of masculinity and femininity as defined sex roles. West and Fenstermaker (2002) argue that:

"Rather than as a property of individuals, we conceive of gender as an emergent feature of social institutions: as both an outcome of and a rationale for various social arrangements and as a means of legitimacy one of the most fundamental divisions of society. Sex is a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males ".

On this basis, gender relations are based on construction processes that structure power dynamics aimed at legitimizing the domination of men over women. This domination is materialized in the public and family sphere by heterosexuality (Rich 1980), but also by different forms of masculinities (Connell 2005). Insofar as gays are associated with or perceived as women in gender representations in Senegal, it is difficult to approach the construction of femininity without theorizing man and the construction masculinity (Wittig 1992). Thus, gender hierarchies that emerge from the dynamics of power and domination in the realm of sexuality reinforce heterosexuality and fuel homophobia.

Judith Butler highlights:

"Sexual hierarchy produces and consolidates gender. It not heterosexual normativity that produces and consolidate gender, but gender hierarchy that is said to underwrite heterosexual relations (…) Heterosexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a feminine term and this differentiation is accomplished through the practices of heterosexual desire. The art of differentiation the two oppositional moments of the binary results in a consolidation of each term, the respective internal coherence of sex, gender and desire " (Butler 1990).

It is this art of differentiation, this binary system of sexuality that partly underpins homophobia. Gender relations are rigid because of an essential gender approach. But this conception of sexuality exists only because, on a daily basis, it is maintained in families where a differentiation between man and woman is established, reproduced within institutions through texts and laws, as well as in the public sphere through language. It is here that we must consider Butler's notion of "performativity" in relation to gender relations and how it anchors the binary conception of sexuality in societies. She argues that heterosexuality is the dominant sexual norm and in fact creates the exclusion of other forms of sexuality like homosexuality by acts of daily reification:

" Performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration. The view that gender is performative sought to show that what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body "(Butler 1990).

The notion of performativity helps us to understand the processes of initiation to masculinity and femininity, to understand the dynamics through which they are perpetuated as well as the social structures that sustain them. Performativity is an important factor in the understanding of gender relations insofar as it allows the inclusion of masculinity and femininity in psychic structures. All our acts produce meaning which legitimise the values enacted in a society.

Thus, this construction of heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm that stems from a daily enterprise to define and affirm what is sexually accepted constitutes a step in the manufacture of sexual consent. This process results in a legitimation of heterosexuality and the social hegemony of heterosexuals as the dominant group. Gramsci (1971) defines social hegemony as the "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function. The social legitimation of heterosexuality, which leads to the recognition of heterosexuality as the only acceptable form of union, is accompanied by the construction of homosexuality as deviance or a crime.

I-1-b) Homosexuality as deviance/crime

The making of heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm has, as a corollary, the marginalisation of other forms of sexuality and identities, such as homosexuality which is subsequently perceived and described as deviance. Deviance can be defined as any behaviour that does not obey the current social norms and standards in a society. It is a set of behaviours that differ from those accepted by a dominant group. Following Durkheim, we describe it as a behaviour that hurts the collective consciousness (Durkheim 1893). Deviance involves the consideration of three elements: a norm, a transgression of the norm, and a "social reaction" to the transgression of the norm.

Deviant acts are normal phenomena and unavoidable aspects of the life of people in a society (Durkheim 1894). When it comes to deviance in the analysis of gender relations, Harry (1983: 350) tries to make a distinction between sexual deviance and gender deviance. For this purpose, he defines gender deviancy as a deviation "that violates the norms for gender-appropriate behavior: this deviance is to be distinguished from sexual deviance (…) while travesties and homosexuals are gender deviant, prostitutes and rapist are sexual deviants who are quite conventional ". On this basis, it may be thought that sexual relations between two consenting adults of the same sex are not only a kind of sexual deviance, but also a case of gender deviance because the individuals involved are transgressing the gender norms in a heteronormative society where the conventional sexual activity must occur between opposite sexes.

Sexual deviance / gender deviance is generally seen as the violation by an individual or a social group of a set of norms and values that prevail in a society based on a moral order. These violations must lead to sanctions, punishments or exclusion insofar as the individual is perceived as a threat to society. However, the process of building a moral order cannot be universal. Instead, it is part of a set of circumstantial beliefs relating to the enterprise of defining what is good or bad, accepted, tolerated or rejected. Whereas sexual practices between people of the same sex were condemned in Europe before colonization, they were tolerated in Africa.

The debate on morality (what is good or bad) is intrinsically linked to representations of deviance. It can be understood from two main approaches: the traditional approach or conventional perspective and the relative approach (Rubington & Weinberg 2007). For proponents of the traditional approach, morality is innate and universal. The definition of

good and bad is immutable and does not change over time or according to social transformations. It is the nature of the act itself that underpins morality. There is a sacred dimension in this approach because it is perceived as above human judgment. Morality is to some extent regarded as a divine inheritance which should not be subject to any interpretation or violation by men. From this perspective, homosexuality is immoral or a sin because it is condemned by the Bible or the Koran. Men cannot question a divine order.

Contrary to the objectively given or traditional approach, relativist perspective regards deviance as a social construct rather than an objective reality (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 2009: 111). This perspective focuses on the processes of construction and definition of good and evil in a society. It postulates that there are no static representations of deviance and that the knowledge and definitions that we attribute to a subject are social constructs that arise from daily interactions (Berger & Luckman 1966). Humans play an active part in producing the social order in which they participate (Blumer 1969). There is no immutable reality. Morality is a human fabrication that is not sacred. It is a process that is constructed, maintained and reified by the members of a social group, hence not universal. Morality is relative geographically, culturally, historically and temporally, situationally and subculturally (Goode & Ben-Yehuda 2009).

From a relativist perspective, homosexuality is a sexual practice that violates a dominant moral order and sexual norms in a given society. Homophobia is therefore a reaction against a sexual act or practice considered as deviant and that goes against an existing moral order. From this perspective, deviance is not a matter of status but of qualification and treatment by others (Kitsuse 1962). The problem is not homosexuals, but those who construct discourses that stigmatize and condemn homosexuality.

Work on homosexuality and homophobia in Senegal raises the debate on the homosexual category. Kitsuse (1962) emphasizes that deviance does not proceed so much from the intrinsic quality of an individual than from the social definition attributed to a behaviour. Homosexuality in Senegal is perceived as an unnatural act not because it is so in itself, but rather because the discourses and representations that structure the imaginary around sexuality tend to present it as such. To this end, he stresses that:

"The forms of behavior in themselves do not differentiate deviants from non-deviants; It is the reactions of the conventional and conforming members of society that, by identifying and interpreting behavior as deviant, sociologically transform people into deviants "(Kitsuse, 1962).

Deviance must, thus, be seen as a social creation. An act is deviant only when it is presented as such. Edwin Lemert considers deviance to be a quality conferred retrospectively to a person through a socially organized reaction where a deviant's label is attributed. This is what he calls "sociopathic individuation" (Lemert 1951). This social reaction can be both the result of a dynamic from the top, orchestrated by the state into legal stigmatization and institutional categorizations, but also a product of structures from below, such as specific group cultures.

At the state level, homosexual deviance takes the form of a crime when existing laws criminalize same-sex sexual practices. Crime here refers to a set of behaviours that are punished by legal texts. Thus, the legal regulation of sexuality at the state level has as its main function the control of sexuality. Deviant behaviour may not be sanctioned by the state if it is not repressed by law. The criminal act is part of the transition from deviance to punishment by the state through criminal law and the criminal justice system. Criminal law refers to all legal provisions, norms and rules supposed to regulate citizens' behaviour, establish their responsibilities and standards which are not supposed to be crossed (Robinson 1997). It has a communicative dimension in that it aims to deter those who would be tempted to these break standards. Thus, analysing the criminalization of homosexuality in Senegal is equal to examining the legal system around homosexuality, analysing the functioning of institutions in the application of laws, but also the impact of the penal system on the representations of homosexuality in the public sphere and among marginalized group (Maguire & Morgan 2012).

However, just like standards, laws are also constructed. Same-sex sexual practices that have existed in traditional pre-colonial Senegalese societies are now considered deviant or criminal following a process that defined homosexuality as criminal behaviour. Social reactions can only exist because there are norms put in place by actors to regulate and control social behaviour.

1-1-c) Enforcement of law, social control and panics

If what is considered a crime or deviance in a society arises from the social reaction to it, the fact remains that this process is based on the decisions of a dominant group able to make these determinations. A heteronormative context makes homosexuals marginal in society. In order to perpetuate a system of values in force in a society, the dominant group develops rules that must be respected by the minority. These rules are part of a logic of social control. Social

control is exercised at the institutional level but also at the social level. From an institutional point of view, social control is maintained by the criminal justice system through the police, prosecutors, judges, court officials, and civil workers. Their mission is to enforce the laws and punish those whose behaviour is perceived as a threat to society. This primary form of social control can be considered as the preliminary form of power, which is exercised by the institution governing reciprocal action of the members of a group. As a secondary effect, specific mechanisms of sanctions are established when individual actors do not completely fulfil the demands of action which are prescribed by the institution (Berger & Luckmann 1966).

David Sudnow's (1965) work on "normal crimes," shows how prosecutors and public defenders operate as a "work group," collaborating to match an offender's conduct to a specific legal category, based upon emergent folk understandings about which kind of offender and behaviour goes with which kind of category. Such strategies arise over the course of long-term organizational arrangements in which public defenders and prosecutors have a common interest in routinizing work (Grattet 2011: 194). It has also been established that guilt is determined according to three general criteria: estimations of the deviant's blameworthiness, assessments of the deviant's dangerousness and the risk that they might participate in further deviant behaviour, and bureaucratic constraints (Kramer & Ulmer 2002; Steffensmeier et al. 1998; Ulmer & Bradley 2006).

The aforementioned criteria which determine the sanctions by the criminal justice system are far from natural or objective insofar as they are taken by individuals who evolve in a society and have benefited from an education or socialization responding to a set of values. Thus, the individual assimilated to heterosexuality as a pillar of society and the family will be more inclined to severely condemn homosexuality than a homosexual who exercises the same functions and who must make a decision in the same circumstances. This is why social control is also the expression of conflicts between groups within a society. Those who are in a position of domination display their will to consolidate these privileges.

The result is that powerless groups are generally the victims of oppressive laws. Quinney (1970) argues that: "[c]rime is a definition of human conduct created by authorized agents in a politically organized society…. [It describes] behaviours that conflict with the interests of the segments of society that have the power to shape public policy ". Homophobia can therefore be analysed as the consequence of a group struggle and of conflicting interests between the

heterosexual majority and the homosexual minority in order to bring the latter to conform to the heterosexual norms prevailing in society. The issue of homosexuality therefore fits into a logic of power dynamics within a society. Becker (1963) states that:

"All social groups make rules and attempt, at sometimes and under some circumstances, to enforce them. Social rules define situations and the kinds of behavior appropriate to them, specifying some actions as "right" and forbidding others as "wrong". When a rule is enforced, the person who is supposed to have broken it may be seen as a kind of person who cannot be trusted to live by the rules agreed on by the group. He is regarded as an outsider".

Beyond the fact that Howard Becker qualifies those who violate standards as "outsiders", in his approach he emphasizes that the implementation of societal rules or standards is the work of several actors who believe themselves to be guarantors of the stability of a society. These actors are called moral entrepreneurs. Moral entrepreneurs mainly operate at the social level. They can turn private matters into public harm, arousing negative reactions from the broader public towards a stigmatized group.

Becker (1963) describes the roles of moral entrepreneurs in these terms:

"First, enforcement of an interpretative act. Someone - an entrepreneur - must take the initiative in punishing the culprit. Second, enforcement occurs when those who want the rule enforced publicly bring the infraction to the attention of others; an offense cannot be ignored, it is made public. Put another way, enforcement occurs when someone blows the whistle. Third, people make the whistle, making enforcement necessary, when they see some advantage in doing so" (Becker 1963).

This approach seems interesting because the African context allows us to analyse the importance of "moral entrepreneurs" in relation to the issue of homosexuality. In societies where the religious occupy an important place in the construction of the imaginary, Becker helps us to understand the role, the place, the actions of religious leaders in the maintenance of the criminalization of homosexuality and its social illegitimacy, as well as to understand the role of the media in the structuring and consolidation of representations.

The enterprise of social control is not permanent. A category can be rejected today and accepted tomorrow. At any time, an individual, a group can be defined as a threat to the values and interests of society. Barricades can be established by the structures that make the imaginary. Sometimes the object of condemnation is something that has existed in society for ages, but suddenly becomes a concern (Cohen 2004: 1). As I will argue, same-sex sexual practices in Africa only burst into the public sphere as criminal or deviance at the beginning of the 21st century, despite the fact these are ancient practices. This mechanism of sudden

transformation of a question into a social problem stems from a process described by the concept of moral panic.

The concept of moral panic describes the eruption of fear and anxiety in a society around a particular object of concern. In its materialization, it creates a feeling of apocalypse and moral collapse. It is based on the principle that the organization of community life relies on common and shared norms and values. These values are the foundation of the collective consciousness. When standards are no longer respected, those who transgress them are a threat to the existence of society. The transgression of norms sparks a fear of the disintegration of society (Devlin 1965). Thus, it appears that moral panic can only occur in a space where there is a group of people or agents of society whose behaviour is considered a threat to the whole of society, its stability and even its existence (Jewkes 2004: 60).

In his book, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*, Cohen writes on moral panic:

"A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (…) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the subject of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself " (1972: 9).

Moral panic implies the existence of a certain power dynamic within a society. Groups that are stigmatized in most cases have no real power, authority, or legitimacy in the public sphere. They are unable to make their voices and perspectives heard. These are subordinate groups that in most cases are called deviant. Even if in some cases they manage to challenge the representations and caricatures built around them, these social categories suffer the violence of society. Thus, moral panic can be perceived as a reaction of the dominant group against the dominated or marginalized in society. In the case of homophobia, the public sentiment generated in the construction of moral panic reinforces both the labelling and stigmatization of gays and lesbians (Wieringa 2009: 208). It is because of their labelling and

stigmatization that homosexuals experience fear, disgust, social exclusion at the level of speech, meanings, and practices (Herdt 2009: 18).

The construction of folk devils is explained by the analysis of the difference between social reaction and threat (Hall & al. 1978: 16), between perceptions and representations of a phenomenon. It is part of a dynamic of amplification of deviance (Wilkins 1964). But what is at stake is not only the maintenance of the repression of a dominated group, but also the making of silence. Moral panic does not appear ex nihilo. It is the product of a context and environment in which several elements overlap, among which: deviance (it is necessary that a type of behaviour is already labelled and condemned by social norms and values); a social problem (this behaviour must lead to questions about the stability of society); a collective behaviour (a group of people must be clearly identified); a social movement (mobilizations around a question) (Garland 2008).

Eric Goode and Ben-Yehuda in their extension of the reflection on moral panic identify five main characteristics of moral panic: (i) the subject (information starts to create anxiety); (ii) hostility (the perpetrators of the act are described as demons); (iii) consensus (the social reaction is negative, broad and united); (iv) disproportionality (the behaviour or threat is exaggerated in relation to the actual situation); (v) volatility (the newspapers seize the file, but the panic that emerges can also quickly dissipate) (Goode 1994). They add that five segments of society need to be studied: the press; the public; agents of formal social control, or law enforcement; lawmakers and politicians; and action groups in order to see how they overlap for the benefits of a context of moral panic.

In the domain of sexuality, moral panic turns into sexual panic. It is a form of moral panic, but it applies to the analysis of crises related to sexuality. African societies are largely dominated by heterosexuality. The family is defined as the product of an alliance between a man and a woman. Accepted sexual practices are those that take place through vaginal penetration. Sexual acts that do not fit in this register are rejected by society. Homosexuality is viewed as a marker of sexual difference. Its existence undermines the moral foundations of a family-oriented society whose central core is father, mother, and child. So, heterosexuality is a regulating instrument of social life. Heterosexual order considers the normativity of everyday life, the functioning of institutions, laws, and regulations. There are also moral imperatives that also guide people's personal lives (Wieringa & Sivori 2013: 9).

In this context, sexual panic stems from the belief that homosexuals pose a threat to the continuity of a heterosexual moral order. They are perceived as an obstacle to the reproduction of society (Herdt 2009: 12). In a context of social fractures, the construction of homosexuals as scapegoats creates a sense of cohesion and unity in the dominant group against a silent minority that is depicted as the enemy of social cohesion. Sexual panic ultimately generates cultural anger (Herdt 2009: 5).

In the introduction to his book on "*sexual panics*," Herdt points out the mechanism by which one panic gives way to another: "[i]t is this general process that I refer to as cultural anger—the marshalling of intense emotion across diffuse domains and arenas of action to unite disparate individuals and groups in political pursuit of a common enemy or sexual scapegoat" (Herdt 2009: 5). Analysing the issue of panic, some authors believe that in this case, it is rather a cultural anger (Awondo et al 2012: 157). This does not prevent several forms of panic from emerging in one context. In the end, homosexuality calls into question the heterosexual hegemony that constitutes the matrix of social, political, and economic organization. Despite their ephemeral characters, the concepts of moral panic and sexual panic are interesting here because their repetitions over nearly a decade make these panics central to understanding the making of structural homophobia.

Moral or sexual panics are not static. They can appear, disappear and reappear in a society. What is decisive is the existence of a category which can at any time become the target of dominant groups. It is therefore possible to have several moments of moral or sexual panic around a category. Analysing their consequences in a society allows us to describe the construction and consolidation of a crime or deviant act. They can create a context for the routinization of discourse around an issue, leave a legal or institutional legacy, generate social movements that are established over the long term, or anchor a debate in the long term.

I-2) The social construction of postcolonial African society

In the previous section, I highlighted the processes that drive the social construction of gender and sexuality in societies in order to understand that homophobia is not an inalienable trait in a society but the consequence of dynamics of power and of groups whose objective is the making of a consensus around heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm. However, if this theoretical perspective can be applied to all societies, the fact remains that the specificities linked to history, internal dynamics, and power relations at the international level affect the

way in which a given society debates and reacts on the issue of homosexuality. Thus, the impact of colonization in Africa and its consequences in the long term cannot be excluded in an in-depth study of the trajectories of homophobia in postcolonial African societies. To this end, two analytical grids are relevant: postcolonial theory and approaches to coloniality.

I-2-a) Postcolonial theory

Postcolonial theory emphasizes the construction of the postcolonial subject. From the 19th to the 20th century, the peoples of Africa, America and Asia were subjected to European domination. The colonial situation (Balandier 2001), a moment of encounter between the colonizer and the colonized, led to the emergence of the double complex of dependence and inferiority. Mannoni (1950) argues that the independence of former colonies erased this situation, but colonization was not only an economic and military enterprise. It was also a kidnapping of body and mind for the colonized. It strengthens its subjugation and legitimizes Western hegemony. The production of discourses and knowledge on the former colonial territories is a decisive factor in the prolongation of colonial domination. Therefore, to think Western domination in order to restore the place of the former colonized in history became a necessity to leave what is described as “the great night” and question their contemporary conditions (Mbembe 2010).

In the wake of anti-colonial thinkers such as WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon and Aimé Cesaire, postcolonial studies emerged in the mid-1970s. Edouard Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) can be considered as a founding moment. These theories offer a critique of capitalism, modernity and Western colonialism (Mendoza 2016). Also considered as “history from below” (Chibber 2013), postcolonial studies have made it possible to perceive the colonized not just as a passive object of domination, but also as a subject with agency. Postcolonial theory offers a critique of Western universalism by challenging colonial discourses on justice and equality from which colonized people were excluded. The "civilizing mission" and European humanism being at the same time accompanied by lies, barbarism, double talk and the disguise of the real (Mbembe 2006).

Paying particular attention to the power of discourse, postcolonial thinkers have relied on textual analysis to supplement earlier criticisms of colonialism and capitalism over marginality and subalternity (Chibber 2013: 8). One of the most influential of this group is Gayatry Spivak who, in her text "*Can the subaltern speak?*", emphasizes the notion of

‘epistemic violence’ that impedes not only the emergence of all specific knowledge about subalterns, but also, shows that any attempt to describe or speak about subordinates has the effect of consolidating the domination of the West over the former colonized territories (Spivak 1990). In the context of Indian society, Spivak also points out that, if in the production of colonial discourse subordinates have no history and cannot speak, subordinate women find themselves in an even more uncomfortable position. We cannot therefore limit colonization to a simple military-economic complex aimed at exploiting the colonies for the benefit of the metropolis. It is a vast moment of control of human life and subject formation, resulting in the materialization of domination in its physical and psychic forms.

However, the subalternisation and infantilisation of the colonised does not lead to a separation from the colonizer. Postcolonial theory emphasizes reciprocal influences and logics of entanglement and concatenation of representations and knowledges. The identity of the subject is built through a circular mechanism between self, intersection and co-construction. The colonized appears as the product of a space in which a plurality of constitutive logics is articulated in the definition of a new identity. Mbembe (2006) argues that: “colonization no longer appears as a mechanical, one-sided domination that forces the subjugate to silence and inaction. On the contrary, the colonized is a living, speaking, conscious, acting individual whose identity is the result of a triple movement of breaking in, erasing and rewriting oneself”.

Postcolonial thought is therefore part of a critique of modernity which appears only as a fact of the West for hegemonic ends, but as a co-construction in which involve the colonized. According to Bhabha (2010: 199), postcolonial theory “is no longer simply about the establishment of separatist trajectories or parallel interpretations, but should be seen instead as an attempt to interrupt the Western discourses of modernity through (…) displacing, interrogative subaltern or post slavery narratives and the critical theoretical perspectives they engender”. Thinking about modernity leads us to think about the multiple forms and the many places where it is deployed.

This notion of mimicry has been developed in postcolonial studies to address the duality of the process of building modernity in the colonies. In his book, *Orientalism* (1978), Edward Said puts forward the claim that colonial discourse produces knowledge about so-called inferior societies to construct realities justifying their domination (Said 1978: 94). This discourse encloses the colonized in an essentialist perspective that prevents them from conceiving of the world beyond the gaze imposed by the colonizer (Go 2016).

Hommy Babbha does not criticize the power of colonial discourse in the making of the colonized imaginary. He argues that the ambivalence of colonial discourse allows the colonized to develop their own mechanisms of appropriation and resistance (Bhabha 1994). For Bhabha, the colonial discourse is "a complex, ambivalent, contradictory mode of representation, as anxious as it is assertive " (1994: 69). It is a fundamentally " ambivalent mode of knowledge and power " (1994: 66). The colonized is " both savage (cannibal) and yet the most obedient and dignified of servants (the bearer of food); he is the embodiment of rampant sexuality and yet innocent as a child; he is mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the most worldly and accomplished liar, and manipulator of social forces " (1994: 82). This psychological tension between the colonizer and the colonized allows the latter to develop a desire to look like the former. The subject that emerges from the colonial context is partially a representation of the colonizer. He is a hybrid subject.

What is interesting in Babbha's argument concerning the issue of ambivalence is this conflict between the desire of making new subject but do not allow them to become as western. We can let them have some practices that we share but also try to live them in a world which is not our world. This situation explains why certain behaviours that were not accepted in the West were tolerated in the colonies: the colonial discourse on progress and modernity, hides the colonizer's will to consolidate differences in order to affirm his superiority. The colonial subject is reproduced almost the same but not quite the same (Bhabha 1994: 86), thereby justifying the colonizer's authority over colonial society. But the colonizer will always try to build differences between us and them. For example, homosexuality was not banned perceived as an abomination was banned in France but tolerated in French colonies.

Postcolonial theory has the merit of questioning the notions of universalism and modernity. It demonstrates the ambiguities of colonial discourse and the marginalization of subjects in the construction of "civilization". At the same time, it deconstructs the passivity of the colonized in the colonial enterprise but highlights a will of the colonizer to make the colonized invisible in all its dimensions. The subject that emerges from this episode is a hybrid subject characterized by a desire to be like the colonizer. European culture was made seductive: it gave access to power. After all, beyond repression, the main instrument of all power is its seduction. Quijano (2007: 169) argues that European culture became a universal cultural model. The imaginary in non-European cultures could hardly exist today and, above all, reproduce itself outside of these relations. Still, the colonizer's desire was to maintain insurmountable differences between himself and the colonized in order to retain his

superiority and authority. The colonized would never be entirely like the colonizer, a situation which generated tensions and contradictions.

II-2-b) The coloniality of power

Two moments mark what has been called the coloniality and decoloniality turn. First, a fracture appeared between the Latin America Subaltern Studies Group and the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group. The former reproached the latter over a lack of regional nuance in their analysis of colonial domination across Asia, America or Africa. Even if there are some similarities in the many experiences of colonialism, the sheer multiplicity of contexts and historical trajectories made sweeping generalizations untenable. It is important to underline here that postcolonialism is a diasporic intellectual movement mainly coming from scholars of the Middle East and South Asia that were inspired by the realities of their societies. South Asian Subaltern Studies Group were also accused of referring too much to Western epistemology, especially the works of Gramsci and Foucault (Grosfoguel 2007: 212), and thus reaffirming Western hegemony in the production of theory. Whereas postcolonialism locates the construction of the domination of colonized peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Latin America Subaltern Studies Group refers to earlier European incursions into the lands that came to be known as the Americas from the fifteenth century onwards (Bhambra 2014).

The second and most decisive break occurred within the Latin America Subaltern Studies Group itself. There were two factions: those who apprehended subalternity as a critique of postmodern thought, drawing inspiration from European thinkers, and those who read it as a decolonial critique (Mignolo 2000: 183-186; 213- 214). For the latter, getting locked into Western epistemology limited the potential for radical critique. These are among the differences that led to the birth of the Latin American modernity/coloniality research programme. Modernity and coloniality represent two fundamental concepts to understand the experience of domination experienced by people outside the Western world. The project also argues that we cannot understand modernity without understanding coloniality. These are two sides of the same coin that form the colonial/modern system (Grosfoguel 2011).

The difference between colonialism and coloniality

It is important to make a clear distinction between colonialism and coloniality. Colonialism refers to a period in the history of the former colonial territories during which their political,

economic, military and territorial sovereignty was under the control of European powers. Coloniality refers to the colonial situation in which the former colonies remain encapsulated in the Eurocentric hegemony despite their independence (Quijano 2002).

Theoretical perspectives aiming to show the continuation of forms of colonialism in formerly colonized territories are not new. Postcolonial theories, as I have mentioned, helped to highlight the survival of logics of marginality and subalternity in the postcolony (Mbembe 2000). There is also the theory of dependency and the world system theory which underlines the consolidation of the unequal structures imposed by the colonial order which keep the Third World in a state of underdevelopment (Wallerstein1976; 2004). Dependency is a historical condition which gives a certain structure to the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits possibilities for the development of subordinate economies. This situation can be traced back to the colonial period in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected (Dos Santos 1971: 226). However, one of the criticisms against dependency theory is that it is primarily focused on economics while coloniality seeks to analyse all spheres of human life.

Frantz Fanon (1961: 67) conducts a sharp critique of colonialism by emphasizing its structural dimension and how it alienates the colonized. Colonialism is brutal in the sense that it is a perverse logic. It turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts it, disfigures and destroys it. It becomes vital to grasp the mechanisms that perpetuate the hegemonic enterprise inherited from the colonial order.

Regarding the differences between colonialism and coloniality Maldonado-Torres argues that:

" Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on another nation, thereby creating an empire out of that nation. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of people, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and everyday " (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 243).

From a decolonial perspective, coloniality continues to regulate all aspects of African societies: knowledge, culture, art, economy, including gender relations. It is a relationship of domination maintained by the myth of decolonization in order to consolidate the Euro-

American hegemony on a global scale. Coloniality allows us to understand the entanglement of old forms of domination and social hierarchies with contemporary forms of oppression, exclusion and marginalization. From this perspective, the terms “postcolonial” and “decolonization” are diluted insofar as the forms of domination and control of the colonized introduced by the colonizer continue to structure the social, economic, political, cultural and social order of the former while maintaining the hegemony of the latter.

In order to be even more precise in this establishment of the difference between colonialism and coloniality, from a chronological point of view, colonialism is mostly associated with the conquest of Africa and Asia by Europeans in the 19th and the 20th centuries. For theorists of coloniality, however, the earliest forms of Western colonialism date back to the 15th century with the discovery of America. Moreover, as pointed by Ramon Grosfoguel:

" Colonial” does not refer only to “classical colonialism” or “internal colonialism,” nor can it be reduced to the presence of a “colonial administration.” I use the word “colonialism” to refer to “colonial situations” enforced by the presence of a colonial administration such as the period of classical colonialism. I use “coloniality” to address “colonial situations” in the present period in which colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist world-system. By “colonial situations” I mean the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups with or without the existence of colonial administrations " (Grosfoguel 2011: 16)

We can therefore see that what is at stake is not the dominant historiography which situates colonialism in a short chronological framework with precise institutions. Instead, the paradigm of coloniality addresses the contemporary situations of former colonies. However, one of the criticisms that can already be made in the differentiations established between colonialism and coloniality is the risk that colonized peoples appear as victims of a hegemonic order imposed by the West since the 15th century. However, postcolonial theories have revealed the reciprocal influences which result from the meeting between the dominant and the dominated. Therefore, as we will see later in this study on homophobic violence, the dominated also have their own agency.

Coloniality of power, globalisation and developmentalism

The coloniality of power refers to the structures of power, control and hegemony that have been around since the conquest of America. For the Latin American modernity/coloniality group, the project of modernity has its roots in the 15th century with the Portuguese and Spanish conquests of America, which later led to the extermination of Amerindian

populations and the birth of black slavery. Thus, the coloniality of power intends to account for the historical processes of the subalternisation of non-European populations but also for the construction of Eurocentric hegemony (Grosfoguel 2011). Modern thought is nothing other than the result of the process of Europeanisation of the planet which began in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Dussel 2000).

The cornerstone of this process is the racial codification of the world's population, making Europe and America the centre of knowledge and modernity, while naming and humiliating the lifestyles of other peoples (Quijano 2007; Mignolo 1995; Mignolo 2000). Race becomes the most powerful instrument of control, subjugation and domination invented in the last 500 years (Quijano 2007). It has facilitated the construction of categories, such as "Indian", "black", "Asian" (formerly "yellow" and "olive colours"), "white" and "mixed race", and helped segment the world into distinct continents: America, Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania.

In this process, the plantation was the founding moment in the making of the subject through slavery and colonialism. At the origin of racial difference, consecrating the process of dehumanisation, is 'the negro'. He is not a person, but a separate subject, deportable, reduced to body, flesh, and physical strength. It is "the Negro slave [who is] the very first subject of race " (Mbembe 2013: 257). Race must be seen as the instrument at the heart of the process of constructing the subjectivity of racialised identities. Thus, we cannot analyse contemporary gender inequalities in Africa without examining them in relation to racial dynamics. Race is the factor that allows blacks to enter civilisation. The racialisation and sexualisation of the black body are concomitant processes in the colonial enterprise (Fanon 1952).

Quijano broadens his understanding of the current forms of Eurocentric domination by arguing that the coloniality of power includes: " Normally, seigniorial relations between dominant and dominated; sexism and patriarchy; the familismo (games of influence based on the family networks), the clientelism, the compadrazgo (cronyism) and the patrimonialism in the relations between the public and the private one and especially between the civil society and the political institutions " (Quijano 1994) . We can therefore summarise the coloniality of power around four major axes: a) the appropriation of land and the exploitation of a labour force (the enslavement of blacks is at the foundation of this process); b) control of the authority for the permanent exercise of violence against the colonised; c) the control of gender and sexuality through the institutionalisation of heterosexuality; and d) the control of subjectivity.

It appears that the coloniality of power is the foundation of the unequal structures between the West and its former colonies. As stated by Quijano, gender also occupies a central place in this dynamic. In her analysis of British colonialism, Anne McClintock (1995:5), emphasises that "race, gender and class are not distinct realms of experience, existing in splendid isolation from each other; nor can they be simply yoked together retrospectively like armatures of Lego. Rather, they come into existence in and through relation to each other ". She adds that "imperialism cannot be fully understood without a theory of gender power. Gender power was not the superficial patina of empire, an ephemeral gloss over the more decisive mechanics of class or race. Rather, gender dynamics were, from the outset, fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the imperial enterprise " (1995: 67).

It is important to understand how gender dynamics were imposed on the colonised by the Eurocentric order starting from the 15th century in the Americas. These dynamics can help to account for the continuation of gender inequalities and representations around sexuality in so-called postcolonial societies. Gender and sexuality are not just about pleasure and sexual enjoyment. In the capitalist order inherited from Western imperialism, they are tools of power and domination. For my purposes, it is important to analyse how gender is part of the continuation of power struggles, dynamics of control and resistance between the West and Africa.

From this perspective, the globalisation of LGBT identity described as " Gay International " (Massad 2007), is regularly associated with modernity and development. Societies which recognise the rights of LGBT populations are seen as modern and developed; those who maintain criminalisation and discrimination against homosexual populations are described in Western discourse as less modern or underdeveloped. As an extension of this perspective, Jasbir Puar (2013) developed the concept of homonationalism to illustrate the introduction of sexual politics into the United States' global strategy of constructing its hegemony and asserting its superiority at the planetary scale. In this so-called American exceptionalism, homosexuals in the United States, marginalised in the past, have not only achieved complete recognition, they have also been integrated into the ideological apparatus for the expansion of neoliberalism, making them full actors in the promotion of capitalism (Puar & Mikdashi, 2012). This American exceptionalism is reflected in the foreign policy of the United States by granting rights to homosexuals as an element of the evaluation of the process of democratisation of a given state.

The issue of homosexuality consolidates this Manichean perception of the world inherited from Western imperialism where there are “normal” regions associated with the West and “other” regions that are considered to be underdeveloped. These categories have the consequence of updating the idea of a "civilising mission" of the West towards other peoples. Criticism of Western discourse on the universality of human rights reveals the perpetuation of the logic of subalternity. Global history became conceived as a continuum running from:

" (…) the primitive to the civilized; from the traditional to the modern; from the savage to the rational; from proto-capitalism to capitalism [...] And Europe thought of itself as the mirror of the future of all the other societies and cultures; as the advanced form of the history of the entire species. What does not cease to surprise, however, is that Europe succeeded in imposing that ‘mirage’ upon the practical totality of the cultures that it colonised; and, much more, that this chimera is still so attractive to so many " (Quijano 2007: 196).

Moreover, the notion of modernity is associated here with coloniality because it took its roots in the alienation and exploitation of so-called inferior peoples. Modernity as understood in Eurocentric imperialism tends to impose its paradigms and representations on other peoples without taking into account cultural differences. The issue of homosexuality appears as a field of extension of the struggles for influence, exploitation, control and hegemony between the West and the "other".

In this context, the ideology of development imposed by the West is questioned. It appears as a new enterprise of subalternisation which masks hegemonic issues. Rooted in the idea of progress, it tends to permanently present the West as the "saviour" of humanity while the non-western other is always portrayed as an infant who needs to be educated and humanised. Behind this approach we can therefore detect the extension of colonial logics. The African historian, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, describes colonial developmentalism in these terms:

" As an ideology of colonial and neo-colonial modernity, developmentalism was born during the Great Depression and bred into a hegemonic discourse in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The seeds were sown with the 1929 British Colonial and Welfare Act. They turned into sturdy developmentalist weeds under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. It was in colonial Africa that most of these seeds and weeds were nurtured. It was there that the term development lost its naturalistic innocence and acquired the conceited meaning of economic growth modelled on the West " (Zeleza 1997: 218)

There is a link established between progress, modernity and developmentalism. This last term appears as a continuum of coloniality/modernity. Grosfoguel (2000: 348-349) maintains that "[d]evelopmentalism is linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. (...) [It] became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy ". Linking the issue of homosexual rights to

the idea of progress and development can be seen as an extension of colonial logic, giving rise to forms of resistance such as neotraditionalism[5] or heteronationalism[6].

The coloniality of power has led to the conceptualisation of other forms of coloniality, such as the coloniality of being, which refers to the violation of the meaning of human alterity to the point where the alter-ego becomes a subaltern (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). The daily life of the colonised "approximated very closely with situations of war. It is a humanity that is denied" (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 257). The colonised world is a world of violence, war, rape, disease, death and mourning. All of them have been denied and they have been reduced under the world of colonialism (Mignolo 2007; Quijano 2007; Grosfoguel 2007; Maldano-Torres 2007; Escobar 2007).

We also have the coloniality of knowledge, which illustrates how, through discourses, categories, imagination, we participate in the construction of Eurocentric hegemony (Escobar 2007). One example of this coloniality of knowledge is the criticism of the homosexual category carried out in chapter 1, where it appeared that the use of the Western concept of homosexuality could not account for the complexity of the erotic, physical and emotional relationships that men and women could have in African contexts.

The concept of coloniality of gender, introduced by the Peruvian Maria Lugones, aims to understand the male oppression of women, but more specifically the gender oppression perpetrated by racialised men (Lugones 2007). Lugones develops Quijano's notion that patriarchy and heterosexuality are constitutive elements of imperial control (Lugones 2007). In the colonial enterprise, the bodies of men and women are racialised and sexualised for the purpose of consolidating domination, but also for the distribution of social roles.

For the moment, this theoretical path leads us to two main conclusions. First, coloniality structures the organisation of life, power, and sexuality in contemporary societies. Steve Martinot (2004), sums up the situation in these terms:

" We all live within a multiplicity of colonialities; subjected in both body and mind. It is not only our labor, but our relations; it is not only the wars, the mass murder and death squads

[5] Neotraditionalist Islam advocates for a more rigorous approach to gender relations in society and more specifically the rejection of homosexuality. It is an ideological movement inspired by the Arab world which places gender and sexuality in the ideological battle against the West which it accuses of wanting to pervert other societies with propaganda in favour of gay rights. The introduction of gender and sexuality in the global struggle against western imperialism constitutes the main difference in Islam between traditionalism and neotraditionalism. This notion will be analysed in greater detail in chapter 5.

[6]Heteronationalism explores how sexuality and gender fit into the national project. The definitions associated with masculinity and femininity are valuable tools in the construction of what is moral and immoral in a state. This notion will be analysed in depth in chapter 6.

organized by imperialist classes, nor the sub-colonies formed by women, African American communities, or ethnic identities; it is also the hegemonic mind, the white, or masculine, gold heterosexist, gold national chauvinist mind that is constituted by coloniality. (...). We so face the question of who we are in this mirror. The power of coloniality's structure of control, is that it speaks for us so forcefully that we see no recourse but to represent it, to uphold its existence, to ratify its dispensing with ethics and sanctity of human life in everything we say and do as labor and resource ".

For that reason, Jack Goody defines the coloniality of power as "a theft of the history of Africans" (Goody 2006: 1). The second conclusion is that coloniality makes it possible to describe the "invisible government" (Bernays 2007) as racialised, colonial, capitalist, patriarchal, hierarchical, heteronormative, neo-liberal hegemonic and Euro-American (Mignolo 1995; Mignolo 2000; Quijano 2000; Grosfoguel 2007; Grosfoguel 2011).

CONCLUSION

Social constructionism is the theoretical cornerstone of this research. I aim to show from this theoretical perspective that homophobia in Senegal is the consequence of two movements. First, the construction of heterosexuality as the dominant norm in Senegalese society. This approach is understood through the imposition of sexual norms and values which naturalise sexual relations between men and women. In this context, sexual practices between same-sex peoples are perceived as deviant and subsequently criminalised by institutions. Homosexuals appear to be a threat to social stability and the moral order in force in society. Secondly, the specificity of the African context and its colonial history forces us to interrogate the formation of the postcolonial subject, heir to a value system imposed by the colonial order of which he will subsequently be the guarantor in a context where relations remain marked by colonial memory.

CHAPTER II: STATE OF ART ON SAME-SEX SEXUAL PRACTICES IN AFRICA

This research examines the discursive production of homophobia in Senegal and the politicisation of homosexuality. In an environment where laws are the first sources of polarisation in the debate on homophobia, one of the main challenges of this study is to go beyond the legal sphere and analyse how Senegal became a homophobic country. Homosexuality is a relatively recent topic of academic study in Senegal, although the work of colonial anthropology, as I will demonstrate in this work, has discussed same-sex sexual practices (Corre 1894; Gorrer 1935). At the beginning of this work, it was necessary to address the issue of homosexuality in Senegal to assess the progress of the research on the subject. The interest at this level was to introduce the problem of homosexuality in the Senegalese context.

As in many other cases in Africa, there is limited research on homosexuality in Senegal, unlike in Western societies (Currier & Migraine-George 2017). Given the scant work that focuses exclusively on homophobia in Senegal, I have focused my attention on work in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. But before I address these issues, it important to clarify the debate around homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice.

Given the novelty of the subject in the academic arena, I could not be satisfied only with academic research. Apart from the scientific papers produced on homosexuality and homophobia in Senegal, I have also read the reports of non-governmental organisations, governmental organisations and even associations in order to have more extensive knowledge on the subject.

II-1- Homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice?

The description of Africa as a homophobic continent derives from the discursive production of African political elites tending to make homosexuality a non-African sexual practice[7], a strategy that legitimised the representation of homosexuals on the continent. Even though anthropological and historical studies have shown that in Africa, as elsewhere in the world,

[7] For example, in September 1999, Daniel Arap Moi, president of Kenya, announced: "It is not right that a man should go to another man. It is against African tradition and Biblical teachings. Kenyans against the dangers of the scourge" Reported in the *East Africa Standard* (September 30, 1999). Cited atwww.mask.org.za/sections/AfricaPerCountry/kenya/kenya1.html.

sexuality has been plural, the argument that is regularly put forward in public debate is the claim that homosexuality has never existed in Africa and is therefore a Western import.

II-1-a) Male same-sex sexual practices in precolonial Sub-Saharan Africa

One of the main ideas about sexuality in Africa is that homosexuality did not exist on the continent (Msibi 2011). For the Cameroonian anthropologist Severin Cecile Abega "Negro-Africans generally assimilated it with a form of witchcraft" (Abega 2007: 224). Achille Mbembe develops the thesis of "original repression" of the homosexual relationship and its association with the occult power in the collective imagination of African societies (Mbembe 2000). Epprecht (2008) describes a strange consensus about same-sex relations on the continent. Since, many studies have shown that sexuality in Africa has always been diverse and varied as elsewhere in the world (Epprecht 2013). Heterosexual relationships have long coexisted with same-sex sexual practices on the continent.

In precolonial societies, young boys had to have sex with women at a certain age, but in their socialisation process, because they slept, played together, the older boys sometimes penetrated the younger ones. This was the case among the Bafia of Cameroon. The five or six-year-old Bafia boy plays the passive role with a senior brother (Falk 1929 cited by Murray et Roscoe 1998). Given that the sexuality of girls was protected so that they could be virgins at the time of marriage, the first sexual experiences were happening between boys. These sexual behaviours were practiced in most cases in secret and were not known by the boys' parents.

However, in some societies, same-sex sexual relations have been instituted and have not suffered from social repulsion. This is the case among the Mossi of West Africa (Tauxier 1912). In Cameroon, "*Mevungu*" among the Beti group and "*Ko'o*" (snail) among Bassa'a group lead to same-sex sexual contacts. The *Mevungu*, for example, marked among women "the celebration of the clitoris and feminine power" (Laburthe-Tolra 1985: 327). This rite "included dances that sometimes mimicked coitus and in which women initiated to menopause played the masculine role" (Ombolo 1990: 119).

Among the Pahuins in Central Africa, even though they had wives, young adults continued to have same-sex relations with young boys, without facing social reprobation. This situation was sometimes described as a game ("*bia bo pfianga*" or: "we have fun"). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that this type of behaviour could also be perceived as witchcraft (Falk 1925: 168). One of the social expectations was that a young man should be married and have

children by the age of 25. Among the Ashanti in Côte d'Ivoire, slaves captured during a conquest were used as concubines. Thus, they became the sexual partners of the men of the kingdom. In Senegal, due to the absence of female partners, male slaves had sexual encounters with each other, but they stopped this practice once they met a female partner. This was also the case among the Azande in Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1970) and among women in Lesotho (Kendall 1998).

Among the Fangs, same-sex relationships were also perceived as an essential path to wealth. Wealth would be transmitted from the receptive partner (the pedicist) to the insertive partner (the pedicon) (Murray & Roscoe 2001: 142). Same-sex practices were also used during initiatory rites. In Togo, women who did not want husbands were forced to undergo an initiation rite called *kpankpankwondi*. This was the case among Moda girls in northern Togo (Ibid: 105).

Age was also a factor that could steer sexual relationships between men. Young people could sometimes be forced to have sexual relationships with their elders. Among the Mossi of Burkina-Faso, at the royal court, young people named *Sorone* were chosen among the most beautiful, between the age of seven and fifteen years old. Dressed in women's clothes, female roles were attributed to them, including sex with the chiefs. This was done (sexual intercourse) on Friday, because that day any heterosexual relationship was socially prohibited. Once the *Sorone* had reached adulthood, the chief gave them women (Gueboguo 2006).

In Angola, in the Quibanda ethnic group, sodomy was practiced by men and those involved in these practices were called: *Quimbandas*. They were men who dressed like women. The most prominent figure of this group was the high priest called *Ganga-Ya-Chibanda*, who kept his female clothes on even during religious ceremonies. In Zambia, among the Mukanda (Murray & Roscoe 1998: 143) and the Kivai, sodomy was part of the initiatory process. Later, it was even thought to help men be more vigorous (Bataille 1983: 131).

One of the elements that attests the presence of same-sex sexual practices in Africa before the colonial period is the vocabulary used to refer to them. The words *inkotshane* among the Shangaan of southern Africa, *motsoalle* (to describe relationships among Basotho women), and *goor-jiggen* among the Wolof in Senegal are just three examples (Epprecht 2008; Kendall 1998; Murray & Roscoe 1998: 107).

In Burundi, words in Kirundi were used to identify same-sex sexual practices. Thus, we have: *kuswerana nk'imbwa* (make love like dogs); *kwitomba* (to make love); *kunonoka* (literally, be flexible); *kuranana inyuma*.

II-1-b) Female same-sex sexuality in precolonial Sub-Saharan Africa

Sexual practices among women in Africa remain largely understudied (Currier & Migraine-George 2017)[8]. While much work has focused on male homosexuality, lesbianism is the subject of a troubling silence (Epprecht 2013). Amina Mama (1996: 39) emphasises that in Africa "homophobia is rampant, lesbianism hardly enters public discussion". This difficulty in reporting female homosexuality is even more complex in Muslim countries. But it is important to recognise that the last two decades have been marked by anthropological research that confirms the diversity and historicity of sexual experiences between women in Africa.

Sexual relations between women were present in Africa well before and during the colonial period. On the continent, female sexuality has always been diverse and varied. More generally, before colonisation, same-sex people who had sex were referred to in Kiswahili as *mke-si mumec*. Another term, *mzebe* was sometimes used to refer to same-sex people involved in sexual intercourse (Haberland 1899: 668-670). Sexual intercourse generally had generic names in local languages outside of specific practices (Gueboguo 2006). We find expressions such as: *dan kashili* (Hausa), *masu harka* (kiswahili), *kuswerana nk'imbwa kunonoka* (Kirundi). More specifically, tolerated sexual relations and practices between women could be achieved through girl's erotic games, initiation rites, girl's or women's weddings (Morgan & Wieringa 2005).

As much as young boys took part in erotic games marked by touching, this was also the case with young girls. Manipulation of the genitals through the elongation of the lips of the vulva, a practice among female friends provokes excitement and can lead to sexual interactions. Bagnol (1996: 25) emphasises that: "With the passage of time they get excited and end up

[8] In the postcolonial context, few works have addressed the multiple forms of love, the contexts of repression, but also the strategies developed by women who have sex with women. The Queer African Youth Networking (QAYN) published case studies on "*women who have sex with women*" in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Ghana (2012), on "*Lesbians, Bisexual and Queer Women's Organizing in Sub-Saharan Africa*" (2013), and on female same-sex practices in Yaounde in Cameroon (Manga 2014). The works of Dankwa (2009; 2011): "*It's a Silent Trade: Female Same-sex Intimacies in Post-colonial Ghana.*"; *The One Who First Says I Love You': Same-sex Love and Female Masculinity in Postcolonial Ghana;* Ruth Morgan and Saskia Wieringa's (2005) edited volume *Tommy Boys, Lesbian Men and Ancestral Wives: Female Same-Sex Practices in Africa* (2005) features original research conducted by African women who used interviews with lesbians to inform their analyses.

seducing each other and having sexual relations. This phenomenon is known as *ocecelana*. They do this clandestinely, without their parents knowing" (1996: 25). According to Arnfred (2004) these practices were prevalent in several groups, including Hottentot, Namaqua, Waganda, and Woloff in Senegal. In all times and at all periods, this type of relationship, which often begins during adolescence, can continue even after marriage.

Rites of initiation are also part of the process by which women can be initiated into sexual practices. As with men, these rites marked the passage from childhood to adulthood. Those who underwent this passage were considered ready for marriage. These rituals were later abolished by missionaries, and colonial and postcolonial authorities considered them as paganism (Morgan & Wieringa 2005: 290).

On the other hand, ties of friendship or maternity were also mechanisms through which sexual relations between women could be built. In Namibia these practices were called *Oumapanga* (Harsch-Haack 1911 cited by Murray & Roscoe 1998). Even though they were married, women could maintain their friendly ties. They justified this situation by the inability of men to satisfy their sexual desires, which was the case among Nkundo women for instance. Other women justified this type of practice by the scarcity of heterosexual relationships. Among the Azande women, for example, women were kept in harems, which encouraged the development of sexual practices among themselves (Evans-Pritchard 1970).

In Tanzania, passive anal penetration was called *Kufirwa*. Female same-sex relationships were expressed through the term: *Kulambana*, which comes from *kulamba* which means to lick, alluded to cunnilingus. The expression: *kujitia mboo wa mpingo* translates as: to introduce an ebony penis. Female same-sex sexual practices were widespread in almost all African societies where sexual relations between women could be encountered, such as among Hausa women in northern Nigeria. And when they rubbed genitals in Zanzibar, we talked about *kusagana*.

There were also cases where older women, or widows, married younger girls so that they could raise children for inheritance purposes. This practice appears to have been concentrated in South Sudan, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Benin (Evans-Pritchard 1970, 1951; Murray & Roscoe 1998; Morgan & Wieringa 2005), before being banned by colonial and postcolonial administrations for disrupting the gender norms instituted by colonialism. Although several ethnologists and anthropologists have provided names for these practices,

Wieringa (2005, 299) prefers the term women marriage. In the past, girls could engage in sexual practices that they would give up once they would reach adulthood.

II-2- Homophobia in Africa

After having clarified the debate on the historicity of same-sex sexual practices in Africa, it is important to dwell on the research carried out in Africa on homophobia. This step will allow me to establish the lines of convergence and divergence between the Senegalese context and other environments in Africa at the end of this study. Homophobia is a social construct. It is the product of a situation and an environment where homosexuals become scapegoats. In many countries in Africa, the issue of homosexuality is not primarily related to the sexual freedom of individuals but is also a social and political issue. In order to generate exclusion, discrimination and physical violence against gays and lesbians, they are labelled as threats to the society.

II-2-a) Homophobia as a political tool

In Cameroon, the association between homosexuality and witchcraft turns accusations of homosexuality into a way to criticise postcolonial elites deemed responsible for the country's underdevelopment (Lado 2011). However, this debate on homosexuality rests on the belief in the non-African character of homosexuality, despite all the anthropological evidence that attests to the existence of same-sex sexual practices in Africa in precolonial times. The Ghanaian government banned a gay conference scheduled for September 2006, claiming "unnatural carnal knowledge violently offends the culture, morality, and heritage of the entire people of Ghana" (Igwe 2007).

However, as previously noted, research today confirms the existence of sexual practices between people of the same sex in Africa as everywhere else in the world. In his article, "The Lies We Have Been Told: On (Homo) Sexuality in Africa", Mbisi supports the thesis that this denial strategy is a mechanism for strengthening patriarchy and the heteronormativity[9] of

[9] The concept of heteronormativity refers to an interdependence of gender and sexuality which defines gender as a binary category (men and women) and naturalizes sexual attraction between men and women. Heterosexuality is perceived as the only accepted form of sexuality. The term was first used by Michael Warner in the introduction to a special edition of the journal Social Text (1991) titled *Fear of a Queer Planet*. Other concepts have emerged to describe this situation. Adrienne Rich (1980) called the phenomenon "compulsory heterosexuality": a "political institution" which is the basis of "male domination". Monique Wittig (1989) coined the term "heterosexual contract", describing patriarchal gender relations as heterosexually structured and consequently gender and sexuality as inseparably intertwined Judith Butler's described it as "heterosexual

African societies (Mbisi 2011: 55). As Saskia Wieringa (2009: 205) argues, “the historical repurposing of sexuality within Africa simply represents postcolonial amnesia that is built on the manipulation of the fear… of same-sex practices”. These uses of homosexuality for political ends are studied through the concept of political homophobia.

Weiss and Boas (2013) define political homophobia “as a state strategy, social movement, and transnational phenomenon, powerful enough to structure the experiences of sexual minorities and expressions of sexuality. A purposeful, especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded in the scapegoating of an “other” that drives processes of state building and retrenchment; as the product of transnational influence peddling and alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the complicated legacies of colonialism”. Political homophobia is therefore a weapon in the hands of political leaders that they can wield to achieve their goals (Bertolt & Masse 2019).

In a study conducted in 2010 on 194 articles in the Namibian press between 1995 and 2000, it appears that political homophobia has two main objectives: to silence political opponents and to quell political dissent. South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) leaders have been exposed to novelties that have been exploited during the national liberation struggle, distorted historical events, and their inflicted “mensities” (Currier 2010). The last aspect related to history and the national liberation struggle is interesting because it helps to actualise the importance of hegemonic masculinity in national construction (Connell 1987). Homophobia appears as a component of the national project.

If the work in Namibia also reveals that the will of the ruling leaders to maintain their hegemony underpins political homophobia, it should be noted that this is not an isolated case on the continent. In Uganda, for example, between 2009 and 2011, the mobilisation of homophobia by political actors took place in a context where President Yoweri Museveni, in power since 1984, was challenged by part of the population (Tamale 2013). In Zimbabwe, when in 1995, Robert Mugabe, after fifteen years at the head of his country seeks to be re-elected, he treats homosexuals as “worse than dogs and pigs” and suggested that homosexuality was part of Western imperialism. Several other African presidents, including Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Samuel Nujoma of Namibia, Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi,

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matrix” (1990) which represents : “a social and cultural system of order, thinking and perception, forcing humans into the form of physically and socially binary and clearly distinct genders (bipolar gender system) which are hierarchically and complementarily positioned ”.

Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal have also espoused homophobic bigotry and policies in their searches for convenient and marginal scapegoats (IGLHRC 2003; Bop 2008). In Uganda, which has seen a flourishing of works on homosexuality, Stella Nyanzi and Karamagi (2015) show that the anti-homosexuality law has become a paradoxical symbol for nationalism, sovereignty, economic autonomy, Africanness, traditional culture, Christian conservatism, progressiveness, propriety, defiant sexualities, foreign intervention, and neo-imperialism.

From the foregoing, there are two points I deem important to raise. First, political homophobia in Africa makes it possible to build scapegoats in relation to national issues. In heteronormative societies, LGBT campaigns are perceived as aggression and divert attention away from social and economic concerns. Homophobia is also linked to a desire to preserve power. That said, political homophobia cannot be analysed seriously by disconnecting national debates from broader geopolitical issues. Thus, political homophobia has gradually emerged as a tool for affirming the singularity of Africa in relation to the West. Oliver (2003: 100) argues that anti-gay rhetoric in Uganda gained attraction especially since it is "formulated with reference to culturally-specific discourses and concerns over 'African' culture and tradition, neocolonial influence and power, and struggles over national sovereignty and identity".

It appears that it is not possible to disconnect homophobia from the challenges of Africa's underdevelopment and globalisation (Ireland 2013). Economic crisis reinforces the feeling that relations between Western and African countries are structurally unequal and are part of an ongoing logic of exploitation (Rodney 1972). Western campaigns to promote gay rights are therefore labelled as hegemonic claims. We can understand why homosexuality can be labelled as "un-African", perceived as an import or imposition (Epprecht 2008) by populations besieged by multiple crises. Gay rights activists are often accused of being agents of Western imperialism in Africa and for diverting crucial funds to LGBT campaigns (Currier 2007). To this end, in Africa, there is a continuum between underdevelopment, unequal globalisation and homophobia.

This constant updating of homophobia as a legacy of colonisation consolidates the conflicting relations between Europe and Africa and feeds the permanent desire to seek independence. Hoad (2007) underlines that ""homosexuality" is one of the many imaginary contents, fantasies, or significations (sometimes in the negative, sometimes not) that circulate in the production of African sovereignties and identities in their representations by Africans and

others". Homophobia can therefore be likened to an attempt to assert sexual nationalism (Jaunait 2013). Homosexuality is therefore a geopolitical issue (Gunkel 2013). The concepts of homonationalism (Puar 2007: 2013) and Gay International (Massad 2007) reflect the ideological divide between the West and Africa around homosexuality. Homophobia appears in many cases as a political unifier on the continent.

II-2-b) The media and homophobia in Africa

The media plays a major role in the depiction of homosexuality as a threat to society and the dissemination of anti-homosexual theses in the public sphere. As we will see later in this thesis, the role of the media is linked to the fact that, for a long time, they were the only actors concerned with the issue of homosexuality. Walgrave and Manssens (2000) show that, in the absence of any prior mobilisation and when circumstances are favourable, mass media can produce mobilisations and inspire collective action. It is therefore difficult to analyse homophobic mobilisations without considering the role of the media.

One of the countries that has received much attention on this topic is Cameroon. Between 2005 and 2006, a section of the local press published a series of lists of presumed homosexual public figures and politicians. The scandal unleashed brought the Cameroonian head of state, Paul Biya to call for the "protection of privacy". Discussing this situation, Awondo (2012) analyses homophobia in the media in Cameroon as a field of confrontation and hegemonic struggles between old and new actors in the media sphere. A battlefield of political ideological struggles. Sexual morality is instrumentalised for the quest of media notability, which contributes to a politicisation of sexuality. Homophobia appears as a tool for discrediting social and political actors (Awondo 2012: 84).

For the Jesuit priest Ludovic Lado (2011) the press is a field of expression of popular homophobia, which reflects the resentment of a society in crisis that makes homophobia a scapegoat for the venality of the elite. The link is established between homophobia, corruption, and economic crisis. Lado's approach is an extension of the analyses of Charles Gueboguo (2006) and Micay King (2007) who see the anti-gay cabal generated by the media as a reactivation of a logic of off-gassing the anger provoked by the socio-economic context. To this end, the media provides the population with the tools of lynching or resistance to the governing elite that it holds responsible for a chaotic situation (Lado 2011).

Nyeck (2013) pushes the analysis further by introducing the lists of homosexuals in Cameroon in the register of the construction of what he describes as erotic nationalism. He argues:

“erotic paranoid nationalism” is an obsessive belief about sexual enemies and self-defence practices that compulsively hijack the public realm and saturate political discourse with retributive justice on a sequential, provisional, and/or continuing basis. Paranoid erotic nationalism aims to consolidate a homogenous national identity and pride. Paranoia in this sense is onerous because to make subversion and conspirators omnipresent, it must control public opinion, outlaw dissent, and obstruct critical thinking without which the sanity of the polity becomes questionable” (Nyeck 2013: 153).

According to this approach, erotic nationalism was an attempt by the media to reactivate nationalism among the masses in a society where there is a crisis of trust between the elites and the population. Mistrust is based on beliefs that establish a connection between homosexuality and the politico-administrative elite.

Cecilia Strand (2012) shows the role played by the print media in the debate around the law against homosexuals in Uganda. She explains how the social context hinders the impartial and non-discriminatory treatment of homosexuality. The media contributes to a discriminatory climate by reproducing homophobic statements or calls for discrimination made by political, cultural, or religious leaders or organisations. The study is based on two media sources: the government newspaper, *New Vision*, and the private newspaper, *The Daily Monitor*. The latter source has a fair treatment of the subject by criticising the anti-homosexual law. She emphasises to this effect that, "[b]y acknowledging discrimination and its negative impact, the newspaper de-legitimizes homophobia and problematizes the proposed Anti-homosexuality Bill for their readers" (Strand 2012: 564). From the Ugandan case, it appears that a meticulous analysis of the media can reveal certain nuances, or a diversity of approaches, despite the presence of a shared homophobic feeling.

In another study, Karine Geoffrion (2018) argues that by creating a climate of fear and hatred, this over-mediatisation of the issue of homosexuality, and therefore its problematisation, contributes to the stigmatisation of homosexuals as an inimical "specie" (Foucault 1979; Weeks 1986) and therefore to the crystallisation of the concept of homosexuality in a "gay" identity within the specific context of Ghana. Mediatisation has blurred the "natural" inclusion and acceptance of a wide set of gender and sexual practices and identifications. The media participate in the social construction of homosexuality by mobilising a Western conceptual paradigm. Thus, the multiplicity of forms of sexuality historically present in Ghanaian society

are masked (Geoffrion 2018: 282) and a binary configuration of sexuality around heterosexuality / homosexuality is reinforced.

Tara McKay and Nicole Angotti (2016) draw on data collected in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda between 2000 and 2014 and conclude that politicians that call to expand criminal penalties for same-sex practices in these three countries are embedded in broader conflicts over social change, political power, and global status hierarchies that present both opportunities and constraints for African LGBT activists and organisations.

It follows from these readings that the media are integral to shaping the discourse that structures homophobia in society. What makes Cameroon so special is that homophobia is not a top-down but a bottom-up production. It means that, unlike in other countries where homophobic propaganda is rooted in the state, in Cameroon it is directed against the state by civil society. Later, I will demonstrate that Senegal and Cameroon differ from other African nations insofar as it is the media that have been vanguard of homophobic propaganda rather than political actors.

II-2-c) Homophobia and religion

It is difficult to understand homophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa without considering the role of religion. It is already important to emphasise that the link between homophobia and religion has not been the focus of attention in majority-Muslim countries. In a country like Nigeria, homophobia is a unifying factor between Muslims and Christians. One of the unique features of this thesis is that it is dedicated to a country where the population is 94 percent Muslim. On the other hand, to understand the link between homophobia and religion in postcolonial Africa, it is necessary to dwell on the works on Christianity and mainly on the expansion of American evangelicalism. According to Kaoma (2013: 76), "U.S. religious conservatives' ideologies and activism are behind the growing violent homophobia in Christian Africa'." Like Kaoma, Baptiste (2014) argues that "as the gay rights movement has gained traction in the United States, the most virulently homophobic ideologies of the religious right have been pushed further out of the mainstream and into fringe territory." Africa later became one of the main grounds for the spread of Anglo-American evangelicalism in what is described as cultural warfare.

The concept of a culture war emerged in the United States in the 1990s to express the divide between culturally conservative and culturally progressive Americans (Buchanan 1992). This cleavage reflected the shift in societal debates from economic issues to new issues such as

sexuality, morality, or religion (Fiorina & Abrams 2011). It is in this context that American evangelical churches have invested in the spread of homophobia in the name of Christian values. They found fertile ground in Africa. In their propaganda, Africa appears as "something of a last frontier for right-wing policy" (Okeowo 2014).

This is not to say that homophobic feeling has been exported from the United States to Africa. Even though anthropological work has demonstrated the existence of same-sex sexual practices on the continent, they were never the dominant norms, nor were they accepted in all societies. Nevertheless, Anglo-American evangelicals in Africa offer moral arguments to opponents of homosexuality in Africa (Heneghan 2013).

The anti-gay rhetoric fuelled by American evangelicals in Africa since the emergence of culture wars in the United States coincides with the emergence of homophobia in Africa as a mechanism for asserting state sovereignty. One of the most interesting cases in Africa is that of Uganda. Popular explanations of the timing of Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Bill suggest that it emerged in 2009 because of a "Seminar on Exposing the Homosexual Agenda" organised by the Ugandan-based Family Life Network, featuring key U.S.- based evangelists such as Scott Lively of Defend the Family (Wahab 2016). Kaoma (2013) suggested that two events: the "Seminar" and a "strategic meeting on Combating Homosexuality in Uganda" (also organised by the Family Life Network in 2009) were catalysts of "antigay sentiment" already set in motion during the 1990s—the 1998 Lambeth Conference in particular, with its contentious and divisive resolution on homosexuality (Hoad 2007).

One of the reasons for understanding the penetration of homophobic evangelical discourse in Africa is its formulation in terms that refer to African traditions, neocolonialism, the struggle for the affirmation of African identity and the sovereignty of the people (Oliver 2013: 100). There is a meeting of interests between different parties. On the one hand, for the American evangelists it is a matter of spreading their radical interpretation of sexuality, sexual morality, and values of the heterosexual family, on the other hand, for Africans, homophobia helps distinguish African societies from Western societies. Oliver (2013) offered four explanations as to why the U.S.-led Christian Right has turned its attention to Africa at this moment, spreading its pro-family and antigay agenda: 1) the perceived attack and erosion of the "traditional" family by global feminist discourse; 2) the fracturing of the Episcopal Church within the United States as a result of gay rights (orthodox vs. liberal constituents) that has marked a turn to Africa (especially the Church of Uganda) to stabilise the Anglican

Communion orthodoxy; 3) the unparalleled degree of political power wielded by Christian conservatives during the Bush administration (especially in foreign relations policies pertaining to abortion, abstinence, HIV/AIDS, etc.); and 4) the Christian Right's attempt to manufacture racial reconciliation between Blacks and Whites in the United States at the expense of LGBT communities.

Adriaan Kliken's (2013) research focuses on the demonisation of homosexuals following the visit of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to Zambia. During this visit, Ban Ki Moon mentioned that the country has a legacy of democracy and freedom in the region and knows how important it is to stand up for human rights and liberty (Kliken 2013). Then he referred to the current constitutional review process as an opportunity for Zambia 'to lead once more by enshrining the highest standards of human rights and protections for all people – regardless of race, religion, gender, sexual orientation or disability' (Ban Ki-moon 24 February 2012). These statements sparked a wave of homophobic reactions. Adrian Kliken's work is based on online articles and commentaries that illustrate homophobic sentiment in general and the trajectories of the debate. Ban Ki Moon is described as the Devil, the Antichrist (Kliken 2013). Homosexuality is the marker of the end times. These trajectories use Christianity to legitimise homophobia.

II-3) Debates on Homophobia in Islam

Previous work on homophobia has shown the importance of religion in the structuring of homophobic discourse and violence in Africa and Senegal. However, it seems important in this section to put a specific emphasis on Islam for at least two main reasons. Not only is it the most important religion in Senegal, but the literature on the position of Islam in relation to homosexuality is characterised by two currents: a so-called traditionalist current which maintains that the rejection of homosexuality by Muslims corresponds to the prescriptions of the holy scriptures, and a revisionist current that argues that nothing in the Koran justifies homophobic violence.

II-3-a) The traditionalist stance

In the Muslim world, the traditionalist interpretation of Islamic law is dominant (Marchin 2008; Beckers 2010; Hooghe & al 2010;)[10]. According to this perspective, Islam is defined as

[10] The sources of Islamic law are mainly the Koran (Qur'an) and the Sunnah. The Koran is the divine word revealed to the prophet Mohamed by the angel Gabriel in the Arabic language. Therefore, for Muslims,

a religion that conforms to the order of nature called: *Fitrah*. Nature is seen as absolute and given, rather than dynamic and changing. The “discourse on the natural” within Islam has this particularity that it is part of the logic and practice of power. The situation of being treated as an object, as inferior in the texts or narratives, has the consequence on the mind that you perceive yourself as an inferior objects or beings. The discourse on inferiority leads the actors to appropriate this condition as natural whereas it is a construction of hierarchies of power in a society. Naturalism therefore has the social function of organising, regulating, and structuring social relations that can take various forms, including exploitation.

In the Koran and other Islamic texts, sexuality is mainly described or perceived as heterosexual. It does not mean that homosexuality is formally forbidden, because the word does not appear in the texts, but the prophet Muhammad encouraged heterosexual relationships. They do not only respond to the logic of satisfying desires or pleasures, but they are an integral part of the identity of the good Muslim. Sex is part of the individual's personal development. Having sex with his wife allows the man to satisfy his desires but also to use his body as an act of charity. To provide sexual pleasure to his wife appears for this purpose as the fulfilment of a divine mission. Sexuality has a purifying power. According to the popular Muslim sociologist Boudhiba:

"Biology occupies a special place in the Quran. This is because man is a being of desire and because the lightning flash of desire transposes the body and reposes the spirit. Hence the radical rejection of every form of asceticism. Contempt for the body is ultimately contempt for the spirit. Islam is first of all a naturalism and Islamic spirituality is full naturalness" (Bouhdiba 1985: 12).

In this perspective, Islam established male domination because the male body is not only a tool for satisfaction of sexual desire but also for establishing a spiritual relationship with God.

The second aspect emphasised by traditionalist is the role of sex within heterosexual marriage. Sexual relations in marriage are obligatory. They appear as a condition of marriage validation. In Muslim law, the term *Nikah*, which in a literal sense refers to sexual relations,

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Muhammad is perceived as God's envoy (Jubair 1996: 42). It is a spiritual and non-legal work that sets the principles of the life of a good Muslim. In general, it is structured around the principles of the Islamic faith (faith in God, angels, the Day of judgment, hope and the difference between good and evil; The ethical rules of a good Muslim (what to do and not do); The practical rules that must guide the behavior of a Muslim in society. Of the 6239 verses it contains, 500 refer to the law. Of these 500, 70 refer to family and inheritance rights; 70 are on obligations and contracts; 30 verses are related to criminal law and 20 on procedures.

serves to designate the sexual relationship that takes place in the context of heterosexual marriage (Bouhdiba 1985). Apart from heterosexual marriage, no other form of sexuality is permitted by the Koran and the Sunnah. Not getting married is a sin. In the Koran and the Sunnah, it is written: "among His signs is that He has created for you spouses from among yourselves so that you may live in tranquillity with them; and He has created love and mercy between you. Verily, in that are signs for those who reflect"[11].

Then, the traditionalists argue that extra-marital relationships and same-sex sexual practices, as well as sex during menstruation are illegal. These deviations in Islamic law are called *Zina*[12]. As Fida Sanjakdar notes, "deviating from the Islamic narrative of heterosexual relations within *zawaj* (marriage) is a highly charged and politically sensitive act, which can subject persons to 'harsh criticism from fellow Muslims' as well as becoming "ostracized from the Muslim community" (Sanjakdar 2013). On this basis, it is therefore not surprising that homosexuality from a traditionalist perspective does not only pose a legal, but also a moral problem.

According to the traditionalists, Lot's parable in the Koran is the one that justifies believers' rejection of same-sex sexual practices. The Koranic version of the story in Sūra XI, which is generally suggested as aiming at the prohibition of homosexuality, reads as follows: "And his people came rushing toward him, and they had been long in the habit of practicing abominations. He said: "O my people! Here are my daughters: they are purer for you (if you marry)! Now fear Allah, and do not cover me with shame about my guests! Isn't there among you a single right-minded man?" They said: "You know well we have no need of your daughters: indeed, you know quite well what we want!" He said: "Would that I had power to suppress you or that I could betake myself to some powerful support." (The Messengers) said: "O Lūt! We are Messengers from your Lord. By no means they shall reach you! Now travel with your family while yet a part of the night remains, and let not any of you look back: but your wife (will remain behind): to her will happen what happens to the people. Morning is their appointed time: is not the morning near?" When Our decree issued, we turned (the cities)

[11] Sūrat al-Nisā, Verse 1; Sūrat al-Zumar, Verse 5, Sūrat Luqmān, Verse 28; Sūrat Naĥl, Verse 72

[12] "The definition of *zina* differs from one Islamic School of thought to another (in Sunni Islam there are four schools [*madhabs*]. The most pertinent analysis is provided by the *Hanafi* School: sexual intercourse between a man and a woman without legal rights, or without the semblance of a legal right. *Zina*, according to all Schools, is one of the six *huddud* offenses *(the plural form of hadd)*. Hadd literally means "limit" or "prohibition": *hadd* punishments refer to those punishments, which have been fixed for certain crimes and are non-discretionary provided evidentiary requirements are met. *Hadd* punishments are also applicable for theft (*sariqa*), highway robbery/brigandage (*hriaba, qat'al tariq*), alcohol consumption (*sharb al-khamr*), and apostasy (*rida*)". See Rehman & Polymenopoulou, (2013), Is Green a Part of the Rainbow? *Sharia*, Homosexuality and LGBT Rights in the Muslim World, *Fordham International Law Journal, Volume* 37.

upside down, and rained down on them brimstones hard as baked clay, spread, layer on layer" [13].

The Koranic parable of Lot is also narrated in several other parts of the Koran. In Sūra VII of the Koran, the Prophet Lot reprimands his people for committing lewdness[14]. In Sūra XI, his people are described as having the "habit of practising abominations"[15]; in *Sūra* XV the people are described once more as being "a people (deep) in sin"[16]; in *Sūra* XXVI as "people transgressing (all limits)"[17]; and in *Sūra* XXIX, as people who commit lewdness, approach men, "cut off the highway" and practice wickedness[18].

The parable of Lot situates the debate on homosexuality in the field of sexual morality. Homosexuality as a socially recognised sexual identity is a modern phenomenon. At the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when the Koran was written, sexual practices between same-sex persons did not exist as a sexual phenomenon and those engaged in this sexual practice did not constitute a social category. Modern concepts of homosexuality and heterosexuality contain an undifferentiated conglomerate of desires and motivations that do not distinguish between inclination and behaviour.

[13]Qur'an, Sūra XI: Hūd, verses 78–83.

[14]Qur'an, Sūra VII: Al-A'rãf, verses 80–84. ("We also [sent] Lūt: He said to his people, 'Do you commit lewdness such as no people in creation [ever] committed before you?' For you practise your lusts on men in preference to women: you are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds. And his people gave no answer but this: they said, 'Drive them out of your city: these are indeed men who want to be clean and pure!' But We, saved him and his family, except his wife: she was of those who lagged behind. And we rained down on them a shower [of brimstone].").

[15]Qur'an, Sūra XI: Hūd, verses 78–83.

[16]Qur'an, Sūra XV: Al-Ĥijr, verses 58–71 provide: "[They] said: 'We have been sent to a people (deep) in sin, Excepting the adherents of Lūt: we are certainly (charged) to save them (from harm), -all except his wife, who, we have ascertained, will be among those who will lag behind.' [...] And We made known this decree to him, that the last remnants of those (sinners) should be cut off by the morning. The inhabitants of the City came in (mad) joy (at news of the young men). Lūt said: 'These are my guests, do not disgrace me: But fear Allah, and shame me not.' They said, 'Did we not forbid you (to speak) for all and sundry?' He said: 'There are my daughters (to marry), if you must act (so)."

[17]Qur'an, Sūra XXVI: Ash-Shu`arā, verses 165–171, notes that: "'Of all the creatures in the world, will you approach males, And leave those whom Allah has created for you to be your mates? Nay, you are a people transgressing (all limits)!' They said: 'If you do not desist, O Lūt! you will assuredly be cast out!' He said: 'I do detest your doings.' 'O My Lord, deliver me and my family from such things as they do!' So We delivered him and his family, -all Except an old woman who lingered behind."

[18]According to the Qur'an, Sūra XXIX: Al-`Ankabūt, verses 28–29. "And (remember) Lūt: behold, he said to his people: 'You commit lewdness, such as no people in Creation (ever) committed before you.' Do you indeed approach men, and cut off the highway? - and practise wickedness (even) in your councils?' But his people gave no answer but this: they said: 'Bring us the wrath of Allah if thou tell the truth."

II-3-b) The revisionist interpretation of homosexuality in Islam

According to the revisionist, there is nothing to validate the thesis of Lot's parable as proof of the rejection of homosexuality in the Koran. Revisionists call into question the condemnation of homosexuality by Sharia (Hendricks 2010; Kugle 2003: 2010). These authors assume that homosexuality as a sexual category defining same-sex sexual practices does not fit the definition of sexuality in the Islamic tradition (Vaid 2017: 47). They emphasise that the categories homosexuality/heterosexuality are productions of modernity. They make it impossible to establish a separation between acts, desires, motivations, and psychology (Kugle 2003).

The absence of the term homosexuality does not mean that sexual practices between people of the same sex did not exist. Revisionists like Kugle believe that homosexuality or heterosexuality are sexual practices that are natural and inherent in the constitution of each individual. An individual is born homosexual or heterosexual, suggesting an essentialist conception of sexuality. It is based on the idea that God created human beings with multiple traits and characteristics that illustrate the diversity of humanity. This human diversity, according to Kugle (2003), has been expressed in the Islamic world with the presence of same-sex sexual practices. He emphasises that, for the prophet Muhammad, sexuality is not an obstacle to spirituality, but rather a place where spirituality is expressed.

Thus, from this perspective, sexual diversity is valued by the Islamic tradition. Sexual relations are not confined to the marital framework but can occur in other relationships. This makes it possible to question the motives of the condemnation of homosexuality by the traditionalists. In this regard, Kugle (2003) writes:

"The Qur'an contains no word that means "homosexuality" (as an abstract idea denoting a sexuality of men who desire pleasure with other men or a sexuality of women who desire pleasure with other women). The Qur'an contains no word that means "homosexual" as a man or woman who is characterized by this type of sexuality as forming a core part of his or her identity. The terms that became popular in Arabic in later times (Liwat for acts associated with same-sex relations, and Luti for persons associated with these acts) are not found in the Qur'an at all. The Qur'an does not explicitly specify any punishment for sexual acts between two men or two women. Most modern commentators and demagogues insist that the Qur'an does do all these things, but their insistence is not rooted in a close reading of the Qur'anic verses with attention to specific terms and their narrative context."

Hendricks (2010) in turn borrows Kugle's approach and criticises an orthodox reading of the Koran, which does not give space to the diversity of human nature. Sexuality is one of the

elements of human diversity, like language, culture, race, and humanity. This diversity of sexuality in the Koran is valued by several verses such as:

"O mankind! Verily We have created you male and female, and have made you into nations and tribes that you may come to know. Truly, the noblest of you, in the sight of God, is the most God-conscious amongst you. Verily God is the Knower, the All-Aware." (*Quran* 49:13).

"Glory be to God who has created all the different pairs/partners from what the earth produces and from themselves (humankind) and from that of which they possess no knowledge" **(***Quran* 36:36).

This diversity allows revisionists to emphasise that non-heterosexual practices have long existed in the Islamic world without being subjected to systematic repression. They were recurrent and socially accepted even if they were not practiced in public (El-Rouayeb 2005). El-Rouayeb demonstrates, for example, that during the Ottoman Empire period, homosexual relations were perceived as sexual practices involving an adult and a teenager. As the teenager was not a man, the adult was not socially condemned. What made a boy into a man was the cultural importance of having a beard. The beard symbolised male honour and slaves were for example not allowed to have a beard (El-Rouayheb 2005:26). We can see here that the act itself is not a problem. The punishment only applies based on the age of the respective partners.

Transvestites or effeminate men were present in the Medina when it was transformed into a centre of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad. They were named: *mukhannathun*[19]. However, if they were not accepted by the prophet, it was not because of their sexual orientation, but rather because of their behaviour in public (Hendricks 2010: 41). Regarding violence against homosexuals, revisionists believe that it is not accepted by the Koran. They highlight two factors: First of all, the freedom of choice of individuals based on the diversity of mankind, but also the fact that only God has the power to say what is right or wrong, not men. Several verses of the Qur'an are mentioned to support this thesis:

"Say: Everyone acts according to his own disposition (nature): But your Lord knows well who is best guided on the way." (*Qur'an* 17: 84).

[19] Two versions exist on the look of the Prophet Muhammad on these effeminate men. One states that Muhammad was indifferent, while the second affirms that they were rejected. See: Rowson, Everett (1991), "The Effeminates of Early Medina", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1991, pp. 671-693.

"And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and be modest, and to display of their adornment only that which is apparent, and to draw their veils near to them, and not to reveal their adornment save to their own husbands or fathers or husbands' fathers, or their sons or their husbands' sons, or their brothers or their brothers' sons or sisters' sons, or their women, or the followers (of Muhammad) amongst the men who have no desires for women, or children who know naught of women's nakedness. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And turn unto God together, O believers, in order that ye may succeed" (*Qur'an* 24:31).

Such passages from the Koran allow revisionists to refute the killing and stoning of homosexuals advocated by traditionalists. Forgiveness, the right to life and access to Paradise are sacred principles in Islam (Hendricks 2010: 43-44).

We can see that one of the revisionists' essential points is the interpretation of Lot's parable. In another book, *Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflection on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims* (2009), Kugle offers an alternative interpretation of the Lot story, asserting that "some men of Lot's tribe were guilty of assault and rape, rather than consensual same-sex acts or homosexual orientation". It is therefore a challenge to the traditionalist reading of this parable. Hendricks points out that the city of Sodom was a prosperous city and that the sexual practices in the time of Babylon could not be disconnected from the rites of worship and consolidation of the patriarchal system for the purposes of domination (Hendricks 2010:38). He further states that the vagueness of several Quranic verses on the destruction of Sodom cannot lead to the conclusion that the city was destroyed because of homosexuals.

Thus, the traditionalist and revisionist approaches to Islam's stance on leave us with a panorama of the ideological perspectives that cross this religion. For my purposes, however, it is important to understand why the traditionalist perspective is dominant in Senegalese society? And how does this perspective enhance homophobic violence? The local and international logic around the traditionalist perspective on homosexuality will be described in depth later.

II-4- Homosexuality in Senegal

It is due to the fight against HIV/AIDS that we have seen a sizeable increase in the number of works on the homosexual community in Africa (Broqua 2012). It was in the late 1990s and early 2000s that work began to flourish on homosexuality in Africa, including Francophone Africa (Teunis 1996: 2001; Niang 2002; 2003; Gueboguo 2006; Boulagua 2007). These

works have the advantage of explaining the many meanings of sexuality and gender in Africa. The research on Senegal remains relatively muted. Homosexuality, as we will see in this thesis, is a subject largely left to journalists. The government and international organisations fund surveys to assess the HIV rate in the homosexual population, but the academic world remains very closed about it.

But one of the first scientific texts on the subject in Senegal is Niels Teunis (1996): "Homosexuality in Dakar: Is the bed the heart of a sexual subculture?". In his article Teunis explores the mores of the homosexual community of Dakar in a context of increasing intolerance against homosexuality. It shows that bars are the places par excellence for the socialisation, dating and social development of homosexuality. He observes that, in Dakar, what could be called homosexual culture is born in community spaces shared by homosexuals. It is therefore not surprising that testimonies describe Dakar at the period when the paper has been published as the capital of Senegalese homosexuals. The paper was written when homosexuality was not yet a popular subject although some press articles already spoke of transvestites.

In 2001, Teunis publishes another text entitled "Same-sex sexuality in Africa: A country case study from Senegal". We can already see that here he does not speak of homosexuality but of same-sex sexuality, because there was already a controversy in the academic world about the viability of the use of the term homosexuality to describe same-sex relationships in Africa, despite their existence (Amory 1997). In this article, he defends the thesis of the fluidity of gender and sexual identities. Although he points out that the law does not explicitly condemn homosexuals, he notes that homophobic sentiment is present in Senegalese society. We can already note here that, from Senegal's independence until the end of the year 2000, there are very few academic studies on homosexuality or homophobia in Senegal. This is the case throughout Sub-Saharan-Africa except for the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa (Evans-Pritchard 1970; Moodie 1988).

Among the important studies to be highlighted here, there is one of the first conducted in 2000 by the National Program to fight against AIDS, the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, and the Institute of Environmental Sciences, and the Population Council, which surveyed 250 gay men for the first time. They found that homosexual men were marginalised in intervention mechanisms for people living with HIV/AIDS. The survey also revealed that they live in a very precarious situation.

In 2004, funded by the research agency ANRS (France Research North & South AIDS-HIV Hepatitis), a team of researchers, comprising of Abdoulaye Sidibe Wade, Coumba Toure Kane, Amadou Pape Niang Diallo, Abdou Khoudia Diop, Khady Gueye, Souleymane Mboup, Ibrahima Ndoye, and Emmanuel Lagarde, led the first epidemiological survey in Senegal on a homosexual population of 463 people on behalf of the Centre Population and Development (CEPED) of the University of Paris-Déscartes. The survey revealed that 94.1 percent of respondents say they have sex with women (CEPED 2004). This study shared some of the arguments raised by Teunis a few years prior. The results of this research were published in 2005 in an article entitled: *HIV infection and sexually transmitted infections among men who have sex with men in Senegal*.

In 2007, as part of the ELIHOS project, a new survey was conducted among 500 homosexual men in four cities in Senegal, including the capital, to measure changes in risk taking in relation to HIV. It was then published in 2010 by CEPED: "Evaluating HIV and STI Prevention Interventions for Gay Men in Senegal". The purpose of the survey was to analyse the developments that were taking place since 2004 (the year of the previous survey) and to evaluate the effects of ongoing intervention programs for this population. This survey was carried out on the initiative of the AIDS/AIDS Division of the Institute of Social Hygiene in Dakar, with the full agreement of the Ministry of Health in Senegal. The results of the survey revealed: "that a declared female partner is not necessarily a sexual partner and that the actual sexual partner, wives and prostitutes, are not systematically considered as "female partner"" (CEPED 2010: 76).

The results of this CEPED survey are confirmed by two papers in 2009. One of them entitled: "*About the female partners of men who have sex with men in Senegal*". The survey gives interesting facts about the male homosexual population in Senegal. We learn that female partners of male homosexuals are not always sexual partners (Lamarange 2009). They can be sisters or friends. Moreover, when the female partner is a sexual partner (a *jeeg* or *kooba),* this type of relationship is exercised in the context of marriage, engagement or out of wedlock. These women are informed about the sexual orientation of their male partners. Finally, some homosexual men do not consider women with whom they have sexual relations with as female partners.

Based on the survey conducted in 2007, Joseph Larmarange, Annabel Desgrées du Loû, Catherine Enel and Abdoulaye Wade (2009) emphasised in an important article that

“In the African context, exclusive homosexuality in the year is much rarer. In Senegal, this concerns barely a quarter of men surveyed, even though it is a sampling of convenience that tends to overrepresent exclusive homosexuals. Several factors may explain, at least in part, this high frequency of "permanent bisexuality" among MSM: legal context condemning homosexuality, social discrimination important to homosexuality, very strong social and religious pressure on marriage and marriage. Parenthood, associations and identities still "emerging”.

We can conclude based on this paper that homosexuality in Senegal is primarily bisexual.

In 2010, at the Faculty of Medicine of the Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar, Youssoupha Niang defended a doctoral thesis entitled *Socio-behavioral aspects of male homosexuality in Dakar* in which he seeks to know the degree of assertiveness, as well as the prevalence of depression among men who have sex with men. In a survey conducted in Dakar, he reached the following conclusions: There is a dissociation between the relatively high incomes of Men who have Sex with Men (MSM) and the prevalence of unemployment, which could suggest paid sexual activity. In his sample, he found that the majority of married MSM are monogamous with at least one child, as well as singles who make up the majority. He also suggests that a traumatic experience could be at the root of the observed decline in assertiveness among MSM compared to heterosexuals.

In the 2013 paper, “*Gay men and other men who have sex with men in West Africa: evidence from the field*”, Fatou Maria Drame, Sarah Peitzmeier, Magda Lopes, Marieme Ndawe, Abdoulaye Sowd, Daouda Dioufe, and Stefan Baral (who have also worked on Senegal) recognised the importance of bisexuality among the homosexual population. They observed an evolution in the mechanisms of care of homosexual men and emphasised the importance of section 319 of the criminal law and the role of religious authorities in the construction of stigma and discrimination. The first work on homophobia in Senegal was also published that year.

In 2015, a study entitled "From the heart: sex, money and the making of gay community in Senegal" explores prostitution among gay men. It highlights the fact that gay prostitution is not just about the quest for economic or financial gain. There is in the approach of gays who prostitute themselves a will to validate their well-being and their sexual desire (Ferguson 2015). The same year, Khateb Omar Khatab, defended a Master's thesis at the University Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar entitled *The effects of stigma in the management of STIs/HIV among men who have sex with men*. This work is partly in line with earlier studies in that he

also concludes that stigma and discrimination hinder the support and follow-up of MSM (Khatab 2015).

In 2018, the National Network of Key Populations (RENAPOC) published the results of a study conducted between 2017 and 2018 in Senegal entitled *Survey on the experience and perceptions of MSM aged over 30, in Dakar, Touba and Mbacké 2017-2018*. The study conducted in Dakar and its suburbs, as well as in the cities of Touba and Mbacke concluded that the sexual lives of the study's participants evolve with age. Discretion in relationships is the main concern. Two-thirds of people practiced transactional sex, especially the youngest because of insecurity and the older ones who have difficulty in finding partners. Among married people, sexuality is the subject of a "double life" that is sometimes difficult to manage.

In Senegal, research on homosexuality has mainly focused on men. Female homosexuality is approached incidentally to illustrate the overall context of homophobia. Government and reports of non-governmental organisations that deal with homosexual issues usually give a marginal place to female same-sex sexuality. I have not been able to find any report from the National Commission against AIDS in Senegal which discusses the situation among lesbians. The reports only deal with male homosexuality. One of the Commission's members argues:

"We don't have yet a lesbian study. We don't have a study which shows the level of vulnerability of lesbians to HIV in Senegal. But the MSM (men who have sex with men) associations work with lesbians and often organise meetings with them. Lesbians sometimes work with us and we give them information to protect themselves" (Respondent 26, Dakar, February 3, 2018).

The most recent work on lesbians in Senegal is Loes Oudenhuijsen's (2018) Master's thesis, '*You Have to Know How to Play, Otherwise They Will Catch You,'' Young Women and the Navigation of Same-Sex Intimacies in Contemporary Urban Senegal*, in which she explores the intimacy between women in Senegal in a context of social hostility towards same-sex sexual practices in Senegal. Beyond showing identification processes and sexual categories, this work provides an overview of the survival strategies deployed in consolidating and manufacturing a queer community.

II-5- Homophobia in Senegal

Work on the homosexual population has highlighted the presence of a homophobic feeling in Senegalese society. Although they don't make homophobia a central concern, researchers have shown the negative impact of homophobia on homosexuals' access to HIV/AIDS

treatment or the affirmation of their homosexual identity. If Teunis (2001) already spoke about secrecy as a tool of protection for homosexuals to escape multiple forms of discrimination, it is in Niang's article (2010) that we see a first proper attempt to explain homophobia in Senegal.

In his paper: "Understanding sex between men in Senegal Beyond current linguistic and discursive categories", Cheikh Ibrahima Niang explains the rise of homophobia in Senegal by the change of representations around the status of Goor-jigeen[20] that have gradually emerged in the eyes of society as women lose not only the social role they had but also the relations they kept with women (Niang 2010). This change, according to him, goes back to the emergence from the 1960s of a discourse on moral rigor as an integral part of national values. Goor-jigeen, prostitutes, and unmarried women have emerged as categories that taint national identity (Niang 2010: 122).

In 2008, before Niang's study, an article entitled: "*Senegal: homophobia and Islamic political manipulations*" was published by the African Regional Sexuality Research Center. Written by the journalist Coudou Bop, the paper analyses the role of Muslim leaders in Senegal in manipulating the facts about homosexuality and its construction as a threat. The author emphasises that in a context of economic and social crisis where religion is a benchmark for young people, the instrumentalisation of homosexuality allows religious figures to consolidate their moral and social positions, as well as to negotiate clientelist positions with the political authorities (Bop 2008). It is not trivial that it is a journalist who writes this paper because homosexuality at this time is mainly discussed in the media.

In 2011, eight researchers from different backgrounds conducted a survey in Senegal on the impact of the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices on Senegal's HIV/AIDS prevention campaign. The study was conducted in six regions of Senegal. The findings highlighted that secrecy is one of the major responses to the context of discrimination and stigma. However, it is not only the law that builds the homophobic context but also religion (Poteat & al 2011: 4). Negative publicity around homosexual arrests has three major consequences: it increases surveillance and stigmatisation; increases fear and causes them to hide; and reduces their ability to invest in their treatment (Poteat & al 2011). Therefore, homophobia does not only affect the sexual and social lives of homosexuals, but also their health as it hinders their ability to receive treatment.

[20] Goor-jigeen is the traditional name associated with men who have sex with men in Senegal.

It took two years to get new work on homophobia. One of the most important is Babacar M'Baye's paper entitled: "*The Origins of Senegalese Homophobia: Discourses on Homosexuals and Transgender People in Colonial and Postcolonial Senegal"*. In this text, Babacar M'Baye begins his reflection by demonstrating that the case of Senegal is not an isolated case in Africa, citing the examples of Uganda, Kenya, or Nigeria. He framed the discursive productions of homophobia in Africa around the binary logic of the West and the rest of the world. Homosexuality is described as a marker of a cultural neocolonialism and symbol of the collapse of Western societies (M'Baye 2013: 114-116). But the originality of this article lies in the fact that it is the first to establish a correlation between French colonisation and homophobia in postcolonial Senegal.

Homophobia is viewed as an invention of colonisation in Africa (Bertolt 2019), but Babacar M'Baye's article does not go deeply into other factors that contribute to crystallising hatred against homosexuals in Senegalese society, such as religion, the media or political struggles. This is what Ndeye Gning tried to do in his paper: "Controversy Analysis: Discourse on Homosexuality in Public Space in Senegal" (2013). Before continuing, it is important to note that Mbaye and Gning's papers do not deal with the dynamics and contexts that produce discourses, but simply with discourses themselves. The problem with this approach, however, is that a discourse is not an ex-nihilo product. It is always the consequence or the resultant of a set of political, social, historical, economic, or cultural contingencies.

Ndèye Gning builds his analysis from two cases that made the news in Senegal between 2008 and 2009: the case of the gay marriage of Petit-Mbao in February 2008 and the arrests of nine members of AIDES-Senegal a defence organisation for homosexual rights. Through interviews with political actors and the exploitation of the media treatment of these cases, the social illegitimacy of homosexuality, beyond its condemnation by the criminal law, is based on a conception of homosexuality as a practice and Western sexual orientation (Gning 2013). In her analysis, she does not fail to stress the importance of religion and the discourse of religious leaders in the construction of the social illegitimacy of homosexuality. Therefore, religious arguments are taken up in the political domain for justifying state homophobia. However, beyond these aspects, the article also places homophobia in Senegal in three registers. First, the discourse on homosexuality is also a crisis of discourse. Homosexuality is a scapegoat for the social and economic transformations of Senegalese society. Subsequently, criticism of homosexuality is a disguised form of denunciation of occult practices in power. Finally, homosexuality is seen in a context of unemployment and underemployment as a

means for young people to have access to certain resources. Homosexuality therefore appears as a survival strategy (Gning 2013: 115).

This paper completes a previous paper published by Ndèye Gning entitled: "*The reasons for the social illegitimacy of homosexuality in Senegal*". In this text published the same year as the previous one, it places the problem posed by homosexuality in the register of the hetero-normative character of Senegalese society (Gning 2013). Gender roles between men and women are instituted from childhood and reinforced by religion. Goor-jigeen has gradually emerged as a category that blurs the separation of gender identities strongly rooted in society. She emphasises in this regard that "heterosexuality remains the only recognized and legal sexual norm in Senegal. As a result, male and female homosexuality is relegated to sexual deviance, or "unnatural act" (Gning 2013: 6). Religion, on the other hand, provides the moral arguments for rejecting homosexuality. Illegitimacy is therefore combined in a mixture of legality and spirituality."

The year 2013 can therefore be considered the founding moment of research on homophobia in Senegal. The works of Babacar M'Baye and Ndeye Gning have the advantage of suggesting a multitude of ways to understand stigma and discrimination against homosexuals. This combined research ranges from colonisation to the media, religion, and political issues. They also make it possible, in a comparative perspective, to link the Senegalese context to other African contexts, notably the non-African character of homosexuality and the instrumentalisation of homophobia by a wide range of actors. But none of this research provides a global overview of the roots of homophobia in Senegalese society, the mutations of the discourse around homophobia and how contemporary forms of homophobia are expressed in Senegalese society. Beyond the fact that female homophobia, which has differentiating features with respect to male homophobia, is absent, homophobic violence is not studied in this work. Hence the importance of building a long-term analysis that is at the heart of my research.

Aminata Cecile Mbaye's book, *Discourse on homosexuality in Senegal: the analysis of a representational struggle",* was published in 2018. In this work adapted from her doctoral dissertation thesis, the author attempts to trace a historicity of the evolution of representations of homosexuality in Senegalese society. In particular, the evolution of the role and perception of Goor-Jigeen. To this end, it examines academic, media, religious, artistic, and activist discourses. In another paper, based on fieldwork research and several interviews conducted in the cities of Dakar, Thies and Mbour, Aminata (2018) explores the rise of new types of

political demands and discourses related to homosexuality in Senegal. The paper analyses the condemnation of homosexuality by some Senegalese religious groups, such as the religious association Djamra/Jamra. She argues that this condemnation of same-sex intimacy is motivated by an attempt to regenerate religious and cultural values. Second, it focuses on the political claims and participatory politics of gay and lesbian Senegalese citizens in this hostile environment. In a more recent paper, Mbaye (2021) examines media representations of same-sex sexuality in Senegal, and analyses how same-sex sexuality has been covered in a selection of Senegalese newspapers since the early 2000s. Drawing on Stuart Hall's perspective on the role of mass media and ideology and the theory of critical discourse A analysis, this article describes how discourses produced by selected Senegalese newspapers generate and circulate ideological meanings.

I cannot finish this part without mentioning some essential reports on homophobia in Senegal. The first report was produced in 2010 by the international organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) entitled: *Fear for his life. Violence against gay men and perceived as such in Senegal*. It follows the "gay marriage" case of February 2008 and the arrest of nine homosexuals in December 2008 who will be imprisoned in 2009. This report tells the story of the police violence and brutality, stigmatisation and social rejection that gays face in Senegal. One of the specificities of this report is that it shows that these cases, which are considered the instigating events for the eruption of homosexuality as a topic of public debate in Senegal, were poorly handled by the media and weaponised by religious actors (HRW 2010).

In 2013, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada released a report compiling information about gays and lesbians in Senegal. The report is titled *Information on the situation of sexual minorities in Senegal, including societal attitudes, and information on whether different treatment is reserved for lesbians as opposed to gays; information on state protection.* In 2014, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) publish his report titled *Current situation of homosexual people*. The interest of these two reports is that they provide information on the ways in which homophobia is experienced in the Senegalese society.

Finally, there is a study conducted by the Panos Institute West Africa around the project: *Voices and avenues against homophobia in Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Senegal*. The study conducted in Senegal, entitled "Images and voices of sexual minorities in the media in Senegal", covers 108 newspaper articles from the Senegalese press, *Le Soleil, Walfadjri, L'Observateur, Le Populaire* and the online media *Dakaractu.com* between 2008 and 2016.

Beyond the fact that the media represented homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice, imported and Western, the study highlights that homosexuality is a marginal subject, treated with stereotypes and the media serve as a relay for discourses that devalue and stigmatise homosexuals (Camara 2017).

At the end of this review of scientific productions on homophobia in Senegal two things are clear: First, it is a recent topic of academic research that goes back less than a decade. Second, except for the reports of international organisations, most of the work relates to the study of discourses. To date, there is no work on the historical and structural construction of homophobia in Senegalese society.

II-6 - Critical perspective on colonisation and gender

The coloniality of gender offers an analytical framework for challenging the categories setting the norms of sexuality and gender in former colonies, whose origins goes back to colonisation. The new social hierarchies introduced by colonisation seem to have destroyed the systems of solidarity and complementarity that existed in so-called "primitive" societies before the European conquest. We can already see the roots of heterosexism[21] in Africa with the fixation on the female body as the main tool of satisfaction of desire and sexual pleasure and a tool for the affirmation of masculinity and virility. In this institutionalisation of a heterosexual imaginary, it becomes difficult for homosexuals to occupy a place in these societies.

But one of the weaknesses of the coloniality of the gender perspective lies on that point. Whereas this approach lays solid foundations for a historicisation of male domination in Africa, it is silent about homosexuality. However, the fact that homosexuality continues to be widely perceived as a Western import sufficiently illustrates the importance of the colonial encounter in contemporary representations of sexuality in Africa. As we have seen in the former chapter, before the arrival of European settlers, same-sex relations have been recognised in several African societies (Hoad 2007). The binary conception of sexuality was

[21] Heterosexism is the assumption that heterosexuality is the social and cultural norm as well as the prejudiced belief that heterosexuals, or "straight" people, are socially and culturally superior to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people. This belief has the consequence of making invisible the plural forms of sexuality in a society and to legitimize the violence against the other sexual minorities in the name of the conservation of the heterosexual privilege.

practically non-existent. The prohibition of homosexuality stemmed from a desire to normalise heterosexuality. Homosexuality has become an analytical reality, visible and permanent (Foucault 1976: 60). We can therefore see homosexuality as a category rather than as a colonial invention. But the Eurocentric and anti-homosexual postcolonial discourse replicates the colonial paradigm on sexuality, which has made invisible relations between people of the same sex and institutionalised a binary conception of sexuality.

Oyewumi Oyeronke is engaged in this deconstruction of categories. The woman category according to her would be a colonial invention (Oyeronke 1997). Asserting that colonisation in Africa, although violent, has a different impact on men and women, she explains this difference mainly by the fact that the colonisers were white men. The colonial state is therefore, first, a patriarchal state, despite the presence in the colonies of white women who, although oppressed, enjoyed the privilege of the race. Nonetheless, power and authority were exclusively concentrated in hands of white men (Bertolt 2018).

Lugones' approach to coloniality (2010) is inspired by Oyeronke's work, which highlights the fact that gender does not exist in some traditional African societies, especially the Yoruba society before colonisation. The binary conception of gender identities was introduced by the European settler. Oyeronke emphasises that gender has become important in Yoruba studies of Yoruba life because the past and present of Yoruba society has been translated into English to fit the Western pattern of body-reasoning (Oyeronke 1997: 30). Yoruba society was guided by other principles, such as seniority, which were the mechanisms for exercising authority and power.

For Oyeronke (1997: 31), "researchers always find gender when they look for it". Before specifying: "The usual gloss of the Yoruba categories *obinrin* and *okunrin* as" female / woman "and male / man," respectively, is a mistranslation. These categories are neither binary nor hierarchical "(1997: 32-33). The prefixes *obin* and *okun* specify a variety of anatomy. Oyewumi translates the prefixes as referring to the anatomical male and anatomical female, shortened as anamal and anafemal. It is important to note that these categories are not understood as a binary opposition (Lugones 2007). This perspective poses the problem of signs and meanings given to categories. The eyes through which we observe a society build our representations. Thus, looking with a Eurocentric gaze that promotes a binary conception of gender identities, colonial anthropologists have apprehended Yoruba society from the male

and female categories, assigning them roles that in their eyes seemed similar to those occupied by women in European society. As a result, Oyeronke thinks that the category of woman in Africa is a colonial manufacture.

Oyeronke sums up his thought in these terms:

"The very process by which females have been categorized and reduced to women made ineligible for leadership roles. The emergence of women as an identifiable category, defined by their anatomy and subordinated to men in all situations, resulted, in part, from the imposition of a patriarchal colonial state. For females, colonization was a twofold process of racial inferiorization and gender subordination. The creation of “women” has a role in the colonial state. It is not surprising, therefore, that it was unthinkable for the colonial government to recognize female leaders among the colonized, such as the Yoruba (...) The transformation of state power to male-gender power is accomplished by the exclusion of women from state structures. This was in sharp contrast to Yoruba state organization, in which power was not gender-determined " (Oyeronke 1997: 124-125).

This situation also highlights the complexity of the use of concepts imported from Western societies and their adaptation in the societies of the South without considering social and anthropological realities. This conceptual ambiguity, which stems from epistemic coloniality, reinforces the controversy around homosexuality as a Western import in Africa. Amadiume (1987: 7) argues that female-to-female marriage among the Nnobi Igbo should not be confused with lesbianism, arguing instead that support and cooperation between women, "do not imply lesbian sexual practice"

It is important here, to note that Oyeronke’s work can’t be applied to the entire African continent, whose cultural realities are manifold. Even within Yoruba society, Segato (2011), even though she recognises that the traditional gender system is more complex than the one we have today, highlights the existence of gender differences albeit less oppressive than those imposed by European colonisation. But she partially joins Oyeronke in pointing out that Yoruba patriarchy has been strengthened under colonisation, a hierarchical system of domination that persists today.

Furthermore, one of the critics of Lugone’s approach is that by making race the key tool in the analysis of colonial dynamics, the concept of coloniality in Africa is invisible to other influences that were part of processes of subjectivation and met colonial ideology in several points to eventually allow for the building of new societies, such as Islam. The adoption of

Islam by pre-colonial African societies before colonisation will upset the gender balance and lay the groundwork for a strengthening of male dominance and heterosexism by the colonial enterprise in Africa. Furthermore, the coloniality of gender has little emphasis on the processes of appropriation and instrumentalisation of sexual and gender norms introduced by colonisation in postcolonial societies. I will try to fill those gaps in this study.

Still, these criticisms do not make it possible to deny the relevance of this theoretical paradigm in a long-term analysis of sexual dynamics and, more specifically, of the homosexual issue in Africa. The coloniality of gender allows us to grasp the continuity of gender relations and the representation of sexuality in Africa. The contemporary binary conception of sex and the hierarchy of gender relations could be perceived as an extension of Eurocentric thought. The contestation of the use of the term postcolonial makes sense here and would simply be a myth (Grosfoguel 2007: 219). This is why Gayatri Chakravorti prefers the use of the term "neo colonized post-colonial world" to better capture the extension of the capitalist system of power and domination inherited from the 15th century (Spivak 1990: 166).

CONCLUSION

At the end of this overview of the research on homosexuality and homophobia in Africa in general and Senegal in particular, it appears at first that Senegalese homophobia is a relatively recent subject in the literature. However, unlike Senegal, in other countries more aspects have been studied. Notably the political and cultural issues or the media's place in the construction of homophobic violence. In other African countries, it emerged that homophobic violence is part of a strategy to assert sovereignty and national identity. I will try to examine whether this is true in Senegal as well. It was necessary in this chapter to return to the literature on the existence of same-sex sexual practices in Africa in order to clarify the debate around homosexuality as an un-African sexual practice. With the exception of Mbaye's work which attempts to establish a link between colonialism and homophobia in Senegal, the historicity of the construction of a homophobic context has not been at the heart of current studies on homophobia in Senegal or the rest of Africa. Works on homophobia are more descriptive of the forms of violence rather than analyses of the mechanisms of production of this violence. Hence the specificity of this research which is part of a double movement. The first step is to show the impact of colonialism on gender identities in Africa. This aspect will be analysed in the fourth chapter which examines the colonial social construction of gender and forms of

mimicry in postcolonial Senegalese criminal law. In the second step, I describe the roles of moral entrepreneurs in the demonisation of homosexuals to keep an old clientelist alliance between politicians and religious figures. How Senegalese postcolonial institutions shape gender and sexuality into a national project is examined in Chapter 6. Finally, I discuss the consequence of globalisation and how resistance to Gay International is tied to a broader resistance to Western hegemony.

CHAPTER III – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This chapter aims to show how I collected the data for this study. I conducted my fieldwork in Dakar, the capital of Senegal, one of the windows into West Africa and French-speaking Africa. According to statistics from the National Agency for Statistics and Demography (NASD), the number of inhabitants of the region of Dakar is estimated at 3,732,284 (NASD 2019). The city of Dakar has nearly 1.5 million inhabitants and is the most populous city in Senegal. It is also a cosmopolitan agglomeration where nearly 98 percent of the country's institutions, most local LGBT rights organisations and non-governmental organisations that advocate for the protection of gay rights are concentrated. It is also in Dakar that all the diplomatic representations and international institutions are located; 95 percent of the Senegalese media is based in Dakar. The city is therefore the nerve centre of Senegalese society and the place par excellence to study homophobic violence in Senegal.

III- 1) Data collection

This research is built on a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis. According to Yin, "qualitative research involves studying the meaning of people's lives in real world conditions, and has the ability to represent the views and perspectives of participants in a study" (Yin 2011: 8). In addition, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) argue that "the aim and function of qualitative inquiry is to understand the meaning of describing the inherent or specific characteristics of social or human experience". Moreover, Silverman indicates that, "if you are concerned with exploring people's life histories or everyday behavior, then qualitative methods may be favored" (Silverman 2013: 13).

Several qualitative techniques or approaches have been mobilised in this research. They "illuminate previously unexamined or misunderstood experiences" and "increase the probability of obtaining scientific credibility and research utility" (Reinharz 1992: 197). I used mixed multiple methods – a design enabling “triangulation” – to generate coherence in research and obtaining validation of the results (Moran-Ellis & al. 2006: 47-50; Richardson 2000: 934).

III-1-a) Data Collection Sequencing Strategy

I employed a sequencing strategy for executing my data collection (Mason 2002). By a sequencing strategy, I mean that I staggered my data collection so that I only gathered information relevant to the issue of homosexuality and homophobia. I gathered and analysed archives of newspaper and documents, conducted and analysed in-depth qualitative interviews.

I took three research trips to Senegal. A first stay from September 3, 2017, to January 31, 2018; a second from April 28, 2018, to July 3, 2018; and a final stay from September 14, 2018 to January 12, 2019. These different trips were opportunities to collect my data and to complete some aspects of my fieldwork that needed deepening. When I arrived in Dakar on September 3, 2017, I took two weeks to settle down, to get to know the research field, identify the priority contacts to be established, set up a work schedule, and assess the risks associated with my security. It was only after all these prerequisites that I started the data collection.

What is striking when you attempt to conduct fieldwork on the issue of homosexuality in Senegal are people's violent reactions to the topic and their contempt for homosexuals. I was confronted with this situation as soon as I arrived in Dakar. To the most open people willing to listen to me, my object of study already seemed strange. At that moment, I quickly realised that I had to be both cautious and methodical. Cautious because I should not attract attention, and methodical in collecting data because that was the only way I would make any progress on my research. My initial problem was that there was no single group of individuals who constituted the target population of my study and who could therefore be geolocated. Homophobia is a social phenomenon that affects all spheres of society.

Thus, I started by identifying the places where I could have access to the media and institutional archives. Media archives were essential considering that I had already surmised that the subject was covered in the local press and constituted the main space where I could gather empirical data. By institutional archive I am referring here to the archives from the Senegalese parliament around the debates on the penal code and the family code. This period covers the years 1965-1972. They were useful to understand legal developments and motivations around the criminalisation of homophobia. Subsequently, I finalised the identification of the categories that I designate here as "experts" on the subject. These include journalists, diplomats, academics, political and religious actors, leaders of LGBT

organisations, human rights defenders, and lawyers whom I interviewed. In total, I interviewed 33 respondents.

Each interview was conducted in French and lasted a minimum of 35 minutes and at most two hours. The choice of interviewees depended on their professional experience or on the issue. For example, despite all my attempts to meet with lawyers who have defended homosexuals, I have been able to meet with lawyers specialising in family law who have followed certain cases concerning homosexuals. Just as I have not been able to meet with members of the government, I have spoken with former ministers from previous governments. Interviews took place in several places depending on the availability of the interlocutors. Often in their offices, homes or in restaurants.

III-1-b) Newspaper archives

It was during the pre-collection period that I started my online research on media in Senegal. I compiled articles that addressed homophobia and to a certain extent homosexuality in Senegal. In 2017, the issue of homosexuality in Senegal was already provoking many debates at the national and international level. It was therefore important for me to familiarise myself with the debates on homophobic violence in Senegal and the debates surrounding the issue in a society with historical and cultural complexities. I limited my online search of newspaper articles to those published between 2008 and 2009. I had in mind the two cases that had already gained international attention: the case of gay marriage in February 2008 and the case of the nine homosexuals arrested between December 2008 and January 2009. My primary online Senegalese mainstream news sources were *Seneweb* and *Dakaractu*. When I searched online for content on homophobia in Senegal, I entered keywords, such as homosexuality, lesbian, gay, homophobia and sometimes I added a date 2008 or 2009 into sources' search engines.

When I entered the field, I quickly understood the limitations of media data collected online. I had collected 12 articles online over the period of 2008-2009. I had the feeling that the homosexual issue was a recurring topic in the news. But with my observations I realised that homosexuality is not a chronic problem but a punctual one. Newspapers talked about it when people were arrested or when they faced violence. The legal aspect of the issue is much more emphasised than the religious or the political aspect, although the three can sometimes become entangled. Subsequently, I discovered that the recent history of Senegal had been punctuated by several other scandals which were accompanied by homophobic waves beyond

those of 2008 and 2009. I therefore went to the Senegalese press house to consult the newspaper archives. I had access to these newspapers:

- ***Le Soleil*** is the oldest daily in the country, created in 1970. It takes an editorial positioning close to institutions and is considered the official press. It is the heir of *Paris-Dakar*, created by the French press man Charles de Breteuil in 1933. Initially a weekly, *Paris-Dakar* became the first daily newspaper in Black Africa in 1936. During the independence of Senegal in 1960, the newspaper changed its name to *Dakar - Matin*, then *Le Soleil* on May 20, 1970. In the context of this research, this government press is decisive because it reports on official information on the subject. It is the government's primary communication voice and can help elucidate the government's position on matters concerning homosexuals.

- ***Walfajiri* or *Walf*** is one of the oldest private newspapers in Senegal but also one of the most important. It is considered a precursor to the private press. It was founded by businessman Sidy Lamine Niasse who also comes from a large Muslim religious family in the country. Moreover, Lamine Niasse has never hidden his close ties to Arab countries and Islamic Republic of Iran. This is why he is considered an Arabist intellectual. Created in 1983, it was in the early 1990s that it became a daily newspaper. In this research, *Walfajiri* is interesting because its proximity to religious circles in Senegal makes this newspaper the spokesperson for Islamic movements in Senegal. It is therefore a medium that can help clarify the position of religious figures on the homosexual issue.

- ***L'Observateur*** is part of Groupe Futurs Médias (GFM), whose owner is internationally renowned artist Youssou N'Dour, close to the current President of Senegal, Macky Sall. This group, which was created in 2003, is made up of a daily newspaper, *L'Observateur* (or *L'Obs*), a radio station, Radio Futurs Médias (RFM), a television channel, Télé Futurs Médias (TFM) and a website. *L'Observateur*, a private newspaper, is considered the biggest print outlet in Senegal with 90,000 copies per day. *L'Observateur* officially displays a neutral position contrary to *Le Soleil* or *Walf*. Therefore, the treatment of information in this medium would be limited mainly to the restitution of facts. But this is not always the case as when it comes to the homosexual issue, editorial treatment tends to exaggerate and condemn homosexuality.

- ***Le Quotidien*** Launched in 2003 by a team from the Pan-African journalism school in Dakar, stands out for its surveys and long reports. Its editorial line is very critical of President Abdoulaye Wade, which has led to several trials and the arrest of some of its journalists. *Le Quotidien* was created by Madiam Bal Diagne, a former journalist from the Walfadjiri group. He claims a neutral position and an affiliation to no political party. However, the treatment of information on the homosexual issue in this newspaper reflects the closeness of its journalists to religious influences.

- ***Le Populaire*** **(Pop)** which, in its first edition in 1999, broke with Senegalese journalistic practice. In fact, the mainstream newspapers very rarely covered news items related to sex. The themes that have given these newspapers the success they are credited with are generally politics and economics. Until recently, subjects related to sex were considered taboo and occupied a marginal place in the treatment of information. *Le Populaire* is therefore one of the newspapers that have made homosexuality their main business. In fact, it went from printing 3,000 copies to 32,000 in only a few years.

- ***L'AS,*** which also claims to be neutral in relation to the political game, is a daily newspaper that gives more importance to sport. However, it also deals with social and political facts according to the news. Homosexuality is therefore one of the issues that it often addresses.

I was able to detect several cases that I did not know before starting my fieldwork, but which had been widely commented on by the Senegalese press. For example, the case of "Manang Kasse" baptised the most famous homosexual of Senegal between 2002 and 2003, or the cases of the journalist Tamsir Jupiter in 2012 and 2016. There are also cases that have been commented nationally and internationally, such as the gay marriage case of February 2008; the case of the nine homosexuals of December 2008 and January 2009; the 2012 Grand-Yoff lesbian affair and the 2016 Wally Seck affair.

I looked for all media pieces which touched on the question of homosexuality: press articles on homophobic violence, interviews, trials, reactions and comments, and LGBT rights. In the end, I was able to collect 217 articles related to the issue of homosexuality. My data collection shows that homosexual articles have appeared in newspapers in Senegal since the 1980s. But only 12 percent of the articles I collected were written before 2008. About 88 percent of the articles analysed were between the period 2008 and 2016.

Given their standing in the Senegalese mediascape, the six media sources that are cited in this work provide an overview of the trends shaping public discourses on homosexuality and homophobia. On the one hand, we have the institutional press which reports on State discourse and, on the other hand, the private press which is split into sub-categories: the press with ties to religious figures, the so-called neutral newspapers supposed to report the facts and the people's press which privileges the sensational.

TABLE 1: NEWSPAPERS AND NUMBER OF ARTICLES COLLECTED

	Date of creation	**Number of articles**
Le Soleil (national; Institutional)	1970	12
Walfadjiri (national; Independent)	1983	39
L'Observateur (national; Independent)	2003	37
Le Quotidien (national; Independent)	2003	54
Le Populaire (national; Independent)	1999	51
L'AS (national; Independent)		24
Total		**217**

Beyond media archives, I did some work in the National archives to understand two things: the status of homosexuality during the French colonial period and the roots of the law that criminalises same-sex practices. I started with the archives of the Senegalese National Assembly and went through the debates on the elaboration of a penal code in 1965 and the family law in 1972. It was necessary to understand the motivations behind the introduction of the article that outlawed same-sex sexual practices. I collected nearly 300 pages of documents related to the Criminal law of 1965, the Family law of 1972 and all the parliamentary debates that took place in the Senegalese National Assembly for the adoption of these two texts. Parliamentary debates over the adoption of the criminal law and the family law were fundamental for at least two reasons. First, they allow us to understand the process of forming the legal framework around gender relations in postcolonial Senegal. From there it was possible to apprehend the appropriation and adaptation of the old colonial laws by the newly independent state. The second reason is that parliamentary debates allow us to understand the

thinking of part of the political elite around sexuality and gender. It helps in a long-term approach to detect mutations, evolutions, or regressions around representations of sexuality and gender.

When the research progressed, and I started the analysis of the first data, I reckoned that the dynamics surrounding homosexuality during the French colonial period should also be examined. I tried in vain to obtain references to same-sex sexual practices from the National Archives of Senegal. Some references related to Europeans but none to Africans or Senegalese, even though the criminalisation of homosexuality was reintroduced into the French penal code before the independence of Senegal. In general, during French colonisation and even during the discussions on the elaboration of the criminal law, the term homosexuality is absent from the lexicon. This observation is interesting because it informed me that homosexuality as a sexual identity and homosexuals as a social category are relatively new phenomena in Senegalese society.

III-1-c) Semi-structured interviews

Press articles and national archives were not enough to understand homophobia in Senegal. The media content highlighted several issues that revolve around homophobia: religion, gender, cultural and traditional values, political issues, poverty, etc. It was therefore necessary to conduct interviews with actors that are connected to the issue of homosexuality in Senegal. The main selection criterion was based, first, on their expertise on the subject. It was necessary to choose actors connected to the problem of homosexuality or even people with knowledge on the subject as a result of their research. Experience with the homosexual community was a second criterion: I looked for respondents in contact with the homosexual population and who could therefore give an account of their daily life. Then, there are actors involved in the making of discourses and representations around homosexuality. Finally, I approached respondents who work in the accompaniment of homosexuals in order to identify the difficulties they face in a context of criminalisation.

I conducted a total of 33 interviews in French. The interviews were anonymised to ensure the safety of the respondents. Here I have favoured semi-structured interviews. Based on my previous research, several themes formed the interview guide: gender relations, the education of boys and girls, the family law, criminal law, homophobic violence, the importance of religion or the instrumentalisation of homosexuality, to name but a few. These different themes made it possible to deepen the collection of data on specific aspects while at the same

time obtaining data from certain interlocutors that I was not able to find elsewhere. These were flexible interviews which could also be adapted to the difficulties I faced with some respondents. The advantage of the semi-structured interview is that it ultimately allows you to bring out ideas that are cut across all the categories discussed.

I started by looking for respondents that worked with human rights organisations. When it comes to homophobia in Africa and more specifically in Senegal, human rights organisations are on the front lines. They are regularly the first to denounce homophobic violence, petition the authorities to calm tensions around homosexuality and they are in contact with people who are victims of homophobic violence. These three levels of intervention make them key actors in discussing homophobia in Senegal because they have cross-sectional data on the subject.

I met with members of the two main civil society organisations involved in the defence and protection of homosexuals: Amnesty International and the African Meeting for the Promotion of Human Rights (RADDHO). I conducted the interview in a Hotel in Dakar for one hour and 50 minutes with the contact point of Amnesty International in Senegal on the issue of homosexuality. We discussed the political, social, cultural, religious and even economic context in which homophobia unfolds in Senegal. We also discussed the work of human rights organisations, including the difficulties they encounter when fighting for the rights of homosexuals in Senegal as well as the strategies the latter deploy to circumvent social and state repression.

The African Meeting for the Promotion of Human Rights (RADDHO) is one of the main international organisations in West Africa and Senegal that regularly advocate for gay rights. This organisation helps homosexual victims of violence in need of legal support. We talked for one hour and 10 minutes about the daily violence that homosexuals face, the support they receive, the challenges the organisation encounter in the field of homosexuality, as well as the general context in Senegal. The RADDHO representative did not hide the difficulties they face themselves as Senegalese working on the subject, mentioning that the victims of homophobic violence had a lot of suspicion towards them because of the slowness of the procedures.

If the interviews with Amnesty International and RADDHO provided a more detached understanding of the problem, I then made the choice to meet officials of the Senegalese Committee for Human Rights (SCHR), a state agency. I met two sociologists. What is striking

is that I had many problems discussing the issue of homosexuality with the first person I interviewed. Despite being fully informed on the matter, in an interview that lasted 35 minutes, she refused to answer questions on homosexuality in the name of religious values. I had the feeling that she was struck by both fear and embarrassment. Still, she felt very comfortable with questions relating to representations of the place of men and women in Senegalese society. With the second sociologist, meanwhile, I had a more interesting interview that lasted 56 minutes and felt like a prolongation of those I had with Amnesty International and RADDHO. The latter did not even fail to point out sometimes their opposition to the government on the subject, but also the obstacles they face, including within the government.

We cannot approach homophobia without looking at gender relations. Hence the importance of discussing the subject with an expert on the issue. For this purpose, I met a Senegalese sociologist who is the director of the AFARD (Association of African Women for Development Research) and a member of the Senegalese Committee for Human Rights (SCHR). Our interview latest one hour and 20 minutes. We discussed gender representations in Senegalese society, the importance of traditions and cultures in the constructions of gender identities, including gender roles. But she was also reluctant to delve into the issue of homosexuality. She repeatedly said that she did not want to talk about homophobia, despite the fact that she was aware of the problem and was in contact with female victims of homophobic violence. We can already see here the complexity of such a subject in the Senegalese environment where certain researchers who enjoy the intellectual means and the academic freedom to discuss homosexuality refuse to broach the subject.

Regarding civil servants, I spoke with the programme Director of the National Council of Fight against HIV/AIDS of Senegal, an organisation that is fully engaged in supporting the treatment of homosexuals against HIV/AIDS. The homosexual population is one of the main targets of HIV programs in Africa. Those who intervene at this level are therefore regularly in contact with homosexuals with whom they work to reduce the rate of seropositivity, which is regularly higher among homosexuals than the rest of the population. These actors are important to explain the efforts of the State in terms of protection of this vulnerable population. Thus, for one hour and 36 minutes, we discussed the distribution of the homosexual population in Senegal, the social and economic condition of homosexuals, the relationship between homosexuals and the state, the efforts of the state to protect this population but also the problems that this state agency faces.

Regrettably, despite all the formal steps taken by the Ministry of Justice and the security forces, I was unable to officially meet actors who have been authorised to discuss homophobia in Senegal. The information I acquired from security forces was mainly obtained in informal settings. It was to overcome this problem that I met two lawyers regularly in contact with LGBT associations in connection with the trials of homosexuals in the courts. For one hour and ten minutes and one hour and 40 minutes, respectively, we discussed how the criminal justice system deals with the homosexual issue, the conditions of the arrests, the treatment at the police station, as well as the trials in the courts. I did not fail to discuss with them the issue of legal arrangements.

The lawyers' contact details were given to me by officials of the LGBT associations that I met. They are key actors in understanding the issue of homosexuality and homophobia in Senegal. LGBT associations, although not officially recognised as such by the public authorities, are nevertheless at the centre of the fight against homophobia. They constitute the first line of protection for homosexuals who, not being able to complain directly to the security forces on problems relating to their sexual identity, appeal to LGBT associations for help. The latter can offer legal, psychological and social assistance, especially for individuals who are expelled from their home by their families because of their sexual orientation and are often in need of temporary accommodation.

I had five interviews with LGBT associations. I conducted one interview in an office with one member of the National Network of Key Populations of Senegal (RENAPOC) and two members of PAC-DH. An interview with a member of PAC-DH was in a restaurant. Another interview was in an office with an official from Action for Human Rights and Friendship (ADHA). In addition, there was an interview with the association SOURIRES DE FEMMES, the main association that brings together lesbians from Senegal but also helps gay men. For example, I observed that the day of my interview, two gay men were present.

Each interview was approximately one hour and 30 minutes. It was important to understand their experience of homophobic violence, as well as the role of the state, religion, traditions and the impact of homophobia on the victims. We also discussed the strategies they deploy daily to protect homosexuals in a hostile environment, but also the relationships they maintain with institutions. Arranging these interviews was not easy. These officials were initially suspicious. I called sometimes, many times to set a rendezvous, even when I had a recommendation.

I already knew from my arrival in Senegal that one of the most important categories of my work would be journalists, given the role they played in other countries like Cameroon in the making of homophobic sentiment. The media were key actors in this research insofar as the daily work of fact-gathering of journalists is useful in the constitution of the analytical material. But the work of journalists is not limited to collecting facts. The way in which the facts are reproduced and presented can make it possible to determine the logics and discursive practices around a problem. The media also serve as a relay for the dominant discourse in a society. Furthermore, because journalists are actors in society, their work can be influenced by their own representations of gender issues. Thus, speaking with journalists was necessary to understand the fabrication of information around homosexuality in Senegal and to detect the influences of institutions on the media.

I did one interview in an office with a journalist of the Senegalese Press Agency (SPA), a governmental media agency. The other interviews took place in public spaces with a journalist working for the government newspaper, a Senegalese journalist working for a pan-African media outlet, an online media journalist, a private radio journalist and a journalist of a private newspaper. All four interviews lasted about one hour and 10 minutes. The longest interview was with the Senegalese journalist working for a pan-African media outlet. I note here that the online media journalist had such difficulties talking about homosexuality in Senegal that, after our interview, he called me back and told me that he wanted me to throw out his interview. It was after having guaranteed him all the confidentiality and anonymity that he resolved to accept the use of his interview for this thesis.

I also met two politicians. It was important because homosexuality is not only a sexual issue but also a political issue. With the international politicisation of gender identities, several countries in Africa are facing pressure from Western governments to decriminalise homosexuality. How is the subject perceived by the political class? How is it debated within political parties? Within government? Which camps clash? How are the state and the political class dealing with international pressure? What are the factors that influence the position of political actors on the subject? Many questions that required meeting with political actors. So, for nearly 2 hours, I spoke with two prominent actors in the Senegalese political class. A Senegalese diplomat, former minister in the government of the former President of the Republic of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade and close to the current President of Senegal, Macky Sall and the former chief of staff of Abdoulaye Wade and member of the Senegalese parliament and currently opposed to Macky Sall. The opponent of Macky Sall during the

interview did not hesitate to regularly accuse me of being an agent of the European Union for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Africa.

I tried for several weeks in vain to get in touch with religious leaders, also called marabouts. Whatever the continent, religion occupies an important place in homophobic discourse. In Senegal, it is regularly put forward as the main justification for homophobic beliefs. Addressing the link between Islam and homosexuality in a country like Senegal is necessary. To fill this gap, I met with the director of the Islamic NGO JAMRA in his office where we talked for one hour and 30 minutes. JAMRA is the main Islamic organisation in Senegal campaigning against homosexuality. We discussed the place of Islam in Senegal, the role of marabouts, the link between Islam and homophobia. Including the influence of the marabout on politics. But, while I was unable to meet the marabouts, I was able to read the position of many of them on homosexuality in the media archives.

I also met two diplomats at their offices. One from the European Union Commission in Dakar and one from Dutch embassy. These two diplomatic representations are important because they put pressure on the Senegalese Government to improve their treatment of homosexuals. In addition, they provide a lot of funding to LGBT associations in Senegal to build their capacities and improve support for homosexuals. The interviews were conducted in French and latest 45 minutes each. Within the European Union group in Senegal responsibilities are distributed. Thus, it is the Dutch embassy in Dakar that focused mainly on the issue of homosexuality with Senegalese authorities.

What I think is important to emphasise here is the fact that, although I do not explicitly mention interviews with homosexuals, I did speak informally with two homosexuals that I met at RENAPOC. We discussed their living conditions and the daily violence they face. In addition, there are testimonies from people accused of being homosexual and the violence they face that I have been able to collect through the media. I cannot fail to mention that, in earlier research conducted in Senegal, I had already spoken to a dozen homosexuals. This analytical material also laid the foundations for a first mapping of the problems of homophobia in Senegal. Finally, all the leaders of LGBT associations with whom I spoke are homosexuals, but only one was a lesbian. I also chose seven young heterosexuals under 35 to discuss their perception of gender and homosexuality. These young people came from disadvantaged and unemployed neighbourhoods. Three women and four men. The interviews

lasted about 30 minutes and focused on the place of men and women in society, homosexuality, the role of religion and the rights of homosexuals.

These different interviews allowed me to collect data from different professional and social perspectives. Thus, I could detect between these different categories the discursive convergences around homophobia and the contradictions that could appear. In addition, some respondents could provide more detailed explanations of aspects of homophobia depending on their area of expertise. These interviews contained important empirical material allowing me to analyse, deepen, validate, or reject data I had collected in the archives.

TABLE 2: INTERVIEWS DETAILS

Interviews categories	Number	Minutes
Human rights	4	271
Gender experts	2	160
Officials	2	96
Lawyers	2	170
LGBT activists	5	450
Journalist	6	420
Politicians	2	240
Religious leaders	1	90
Diplomats	2	90
Young	7	210
Total		**2197 mn**

III-2- Data analysis

May (2001: 157 -158) notes that, documents, as the sedimentations of social practices, have the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily and longer-term basis; they also constitute particular readings of social events. They tell us about the aspirations and intentions of the period to which they refer and describe places and social relationships. But, understanding all the complexities, implied representations and attitudes behind documents requires analysis. Thus, the analysis of the data collected during this work was based mainly on two techniques: content analysis and legal analysis.

III-2- a) Content analysis

Content analysis is a technique regularly used in qualitative research. It is used to examine texts and images, either documents that have been developed for other purposes (newspaper articles, case reports etc.) or research-generated texts such as interview transcripts. Content analysis is reliant on a relatively large data set which allows the researcher to interrogate the content of a range of documents to draw conclusions relating to a theme or themes, or a group or groups (Webley 2010). In content analysis, there are two types of approaches : the inductive approach and the deductive approach. Given the existence of work on homophobia in Africa in general and in Senegal in particular, it is the deductive approach that I used in this work. The goal of a deductive approach to content analysis is to validate or conceptually extend a theoretical framework or theory (Hsieh & Shannon 2005). Deductive category application works by bringing existing concepts and theoretically derived categories into dialogue with the texts under analysis. The qualitative step of analysis consists in a methodologically controlled assignment of a category to a passage of text (Marying 2000).

In the case of my research, two main types of texts emerged: newspaper archives and interviews. I used content analysis to analyse both newspaper archives and interviews. I personally transcribed all the interviews that were in French. In almost all of the transcriptions, I used the Ubiqus IO transcription method which consists of eliminating repetitions insofar as the interviewees sometimes come back to elements that they had already mentioned; I removed language errors, and comments that were not directly related to my work. I just reported the words and rewrote some answers to the extent that some interviewees did not have fluent French.

Subsequently, I proceeded to the coding which enabled me to detect themes. The coding technique used here was open coding. This coding allows me to use the questions in the interview guide or the themes of the study to identify the code in the texts. On the basis of the questionnaire, I fragmented each interview into small parts to first extract a certain number of codes according to the ideas developed. Thus, for example, I was able to obtain the place of women, farm work, the place of the man in the home, the Goor-jigeen, making love to a woman; prolonged police custody; independence of Senegal, in the name of Islam etc. This first step subsequently gave rise to axial coding. To this end, manually, the different categories or codes were included in new, broader codes which made it possible to highlight

the main themes of the interviews. These news codes were for example: femininity, masculinity, gender roles, violence, law, religion, social roles, the State, politic, police, West, imperialism.

The interviews and newspapers articles were analysed separately, which allowed me, after coding, to sort out the extracted elements in the themes and categories that appeared after the analysis of the interviews. Beyond understanding how the homosexual issue in Senegal is perceived and represented by different categories of actors interviewed, it was necessary to determine from a thematic point of view the convergences and the lines of fractures, to be able to extract, deepen, and analyse the points that truly structure "the sexual struggle" around homophobia in Senegal.

Moreover, I made a separation between the semi-structured interviews that I conducted and those that I collected in the media because of two main reasons: The first reason is that not all categories have access to the media. I was able to observe in the analysis that it is mainly political actors and religious leaders who intervene regularly through mass media. Of the 217 articles collected, there is only one article where an LGBT association speaks. It was SOURIRES DE FEMMES. There is no interview with a human rights organisation on the homosexual issue. University teachers interviewed in the media condemned homosexuality. Which brings me to the second reason: media interviews and reactions do not necessarily give an overview of the issues surrounding homophobia, but have political, religious, or cultural objectives. Thus, content analysis was for both in-depth interviews and media sources.

The information itself is the result of a filtering process. This filtering process is therefore based in part on the ideological, religious, and cultural convictions of those who produce the news. During this process, we cannot exclude the fact that heterosexual assumptions or heteronormativity becomes a fundamental perspective of the news concerning sexuality. If a country’s laws criminalise homosexuality and homosexuals are tracked down by security forces, then the media are no longer just instruments of the production and reproduction of hegemonic discourses. Either they are at the service of social control agencies, helping them to disseminate socially accepted norms and values, or they accompany the repressive apparatus of the state in their mission to maintain social cohesion. Analysing discursive formations in the media is therefore essential to understanding their role in exclusion and inclusion processes.

III-2- b) Legal analysis

Legal research may be defined as any systematic investigation that increases the sum of legal knowledge. That said, a country's laws are not an ex-nihilo data. They are the product of an environment and they operate within a social complex. Laws regulate, organise and reflect social attitudes and behaviors. The law is therefore an integral component of society which deserves to be analysed. Jain (1972) : " To advance the science of law, it is necessary for a researcher to go into the underlying principles or reasons of the law. The enquiries will have to be: Why a particular rule? What led to its adoption? What are its effects? Whether it is suited to the present conditions? How can it be improved? Whether it needs to be replaced entirely by a new rule?". Legal research is therefore a process that makes it possible to understand and examine all the dynamics that frame the production of laws, the enforcement of law and their impact on society.

There are two main techniques in legal research: doctrinal legal research and non-doctrinal legal research. In the case of this research, I used doctrinal legal research because sexual violence and sexual inequalities also result from law. Doctrinal research examines legal rules, principles, concepts or doctrines. As argued by Vibhute and Aynalem (2009), doctrinal legal research "gives prominence to the relationship of law with people, social values and social institutions. It endeavors to highlight the relationship between law and other behavioral sciences and social facts. It involves empirical inquiry into the operation of law. Here inquiry is directed to some manifestation of human behavior as law affects it or as it affects law. The researcher wants to know to what extent certain legal rules work or have worked". This approach allows us to grasp the weight of legal texts on the oppression of homosexuals in Senegal and their instrumentalisation in the consolidation of gender inequalities.

The legal sources that were analysed in this research were primary sources. This category includes colonial laws, the postcolonial Senegalese criminal code and Senegal's family law. Secondly, there are the secondary sources which can be found in hearing reports, interviews and commentaries by magistrates on the criminal and family law. These two categories were analysed on the basis of the central themes obtained after data coding. There are legal aspects that fall under the themes of sexuality, gender and those that relate to the state in its mission to organise society. Examining primary sources, their classifications and categorisations, made it possible to identify affinities, similarities and differences.

III- 3 - Ethical considerations

I cannot ignore here the question of ethical considerations linked to research on such a sensitive subject as homosexuality in Senegal. These ethical considerations fall into three categories: The first is the protection of the identity of the respondents; the protection of information provided by the parties concerned directly or indirectly; and finally, my integrity as a researcher.

Regarding the protection of my participants' identities, although some interviewees accepted their identity to be revealed, no identity of the interviewees is contained in this work. All have been masked. In order to better protect the identity of some participants, the location of the interview was not indicated. To prevent the identities of people from falling into the hands of strangers, the names of the respondents are not found on the tapes and are not even on my computer. In addition, the data collected has all been stored in a place that I alone can access. The notes taken in the field were transcribed and then shredded.

III- 4 – Sensitive issues during data collection

When working on homophobia in Africa, the researcher is confronted with several dilemmas. The first dilemma is the suspicion surrounding his research activity. In Senegal, beyond the fact that homosexuality suffers from social illegitimacy, portrayals of homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice give rise, among other things, to fears and to a certain extent the rejection of a part of the population who suspects the researcher to be an actor of the Western campaign for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal. I witnessed such accusations in some discussions including with scientists. The situation would not improve when my interlocutors were informed that I was a beneficiary of EU funding. As in other African countries like Cameroon, the European Union is seen as an agency supporting homosexuality. This perception is linked to the fact that the representations of the European Union financially support organisations promoting human rights, including LGBT associations. However, I needed to continue the research to produce for the first time a work on the phenomenon of homophobia in Senegal.

The second issue comes from the fieldwork. The question is: how to make people talk about something they do not want to talk about or something they perceive as a threat? Even though the finalisation of this work shows that I was able to skirt this dilemma, the methodological concern remains fundamental: how to perform work in a hostile research field? A field where it is difficult to know what the respondent really thinks about you and where it is always

necessary to assess not only the person with whom you are discussing, but also the interpretation that he can make after your exchanges. For example, I was mindful of the embarrassment that some of my heterosexual interlocutors experienced. I could sense that at one point in the interview, they were curious about my sexual identity because of some prejudices related to people working on homosexual issues who could be perceived as homosexuals themselves.

The last issue also revolves around questioning: how to speak about homophobic violence without taking an interest in those who are victims of homophobia. A priori, to give a large place to homosexuals in this research is at first sight something normal. However, as I became interested in other works on the topic, I realised that many of them had tried to illustrate homophobic violence by making the victims of this violence talk about their own experiences and share their opinions on homophobia. The problem with this approach is that homophobia is inextricably linked to heterosexism. Thus, in order to understand the mental, institutional, social, and political structures of homophobia one must understand the heterosexism of the Senegalese society.

III- 5 - Safety, access, and research identity

Before going to Senegal for my fieldwork, I was quite worried about my safety. The informal interviews I conducted in the past with victims of homophobic violence and what I read in newspaper made me think that, even as a researcher, there were no guarantees that I could safely carry out a study on homophobia in Senegal. I will also point out that when I first arrived, the first people to whom I explained the purpose of my approach displayed distrustful glances, which was unsettling. This is one of the reasons that motivated me to pay a higher rent for an apartment in a residential area that was more secure than some other neighbourhoods in Dakar. I spoke of homosexuality because some people did not understand what homophobia meant.

I was obliged to be honest, but only with the people I interviewed or useful contacts. And even with some interviewees, when I indicated from the beginning that we would talk about homosexuality they were reluctant. The strategy that I eventually used in many cases was to initially frame discussions in terms of gender violence, which allowed me ask questions about homosexuality once a report had been established. This strategy did not always work. In several cases, especially with young heterosexuals, I detected a certain mistrust. The times when I felt most fulfilled and where my interview guide did not undergo amendments related

to the circumstances, was when I was interviewing diplomats, experts, and representatives of Senegalese organisations defending LGBT rights and international organisations.

These issues related to security and access to the research field are also connected to the researcher's identity. Of Cameroonian nationality, coming from Europe and working on homosexuality, I was immediately suspicious. This is a psychological state linked to the dominant discourse about homosexuality as a new colonial stratagem. As many people working on homosexual issues, and as what some respondent told me, I was suspected of being one of those Africans who works with the "white enemy" to make Africans accept homosexuality. It was therefore necessary to work to build a climate of trust with my interlocutors and explain that my interests were academic, not political.

CHAPTER IV: THE COLONIAL CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOPHOBIA IN SENEGAL

The postcolonial perspective highlights the syncretism between colonial and postcolonial society. The realisation of political independence for formerly colonised territories does not necessarily mean the emergence of an area of complete autonomy. These new independent states are the fruit of a circulation of ideas and ideologies resulting from the encounter of Africa and the West. The postcolony must be seen therefore as a co-construction in which the imagination finds itself straddling between the desire to look like the coloniser and the will to assert one's autonomy. Thus, postcolonial society cannot be analysed without first studying the process of formation of the colonial imagination which impacts on the projection of the colonised in a contemporary situation. It is this reproduction in a postcolonial situation of the structures of Western domination and the imaginary inherited from the colonial order that is apprehended by the concept of coloniality. In order to understand homophobia in postcolonial Senegal, one has to examine the gender dynamics during the colonial period, the mechanisms that regulated and managed sexuality as well as their consequences on the logics of empowerment after independence.

It is important to know what political, ideological, and social dynamics were produced throughout the country's history that led to the criminalisation of homosexuality. I maintain that the answer can only be obtained by a long-term analysis. Works focused on homophobia in Africa have highlighted the impact of British, Portuguese, Spanish or Dutch colonisation (Schmidt 2008; Epprecht 2005; Tielman & Hammelburg 1999). Given that the crime of sodomy had been abolished in France after the revolution and that there were no laws in the French colonies repressing homosexuality, it is difficult to establish a link between French colonisation and the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal. Nevertheless, I argue that we can also perceive the French colonial heritage as having played a major role in the construction of homophobia in Senegal.

That said, French colonialism is not the exclusive cause of homophobia in Senegal. In the other chapters, I will show that homophobia in Senegal is the result of a co-construction that integrates multiples factors, such as religion and politics. But here, I analyse the role of colonisation in emergence of homophobia in contemporary Senegalese society. If it is not an issue of incriminating France in the making of homophobia in Senegal, this chapter shows that it is possible to detect in the French colonial enterprise the germs of homophobia that

would come to fruition in the postcolony. France's "civilising mission" was not simply about the appropriation of land, labour and resources; it also contributed to the disintegration of the sexual morality of pre-colonial African societies, the effects of which are still palpable today. Independence will subsequently be marked by a consolidation of this colonial legacy, including in a legal form.

IV- 1) Colonial knowledge/discourses and the myth of heterosexual Africa

It is not possible to understand the management of sexuality and gender relations during French colonisation without being interested in the Western heterosexual imagination. Research on coloniality (Lugones 2007; 2010) has underlined the mechanisms by which representations of gender in the West were exported to colonised territories. I showed previously that sexual practices in Africa were plural and varied insofar as the practices described as heterosexual coexisted with those now defined as homosexual (Kendall 1998; Murray & Roscoe, 2001). These situations attest the complexity of homophobia in Africa and highlight the fact that it is more a construct than an innate trait of African societies. The existence of same-sex sexual practices in Africa in the past makes it possible to relativise the discourse on homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice. The question of how African societies have come to regard homophobia as a constitutive trait of African societies is therefore fundamental.

IV-1-a) Discourse, power and gender in the colonial enterprise

Colonialism transformed sexual representations and practices in Africa. This enterprise was undertaken through the construction of the figure of the other as a different human being, primitive and deviant, exposed to the civilising mission in order to benefit from the progress of Western civilisation (Geshekter 1995; McClintcok 1995; Mugabane 2001). In the colonial scientific discourse, Africans are represented as good savages or beings with perverse customs (Bozon 2002: 83). Colonisers described certain sexual practices as: insolent; obscene; extremely ugly; felonious crimes without impunity; indecent; obvious vices; copulations against nature; morbid eroticism, etc. Others perceived sexual relations between same-sex people in Africa as remnants of primitive sexuality (Borillo 2001: 67). In some cases, homosexuality in Africa in the eighteenth century is considered as non-existent. Transforming the sexuality of the colonised was part of the civilising mission.

These discursive productions on the sexuality of Blacks must be inscribed in the continuity of the relations of domination existing between Europe and Africa since the 16th century with the emergence of the slave trade (Bertolt 2018). In the imperial project, race and sexuality have always been two sides of the same coin. It becomes difficult to analyse imperialism without understanding the power dynamics that revolve around gender. That's why McClintock writes:

"imperialism cannot be fully understood without a theory of gender power. Gender power was not the superficial patina of empire, a decisive mechanics of class or race. Rather, gender dynamics were, from the outset, fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the imperial enterprise" (McClintock, 1995: 6-7).

Discourses occupy an important place in the making of the subject. The terms and words with which the subject is described, perceived and analysed determine perceptions, representations, social relations and construct a reality. Thus, Foucault and Habermas analysed the process of subjectivation as social processes based on reciprocal relations of recognition (Allen 2009). However, unlike Habermas, Foucault inscribes the processes of subjectivation in the relations of power and domination. For Foucault (1977), it is through discourse (through knowledge) that we are created; and that discourse joins power and knowledge, and its power follows from our casual acceptance of the “reality with which we are presented”. Thus, imperial discourses have mainly two functions: the dehumanisation of the subject through the qualifier of "primitive," which legitimises the colonial enterprise, but in turn naturalises heterosexuality through the rejection of the existence of same-sex sexual practices. Colonial discourse therefore lays the foundations for the construction of the colonial subject who must be a heterosexual subject, as 19th century Europe had institutionalised heterosexuality. Thus, the colonial project became a heterosexual project.

From this perspective, Foucault (1990) revealed that homosexual identity appeared at the end of the 18th century and in the 19th century with the emergence of new powers of control over the body and the life of individuals described as biopower. This period also coincides with the birth of capitalism. Thus, John D'Emilio, without contradicting Foucault, underlines that gay identity appears in the 19th century with capitalism. This economic system leads to transformations in the family structure and the emergence of an ideology of motherhood (D’Emilio 1983). Heterosexuality became an institution for consolidating the capitalist system and the heterosexual family is considered the basic element of production. Social roles became defined, and women’s roles were exclusively limited to the private sphere.

The colonial enterprise will subsequently be a project to build a heterosexual subject in Africa. A discourse emerges on sexuality and how the African should practice it. Discourse, as a social construct, is created and perpetuated by those who have the power and means of communication. For example, those who are in control decide who we are by deciding what we discuss. Mundimbe argues that: "It takes little imagination to realize that missionary discourses on Africans were powerful. They were both signs and symbols of a cultural model" (Mundimbe 1988). In the area of sexuality and gender, the cultural model transmitted by missionaries is heterosexuality and male domination. In Africa, missionaries will be the first to inculcate in Africans a heterosexual conception of sexuality under the pretext that homosexuality was an unnatural sexuality (Aldrich 2002; Hoad 2007). Many studies have already demonstrated the link between Christianity and irrational reactions towards homosexuals (Plugge-Foust & Strickland 2000). Thenceforth, religion will be an important vector in the making of representations around sexuality and gender relations.

As Hutcheon (1991) observes, discourse is not merely a tool of domination but also an instrument of power. In a position of domination and power, the colonial discourse naturalises the Western conception of sexuality and it is accepted as truth by the colonial. However, when examining the issue of sexual categories in precolonial times in Africa we have seen that the notion of homosexuality which is a Western notion poses some issues related to the understanding of sexual practices in the South. In many non-European societies, colonisation has had the effect of establishing a new gender hierarchy and a new definition of sexuality (Lugones 2007). The new social hierarchies introduced by colonisation seem to have destroyed the systems of solidarity and complementarity that existed in so-called “primitive” societies before European conquest. Thus, according to Mendoza, “Through sexual violence, exploitation, and systems of cohabitation, the colonizers used to break the will of indigenous men and women, imposing new hierarchies that were institutionalized with colonialism. The bodies of women became the land on which the country negotiated under new conditions” (Mendoza 2016).

I have previously emphasised that the process of constructing heterosexuality as a dominant social norm takes place through a transfer into the family framework of heterosexual parental values. However, in the register of the construction of the postcolonial subject, this transfer took place through colonisation and one of the objectives was to create new subjects in the image of the West. The colonised had the duty to learn Western values in order to mark his

entry into modernity. Colonisation is based on the assumption that the African has no history. Indeed, no idea could hatch in Africa because "it was an undeveloped anhistoric world, completely trapped in the natural spirit" (Adler 2017). The dominant status of heterosexuality in Western societies is seen as a value to be transferred to so-called primitive societies.

It is from this angle that we must understand the importance of patriarchy, the pillar of the heteronormative system in postcolonial societies. Patriarchy can be defined as: "a family-social, ideological, political system in which men- by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, law, language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labor, determine what part women shall or not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male" (Rich 1976: 57). This is a broad definition that allows us to grasp all the ideological contours surrounding this notion. The normalisation of patriarchy in African societies by colonisation contributed to a redefinition of male and female roles in African societies.

Patriarchy is an ancient social and political organisation of societies that existed in many forms around the world (Bennet 1989: 261). But patriarchy was not the main political and social organisation in Africa before colonisation (Amaduime 1997). There have been many matriarchal societies where women held important roles and ensured the balance of society. The hegemony of patriarchy has its roots in Indo-European nomadic culture before spreading on a planetary scale (Diop 1987). Diop argues that in precolonial Africa there was no transition from matriarchy to patriarchy, since the social structure was essentially matriarchal in the sense of female rule, female transmission of property and descent, and man being the mobile element in marriage or sexual union (Amaduime 1997: 74). The changes occurred in Africa with the Arab-Muslim conquest, followed by European colonisation (Diop 1987). In the imperial project, patriarchy is an essential component. Power and authority were exclusively in the hands of White men. Hellen Callaway describes the situation of the Colonial Service as:

"A male institution in all its aspects: its masculine ideology, its military organization and processes, its rituals of power and hierarchy, its strong boundaries between the sexes. It would have been "unthinkable" in the belief system, which had had to become recognized for their important "feminine" work" (Callaway 1987: 5-6).

Ashis Nandy explains that colonial practices stemmed from "a world view which believes in the absolute superiority of the human over the nonhuman and the sub human, the masculine over the feminine...and the modern or progressive over the traditional or the savage" (Nandy 1983). However, before the colonial period, matriarchy was the main social and political

organisation in Africa (Amaduime 1997). Changes occurred initially with the Arab conquests and the introduction of Islam and then the European conquest which will complete the domination of patriarchy with the introduction of Christianity. The two religions glorified the place of man in society and reinforced heterosexuality as the only sexual practice that should be accepted by believers.

But, as underlined earlier, the heterosexual imagination of the West was accompanied by discursive practices that sought to portray Africa as a heterosexual continent, despite the existence of same-sex sexual relations. The invisibility of same-sex sexual relations in Africa's early sexual discourse is based on a desire to build virginity in Africa and a desire to remove it from perversions which occurred in European societies. For example, the case of Captain Sir Richard Burton. He travelled between 1821 and 1890 in Asia, America, the Middle East, and Africa. Speaking of homosexuality, he describes from his point of view what he calls the "sodatic zone". He referred here to places where pederasty or homosexual relationships could be practiced. He located this area in a band from 43 degrees north of the equator to 30 degrees in the south, which includes southern France, the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, and Greece, as well as the north-eastern coast, North Africa, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Chaldea, Afghanistan, Sindh, Punjab and Kashmir, China, Japan, the South Sea Islands, and the Americas (Aldrich 2002: 31). These are the places on the planet where, according to Richard Burton, same-sex sexual relations were practiced. We note here that sub-Saharan Africa is outside this zone.

With colonialism, a heterosexist vision of Africa was constructed. Its extension can be analysed today with the current discourses on homosexuality that make this practice a Western import (Tamale 2013). The invention of Sub-Saharan Africa as a heterosexual land is linked to the fact that the Western sexual imaginary of the nineteenth century is a heterosexual fantasy. In some Western countries, homosexuality was criminalised. Where there was no anti-sodomy law, homosexuals suffered from social illegitimacy. Accomplishing the civilisational project in the colonies meant transmitting the values and the sexual morality that applied in Europe.

There is a very close link between discourses and power. Because subjects are created by power-relations they do not consciously control, the creation of subjectivity is a homogeneous process in which subjects are little more than "individual copies that are mechanically punched out" (Habermas 1987: 293). Consequently, the construction of the heterosexual

colonial subject takes place without his input, which ultimately naturalises the values transmitted. Thus, beyond the description of the colonial subject as primitive and heterosexual, colonial discourse makes same-sex sexual practices invisible. The long-term consequence is therefore an erasure of history, of which homophobia appears to be a consequence.

Marc Epprecht (2008:115, 117) informs us that:

"The word homophobia was coined in Europe in 1969 at the time of the emergence of the modern gay rights movement and the sharp political reactions against it in the United States. The attitudes and behaviors it describes, however, clearly existed long before this. Portugal, for example, produced crudely anti-homosexual literature in the 14th and 15th centuries. The Spanish Inquisition, from the 16th to 18th centuries, resulted in hundreds of executions for what was termed the nefarious sin.… Hatred and fear of homosexuality is thus a very old, well-established part of European culture that was transplanted into Africa in sometimes sincere, and sometimes opportunistic ways."

It appears that it is not same-sex sexual practices that are Western imports to Africa, but legal homophobia (Amchat 1993). "Unnatural fornication" between men and between people and animals was illegal in German colonies (Schmidt 2008). But after the First World War, the Germans left their colonies for the benefit of the British and French. "The Netherlands and Portugal likewise" enforced harsh laws couched in religious language against sodomy or "unnatural lust" during colonisation (Epprecht 2005: 254). Many authors have recently highlighted the link between anti-homosexual laws in British colonies and postcolonial homophobia (Tielman& Hammelburg 1999; Gupta 2008; Frank & al 2009; Han & O'Mahoney 2014; Ireland 2013; Itaborahy & Zhu 2013; Sanders 2009). Between 1897 and 1902, British administrators applied the Indian Penal Code in Britain's African colonies (Read 1963). "Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment… for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall be liable to fine".

However, this perspective hides some important aspects useful for explaining the contemporary diversity of situations concerning homosexuals in Africa. First, if in the British, Portuguese, and Spanish colonies there were anti-homosexual laws, the situation is different in the French and Belgian colonies where same-sex sexual relations were not punished from a legal point of view. In 1791, the crime of sodomy was removed from the French criminal code after the French Revolution. Homosexuals were supposed to be free from a legal point of view even though the population and social control agencies were hostile towards them

(Gunther 2009). This situation could explain why there weren't specific laws condemning homosexual practices in French colonies.

Moreover, even where laws criminalising same-sex sexual practices were found, the repression was not systematic. People could maintain these relationships in secrecy while maintaining good public standing (Epprecht 1998a). The attitude of the coloniser could be summed up in the phrase "don't ask, don't tell". This situation is reinforced by the fact that compulsory heterosexuality publicly locked men and women into marriage. Thus, an individual who publicly displayed his preference for women could maintain a homosexual relationship in secret without facing any social stigma. Marriage served to conceal and deny (M'sibi 2011: 64). Men, therefore, had nothing to fear in that case, because they are going to get married. In this context social norms and male virility remain performed (Epprecht 1998a: 634). In his ethnographic survey of South Africa, Donham (1998) shows that arrangements existed between families to hide a child's homosexuality through a sham marriage.

Other studies have shown that during the colonial period same-sex sexual relationships occurred in mines in southern Africa (Achmat 1993; Epprecht 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2001, 2004; Moodie 1998). Other miners and employers were informed. Young people had sex with older people and received gifts or wages from some employees (Epprecht 2001; Moodie 1998). Gender roles were established between the different partners. Young miners would be "married" off to older workers through marriages known as *inkotsane* and would be expected to perform "wifely" duties (M'sibi 2011). These marriages were common, and the state was aware of their existence, but chose not to intervene, as these "marriages" served to protect the nation's economic needs (Epprecht 1998a).

These descriptions inform us that we cannot have a uniform vision of the role of colonisation in the construction of homophobic societies in Africa, as colonial policies were not the same across the continent. The absence of anti-homosexual laws gave more visibility to homosexuals in the French colonies. This is not the case in the British, Spanish, or Portuguese colonies where laws against homosexuals were applied. However, even in the context of legal repression, same-sex sexual practices occurred. Settlers sometimes turned a blind eye to these practices if they could remain invisible without disrupting the social equilibrium that was based on heterosexuality.

What appears to be transversal is heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm both in representations, but also in Western discourse. Heterosexuality as a natural sexuality in Africa

appears as a construction rather than an ancestral fact. Although present in precolonial African societies, heterosexuality as an institution is also the result of gender transformations introduced during the colonial period. Beyond the general overview, let's take a closer look at the specificities of French colonialism.

IV-1-b) Gender and the "civilising mission" in French colonisation

The previous part therefore allows us to understand that the making of a heterosexual colonial subject was one of the fundamental aspects of the Western colonial project. For its part, the French colonial enterprise was based on a feeling of duty towards non-European peoples. The term "civilising mission" was therefore coined to justify from a philosophical point of view the need for France to transmit to others its values and its morals which they considered to be universal and thus superior. Gender and sexuality as tools for the regulation of society were therefore integrated into the education to be transmitted to the colonised.

After the end of the French Revolution of 1789, slavery was also officially abolished in European countries and in America, like Britain. France also embarked on a colonial enterprise. To legitimise the project of territorial conquest, the French elite of the time developed the idea that France had a duty towards primitive or inferior peoples. France had the duty to get them out of their wilderness and grant them access to science (Conklin 1997). It is in this context that the notion of the "civilising mission" emerged in France.

It is difficult to know when the concept of the "civilising mission" appeared. But the term civilisation was used for the first time in 1776 by French intellectuals. They searched for a word that could illustrate the triumph of science and reason in all areas of life and differentiate them from the uncivilised world, from slaves and barbarians (Conklin 1997). The notion of a civilising mission will come later, after the French Revolution (Beneton 1975)[22]. The French revolution was perceived as a pivotal moment in European and world history with its ideas of freedom for citizens. From this moment, French people were convinced that they are the most important people on the planet and that the great nation had the duty to carry its ideals of freedom, fraternity, and equality beyond its borders (Godechot 1983). Alexis de Tocqueville (2003: 54) wrote to this effect: "We have to imagine that a powerful and civilized people like ours exercises by the sole fact of the superiority of its enlightenment, an almost invincible influence over small tribes, almost barbaric; and that in order to force them to

[22] Before the French coined the term "civilization," they had used the term "police" *[un peuple policé*) to describe the contrast between European societies and barbaric ones.

incorporate themselves into him, it is enough to be able to establish lasting relationships with them ".

In his influential work, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes,* first published in 1874, the economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu gives a description of his vision of the civilising mission. From his point of view, the new settlements had to be acquired through trade and a minimum of violence. One of the essential objectives of the motherland's colonial enterprise was to lead the colonised peoples to civilisation (cited by Conklin 1997: 13).

In the French right-wing magazine, *La Revue des deux mondes*, Gabriel Charmes claimed:

"If France were able to establish itself permanently in North Africa, to penetrate to central Africa, to make its influence felt in the entire Sahara and to win the [Western] Sudan; if in these immense regions where only fanaticism and brigandage reign today, it was to bring—even at the price of spilled blood—peace, commerce, tolerance, who could say this was a poor use of force? . . . Having taught millions of men civilization and freedom would fill it with the pride that makes great peoples" (Ageron 2016).

It was in these circumstances that the French colonial empire was born. In 1895, the French Ministry of the colonies created the general government of West Africa headed by a governor. This vast territory called French West Africa included the colony of Senegal. The notion of the civilising mission can be compared to the notion of childhood that emerged in Europe in the seventeenth century. Colonies are places occupied by children who need to be cared for. The colonial enterprise was linked to the idea of social progress (Nandy 1983: 15). Locke's argument that a period of tutelage was a necessary stage for a child before it could reach adulthood was extended to colonial relations. That colonised peoples were in a state of civilisational infancy became a key theme in French liberal discourse (Mehta 1999).

So, the enterprise of subjectivation in the colonies, which is based on the ideological notion of the "civilising mission", started with a process of othering. Crang (1998: 61) describes othering as "a process (...) through which identities are set up in an unequal relationship". Othering is the simultaneous construction of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual and unequal opposition through the identification of some desirable characteristic that the self/in-group has and the other/out-group lacks and/or some undesirable characteristic that the other/out-group has and the self/in-group lacks (Brons 2015: 70). Othering thus sets up a superior self/in-group in contrast to an inferior other/out-group, but this superiority/inferiority is nearly always left implicit. The discourse on the civilising mission makes it possible to rationalise the superiority of the French coloniser.

Thus, in the construction of the heterosexual colonial subject, the first step consisted in positioning the coloniser as a superior being. The concept of race, invented in the 16th century with a view to establishing the hegemony of the West over other populations as highlighted by research on coloniality (Quijano 2007), was imposed on African populations. Racism obeys two processes linked to Michel Foucault's notion of biopower: a first process that determines the body as a machine to train, integrate, control, and a second which is interested in the biological body, in the living, and proceeds by "regulatory controls", leading to a "bio-politics of the population (Foucault 1976: 185).

Race becomes the matrix of the colonial project that justifies the duty to bring progress to the primitive. In the colonial literature produced and taught to the French at this time:

"The African is presented not only as a child, but as an idiot child, the prey of a handful of kings of small kingdoms, cruel and bitter potentates. This idiocy is the consequence of a congenital vice of the black race. Colonization is an assistance, education and moral treatment of this idiocy. It is an antidote to the spirit of cruelty and anarchic functioning of indigenous peoples "(Mbembe 2013: 100).

With race as an instrument of sociobiological differentiation, the coloniser added the institutionalisation of a bureaucracy as a technique of domination (Arendt 1982). Beyond the humanist discourse, the ultimate goal is economic exploitation. Moreover, Alexandre Mérignhac in his book, *Précis de législation et d'économie coloniales*, believed that colonisation was a way to take advantage of all kinds of resources from other countries. Colonisation is therefore a structure founded in a new country by a race with advanced civilisation (Mérignhac 1912).

To achieve its economic goals, the French coloniser worked on the making of subjects and gave them the moral and sexual values in force in the metropolis. Sexuality is also part of the production of dynamics necessary for the capitalist system. Race and gender were at the heart of the colonial enterprise. The French imaginary of sexuality was primarily a heterosexual fantasy. The discourse of eroticisation of the colonial enterprise and sexualisation of the Black man's body cannot only be analysed under the prism of "sub-eroticism" or the expression of racial domination (Aloula 1981). It is not a simple popular orientalism whose exoticism of the Black continent stir the desire for discovery (Savarese 1999: 126). The French colonial enterprise aimed to inculcate in others the moral and sexual values of European society.

The colonial discourse emphasised the need to manufacture male and female subjects. Thus, Senegalese women are presented as "niggers" who suffer under the weight of labour inflicted

by Black men (Durel 1898: 67). The Senegalese man was perceived as a primitive, savage, brute whose existence is resumed to the use of his penis. He is a threat against the white woman, the Black woman, and subhuman relative to the White man. French colonisation will undertake a triple movement of bestialisation, effeminisation and devirilisation of the Black man (Dorlin 2006). In the colonial novel, Africa was described as a virgin female body, that the White man, depository of masculinity, must unveil and penetrate (Ayesha 2002: 79).

The devirilisation of Senegalese men can be observed in the advertisement poster "*Y'a bon banania*" in 1915. This poster was produced by the company Banania, which promotes local chocolate made from cocoa and flour. The poster designed by Giacomo de Andreis shows a Senegalese sharpshooter (*tirailleur sénégalais*), sitting under a tree, his rifle at his feet enjoying a pot of Banania[23]. He is dressed in a parade outfit: red iron pompon, short blue jacket, and bloomers. The vast plains in the background evoke ripe wheat and the African savannah under a yellow banana sky (Sibeud 2016). This poster resuscitates colonial stereotypes and clichés about Black people, who are represented as tall and big but childlike.

Such representations were also common in films. In movies such as *Bouboule 1er*, *roi nègres*, *trader horn* for example, Black men are shown running away from a car or a bicycle driven by a white man (Ukadike 1994: 35). In this iconographic work, there is a desire to hypersexualise white masculinity and demasculinise Black masculinity. In *Camp Thiaroye*, a production of the Senegalese filmmaker Sembene Ousmane, the French captain Labrousse, commander of Camp Thiaroye in Dakar, described Senegalese riflemen as "great children".

We can see here that in a colonial context, masculinity in Senegalese is not determined by biology. Although he may exhibit physical traits that make him a full-fledged male, racial hierarchies confer on the Senegalese man the status of an inferior male compared to his white counterpart. The Senegalese male body is defined and disciplined by order and colonial institutions which make them inferior to white men. If the concept of hegemonic masculinity[24] highlights the most natural form of being a man by defining certain codes,

[23] The military unit of “tirailleurs sénégalais” was created in 1857. In 1914, it had 31,000 men recruited in the French colonies of West Africa. They took part in the first world war.

[24] "Hegemonic masculinity was understood as the pattern of practice (*i.e.*, things done, not just a set of role expectations or an identity) that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue. Hegemonic masculinity was distinguished from other masculinities, especially subordinated masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense; only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly normative. It embodied the currently most honored way of being a man, it required all other men to position

values, attitudes and behaviours that legitimise gender inequalities, it appears that in the colonial context, there is not a single masculinity, but several masculinities (Connell 1987). Senegalese men fit into this configuration in the sphere of subordinate masculinities. They are not considered men, but sub-men.

In everyday colonial life, Senegalese men were permanently humiliated by French settlers. They must, for example, constantly take off their hat in front of a Frenchman who is the only one to wear a hat. These places where white and black people interact, especially in the administrations, were called: *Fii mbakhana dooné benn* (where only one person wears a hat). There is behind this act a will to discipline the Black man through submission to the white man. We can also cite the humiliations suffered by "native boys"; young Senegalese males recruited to work in white houses, establishments, or properties of French settlers. They had to submit to all the requirements of the white master including fulfilling “feminine duties”. Sometimes they became "servants in bed" (Frank 2002: 610).

Several researchers have highlighted the impact of colonialism in the construction of gender inequalities in Africa (Oyewumi 1997; Bertolt 2018). What we can see here is the fact that in Senegal, the social construction of masculinities took place through a process of emasculation of the Senegalese man, which led to the destabilisation of the power systems, the weakening of the role of the elders and the upheaval of earlier gender relations (Rich 1976; Uchendu 2009).

While European men considered both European women and indigenous men to be inferior subjects, in the context of colonisation discourse, their race was superior. European women were considered inferior because of their sex – an inferiority within an otherwise superior race (Gouda 1995). The situation of Senegalese men overshadows how Senegalese women were treated. They were at the bottom of the colony’s social hierarchy. They suffered from a triple oppression: oppression from white men, from white women and from Black men. In colonial

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themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the global subordination of women to men. Men who received the benefits of patriarchy without enacting a strong version of masculine dominance could be regarded as showing a complicit masculinity. It was in relation to this group, and to compliance among heterosexual women, that the concept of hegemony was most powerful. Hegemony did not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it meant ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion. These concepts were abstract rather than descriptive, defined in terms of the logic of a patriarchal gender system. They assumed that gender relations were historical, so gender hierarchies were subject to change. Hegemonic masculinities therefore came into existence in specific circumstances and were open to historical change. More precisely, there could be a struggle for hegemony, and older forms of masculinity might be displaced by new ones" (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005: 832-833).

society, the Senegalese woman should copy the Western woman and look like her. If in the past, she could intervene in the public sphere and sometimes play important political roles, during colonisation, Senegalese women would essentially be confined to the private sphere. Caring for her husband, raising children, and taking care of the household constituted her main functions (Boubacar 1985; Mamadou 1990). She had to learn how to become a "Victorian woman".

Colonisation therefore builds new forms of expression of femininity and gender relations. Gender roles are being redefined, breaking with the past where women played important roles in the public sphere. These societies were organised with roles and responsibilities that were entrusted to both men and women. In Senegalese traditions, there was a kind of gender equity that made it possible for both men and women to benefit from the responsibilities exercised their activities without being subjected to any negative or inferior considerations from the community. Women played political roles before colonisation. The Queen Diata in southern Senegal, for example, ruled her own kingdom. There were no distinctions that resulted in a form of ostracism, rejection or marginalisation of women. It did not exist traditionally. It was thought, for example, that inheritance was on the side of man and heredity on the side of woman. There were matriarchal societies where women sometimes had much more power than men. In the historical Senegalese social formations, there was equality, a gender equity which made that once again, each of the two sexes had a perimeter of responsibility. French colonialism will create new definitions of the roles of women in Senegalese society that confine them to the private sphere.

French colonialism in Senegal will build what comes under masculinity, femininity and gender relations. But, if racial hierarchies place Senegalese men below the white coloniser, the Black man remains superior to the Black woman. We can conclude that French colonialism institutionalises gender inequalities between men and women. We can see that, during colonisation, an alliance was built between white men and Black men to consolidate the inferior status of Black women. For example, when in 1945 France decided to extend the right to vote to women in the colonies, only White women could vote. This was in contradiction with the colonial discourse on the civilising mission that claimed to accompany the evolution of indigenous societies. Moreover, on the question of the acquisition of French citizenship by Senegalese subjects, the French settler worried that granting citizenship to men

whose women were not sufficiently assimilated could lead to a poor transmission of French culture to their children (Boittin 2010).

Besides upholding strict and unequal gender roles in Senegal, colonisation reinforced the heterosexual conception of the family. Thus, in a document from 1920 that I accessed at the National Archives of Senegal, the governor general of French West Africa states that:

"La famille est la base de la société indigène: l'autorité du chef de famille en est le ressort. L'œuvre d'émancipation de l'individu, que nos concepts mentaux nous inclinent à poursuivre, risque ainsi de troubler profondément l'ordre indigène, d'ébranler un système social sur lequel repose au surplus notre propre domination. Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler que c'est cette autorité du père de famille et, par extension, du chef de village ou de canton, que, récemment encore, nous mettions en œuvre pour assurer le recrutement des contingents destinés aux champs de bataille européens" (ANS 1920)[25].

The family as any category is a social invention, a "well-founded fiction" that the state built and sustains. This ideology around the protection of the heterosexual family is a Western import in Africa. The main consequence of this ideology was that it strengthened the patriarchy in societies where it was not the main mode of social and political organisation. As argued by Walby, patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices, in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women (Walby 1990: 24). However, studies on coloniality have shown that rhetoric about the importance of the heterosexual family during the colonial period was intended to legitimise the oppression of women (Oyewumi 2000). Given that Patriarchy is produced within the construction of gender (Butler 1990: 5), with the institutionalisation of the heterosexual family in which sex roles are defined, colonialism establishes the basis for the transmission of heterosexual values and representations around gender and sexuality in Senegal.

In contemporary Senegalese society, it is easily observed that man occupies a central place in social life. The Senegalese sociologist, R7 with whom I spoke emphasises the role of religion in the strengthening of patriarchy in colonial times:

"By Christianising the local populations, colonisation promoted the disintegration of traditional practices that emphasised gender equality and the installation of a new conception

[25] The family is the base of the indigenous society: the authority of the head of the family is the key. The work of emancipation of the individual, that our mental concepts lead us to pursue, risk of deeply disturbing the native order, of undermining a social system on which rests our own domination. I do not need to recall that it is this authority of the father of the family and, by extension, of the village or cantonal head, that, until recently, we put in place to ensure the recruitment of the quotas for the European battlefields.

of the world based on the superiority of men over women referring to the Bible. We are here in the presence of a religion that emphasises patriarchy. Patriarchy is a space of privileges devolved to the man against woman. As a result, when local people became Christianised, the chapels were built and run by priests. Women were relegated to the background" (Interview, Dakar, January 7, 2018).

R7 establishes a close link between Christianity, colonisation and patriarchy in Senegal which consecrates the subordination of women to men. He supports the idea that, in Africa, colonisation overthrew the egalitarian traditional system that existed in the past and replaced it with a new system that enshrined the domination of men. This paradigm shift in gender representations has had an impact on the definition of sexual identities to the extent that religious discourse will gradually instil in people what is sexually acceptable or intolerable.

Thus, race and gender intersect to define norms of masculinity, femininity and gender representations during colonisation. Heterosexuality becomes the recognised, accepted, and institutionalised norm of sexuality. Fanon (1952) argues that at the same time, race caused a trauma among the colonised. Black people desire to look like white people since the latter have been recognised as superior by the former. But there is also a thirst for revenge (Fanon 1952: 14, 31). Sigmund Freud's foundational work discusses the mental process by which masculinity is constructed as the repudiation of femininity (Seidler 1989; Kimmel 1994; Connell 1995). In his competition with the white colonisers for the control of women, the Black man does not perceive himself as a man because he is dehumanised, humiliated, and feminised (Fanon 1952: 1). He does not exist. In order to look like White people, he should affirm his masculinity without being challenged. This masculinity can only be conceived in relation to femininity in the context of a heterosexual society. Homosexuals in the postcolony could thus embody the ghost of this masculinity humiliated during the colonial period.

IV- 1-c) Islam, colonisation and gender

French colonisation constructed heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm, but it also resonated with Islam which already existed in traditional societies before the arrival of Europeans. One of the strategies of the colonial order was to strengthen Islam and establish a mutually beneficial cooperation with Muslim religious leaders. For this purpose, one of the particularities of Sufism is the fact that there is no unity. There is not a single spiritual guide to which all Sufi believers are attached. There are religious masters, the marabouts, who deliver teachings to followers, called in Senegal the *talibés*. The marabout is a spiritual authority in Senegalese society. He is, for his followers, the holder of a hidden truth that he

can transmit by delegation or reveal to his subjects. The marabout is also, as Liliane Prévost and Isabelle de Courtilles (2005: 25) wrote, "recognized as a bearer of Islamic law". It is possible for him, and even his duty, to found a Koranic school intended for the instruction of children or for transmitting his knowledge to his followers and descendants, through a master/followers relationship, by way of initiation.

Marabouts therefore become spiritual leaders who occupy a central place in the religious organisation of Senegal. They play an intermediary role between God and believers. But the marabouts are organised around brotherhoods. There are four major brotherhoods in Senegal: The Brotherhood of Mourhides, Tidjanes, Layennes, and Qâdiriyya. The Brotherhood is a group of disciples who claim to have a common guide. The vast majority of the Muslims in Senegal belong to a brotherhood. They receive their initiations in Koranic schools from the marabouts. The marabout is the conveyor belt between the follower and Allah. This creates submission links between the follower and the Marabout insofar as the former believes that the latter is a major asset that allows the follower to look like God (Stamon 1995).

It is important to understand the place of brotherhoods in Senegalese society and the power they exercise over their followers to understand the lack of criticism of the religious discourse around homosexuality. In the brotherhood, the spiritual guide embodies wisdom and holiness. He is the link that connects the *talibé* to the Prophet Muhammad, by means of a complex but continuous chain of transmission. A man of science and scholar, he could be a descendant of the holy founder of the Brotherhood, and, as such, enjoys his Baraka, a blessing which he transmits to the believers (Blondin 2007). The Marabout/disciple (or simple faithful) link is based on a sincere affection for the sheikh, and on the renunciation of any opposition. Among the Murids community, this personal submission to the marabout is called the *Djebelou* (Beck, 2001). It can therefore be concluded that in a brotherhood order there is a hierarchy which places the sheikh at the top of the pyramid, followed by the marabouts and finally followers or *talibés*.

Indeed, after a brief resistance of Muslim leaders against colonisers (Robinson 1988: 3; Barry 1988), the colonial administration tried in vain to reduce the power of the marabouts. This situation led to a cordial understanding, a convergence of interests in which the marabouts found themselves at the service of the colonial administration (Fall 2013).

The introduction of Islam into the traditional Senegalese society and the colonial enterprise consisted of two concomitant processes. They cannot be analysed separately insofar as they

converge towards the establishment of dynamics of exclusion and oppression. However, in the manufacture of the heterosexual subject, an association with mutual benefits was established between the coloniser and the marabouts. The daily and traditional life of the Senegalese populations was regulated in part, including legally, by the marabouts. In cities as in villages, the marabout is omnipresent. Indispensable, he ensures the daily management of the concerns of the populations with the celebration of weddings, baptisms, funeral ceremonies, actions of solidarity and assistance to the needy (Fall 2013). These religious leaders lead the prayers (five times a day), teach the Koran, lead the Wasifa sessions (prayer sessions and collective chanting twice a day). Likewise, they play the role of judge, performer, mufti, healer and finally animate religious songs and public conferences. This alliance is at the basis of what is called the "Senegalese social contract" (Diouf 2013).

It was therefore necessary to turn potential enemies into friends to ensure their neutrality and cooperation. The satisfaction of the marabouts ' interests was based on two principles: the preservation of their advantages and respect for the principles and values of the Muslim religion (Frebourg 1993:633). In a memo dated April 22, 1909, General William Ponty, the general governor of West Africa wrote, “It seems possible today to formulate this [Muslim] policy into a body of principles derived from the greater understanding that we have of the psychology of our subjects, from our constant concern not to offend them in their customs, in their beliefs, and even in their superstitions” (Diouf 2013).

The person who set up this new social contract in Senegal is the administrator, Paul Marty. From his point of view, France had to work to preserve the interest of the Sufi brotherhoods rather than stir up rivalries. Between 1920 and 1930, France intensified its cooperation with the brotherhoods (Harrison 1988:65). The consequence of this new alliance was greater collaboration between religious elites and the colonial administration. It must be emphasised that the alliance between the settlers and the marabouts did not result in the complete submission of the Muslim populations to the colonial order. Governor General William Ponty recognised the failure of the moral conquest in Senegal in 1910, by evoking "the almost total absence of submission of the populations and the continual deterioration of the state of mind of the populations of the 'interior " (ANS 1910).

On the financial level, the marabouts generated a substantial amount of economic activity (Fall 2013). They have large budgets (a real treasure), supplied by income provided by the cultivation of peanuts, contributions in money or in kind paid by the *talibés* such as zakat (in

principle due to the needy), adhya (paid in principle, once a year on the occasion of Ziarra or pilgrimages) and other exceptional contributions intended for companies of brotherly interest such as the construction of mosques, Koranic schools, tombs of dignitaries. We can also add the strengthening of the influence of Muslims. It was during French colonisation that the penetration of Islam in West Africa was accentuated (Hiskett 1984:281). With the development of trade, security and the support of the French colonists, Islamic values and morality were consolidated and extended towards territories that before remained impermeable to this religion.

With French colonisation, the marabouts are not only moral or spiritual authorities, but actors in a system of exploitation and domination. What is at stake in colonial Senegal are “win-win” relationships which sometimes put the marabouts in a situation of competition or conflict with the colonial power. During colonisation, the Caliphs had succeeded in setting up a parallel administration whose mechanisms and operations resembled in some respects those of the colonial administration. They all surrounded themselves with a kind of government, made up of a protocol service "Beuk Nëkh" or (secretaries) and a ministerial cabinet dealing with economic, foreign affairs, and worship. The "Muqadams" among the tidjanes and the Sheikhs among the Murids sufficiently trained and able to give the *wird* (initiation into the Tidian brotherhood) or to receive the personal submission of the *talibé,* "the djebelou", constituted the territorial command. They are located across the country from towns to the most remote villages. The zeal in the work and the submission required in the colonial administration between the subordinate personnel (the Natives) and the management personnel (Europeans) was comparable between the *talibé* and the marabout. This configuration had the effect of reinforcing the control and allegiance of the followers towards their marabout.

During French colonisation, religious leaders were an asset to the coloniser in the development of the colony. In the case of the Murid Brotherhood, the French gave them space and autonomy to build the great Mosque of Touba. France was the first to recognise Touba as a holy city. In 1949, on the visit of Coste-Floret, Minister of French Overseas in Senegal, the governor proposes the award of the Knight's Cross of the Legion of Honour to the marabout and son of Amadou Bamba (founder of the Murid brotherhood), Mamadou Bachirou M'Backé (ANS 1949). This award was justified by the economic dynamism of the country. At the mention of "Services rendered to colonization", the written report states: "Great farmer, is

concerned to introduce in his home, his entourage and his "Talibés", methods of mechanical cultivation coupled to the use of fertilisers. Founder, at the end of 1947, of one of the first agricultural cooperatives of production, which extends its activity on the Baol and the north of Sine-Saloum"[26].

In the justifications of the honours attributed to Mamadou Bachirou M'Backé, we notice that the control of the *talibés* is essential for the colonial power because their labour force guarantees economic production. The Muslim religion and the colonial enterprise converge in the structuring of a mechanism of oppression. At the top of the pyramid is the coloniser who resorts to the marabout. The marabout, in turn, ensures the fidelity of his followers towards the coloniser. It is not only a clientelist regime that is built but also a regime of discipline of the *talibés*. The marabouts are intermediaries of the colonial administration with the *talibés*. The settler-religious transaction offers the marabouts the ability to redistribute to their followers a set of economic and social privileges they enjoy, a situation which reinforces their control over their followers.

This transfer of competence allows the coloniser to reinforce, through religious leaders, the heteronormative character of Senegalese society. Islam, like Christianity, gives a central place to heterosexuality, reproduction and male domination. Norms appear as the product of multiple influences. At any time and depending on the dynamics, they can be reinforced or attenuated. This ideological convergence between Islam and the sexual and gendered values of colonisation will result in the naturalisation of heterosexuality not only as a dominant sexual norm but also as an accepted sexual practice from a spiritual point of view. Taking for example the case of male domination, the source of patriarchy, in Islam the body of man is not only a tool for satisfaction of sexual desire but also for establishing a spiritual relationship with God. As an extension of our discussion, on the place of Islam, respondent 7 argues that:

"In the Muslim religion, men have far more privileges than women. There is a surah of the Koran entitled women. In verse 34, God says men have authority over women. Virtuous women are obedient to their husbands and protect what needs to be protected in the absence of their husbands. As for those whose disobedience you fear, speak with them. If they persist, stay away from their bed. If it persists, hit them. The next verse 35 says that it is up to the man to spend property on the woman" (Interview with R7, January 14, 2018, Dakar).

[26]ANS, fonds du Sénégal colonial, série 10D Tournées, voyages et missions, n°10D6/62. Dossiers de propositions à la Croix de Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur, à l'occasion du voyage du ministre de la France d'Outre-mer au Sénégal en 1949

According to Respondent 7, heterosexuality is a virtue in Islam. The obedience of the woman to the man is a marker of her devotion to God, while the exercise of the authority of the man over the woman symbolises his respect for the divine rules. This conception of gender relations, inspired by the Koran, is the one transmitted by the religious leaders that intermediate between the coloniser and local populations. The convergence of religious and colonial morals and values around sexuality and gender relations built the hegemony of heterosexuality in Senegalese colonial society. Thus, the heterosexual hegemony imposed by colonisation was reinforced by religious beliefs.

IV-2- The ambiguity of homosexuality during French colonialism

As multiple anthropological studies have demonstrated, unlike Western discourse on Africa's virginity and heterosexuality, same-sex practices also existed on the continent. But what is interesting about the French case is that there are also ambiguities as we have seen in other contexts. If from a general point of view Western discourse tended to mask homosexual practices in the colonies, as done by the British, this strategy was also present in French colonies. It was accompanied with homophobic literature sometimes tending to demonise the Africans as responsible for the perversion of French soldiers. However, the reality of Senegalese society was more complex. What is interesting here is to underline that colonial homophobia is not put forward in postcolonial analyses of homophobia in Senegal. While as we will see later the study of colonial archives highlights a homophobic construction of Senegalese colonial society, postcolonial interventions tend to present homophobia as a postcolonial invention. We can therefore think that postcolonial homophobia is a form of appropriation of the homophobic colonial imaginary.

IV-2-a) The homophobic imaginary of French colonialism

It is in the writings of ethnographers, doctors, colonial anthropologists that we can find elements of homophobia and representations of homosexual practices in the French colonies. These documents attest to a varied sexuality in the colonial situation despite an institutional and social construction of heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm. The reading of this work shows a certain discomfort. Some describe homosexuals as perverts; others see homosexuality as imposed by the Europeans on a land that was untouched by any perversion; on the other hand, the practice of homosexuality by settlers results from a phenomenon of

native contamination (M'baye 2013: 116). All these approaches have one thing in common: their homophobic nature and social construction of heteronormativity through knowledge.

In *l'Ethnographie criminelle* (1894), Armand Corre, a French doctor and sociologist, blames the Senegalese local population for the deprivation of the mores of French soldiers. The sociologist justifies this situation by the difference of moral education between Africans and Europeans (Corre 1894: 9). He also denounces the sexual behaviour of French soldiers in Senegal who do not show attachment to the kingdom of heaven. Here again, the Senegalese population is blamed for homosexuality (Ibid 34). Describing the life of French soldiers in Africa, he points out that the soldiers exchange mutual and ignoble services, or, if they do not obtain the consent of a native, take them by force, to the detriment of our moral influence (Ibid.). Moreover, the French doctor is more explicit in a footnote when he affirms that he saw a military post where three of a group of five soldiers had a relationship in which a young caporal fulfilled the role of the woman, while a fourth member, a nostalgic Breton, was masturbating to death (Ibid).

But it is not only in Senegal that homosexuality among French soldiers has been observed. This was also the case in Algeria another French colony (Zwang 1975: 67). Colonel Weygand, son of a general and former legionary, testified that commanders had to turn a blind eye to what was happening between legionaries during the resting airs in desert oases (Ibid: 67). The absence of female partners and the weather in the settlements were often used as excuses for homosexual behaviour among settlers. In 1911, two writers, including a doctor of the army, reported that:

"When we arrived in Algeria, under the influence of the climate and because of the total lack of women . . . [soldiers] could not resist imitating the ways of the locals, and soon their bad reputation for having 'African morals' had reached France... Homosexuality in the [French] African army corresponded to a physical necessity, but not, in general, to a form of erotic folly"(Aldrich 2005: 267).

This argument put in perspective two main ideas. First, it refers to Richard Burton's "Sodatic Zone", which tends to geographically restrict the regions where homosexuality was located. Among these regions was North Africa. Second, there is this notion of homosexual contagion of the white man by indigenous peoples as it was described in Senegal. The sexuality of the natives is represented as unbridled and wild. Homosexuality, a sexual practice that was rejected in France at the time, was perceived as widespread among Algerians. To avoid contagion, one of the coloniser's strategies was to import women into the colonies. Thus, the

feminine presence, beyond delimiting the social space between settlers and natives, also aimed to maintain the purity of the white race, blurred the plurality of sexual practices and reinforced heterosexuality (Stoler 2005). In the colony, race and sexuality are different sides of the same coin.

On the other side, despite these discourses that attested to the presence of homosexual practices among the colonised during the colonial period, some French administrators had developed the hypothesis that homosexuality was non-African. So, Oswald Durand, colonial administrator, in an article entitled "Mœurs et Institutions d'une Famille Peule du Cercle de Pita" published in 1929 in the Bulletin of the Committee of Historical and Scientific Studies of French West Africa, argues:

"Les pratiques lesbiennes n'ont pas d'adeptes ici (...) L'homosexualité n'existe pas dans le Foutah; La loi coranique l'interdit et recommande que ceux qui en sont coupables soient mis à mort par strangulation; les corps des homosexuels doivent être brûlés et jetés en mer" (Durand 1929 : 75)[27].

The discourse of the French administrator in West Africa illustrates very well a conflict of representations of sexual practices between same-sex people in Africa and in Europe. Extending the idea of homosexuality as an importation into Africa, Durand as some authors highlighted, emphasised the fact that homosexuality in Africa is a foreign import (Mbisi 2011). French soldiers were criticised for their inability to control their sexual needs. A more in-depth analysis can make it possible to read behind this discourse the projection onto Africa of the ideal of a society in which the French colonisers wanted to live. Given that non-procreative sexuality was associated with homosexuality in France at the time, sodomy or pederasty was rejected by French society despite the decriminalisation of homosexual practices in 1791 after the French Revolution.

It is important here to recall that, when colonisation took place through Western discourse and conquest, homosexuals remained excluded from French society (Tamagne 2002). It was during this period that the medical discourse on homosexuality emerged and provided to the police and the public the intellectual justifications for the repression of homosexuals. Ambroise Tardieu is among those actors in France who played a leading role in the medical construction of homosexuality. He states that:

[27] "Lesbian practices have no followers here (...) Homosexuality does not exist in the Foutah; It is prohibited by The Koranic law. The Koranic law recommends that those who are guilty must be kill by strangulation; the bodies of homosexuals must be burned and thrown into the sea "(Durand 1929, 75).

"Les signes caractéristiques de la pédérastie passive, que nous verrons successivement, sont le développement excessif des fesses, la déformation en forme d'entonnoir de l'anus, la relaxation du sphincter (...) C'est sur le membre viril que l'on s'attend à trouver la marque des habitudes actives. Les dimensions du pénis sur les individus qui participent en tant que partenaire actif à la sodomie sont soit très grêles, soit très volumineuses: la minceur est la règle générale, la graisse est la rare exception; mais dans tous les cas, les dimensions sont excessives dans un sens ou dans l'autre" [28] (Tardieu 1873: 203).

He explains that the aim of his work was:

"de donner aux experts médicaux les moyens de reconnaître les pédérastes par certains signes, et ainsi de résoudre avec plus de certitude et d'autorité que cela n'a été possible jusqu'à présent, les questions pour lesquelles la justice invoque son assistance pour poursuivre et si possible, éradiquer ce vice honteux" (Tardieu 1873)[29].

The medical discourses which see homosexuality as a disease have resulted in the construction of a relationship between homosexuality and public space. It made it possible to scientifically demonstrate how homosexuals could constitute a danger to society, a threat to public order and why it was necessary to control them. We can see that this reasoning draws lines between the potential harm of the threat and constructs the figure of the potential victim. The aim of the repression of homosexuals is to prevent the contamination of society by individuals deemed dangerous. Society must be both protected and disinfected. Medicine also developed a classification of the sexes, contributed to the notion of a population as an administrative category, and facilitated the control of the body through power (Foucault 1976). This is why Foucault rejects the argument that sexuality has been repressed in society: sexuality is central to the emergence of a new technology of power he calls biopower.

Michel Foucault describes biopolitics as a set of techniques aimed at controlling the body of individuals. Power enters the realm of life. Individuals therefore lose all freedom and must conform to a set of mechanisms designed to discipline their life. It is this investment on the bodies of the population for regulation and control that will give rise, according to Foucault, to the figure of the homosexual. We are not only witnessing the establishment of norms or the

[28]"The characteristic signs of passive pederasty, which we will see successively, are the excessive development of the buttocks, the funnel-shaped deformation of the anus, the relaxation of the sphincter (...) It is on the virile member that one expects to find the mark of active habits. The dimensions of the penis on individuals who participate as an active partner in sodomy are either very slender or very bulky: thinness is the general rule, fat is the rare exception; but in all cases, the dimensions are excessive in one direction or the other " Translation of Boris Bertolt.

[29]"To give medical experts the means to recognize pederasts by certain signs, and thus to resolve with greater certainty and authority what has not been possible still today, the questions for which the courts invoke their assistance to continue and if possible, eradicate this shameful vice "Translation of Boris Bertolt

punishment of people judged deviant, but the construction of individuals in species or categories, the discovery of perversions, the consolidation of norms and the creation or organisation of social control agencies (Halperin 1998: 98).

It thus appears that French society, despite its decriminalisation of homosexuality, was a society in which homosexuals were rejected both socially and institutionally. However, one of the consequences of this new form of taking possession of the body was also the invention of heterosexuality. From a sexual point of view, society was divided into heterosexuals and homosexuals. Heterosexuality became the authoritative and institutionalised sexual norm.

The French colonial imaginary is therefore a homophobic and heterosexual imaginary. This explains both the discourse on the presence of sexual practices between people of the same sex as imported by French soldiers, those tending to accuse the Senegalese population of transmitting homosexuality to the colonisers or even those who deny the existence of any sexual practice between persons of the same sex.

Behind this double dynamic of a discourse attributing the presence of homosexuality among Senegalese to French soldiers and, on the other hand, a discourse denying the existence of such practices within Senegalese society, there is a social construction of the invisibility of homosexuality in Senegalese society. Thus, the social construction of homophobia obeyed a double strategy: the institutionalisation of heterosexuality on the one hand, and a selective memory with regard to sexual practices in persons of the same sex on the other. The problem is that this discourse on homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice has now been internalised by a majority of the Senegalese population.

During an interview in Dakar, a journalist told me: “Homosexuality is not part of our culture. We don't know this here in Senegal. It is the whites who bring us this matter here and we do not understand why they want us to accept what we do not know” (Interview, Dakar, January 7, 2018). These words, which are in line with part of the colonial discourse on homosexuality in Africa, reproduce these colonial ideas on gender and sexuality in Africa which have contributed to promoting heterosexuality and encouraging homophobia. However, if we only focus on discourses, we can think that the situation of people who are known today as homosexuals was difficult in Senegal during colonial era. This assumption is misleading. The Senegalese context was far more complex.

IV- 2-b) Once upon a time*: The Goor-Jigeen*

Like other regions of the African continent, early research aims to deconstruct what Wieringa (2009) describes as postcolonial amnesia. This is the desire of many Africans to deny the existence of same-sex sexual practices in Africa before the arrival of colonisation. It is in this register that we must situate the works of Hayes (2001) who address the question of Goor-jigeen (man-woman) in the book *Boy-wives and Female Husbands Studies of African Homosexualities*. The name Goor-Jigeen is now used to describe homosexuals in Senegal.

In the context of Senegal, same-sex sexuality was embodied by the figure of the Goor-Jigeen which appeared in the writings of several European travellers (M'Baye 2013). As early as 1884, Doctor Armand Corre described his encounters with some Goor-Jigeen in Dakar:

"J'ai rencontré à Saint-Louis des noirs, parés à la manière des femmes et en affectant les allures, qu'on m'a dit faire métier de leur prostitution. À Boké, j'ai vu, auprès d'un prince foulah, un griot, dont les danses lascives traduisaient bien le rôle plus intime qu'il devait remplir en la maison de l'altesse. Les habitudes de pédérastie ne sortent pas des milieux musulmans. Dans le langage wolof, l'expression pour les désigner serait de date récente, et elle n'existerait pas dans la plupart des idiomes africains"[30] (Corre 1894: 80).

During this period, the Senegalese figure of the Goor-Jigeen mainly referred to the adoption of attributes and social roles attributed to women by men, which included mannerisms, clothes, make-up and hairstyle (Hayes 2016). These social attributes did not necessarily correspond to the biological sex of the individual but were sometimes extended to men (Hayes 2016). The writer Michel Leiris for instance described an evening in a "Negro dance hall" of Dakar during which he saw "Negro pederasts [dancing] together in little arched jackets, [as well as] a white pederast with the appearance of a dancing clerk, a flower in his mouth, [dancing] with a negro sailor with a red pompom"[1] (Leiris 1988: 33). According to Leiris, the adoption of female attributes was not limited to the natives. Nor was the practice of same-sex sexuality. French soldiers also regularly exchanged mutual services with the locals or, in absence of consent, engaged in forced same-sex sexual intercourse (Corre 1894).

The English anthropologist, Geoffrey Gorer asserts that same-sex sexual relations did not suffer from social illegitimacy during colonisation:

[30]"I met blacks in Saint-Louis dressed like women and walking the same pace (...) At Boké, I saw a Foulah prince with a griot whose lascivious dances reflected the more intimate role he had to play in the house of his Highness. Pederasty habits do not come out of Muslim circles. In Wolof language, the expression to designate such beaver would be of recent date and would not exist in most African idioms". Translation of Boris Bertolt

"It is said that homosexuality is recent among the Wolof, at any rate in any frequency; but it now receives, and has for some years received such extremely august and almost publicly exhibited patronage, that pathics are a common sight. They are called in Wolof men women, gor-digen, and do their best to deserve the epithet by their mannerisms, their dress, and their make-up; some even dress their hair like women. They do not suffer in any way socially, though the Mohammedans refuse them religious burial; on the contrary they are sought after as the best conversationalists and the best dancers" (Gorer 1935: 36, cited by Hayes 2016 (2009): 89).

Although the term Goor-jigeen primarily referred to the adoption of social attributes associated with women, it was not a homogenous category. A French teacher in Dakar for instance described the Goor-jigeen as two distinct categories, emphasising the complexity of same-sex sexuality during the colonial era:

"Le problème des *ngor-digen* wolofs est plus complexe. Il y a des ‘’tapèt’’ qui sont des homosexuels tout à fait semblables à leurs correspondants européens et assez souvent en rapport avec eux dans les escales où ceux-ci sont représentés, mais il y a des *ngor-digen* qui font quelque peu penser au chamanisme, habillés en hommes mais de façons féminines, ayant des gestes féminins, voire habillés en femmes et conduisant en se déhanchant les femmes pour les tam-tam de fanal ou de faux-lion" (Béart 1955: 549, cited by M’Baye 2013: 127)[31].

According to this testimony, the notion of Goor-Jigeen referred in Senegal to two types of realities: the existence of men who engaged in homosexual practices; and the existence of men who were not necessarily involved in same-sex sexual relations but adopted feminine attributes. Hence the Goor-Jigeen was both a sexual figure and a social identity. But, in the stories of Western travellers in Africa, it is the sexual figure of the Goor-Jigeen that is mainly put forward. The English journalist, Michael Davidson, described Dakar as a gay city in a text published in 1970. He states that:

"In 1949, (…) Dakar was already the “gay” city of West Africa. When I returned nine years later, the French rulers had gone, and Dakar was gayer than ever… For some reason, buried in history and ethnography, the Senegalese (…) have a reputation in all those regions for homosexuality, and in Dakar one can quickly see that they merit this reputation" (Davidson 1998: 111).

David Gamble, an ethnographer quoted by Murray, argues that homosexuality existed during French colonisation in Dakar (Murray 1998: 107). Historian Michael Crowder argues that:

[31] The issue of the Wolof Goor-Jigeens is complex. There are ‘tapets’ who are homosexuals and quite similar to their European counterparts...often [they] enter in contact with them in the stopovers where they are overrepresented, but there are also Goor-Jigeens who are somehow related to shamanism. [They are either] dressed as men but in feminine ways with feminine gestures, or as women [and they] wiggle on the rhythms of drums [made] of fanal or false lion. (Béart in M’Baye 2013:127). Translation of Boris Bertolt.

"Homosexuality had a much freer rein [than prostitution], being prevalent amongst Africans, Mauretanians and Europeans alike. (…) Today one can even see Jollof men dressed in women's clothes. I once met one in a small bar outside Dakar. He was obviously pathetically feminine. The Jollof must be used to this since they even have a word for them – Goor-Digen. The elders and faithful Muslims condemn men for this, but it is typical of African tolerance that they are left very much alone by the rest of the people" (Crowder 1959: 68, cited by Hayes 2016 (2009): 89-90).

These accounts illustrate the assimilation of the Goor-Jigeen to homosexuals. However, homosexuality is a politico-legal category whose invention dates back to the 19th century in Europe. It cannot therefore be adapted as a descriptive conceptual category of sexual practices between people of the same sex in all societies and at all times (Greenberg 1988: 4). Moreover, recent ethnographic and anthropological surveys on sexual practices between same-sex people in Africa have shown that these practices have always been situational, even contextual, and are not based on a binary conception of sexuality between heterosexuals and homosexuals (Morgan & Wiering 2005: 19).

This research thus calls into question the existence of a homosexual subculture as described in the accounts of Western travellers. People involved in same-sex sexual practices engage in these practices for many different reasons, depending on social context, norms, desire and even traditions, without forming a clear-cut sexual identity. This is what Potgieter (2005) called strategic agency. This situation explains why even in traditional Muslim societies during the colonial period, homosexuality was not a problem. Because, even if heterosexuality is defined as a marker of allegiance to the Prophet Muhammad, homosexuality as a social, political and legal category is unknown.

Research on homosexuality in Senegal has mainly focused on men. Female homosexuality is approached incidentally to illustrate the overall context of homophobia. Unlike in other African countries, there is no research on female homosexuality in Senegal during colonisation. Even today, governmental and non-governmental reports that deal with homosexual issues usually give a marginal place to female same-sex sexuality. I have not been able to find any report from the National Commission against AIDS in Senegal which discusses the situation among lesbians. The reports only deal with male homosexuality. One of the Commission's members that I met in Dakar argues that:

"We don't have yet a lesbian study. We don't have a study which shows the level of vulnerability of lesbians to HIV in Senegal. But the MSM (men who have sex with men) associations work with lesbians and often organise meetings with them. Lesbians sometimes

work with us, and we give them information to protect themselves" (Interview with R26, Dakar, February 3, 2018).

Loes Oudenhuijsen (2018), explores the intimacy between women in Senegal in a context of social hostility towards same-sex sexual practices in Senegal. Beyond showing identification processes and sexual categories, this work provides an overview of the survival strategies deployed in consolidating and manufacturing a queer community.

Still, research on the Goor-jigeen confirms the existence of same-sex sexual practices during the colonial period in Senegal. In the Senegalese context, the Goor-Jigeen, as stated previously referred to a social role rather than to a sexual identity. Particularly appreciated by women, Goor-jigeen often accompanied them to the fields, advised them and more generally spent time with them (Broqua 2017). During weddings and baptisms, they entertained the guests and played the roles of poets, musicians, or performers (Niang 2010). Goor-jigeen could also marry a man, although it did not necessarily mean that the couple had to share the same household. Instead, weddings between a Goor-Jigeen and a man were considered as a festive occasion and an opportunity to meet people in the community (Niang 2010). The Goor-Jigeen was consequently a socially accepted figure in Senegal who fulfilled a number of social functions.

It therefore appears that the construction of social categories is not static but fluid, changing over time, space and with the transformations of a society. They can also constitute inventions. However, in contemporary Senegal, the Goor-jigeen are now associated with homosexuality and homosexual identity.

IV-3 – The postcolonial criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices

From the previous discussions, two essential facts emerge: Unlike in British colonies, there were no laws in the French colonies explicitly criminalising same-sex sexual practices. Nevertheless, the two colonial models agreed on the fact that these practices existed in colonial societies. The absence of laws criminalising homosexuality in the French colonies cannot be interpreted as an acceptance of homosexuality, in view of the French colonial homophobic imagination. Instead, the principle of "don’t ask, don’t tell" was in force in the French colonies. However, this context will change after Senegal's independence with the adoption of a criminal law criminalising same-sex sexual practices

From a social constructionist point of view, what stems from this ambiguity in the management of the issue of deviance and particularly of the notion of Goor-jigeen is the complexity of the notion of deviance. In a colonial system which promotes a heteronormative society, same-sex sexual practices could be considered deviant. And yet, the Goor-jigeen were not treated as deviants. Therefore, if it appears today that homosexuality as deviance is a creation of the dominant social group, namely the coloniser in his project of transmitting heterosexual values and morals to Senegalese, the Goor-jigeen did not, however, arouse negative reactions in society. This confirms that deviance in a society takes on its full meaning from the reactions it elicits within the dominant group. As Becker (1963) argues "deviance is not a simple quality, present in some kinds of behavior and absent in others. Rather, it is the product of a process which involves responses of other people to the behavior".

The other problem is the issue of rules. The existence of unwritten rules, such as those prescribed by morality, does not always lead to sanctions. With regard to homosexuality, as I emphasised earlier, there were no formal rules punishing sexual practices between people of the same sex in the French colonies. The absence of formal rules therefore made it difficult to apply sanctions against homosexuals. In 1942, however, the condemnation of same-sex sexual practices would be reintroduced into French criminal law by the Vichy regime.

Paragraph 1 of section 334 of the French Penal Code of 1942 stipulated:

"Will be punished with imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of 2,000 FF to 6,000 FF: Anyone who either has to satisfy the passions of others, aroused, favored or usually facilitated debauchery or corruption of the youth of either sex under the age of 21, either to satisfy their own passions, committed one or more indecent or unnatural acts with a minor of their sex under the age of twenty-one" [32].

What must be specified here is that if the contemporary analysis of the text suggests that it refers to paedophilia or pederasty, we cannot forget that, until recently, these tendencies were linked to homosexuality in French society. Several dictionaries and encyclopaedias give the definition of sodomy as: "crime of Sodom with reference to biblical history" (Dictionary of Trévoux, Dictionary of Richelet, Dictionary of law and practice of Claude Joseph Ferrière (1680-1748) and the Encyclopaedia of D'Alembert and Diderot). According to the legal definition in 1780, "Pederasty or sodomy is the crime of every man with a man, of every

[32] Law n ° 742 published in the Official Journal of August 27, 1942, p.2923

woman with a woman, even of a man with a woman, when, through unimaginable debauchery, they do not 'use the ordinary path of procreation"[33].

The ordinary path of procreation discussed at this time refers to vaginal penetration that takes place in a sexual relationship between a man and a woman. The French penal code of 1942 took up a set of representations of sexuality that were in force in the 18th century and reinstated the legal repression of homosexuality in French society. This paragraph 1 of article 334 will be amended and moved to paragraph 3 of article 331 of the criminal by ordinance 45-190 of February 8, 1945, reading: "Shall be punished by imprisonment of six months to three years and a fine of 60 FF to 15,000 FF anyone who commits an act of indecent or unnatural behaviour with an individual of his sex under the age of twenty-one. "[34]

This change in the French penal code will not have an impact in the colony for three reasons. First of all, homosexuality was already locally prohibited by Islamic law. Secondly, the Goor-Jigeen do not refer to a sexual identity but to a social role. Finally, even if the law punishes the act and not the person, homosexuality not being a social and sexual category makes it difficult to apply the law. But, from a legal point of view, the contribution of this new device will have been to harmonise the colonial law that also applied to Senegalese who obtained French citizenship with the traditional values encouraged by Islam.

From a theoretical point of view, this situation gives rise to two observations. First, it confirms the thesis that the shift from deviance to crime or criminalisation is not an ex-nihilo process. It is a human enterprise that operates through legislation orchestrated by a dominant group. In the Senegalese context, it was the coloniser who imposed a law criminalising homosexuality. Thus, in the French colonies from 1945, the Goor-jigeen no longer only violate moral values, but are also considered criminals. Subsequently, as highlighted by social constructionism, criminalisation does not necessarily lead to repression. We find ourselves in this scenario in a context of secret deviance: "an improper act is committed, yet no one notices it or reacts to it as a violation of the rules. As in the case of false accusation, no one really knows how much of this phenomenon exists" (Becker 1963). So, the same behaviour may not be an offense of the rules at one time and be an offense to the rule at another time.

[33] Cited by Sibalis but read Pierre-Jean-Jacques-Guillaume Guyot, *Repertoire universelle et raisonne de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, et beneficiale,* 17 vols. (Paris, 1784-85), 13:60-61.
[34] However, it should be recalled here that since 1982 this law was repealed with the coming to power of French President François Mitterrand.

Crucially, the new French penal code is drawn up in a context of decolonisation. Former colonies are preparing for independence. After its independence, on April 4, 1960, it is French law that applied in Senegal. I have already mentioned that, since 1942, homosexuality was criminalised by French criminal law. To assert its autonomy, Senegal acquired new legal texts that replaced the judiciary system in force during the colonial period. The colonial judiciary system was characterised by a normative pluralism. Two types of rights based on racial separation were applied in colonial societies. French colonial law applied to European populations, indigenous law for local populations and even traditional and religious law (Solus 1927; Mangin 1997). Among these new legal texts was the criminal law adopted in 1965.

Although the Senegalese criminal law does not explicitly refer to homosexuality, same-sex sexual practices are today repressed under section 319 of the criminal law which states that:

"[s]hall be punished by one to five years and a fine of 100,000 to 1,500,000 francs, whoever has committed an indecency or unnatural act with an individual of his sex. If the act was committed with a minor of twenty-one years old, the maximum penalty will always be pronounced".

However, this controversy from a legal point of view cannot be explained if we do not take into account the correlation which existed between the French colonial inheritance and the development of the criminal law in Senegal after its accession to independence. In the social construction of postcolonial African societies, postcolonial theory has developed the notion of legal mimicry to refer to a normative phenomenon that is characterised by the importation or transplantation of a legal system into another, and manifested through the imitation, interpretation, or standardisation of legal norms (Agostini 1990; Mény 1993). Similarities have been established between the legal and institutional frameworks of postcolonial societies and those of their former colonial powers (Ki-Zerbo 1995; Gaudusson 2009). This mimicry is for some authors a barrier in the current development of Africa (Bugnicourt 1973). This argument is based on the idea that Western standards cannot be applied to African societies because of historical, social, and cultural differences.

Regarding homosexuality, legal mimicry takes two forms. First, the circulation of ideas. The notion of an unnatural act used in the Senegalese criminal law to repress homosexuality is also found in philosophical debates that took place in France during the French revolution around sodomy, as well as in earlier religious discourses. In his philosophical writings, Rousseau thought that sodomy was unnatural, based on his theory of natural feeling, and that

it could only lead to the collapse of society (Zaoui 2003: 319-320). For Montesquieu, sodomy is unnatural (Montesquieu, 1995). Voltaire did not think that homosexuality could be tolerated in any society. He says: "I will not believe in Sextus Empiricus, who claims that among the Persians, pederasty was ordered. What a pity! How to imagine that men would have made a law which, if it had been executed, would have destroyed the race of men" (Voltaire 1984).

There is behind the "unnatural" argument the view that homosexuality is a threat to society. The use of the right to preserve the existence and public morality becomes vital (Devlin 1965: 10). The sphere of individual liberties (Mill 1859) which can curb the sphere of intervention of the State in the private life of individuals does not exist to the extent that the criminal law considers homosexuals to harm both society and themselves. The state as guarantor of the security of individuals has the duty to protect even homosexuals. The goal of punishment of same-sex sexual practices is to reduce the number of risks they pose to society (Devlin 1965), but also to encourage them to embrace a so-called natural sexuality (Dworkin 1970: 109).

This conception of a natural sexuality that deserves to be framed by the state is based on the heterosexism of Senegalese society. As we will see later, multiple interviews conducted in the field suggest that the so-called natural order of sexuality is the one that occurs between a man and a woman. Other forms of sexuality are perceived as abominations. Heterosexuality is the bedrock of the family. The family is the main instrument of organisation and social regulation in Senegal. Thus, it is not only the homosexual act that is worrying, but the threat it poses to collective interests.

Secondly, beyond the circulation of ideas, legal mimicry can also be analysed through the borrowing of ideas. Aristotle teaches us that imitation is a crucial element of human nature. Humans differ from other animals by their capacity to imitate. René Girard postulates that imitation, rather than innovation, is the meaning of every man (Girard 2004).

Another example of mimicry is the resemblance between the Article 319 of the Senegalese criminal law and the Article 334 (1) of the French Act of August 6, 1942, which concerns penalties for incitements to debauchery and the corruption of minors under twenty-one years of age. Although the article does not explicitly mention the term “homosexuality”, it will serve as the legal basis for the re-criminalisation of non-heterosexuality in France,[4] before being amended and moved to paragraph three of the Article 331 of the Penal Code by Ordinance 45-190 of February 8, 1945.[5] Under the paragraph one of the Article 344 of the French Penal Code of 1942:

"...will be punished with imprisonment from six months to three years and a fine of 2000 to 6000 francs whoever will have, either to satisfy the passions of others, excited, favoured or facilitated the debauchery of corruption of the youth of either sex under twenty-one years old, [or] to satisfy their own passions, committed one or more indecency or unnatural acts with a minor of his sex under the age of twenty-one years old".

In sum, legal mimesis in the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal is apparent in two ways: first through the qualification of same-sex sexual practices as “unnatural” and “indecency acts”; and second through the penalties incurred by individuals engaging in same-sex sexual practices. Yet, this mimetic logic is not integral.

When I worked at the Dakar National Archives on the legislative process leading to the adoption of the Senegalese penal code in 1965, I discovered that, during the introduction of parliamentary debates on the penalisation of homosexuality in 1965, Mr. Khar N’dofene Diouf announced that "for the purpose of youth protection, immodest acts committed by an individual with a minor of his sex which were previously punishable from six months to three years of imprisonment, are now punishable under Article 319 from one to five years of the same sentence” (ANS 1965). Diouf emphasised during the reading of his report that in terms of punishment, the criminal law is inspired by French criminal law (Ibid). Senegalese legislators based their work on the French criminal laws, but decide to adopt more severe sanctions against same-sex sexual practices than in France. Thus, mimicry produces speeches or representations that can be altered, reworked, or exaggerated.

The text mainly refers to pederasty. But if we contextualise his production while making a connection with the French text of 1942, we see that the amalgamation in the interpretation of the French text around pederasty, paedophilia and homosexuality is reproduced in the Senegalese context.

Given that the postcolonial Senegalese elites toughened the punishment for same-sex sexual practices, we can conclude that the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal is a dynamic process that involves both the coloniser and the colonised. Ashis Nandy emphasises that the settler and the colonised became co-victims through the colonial encounter (Nandy 1983: 30). As before him, Frantz Fanon indicated that colonisation affects both parties at the same time (Fanon 1952, 1961). It is therefore important to stress that Senegal’s postcolonial society was built by both French and Senegalese (Nandy 1987: 31). Legal homophobia highlights this dual responsibility. Still, despite the passing of the 1965 law criminalising homosexual acts, homosexuals would remain invisible subjects for years to come.

Conclusion

It appears that French colonisation played an important role in the construction of homophobia in Senegal. First, the civilising mission institutionalised heterosexuality as a dominant sexual norm in a sexually plural society. This imposition of moral and sexual values in force in the West onto the colonised helped construct a heteronormative society by making reproduction the ultimate goal of the sexual act. Moreover, it consolidated the heterosexual family as the basis of social and political organisation.

While homosexuality was viewed as deviance in the eyes of the coloniser, homosexuals called Goor-jigeen were not rejected in society. Even the subsequent criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices in colonial laws did not result in legal repression of Senegalese homosexuals. The first change occurred with a mimetic dynamic after independence, when Senegalese authorities imported legal provisions in force in France and criminalised homosexuality. It is at once the ideas and texts of laws that structured the representations of homosexuality between the 19th and 20th centuries in France which today constitute the fabric of legal homophobic discourse in its former colonies. Subsequently there was a re-labelling of the Goor-jigeen, whose roles underwent a process of resignification to be exclusively associated with homosexuality. Despite the criminalisation of same-sex practices in 1965, homosexuals were tolerated for more than three decades. In order to understand the rise of homophobia as a social and political force in postcolonial Senegal, we must examine the role of moral entrepreneurs.

CHAPTER V: MORAL ENTREPRENEURS, HOMOPHOBIA AND BENEFITS

The previous chapter established the link between French colonialism and homophobia in Senegal, especially the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices in 1965. However, it should be noted that for decades, the existence of section 319 of the criminal law was not systematically applied. The Goor-Jigeen, who are now referred to as homosexuals, have not always suffered from legal repression and social illegitimacy. It is only recently that the term Goor-Jigeen has undergone a process of redefinition. This process started in 2008 with an increase in the arrests and trials of homosexuals. In this chapter, I attribute this transformation to moral entrepreneurs.

Becker (1963) defines moral entrepreneurs as individuals or groups who seek to promote certain moral codes or rules. These entrepreneurs set themselves up as guardians of the moral values of a society. They set themselves up as builders of what is good or bad, accepted or tolerated. As Stanley Cohen (2011: 1) notes, "the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions". In this context, the marginalised and invisible category is described as a threat to society, equated with the devil. Discourses generate stigma accompanied by negative stereotypes. They call on the state to act in order to prevent the collapse of society.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the enterprise of demonising homosexuals in Senegal and the commitment of the state in the fight against homosexuality results from the work of two categories of actors: the media and religious leaders. The media have been instrumental in creating a social problem that did not exist in the past through a negative resignification of the Goor-jigeen and the construction of a sexual panic. Religious leaders have embarked on a moral crusade against homosexuals in the name of Islam. Later, I show that the State decided to act against homosexuals within the framework of an alliance between political actors and religious leaders that has been maintained since the colonial period and was consolidated by the postcolonial state.

V-1) The Creation of a social problem

Labelling theorist highlight the socially constructed trait of deviance/crime which they claim can only take place in social interaction (Kitsuse's 1962; Goffman 1963; Lemert 1951).

Deviant behaviour can vary depending on the societies, contexts, and actors. As illustrated in the previous chapter, same-sex sexual practices shifted from deviance to crime in 1965. Despite the creation of homosexuality as a crime, the Goor-jigeen were not a social problem. This problem arose in Senegal in the early 2000s, almost forty years after the introduction of section 319 in the penal code, when homosexuals are publicly described and perceived as threats to Senegalese society. In other words, the demonisation of homosexuals has followed a long and protracted process. According to Cohen (1972) social problem construction always needs some form of enterprise. This manufacture of social problems is also referred by Tannebaum (1938) as the "dramatization of evil". A process partially described in the following lines.

V-1-a) From 1980's – 2000's: The era of negative resignification

The Senegalese criminal law is inherited from the colonial heterosexuality morality. This is why I agree with Finnis (1992: 141) when he defines law as " a cultural object, constructed, or (…) posited by creative human choices, [and which] is an instrument, a technique adopted for a moral purpose, and adopted because there is no other available way of agreeing over significant spans of time about precisely how to pursue the moral project well ". Thus, after gaining independence, the criminalisation of homosexuality in 1965 created a new category of criminals. Nonetheless, the Goor-jigeen were not immediately labelled as criminals or deviants. In fact, they continued to be socially accepted and enjoyed freedom in Senegalese society.

In Dakar, I met with R1, the head of a lesbian rights organisation, who describes the role they played in the past:

"The Sabar is the traditional dance among the Woloff tribe in Senegal. The goor-Jigeen is the gay. This dance was public because it was organised in the street. Our moms used to say: if you don't wash dishes or clothes quickly, you're not going to the *saba goorjigeen*. We didn't talk about lesbians. It's things that were done, we understood but we did not talk about it. But the Goor-Jigeen had a social role. They were the best hairdressers in the 1960s and 1970s. My mother got married in 1969 -1970. She used to tell me that sometimes she left Dakar for another area to queue up and get her hair done at a gay hair saloon and even her dress was made by a gay. She boasted about that in 1969, I was not born at that period. So, it's something that has always been in our heads. But it is now that we are starting to talk about violence against Goor-jigeen." (Interview with R1, Dakar, December 12, 2018).

These "Sabar" had nothing to do with the "modernised" or urbanised Sabars during which intimate parts of women are exhibited. Traditional "Sabars" put more emphasis on the aesthetic values of dance. This testimony reveals that, even after independence, the Goor-

jigeen were seen to play an important social role for the balance of society to the extent that their activities were entertaining to children. Socially, they inspired neither fear nor disgust. They were in regular contact with the population, especially women. The respondent informs us that the lesbian category was unknown, which does not mean that sexual practices between women were non-existent. In fact, R1 says they were aware of the presence of women who had sex with other women in society, but the term lesbian as a concept referring to a sexual category and sexual identity was unknown. But the fact that the concept did not exist in everyday language does not mean that the practice was absent. Here again we encounter the problem of the Westernisation of sexual categories.

It is important to emphasise that the role of Goor-jigeen must be related to the status of women. Before the colonial period, there were many spaces in Africa and in Senegal dominated by women. Some women had a special status that allowed them to build spaces where they had total control. The Goor-jigeen accompanied beautiful women, often corpulent. Before each ceremony, the Goor-jigeen would play the role of stylist or makeup artist. During the ceremony, he could be the poet, the musician, or the impresario.

But the influence of Goor-jigeen was not limited to the social level. They seem to have played a significant role from a political point of view after independence. Niang explains that:

"Lamine Guèye and the future President Senghor, the two main African political leaders in the period just prior to Senegalese independence were both very popular with the female electorate. They benefited from networks of female leaders capable of mobilizing important masses of voters. Several of these women leaders – if not all of them - were surrounded by networks of Goor-jigeen who played decisive roles in social and political mobilisation. Tradition states that women and Goor-jigeen together organised the triumphal entry of Senghor into the Senegalese city of Saint-Louis after his successful election campaign. He was reportedly welcomed by Goor jigeen singing ‘Ar watam, mbimi xañ ma ci’, which in a coded language signifies ‘Come and make love to me" (Niang 2010: 118-119).

Until recently in Senegal, when talking about Goor-Jigeen, they did not refer primarily to a sexual orientation but to a social or political role. We can date the mutations of meaning, roles, and significance of Goor-jigeen not from the 1990s like Christophe Broqua (2017) thinks, but rather from the 1980s. Two major factors seem important from our point of view. First, the appearance of HIV/AIDS and the implementation of protection programmes for infected people. In 1986, Senegal had become one of the first countries in Africa to adopt a national strategy to curb this scourge (Sow 2005). The inclusion of homosexuals in these programmes increased the visibility of homosexuality in the country. The second factor,

which is linked to the first, is the role of the media in the process of stigmatisation and stereotyping.

Media are important in the process of setting the agenda, transmitting images and breaking the silence on a topic (Cohen 1972). Foucault underlines the fact that: “In every society the production of discourse is all at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (cited by Young 2009: 53). Because discourse is part of a dynamic of power that produces representations and knowledge, it is related to an ideology in favour of a class or interest group (Hall 1997). The emergence of a new media discourse in the early 1980s on the Goor-jigeen opens the door to a renegotiation of the meanings and definitions of the place and roles of the Goor-jigeen in Senegalese society.

In 1982, the newspaper *Djamra*, produced by the Islamic organisation JAMRA, published several articles to denounce the scourges that undermine Senegalese society, which notably included prostitution, debauchery and homosexuality. One of the photos which accompanied these articles depicted a woman with the caption: "This woman is a man". This caption illustrates the desire to fight sexual practices which challenge heterosexual identities. It highlights the perceived risks that homosexuals represent for binary representations of masculinity and femininity. In another article published by *Djamra*, homosexuality is described as an "aberrant practice in relation to the physiological significance of the sexual function".

During an interview I conducted with the director of JAMRA, he explains the context in which this discourse emerged:

"In the 1980s, we noticed that the behaviours of people were changing. We created this newspaper to think, to sensitise, to prevent and campaign in favour of populations exposed to these deviances. We observed that we were moving towards horizons that were not better and we warned on time. This is why our first actions were to fight against drugs in general and all social evils (illiteracy, homosexuality) etc. "(Interview with R2, Dakar, January 14, 2018).

What is striking with the testimony of the R2 is its departure from the remarks of the R1. We can see that, if in the early 1960s and 1970s lesbians and gays did not constitute identifiable categories in society, a change took place in the 1980s. This change is noticeable when the R2 emphasises that homosexuality from this period is perceived as deviant. What also appears

here is that by the early 1980s, the *Djamra* newspaper and the JAMRA organisation created a social problem that did not exist. Because from a legal point of view, homosexuality is not explicitly mentioned in the criminal, but the Goor-jigeen are member of the Senegalese society. Becker (1963) defined them as rule creators.

In issue five of Djamra, published in April 1984, homosexuality is classified within "the sinister files of social degradation in Dakar" (Niang 2010: 122). Issue six denounces it as one of the evils to combat. The editorialist, Abdou Latif Gueye, categorises homosexuality as one of the political issues in the country: "not only are they rebels and prevaricators behind the evils we are fighting, they are above all huge financials and political interests". He perceives homosexuality as a consequence of the "acculturation" and "moral decay" of Senegalese society due to Westernisation. Gueye's editorial called for a struggle against these 'problems' and advocated a "return to zero ", a "return to our own identity " and a "return to what we truly are " (Gueye 1984: 4). We can therefore see that, from this period, an enterprise of demonisation and enemification of homosexuals emerged in the media discourse. Homosexuality is described as a major political issue faced by Senegalese society.

Those rule creators could also be crusading reformers (Becker 1963). They are not only satisfied with the law, but also feel a duty to protect Senegalese society from an evil that plagues it. They are convinced that they are doing something right in the name of protecting the community. The crusader is not only interested in ensuring that other people do what he thinks is right. He believes that, if they do what is right, it will be good for them, or he may feel that his reform will prevent certain kinds of exploitation (Becker 1963). Homosexuality therefore emerges as a social problem that explicitly deserves to be addressed. As Plummer (1975: 32) suggests, "[s]exuality has no meaning other than that given to it in social situations".

Even though during this period, we didn't observe a spread of homophobic discourse, this does not prevent it from gradually spreading across Senegalese society. Respondent 30, 35 years old, was a PhD Student in Linguistic at Cheikh Anta Diop University at Dakar. Speaking of this gradual transformation of the meaning of Goor-jigeen and the emergence of a new sexual morality, here is what he claims to have experienced when he was 14:

"When we were too young, one day, I remember very well, there was a dancer - a man, at the time he was still a boy - who came from the village of Diofor to participate in the competition. Despite being a man, Samba - this is his name - was an excellent "Sabar" dancer and the girls sympathised with him very well. One day, while I was discussing with my brothers and

friends under a large tree in the village, I do not know what, we saw Samba, the dancer of Sabar, accompanied by another cousin. This is how he began to greet - giving his hand as usual - people, and I could feel a certain silence in the group, and a discomfort on the faces. That day, I remember very well, I refused to shake his hand, because in the popular sayings, it was whispered that Samba was a "goor-jigeen", the Wolof term assigned to homosexuals in Senegal. At that moment, I could not realise how much violence I had done to this person" (Interview with R30, Dakar, May 20, 2018).

From this testimony of R30, we can see that the Goor-Jigeen shifted from the status of social actors to that of a group rejected by society. They are no longer subjects of entertainment but arouse fear and contempt. These rejectionist attitudes will gradually become anchored in society and generate an explosion of violence against homosexuals. His refusal to greet Samba aims to show him that he is no longer welcome in the community. This situation denotes the passage of same-sex sexual practices from the status of secret deviance to pure deviance (Becker 1963). In this context, even if not all Goor-jigeen are homosexuals, the social reactions aroused against this social category transform the Goor-jigeen into deviants and give birth to a social problem.

We can observe that, during the 1980s and through to the beginning of 1990s, the first victory of crusading reformers was to reconfigure the meaning of the concept of Goor-jigeen and associate it with homosexuality. This is a renegotiation of the meanings of deviance. Ferrell (2013) underlines that ‘meaning’ refers to the contested social and cultural processes by which situations are defined, individuals and groups are categorised, and human consequences are understood. There is therefore a close link between the way we react to a subject and the set of representations built around it. Meanings arise from the daily interactions that take place in everyday life and can take different forms in different contexts (Ferrell 2013: 259). Therefore, the hostility displayed towards the Goor-jigeen and their gradual rejection creates deviance. This situation does not lead to a state reaction.

As early as 1999, Goor-jigeen became subjects of persecution. Their clothing was assimilated to the promotion of homosexuality. This aspect seems interesting to me insofar as those who are designated as transvestites are those who in the past entered the category of Goor-jigeen. Confusion arises in the representations, because the Goor-jigeen also referred to men who wore feminine outfits. The use of the term “transvestite” to designate them by the media has a dual function: it masks the social role of the Goor-jigeen and reduces the wearing of feminine clothes to a gender category. Henceforth, the social role merges into the sexual role. The notion of “role”, borrowed from McIntosh (1968), is interesting because it is easy to see that

the category of Goor-jigeen once played a social role that is no more. The Goor-jigeen have become a category that is used to erect barriers around sexuality. Thus, social roles, like deviance, are not timeless and can change according to transformations in a society.

This blurring of social and sexual identities has another function, namely, to create negative labels that can be imposed on Goor-jigeen, amounting to a process of stereotyping and stigmatisation. The work of cultural and media studies has largely emphasised the processes by which individuals are stereotyped. Lipman (1922) emphasises that stereotypes use negative connotations to falsely describe individuals or groups. Hall (1997: 258) argues that stereotyping "reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes 'difference". Stereotypes function as markers, labels, negative images that help to define the perception of reality and exclude individuals or groups of people whose behaviour appears to be outside socially established norms. As a result, the Goor-jigeen lose the positive social role they previously occupied and are equated with homosexuals, as intended by crusading reformers.

The biggest scandal occurred at the seaside town of Saly, where a "parade of transvestites" was organised. JAMRA requested and obtained the closure of the club. The same year, transvestites were arrested in Dakar's Independence Square (Ndiaye 1999). Following this event, the Senegalese daily newspaper *Le Matin* publishes an article entitled "Homosexuality: the warning situation reached?" where they wrote:

"Dans les grandes agglomérations urbaines coloniales de l'époque […] on tolérait ces hommes efféminés […]. Quand ces bouffons ont commencé à se prendre au sérieux, c'est-à-dire à dépasser le cadre du travesti rigolo, pour vivre carrément leur transfert de libido, les gens les ont désignés à la vindicte populaire. Ils étaient devenus des "goordjiguène" dont le lot quotidien, depuis lors, est fait de lapidation et de quolibet" (Aïdara, 1999)[35].

These events lead to three reflections. First, in 1999, Goor-jigeen began to be linked to homosexuals. In the past, Goor-Jigeen were also seen as transvestites. Second, dress codes became an instrument of definition of masculinity and femininity. Thus, a man wearing female clothes was now considered deviant. Finally, the Goor-Jigeen are now equated with homosexuals. The term took the form of an insult. Pierre Bourdieu (1990: p.33) argues that there is no worse insult than to call a man "possessed" or "fucked". the term "fucked" here has

[35] "In the great urban agglomerations during the colonial periods [...] these effeminate men were tolerated [...]. When these jesters began to take themselves seriously, like, to go beyond the framework of fun transvestite, to live squarely their transfer of libido, people designated them to lynching. They had become "Goor-Jigeen" who's daily life, since that time is made of stoning and quibbling" (Aïdara, 1999).

a negative connotation in a heterosexist environment because it refers to anal intercourse outside of vaginal intercourse.

The labels that a society uses to identify scapegoat deviants embody socially constructed stereotypes (Goode 1990). My study of the Senegalese media reveals that the process of stereotyping and stigmatisation follows two paths: a negative labelling process and demonisation. Homosexuals are labelled in Senegal through expressions such as: *pédés, tapettes, gays, étalon, Goorjigeen, transvestites, effeminate*. These terms are used to describe male homosexuality. Female homosexuals are designated by the term lesbian. The multiplicity of expressions around male homosexuality reflects the complexity and difficulty experienced by the Senegalese media in describing people who share this sexual orientation. But these designations aim at separating these individuals from society, differentiating them from the dominant social group and establishing barriers between homosexuals and heterosexuals.

If from a general point of view these concepts aim to establish a parallel between male homosexuality and femininity, the confusion or the absence of conceptual clarifications creates a scramble around gender identities. Thus, transvestites and Goor-jigeen are represented as homosexuals.

"If there is one person who will think well before thinking of the Sorano Theatre, it is the well-known Goor-jigeen, Serigne Mbaye. Mandated by the businesswoman, Ndèye Astou Athie, to give an envelope stuffed with money to the group CEDDO who was celebrating his birthday, the transvestite was hit by the boos of the public who told him to leave the place" (*Walfgrandplace*, May 14, 2007).

"Like the most famous transvestite of Senegal, Maniang Kasse, our son, Louga counts many homosexuals. But given the religious weight, some preferred to take refuge to make a fortune and live their vices" (*Walfgrandplace*, 2006: 3).

The stereotypes assigned to homosexuals, the amalgams maintained around the identity of gender aim to exclude, marginalise, stigmatise and lock up homosexuals in the language registers of threat and danger. In this context, stereotypes have a hegemonic function. Because discourse is part of a dynamic of power and allows the making of representations and knowledge, it is thus related to an ideology in favour of a class, a group of interest or people (Hall 1992 :202).

Beyond negative resignification, the visibility of homosexuals has been heightened by the national and international campaigns against HIV/AIDS carried out by JAMRA. However,

associative mobilisations in favour of homosexuals in a context where a set of negative connotations are already associated with this category, will have the effect of reinforcing hostility towards them, as happened in 2008.

V-1-b) 2008: Media and the sexual panic

If the media played an important role in the construction of homosexuality as a threat in the 1980s, it was from 2008 onwards that they managed to build a sexual panic around homosexuality. This panic resulted in state and non-state stigmatisation, ostracism and the social exclusion of homosexuals. As argues by Herdt (2009) sexual panics may generate the creation of monstrous enemies—sexual scapegoats. This "othering" dehumanises and strips individuals and whole communities of sexual and reproductive rights, exposing fault lines of structural violence (Hunt 1998). In this process of demonising homosexuals, the media play an essential role. In Senegal, it was mainly the written press that was at the heart of this dynamic.

Prior to 2008, Senegal was described as one of the most tolerant countries towards homosexuals in Africa (Teunis 1996), even if being visible constituted a risk for homosexuals. Those who publicly transgressed sexual norms exposed themselves to stonings by Muslims. The country is still recognised as respecting certain norms of democracy such as political pluralism, the peaceful transition of power and the respect of freedom of peoples. Senegal was recognised as a "safe country" by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office Français pour la Protection des Refugiés - OFPRA), despite the ongoing armed conflict in the south of the country that has lasted for almost three decades. Senegal was the first country in French-speaking Africa to set up public health programmes specifically for men who had sex with men (Lamarange 2009). However, three events damaged this image to such an extent that the country is today described as a homophobic country.

The first event took place in February 2008, after the publication of photos of a marriage between two men in *petit-Mbao*, a locality located at 20km in the South of Dakar, by the magazine *Icone*. The photos sparked a wave of arrests of homosexuals. The most publicised arrest was that of five people suspected by the Criminal Investigations Division of having attended the event. The publication of these photos, widely broadcasted by the media, aroused a wave of indignation among the population. One of the spouses of the marriage had to leave

the country, first to Mali and then to Gambia where he was assaulted. He finally found refuge in South Africa, with the support of French activists.

Mansour Dieng, the editing director of *Icone*, accused the "alleged homosexual" of threatening him with physical violence. What was now considered "the case of same-sex marriage" in Senegal, spread in the public space when Mbaye Niang, an imam and member of the parliament wanted to organise a protest against homosexuality in general and the release of the arrested young men accused of homosexual practices. This manifestation was prohibited by the government.

The second event occurred the same year. On August 21, 2008, the Belgian Richard Lambot and the Senegalese Moustapha Guèye were sentenced to two years of imprisonment by the Dakar Regional Court for "same-sex marriage and unnatural acts". The accused were 61- and 33-years olds respectively. At the beginning of the case, they denied that they had homosexual relations. The two men met in June 2006 in Dakar, where the Belgian, a retired soldier, used Moustapha Gueye as a servant. Richard Lambot and Mustapha Gueye were arrested on 15 August 2008 after a denunciation. According to local media, the police found lubricants and pornographic videos. Moustapha reportedly said at the preliminary investigation that he had relations with Richard and that homosexuals often went to their homes. According to his lawyer, Seyni Ndione, it was a wedding "to help Moustapha Gueye to have the papers that can allow him to live in Belgium".

In December 2008, nine members of different LGBT's rights associations were arrested in Dakar. They were prosecuted for "unnatural acts and criminal association". The nine men had been accused anonymously. Police officers raided the home of Diadji Diouf, secretary general of AIDES Senegal, an organisation for HIV prevention among homosexuals. The court considered this organisation to be a front that actually "recruited" or brought together individuals for sexual activities under the pretext of conducting HIV/AIDS sensitisation and prevention programmes.

Data from these three cases collected in the field help to give a significant visibility to the homosexual issue through excessive publicity orchestrated by the media. It is also at this time that the state truly begins to systematically enforce section 319 of the criminal law against those arrested and accused of homosexual practices[36]. One can conclude here that 2008 marks the first victories of the moral crusade engaged since the beginning of the 1980s. The media

[36] This does not mean that before that date there were no judicial cases in which article 319 was mentioned. In 2002, Senegal's most famous transvestite was also prosecuted on the basis of this article. This is also one of the few cases before 2008.

succeeded in creating a context of fear which compelled the Senegalese state to act (Becker 1963). This victory for the media was not the creation of a new law, but the application of an existing law which is difficult to apply and does not explicitly target homosexuals. It is the culmination of two decades of work to construct homosexuals as enemies of Senegalese society.

This enemification is built through the discourses and images produced and maintained around homosexuality. According to Staub (1992), enemy images play an important role in the maintenance and reinforcement of hostility and antagonism between conflicting sections of a population. The enemy is a subject to fight because they are a threat to the social order. The fight against homosexuals involves the production of negative images that inspire hostility from the public. Socio-cultural contexts and ideological perspectives are essential in the definition of self and the representations of others (Szalay & Mir-Djalali 1991). Therefore, stereotypes are inherently subjective because they are anchored in specific psycho-sociological contexts and ideologies in a society (Oppenheimer 2006).

At the same time, the Senegalese media realised that there was a highly receptive, and thus lucrative, audience for homophobic content (Cohen & Young 1973) and capitalised on the moment. As Cohen (1972) notes, a considerable portion of what we call “news” is devoted to reports about deviant behaviour and its consequences. This is not just for entertainment or to fulfil some psychological need for either identification or vicarious punishment. Such ‘news’ is a main source of information about the normative contours of a society (Cohen 1972). Thus, this media strategy which consists in giving an important place to a subject like homosexuality aims to reaffirm the codes and the moral values of a predominantly heteronormative society. Ferell and al. (2008: 50) explain that “it often involves a displacement of another fear, or a mystification of a deeper threat – but it is collective panic nonetheless, and if ‘read’ carefully, it can teach us much about the cultural dynamics of fear and the structural crises that underlie it".

In the Senegalese context, the media feel they have a duty to protect society against moral collapse, viewing themselves as the guardians of public morality. Thus, the demonisation of homosexuals is the privileged editorial perspective. Respondent 15 is a journalist at one of Dakar's leading newspapers, we discussed the editorial treatment of homosexuality at his outlet. He recognises that information is framed a certain way. He affirms:

"It is a taboo subject that arouses every time we talk about it: the indignation, anger and misunderstanding. These three feelings can often be perceived in the treatment of information. Journalists write articles based on their cultural convictions. Homosexuality should be banned. It is not accepted here in Senegal. As long as people do not support that, the treatment cannot be favourable to homosexuals" (Interview with R15, Dakar, January 24, 2018).

We can see through the words of Respondent 15, the need to protect society. Prevent youth from adopting behaviours rejected by social norms and values. The exaggeration of facts, their simplification and the distortion of events are essential to this strategy (Jewkes 2004). The exaggeration of the events is decisive because it is at this moment that the journalist really transmits to the reader his vision and interpretation of a situation. The exaggeration of the facts and misleading sensational headlines have the added effect of sparking indignation.
In the case of the events of February 2008, since baptised "the gay marriage affair", there is still controversy surrounding what actually happened and what was reported in the media. Some people who participated in the "marriage" claimed that it happened in November 2006, 14 months before the arrests. This is the thesis defended by Ndèye Marie Ndiaye Gawlo, a famous Senegalese singer who had attended the alleged wedding and had been arrested and detained for four days (Bertolt 2016). Testimonies gathered from attendees maintained that it was not a wedding, but an anniversary where a joke ceremony had been simulated (HRW 2010: 17).

Stories are often staged by the media. Exaggeration or distortion of facts and symbolisation through image publication or prediction are important in the forming of public opinion (Cohen 2011). Thus, the newspaper *L'Observateur* writes: "Fun late night at Saly's Star Night. "*Guéweuls*" (griots) beat goor-djiguene (homosexuals)" *(L'Observateur*, October 11, 2012). *Le Populaire* writes: "Handbag, Flashy colour, Gloss and other accessories: When men are more stylish than women. Raising shields against these men who carry women's handbags" *(Le Populaire,* January*21,* 2016). The media can afford to lie, distort information or incite violence in the name of the preservation of a social order. This position has soured relations between journalists and LGBT rights organisations, thereby inhibiting a democratic debate on the rights of homosexuals in Senegal. The media, instruments of democracy at the service of the promotion of freedoms, are transformed in this context into agents of oppression of individual freedom because they are leading a moral crusade.

Respondent 16, an LGBT activist in Senegal summarises in our interview the relations with the media in these terms:

"I have been here for almost 20 years. When we have a meeting or a workshop, organised by United Nations or International NGO, they mistrust us because they think we are viruses. You sit side by side with someone and he doesn't want to be touched. During the three or four days of a workshop, some of them leave the session without speaking to us. They did not do their job. They did nothing. They collect information like common people when they hear stories on the street. They say it is like that. After they show it as a headline for sensational goals and to sell their newspapers, but they will never come to us and listen to both parties" (Interview with R16, Dakar, April 17, 2018).

What the R16 points out through these remarks is the fact that journalists are not interested in actually learning about homosexuality but prefer to advance a homophobic agenda through their reporting. In this case, the media are not mere tools for social control agencies. They are involved in the construction of a moral panic insofar as they endorse and assume the heterosexism of Senegalese society (Watney 1987: 42). As a result, they contribute to the formation of a sexual panic. Homophobia therefore appears as a unifying tool. Homophobic violence helps to generate a sense of consensus in a postcolonial society plagued by ethnic, political and economic contradictions. It emerges a situation where gender and sexuality are socially and culturally constructed and play an important role in constructing the others. They create "us" versus "them" and the exclusion of other (Mayer 2012; Ivekovic 2004). However, the media's moral crusade since 2008 was only made possible by the influence of Muslim religious leaders.

V-2-) Muslim leaders and the moral crusade

We cannot understand the problem of homophobia in contemporary Senegal without analysing the role of religion and religious leaders commonly referred to as "Marabout". In the previous part, we could see for example that if the media were at the heart of the process of negative resignification of the *Goor-jigeen* and the construction of sexual panic around homosexuality from 2008, this approach had a deep religious anchoring. It is from a spiritual point of view that the fight against homosexuality in Senegal takes the form of a moral crusade.

The term moral crusader refers to people who play the role of activists in a social movement aimed at fighting an evil they perceive to exist in a society (Becker 1963). A societal scare about a newly recognised form of dangerous deviance does not arise out of some kind of mass

hysteria spread by contagious emotionality but from shared perceptions of a threatening reality (Bartholomew 1990). The reactions of religious leaders against homosexuality are also a consequence of the fear and panic discourse generated by the media around the homosexual issue. As we will see later, the Marabouts have not always been at the heart of the battle against homosexuals. However, before understanding their role in homophobic propaganda, it is necessary to understand the power of religion in postcolonial Senegalese society.

V-2-a) The postcolonial influence of religious leaders

Religion occupies a central place in postcolonial Senegal in the process of redefining the norms and values of sexuality. In Senegal, the place of religious leaders, also called Marabouts, is essential. Respondent 21, secretary general of the PAC-DH platform in charge of defending gay rights and a Cameroonian journalist, has lived in Dakar for more than a decade. He illustrates the weight of religion in Senegalese society in these terms:

"Religion is everywhere. To say it simply, there is what I would call "blackmail to the heaven". That means, if you don't conform to rites, we don't recognise you as a good Muslim and if you are not recognised as a good Muslim, you will go to hell. There is an interesting illustration which is the issue of cemeteries. Apart from Casamance and the small coasts, there are no mixed cemeteries in this country. To be buried in a cemetery, you must be recognised as a Muslim. If you're not, we even refuse the burial. So, there is blackmail to the heaven that begins with burial. There are LGBT people who have been unearthed in this country. Sometimes people guarded cemeteries to prevent LGBT from being buried " (Interview with 21, Dakar, December 13, 2017).

Theoretical perspectives on postcolonialism and coloniality have shown the interdependence that exists between colonial and postcolonial structures and subjects. The influence of religious leaders in social and political organisation will remain unchanged after Senegal gains independence in 1960. As in the colonial period, postcolonial administrations wished to reduce the subordinate position of peasants relative to the marabouts while the marabouts strive to retain the privileges they acquired during the colonial period. Religious and political figures compete for ultimate authority over the masses of the Senegalese population; to maintain their positions of power, governments need obedient citizens just as marabouts need faithful disciples (Villalon 1995: 201). Two years before independence, the marabouts had already shown their political power by opposing the country's entry into the African community in 1958 which would have precipitated the independence of Senegal (Coulon 1981).

Even if later in this chapter I will explain how the homosexual question contributes to consolidating the logic of political patronage, it is already important to understand the origins of the alliance between political actors and religious leaders on the use of political homophobia. Because, very quickly, the Senegalese religious leaders carrying Sufi Islam will bind themselves to the Senegalese political class to build a complementary relationship (Coulon 1981). For the Marabout, their political activity is principally devoted to securing material benefits for themselves or for the locality in which they live (O'Brien 1975: 276). In search of intermediaries who can maintain control over the populations, the Senegalese political class forges privileged links with religious authorities, bonds that sometimes take the form of friendship. Thus, the Caliph of the Mourides declared for example during the Magal (religious festival celebrated in Touba) of 1966: "President Senghor is my everyday friend. Since I got to know him twenty-one years ago, he has always kept his promises. I entrust him to you and ask you to follow him wherever he asks you to follow him. I am sure he will lead our Senegal to a safe haven. " (*Dakar-Matin*, 1966).

The speech of the General Caliph of the Mourides, the largest brotherhood in Senegal, ensures the support of his followers to the political class. This speech links the successes or failures of the political class to religion. The separation between state and religion is shaken. In this context, the *talibés* owe themselves obedience and submission not only to spiritual guides but also to political actors. In return, religious leaders receive privileges, as in colonial times. Thus, the Caliph General of the Mourides received in 1960, 135,000 euros to mobilise his *talibés*. This was more than he could earn in several years from peanut farming (O'Brien 1975). In addition, the state has granted large land concessions to marabouts, between 1,000 and 3,500 hectors to certain great marabouts in 1966 for example (Coulon 1981: 241). In addition, there are subsidies for plane tickets to La Meque, for scholarships for *talibés* to continue their studies in Arab countries, for the construction of mosques, etc.

The central place of religion in the construction of the postcolonial Senegalese state from the first years of independence can be measured through its influence on the development of the 1972 family code. The family code appears to be the privileged field of Islamic organisations in the debate around sexuality (Mbow 2010). On April 12, 1961, a commission known as the "codification of the law of persons and of the law of obligations" was set up by the President of the Republic Leopold Sedar Senghor. It was only after 11 years that a draft family code would be submitted to the National Assembly in May 1972 and adopted on June 12, 1972.

The project aimed to standardise indigenous, Arab Muslim law and the Napoleonic code around a single text. In the end, the text gave an important place to Muslim law and the French civil code. One of the consequences of this approach will be the consolidation of gender inequalities (Camara 2006). The family code in Senegal was therefore the result of a syncretism between colonial law and Muslim law which enshrined heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm.

Fatou Camara (2006), in the study of this text, demonstrates that this code of the family favoured men and infringed on the rights granted to African women, all customs combined, by Negro-African law (Camara 2006). The text of 1972 had already favoured Muslim law both in the composition of the options committee in the elaboration of the text and in the government guidelines. Still, let us emphasise that in 1972, religious leaders had already indicated that the text was in contradiction with Muslim law. Other religious leaders argue that it would not apply in their areas and that their followers would never go to the state courts for matters related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

As soon as it was adopted, it was also criticised by the Islamists. As early as 1972, the Higher Islamic Council, which brings together Islamic theologians in Senegal, affirmed, in a letter addressed to the lawmakers, its rejection of the new text. They wrote: "While it is not and cannot be at all in our intentions to subjugate ourselves in the conduct of the affairs of the nation which falls to you by the will of the sovereign people, we reaffirm our unshakeable will to categorically reject any measure, even official, which does not respect the sacred principles of religion" (N'Diaye 2018). It was already a call for the application of Sharia in the regulation of family life in a supposedly secular country. It is therefore not surprising that in the register of gender and sexuality, it is an Islamic organisation, in particular JAMRA, through its newspaper *Djamra* which lays the foundations for the debate on homosexuality in Senegalese society at the beginning of the 1980s.

Despite the changes and adaptations linked to the mutations of Senegalese society (Boone 1990; Gifford 2016; Babou 2013), religious leaders have not only retained their privileged positions in relation to the State, but also in society. To understand the sacred character of the figure of the religious leader in Senegal, we can look to the case called: "the Damien Glez affair". On January 28, 2016, Damien Glez, the caricaturist of the Pan African magazine, *Jeune Afrique*, published a satirical drawing representing Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, the founder of the Mourides brotherhood in Senegal. The religious leader is drawn with a caftan,

a traditional dress. A Western observer wonders by looking at him: "Hey, why is he wearing a dress?".

The caricature was met with indignation and outrage from the Murid brotherhood in Senegal, the most powerful brotherhood in the country. Every year for example, millions of Senegalese people gather in Touba, the holy city to pray and glorify Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba. This is what is known as "Magal de Touba". It is arguably the most important annual event in Senegal. Following the publication, marches involving thousands of Senegalese were organised in Dakar and Touba. The press accused the lobbies (pressure groups) of being behind this campaign against Islam (*Walfquotidien*, January 26, 2016). In the governmental newspaper, *Le Soleil*, the spokesman of the Tidjane community speaks of: "Unbearable provocation, which clearly aims to trivialise and weaken the intangible symbols that so effectively maintain our Muslim faith" (*Le Soleil*, February 1, 2016: 15). Mourides Brotherhood spokesman Serigne Bass Abdou Khadre reacts in these terms: "We are aware that there are always malicious people who are always trying to hurt. God reserved them a punishment" (*L'Enquête*, January 29, 2016).

Confronted with this anger, the government was forced to react. In a public statement, the government spokesman, Seydou Guèye, expresses:

"The disapproval, of the anger of the Murid community, and beyond, of all the Senegalese. (...) Following the head of state, President Macky Sall, the government of Senegal expresses all his indignation and firmly condemns this incomprehensible and unacceptable clumsiness coming from a press organ that identifies itself to Africa and supposed to know, defend and promote African culture and values."

Following this reaction of the Senegalese government, *Jeune Afrique* apologised to the government of Senegal and the Senegalese people.

This case shows that spiritual leaders can be considered untouchable in Senegal. When a religious guide is attacked, the followers feel compelled to defend him, as the Cheikh or the marabout is perceived as the key to access to eternal life. The laws of the Republic, which enshrine the separation between state and religion, are shaken. The freedom of the press is restricted in the name of religion. The influence of religious leaders is so important that they are perceived to be above the law. This context is deeply dependent on the spiritual bond which exists between the population and its religious leaders. I interviewed Senegalese journalists on the "*Jeune Afrique* case " to understand the perceptions of press freedom in a democracy where religious leaders seem to be above constitutional laws. One journalist was

working for a radio, and another was a web journalist. The web journalist did not want to talk about homosexuality in Senegal, threatening to stop the interview at one point, but he was rather talkative about the *Jeune Afrique* case. The radio journalist was more open to discussion without showing any sympathy towards homosexuals. He explains:

"Where do you put freedom of worship? Have you ever seen a Senegalese media outlet caricature the prophet Jesus? No. Serigne Touba, the marabout of Touba is not the prophet. But if Senegalese are 14 million today, 9 million firmly believe that he will bring them to Paradise. Because he worked all his life. He fought against colonial oppression (…) He has come to a level of spirituality that allows him to seek favours from God, the Prophet Muhammad and obtain them easily. Today, people say that if someone is a fervent *talibé*, if he dies, if he is buried in the cemetery of Touba, he goes directly to paradise. If you believe in something like this, it is perfectly normal for people to be able to react violently when the one in whom they believe here and in the afterlife is caricatured and dragged into the mud. It's exactly the same when Charly Hebdo caricatured the prophet. You know how many people were killed? I believe that freedom of expression should not encroach on people's freedom of worship because religious belief is sacred and rooted in itself" (Interview with R5, journalist RFM, Dakar, January 16, 2018).

This reaction makes it possible to understand that there are limits that must not be crossed in the exercise of freedoms in Senegal. Journalists themselves consider religious freedom to be above the freedom of the press. This aspect is important because it illustrates very well the power of religion in Senegalese society. Some freedoms stop at the door of religion. Journalists who are seen as the guarantors of democracy and freedom set barriers when it comes to religion and support the pre-eminence of religious order over democracy. But this situation is only possible because individuals are educated and grow up in an environment where they are taught on a daily basis that spiritual leaders are the mediators between them and God. They owe him submission and obedience.

The power of religious leaders is sometimes above that of parents. R13 tells the story of a young woman who had sex with another woman. Her parents became angry. They explained the situation to their Marabout, who suggested to send their daughter to his *Dara* (Koranic school) so that she could "get back on the right path". The girl, aged 18, was sent to the Koranic school. Six months later, she returns to her parents' home pregnant. Stunned, the parents call the marabout to know where her pregnancy comes from. The Marabout told the parents that he had the duty to teach her how to make love so that “she could feel how the penis is good”. He wanted to prevent the girl from becoming lesbian.

The child is now 8 years old. As a result, after having given birth because abortion is prohibited in Senegal, she has a difficult relationship with the child. Even though it was a

rape, the family was not able to complain to the police. Not only because the family cannot admit in front of the authorities the sexual orientation of their daughter, but also because if the case would become publicised, they would be rejected by their community. In this area, the word of the marabouts is preeminent.

Finally, it is not possible to criticise religious figures because of the place they occupy in society. Likewise, people cannot support homosexuals because it goes against their religious beliefs. Religion serves a dual function. The first function is to construct an order of submission. The spiritual guides establish a relationship of dependence that transforms the followers into subjects. They live, think and act mainly through the marabout or the sheikh. The second function is the exclusion of the impure from the established social order. Faithful to the precepts and instructions of the marabouts on sexuality, the Senegalese conforms to the traditional conception of sexuality in Islam. Homosexuals are therefore perceived as people to be banned. Even those interested in the subject can be victims of homophobic violence.

V-2-b) The moral crusade against homosexuality

The 1972 family law remains contested to this day by the Islamic Committee for the Reform of the Family Code in Senegal (CIRCOFS)[37]. What is important to underline is the fact that the enterprise to construct the homosexual category, carried out by Islamist organisations in the early 1980s, was interlinked with a questioning of the 1972 family code. Both projects were motivated by a desire for a more radical application of the norms around gender and sexuality inherited from the colonial era[38].

Even though they have failed to establish Senegal's family code on Sharia law, Islamic organisations and religious leaders have nevertheless strengthened their presence in public debate. Thus, the highly publicised arrests of homosexuals in 2008 gave them yet another opportunity to disseminate their theses on the topic of homosexuality in public. They gave

[37] The Higher Islamic Council in Senegal created in 1996 the Islamic Committee for the Reform of the Family Code in Senegal (CIRCOFS) which attacks the Family Code. The CIRCOFS calls for reforming the text and creating an Islamic State strengthening the patriarchy of Senegalese society, with the reestablishment of repudiation, the elimination of the inheritance of the so-called "natural" child, the maintenance of the father's authority.

[38] For this purpose, the draft of personal status code was composed of 278 articles divided into seven books. Book 1 deals with marriage and the resulting obligations. Book 2 deals with divorce, while Book 3 talks about adoption, filiation, and child custody. Book 4 deals with guardianship and book 5 of the Testament. Books 6 and 7 deal with successions and *Waqf* (inalienable property). It advocates for the return of Islamic values in the current code, called "profane". The return to the repudiation, to tutoring, to polygamy, to the duty of obedience of the woman to her husband.

their support to homophobic violence in the name of Islam and didn't hesitate to criticise what they saw as a lack of firmness on the part of the state towards homosexuals. The homosexual question appeared in 2008 as a moment of affirmation of their moral and social leadership. In their strategy to take control of the debate on the homosexual issue, an example is quite illustrative of the strategy deployed.

On the night of 24 December 2015, 11 men suspected of having participated in a gay marriage were arrested by the police of Kaolack at the Lycée Ibrahima Diouf. On Monday, 28 December, after two days in jail, they were referred to the Public Prosecutor's office. But the prosecutor of the High Court of Kaolack, considering that the file did not contain sufficient evidence to incriminate them, classified the case without consequence and ordered their release. Outside of the courtroom, angry protests intensified. Massed in front of the court, the crowd seemed ready for a lynching. The police finally had to wait until 2AM in the morning to discretely release them - hidden in unmarked vehicles - in the four corners of the city.

Relayed in real time by the media, the decision would cause misunderstanding beyond Kaolack. The Islamic NGO JAMRA, opposed to the decriminalisation of homosexuality, published a statement arguing that they are "perplexed by this decision of justice". The association would not hesitate to reveal the identity of two of the persons concerned, affirming that one was to be "the husband" and the other "the wife" in the context of a gay marriage that they have "evidence" of through a "police source".

Mame Mactar Guèye, the vice president of JAMRA underlined:

"The police were informed of the ceremony for four or five months, via anonymous information. They waited for the expected date and even managed to infiltrate the group with a person who kept them informed of the preparations. That evening they hid nearby and intervened when they had visual proof that the ceremony had begun."

On the scene, the police claimed to have seized a wedding dress, wedding rings, condoms and lubricant. In JAMRA's decision to reveal the identity of two people arrested, one senses a desire for humiliation, exclusion and even a call for violence against them.

With about fifteen religious movements and civil society organisations, JAMRA exploited the situation to create a collective of religious movements named "No to homosexuality". According to its members, the eleven persons arrested in Kaolack benefited from an incomprehensible laxity from the prosecution. The collective called for the resignation of the minister of Justice, Sidiki Kaba, accused of defending homosexuals. However, at the

beginning of January, Sidiki Kaba recalled that "no hysterical public protest should go against the right of these people to be defended by justice".

The decision of the prosecutor was very badly received by in public opinion. The collective "No to homosexuality" that brings together organisations like *Nittu Deug*, the Follow-up Committee of the forum on the non-respect of religious values and degradation of morals, the Senegalese League of Patriots (LSP/BOKK YENN), ASDREM of Sérigne Bassirou Mbacké, the League of Imams and Preachers of Senegal, Mouride Action and the Association of Muslim Students of Senegal, announced a great march to be held on Friday, January 22, 2016, after the prayer. The march at the Obelisk Square had as its main message, "No to homosexuality in Senegal". The fight against homosexuality makes it possible to build solidarity between Muslim associations and updates the discourse of Islamists on the moral decline of Senegalese society.

During the press conference announcing the march, Abdou Karim Gueye of Nittu Degg, Ousmane Barro of Islamic Rally of the Republic (RIS ALWAHDA) and Professor Malick Ndiaye listed their five primary demands. They called on the head of State to preserve the country's religious, cultural and moral values, the basis of peace and national cohesion; required the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Abdoulaye Daouda Diallo, to dissolve all homosexual associations, because the Secretary-General of Raddho announced the existence of nine associations of this nature in Senegal; asked for the immediate resignation of his position as Minister of Justice of Senegal, by his apparent propensity to defend homosexuals; required members of the National Assembly to revise laws dealing with unnatural acts by explicitly prohibiting homosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality, and transgenderism, in order to put an end to any perverse interpretation of the law in question; and they unanimously decided to file a complaint against the 11 alleged homosexuals of Kaolack for offences of indecent assault, attacks on morals and to the consciousness of the beliefs of all the obedient. They argued that the 11 alleged homosexuals have traumatised and undermined the innocence of the children of this school to which national and international courts grant special protection because of their lack of physical and intellectual maturity. The march, which was to be held at the Obelisk Square on January 22, 2016, was ultimately repressed by the police. It ended with the arrest of 11 people.

Cultural anger and fear fuelled by the media placed clerics and religious organisations at the forefront of the crusade against homosexuality. They positioned themselves as the guarantors

of the moral values of Senegalese society. If according to Becker (1963) a moral crusade is oriented towards altering people's behaviour through the promotion of an ideology of evil, here the moral crusade is also against the state whose officials are accused of complicity with homosexual networks, and court decisions deemed complacent with regard to homosexuals. The ambition here is not only to get the state to act but act more severely. In this process, the religious actors are attempting to renegotiate the enforcement of norms. Religious leaders as moral entrepreneurs position themselves to shape the discourse by claiming moral authority. The coalition formed in the context of this affair allows religious organisations to strengthen their legitimacy and gain the trust and sympathy of the public. Therefore, moral panic is "not 'an isolated phenomenon but a connective strategy' for moral campaigns and the cultural politics and hegemony of civil society" (Herdt 2009).

In the aftermath of the case of the 11 homosexuals of Kaolack, Imam Massamba Diop, president of JAMRA, was quoted in the government newspaper *Le Soleil*, during his visit to the Khalif of the Mourides in Touba, stating:

" Very offended by the verdict favourable to the followers of homosexual practices contrary to the values of Islam, he says "These people stabbed us three times. First, they waited for the night of the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, who is in the eve of the next night commemorating the birth of the prophet Issa "Jesus"; then choosing an education house to organise a gay marriage; and finally trampling Article 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prohibits unions against nature." (*Le Soleil*, January 4, 2016).

If moral entrepreneurs seek to defend the heteronormative character of Senegalese society against homosexuality (Watney 1987: 42), there is in these remarks made by Imam Massamba Diop a sense that the accused had attacked Islam itself with the timing of their acts; attacked society through the location of the event as well as broken the law. This situation requires appropriate responses against homosexuals for the offense. They pose a threat to the continuity of the dominant moral order. They are an obstacle to the reproduction of society (Herdt 2009: 12). In a context of social fractures, the construction of homosexuals as scapegoats creates a sense of cohesion and unity of the dominant group against a silent minority. Homosexuals are turned into devils (Critcher 2003). The representations developed described them as enemies of social cohesion.

But what I think is important to emphasise here is the fact that there is an adaptation of religious discourse around gender and sexuality according to changes in society. During the colonial period, we could see that the Goor-jigeen, defined today as homosexuals, did not

maintain conflicting relations with Muslim society because in the gender classification, homosexuals did not exist. The emergence of the homosexual category in public debate therefore leads to an adaptation of religious discourse and an interpretation of Koranic texts according to the transformations of the debate around sexuality and gender in Senegal since the early 1980s. Homophobic discourse based on religion also appears to be a construct.
During the prayers, the faithful are showered with speeches stigmatising homosexuals. In the public sphere, it is through the media that religious groups, with the support of certain politicians, spread homophobic discourse. In 2009, the Islamic Front for the Defence of Ethical Values stated, for example: “The prophet said, if you find the people doing the practices of Lot's people, kill them. These words of Allah and of the Prophet oblige us to react against all the attacks of Islam, wherever they come from […] if they refuse to do so, that they join the silence of the cemeteries, that they are simply eliminated from life”[39]. Mamadou Dia, Senegalese politician, argued: "We hope that the people of Senegalese believers (Muslims and Christians) will not give up and that they will continue their fight for the safeguard of our most sacred social and religious values"[40].

Moral crusaders are more concerned with ends than with means (Becker 1963). Thus, the protection of the dominant heterosexual morality is more important than the life of homosexuals. In Senegal, for many religious people, killing homosexuals is a matter of obedience to the precepts of Allah. Imam Mbaye Niang points out: "Islamic law condemns the homosexual to death, asks to kill him, also stipulates he must be brought to the top floor and let him down" (*Le Quotidien*, January 10, 2009, 3). Here we see an attempt to legitimise murder, while Islam and other revealed religions promote the right to life. There is an attempt to redefine what it means to be a good Muslim. It is not only the person who exercises his sexuality in the heterosexual normative framework, but also he who exercises his right to kill homosexuals.

"The general Zaara of this year has a special character. The general Khalif of Tidjanes, Sand Mansour Sy gave yesterday a content in the fight he intends to lead against the resurgence of homosexuality in Senegal. Explaining that Homosexuality is spreading quickly. The general Khalif of the Tidjanes declares that: "the deviance of the people of the prophet is very

39 Anonymous, « Sénégal : des religieux créent un Front islamique contre l’homosexualité », 1er janvier 2009, <http://www.bivouac-id.com/billets/senegal-desreligieux-creent-un-front-islamique-contre-lhomosexualite/> (cité dans GNING 20013).

40 *Walfadjri*, « Mamadou Dia condamne et appelle les croyants à poursuivre la lutte », Rubrique Actualité, 19 février 2008, p. 7.

frequent in the prisons". In a long indictment that the religious guide wrote himself and whose translation was assured by the nephew of Mame Abdou, Sand Makhtar Kamel, (...) Serigne Mansour Sy, repeating the Qur'anic verses and lighting of the Prophet Muhammad's Sunnah, recommended the stoning of homosexuals (...) caught in the action. "The Prophet recommends that the homosexual must be pushed into the void from the top of the highest building in the city of the neighbourhood, from the house." To give an idea of the harm causes by homosexuality, the marabout declares: "Whenever there is a practice, an act of a man with unnatural intercourse with another man or a woman with another woman, the devastating effect is equivalent to an earthquake." Which can have harmful consequences in the life of the Senegalese nation. Moreover, the religious guide warns the Tidiane community: "the return and frequency are a clear sign and announcing great misfortunes for the country." According to Serigne Mansour Sy: "disasters, diseases, floods and accidents are only the result of the upsurge of homosexuality in Senegal" (*Le Populaire*, n ° 1435, Monday, May 3, 2011, p3).

This statement by a Senegalese marabout on homosexuality reported in the media is interesting for more than one reason because it summarises the religious discourse around homosexuality in Senegal. At first, Serigne Mansour Sy emphasises the growing number of homosexuals in the Senegalese society and more particularly in prisons, an idea that has its roots in the mediatisation of homosexual cases since 2008 with people prosecuted for "act against nature". Subsequently, he openly calls for violence against homosexuals who threaten the collapse of society. Thus, granting freedom to homosexuals is endangering the existence of humanity. Homosexuality generates chaos. As a last resort, the Senegalese marabout establishes a link between social crises and homosexuality. This latter aspect has the corollary of turning homosexuals into scapegoats for the misfortunes that can afflict Senegalese society. Homophobia therefore appears as a matter of survival and homosexuality is perceived as an aggression. The duty of the Muslim is to protect society.

Understandably, this violence prescribed by the marabouts against homosexuals is not well received by the homosexual community and more particularly the gay associations in Senegal. Speaking of marabouts and homosexuality, Respondent 12 is a homosexual who has lived in the Dara and is familiar with the religious discourse on sexuality. He was also the victim of sexual violence. On the role of marabouts, he underlines:

“They are ignorant, people who know absolutely nothing. They are fools. They put themselves in the place of God. We can judge a human being, we kill him, we bring him back to heaven or hell. You are born like me you will die and go to hell or heaven like me. During the last judgment we will be in the same rank where everyone will be in his rank and give an account to God. So, who are you to judge me? I do not let myself do it. I'm not afraid to die because I know I'm going to die. I want to pray, if you say that I cannot pray in this mosque, so much the better, the earth is great. I pray where I want. Physical aggression, verbal, it's all

the time especially when the press talks about it" (Interview with R12, Dakar, October 22, 2017).

R12 is also Muslim and homosexual. It is clear that there is a difference of perception about the place of Islam. He is not only against the dominant religious discourse on homosexuality. he also questions the right of marabouts to judge him and claims the freedom to pray wherever he wants. It is possible to see in this debate between the marabout and the Respondent 12 the ideological extension of the battle between traditionalists and revisionists in Islam. Although he does not share the neotraditionalist approach, he recognises that it has consequences for the situation of homosexuals in Senegal. For example, in 2009, Magueye Diallo's body was twice exhumed in Thies because he was suspected of being a homosexual. His body, in a torn shroud, was dragged several hundred metres to his family home under the cries of the people chanting: "*Fi du pu Goor-jigeen* (a homosexual should not be buried here)". Yet, this act shows that it is not only the refusal to life that is removed from Senegalese homosexuals, but also the right to die and to be buried.

VII- 2- Homophobia and clientelist relations between religious and political leaders

Since 2008, when the homosexual issue came to the fore in the public sphere in Senegal, dozens of people suspected of being homosexual have been arrested by the police. This date marks the beginning of the state's repression of homosexuals. But it was also on this date that political actors began to speak out publicly against this sexual orientation. In May 2009, the Senegalese Prime Minister, Souleymane Ndene Ndiaye, deplored the "proliferation of homosexuality" in Senegal and invited "religious leaders and all believers to fight against this practice which is a sign of crisis in values and insecurity." Describing homosexuality as a form of "aggression against Islam" and "plagues," he pledged that the ministry of interior and the ministry of Justice should join the struggle "against the plagues of modern times including homosexuality."

We can see through the Senegalese Prime Minister, a mobilisation of religion to encourage homophobia by state actors. The words used such as "aggression", "plague" indicate that society is in danger. The state through its prime minister undertakes to lead the hunt for homosexuals. The reference to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice is not trivial, as these ministries are in charge of criminal prosecutions. We also detect in this discourse an ideological alignment between state actors and religious discourse. Beyond the

need to comply with the law and the protection of the dominant sexual norm, there is a set of historical interests between political actors and religious leaders.

A striking feature of homophobia in Senegal is the cooperation between political actors and religious leaders in the repression of homosexuality. Several scholars have stressed the role of Christianity and Islam in the rise of homophobic sentiments, arguing that both religions promote heteronormativity and the repression of same-sex practices (Avery 1997; Murray & Roscoe 2001; Ireland 2013). According to Murray and Roscoe (1998), no traditional African beliefs systems have singled out same-sex relations as sinful or as mental illness, except where Christianity and Islam have been adopted. Yet, explicit references to homosexuality in religious scriptures are scarce (Avery 1997). The absence of clear guidance on such practices consequently allows for a variety of interpretations and punishments which diverge according to religious doctrines. While some hardline interpretations of Christianity and Islam dictate that homosexuality is a capital offense, others adopt a more flexible approach and condemn violence against homosexuals (Ward 2002). Because of the ambivalence of religious texts towards homosexuality, religion can become a strategic instrument for the negotiation of interests.

VII-2-a) Homophobia in electoral bargaining

In 2009, the imam of Guediawaye, a suburb of Dakar, argued "Goor-Jigeen are people who deserve to be banned from society, to join the silence of cemeteries, to be simply eliminated from this life". In this context, the figure of the homosexual becomes perceived as a moral "Other" who disrupts the economic, cultural and moral equilibrium of society, and who must therefore be eliminated. The instrumentalisation of Islam in the construction of political homophobia is a major challenge for political actors because it enables them to maintain a certain closeness to religious authorities and to youth. It becomes important to analyse not only religious discourse in the construction of homophobia in Senegal, but to understand why political power remains silent and blind to the homophobic discourse advocated by religious organisations.

Although Senegal is officially a secular country, the majority of the population is Muslim. With the economic crisis, many Senegalese became disaffected with the political system and have turned towards religion, which has become the primary avenue for political expression. Many religious leaders have taken advantage of the current situation to strengthen their

influence in politics by attributing social and economic problems to the moral debauchery of the Senegalese elite (Awondo& al 2012). The latter have been criticised for adopting behaviours that are at odds with the moral values promoted by Islam and disrupt the moral equilibrium of society.

As we have seen, religious authorities play a central role in redefining social boundaries by enforcing sexual morality derived from their interpretation of religious sources. Whether they favour a conventional or reformist form of Islam, they all agree on the proscription of same-sex sexual practices. During sermons and in public speeches, they deliver stigmatising discourses on homosexuality and encourage violence against homosexuals. In the present context, tackling those who are perceived as responsible for the Senegalese economic crisis becomes necessary for the survival of the country. Social unity is reaffirmed through a stricter definition of social normality and the exclusion of groups considered as responsible for disorder and moral drift (Durkheim 1893).

Several scientific works on the state of Senegal have described the relations between politicians and religious leaders under the prism of a relationship of clientelism or a social contract (Faton 1986; Babou 2013; O'Brien 1992). These analytical categories aim to explain the transactional relationship built between political and religious powers to maintain a social order. But the added value of the clientelist approach is that it highlights the benefits and advantages gained by the various parties in the context of an informal exchange. James Scott defined clientelism as an "instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or for a person of lower status (client), reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, the boss" (Scott 1972: 92). This relation could be defined as an association with mutual benefits, although it implies a situation of domination and exploitation (Kitschelt 2000: 849).

We already know that the French colonial administration, to put an end to local resistance to colonisation and consolidate its strategy of subjugation of the colonised, has associated religion with colonial policies by giving religious leaders places of power that allowed them to maintain control over their disciples. These close ties between religious and political powers continued after Senegal's accession to independence. In this relationship, religious people receive many benefits that can be financial, political, and material. Under Abdoulaye Wade for example, hundreds of marabouts found themselves with diplomatic passports that are only reserved for officials.

If in other African countries, the clientelist system, sometimes described as neo-patrimonial, takes a direct form (Medard 1990), in Senegal, it is both direct and indirect. On the one hand, there is a relationship between political actors (patrons) and marabouts (clients) in which the French colonisers made religious leaders auxiliaries of the colonial administration and in return they ensured the docility of local populations. On the other hand, the relationship between the marabouts and the *talibé* as described in chapter 5. The *talibé* has much more trust in the marabout than in the government because he is waiting for his spiritual guide to make sure he goes to Paradise. In return, the *talibé* ensures his submission to the marabout. We are thus in a multi-faceted clientelism whose objective in the end is to maintain political stability.

Since the introduction of *ndigel* (or voting instructions)[41] in Senegal, marabouts have become key actors in the political game. During elections, they regularly make political statements, advise their followers on how to vote, and are regularly approached by political parties to provide support - often in exchange for money (Osei 2012). Moreover, many marabouts today occupy a political position. Because of their relative importance, it is not rare to see politicians visiting marabouts, or governmental representatives attending the Magal of Touba[42]. This "clientelist relation" (Osei 2012: 205) is also reflected in debates on homosexuality.

The difficulty that Senegalese politicians experience when criticising religious leaders when they officially call for violence against homosexuals, is not simply linked to the fact that they are afraid of being accused of supporting homosexuality. They also fear being taxed as enemies of Islam or false believers. An embarrassing situation for any political actor in a predominantly Muslim country. Macky Hall has recently experienced it.

On January 7, 2015, the Kouachi brothers of French nationality entered the offices of the French newspaper *Charly-Hebdo* and killed 10 people and two policemen, following the publication by this newspaper of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. The next Sunday, a march was held in Paris for "the defence of republican values". There were 42 leaders from around the world who took part in this event, including Macky Sall. During this march, the slogan "I am Charly" was chanted by the millions of people present in homage to the victims

[41] The Ndiguel refers to what can be commonly called voting instruction. The society being strongly hierarchical and under the influence of religious leaders, the instruction of vote allows the marabouts to tell their disciples who they should vote for in a given election.

[42] The Magal Touba is the largest religious festival in the brotherhood of Mourides in Senegal. It is the commemoration of the departure in exile in Gabon in 1895 of Ahmadou Bamba, the founder of the brotherhood. It's a celebration celebrated since 1928, the date of his death.

of the attack. The Senegalese president's visit to Paris was criticised by a large part of the Senegalese population who saw the gesture as an act of submission of their Head of State towards France. According to the website Dakar Actu, eighty percent of Senegalese on social networks were against this trip.

In the newspaper *L'Observateur*, the islamologist Khadim Mbacké argued that "his displacement was not justified" (*Seneweb* 2015). For Imam Ismaïla Ndiaye of the mosque of the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar (Ucad) "participating in the march is giving too much importance to France". Mamadou Ndoye of the Democratic League (Ld), for his part, thinks that "the participation of Macky Sall in the march was not timely, but important." A big demonstration was organised in Touba where many religious leaders took part such as: Serigne Mountakha Mbacké representative of the Caliph, Serigne Modou Lô Ngabou, Serigne Abdou Samad Souhaibou, Serigne Sheikh Aliou Mbacké. On the signs, one could read: "I am Cherif Kouachi"; 'Death to Charlie'; 'I am not Charlie, I am Mohammed'; and also 'Macky Charlie, we do not want you; Macky Sall, your place is at the Elysée".

The media and popular pressure provoked by the controversy compelled the Senegalese president to react in Woloff on national television. He affirms at first: "God only knows who is Muslim. When I knew that the newspaper was published, I banned its sale in Senegal and even the other newspapers that supports them. Those who want to make politics and take the opportunity to create an amalgam seek to confuse Islam and "Charlie". But there is a big difference". He continues: "I will fight against those who attack Islam. I am Muslim". And adds: "I did not want to pronounce on this subject to add to the controversy, but I must enlighten the lantern of Senegalese on this case. France has always been on our side whatever the circumstances. It is normal for me to present my condolences, to show them my solidarity in the fight against terrorism". In the end, he said: "They (marabout) cannot manipulate anything to create a situation other than the one we are living here in Senegal. If they want to oppose, let them wait for the election. But that they do not seek to amalgamate".

This case illustrates the political importance of religious leaders. By reacting in Woloff and on national television, Macky Sall did not pose only himself as commander in chief. He wanted his discourse on the national television channels to be followed by most Senegalese. Macky Sall is aware of the impact of the controversy aroused by this case on the population. In addition, while his opponents are setting the debate around his commitment to the defence of Islam, he believes it is actually an attempt to weaken him politically. It appears that the

Senegalese head of state has some knowledge of the ways that religion can be manipulated for political ends.

VII-2-b) To be blind to our common interests

The Sall case pushes us to delve deeper into the relation between political and religious actors and the asymmetry of political patronage in Senegal. This dyadic relationship is a triad that involves three categories: politicians, religious leaders and popular masses. In this scheme, the patrons (politicians) do not leave the monopoly of the control of the popular masses to their clients (marabouts). State resources, such as official media, can also be used to circumvent the power of the client in his relationship with the boss, which to a certain extent can help to relativise the discourse on the influence of marabouts on people who retain a certain autonomy in this multi-speed clientelist system. To weaken their clients can become for politicians a necessary strategy which aims at reducing their dependencies with respect to their clients. It is in this sense that we should interpret the discourse of the Senegalese president during the presidential campaign of 2012 which marked his rise to power where he affirmed: "the Marabouts are only ordinary citizens". A manner for him to emphasise that they cannot be above the law (Gifford 2016).

Moreover, the asymmetrical relation between patron and client supposes a verticality of power dynamics in a clientelist system. This supposes that the patrons who have the power, the money, the material goods, decide to put them at the disposal of the client. That is why this verticality of the relationship also combines exploitation and domination. Clients appear as intermediaries who can meet the needs of the patron to maintain their dominant positions and other benefits (Kischelt & Wilkinson 2007: 7).

What these analyses do not consider is the fact that, in the Senegalese context, religious leaders are not the mere subordinates of politicians, but can also use their position of clients to blackmail the patrons who in return finds themselves to serve the interests of religious leaders, which leads to the formation of a dominant class. Politicians and religious leaders help each other. In return, the politicians guarantee their alliance with religious leaders who work to maintain their control over the popular masses.

The homosexual issue in Senegal confirms the thesis that the clientelist system does not prevent the development of a class logic (Fatton 1986). It promotes the preservation of a reciprocal alliance allowing the consolidation of homophobia in Senegal. Politicians do not simply remain blind to the calls for violence against homosexuals formulated by religious

leaders but in some cases, they do not hesitate to satisfy the will of religious leaders to make homosexuals invisible in Senegal.

In May 2014, for instance, the art centre Raw Material Company organised a series of events, including several exhibitions and workshops on homosexuality in Africa. Several artistic works were to be exhibited as part of the 11th edition of Dak'Art, one of the biggest cultural events in Africa. The exhibition was titled "Precarious Imaging, Gay Visibility in Africa", The exhibitions were described in media as "an event promoting homosexuality". Several young people threatened to burn the centre, and JAMRA asked the government to ban the exhibition. The director of the centre, Mrs. Koyo Kouoh, was summoned by the Minister of Culture to close the exhibition claiming, although the government could not officially ban an art exhibition –Senegal being a free country– religious values had to be respected. Subsequently, the quartermaster told the director of the centre that the Baye Fall (a branch of Mouridism) was preparing an attack. It was in this context of violence that Mrs Koyo decided to temporarily close the centre.

Following the closure of the centre, JAMRA and the Observatory for the Monitoring and Defence of Cultural and Religious Values named, *MbañGacce* welcomed this decision in a statement. They affirmed: "This event, supposed to promote our culture, proves to be a propaganda support of unnatural unions. It is therefore indisputable that this edition of Dak'Art is offensive to our good morals and our laws." However, there is no official government statement calling for the closure of the centre. Yet this closure has been interpreted in public opinion willingness on the government’s behalf to conform to religious demands.

The government's strategy will have been, in the first place, to allow religious and public opinion to press Mrs. Koyo to close the centre. This allowed the government to evade accusations from human rights associations that it had directly infringed on certain freedoms. In a second step, the government tried to reap the political benefits by suggesting that it is the State which ordered the closure of the centre. It helps political actors to reaffirm to the religious and public opinion their hostility to homosexuals. Clientelism in this context can no longer simply be interpreted in a perspective of exploitation and domination but also as a system of complementarity.

One of LGBT’S human rights advocates that I met in Dakar during the fieldwork argues:

"We have in Senegal many brotherhoods that play an extremely important role in the electorate. And so, politicians do not dare to favour homosexuality. They are forced to denounce homosexuals. Once these politicians defend LGBT rights, they are rejected by the

different brotherhoods. That's why it's a bit taboo. Many politicians are subject to very harsh criticism from the population because they consider that many politicians are funded by gay lobbies" (Interview with R10, Dakar, February 22, 2018).

R10 highlights the difficulty experienced by political actors in Senegal in confronting the homosexual issue. If they are silent, they may be suspected of tacitly supporting homosexuals. When they defend the rights of homosexuals, they are rejected by brotherhoods. Muslim brotherhoods occupy an essential place in the political game. It is therefore very difficult for any political actor to oppose them. Therefore, political elites prefer to be blind on human rights violations promoted by religious leaders. It should be recalled here that some political elites occupy political positions because of the support they received from some influential religious elites. In Senegal, therefore, we cannot speak of a dependence of religious elites on political actors, but rather of interdependence.

This relationship of interdependence is not static but maintained by religious people who do not hesitate to carry out political blackmail. Respondent 14 stresses the role of religious authorities in the instrumentalisation of homophobia during political campaigns.

“Follow the electoral campaign a bit. You cannot watch the news without hearing a party talking about homosexuality. And during the campaign, there is not a single Friday during which an imam does not preach against homosexuality. [They say] do whatever you want but do not bring homosexuals. And this happens because Senegalese are in general not educated. Less than 50 percent are educated. And they say [politicians] are right and immediately they will vote for them. [Homosexuality] is one of the biggest campaign themes” (Interview with R14, Dakar, December 12, 2017).

From these remarks of the R14, political actors have their backs to the wall around the homosexual issue during the elections and must comply with the diktats of marabouts. Some studies have highlighted poverty as a factor of homophobia (Xie 2010). These remarks establish a correlation between the level of education and homophobia in Senegal. The respondent emphasises that political manipulation is linked to the under-education of the masses. In fact, according to the 2013 General Census of Population and Housing, Agriculture and Livestock (RGPHAE), 54.6 percent of Senegal's population is illiterate, 62.3 percent of whom are women, amounting to 5,089,313 individuals (ANSD 2013). Beyond religion and law, we can think that ignorance is a tool for the manipulation of public opinion by political actors. The latter are fully aware of the subject's sensitivity in electoral contexts.

Clientelist relations between religious authorities and political actors contribute to the politicisation of homophobia in Senegal in two ways. On the one hand, the expansion of

religious authorities' sphere of influence enables them to intervene in the repression of homosexuality by putting pressure on political actors and taking part in legislative debates. On the other hand, political figures increasingly adopt homophobic rhetoric based on religious morality to mobilise support from religious leaders and strengthen their electoral support. Homophobia is thus inscribed in power dynamics that exist between social actors in society.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this analysis, it appears that moral entrepreneurs have played a fundamental role in the construction of homophobia in Senegal. The media and religious leaders have constructed homosexuality as a threat to Senegalese society and set themselves up as the guardians of a moral order endangered by homosexuals. This enterprise of institutionalising homophobic violence took place through a dual process. First, the creation of a social problem through a negative resignification of the Goor-jigeen and secondly, the construction of a sexual panic in Senegalese society. With its negative stereotyping of homosexuals and the proliferation of content on the topic, the media forced the state to act.

Religion played a fundamental role in the media discourse on the homosexual issue in Senegal. Moreover, it is interesting to note that media outlets affiliated with Islamic organisations were the first to initiate the enterprise of demonising the *Goor-jigeen* in Senegal. Although they did not openly show themselves in the battle against homosexuality for a time, religious leaders were in fact always present. The events of 2008 gave them the opportunity to launch a moral crusade in Senegal against homosexuality. Given their influence in society, the moral crusade was an opportunity to build a coalition against a perceived threat and thereby legitimise homophobic violence.

One of the victories of moral entrepreneurs has been to compel the Senegalese state, previously passive on the issue of homosexuality, to promote homophobia. However, this victory cannot be analysed as the simple result of a sexual panic. It also stems from a long history of power dynamics between religious leaders and the political class in a client relationship.

CHAPTER VI– WHY AND HOW THE STATE ACTS

I have been able to demonstrate in the previous chapters that, for years after the end of the colonial period, the Senegalese state did not enforce a repressive legal framework on homosexuals. It is through a process of resignification of the Goor-jigeen, led by moral entrepreneurs, a publicisation of the homosexual issue in public opinion and finally a moral crusade against homosexuals that, in 2008, the State of Senegal started to actively repress homosexuals. The existence of a law does not automatically entail its application. Laws are customarily enacted after a state of fear has been aroused in a community and the enforcement of the law is proof of the success of a moral crusade (Becker 1963).

Due to the increased number of arrests and trials against homosexuals, Senegal is now categorised as a homophobic state (M'Baye 2013). State homophobia or state-sponsored homophobia refers to situations in which hatred towards homosexuals is primarily conveyed and orchestrated by legal and criminal processes sanctioning same-sex sexual identities and practices (Weiss & Boas 2013). In short, it is related to the laws and policies that govern sexuality. The state is therefore seen in this register as a central actor in homophobic violence both in the production of norms, but also in their enforcement. The aim is to build a moral and sexual order in which heterosexuality appears as a component of national identity.

Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) defines the nation as "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign ". The nation, he argues, is a community which is, " regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, (…) always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible (…) for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (Anderson, 1991: 7). This portrayal of nationalism by Anderson strikes me as useful in that it underscores the fact that nationalism generates a kind of fraternity within a group. This fraternity makes it possible to define the barriers both within the community but also in relation to others. In the context of Senegal, where heterosexuals are the dominant group, heterosexual identity is defined as a feature of national identity. In fact, one of the consequences of the moral crusade against homosexuality was to elevate heterosexuality as a constitutive identity of the Senegalese national project.

We saw in Chapter 4 that gender was a central element of the colonial project, the culmination of which was the construction of heterosexuality as a dominant sexual norm, which

constitutes one of the legacies of the colonial order. Strengthening this heritage has been one of the missions of the postcolonial state. Therefore, discussing the laws, norms and instruments that police gender also means discussing the place of femininity and masculinity in the national project. Homophobia appears in this process as a technology of othering (Slootmaekers 2019). Homophobia serves to strengthen the bonds between those who consider themselves to be representatives and guarantors of the Nation, while excluding people perceived as deviant. As Nagel (2003: 147) argues, "defining ‘outsiders’ (...) is part of the process of designating ‘insiders’ and ‘citizens,’ and thus of defining the nation itself ".

State homophobia is therefore a form of expression of nationalism. Thus, in this chapter I describe the construction of heterosexual nationalism by the postcolonial Senegalese state around the definitions of sexual and gender norms. In a second part I describe the impact of the law on the consolidation of male dominance inherited from colonisation. The third part examines how the political actors in power have an interest in using homophobia to consolidate their legitimacy and destabilise their political opponents.

VI-1- The postcolonial sexual boundaries

Heterosexual hegemony stems from the fabrication of an ideology around sexuality. By ideology, I understand a system of ideas, of representations that dominate the mind of an individual or a social group. The heterosexual ideology transmitted by the colonial order was enforced in postcolonial Senegal. The postcolonial state of Senegal sets itself the task of consolidating the sexual norms and values inherited from colonisation. This reproduction takes place through what Althusser (1970) calls the ideological apparatuses of the state. Among the ideological apparatuses of the state are the laws whose mission is to regulate behaviour and to dictate what is good or bad; accepted or rejected. Thus, the criminal law of 1965 and the family law of 1972 are ideological state apparatuses which define the boundaries of sexuality in Senegal.

VI- 1- a) Homosexuality and criminal law

If every state uses its laws to create, promote and maintain a certain type of behaviour for its citizens (and hence for its collective life and individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others. As Becker (1963) argued: “Before any act can be viewed as deviant, and before any class of people can be labelled and treated as outsiders for committing the act, someone must have made the rule which defines the act as

deviant. Rules are not made automatically". Homosexuality as a crime is a product. A legal construction.

During my fieldwork, I found that all those who condemn same-sex sexual practices, even if they later appeal to religion as a justification, insist that it is an issue of respecting the rule of law. The law is therefore important in the structuring of homophobic discourse.

In Senegal, Section 319 of the criminal code serves as the legal basis for the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices. It states that:

"shall be punished by one to five years and a fine of 100,000 to 1,500,000 francs, whoever has committed an indecency or unnatural act with an individual of his sex. If the act was committed with a minor of twenty-one years old, the maximum penalty will always be pronounced".

Despite the ambiguity of this section, love between two women is also considered, from a legal point of view, to be an indecent or unnatural act. This ambiguity has consequences not only at the level of the law, with the flowering of multiple interpretations on same-sex sexual practices, it also blurs social representations insofar as it does not facilitate the identification of a category. Homosexual crime is therefore not clearly defined in the law. Beyond maintaining the stigma and prejudices on homosexuals, this ambiguity allows the dominant group to define what constitutes a crime in their eyes.

Take, for example, the case of a 21-year-old lesbian I met in Dakar. In mid-2014, along with three other girls, she was expelled from high school. She was in the final year and had to pass her high school diploma. The head of the school accused them of being lesbians because they wore a lot of pants and cut their hair. This was enough to qualify them as lesbian and expel them from college because according to him: "the law forbids it". At this level, there is a social transfer of the legal ambiguity of the text. This legal uncertainty fuels the rejection, discrimination and exclusion of the lesbian category. The problem is not that she is lesbian or not. Because she is indeed. The problem lies in the arguments put forward to justify her exclusion, which are essentially based on prejudice. The ambiguity of the Senegalese criminal law favours the development of prejudices around female homosexuality.

Evidently, the social construction of homophobia relies less on the clarity of the law but rather on its interpretation. The case of this teacher shows that the forms of behaviour in themselves do not differentiate deviants from non-deviants; it is the reactions of conventional and

conforming members of society which, by identifying and interpreting behaviour as deviant, sociologically transform people into deviants (Broqua 2011). Thus, the repression of homosexuality on the basis of the criminal law is the project of a group of actors that share a heterosexual ideology. It should not be said that homosexual behaviour upsets the common conscience because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it upsets their common conscience. They do not condemn it because it is a crime; it is a crime because they condemn it (Durkheim 2013).

Therefore, the vagueness of the text that criminalises homosexuality in Senegal has as its main function the establishment of differences within the national community, a process of othering in the construction of the nation's boundaries. Othering is understood as "the process of differentiation and demarcation by which the line is drawn between 'us' and 'them' (…) and through which social distance is established and maintained" (Lister 2004: 101). It is a process "whereby a dominant group defines into existence an inferior group " (Schwalbe et al. 2000: 422). As a process, othering implies the essentialisation and reduction of "the Other " to a few negative and stereotypical characteristics, ultimately dehumanising them (Jensen 2011: 65).

In the discourse on the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices, there is therefore both a mechanism for consolidating the community, but also a mechanism for exclusion. This process continuously creates and reinforces a feeling of fraternity among the members. The law appears to be a powerful tool for building the solidarity of a group, but it can also be used to justify abuses against a minority. The law strengthens the similarities between the dominant group and maintains cohesion around these similarities, thus allowing the dominant group to permanently assert its hegemony. We can take for example, the case of the lesbians in Grand-Yoff Dakar.

On the night of November 10, 2013, five women were arrested in the bar called "piano-piano" located in the district of Yoff in Dakar. According to reports in the media, they are accused of kissing in the bar. "They celebrated in great pomp the anniversary of one of them which happens to be a minor. Only, instead of low profile, these very special women chose to engage in acts repressed by Senegalese law and were arrested by the police"[43]. They were

[43]http://www.setal.net/Les-5-lesbiennes-de-Piano-Piano-jugees-aujourd-hui_a20758.html

arrested and tried for acts against nature and indecent assault. Four of them were released on November 20, 2013. The court found that there was not enough evidence against them. The fifth, judged separately who was a minor, was also released.

The accusations of unnatural acts in public against the five women were not corroborated by the gay rights defenders and even less by the bar owner, who provided a different version of events than those of the authorities. On this aspect, the testimony delivered by the owner of the "piano-piano" bar collected during my fieldwork is quite illuminating:

"I know there was one of the policemen who got inside the bar when his other colleagues were out. This policeman went to the place where girls had actually reserved a table, with their boyfriend, like all the customers, to celebrate their birthday. I do not know what happened between him and one of the girls, but I know that one of them insulted the policeman. Then the officer pulled her out towards the police vehicle. It is at this moment that the other girls stood up to rescue their friend. The policeman then embarked them all, that's how the story happened. So, I was surprised to hear sex in public here. It's incredible, because the bar does not have a room or a place where you can do things like that. In addition, there are security guards who are particularly vigilant about this kind of slippage, and they do not accept this kind of practice here".

The five women arrested by the police were members of the lesbian rights association in Senegal: SOURIRES DE FEMMES. Sitting on a chair in her living room, it is with a smile that hides her discomfort that one of the leaders recounts this episode. She recounts:

"In fact, what happened was that a friend was celebrating her birthday. She invited other friends. When she arrived, she came to see the bar manager and asked if she could buy chicken outside and buy drinks because she did not have enough money to buy chicken because it was expensive. The boss of the bar was understanding because they were girls who used to have drinks there. When she arrived two or three minutes later, another friend arrived and after a quarter of an hour later, another friend joined them. When they were five, there was a gentleman who came in, then a second then a third, they circled them. They said yes you are lesbians and you are kissing. No one understood. If I can describe the place, it is a very large open-air room. It is a courtyard and at the end of the courtyard there is a piano and that is why the bar was called Piano Piano. So, there is no corner. People look together. It was a chic bar frequented by judges, lawyers; Everybody. Not frequented by the low class because given its location it was difficult at some hours to go over there. Then, they took them like that by saying that they were lesbians and they found them kissing each other. There was a minor of 17 years old. It was the most publicised trial of the year. They were released pure and simple. They spent three to four weeks in prison" (Interview with R1, December 12, 2017, Dakar).

The testimony of Respondent 1 is interesting because it reveals one of the negative dimensions of the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices in a homophobic society. The women arrested spent nearly a month in detention before being released for lack of evidence. The importance of mobilisation around the decriminalisation of homosexuality makes sense in this case, as the homophobic violence experienced here is based primarily on the law. Even if the men who call the police are homophobic, their reaction is produced publicly because they know that they can act and be protected by the law and indirectly by the state. The law legitimises homophobic violence. Because it is homophobia that serves as fuel for the promotion of heterosexism.

However, the bar owner's version shows that, from a visual point of view, it is difficult to recognise a lesbian. However, it raises questions about the role of the police as a social control agency. According to one human rights activist who defends the rights of lesbian, it is with the "piano-piano" affair that Senegalese society became aware of the existence of lesbians. But, beyond the controversy over the vagueness of the law, it should be emphasised here that this situation also makes it possible to materialise the hegemony of one category of the population over another. In Gramscian analysis, the judiciary is constitutive of political hegemony in the same way as the legislature or the executive. Therefore, laws can be used to organise social life or even repress a certain type of attitude that calls into question the interests of the ruling class. This instrumentalisation of the law is not only part of a strategy of manufacturing sexual norms, but also of consent through discipline (Hall 1978).

VI-1- b- The legal construction of the heterosexual family

It is not only the criminal law of 1965 that legally justifies the repression of homosexuals. The family law of 1972 is a determining factor to the extent that it legally defines, codifies and enforces the accepted or tolerated forms of unions. In the social construction of heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm, the union between man and woman is institutionalised. The law builds for this purpose a regime of truth around sexuality. In the production of the heterosexist character of Senegalese society, the law has a symbolic efficiency and a performative character (Bourdieu 1986). The law does not need to be applied for female homophobia to be repressed. Family law sets the norms of the heterosexual family. The application of family law reinforces and consolidates the heterosexism of Senegalese society.

Family law organises the state's vision of sexuality and makes the state the regulating tool of norms, values and sexual morality. It is not only traditions and cultures that define what is marginal or deviant. The law establishes social links and installs the state in a regulatory role. The legal authority which is exercised within the legal field is therefore the excellent form to legitimise the symbolic violence whose monopoly belonging to the State, which can be accompanied by the exercise of the physical force (Bourdieu 1986: 3). The objective is therefore to first understand how this symbolic violence is exercised in legitimising heterosexuality to the detriment of homosexuality.

The first pillar of family law in Senegal is marriage, specifically heterosexual marriage. Article 100 of the family law stipulates that: "The marriage bond creates the family through the solemn union of the man and the woman in the wedding. This link is destroyed only by the death of one of the spouses or by divorce. The separation of the body only reduces the effects". Article 101 states that: "Engagement is a solemn convention by which a man and a woman mutually promise marriage".

What we can already observe here is that, in its definition and formulation, only unions between man and woman are permitted. Marriage, which is the first step towards the formation of a family, has no existence unless it takes place within the framework of a contract between a man and a woman. The union between two women or two men is not allowed. Moreover, the lack of precision about the nature of marriage, i.e., heterosexual or homosexual, shows that the state naturalises heterosexual marriage as the only form of marriage accepted by Senegalese society. Section 141, paragraph 2, explicitly refers to the nullity of marriage "where the spouses are not from different sex". From here, a mechanism for the institutionalisation of heterosexuality emerges.

In this regard, Jackson (1996) stresses that it is important to differentiate heterosexuality in its practice and heterosexuality as an institution. Heterosexual desires are not inherently dominant. The hierarchy or exclusion of female homosexuality is not based on an established hierarchy of sexuality. It is the institutionalisation of heterosexuality that turns lesbians into an oppressed group and heterosexuals into a dominant group. The subordination of women in a patriarchal society helps to unify sex and gender. Judith Butler writes:

"The institution of compulsory and naturalized heterosexuality has as necessary condition gender and regulates it as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from

the feminine term, and in which this differentiation is realized through the heterosexual desire. The act of differentiating the two antagonistic moments in the binary relation has the effect of consolidating the one and the other term, the internal coherence of sex, gender and the desire proper to each one" (2005: 93).

There is indeed in Senegalese family law an institutional production of heterosexual desire. The prohibition of same-sex unions illustrates a willingness to legally codify gender relations. Normative discourses and the regulatory practices of sexuality play a decisive role in the production of identities, sexual hierarchies and exclusionary mechanisms. The naturalisation of heterosexuality in family law renders de facto illegitimate homosexuality. It is important to situate this dynamic in the patriarchal logic that consolidates the subordination of women. Article 111 stresses that:

"Marriage may only be contracted between a man over the age of 18 and a woman over the age of 16, except for age exemption granted for serious reason cause by the President of the Regional Court after investigation."

This article already illustrates that woman is under the authority of man. Because we realise here that the man must be first the eldest of the woman. This situation of subordination is reinforced by section 133 which allows a man who subscribes to the regime of polygamy to marry up to four women, but the same does not apply to women. Section 152 states that "The husband is the head of the family, he exercises this power in the common interest of the household and children". Section 153 on the choice of residence emphasises: "The choice of the household residence belongs to the husband; the wife is obliged to live with him, and he is obliged to receive her". According to section 277, men have parental authority over children. Section 305 states that abortion is a crime, even if the pregnancy is the result of rape.

In Senegal, a woman's status is based on her gender, which sets the context in which her sexuality and social role are expressed. The law generates inequalities of sex and gender. Female homosexuality does not need to be explicitly condemned to be repressed. The lawfully defined place of woman is beside man. Heterosexuality becomes compulsory (Rich 1980). Based on local religion and traditions, Senegalese family law consolidates social arrangements around gender inequality. In this case, the exclusion of lesbians is substantially produced in a process that affirms male domination.

In this sexual regime where law promotes heterosexuality, homosexuality deserves to be repressed because it does not promote the materialisation of sexual services and sexual constraints devoted to men and women, meaning the obligations of women towards their

husbands. These two concepts, theorised by Colette Guillaumin, can only be exercised within the context of heterosexual marriage and can only be cancelled through divorce (Guillaumin 1978). The repression of homosexuality therefore aims to ensure the durability of forms of oppression of women for the benefit of men. Therefore, positive law cannot be the only factor promoting homophobia.

VI- 2) State and the preservation of patriarchy

What emerges from the manufacture of sexual boundaries in the process of defining what should be accepted or tolerated within the community, it is not only section 319 of the Senegalese criminal code which constructs legal homophobia, but also the family law adopted in 1972, which defines social and sexual roles throughout the country. Through this law, gender becomes an essential tool in the construction of the Senegalese postcolonial nation. There is a similarity to colonisation here in that race and sexuality were both integral to the imperial project. This legal codification of sexual and gender norms participates in the construction of what concerns femininity and masculinity in Senegal. Traditional and cultural representations of gender and sexuality dominated by heterosexuality are solidified and legitimised, as the law has an impact on the way in which gender categories represent their places and roles in society. But the end of this process is the promotion of heterosexual patriarchy, as was the case during the colonial period.

VI-2-a) Being *jöngue*

Davis (1997 : 7-8) identified five ways in which women have tended to participate in ethnic, national and state processes and practices : (a) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (b) as reproducers of the (normative) boundaries of ethnic/national groups (by enacting proper feminine behaviour); (c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; (d) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and (e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. When looking at Senegalese family law, the processes that include women in the national project combine reproduction, motherhood and children's education. However, as indicated in the family code, these factors can only be ensured within the framework of marriage. Heterosexual marriage is therefore a pillar of the national construction. Now, take the case of lesbians, they are excluded from the national project because femininity, one of whose components is reproduction, is defined by the interaction between a man and a woman.

I met Respondent 28 in Dakar, through a contact. She is a 30-year-old Christian woman. Today, she is unemployed after working at the Zimbabwean Embassy in Dakar. She still lives with her mother is divorced from her father and married another man. She confides that she must fight to be able to help her little brothers who are abandoned by their mother's new husband. She feeds them and pays their tuition fees. Her mother's new husband is essentially caring for the other two children he had with his wife. When she tries to complain to her mother about the situation of her little brothers, the mother asks her what she is doing at home. She is not very satisfied with her unmarried situation and shares her own experience:

"Marriage is very important in Senegal. We try to be as our parents. Because today in our society, there is a moment at a certain age, when you are still at home, everybody asks you what are you doing there? What are you waiting for? Why don't you get married? It is God who gives the marriage. But they tell you, as soon as they see other children getting married: the child of the neighbour gets married. What are you waiting for? What are you waiting for?" (Interview with R28, Dakar, January 17, 2018).

From her testimony, we can understand that R28 considers marriage to be a crucial stage of womanhood. Marriage is a sacred institution in Senegal. In a heteronormative society, marriage is among the social expectations that mark the social success and education of a young woman. From an early age, in their process of socialisation, education to social and sexual life, young girls are prepared by their mothers to marry a man. Marriage has for this purpose a symbolic and social power. It symbolises a certain success as a woman and confers a social position onto the wife. The girl's marriage opens the doors to respectability. That is why social pressure is strong among young girls who are unable to marry.

Because the national project is inward and outward, femininity is also a marker of the cultural boundaries between the Senegalese Nation and the exterior. Women are not limited to biological reproduction or motherhood, but are also tools for promoting a Senegalese specificity, a national identity. Hence the expression one can regularly hear in the streets of Dakar: "the Senegalese woman". There is in this expression a desire to promote a national heritage, of which women are an essential part. This national identity is accomplished through what is considered specific to Senegalese women and is passed down from generation to generation, such as knowing how to take care of a man.

In Dakar, I also met a 25-year-old Senegalese woman. Single and Muslim, she has two sisters and three brothers. Like millions of young Senegalese, she does not have a fixed job. This Saturday afternoon, she is at home with her little brothers and sisters. The girls braid their

mom while the boys play football. For her, it is quite normal. Moreover, she emphasises that the work of young boys is mainly limited to playing football. Girls must stay with their mothers to learn the place of a woman. I was able to observe that the mother asks nothing of the boys who stay in front of the television. When I ask her what it means to care for her husband, she replies:

"When he comes back home after a hard-working day, you ask him how things went. You cook, you give him water to drink. You do all the care a woman has to do to her husband. And you have to work well where I think. You have to be *Jöngue*. You must hold your husband in your hands so that he cannot go elsewhere. If you don't do that, Senegalese women are very strong. Even when you have your husband, women outside don't leave you alone" (Interview with R27, Dakar, January 12, 2018).

R25 gives an overview of what it means to be *Jöngue* in Senegalese society. Being *Jöngue* allows the woman to fulfil several functions in the heterosexual relationship. First, the satisfaction of the sexual desires of her husband. This is the major element because women believe that sexual desire can guarantee that the husband come back at home after the job. In a society where men can marry several women, sex is seen as an essential trait for a wife to keep control over her husband. Being *Jöngue* is therefore a behaviour that is only applied and defined only in a heterosexual framework. For men, lesbians cannot be *Jöngue*. Because the validation can only be done by men. Lesbians are no longer women. However, Loes (2018: 48) has shown in her work that within the lesbian community in Senegal, divided between Jump (women who act as men) and Sexy (tender women), the sexy are those who fulfil the function of *Jöngue*.

Legal norms around gender and sexuality have an impact on the representation of femininity. They reinforce the traditions and cultural values which frame femininity and legitimise the social and gender roles attributed to women. This performance of femininity simultaneously builds negative representations around same-sex sexual practices and reinforces heterosexual male domination.

VI-2-b) Honours to real men

The place of women in the national project is one of dependence to men. As I was able to point out previously, male domination is instituted by the family code in several articles namely: section 133, section 152, section 153, section 277, section 305. Masculinity and femininity therefore result from permanent constructions and interactions which promote the consolidation of the social and sexual roles of men and women within the community. As

critical masculinities studies argue, masculinity should be conceptualised as "a social position, a set of practices, and the effect of the collective embodiment of those practices on individuals, relationships, institutional structures, and global relations of domination (…) It is produced, contested, and transformed through discursive processes, and therefore embedded within and productive of power relations " (Schippers 2007).

It therefore appears that the national project is first and foremost a male project insofar as femininity is instituted with a view to strengthening male domination. The state can therefore only appear as a male state with two main functions: to reaffirm patriarchal relations between the different sexes and to ensure that male interests prevail (Nagel 1998). This is what can be observed through the family law, where the exercise of femininity must allow men to assert their masculinity. However, there is not just one form of masculinity, but many.

Research on gender and more specifically on men and masculinities in the twentieth century was dominated by work highlighting the mechanisms of the subalternation, oppression, and exploitation of women in a patriarchal system (Kimmel 1994; Plummer 1999). One of the most influential theoretical concepts used to understand this domination of men over women is the Raewin Connell's notion of hegemonic masculinity. In its original formulation, hegemonic masculinity refers to a set of attitudes, practices, and social relationships that maintain the power of men over women (Connell 1987; 1995). It therefore appears as a performance, a repetition of a number of discourses and behaviours that naturalise male hegemony. When she stresses that masculinity needs to be analysed from a relational perspective, Connell joins Judith Butler (1990) who argue that the categories men and women are social constructs.

As we observe during the colonial period, there is also a hierarchy in the expression of masculinities in postcolonial Senegal. If hegemonic masculinity sits above and is considered the most common form of expression of masculinity, subordinate masculinities are at the bottom of the scale. This is where homosexuals fall. They are seen as sub-human or not sufficiently male. Described as incapable of expressing their virility towards women, they are seen as a threat within the patriarchal state and a danger for a nation whose male domination is defined in relation to heterosexuality.

In Senegalese society, the term *Goor-jigeen* does not simply express a distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals but is part of global representations of sex in Senegal. In the imaginaries, gender roles are clearly defined and contribute to an essentialisation of man and

woman. A man's sex gives him a specific role in society. The term *Goor* refers to those called "real men". But it does not have a simple biological connotation. It refers to a set of traits associated with masculinity like virility and domination. The sexual act itself is conceived by men as a form of domination, appropriation and possession (Bourdieu 1998:36). Manhood is measured by the ability of young boys to satisfy female sexual desires. Beyond the fact that the family code allows man to have several women, for the young boy, the multiplication of female partners is an indicator of his power, of his strength and confirms his masculinity. It is not uncommon to see young boys debating and bragging about their female conquests; their manliness depends in part on the testimonies of their peers.

Beyond naturalisation and the biologisation of sex, discourses show that male identity has an important social significance. Therefore, young people talk publicly about sex to avoid not being perceived as women. To be viewed as a man gives a certain social prestige. The *Goor* are therefore those who share the masculine identity. *Goor-jigeen* are seen as non-male, effeminate men. Not because they do not have a penis or a form of masculinity, but because they do not have sex with women. As Welzer-lang (2000:121) points out, the relationships between men are structured to the hierarchical image of the relationships between men and women. Those who cannot prove that they are in danger of being downgraded and considered to be dominated, like women. The culmination of the construction of the masculine identity is marriage and procreation. As soon as he is an adult, a young man must be able to find a woman and have children. Homosexuality challenges the rule bound, essentially performative, reproductive, normative and legitimate form of sexualities on the bases of which we represent ourselves as nation or a community with an established set of a particular culture, different from others. In the intersection of nation, gender and sexuality, the body becomes an important marker – even boundary- for the nation (Kumari 2018: 37).

In January 2016, social networks, media, and public opinion are held in suspense by an unusual case: the case of the handbag or the so-called "Wally Seck" case. Wally Seck, a famous Senegalese rapper, was filmed wearing a female handbag. The photos posted on Facebook trigger a wave of outrage at the national level. The Senegalese newspaper *L'Enquête* writes:

"Women's handbags are worn by men and it's boiling on social networks. Facebook in particular. Images shared at exponential speed circulate. Showing men with the popular accessory of women. Enough to carry a lot of sharp comments. And misunderstandings. (...) A homosexual agenda is in place, and everything must be done to preserve Senegalese society

(...)The artists of the Hip-Hop movement are also involved. The new title of rapper Simon is talking about that. "*Yi Bags*" protests against this pederast trend that is emerging among some fashion lovers. With strong references to Sodom and Gomorrah, he urges, without naming him, Wally Balago Seck to become a more exemplary model for its many young admirers" (*L'Enquête*, Thursday, January 21, 2016, 6).

As an extension of this debate on Wally Seck's handbag, the griot Abdoulaye Mbaye Pekh condemns the wearing of such an accessory: "a man must not dress like a woman, even less with a handbag. A man can put his files in a satchel, provided it is a man's bag." Even his "friend", the singer Baba Hamdy, in an open letter supposed to rescue Wally Seck and call for "restraint and understanding", condemned his behaviour.

The Wally Seck affair was the subject of lively debate in Senegalese society during the month of January 2016. For any foreigner who does not know Senegalese society, the Wally Seck affair is unthinkable. The problem here is the sacredness of male identity. Male status is not just about having heterosexual relationships, marrying a woman, and having a family. One also has to respect a certain number of codes which make it possible to construct the difference between men and women. Dress codes are associated with masculine identity. The feminine handbag is a marker of femininity. Men are not supposed to wear it, to avoid the upheaval of existing gender identities.

Men who wear female clothing or women's handbags are accused of promoting homosexuality or being homosexuals. These accusations not only refer to latent homophobia but aim to present accused persons as threats to male identity. In this context, society is invited to take measures to preserve itself. Given that masculine identity is expressed in relation to femininity, this discourse seeks to distinguish true men from those who are considered to be men-women or *Goor-jigeen*. The masculine is therefore expressed in a strict relationship with what is feminine.

The Wally Seck case also puts into perspective the place of music in the formation of male identity. In general, rap and hip-hop are considered musical genres where masculinity is emphasised: big jeans or trousers, serious voices, an imposing body, brutality in the gestures are associated with the masculine. Young male fans shape their representations of male identity through these images of their favourite artists. When a rapper like Wally Seck is seen with a female handbag, the masculine identity built around rap is shaken.

When Wally Seck is invited to be a model for young people, it is generally because he is accused of breaking the *Sutura*. The *Sutura* refers to a code of honour that regulates the

behaviour of men and women in Senegalese society. It establishes the boundaries of masculinity and femininity and invites respect for the values that shape Senegalese society. The *Sutura* occupies a central place in the construction of gender relations in Senegalese society. It affirms women's submission to men, sets dress codes and defines sexuality. It is therefore a regulatory tool for what is a male identity or a female identity.

The exclusion of *Goor-jigeen* is not simply related to sexual orientation or to the fact that they are not perceived as men, but also because they pose an ethical problem. They are viewed as people who challenge the honour of being a man, but also do not refer to femininity. They are a problem for both male identity, female identity and the nation. They therefore deserve no honourability and must be banned from society. There is a close relationship between gender and reputation. When Wally Seck is accused of promoting homosexuality or carrying a woman's bags, he attacks the *Sutura* and exposes himself to shaming and social rejection. This dynamic of othering strengthens the links inside the community and place sexuality and gender in a process of nation building where the state must permanently ensure the dominance of the heterosexual patriarchy.

VI-3- State violence against homosexuals

Masculinity being at the heart of nation building, it is the duty of the state to protect it. As we have seen, the legal norms that govern sexuality lay the groundwork for a repression of homosexuals in Senegal. In this section, it is appropriate to analyse the role of the criminal justice system in homophobic violence. As of 2008, the Senegalese state has become a central player in homophobia. Becker (1963) argues that, in order to understand how the rules creating a new class of outsiders are applied to particular people, we must understand the motives and interests of the rule enforcers, i.e., the police. During my fieldwork, I analysed articles and comments in the media about the arrests of homosexuals, I have had interviews with lawyers and LGBT rights activists. I found that the actions of the police can be classified into two categories. First, the all-out arrests of homosexuals which, in my view, are primarily aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of state institutions in a context of popular hostility. Second, what I qualify as the "outsourcing of violence" which consists in delegating the repression of homosexuality to the general public in order to build national solidarity.

VI-3-a) The quest for institutional legitimacy

Building consensus in a society lies in the capacity of institutions to be accepted as legitimate. For institutions, gaining legitimacy is essential because it allows them to justify the use of force, power and authority (Homolova 2018). Legitimacy reinforces convictions and creates perceptions that make acceptable a set of police actions, deemed desirable and appropriate in a logic of respect for norms, values and beliefs in a society (Suchman 1995: 574). The role of the police is not only limited to the enforcement of Senegalese criminal law and family law which establish morals, norms and values of sexuality and gender. They must also establish the legitimacy of state institutions in an environment where homosexuality suffers from social illegitimacy. In this context, homophobia can be seen as a tool to strengthen their legitimacy. It is therefore not trivial that human rights organisations insist that it is enough for an individual to be presumed homosexual for his arrest to be justified (Human Rights Watch 2010: 2).

This excerpt from a report by the international organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) on homophobic violence in 2008 is quite enlightening on this subject:

“July 2008, it was around 8pm. Babacar and a colleague are raising awareness of HIV/AIDS in a place frequented by homosexuals when a man attacks them. Knowing that Babacar's friend is gay, for the aggressor, Babacar is too. The abuser tells the crowd that Babacar and his friend are "goor-jigeen" (a discriminating Wolof term for homosexuals, literally a "man"). Very quickly, the gendarmes arrived. The attacker told the gendarmes to have surprised Babacar and his friend in full intercourse. The gendarmes search Babacar and his colleague and find in their bag condoms and gel. Babacar explains that the gendarmes "knew" that they were homosexuals as soon as they saw the gel: "[The gel] proves that you are Goor-jigeen because it facilitates [anal sex] relations. The gendarmes put the three men in custody, who stay overnight at the police station of the Regional Court of Dakar. For Babacar, it was a "night in hell": There were about ten gendarmes. They made us pump up for over an hour. If we refused or stopped, they beat us. They asked us to go faster and faster and if we did not succeed, they sprayed us with water. They did not let us call. They called us Goor-jigeen and fags. They said, "Why do not you want our women, our pretty women? We were beaten, beaten, slapped in the face and head. They did not let us go to the bathroom for hours. The next day, the attacker confesses to the police having lied. He did not surprise Babacar and his friend having sex. Both men are released. However, the police do not take any punishment against the aggressor”" (HRW 2010).

If in this testimony we can already deplore the fact that the attackers are not subjected to any punishment despite their lies, what seems rather surprising in this story is the fact that the security forces arrest persons suspected of being homosexual based on testimonials that they

did not bother to verify. This actually reflects a deep hostility towards homosexuals within the security forces. However, if the facts alleged against the arrested persons are false, their arrests have no legal basis. The story of Babacar and his colleagues highlights an enterprise of disciplining homosexuals. These arrests, based on unsubstantiated evidence that led to violence against the accused, reveal the vulnerability of homosexuals in Senegalese society. They are arrested by gendarmes because anal sex is seen as an unnatural act. In the arrest of Babacar and his friends, there is both homophobic violence and a celebration of heterosexuality. This why when they were in jail, they were asked why they do not love Senegalese women. Social control agencies no longer simply apply laws but become agents for the promotion of heterosexuality.

The labelling process allows the criminal justice system to define those who constitute deviants and criminals, but also to consolidate norms that must govern and regulate the behaviour of citizens (Lemert 1974; Kitsuse 1961). However, the norm is a construction that is formed in the power of writing (Foucault 1975: 191). It is the one who writes who will dictate, according to his beliefs and interests, what is acceptable. Norms therefore appear as constructions of the dominant order for hegemonic purposes. Thus, the absence of a clear definition of section 319 of the criminal law and the vague use of the words in the qualification of the offense makes it possible for agents of the state to exclude those who do not comply with the rules enacted and to define what is "good" or "bad" according to the interests of power (Becker 1963; Foucault 1975). It therefore appears easier for the state order to manufacture outsiders or enemies, which, according to Carl Schmitt (1992) is normal because politics goes hand in hand with naming enemies, choosing friends and building alliances.

As a social control agency, the police are seen as amplifiers of moral panic around the homosexual issue in Senegal (Ushiwata 2013: 38). The increase in arrests, which are carried out regularly on an arbitrary basis, has a dual function. On the one hand, these arrests legitimise violence against homosexuals, to the extent that populations develop the feeling of adhering to legally enacted sexual standards. On the other hand, the all-out repression strengthens the heterosexual normative framework for the exercise of sexuality and promotes the emergence of a certain collusion between the police and the heterosexual population, allowing the police to legitimise their actions to enforce the laws in other areas of society.

This situation doesn’t mean that the police actions obey on decisions taken at the top of the state level or official directives of systematic repression of homosexuals. The data shows that the work of the police is not uniform. Some homosexuals, arrested on the basis of a simple accusation without any evidence against them, have been promptly released by law enforcement. In other cases, arrested and detained homosexuals who have been brought before magistrates have simply been released for lack of evidence. Behind the legal repression of homosexuals, we can also see the effect of cultural values on the security forces. In many cases of homophobic violence, state repression rests primarily on the dominant heterosexual imaginary rather than on legal grounds for ascertaining and justifying offenses. As a result, there is a deep mistrust between the police and the homosexual population.

Crucially, the arrests of suspected homosexuals serve to reinforce a national consensus around heterosexuality as a national identity. The intensification of police brutality against homosexuals that emerged in the late 2000s exposed the close connection between the heterosexual family and national identity in Senegal. Building a heterosexual society is defined as an integral part of the national project. To fully grasp this point, we must revisit the parliamentary debates on the adoption of the country’s family law back in 1972. According to parliamentary debates newspapers available in the national archives of Dakar, the rapporteur of the legislation commission, Moustapha Toure affirmed: "The uniqueness of family law, in other words, a unique family code has appeared to the leaders of this country as an indispensable element of the unity of the nation" (ANS 1972). The Minister of Justice, Amadou Clédor Sall, stressed:

"If it takes its source in a political and economic context, the national feeling is also nourished by a certain way of living in common, under the protection of common institutions that everyone feels in their daily life [...] The implementation of a Senegalese Civil Code was therefore essential for the institution of a single family law, an essential element in the elaboration of the fundamental unity of the Nation" (ANS 1972).

It is clear that in 1972, Senegal's Minister of Justice established a link between family and national identity. Here, he refers to the heterosexual family as a place of socialisation, of learning national values and strengthening one’s sense of belonging to the nation. We can therefore understand why, beyond enforcing sexual norms, the police and the gendarmerie feel they have a duty to protect the heterosexual quality of the Senegalese nation. In repressing those involved in the criminal justice system, there is not only a desire to uphold the law, but they also feel invested with a duty to participate in building cohesion within the community. The theatricalisation of the arrests and police brutality makes it possible to

establish a convergence between the institutions and the dominant feeling within the population.

A similar dynamic extends beyond the security forces to the rest of the penal system. Even if convictions at the level of the courts are not common, the trials themselves are opportunities to publicly demonise same-sex sexual practices and reaffirm the state's hostility to homosexuality. Take, for example, the following story collected during my fieldwork.

Between May and June 2012, the media and public opinion in Senegal was held in suspense by a case described by the media as: "the lesbian case of Grand-Yoff". Grand-Yoff is a popular district in Dakar. Five girls, all inhabitants of Dakar were accused of lesbian practices. The media identified them as F. D (17 years old, living in Patte d'Oie), Sanou Faye (20 years old, living in Grand-Yoff), Leila Sankarlay (20 years old, living in Yoff Tonghor), Marie Fall (20 years old, domiciled to Yoff Tonghor), and Anna Bass (the oldest who eventually fled to another country of West Africa). The scandal erupted after the publication on social networks of a video in which we can see F. D., Leila Sankara, and Anna Bass engaged in sexual touching. Marie Fall and Sanou Faye were recording the video. The video, which lasts about 15 minutes, was broadcasted on May 9, 2012. In the video, we can hear speeches such as: "*Anna li nguay deff nekh na*, *sama yaram mi ngui daw* (That's good, what are you doing Anna! I even have chills". In a country where homosexual practices are rejected, the video provoked an uproar and the young women were described as lesbians, although they later denied these accusations.

Ultimately, no charges were brought against the women. But the urban safety squad of Dakar opened an investigation into the people who had broadcasted the video. Five young boys, all living in Grand-Yoff were arrested and detained on June 5, 2012. They were identified by the media as: Bouya Fall (22 years old, tailor), Pope Aly Seck (25 years old, Boutiquier), Mohamed Fofana (28 years old), tailor), Zakaria Saliou Ndoye (27, unemployed), and Bassirou Cisse (no more information).

The five men were prosecuted in the court of flagrant offences in Dakar for the "dissemination of images contrary to morality." During the trial, the young women from the video testified. Leila insisted on the fact that it was only a game between friends. "I could not imagine that it would have taken this magnitude. It was just for fun. I had even forgotten the video until Mary (Marie Fall) called me and informed that it was on the internet. But I do not know who broadcasted it" argued Leila in court. Following her speech, the prosecutor asked a

first question: "Have you measured the seriousness of this game?" Leila remained silent. The prosecutor returned to the charge: "answer so at least you have a little dignity. You should be ashamed, but I do not know if you have any. It's something that will follow you all your life. Be aware of it. The president of the court, in his turn, blustered: "You are dirty forever. Leila you were going to get married soon. No parent will let his son marry you".

The words of the president of the court and of the prosecutor in this case attest to the level of reprobation of same-sex sexual relations by the criminal justice system in Senegal. The punishment in this case is meant to deal with a moral problem that has consequences for the rest of society (Lacey 1988: 13). Norbert Elias emphasises the importance of the sensitivity of those in charge of determining punishment (Elias 2000). To this end, he demonstrates that the convictions of an individual are in part the result of a cultural process of imposition of certain norms, values and attitudes from childhood. It is their assimilation that also determines our relationship to space or environment. Thus, the police, legislators and magistrates responsible for the implementation of the laws and their application are cultural products.

But what is even more interesting here is the reference by the prosecutor to Leila's dignity and the claim that she is “dirty forever.” He is alluding to *Sutura*, the code of honour that regulates and organises personal conduct in Senegalese society. *Sutura* has a greater impact on women than men. As a gendered virtue, there is more at stake when *Sutura* is broken by a woman, because it is regarded as the foundation of feminine honour. In Senegalese society, men’s sentiments of love and their expression of it - usually through material gifts - are recognised, whereas women’s love ought to be kept secret and unspoken. In Senegal, there is a cultural expectation that girls should not talk about sex publicly, unmarried women ought to be virgins. A woman’s sexuality is perceived to be dangerous, and expressions of love and desire are therefore forbidden. The ideal Senegalese woman is a modest woman who dresses appropriately (i.e., properly covering the body), who avoids spending unnecessary time in public space, and who guards her chastity (ibid.). Respecting this code of conduct is necessary for a woman to be eligible for marriage, which is a crucial in Senegalese society. Marriage marks the achievement of her education. A woman who breaks with the virtue of *Sutura* then breaks with legible womanhood and marriage.

Clark (2005) points out that legitimacy encourages or even enables certain types of behaviour while discouraging other types. In a heteronormative society, the main function of the penal system is to uphold the dominant sexual ideology so as not to lead to a loss of trust between

institutions and the populations they act on. In this dynamic, the enforcer could appear as an amplifier. In the Piano-Piano case, for example, it appeared that the techniques of repression of lesbians by the police helped to give them more visibility to the extent that the issue of lesbians appeared in the public sphere. Young (2009) describes this as "the translation of fantasy into reality".

VI-3-b) Win the respect of those we deal with.

Social and legal pressure around the homosexual issue hinders the functioning of the criminal justice system and transforms it into a space for strengthening the dominant sexual order. Lawyers who have to defend homosexuals sometimes use intellectual gymnastics to prevent their clients from going to prison. I met a lawyer in Dakar who specialises in family law. During our meeting, he argues:

"We evolve in a society and the realities of this society have an impact on our way of seeing things, the way we do business. We must dare to say it: the lawyer who defends a homosexual will not have the same consciousness, the same approach. He may be uncomfortable the case as a defender of a person accused of homosexual practices. It can be messy. But the priesthood is beyond these contingencies. The lawyer controls the file. If, in light of the evidence, he thinks that a good defence strategy is to challenge the accused's sexual orientation, that's the right strategy. In the same way, if the facts are established, the lawyer will not come to ask his client to contest his sexual identity. He may ask him to plead guilty and invoke other circumstances and seek leniency from the court. It is managed case by case. If the record does not establish the facts, it must be denied. It is necessary not only to deny the acts reproached, but the accused's belonging to this category of people" (Interview with R32, January 11, 2918, Dakar).

Through the words of R32 it appears that the problems of arrested homosexuals may not be limited to their prosecution, but also to their defence. Sometimes defendants find it difficult to find legal representation because lawyers are sometimes afraid of being labelled pro - LGBT by the media and the public. For example, some of those arrested could not find lawyers for their defence and were released to court after spending many weeks in prison. I myself have observed the difficulties lawyers can have when discussing the issue of homosexuality, a situation that hinders the work of human rights organisations. Criminal law is therefore above the freedom to choose. In this society the only choice conferred by the state onto its citizens is to be heterosexual.

Law enforcement regularly violates the rights of homosexuals in Senegal. The latter feel that they have no institutional protection. Thus, according to gay rights organisations, the police

sometimes do not fulfil their duty to protect homosexuals who suffer from social violence. R3, a LGBT rights activist in Senegal, affirms:

"A homosexual is assaulted elsewhere. He goes to the police, thinking the authority will deal with him. Sometimes the aggressors have courage, they still come to the police. The victim is there, they too are there. And when you ask why the victim has been beaten, they reply: because he is homosexual. And the police, instead of first forgetting that he is gay, looking at what's in the complaint and dealing with the complaint, start looking at the person being called "gay". They check his shoes and clothes, the way he talks. In order to see if they can confirm his gay identity. Afterwards, the policeman asks this question: is what these people say true? And when you're not careful, they tell you to go and change your place of residence. Whoever has laid hands on you can leave the police station and sometimes is cheered by the crowd" (Interview R3, January 7, 2018, Dakar).

I received several testimonies confirming this statement where attackers went to a police station to try to get a homosexual out and lynch him, all under the gaze of the police who close their eyes to this violence. These remarks by R3 bring out three observations. The first is the collusion between the heterosexual population and the police in the hunt for homosexuals. The population feels invested with the same duty as the police to enforce the legal norms and values regulating gender and sexuality. This is why some people are not afraid to besiege a police station to demand that people suspected of being gay should be released in order to be lynched by the population. The second observation relates to the failure of the police to ensure the legal rights of all citizens are respected in accordance with article 7 of the Senegalese constitution which guarantees the right to life, liberty and security of all citizens: " The human person is sacred. It is inviolable. The state has an obligation to respect and protect it". Meanwhile, homosexuals are not safe, including in police stations. Finally, the impunity enjoyed by attackers with the security forces fuels homophobic violence and instils a climate of fear among homosexuals.

R3's story is reinforced by this testimony from the human rights activist R1:

"There is a young guy who lives in a neighbourhood called Pickine in the suburbs of Dakar. One day, the neighbourhood chief's son came at his house and found him washing his sheep and said: "You are gay, you are going to get out of the neighbourhood. If you don't get out of the neighbourhood, I'll kill you. When he calls me, he was in tears. I went to his house and listened to him. I told him, "File a complaint because we don't know how far it's going. The youngster said: he was in tears" No, we leave it like that because I don't want people to know he was in tears. Two days later, they find him and beat him. He runs, he enters his house, they catch him and beat him up again. He calls me, I came back, and I told him: We're going to complain. We file a complaint at the Pickine police station. He calls me afterwards to tell me

that his mother told him to withdraw. He did it without telling me. In return, the inhabitants of the district file a complaint against him, notify the sub-divisionner and the mayor of the locality. They posted banners where they wrote: "No to homosexuality, no perversion of young people in our neighbourhood" and they went to the police to say that the young person should leave or they will kill him. I arrive at the police station, explain and say how they threatened to set his house on fire, the police commissioner listened. The commissioner detains the youngster. Around 8 p.m., he told him to go back home. The next day, the young people return to the charge. The neighbourhood delegate goes to the police station. The commissioner said to the youngster: " Look at you, I know you are gay ". He said it twice to the person who received death threats. Today this young man is an immigrant. He is in Mauritania, but in Mauritania it is not better " (Interview with R1, December 12, 2018, Dakar).

This story illustrates both the mistrust that homosexuals have in the security forces, but also the complicity that exists between the police and the dominant heterosexual population when it comes to homophobic violence. State institutions thus participate in the exclusion and discrimination of homosexuals. In this case, for example, we observe that social rejection is not limited to the legal framework and the exercise of legitimate violence by state institutions. We can describe this situation as a form of subcontracting of homophobic violence insofar as, not having enough elements that could allow the state to initiate proceedings against an individual suspected of being homosexual, the police informally delegate the repression of homosexuals to the community.

This outsourcing of homophobic violence has an important political function. It creates a bond of solidarity around the homosexual issue between populations and state institutions. The feeling of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for homophobic violence creates a climate of trust with law enforcement. They act with the conviction of being invested by the state with a duty to protect society and to support institutions in their mission of building a heterosexual nation-state. State homophobia therefore takes on a diffuse character. It is not simply embodied by the criminal justice system but reinforced by the popular support for the state repression of homosexuals. However, the strategy of the Senegalese state is not always so obvious. This could explain for example the fact that in some cases the security forces do not engage in a systematic repression of those accused of homosexual practices.

However, behind the outsourcing of violence, one can also see the identification of the criminal justice system with the ideology of the dominant sexual class. People's social identities are shaped by the behaviour of the police as a group authority, and the strength of police's identification with the group influence their behaviour. Thus, the passivity of the

police towards populations who perpetrate violence against homosexuals creates a link of identification of the predominantly heterosexual population with the work of law enforcement against homosexuals. People who feel strongly affiliated with a group incorporate it in their concept of self in such a way that the ends of the group become their own (Blader & Tyler 2009: 446). Thus, beyond the legitimisation of institutions, the criminal justice system strengthens the mechanism that adheres the population to heterosexual values.

This strategy defined by Becker (1963: page nr) as "win the respect of those we deal with" is necessary for the project of national cohesion insofar as it makes it possible to permanently underline the existence of the problem in the society. As long as homosexuals are seen by the dominant heterosexual class as a threat, this group finds itself unified in opposition to a common enemy. Therefore, the outsourcing of homophobic violence helps to consolidate the consensus around heterosexuality as the dominant sexual norm.

VI-4 Homophobia: a political tool in the political game

At first glance, the homophobic violence instigated by the state aims to reaffirm heterosexuality as value of national identity, while consolidating the perceptions and representations that frame masculinity and femininity. However, we saw in the previous chapter that, if the State and more specifically the political actors have yielded to the pressure of moral entrepreneurs, it is also partly linked to the fact that political actors maintain a clientelist relationship with religious leaders. Beyond this aspect, there is the fact that homophobia can reinforce the legitimacy of political actors, delegitimise their speech or quite simply put an end to their political careers.

Homophobia and power dynamics are further reflected in the use of homophobic rhetoric in the political game. As Sylvia Tamale (2013) and Ashley Currier (2010) have shown, political homophobia in some African countries has increasingly been deployed as a silencing tool against political figures accused of endorsing Western governments or violating moral laws. Therefore, homophobia is useful for political actors within the state to retain their power, but also to demonise their opponents. In Senegal, however, homophobia has also been used to weaken political actors or eliminate political opponents.

An illustrative example is the institutional reform undertaken by Macky Sall in 2016, which had to be adopted by referendum. Among the points contested by the opposition was an article concerning “the recognition of new rights for citizens: rights to a healthy environment on their lands and their natural resources”. From the lack of definition and specification on the

notion of “new rights” arose controversies over the President’s possible intention to decriminalise homosexuality, despite the fact that Macky Sall had announced three years prior that he did not intend to change the current legislation on same-sex sexuality. In Touba, the most religious city of the country, meetings were organised by religious authorities against the reform project. Political opponents gathered under the “Front du Non” and used the concept of “New rights” proposed in the reform project to portray the Senegalese President as a proponent of the homosexual cause.

Respondent 11 is an MP of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), the party of former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, known for its very close proximity to religious brotherhoods. He rationalised his decision to join the “Front du Non” by the fact that “(The reform project) was going to favour homosexuals. It was the president Macky Sall that proposed (this reform) and his wife frequents homosexuals. She participated in gay meetings. It’s known. The photos are there, the videos are there” (Respondent 11, Dakar, December 17, 2017). The R11 is politically opposed to Macky Sall. In our interview, he did not provide any evidence of Macky Sall wife's collusion with homosexual circles. However, in a society where people accused of supporting homosexuals are frowned upon, he is aware that such an accusation will help weaken Macky Sall in the political battle around the referendum.

Several points of the referendum of 2016 in Senegal were contested by the country’s official opposition, especially: "the restoration of the quinquennat for the presidential mandate"; "The appointment by the President of the National Assembly of two of the seven members of the Constitutional Council" or "the inviolability of the provisions relating to the republican form, the laicity, the indivisible, democratic and decentralised nature of the State, the mode of election, the duration of the number of consecutive terms of office of the President of the Republic". Still, it is homosexuality that will be the main point in the coalition for the rejection of the new constitution.

Yet the term itself is not included in the new proposals. Nevertheless, the vagueness of the text sparked controversy over Macky Sall's desire to decriminalise homosexuality. Even if the other points of divergence are debated, homosexuality provoked the strongest reactions. In the political campaign in Saint-Louis, in the North-West of Senegal for the vote of the "YES", Macky Sall proclaimed: "One does not attack me on my economic balance sheet". He goes on to accuse the other side of being "confused, misinformed and intoxicated". Homosexuality can therefore be used as a political weapon that can lead to the adhesion or rejection of an individual or a political project.

Faced with political backlashes, Senegalese President Macky Sall met with religious leaders in Dakar on March 4, 2016, to clarify his intentions. During the meeting, he explained that “as long as I am President of the Republic in Senegal, homosexuality will never be legalised (…) These accusations are unfounded. They are not based on anything at all. They simply aim to sow confusion in the mind of the Senegalese people” (*PressAfrik* 2016). For President Macky Sall, it was clear that controversies surrounding the decriminalisation of homosexuality aimed to weaken his efforts at institutional reform. As this case shows, homophobia can also be used to discredit political figures, either to oppose new legislation and reform projects or to eliminate candidates during electoral campaigns.

A diplomat from a European Union country serving in Dakar confirms the strategic use of homosexuality as a campaign strategy:

"During elections there is no politician who will touch this subject. Apart from being against it. There is no minister who will try to soften the law when elections are coming. Because 96% of the population is anti-homosexual. If you propose to be more tolerant with this subject, you will lose the voters. It is used strategically" (Interview with R12, October 22, 2017, Dakar).

What the R12 highlights here is the use of homophobia for purposes of power, control and domination. As Foucault (1980) argues, sexuality does not only serve to control reproduction and to reassert moral and cultural values, but also shapes power relations between groups. Homophobia in this sense can also be used as a political resource among groups engaged in political competitions.

This strategy can be traced back in Senegal to the period of 2010-2012, when homosexuality emerged as a main theme in political campaigns. During this period, the former president of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade proposed a constitutional reform to extend his presidential term. The country’s political opposition and civil society opposed this proposal. In 2011, following the failure of his constitutional reform project, Abdoulaye Wade attempted to stage his son, Karim Wade, as his potential successor. Referred to as the “minister of heaven, earth and sea”, Karim Wade had already occupied several ministerial positions. Members of the political opposition, as well as several members of his father’s party, denounced what they perceived as an attempt to establish a “dynastic succession”. Karim Wade consequently became the target of the PDS ruling party’s opponents, including Macky Sall, the current President of Senegal. Among opponents’ criticisms was the rumour that Karim Wade was a homosexual, a rumour that was later relayed in several media reports. Several people who had been seen with him were further accused of engaging in same-sex sexual relations, thus

reinforcing the allegations made against Karim Wade. Allegations of homosexuality consequently became a political weapon to destabilise political opponents. President Macky Sall's position illustrates this later point.

As a human rights activist explains:

"At one point [Macky Sall] gave a first interview saying that we will handle the issue of homosexuality in a civilised way because the truth is that he also received funding (…) He was such between the hammer and the anvil. He had people who financed him, people he knew were LGBT, but on the other hand there was also the need to satisfy people's expectations. So, he was elected by saying that he will handle these issues responsibility. The problem is that [his promises] have become a perpetual target" (Interview with R13, December 13, 2017, Dakar).

The reaction of R13 reflects the embarrassment that human rights organisations are facing today. Before he came to power, Macky Sall was open on the issue of gay rights. But once in power, as I was able to show previously, he did not fail to show his hostility to the decriminalisation of homosexuality. Macky Sall's position on the decriminalisation of homosexuality illustrates the fact that homophobia in Senegal is, above all, an issue of power. In 2014, the Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA) reported that Macky Sall's position on homosexuality had significantly changed since his accession to power. Before, he was more sympathetic to homosexuals' rights than today. Even if the Senegalese president has not decided on the proposed law for a more explicit criminalisation of homosexuality, his silence raises fears within human rights organisations.

In 2016, a bill was introduced to further criminalise homosexuality in Senegal. Respondent 14 from Amnesty International who also works in the West Africa sub-region on the homosexual issue underlines during our interview on this subject:

"We were quite concerned about the introduction of the bill in 2016. I do not really know where this bill stands, the advantage sometimes is that the bills are not prioritised by the National Assembly. It can stay on the president's desk for some time. The risk is obviously that it comes at a time when it will be interesting for the power to play the card of homosexuality to have more political support" (Interview with R14, January 22, 2018, Dakar).

This reaction from R14 suggests that homophobia is not only a resource for the opposition in political struggles, but also for political actors in power. The cross-cutting nature of the use of homophobia in political struggles makes it possible to perceive a political consensus around the rejection of homosexuality, which transgresses political or ideological battles. Homophobia generates a sense of unity in a deeply divided society.

CONCLUSION

Sexual norms framed by laws in postcolonial Senegal build the hegemony of heterosexuality and the repression of homosexuals. The postcolonial subject is a subject built around two dynamics. The first dynamic is the colonial order which laid the foundations for the heteronormativity of Senegalese society. The other dynamic is part of an appropriation of the colonial heritage and a strengthening, or even hardening of gender norms. The family law sets out social relations and commonly shared moral values in the area of sexuality and gender relations, while the ambiguity of the penal code paves the way for violence against homosexuals. At the end, we are witnessing the institutionalisation of heterosexuality as part of the national project, but also the consolidation of the heterosexual patriarchy inherited from colonisation. The state's repression of homosexuals, beyond building a national consensus around sexuality, is part of an enterprise to consolidate male domination.

However, despite this context, it seems important to make a few remarks: First, the lack of adoption of a law criminalising homosexuality illustrates the authorities' caution on the subject. Moreover, legal repression does not follow formal institutional guidelines but is marked by treatment on a case-by-case basis. Although the police display hostility towards homosexuals, the outsourcing of homophobic violence to the general public reflects the difficulties of social control agencies whose mission is to enforce the law. The media and religious leaders have constructed homosexuality as a threat to Senegalese society and set themselves up as the guardians of a moral order endangered by homosexuals. This enterprise of institutionalising homophobic violence took place through a dual process. First, the creation of a social problem through a negative resignification of the Goor-jigeen and secondly, the construction of a sexual panic in Senegalese society. With its negative stereotyping of homosexuals and the proliferation of content on the topic, the media forced the state to act.

However, to this is added the fact that political actors within the state use homophobia to advance their political interests and maintain their legitimacy within public opinion.

CHAPTER VII: GLOBALISATION, GAY INTERNATIONAL AND RESISTANCE TO THE WEST

The previous two chapters have reported the process by which homosexuality gradually became a matter of national interest in Senegal, a country where, during colonisation and even after independence, the Goor-Jigeen didn't suffer from social illegitimacy. The concept of political homophobia has been developed to highlight the entanglement of national, diplomatic and geostrategic political issues around homophobia. According to Weiss and Bosia (2013), political homophobia is deployed through political rhetoric and policies that can be observed across a wide range of cases. Political homophobia thus describes the modular nature of homophobia, which involves several actors within a state participating in the promotion of the "fear of small number" or "rage about minorities in a globalizing world" which could lead to the building of "predatory identities" (Appadurai 2006). Understanding political homophobia should lead also to an understanding of how diplomatic and geostrategic issues fit into the battles around the homosexual issue in Senegal.

When studying the relationship between homosexuality and Senegalese society, one discovers that homophobia is deeply associated with a rejection of globalisation and the prevailing neoliberal order. According to the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1998), globalisation is "the intractable fate of the world," an "irreversible process" that "affects us all in the same measure and in the same way". Brah (2002 :38) explains globalisation as "multiaxial and multidirectional," representing "complex articulations of socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions". Douglas (2008: 25) views globalisation as "the process by which anything, any movement, any phenomenon becomes global," and this argument is also shared by Enloe (2007: 2–3). Gupta (2004: 79), however, views globalisation as "a rapid accelerating process of change that is transforming the ways individuals, social groups and political states interact with one another."

However, studies on coloniality have inscribed globalisation as an extension of old forms of Western domination that appeared in the 16th century (Quijano 2007; Mignolo 2000), a critique of globalisation that is tied to a critique of capitalism, modernity and developmentalism. It is therefore not surprising to note that the negative apprehensions of the liberal order at the beginning of the 1990s were accompanied in Africa by the appearance of

homophobic political discourse[44]. "Global resistance to neoliberalism" tends to cast gay men in particular as "the winners or the agents of capital of globalization, of the precariousness of labor," and the leading edge of "Western societies' immoralism" (Woltersdorff 2007) and a pending "corrosion of character" (Sennett 1998). Western propaganda around homosexuals is seen as an extension of the capitalist domination responsible for Africa's underdevelopment. In this chapter, I examine the process by which globalisation fuels homophobia and places the homosexual issue at the centre of a resistance to Western hegemony in postcolonial African society.

VII-1- Globalisation, poverty and culture war

One cannot extract the construction of the postcolonial subject from globalisation. Globalisation affects all spheres of life and shakes up political, economic, social, cultural and religious boundaries (Bohman 2004; Bosia & Weiss 2013). Therefore, to think of the postcolonial subject is to think of the environment in which he evolves. However, it turns out that the promises of globalisation have been accompanied in Africa by the persistence of poverty, a situation that has reinforced resistance to the West. Societies are plural and do not have the same history. Perceptions of globalisation are different on both sides depending on the hemisphere in which one is located. In this context, the discourse on the universality of human rights carried by Western governments and non-governmental organisations are seen in Senegal as new attempts to standardise the planet for the purpose of consolidating Western hegemony. Poverty renders the discourse on homosexual rights inaudible and inscribes homosexuality in the register of a culture war.

[44] At the end of the 20th century, African political leaders intensified their use of homophobic rhetoric. In 1996, President Nujoma, while addressing students at the University of Namibia, said, "The Republic of Namibia does not allow homosexuality here. We will fight this with vigour. We will make sure that Namibia will get rid of lesbianism and homosexuality. (…) Police are ordered to arrest you and deport you and imprison you (...). Those who are practicing homosexuality in Namibia are destroying the nation (. . .). It is the devil at work". The Namibian president establishes in these circumstances a link between homophobia and the assertion of national identity. Sexuality is not simply a private matter; it is an integral part of the building of the nation as I will demonstrate in this research. In July 1998, President Yoweri Museveni from Uganda told reporters, "When I was in America some time ago, I saw a rally of 300,000 homosexuals. If you have a rally of 30 homosexuals here, I would disperse it". Museveni was further quoted in the state-owned newspaper New Vision as saying: "I have told the CID (Criminal Investigations Department) to look for homosexuals, lock them up, and charge them." The statement followed press reports (apparently false) of a marriage between two gay men in a suburb of Kampala. In September 1999, Daniel Arap Moi, president of Kenya, announced: "It is not right that a man should go to another man.

VII-1-a) Globalisation, poverty and homophobia

As I pointed out in the theoretical discussion of coloniality, critiques of globalisation view it as an extension of capitalist ideology, with the ultimate goal of consolidating the hierarchies inherited from colonialism. The idea of independence is seen as a lure as these societies remain dominated by liberal Eurocentric discourse (Wallerstein 1991a; 1995). The economic and political systems of those postcolonial states are still shaped by their subordinate position in a capitalist world-system organised around a hierarchical international division of labour (Wallerstein 1979; 1984). The multiple and heterogeneous processes of the world-system, together with the predominance of Eurocentric cultures (Said 1979; Wallerstein 1995; Quijano 1998; Mignolo, 2000), constitute a global coloniality between Europeans/ Euro-Americans and non-Europeans (Grosfoguel 2002).

The contestation of globalisation is understood as an intrinsic "colonizing paradigm" (Peters 2004: 111). The postcolonial critique of globalisation argues that it exacerbates inequalities between poor and rich nations. These inequalities and the emptiness of Western promises of a more economically egalitarian world generate distrust of the West. Poverty on the African continent is seen as a tool to maintain the hegemony of rich countries. The consequences of this poverty affect the perceptions of the Western discourse on the rights of homosexuals.

The survey of the National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD) on poverty and family structure published in 2015 reveals that 43.2 percent of people aged 13 and over are married (28.9 percent monogamous and 14.3 percent polygamist). Singles represent 65 percent of the population, almost one in two people. It appears that celibacy is more important in urban areas (53.6 percent compared to 45.9 percent in rural areas). Contrary to the conclusions of the first phase of the EPSF (2006), in 2011, the opposite trend is observed for celibacy where men are the most concerned (60%) against 40.8% for women. In urban areas, there are more singles in the agglomeration of Dakar, 54.1% against 53% in other cities of the country. Conversely, marriage is more prevalent in rural areas (47.5 percent) than in urban areas (38.7 percent) and the practice of polygamy also follows the same trend: 18.4 percent in rural areas compared to 10 percent in urban area.

These statistics lead me to conclude that half of the population which could get married is unmarried. This is a problem in a society where marriage among men is a matter of male identity and wealth. To the extent that the population has a slight female majority we can see that more women are free, although many men are single. There is a feeling of a gradual

reduction in the power of men who are unable to meet social expectations, but also to satisfy their sexual pleasures. The differences between rural and urban areas cannot hide the fact that there is a real crisis of marriage in both geographical areas. The celibacy rate is higher in urban areas because these spaces are more organised around the modern economy. Urban areas therefore become spaces where gender struggles are in permanent negotiations.

Thus, the same ANSD report of 2011 stresses that if the number of households headed by men (76 percent) is at least three times higher than those directed by women (24 percent), the fact remains that the percentage of women who hold this role is increasing. Women are becoming more numerous at the head of households in both urban and rural areas (30.2 percent and 17 percent). On the other hand, heads of male households are more represented in rural areas (83 percent) than in urban areas (69.8 percent). In urban areas and among male heads of households, 13.5 percent have an age between 15 and 34 years, 45 percent are aged 35 to 54 years and 41.3 percent are at least 55 years old. In rural areas, there are fewer male heads of household aged between 35 and 54 years (43.7 percent) but more male head of household (43.2 percent) aged 55 years and over. In urban areas, statistics on female heads of households mention that: 12.5 percent are aged 15-34, 41 percent aged 35-54 and 45.7 percent aged 55+. In rural areas, the proportion of women heads of households aged 15-34 years is estimated at 16 percent, 35-54 age group at 42.4 percent and 41 percent for those aged 55 and over (ANSD 2015: 39). This power of women is not well perceived by men, including in rural areas (Perry 2005).

The situation is even more catastrophic among young people. The ANSD's report of the second trimester of 2017 on the national survey of employment in Senegal shows that only 39.7 percent of the employed population had a salaried job. Differences emerge according to the place of residence. The employment rate in urban areas is higher than in rural areas, 46.8 percent and 29.7 percent respectively. These differences are even more pronounced by sex, with 46.6 percent of men in paid employment versus 30.5 percent of women. The distribution of salaried employees by area of residence (68.7 percent in urban areas versus 31.3 percent in rural areas) and sex (66.8 percent for men versus 33.2 percent for women) is highly unequal (ANSD 2017: 5).

A distribution of the unemployed population by age group shows that young people are more affected. In Senegal, it should be noted that half of the population is under 17 years of age (the median age of the population is 17 years). As for the average age, it is 22 years old. The

population under 15 represents 43.3 percent of the whole population, while the population under 25 represents a total of 64 percent. Senegal therefore has a very young population (ANSD 2014). In fact, more than 63.0 percent of the unemployed are in the age group of 15 to 34. The highest rates are observed among young people aged 20-24 years and 25-29 years, (18.8 percent and 16.3 percent, respectively). The phenomenon affects less the age group 35-64 years with an unemployment rate of people estimated at 10.2 percent (ANSD, 2017: 7).

Economic crisis and the impoverishment of the population have consequences for the gender dynamics within Senegalese society. Given the crisis, and because men's incomes have also decreased, girls must also fight to help their mothers to take care of the home. This gradually leads to a loss of control of the family on the girl. Young men must multiply their efforts to be able to assume their masculine identity which includes the financial ability to take care of their wives. This galloping precariousness and social exclusion will have consequences for gender roles. Male and female identities in negotiation are no longer static. Even married couples are transformed (Mbembe 2010: 214). Both men and women develop survival strategies that affect relationships including in the domestic environment. Masculinity is in trouble. For the young man, it becomes difficult to boast himself of being virile because young women do not only appreciate the young man for sex, but also for the economic benefits that she can obtain in the relationship. Hence the multiplication of male partners by young women.

Respondent 22 works for a company in Dakar. During our interview, she admits having several male partners. When I asked why girls have multiple partners, she says:

"Due to poverty, materialism, lack of parental education and I should also emphasise puberty and non-social follow-up are some encouraging reasons. Some girls should struggle to survive and sometimes even support their families, but in all of this there are risks to undertake like HIV or many others. By multiplying men, they think they can quickly find the jackpot. Each of them fills his tasks in the sense that the girl has what she wants, money, pleasure of satisfaction. If you need something, if the first does not, you ask the second, if it is the same the third, so on. You have more chance to have what you actually want. When a man cannot care about you when you love him and your job, you can keep it, or you will spend your life to cheat him and to avoid that I prefer to leave him. Otherwise, I will keep him, and I will cheat him all the life" (Interview with R22, December 14, 2017, Dakar).

The respondent here openly recognises what I have observed on the ground and what I have heard from several Senegalese. The multiplication of male partners by young women stems from their desire to have several sources of funding and to lift themselves out of their state of poverty. The respondent goes further by establishing a link between the low purchasing power

of men and the infidelity of women. However, female infidelity in Senegalese society is seen in many cases as a marker of a man's weakness, even if the reasons for infidelity are not only financial. Still, the financial stakes are fundamental in the multiplication of male partners by women. With poverty, young girls must take on a more important role in the family to maintain a certain balance. In some families where the father is non-existent, they can play the role of mother for younger siblings. Masculinity in this context can be much more economic than sexual.

In a context where masculinity is also defined by the number of female conquests, the difficulties of young men to have many women due to the weakness of their purchasing power affect their representations of male identity. Young men feel they are gradually losing control over women who are gaining greater autonomy. In this context of economic crisis, the relations between men and women are upset. Many young people are now maintained in forms of prolonged dependence. The economic crisis has therefore given birth to a crisis of masculinity which leads to a crisis of the nation-state of which hegemonic masculinity is a constitutive element. In this context, homophobic violence appears as a mechanism for strengthening ties within a patriarchal state that feels threatened.

However, the crisis also led young people to develop new forms of sexuality. Heterosexuality, deeply rooted in tradition and culture, has come into competition with heterodox sexualities. In this regard, Tshikala Kayembe Biaya (2001) believes that this new economic situation has produced some dramatic changes. The author notes:

"In the context of Dakar at the end of the nineties, sexuality, masculinity and femininity first appear on the register of the crisis. The age of entry into adult life - which is characterized, at least in boys, by financial autonomy, the exit of the parental roof and entry into the world of employment is declining. This recession causes a great deal of sexual anguish and is at the origin of new behaviors" (Biaya 2001: p.77).

Among new forms of sexuality is homosexuality. Even if male homosexuality is rejected socially and institutionally, in the Senegalese context as in other countries in Africa, homosexuality is also represented as a sexual practice that generates financial resources. Young homosexuals are accused of being homosexual mainly for money to support their financial needs. The young homosexuals interviewed in this study do not hide the fact that they sometimes accept money for sexual intercourse or can be financially assisted by another older man.

"I met someone in our network. He was an old man. He saw me, he (?) loved me. We went out together, but I did not love him. I was just with him for money. But when we were in bed, I was not sexually active and he told me "you, your body does not accept me". Now he takes me like his friend. He gives me money and when I have problems, he resolves it" (Interview 23, September 9, 2018, Dakar).

"Yes, they paid me. Someone sees you. He wants to fuck you and he gives you money. Sometimes he harasses you. I don't have a job. When I face this kind of situation, I don't have a choice. You meet someone, you call him and after he gives me money and I take it because this money will be used to do something. Sometimes it is 50000 Fcfa (80 euros), often 30000 Fcfa (50 euros)" (Interview with R24, September 19, 2018, Dakar).

In the responses of R23 and R24, it appears that money plays an important role in homosexual relationships. This situation is also linked to their vulnerability because they are people rejected by their families on account of their sexual orientation. They need this money to survive in a hostile environment. It is therefore not possible to exclude the importance of money in homosexual relationships. Many homosexuals I spoke to highlighted the fact that this transactional sexuality also helps to solve the problems of everyday life. These economic-sexual exchanges (Trachman 2009) are not only present in heterosexual relationships as developed by Paola Tabet, but also in homosexual relationships. The representation of money in homosexual relationships is accentuated by the fact that the anti-gay discourse regularly associates a lifestyle that is attractive to young people with homosexuals.

The centrality of money in same-sex relationships reflects the importance of precariousness among young people. There are indeed many people in Senegal who believe that the practice of homosexuality is linked to difficult economic conditions. Homosexual practices are seen as strategies for circumventing poverty. In 2008, following the publication of photos of homosexuals in the magazine *Icone*, Mansour Dieng, the editor in chief claims to have been threatened by homosexuals. Thus, the NGO JAMRA published a press release in which it underlines: "the object of threats for having done only its work of journalist, that is to warn public opinion on the dangers of perversion and sexual corruption underpinned by the easy money that plagues our youth and painfully undermines our moral and religious values" (*Le Soleil*, Feb. 5, 2008).

The use of the term "easy money" by the Islamic organisation JAMRA is not accidental. It aims to maintain the link between the triptych: poverty-money-homosexuality, but also to emphasise that this dynamic is only possible because of the existence of donors who finance these sexual practices in Africa. Besides the context of this affair, the government daily newspaper goes further by questioning the origin of the donors. The journalist writes: "(...) the

mystery persists as to the source of the financing of alleged homosexuals that could be of foreign origin or provided by associates" (*Le Soleil*, 7 Feb. 2008). The “foreign origin” referred to by the journalist here are Western governments, and their “associates” are Western NGOs. In a context of poverty, Westerners are accused of encouraging homosexuality with their money in a poor country.

During my discussions with Western diplomats at Dakar, they confessed to funding gay rights organisations in the name of promoting human rights. The problem is that this approach comes up against two issues. First, they are accused of exploiting poverty to advance the homosexual agenda in Senegal. For example, an official from the Ministry of Justice that I met does not hesitate to criticise the local funding of civil society organisations. He argues:

“It is known that the European Union promotes the development of homosexuality in African countries. It was the homosexual lobbies that brought down the Wade government. (…) The European Union operates with NGOs which are supposed to defend human rights. These NGOs are made up mainly of gays and lesbians and promote the protection of homosexuals in Europe, wanting to widen their circles. Today all over Africa we have NGOs. And on top of that is poverty. When somebody's a lawyer and doesn't have a job. If you tell him that his job is to help homosexuals with a salary of 800,000 FCFA, it is very easy for him to say yes”. (Interview with R17, June 3rd, 2018, Dakar).

We see here that this discourse highlights the classifications inherited from the coloniality of power which maintains that, in a globalised world, all dimensions of social life are affected (Quijano 2000). We have a binarisation between Europe / Africa; Rich / poor; Dominant / dominated. Poverty is therefore presented as a point of vulnerability for the promotion of homosexuality in Senegal. This situation actually leads to the second problem, that of priorities. Homosexuality is seen as a consequence of poverty. Therefore, it seems more important to fight poverty than promote homosexuality. However, inequalities and economic underdevelopment throw doubt on Western intentions around the homosexual issue.

Respondent 33 argues:

"Why do people focus a lot on this problem when there is poverty? While there is social injustice. The distribution of wealth in all African countries is not good and is not what it should be. Why don’t people talk about this? Why don’t we talk about the problem of our people who are taking the desert, the sea? Why don’t we talk about our underdevelopment that has been imposed on us? From our ignorance or our passivity. Why people on the other side want to impose a way of life on a majority. (...) It's wider than that. Because our elders who went to Europe were polygamous. If we talk about homosexuality, we must also talk about polygamy. They did not talk about it" (Interview with R33, Dakar, January 28, 2018).

R33's point of view is shared by many Senegalese that I met. They argue that, in a poor continent like Africa, priority should not be given to the rights of homosexuals. This discourse has the peculiarity that it shifts the debate on considerations that affect the daily lives of the populations. The rejection of polygamy in Western society illustrates the hegemonic claims of the West. This situation is also led by the fact that in the imaginaries of the formerly colonised, relations between the West and Africa are unequal and subject to exploitation, domination and cultural imperialism.

As Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin (1995) warn: All post-colonial societies are still subject to one or another overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved this problem. Political and geopolitical contingencies thus affect the psychology of actors who make homophobia an instrument of resistance to the West and a mechanism for building a personal, social and cultural identity. The neoliberal order that emerged in the 1990s was accompanied by a process of resistance from underdeveloped countries against the West (Ireland 2013: 54). Thus, rejecting the liberalisation of sexual identities constitutes a mechanism of defence and fight against the evils which undermine society. Fighting homosexuality is akin to fighting social inequalities.

VII- 1-b) The globalisation of human rights as a cultural war

For the theorists of coloniality, globalisation is ideological rather than neutral, a project rather than a process, globalisation is the metastasis of a particular European modernity to the rest of the world, advanced predominantly at present by the United States. This violent and uprooting project involves the always already weighted transfers, extractions, and "development" of capital, people, resources, and information across borders. As a result, globalisation is profoundly destabilising to local cultures as communities engage new sets of norms that originate from dominant parts of the globe (Kaoma 2018).

In a context of poverty, African leaders have re-appropriated the myth of African heterosexuality, portraying homosexuality as a colonial and neocolonial form of corruption of African societies. This postcolonial rhetoric has in turn served to mask the failures of political leaders by linking Africa's internal problems with the imposition of decadent Western mores (Hoad 2007; Bhana & al. 2007). Such forms of "cultural decolonisation" have also enabled them to consolidate their power through the construction of a national identity based on heteronormativity, articulated around "Us" and the "West".

As Bhana (2007) notes, the politicisation of sexuality functions as a unifying force in a context of increasing social fragmentation: it deflects attention away from more pressing issues and unites the divisions among people of different class and ethnic groups by drawing moral boundaries. Articulated around notions of “Us” and “The West”, these boundaries function as cultural markers (Aarmo 1999). They deemphasise differences through the essentialisation of culture and unite citizens that may not share the same language, traditions or historical experiences. Heteronormativity consequently becomes the cultural stuff around which national identity is built, homosexuality the boundary around which definitions of “Africans” and “Westerners” are constructed, and homophobia an instrument of resistance to Western influence.

On October 25, 2015, Macky Sall, President of Senegal, invited on the French TV channel *I-Télé* on the program "18h politique" answered the questions of the journalist Audrey Pulval. Interrogated about homosexuality in Senegal, he affirms that:

"We have our family code, we have our culture, we have our civilisation. People also need to learn to respect our beliefs. In the name of what we must think that because elsewhere, we think that homosexuality must be decriminalised, that it must be a universal law? In the name of what should it be a universal law? We must also respect the right of every people to define their own legislation. I do not see why we must impose this vision on ourselves. People must have the modesty to understand that not all countries are the same, do not have the same stories, evolutions, each country has its own metabolism. These are problems of society; each society must appreciate according to its capabilities. Personally, I think people have the freedom to do what they want, but they do not have the freedom to impose on others what they are. That they are homosexual, it is their problem, it is not my problem" (Interview of Macky Sall with Audrey Pulvar, October 25, 2015).

Macky Sall’s response illustrates both the perception of homosexuality as non-African and the promotion of heterosexuality as an integral part of Senegalese identity. For the Senegalese president, homosexuals are outsiders because their sexual orientation does not respond to African culture. In making these remarks, the President of Senegal put an end to the hopes of human rights organisations that had been calling on him for months to decriminalise homosexuality in Senegal. At the same time, he offered pledges to the Senegalese population who was gradually showing their wrath at the pressures facing the Senegalese state. But what appears in the background is the link that is established between heterosexuality and African civilisation.

The politicisation of postcolonial gender identities is deeply rooted in the colonial heritage. Colonialists formulated heterosexist suppositions about African women and men (Epprecht 2004; 2008; McClintock 1995). They ignored the existence of same-sex sexual practices on

the continent. The qualification of same-sex sexual practices as “primitive” or “unnatural” in Western travellers’ writings, and the persecution faced by individuals engaging in non-heterosexual practices under the colonial regime, have played an important role in the re-writing of the history of African sexuality (Epprecht 2008). Sensitised by racial and moralistic views on homosexuality promoted by colonial regimes, many postcolonial African authors developed the vision of a single, heterosexual African sexuality to claim high moral ground despite the evidence of same-sex sexual practices before and during the colonisation of Africa. Saskia Wieringa (2009: 208) refers to this process as “postcolonial amnesia," a selective and strategic forgetting of certain aspects of the past which allows communities to reimagine and reconstruct their history.

In his remarks, the Senegalese president clearly establishes a difference between "them" and "us". He emphasises that the freedoms of homosexuals can be applied in Western societies, but they cannot apply in Senegal because Senegalese society is different from Western societies. One of the consequences of this argument is the construction of an opposition between the West and Africa around sexuality. But this dynamic can only be effective if it is reinforced by a process of enemification of homosexuals who appear as a category that undermines local cultural values.

In Senegal, as in other African countries, the international mobilisation of LGBT organisations for the rights of homosexuals has provoked negative reactions. Homophobia is no longer justified exclusively on religious or legal grounds but is understood as a reaction against what is perceived as Western aggression, an interference in national affairs. Western organisations are accused of wanting to impose their customs and cultures on Africans. The notion of a clash of civilisations developed by Samuel Huntington (1993) is updated here although it is a cultural construct that does not necessarily refer to a structural antagonism between Western and African societies.

This discourse celebrates the heteronormativity of African societies as a symbol of the authenticity of African societies against the West which engages in practices likened to debauchery. It is reactionary and places the debate around homosexuals in a binary configuration of geopolitics around the West and the South. But the binarisation of the discourse around homophobia between the West and the South must also be understood as an attempt to reject neocolonialism and international capitalism.

This approach is rooted in the economically unequal relationship between the West and Africa. Western discourse on Africa is tainted with doubt, its credibility called into question and the sincerity of the actors involved questioned. Africa, in the imagination of local actors, is seen as a testing ground for an agenda aimed at consolidating the hegemony of the West and keeping Africa in a subordinate position. From this perspective, the discourse on the decriminalisation of homosexuality is part of this Western conspiracy.

In 2013, Macky Sall faced severe criticisms for his alleged intentions to decriminalise homosexuality. Due to this situation, the issue of decriminalisation was discussed during a minister's council which was chaired by the President in April, 2013. It was followed by a governmental statement: "the state has never considered such an option (decriminalising homosexuality) and totally excludes it under its magisterium". The visit of the American President Barack Obama to Dakar in June, 2013, revived discussions on homosexuality. During their joint press conference in Dakar, Jessica Yellin, the CNN Chief White House Correspondent asked President Obama whether he pushed his counterpart to decriminalise homosexuality. She also asked President Sall whether he had plans to do so. Aside from acknowledging the controversial nature of homosexuality in Africa, President Obama made a strong case for sexual equality:

"My basic view is that regardless of race, regardless of religion, regardless of gender, regardless of sexual orientation, when it comes to how the law treats you, how the state treats you—the benefits, the rights and the responsibilities under the law—people should be treated equally (…) We cannot have a standard model which is applicable to all nations, all countries—you said it, we all have different cultures. We have different religions. We have different traditions. And even in countries where this has been decriminalised, and homosexual marriage is allowed, people don't share the same views" (The White House: Jun 27, 2013).

Barack Obama's words in Dakar fall within what is described by the concept of homonationalism (Puar 2007). This concept underlines "the complexities of how "acceptance" and "tolerance" for gay and lesbian subjects have become a barometer by which the right to and capacity for national sovereignty is evaluated" (Puar 2007). It is related to the propensity of the Western world to understand the levels of development of societies on the basis of their acceptance of homosexuality, a strategy which classifies under the banner of underdeveloped countries which maintain the criminalisation of homosexuality. What is considered American exceptionalism is also often described as the ability of the United States

to include the rights of sexual minorities in the neoliberal project. The rights granted to homosexuals illustrate the progress of Western societies. The criminalisation of homosexuals in Africa is assumed to reflect the underdevelopment of these countries. To fly to the rescue of these populations who are subjected to barbarism and violence is a duty. One can read behind this step an updating of the philosophical ideas around the civilising mission. For this purpose, homosexuality integrates the issues related to the democratisation of societies.

This posture of Barack Obama reinforces the theses of critics of globalisation who argue that globalisation is only a tool of capitalism to consolidate Western hegemony and universalise Western culture. As stated by Bosia (2014), global North human rights advocacy often assumes that the Western-born human rights framework is universally applicable, from Africa to Asia, to South America. Tomlinson (2013) describes globalisation as a tidal wave aimed at destroying our diverse socio-cultural and religious identities in favour of "a market driven 'branded' homogenization of cultural experience." Indeed, globalisation promotes pluralism and cultural diversity, but it is predominantly Western values and American culture that are widely exported, threatening the existence of weaker cultures. About Africa, Oni (2005: 15) writes, globalisation "has dealt a serious blow to African culture and has even almost wiped off [African] culture."

A few minutes after Obama's speech, Macky Sall reacted in these terms:

" Senegal, for its part, is a tolerant country which does not discriminate when it comes to the inalienable rights of individuals. We do not tell someone that he will not be recruited because he is a homosexual (…) but nor are we ready to decriminalise homosexuality. For the moment we are not prepared to lift this provision of the law. This does not mean that Senegal is a homophobic country, but society must absorb these questions, take the time to reflect on them and treat them without any pressure or force (…) Be reassured, Senegal is a country of freedoms, and homosexuals are not persecuted ".

Macky Sall's statement mobilises three main arguments. The first concerns the government's compliance with Senegalese law, which must be applied and respected regardless of personal beliefs. The second reasserts heteronormativity as a cultural marker of national identity while portraying Senegal as a tolerant and democratic country in compliance with human rights. The third argument finally reaffirms the sovereignty of the state by excluding external interventions in the process of decriminalising homosexuality. It is clear that the Senegalese president perceives the homosexual issue as a tool of pressure in the hands of the West, which tends to undermine Senegalese sovereignty. Macky Sall critiques the globalisation of

homosexual identity by the West, a process that fails to take into account the cultural realities of other societies. This attitude has been described as sexual imperialism (Massad 2002).

Massad (2002) criticises what he calls the "Gay International", composed of activists at organisations like the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) and the U.S.-based International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) as well as mostly U.S.-based gay scholars who seek to impose a Western conception of homosexuality in contexts that do not lend themselves to it and where these actions would even produce the harmful effects of increasing the repression of homosexuality. Massad argues that this hegemonic attitude of the West has had the opposite effect in Muslim countries where people identified as gay or who self-identify with the gay category have found themselves threatened.

The feeling of a hegemonic attitude as described by Massad (2002) around the mobilisations of international organisations for the rights of homosexuals is also present in Senegal. In Dakar, I met a member of the pro-democracy civil society organisation YEN A MARRE who shares the thesis that it is the discourses in favour of homosexual populations in Senegal that have had the opposite effect of provoking homophobic reactions. He underlines:

"Homosexuality has existed in our society for years. But this homosexuality has never been a problem. It was more or less tolerated in some societies. There were no problems related to this issue. The problems started when the West got involved. When the West wanted to make it a priority, to force African societies to accept homosexuality. It is at this moment that we faced a clash. Because in many African societies, these are things that exist. We knew in the villages who was effeminate, homosexual, but we kept him. But when there was the European agenda which wants to give many more rights to homosexuals, this is precisely where African societies started to steer clear, to say not to impose your agendas on us. Because the problem of homosexuality is not on the agenda in some African countries. In particular in Senegal, which has other immediate concerns. There are economic concerns or concerns that are much more mundane: "education, health, food self-sufficiency. These are situations in which African societies must find a solution rather than finding a solution to homosexuality " (Interview with R33, January 28, 2018, Dakar).

It appears in this statement that beyond the hierarchy of priorities which maintains that the rights of homosexuals cannot come before the fight against poverty, the mobilisations of "pro-LGBT" organisations and Western governments have had the reverse effect of arousing homophobia in African countries. This all-out strategy of the Gay International movement of stimulating debate around the universality of gay rights has been described by Massad (2002) as "incitement to discourse". In a context of suspicion, given the historical relationship between Africa and the West, the discourse on the universality of gay rights quickly appeared to Africans as a new attempt at colonialism. But the incitement to discourse has created a

context in which the world is divided between those who support LGBT rights, perceived as superior, and those who reject homosexual, described as inferior. This diagram updates the old logics at the source of colonialism between the civilised and the savage.

The issue of homosexuality in Senegal is not simply rooted in sexual normativity but is intertwined with broader processes. In a context of asymmetrical relations between the Global North and the Global South, the politicisation of sexuality emerges as a way of reasserting moral authority and cultural differences over foreign influences (Awondo & al. 2012). The homosexual issue therefore generates in Senegal what can be described as neo-cultural nationalism. Homosexuality is perceived as a cultural attack. Finally, Africa's sustained opposition to homosexuality is also a reaction to globalisation (Kaoma 2014). As Stohl (2005: 254) puts it, "Paradoxically, the increasing levels of global consciousness" derived through globalisation can also be "associated with increasingly local politics, a heightened sense of the importance of community, social movement organizing designed to counter the new world order, and individuals' desperate struggles for identity."

VII- 2- Fight France and preserve the Muslim world

The cultural war fuelled by poverty gives some legitimacy to the rejection of same-sex sexual practices in Senegal. But this global perspective around a hegemonic strategy of the West shouldn't mask a more specific dynamic linked to Senegal's history. These dynamics revolve around the French presence in Senegal and the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country. In the first case, France, as a Western power, continues to be seen as an enemy. Its commitment to homosexual rights can provoke a homophobic backlash, given the mistrust and criticism that surrounds its presence in Africa. As for the second aspect, it follows on from the rivalry between the Muslim world and the West since the Iranian revolution of 1979.

VII- 2-a) France in the whirlwind of homophobia

The end of colonisation did not lead to the end of European domination. It is at this level that the difference established between colonialism and imperialism by Edward Said (1978) becomes relevant. He suggests that colonialism is the physical, material and typically violent practice of dispossessing people of their native territory. Imperialism, by contrast, is the broader theoretical and ideological basis that attempts to justify such actions (Said 1978; 1993). Relations between France and its former colonial territories remain encapsulated in

imperial logic. The end of colonialism did not lead to the end of imperialism. This is, moreover, the thesis developed by the partisans of coloniality and critics of globalisation.

Indeed, the former colonial power, France is perceived as one of the symbols of a supposed Western plot against Africa. The colonial past remains alive and hostility towards the French is strong in Senegal. I have observed in the streets of Dakar the proliferation of graffiti hostile to France and in informal discussions, France is seen as one of the main factors of underdevelopment in Senegal. The postcolonial context did not shatter representations around the past. This makes it possible to apprehend the homosexual issue in Senegal from a psychopolitical perspective. Derek (2004) defines psychopolitics as a critical awareness of the role that political factors (i.e., relations of power) play within the domain of the psychological. An understanding of both how politics impacts upon the psychological and how personal psychology may be the level at which politics is internalised and individually entrenched. Psychopolitics becomes an essential element in the analysis of social and political reactions around homosexuality when it comes to the former colonising power, France.

The colonial liability structures homophobic discourses and reactions. The commitment of French political actors in favour of the decriminalisation of homosexuality is synonymous with the prolongation of colonial domination. Senegalese political actors who gain the support of French politicians who support the rights of homosexuals are not only accused by the population of going against religious values but are also suspected of being agents of the West. French interference in the homosexual cases in Senegal is perceived as an attack on national sovereignty. It becomes even more risky for a Senegalese political actor to benefit from the support of a French politician openly favourable to the rights of homosexuals.

The media archives report on an episode describing this atmosphere. In 2012, Macky Sall, presidential candidate was supported by a coalition of opposition and civil society actors called "*Benno Bokk Yakaar*". In the second round of the presidential election, when Macky Sall confronts former President Abdoulaye Wade, the former French Socialist Minister Jack Lang announced his participation alongside him at his last campaign meeting. According to the pan-African magazine *Jeune Afrique*, he was mandated by Francois Hollande, the former French president, to provide public support for Macky Sall against Abdoulaye Wade. The pan-African magazine argues that Jack Lang and Macky Sall did not know each other. On the other hand, the former French Minister of Culture is well acquainted with the artist Youssou Ndour, who supports Macky Sall.

Jack Lang's political engagement in favour of Macky Sall was interpreted by local media as gay support for Macky Sall. The news website *Senenews* headlines: "Is Macky Sall hostage to homosexuals?"; *Leral net* wrote: "Let Macky Sall tell us why the gay Jack Lang supports him". *Senenews* news reproduced a discourse very much anchored in the Senegalese public sphere that considers homosexuality to be an extension of the Masonic Orders. They write: "He was far from suspecting that he had just raised a hare which his adversaries will be agitating throughout the campaign to discredit him. Pape Diop, Farba Senghor, Mamadou Seck ... rushed into the stretchers and seized this part of the sentence to cry ignominy in a Muslim and conservative country, still very hostile to homosexuality. Some liberal leaders have gone further, amalgamating this form of tolerance of Macky Sall towards homosexuality with his belonging to the freemasonry".

According to Geschiere (2000), the alleged relation between Freemasonry and homosexuality can be traced back to a rumour that emerged in France during the fourteenth century, according to which initiation ceremonies among the Freemasons required the “preceptor” to kiss the novice on the navel and buttocks. Rumours of “unnatural acts” later spread in Africa during the colonial period when Freemasons started recruiting among civil servants, students, and the emerging African elites. Today, it is relayed by a wide range of sources, including mass-media, intellectual figures, and Islamic coalitions such as “No to Freemasonry and Homosexuality”.

Respondent 8, who is a former minister of planning and sustainable development under the presidency of Adboulaye Wade, and also a friend of Macky Sall claimed during an interview that “there are many homosexuals in the high spheres of the state. I heard that there is a link between these homosexuals and the Freemasons who hold the world. Those who want to succeed here in Senegal embrace [homosexuality]” (Respondent 8, Dakar, January 7, 2018). The remarks of the R8 are a reproduction of a widespread belief in Senegal that establishes a link between homosexuality, Freemasonry and social success.

In Senegal, as in other states in Africa, there is a rift between the elites and the popular masses. The latter reproach the former for their corruption and their alliance with Western powers. Homophobia is therefore a form of resistance. The stigmatisation of homosexuality and freemasons contributes to the demonisation of an elite who through their antisocial behaviour represent the deviance typically embodied by witchcraft in Africa (Lado 2011). Some authors view these suspicions and accusations as a form of rebellion by the ruled against their rulers (Nyamsi 2007: 62), a way for an oppressed and frustrated people to make

their voices heard. In societies where the conventional mechanisms of social ascension seem to be blocked, public beliefs emerge that reinforce homophobia.

In 2018, a big meeting of the Freemasons was to take place in Dakar as part of the African and Malagasy human and fraternal meetings (REHFRAM), a meeting which aims to bring together the Freemasons of French-speaking Africa. The announcement of this meeting provoked an outcry from the collective of Islamic organisations and the platform of association “Ensembles protégeons nos valeurs” (Together, protect our values). In a statement released on January 16, they underlined: "these occult congregations insidiously, under the pretext of "protection of freedoms", promote this new form of infanticide, which is abortion and the apology of unions against -nature, like homosexual marriages". They continue:

"By pouring into atheism and libertinage, the founding texts of Freemasons are poles apart from ours. We are a country of tolerance, but we do not accept the presence of organisations, which call into question the achievements of Serigne Touba and El Hadj Malick Sy [founders, respectively, of the murid brotherhood and the Senegalese branch of Tijaniya] or are likely to cause disturbances to public order".

It is clear here that Freemasonry and homosexuality are the subject of a systematic association and are presented as foreign threats that imply a duty of resistance. As a result of these religious pressures and civil society, the head of the district of Dakar, Alioune Badara Sambe banned, by order dated January 31, 2018, the rallies of organisations "of Masonic Obedience" on the following grounds: "Threats of disturbance to public order; Risks of clashes between opposing organisations; The need to safeguard the safety of people and property". Faced with this ban, the meeting was cancelled.

This connection, established between homosexuality, Freemasonry, corruption and poverty in Senegal, places the problem of homosexuality in what could be described as the globalisation of the discourse of crisis: the interweaving of local issues in debates around neoliberalism and globalisation. However, homosexuality is perceived as a characteristic feature of Western culture and an instrument of extension of its cultural hegemony. The conflict of civilisations is played on the grounds of politics, economics, and sexuality. Homophobia reflects opposition to what Eric Fassin (2006) calls sexual democracy. He defines sexual democracy as the extension of the democratic realm, with the growing politicisation of gender and sexuality issues that multiple current public controversies reveal and encourage (Fassin, 2006). Today, sexuality is used as a marker to maintain the cleavage between the West and former colonies.

It extends from a symbolic point of view the process of differentiation between Europe and the uncivilised other.

The 2008 case of "the homosexuals of Sicap Mbao" in Senegal highlights the conflicting relationship that exists between France and Senegalese public opinion around the homosexual issue. In December 2008, nine members of an association for the defence of homosexual rights were arrested in the suburb of Dakar for "acts against nature and criminal conspiracy" after an anonymous source called the police to report their sexual behaviour. Police officers raided the home of Diadji Diouf, secretary general of AIDES Senegal, an organisation working on the prevention of HIV among homosexuals. The court considered the organisation to be a cover for "recruiting" individuals for same-sex sexual activities under the pretext of conducting HIV awareness and prevention programs.

On 7 January 2009 the defendants were sentenced to eight years in prison and a FCFA 500,000 fine. Following the court decision, international human rights organisations, the embassies of the Netherlands and Sweden, and the representative of the European Union in Dakar, requested the release of the defendants. The case reached a state level when the French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed his "emotion and concerns" for the defendants. The Health Minister of France, Roselyne Bachelot, additionally asked her Foreign Affairs colleague Bernard Kouchner, to "secure the release of the nine homosexuals imprisoned in Senegal." On 20 April 2009 a judge of the Court of Appeal of Dakar, Bara Niang, ordered the release of the nine defendants.

In public opinion, this decision reflected Western pressure, and more particularly French interventions, on the Senegalese justice system. The headline of the daily newspaper *L'Office* for instance stated on 21 April, 2009: "The nine homosexuals recover freedom: Sarkozy and Delanoe bend the authorities" (Gning 2013: 148). In a similar vein, *Le Quotidien* observed "in addition to the reaction of Nicolas Sarkozy, all the French press and human rights organizations have invested in the fight for the release of these homosexuals."(Gning 2013: 148). The press editorial *L'As* further reported "the homosexuals of Mbao [were] saved by pressure from Nicolas Sarkozy, [and] human rights organizations such as Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, Human Rights Watch, [and] Amnesty International." (Gning 2013: 148).

Social reactions to the release of the nine activists reflect the current attitude of the Senegalese population towards the French state. As a former colonial power, France remains perceived in Senegal as a foreign influence that continues to exercise its power through Senegalese

political leaders and African human rights organisations. Informal conversations with locals in Dakar reveal that many Senegalese believe that LGBT activists are involved in homosexual rights because they receive financial benefits from the West. Given Senegalese's attitude towards France, it comes as no surprise that international pressure to release the defendants has reinforced the belief that Western influences promote, if not encourage, homosexuality in Senegal. This feeling of affiliation and subordination of the Senegalese political class to France is not only shared by the media and public opinion, but also by political actors and civil servants.

VII- 2-b- Muslims against the West

Beyond the colonial dispute, opposition to gay rights is more generally a part of the rivalry between the West and the Muslim world. In Senegal, as in other postcolonial African countries, religion has been used to explain homophobic attitudes (Niang 2010; Mudavanhu 2010; Obasola 2013). Massad (2002) argues that the Gay International has succeeded in inciting discourse by attracting antigay Islamist and nationalist reactions to its efforts. Today, the homosexual issue is one of the areas of confrontation between the Muslim world and the West. It updates an old rivalry between the West and the East. From a historical point of view, the European construction of sexuality coincides with the era of imperialism and the two projects interconnect. The debates on sexuality led by Western organisations and their governments are seen as part of a new enterprise to consolidate Western hegemony. In the Muslim world, the Gay International is correctly perceived as part of a Western encroachment on Arab and Muslim cultures (Massad 2002). The extension of this battle in the Senegalese context on the homosexual issue has its roots in the growing influence of Islamist movements mainly funded by Arab countries and the dissemination of Islamist theses around homosexuality in Senegalese society.

The growth of Islamic movements in Senegal

The appearance of Islamic movements in Senegal cannot be analysed without examining the global international context. Senegal gained its independence in 1960, but in the 1970s, decolonisation processes started provoking disenchantment in former colonies (Rodney 1972). The neotraditionalists are Muslim reformers who advocate for a return to the *Quran*, Sunnah, and shariah to renew Muslim society. They respect

classical interpretations of Islam but reserve the right to reinterpret Islam for contemporary needs and issues. They also believe that Islamic law historically incorporated many un-Islamic practices, necessitating a return to original sources for fresh interpretation. What's more, they emphasise Islam as a complete way of life; promote Islamic alternatives to Western politics, economics, law, and education; and they saw the return to the values and principles of the Koran as a renaissance opportunity, while modernists called for social reform, openness to capitalism and Western education (Kugle 2012:263; Esposito 1990:283). This opposition between these different schools of thought resulted in ideological conflicts that can still be observed today in the Muslim world.

Several events boosted the transformation in the Muslim world: the Shiite Revolution in Iran in 1979, the coup of the Sunni general Zia ul-Haqq in Pakistan in 1977, the resurgence of the Sunni Hamas and the Shiite Hizbullah militant organisations against Israeli occupation in Palestine, the religious assassination of President Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1981, and the rise of petrodollar politics in the Wahhabi kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its tiny Gulf allies. These changes provoked a shock in the Muslim world and resulted in the victory of the Islamists who presented themselves as opponents of Western imperialism whose values were said to have contributed to the destruction of Muslim societies. Religion became a political tool to redefine the ways of life and the political organisation of Muslim societies.

The shock wave of these events extended to Senegal with the resurrection and appearance of associations claiming to be members of the Islamic movement. The Muslim Association of African Students (AMEA) and the Muslim Cultural Union (UCM) were created in 1953 and pushed for the establishment of an Islamic state (Mbow 2010). These movements have the specificity of calling into question the alliances formed during the colonial period between colonial administrators and religious leaders whom they accuse of complicity with the coloniser. They were opposed to the marabouts because of their links to political power. These movements were already qualified as reformers by the colonial administration. They were mainly animated by young Senegalese intellectuals who studied in North Africa or in the Arab world.

What is important to underline here is the fact that, before independence, a number of young Muslims in Senegal already pleaded for a less tolerant Islam. In addition to this, the links between religious leaders and the political class are also subject to dispute. Still this current, was in the minority in Senegalese society. But it will experience a boost with the events of the

1970s in the Near and Middle East. In 1978, the Senegalese Islamic Association *Jamaatou Ibadou Rahmane* (JIR) was created. As with AMEA and UCM, the JIR was mainly composed of Arabist students, having followed training in Franco-Arab schools. This movement criticises the secular state and pleads for a strict application of Muslim values (Gomez-Perez 1994). Christian Coulon (1981) writes on this subject that the reformers attack "the obscurantism of the marabouts who, they say, have become mediators between God and men (...). They reproach them for selling themselves to the colonisers and for being the instruments of an administration that discipline and represses Islam". The first lines of what could become the realisation of an Islamic society in Senegal are already being developed at this time.

In 1979, the first issue of the magazine *Etudes islamiques* was published by Cheikh Touré, who was the first president of the UCM in 1953. In its texts, the magazine denounced the fact that the "ideological neo-crusade" against Islam "takes a little more vigour and aggressiveness" (*Etudes Islamiques* 1982: 4). This magazine protested against the situation of "unjustifiable injustice" inflicted by "an extrovert minority which had seized power in the name of the ridiculous Western democracy and had acquired the lifestyles of societies of overabundance " while the masses were starving (Ibid). It openly advocated "for the advent of a society governed by the law of God: Sharia", that traditionalist Islamists had to "declare publicly and put clearly at the head of [their] programs of action next to [their] will to fight for the oppressed, against the oppressors "(*Etudes Islamiques* 1981).

These two Islamic movements, UCM and JIR, will be at the forefront of the diffusion of the neotraditionalist theses of Islam in Senegal. Their discourses were characterised by an intolerance towards certain behaviors such as homosexuality. The Western model is perceived as hostile to human progress and humiliating. Islamic law is presented as a solution to this crisis. In 1979, another religious newspaper called *Allahou Akbar* was founded by Ahmed Khalifa Niasse who at the same time created his own party, the "party of God" (*Hizboulahi*). In his first issue, he openly calls for the creation of an Islamic Republic in Senegal (Mbaye 2018). This newspaper would be banned from publication.

The coming to power of Abdou Diouf in 1980 will radically transform the propaganda capacities of the reformist movements. The latter will benefit from the liberalisation of the private press sector. This new development will lead to the creation of the Journal *Djamra* as mentioned earlier. This journal will also be a place of propaganda for neotraditionalist theses of Islam. This newspaper is the propaganda tool of the JAMRA association created in 1981.

In 1984, the Association of Muslim Students of Dakar (AEMUD) was created. This organisation intends: "to revalorise the image and the practice of the Muslim religion within the university campus". This organisation invested in the construction of a mosque within the Cheikh Anta Diop University campus in Dakar, which was completed in 1996 (Mbaye 2018). The creation of AEMUD would accelerate the penetration of reformist theses in the educational field. This organisation received the support of the leaders of the JIR. The association's objective was to:

"To purify the faith; facilitate the practice of religion on campus in general, spread the message of Islam in the university environment in particular; train through general education, religious, physical education and culture; inform using all forms of media; develop social action and promote solidarity and brotherhood among Muslims; respond to critics of Islam " (Brossier 2010: 97).

The creation of AEMUD opens an even wider horizon for reformers who can directly reach young people on the university campus and convey their ideology. The dynamism of reformist movements observed in the late 1970s and the 1980s reflects a deep crystallisation of Senegalese society around a Muslim identity. What could be termed a Muslim option emerges (Gomez-Perez 2005: 13). This situation initiated the creation of a new type of 'cultural citizenship' within the young Senegalese population whose manifestations can be observed today on the homosexual issue (Gomez - Perez & Leblanc 2007; Mbaye 2018). Leblanc and Gomez-Perez (2007: 45) suggest that these changes have contributed to the emergence of a new "homo islamicus." However, Mara Leichtman (2009: 111) argues that this 'Return to earlier practices of Islam' represents a global dynamic, visible all over the Muslim world.

Still, the rise of Islamic movements advocating for a neo-traditionalist agenda at this time in Senegal cannot be exclusively attributed to changes in the Arab world. Since the 1970s, the basic structures of the neocolonial economy that contributed to the consolidation of a patrimonial and clientelist state started to collapse in the 1980s (Boone 1990: 351). The revenue from peanut production, the country's main income, continued to decrease in the following years and lead to an economic crisis. This situation weakened the state's capacity to redistribute resources, eroding in turn the alliance between politicians and the marabouts (Gifford 2016).

The weakening of the marabouts' economic power additionally impacted on their followers who became increasingly critical of their spiritual guides. In response to local resistance,

marabouts started developing strategies of mistrust towards politics, as well as campaigns for the respect of Islamic moral values (Babou 2013). These campaigns resulted in the emergence of Islamic movements favourable to the application of Sharia within Islamic brotherhoods. Here again we can observe that poverty has played an important role in the emergence of Islamist movements which promote homophobia in Senegal.

Facing Western Aggression

There are two important points to make. First, the emergence of moral entrepreneurs of homosexuality in Senegal coincides with the allegiance of Islamic organisations inspired by the neotraditionalism inherited from the Arab world. Therefore, the appearance of the homosexual category in the public space in Senegal is partly linked to external influences and the ideological rivalry that emerged at the end of the 1970s between the Arab world and the West. Then, the growth of neotraditionalist theses in Senegalese society has to be associated with the failures of the postcolonial state whose economic model is inspired by Western capitalism. Consequently, the economic crisis is perceived as a crisis of the Western model of development. In this context, the discourse of rupture disseminated by Islamic organisations finds fertile ground. Sexuality and gender constitute the first site of experimentation of a revolutionary temptation.

The Islamic discourse in Senegal tends to frame homosexuality as an import and marker of Western culture. The appearance of Islamic discourses in the Senegalese public sphere marked the end of the tolerance of certain behaviors. As described in the chapter V, moral entrepreneurs, influenced the meaning, roles and significations ascribed to the *Goorjigeen*. We can indeed establish a link between the progression of Islamist movements in Senegal and the radicalisation of discourse around sexuality.

Respondent 11 was a member of JAMRA in its early days just like R2. Here is what he explains:

"We had observed behavioural and socio-cultural changes in our country. At the time, we were taken as revolutionaries because many problems were not well perceived, but we continue to struggle. There were mutations at the continental level. It was in the 1980s we conducted awareness activities in high schools, in the neighbourhoods we have kept this position. When our religion is attacked, we must react" (Interview with R 11, December 17, 2017, Dakar).

It appears from the testimony of the R11 that the ideas disseminated by Islamic organisations, inspired by the changes in the Middle – East in the early 1980s, did not generate widespread support among the population. Nevertheless, they feel invested with a dual mission: to protect their society and their religion. Homosexuality therefore symbolises a double aggression, and a more rigorous application of Islam is seen as the instrument to redeem a decadent society, a means of combating the deviance that harms the proper functioning of society. Religion is no longer only a matter of faith, of the individual or private domain, but appears as a political tool that can be used to solve the problems facing Senegalese society.

The politicisation of Islam over recent decades has significantly changed same-sex sexual relationships within the Muslim community through the imposition of strict 'Islamic' moral codes. Oft-quoted verses from the Koran have been used to legitimise these fatwas and the policing of people's sexuality (Huma 2012). The consequence of this transformation was to place Islam at the heart of the geopolitical battle between the West and certain elements of the Muslim world.

In January 1984, the *Walfajiri* newspaper was created in Senegal by Sidy Lamine Niasse, the younger brother of Ahmed Khalifa Niasse called the "Ayatollah of Kaolack". The term "Ayatollah" here establishes a connection with the reformist regime in Iran. Ahmed Khalifa Niasse organised a national propaganda for the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Senegal. Latif Gueye, the founder of *JAMRA*, later became the first editor in chief of *Walfajiri* (Broqua 2016: 166). Thus, it appears that neotraditional Islam had important quickly established media relays in Senegal that enabled the public dissemination of its theses. *Walfadjri* and *Jamra* have a very close bond. In the issue from March 9 to 30, 1984, *Walfadjri* hails the mutual struggle of the two newspapers for "the liberation of our peoples".

The creation of *Walfadjiri* in a context of crisis will move Islam from the sphere of belief to politics. Islam appears in the discourse as a solution to the problems facing Senegal. Thus, Sidy Lamine Niasse (1984: 2) writes in *Walfadjiri*: "The solution to the crisis is Islam, without a doubt. The Islamic solution is the reconciliation of man with himself, the reconciliation of man with his Creator, for a just world of peace and happiness". Homosexuality and the AIDS pandemic are seen as symbols of the decline of the West. Moreover, homosexuals are blamed for the propagation of AIDS in Senegal. Thus, the first article openly dealing with homosexuality appears in No. 47 (1986). The journalist writes:

“There are no AIDS cases in Senegal. However, AIDS is with us because of prostitution, tourism and homosexuality. If nothing is done to combat it, it does not say that AIDS will always be the "accursed plague of the West".

It is interesting here to note that the journalist's problem is not AIDS, but rather the scourges with which it is associated, especially homosexuality. By insinuating that the fight against AIDS is a priority in the fight against homosexuals, he establishes a hierarchy of threats against Senegalese society. To slow the spread of AIDS, we must attack homosexuals. The use of the word "plague" is not trivial. It has a symbolic and religious power. In the Old Testament, it is a disease which has decimated a part of the European populations during the Middle Age. It therefore becomes important to guard against what has happened to Europe which is stigmatised as the bedrock of the problems facing the country.

The process of resignification of *Goorjigeen* is thus also linked to the rise of neotraditional Islam in Senegal which led to the radicalisation of the discourse on gender. In a predominantly Muslim society like Senegal, religious discourses profoundly disrupted gender representations and framed homosexuals as a threat. Homosexuality came to be perceived as a Western conspiracy against Islam and society. Therefore, opposing Western discourses on gay rights took the form of an act of resistance against the West.

The Sufi thinker Mawdūdi for instance believed that there were three distinct features of ‘Western society’, 1) equality between the male and the female, 2) economic independence of woman and 3) free intermingling of the sexes (Mawdūdi 2004: 12). In his view, the promotion of equality between men and women and sexual freedom constitutes a threat to the Muslim faith. Homosexuality is classified among the sexual freedoms that are considered immoral. For the international gay community, the universalisation of the rights of homosexuals and the affirmation of gay identity constitute a marker of human progress whereas their non-respect is perceived as an illustration of archaism. In contrast, Islamic movements perceive homosexuality as a marker of deviance and of the decline of Western civilisation. From this perspective, the eradication of homosexuals aims to ensure the survival of humanity.

This feeling of a failure of the Western model and of the need to resort to Islam to protect Senegalese society from the decadent West holds for more than three decades after the creation of the first journal to disseminate Islamist theses in Senegalese society. Homosexuality arouses a desire for preservation in the face of a declining Western society

that tries to pass on its failures to others. This is, for example, what emerges from this interview in Dakar with a teacher from Cheikh Anta Diop University, the largest university in the country and at the crossroads of all cultures:

"The Senegalese has rights which are respected. When you leave this framework, you cease to be Senegalese. I am talking about Senegalese from a sociological perspective. The Senegalese sociologically does not understand that a man can live with another man. There is no family that would want any of its members to live with a man of the same sex or a woman. No one can accept it, it is intolerable. It is part of the stigma. People need to understand that we are not in a society where the benchmarks have disappeared. We still have values to defend, and it is we who must heal Europe, which seems to me to be sick. The society has set standards. It is possible that a man is not within the rules that society has set. This man I think we can try to understand, possibly help him to reintegrate into his society and encourage integration ". (Interview with R9, February 22, 2018, Dakar).

Homosexuality is perceived as a threat to religion and society. Sexuality is no longer a simple instrument of regulation of social life, organisation of relationships and a means of access to paradise. It appears as an instrument of affirmation of a difference in comparison to Western civilisation which is deemed responsible for the ills of Islamic societies. In her introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Lesbian Studies* on the topic of 'Lesbians, Sexuality and Islam', Huma Ahmed-Ghosh writes:

"For Muslim communities, especially in recent decades, the politicization of 'conservative' Islam has pointedly impacted same-sex relationships through the imposition of strict 'Islamic' moral codes. By labeling alternative sexualities as 'deviant', oft quoted verses from the Quran have been used to legitimize these fatwas and policing of people's sexuality" (Huma, 2012).

In this new configuration of international cultural struggles, international gay and Islamic neo-traditionalists agree that the homosexual issue is also an issue of identity affirmation (Massad 2007: 195). Based on a colonial and neocolonial perspective from Muslim countries, this analysis endows the Gay International with the discursive legacies of Western orientalism and the institutional power of government ministries and universities (Weis & Bosia 2013).

VII-3 – The limits of the resistance

Beyond the resistance displayed in Senegal by the state and the majority of civil society, it is important to mention that this strategy cannot be global. The release of homosexuals from police custody, after confrontations with magistrates or after trials, shows the difficulties that the state has in exercising the legal repression of homosexuals. Those difficulties in the

criminal treatment of the homosexual issue are also perceptible in the debates on the criminalisation and decriminalisation of homosexuality. The state is aware that it has international obligations to fulfil. It would not want to take the risk of completely offending its Western partners, major donors in a context of economic crisis. Since 2012, with the arrival of Macky Sall to power, the state has shown signs of openness on the homosexual issue.

VII-3-a) Decriminalisation *versus* criminalisation

Faced with the stronger commitment of Western states and human rights organisations to decriminalise homosexuality in Senegal, the reaction of political actors has been twofold. While some have openly displayed their opposition to any form of decriminalisation, others have called for an overt criminalisation of homosexuality. Supporters of decriminalisation argue that article 319 of the Senegalese penal code does not apply to homosexuals. This is the case, for example, of the former honorary president of the International Federation of Human Rights, lawyer Sidiki Kaba, later Minister of Justice in the government of the current Senegalese president, Macky Sall, who argues:

"There is a contradiction between the democratic image and the rule of law that Senegal seeks to project in the world and the reality on the ground. If it wants to be credible and in line with international human rights conventions that it itself has signed and ratified, the government must urgently change the new law that condemns homosexuals. It should be noted that in Senegal, article 319 of the penal code does not directly mention homosexuality but rather speaks of "acts against nature". In other words, acts between two people of the same sex and bestiality. In reality, it is a "catch-all" qualification that makes it easier for the courts to convict homosexuals"[45].

It appears from this statement that the former Minister of Justice of Senegal recognises that the ambiguity of the law is a tool for manipulating sexuality. The law is an instrument in the hands of the dominant sexual class. We can conclude that homophobia is a legal and discursive production for hegemonic ends by the heterosexual class. This makes it possible to think like Anne Laura Stoler that there is no "original" desire that the law represses. On the contrary, desire is generated and produced by the law, by the powerful discourses of sexuality that shape it and take it for an object (Stoler 2008). Judith Butler, taking the Foucauldian perspective, argues that " the law, which we expect to repress certain desires that pre-existed

45 T. Hani, « L'État doit dépénaliser l'homosexualité », 8 janvier 2009, <http://www.france24.com/fr/20090108-letat-doit-depenaliser-lhomosexualite->.

it, succeeds in naming, delimiting and thus giving a meaning and a social possibility to the desires that it was supposed to eradicate" (Butler 1987: 218).

This debate did not progress much until 2020. On the contrary, in 2009, in the aftermath of the highly publicised arrests, when the question of decriminalisation was put to the regime of Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012) by the international community, Madické Niang, his foreign minister, underlines:

"Decriminalisation does not go with our realities. The international community must not impose it on Senegal. There are fundamentalists who will rise up and the consequences will be more dramatic, because it does not go with our realities. Each country has its social realities, and the international community must take the differences into account and must not force us to legalise unnatural relations" [46].

This reaction follows accusations made by religious movements like JAMRA and certain civil society organisations like CIRCOF (The Islamic Committee for the Reform of the Family Code in Senegal) against the government of Abdoulaye Wade of having freed homosexuals in April, 2009, under pressure from the President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, who wanted the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal. This government position can also be explained because homosexuality is a subject that arouses many passions in Senegalese society, passions that can be easily exploited.

R24, president of Action for Human Rights and Friendship (ADHA), an association for the protection of homosexuals, underlines:

" Senegal is made of many brotherhoods which play an extremely important role in an electoral process. And so, politicians do not dare to promote homosexuality. They are forced to castigate them. Once these politicians defend LGBT rights, they are rejected by the various Muslim brotherhoods which play an extremely important role. That's why it's a bit of a taboo question. Many politicians are subject of very harsh public criticism for considering that many politicians are funded by gay lobbies. They believe that Westerners want to integrate homosexuality into Senegalese culture" (Interview with R24, December 23rd 2017).

On May 6, 2016, MP Amadou Mberry Silla, from the Louga region in Senegal, submitted to the National Assembly an amendment for the criminalisation of homosexuality. He stated:

"Criminalising homosexuality in Senegal is quite normal (...) we are carrying the voice of the populations and the majority of the population do not want that. That's what I did, and I will continue to do that. I share the same point of view with the President of the Republic. 110 MP

46 Anonymous, « La dépénalisation de l'homosexualité : Madicke Niang dit niet », 11 décembre 2009, <https://www.pressafrik.com/Depenalisation-de-l-homosexualite-Madicke-Niang-dit-niet_a16872.html>.

have already signed, even if there are lobbies, I am with the Muslim lobby, and we Muslims are very strong"[47].

This bill, which until 2020 has still not been debated in the Senegalese National Assembly, aims to toughen the repression of homosexuals. In the background, it is indeed a question of defeating the arguments of the defenders of the rights of homosexuals who maintain, to justify the decriminalisation of homosexuality and to criticise the arrests of suspected homosexuals, that homosexuality is not condemned by section 319 of the criminal law. Explicitly introducing the repression of homosexuality would strengthen the legal power of the police in the hunt for homosexuals. But these words also reveal a desire to make homosexuals invisible. Relying on religion to justify his bill, Mberry Silla refuses to recognise that many homosexuals in Senegal are Muslims and that studies have shown that most of the people engaged in same-sex practices appear to be bisexual (Larmarange & al 2009). Consequently, the strengthening of the criminal law against homosexuals has more legal than political effectiveness.

However, the debate on strengthening the legal system on homosexuality and more specifically on the criminalisation of homosexuality shows that the process of building norms is evolutive and stems from the balance of power within a society. The rules in a society obey a permanent negotiation between dominant and dominated (Becker 1963). The law and its application are based on local dynamics and the commitments of authorities. The state as the guarantor of a moral order determines the dynamics of inclusion or exclusion according to its interests. Concerning homosexuality, the Senegalese government remains very cautious about a formal criminalisation of homosexuality. Even if existing laws already position the state as a major player in the construction of homophobia, a whole set of relatively discreet mechanisms are also put in place to guarantee certain rights to homosexuals despite the context of discrimination.

VII-3-b) Discrete support for associations by the Senegalese state

Along with the numerous declarations of the Senegalese authorities regarding their opposition to any decriminalisation of sexual practices between people of the same sex, the Senegalese government is showing signs of openness towards organisations defending the rights of

47 Anonyme, « Le député Amadou Mberry Sylla pour la criminalisation de l'homosexualité », 27 juillet 2016, <https://www.dakaractu.com/Le-depute-Amadou-Mberry-SYLLA-pour-la-criminalisation-de-l homosexualite_a115180.html>.

homosexuals. Thus, there have been in Senegal, for more than twenty years, specific treatment programs for homosexuals against HIV / AIDS. The latter benefit from free treatment and follow-ups, unlike heterosexuals also suffering from HIV / AIDS who sometimes have to pay for consultations and treatments.

The figures show a progressive commitment from the Senegalese state to homosexuals. In its 2013 report, the National Council for the Fight against HIV / AIDS (CNLS) mentions an increase in the number of care sites for men who have sex with men affected by the pandemic. We would thus have gone from 9 sites in 2005 to 12 in 2006, 18 in 2008, 21 in 2009 and 43 in 2013. Senegal was one of the first countries in Africa to set up strategies and services specifically adapted to homosexuals.

Moreover, in order not to arouse the anger of religious leaders and the population, the state of Senegal is discreetly training the leaders of local associations for the defence of homosexual rights by involving them in discussions. To this end, the government regularly covers the travel and subsistence expenses of certain LGBT associations within the framework of international conferences or symposia on the situation of homosexuals. For example, the National Network of Key Populations Associations (RENAPOC) of Senegal was part of the Senegalese delegation to the high-level meeting on AIDS which was held from June 8 to 10, 2016 in New York. In the field, LGBT organisations are supported materially and financially in the fight against HIV / AIDS.

R1 during our interview recognises, for example, that the government is currently making efforts in favour of homosexuals:

> It moves but timidly. The only problem is that it doesn't move at the speed of negative attitudes. I said in a radio station that this is normal because if you see how women fought for March 8, they gave their lives to obtain maternity, when you see what arrive for the first woman who dared to smoke in public. It is precisely because the government has tried to make efforts that there are people in court who are increasingly careful with the arrests (Interview with R1, December 12, 2017, Dakar).

The publicising of homosexual violence allows the government to mask its attention to the demands of LGBT organisations. In return, it obtains two benefits. On the one hand, its discretion allows it not to provoke the disapproval of a population that is mostly hostile to homosexuals. On the other hand, by providing support to LGBT organisations, it reduces some of the criticism that can be levelled against it regarding respect for gay rights.

But, in this double strategy aiming not to legislate on the criminalisation of homosexuality and to discreetly support organisations promoting the rights of homosexuals, we see a desire

on behalf of the state to comply with international texts. These texts include: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified in 1978 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) ratified in 1982. These two international legal instruments are binding insofar as they oblige the Senegalese state to protect and promote the fundamental rights of individuals regardless of gender or sexual orientation.

Section 2 of the ICCPR stipulate that: " Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status ". Section 26 of the ICCPR states that " All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status".

According to article 4 of the ACHPR, "The human person is inviolable. Every human being has the right to respect for his life and to the physical and moral integrity of his person: No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right ". Article 6 states that: "Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security. No one may be deprived of his liberty except for reasons and under conditions previously determined by law; in particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained". However, some Senegalese have been arrested and detained on the basis of denunciations without the facts being verified.

The Senegalese constitution also obliges the Senegalese state to protect and guarantee all the rights of all citizens. Including those of people categorised and identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. Article 7 guarantees the right to life, liberty and security of all citizens. It is mentioned in its formulation that: "the human person is sacred. It is inviolable. The state has an obligation to respect and protect it ". Article 8 formulates all the fundamental individual freedoms, economic and social rights which are guaranteed by the Senegalese state to all citizens. Among which: civil and political freedoms, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, cultural freedoms, as well as the right to health, a healthy environment and information. It guarantees economic and social rights to both individuals and groups.

The Senegalese government's efforts are also mentioned by European diplomats who believe that the government's public discourse is linked to social pressure (Anonymous 2018). However, the subject is regularly discussed in various consultation frameworks. This has been mentioned on several occasions during political dialogue with the European Union or within the framework of bilateral discussions between Senegal and other states (Anonymous 2017). This situation highlights the constructed character of homophobia through the law. On the one hand, the ambiguity of article 319 opens the way to the repression of homosexuals by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, there is the refusal of the Senegalese state to apply international legal texts and to respect the constitution which could protect the rights of homosexuals. Thus, Senegal can be described as a state-sponsor of homophobia.

CONCLUSION

The globalisation of gay rights is seen in Senegal as an assimilationist project carried by the West. The homophobic postcolonial subject is the product of an environment in which structural economic inequalities between Africa and the West frame discussions around sexuality. The concept of coloniality is reinforced in a context where the promises of equality of globalisation have given rise to the reinforcement of inequalities. The economic crisis that feeds poverty establishes a hierarchy of priorities where the homosexual issue is peripheral. Yet, the intensification of Western mobilisations in favour of homosexual rights and the resistance that goes with it gives rise to a cultural war which is based on a conception of heterosexuality as a feature of African identity. International human rights organisations and Western governments' pressures to decriminalise homosexuality have accentuated homophobic sentiments in Senegal and given rise to a cultural nationalism that centres around heteronormativity. This cultural nationalism is rooted around two main axes: hostility to France, the former colonial power, symbol of Western hegemony and perceived as responsible for the country's underdevelopment, and homosexuality as a new act of aggression by the West against the Muslim world.

GENERAL CONCLUSION: HOMOPHOBIA IN A POSTCOLONIAL AFRICAN STATE

The aim of this research was to understand the processes that drive the construction of a homophobic society in Senegal. The choice of Senegal was justified because Senegal is usually categorised as a democratic country, and because it is a predominantly Muslim nation. Over the last two decades, there has been a proliferation of work on homosexuality in Africa, but it was only during the last ten years that researchers have turned their focus to the topic of homophobia. This work has shown the influence of Christianity in the development of homophobia in Africa and has emphasised the significant role of American evangelical churches. Very few have dwelt on Islam, as if it were self-evident that homosexuality is rejected by Muslims. Others have focused on the manipulation of homophobia by political actors in the context of power struggles. Some work has also revealed the role of the media in aggravating homophobic feelings. Thus, taking Senegal as a case study allowed me to compare contexts to determine points of convergence and differences with respect to other states in Africa that criminalise homosexuality.

In this thesis, homophobic violence appears as a socio-historical construct in which actors intervene in turn with amplifying roles. This violence is therefore multifaceted; the actors do not have the same interests and do not belong to the same social groups. It was, therefore, fundamental to understand the logic of each group, and to analyse how they interact. In summary, it was necessary to highlight the multiple meanings of homophobia within these different groups.

Cultural criminologists view crime, deviance, criminality, and criminalisation as part of an ongoing process that is interwoven with the dynamics of culture and all its attendant meanings. However, these meanings derive in part from a desire to build a consensus that will allow the dominant category to consolidate its hegemony over a sexual minority. Because cultural criminologists are also interested in the invisible and structural aspects of the construction of crime and deviance, cultural criminology, which has its roots in critical criminology, provides an attractive framework for the study of violence and homophobic attitudes. Homophobic violence is often described as a phenomenon that leads to social inequality, due to the social construction of stigma. In this regard, several methodological techniques used by the cultural and critical criminologist have been used in this research, such as interviews, archival work, and content analysis. This allowed me to account for the

historical, social and power dynamics that structure the construction of a homophobic society in a postcolonial context.

I- Summarising the key contributions of the research

I-1) Key findings

The central question which this research endeavoured to answer was how can the contemporary legitimacy of homophobic violence in postcolonial Senegal be explained? From a theoretical point of view, I demonstrated in this work that there are two processes which are combined. The first is the social construction of gender that started with the heterosexualisation of colonial societies, a historical dynamic that made precolonial same-sex sexual practices invisible and helped transform African societies into heteronormative societies. The second process is the construction of the postcolonial subject. The postcolonial subject is a subject whose daily life remains marked by the colonial heritage, but also a desire to break with the past, which leads to mechanisms of adaptation or resistance. Thus, we find ourselves in a situation where the heteronormative character of colonial societies was reinforced after independence, while resistance to homosexuality is rooted in logics of distrust between the West and its former colonies.

I suggested in this thesis that the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal is inspired by the French criminal law. I also explained that homophobia is not a recent phenomenon in Senegal. Since in the early 1980s, moral entrepreneurs of sexuality have engineered a new enemy, namely, homosexuality, in a society where this social and political category was non-existent. These moral entrepreneurs, religious leaders and the media in particular, created a context of fear and demonisation of homosexuals which gave rise to state homophobia. In this context, the victory of moral entrepreneurs does not lie in the creation of a new law, but rather in the instrumentalisation of an existing law for the purpose of preserving heterosexual hegemony. I have tried to demonstrate that moral entrepreneurs have succeeded in putting pressure on the State through the old clientelist relationships that exist between Muslim leaders and political actors; simultaneously, homophobia allows the state to affirm heterosexuality as an integral part of Senegalese identity. This appropriation, adaptation and even reinforcement of the gender norms of the colonial period by the postcolonial state was analysed through the concept of gender coloniality. In this context of coloniality, globalisation is perceived as a hegemonic project of the West. Consequently, the international campaigns

for the rights of homosexuals generate Senegalese resistance to what is perceived as the imposition of Western hegemony.

More specifically, the first dynamic I analysed was to understand the criminalisation of same-sex sexual practices. At first glance, it appeared that the Senegalese criminal law adopted in 1965, and still in force today, does not directly criminalise homosexuality. However, it serves as the legal basis for the institutional repression of homosexuality. Although there were no laws criminalising homosexuality in the French colonies, the legal repression of homosexuality was reintroduced into the French penal code in 1942. The mimetic perspective developed by postcolonial theories allows us to detect two points of convergence between the French criminal law of 1942 and the Senegalese criminal law of 1965.

The term homosexuality is not explicitly mentioned in both texts. Nevertheless, these two texts have been used to repress homosexuals. Thus, one of the main contributions of this work has been to establish the link between French colonisation and the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal. This link is the gateway to any study of the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal. At this level, there is a point of convergence that can be established between Senegal and former British colonies where colonial laws against sodomy have been shown to inform the criminalisation of homosexuality post-independence.

In addition to this relation between colonisation and the criminalisation of homosexuality in Senegal, the colonial order strengthened the heterosexism of Senegalese society. This aspect is important insofar as, even if precolonial Senegalese societies were not completely egalitarian, colonisation reinforced male domination and institutionalised heterosexuality in societies where sexuality was plural. During the French colonial period, reproduction became the key to the sexual act. The social construction of gender during the colonial period therefore resulted in the loss of legitimacy of same-sex sexual practices. Colonisation therefore contributed to ‘naturalising’ heterosexuality in Africa. We can conclude on this point that it is not homosexuality that is a western import into Africa, but heterosexism and indirectly the criminalisation of homosexuality.

The second key aspect of this work is the claim that homophobia is not a recent phenomenon in Senegal. Most of the academic work on homophobia in Africa dates back to the late 1990s and more particularly in the 2000s. Even in the case of Senegal, the work that addressed the problem of the emergence of homophobic discourses focused on the case of the gay marriage

of petit-Mbao in February, 2008, and the arrest of the leaders of AIDES SENEGAL in December 2008. This work shows that the year 2008 is the moment when homophobic discourses were amplified by the media, religious moral entrepreneurs and instrumentalised by the political actors.

The first homophobic discourses appeared in the early 1980s. Moral entrepreneurs have not only played a fundamental role in fomenting fear and sexual panic around homosexuality, they have also created a social problem, built an enemy, and transformed gender dynamics in society. This is how the Goor-jigeen became equated with homosexuals and consequently were demonised. The media discourse, inspired by religious convictions and amplified by Muslim leaders, forced political actors to act against homosexuals. Sexual panic in the Senegalese context is not a product of the ideological devices of the State, but political actors recognise the usefulness of homophobia as a way to consolidate their power and build legitimacy for state institutions.

The other interesting aspect here is the place of media. If in other parts of the continent, like East Africa or southern Africa, the media has been a tool for relaying homophobic propaganda, in Senegal, it played this role from 1980 to 2008. Throughout this period, they were able to build and solidly implement a set of representations of homosexuality in Senegalese society that would subsequently be used by different actors in homophobic propaganda. While in countries such as Uganda, Zimbabwe and Gambia, homophobic campaigns were fuelled by politicians, in Senegal, homophobia is rooted in alliances between the media and religious actors (as is also the case in Cameroon).

My research also shows that homophobia at the institutional or political level, mainly characterised by the definition of homosexuality as a non-African sexual practice, is not simply aimed at the affirmation of heterosexuality as a traditional sexual norm in Senegal. State homophobia is part of a larger framework which aims to build sexual nationalism. Through the criminal law that criminalises same-sex sexual practices, the family law that sanctifies the heterosexual family, and the criminal justice system that reinforces the repression of homosexuals, homophobia allows the Senegalese state to integrate heterosexuality into a national construction project. However, facing pressure from Western governments, non-governmental organisations and LGBT organisations for the decriminalisation of homosexuality (an approach described by the concept of the "Gay

International"), homophobia is perceived in Senegal as a tool of resistance. Western demands to decriminalise homosexuality are represented as a new hegemonic enterprise of the West in Africa. As was the case during the colonial period, when gender was an essential element in the making of new subjects, in the postcolonial era, gender and sexuality are at the heart of the efforts to build a Senegalese national identity.

Resisting Western campaigns to decriminalise homosexuality allows the Senegalese state to display a degree of independence in an international context marked by unequal economic relations between North and South. The debates on neocolonialism or the recolonisation of Africa have strongly highlighted the lack of autonomy of African states despite their accession to independence in the early 1960s. Sexual nationalism in Senegal appears as a *logic of self-determination* in relation to the other (the West), perceived as a permanent threat. This dynamic is not unique to Senegal. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe positioned his homophobic rhetoric as resistance to Western imperialism. The difference that can be established between Senegal and a country like Zimbabwe is that, in Zimbabwe, this is a top-down process while in Senegal it is a bottom-up dynamic. The homophobic rhetoric of political actors in Senegal intervened in a context where the media and religious leaders had already primed the masses to resist what they called homophilic propaganda. Thus, homophobic propaganda as a political strategy relies on the homophobic sentiments that are deeply rooted within the Senegalese population.

It is this last aspect that makes the case of Senegal particularly different from other African contexts. Given the historical alliance between political and religious actors in the framework of the realisation of the Senegalese social contract, political elites felt compelled to align their positions on homosexuality with those of prominent religious leaders. In a context in which the economic crisis has led to a crisis of confidence between political actors and the general population, the religious leaders who retain some influence on their followers hold immense power over political actors. Sexual nationalism in Senegal is the product of patronage and client relations.

The claim that the media are vectors of homophobia in Senegal is not new to studies of homophobia in Africa. In most countries where the phenomenon has been studied, the media have emerged as key players in the construction of moral panics, and the same holds true in the case of Senegal. But what I find essential to underline here is the need for the concept of a

homophobic matrix to sufficiently emphasise the place and the role of the media in both the reinforcement of the heterosexual character of the Senegalese society and the construction of homophobic social representations.

The notion of a homophobic matrix helps to justify the rejection of homosexuality for a whole range of reasons, from its supposedly non-African character to its definition as an unnatural act. From a theoretical point of view, the Senegalese case makes it possible to show that the media are not mere tools for relaying the ideologies of the ruling elite. They can also shape the imagination of the elite. In a homophobic matrix, it is difficult to establish a hierarchy of roles because the actors are interdependent.

Another contribution of this work is the gateway chosen to analyse homophobia in Senegal. Typically, when we discuss homophobia, we seek to understand its consequences and establish the actors involved, an approach that does not directly question the root of the problem, namely, heterosexism. Many people, including researchers, tend to view heterosexuality as a normal sexual practice. What I did in this work was to try to reverse the analytic paradigm and ask myself about the roots of heterosexism. As other works have shown, heterosexuality generates benefits for men, mainly the exploitation of the bodies and the work of women. Through multifaceted cultural processes, women have managed to internalise male domination as something normal. Heterosexuality in Senegalese society allows men to retain privileges deeply rooted in traditions and institutions.

However, this study found that the increasing visibility of homosexuals took place in a context of economic crisis that profoundly affects men. The increasing empowerment of women generates in men a sense of diminished dominance. Young people find themselves even more affected. In a society where masculinity is seen through the capacity to respond to the needs of a woman, the economic weakening of young people raises fears of widespread demasculinisation. Homophilic propaganda reinforces this fear and channels it into conspiracy theories.

I-2) Contribution to the literature

This research contributes to the literature on homosexuality and homophobia in Africa and contributes to the project of cultural criminology, as it produces a deeper understanding of the

processes of criminalisation, labelling, exclusion, and the construction of inequalities. More specifically, this work merges multiple perspectives in critical and cultural criminology that allow for the analysis of homophobic violence in societies that are culturally dominated by heterosexuality.

Another contribution of this work pertains to the debates on criminalisation. In the case of homosexuality in Senegal, I have shown that criminalisation is not only a process that stems from the state's desire to enforce norms and regulate behaviour, but also a way to build an art of living, build a community or consolidate social cohesion. Thus, one of the aspects related to the criminalisation of homosexuality in the Senegalese context is this desire to build a sexual nationalism in reaction to what is perceived as neocolonialism. The individual freedoms are diluted by geopolitical considerations. A fundamental break with the West emerges on the question of homosexuality. If in Western societies the discussions about homosexuality are related to sexual freedom and the state protection of individual rights, the framework of this discussion in Africa includes the logics of inequalities, fear, domination which continue to guide relations between Africa and former colonial powers. On this last aspect, this study makes it necessary to understand the historical trajectories of African societies in the study of criminalisation processes. Legal mimicry has been at the heart of the construction of postcolonial states and postcolonial subjectivity.

From a theoretical point of view, works on homophobia in recent years tend to rely on the concept of moral panics. What this work on Senegal demonstrates is that the moral panic theory cannot be used to understand the dynamics around homophobia in all circumstances. Even if moral entrepreneurs (political, religious and media elites) played an important role in the rise of homophobia in Senegal since 2008, we cannot limit ourselves to this explanation and reduce a wave of arrests, violence against homosexuals, and homophobic speeches to a case of moral panic. Homosexuals were described and identified as a threat by the media and religious leaders for more than a decade before political actors started actively repressing homosexuality. I also found that there is no uniformity and cohesion in this process of enemification.

This work also builds on and contributes to the field of feminist criminology. Work in criminology remains dominated by androcentrism (Cook 2016). However, feminist criminology aims to give a more important place to women in research in criminology where

deviants and criminals are regularly presented as men. From the Senegalese example, it appears that homophobic violence is a societal problem that involves both men and women. However, from discourses, testimonies and press articles, nowhere are women presented as the main actors of homophobia. Homophobic acts are systematically attributed to men. In the accounts of homophobia, women remain passive or even marginal, while we have seen that mothers sometimes reject their son or daughter because of their sexual orientation. I should also mention here that my long-term approach reinforces the importance of the multiplicity of perspectives in feminist criminology. The trajectory of African societies in feminist criminology calls for a perspective which is closer to intersectionality insofar as women in Africa do not experience the same realities as women in the West.

This research also reinforces the importance of critical criminology. It establishes homophobia in the logic of the power dynamics that are articulated between heterosexuals and homosexuals. However, the formation of these identities, like homophobic violence, revolves around multiple categories that overlap at the levels of race, class, and gender. Moreover, homophobia in Senegal does not only have cultural or legal roots. Anti-gay sentiment also stems from unequal power struggles between the West and Africa. Western-driven homosexual propaganda appears as a form of neocolonialism and leads to hostile reactions against homosexuals in Africa. Homophobic crimes and violence take root in the unequal structure of capitalism.

Another contribution of this work is the extension of the analysis on the coloniality of gender in Africa. Works on the coloniality of gender have been largely devoted to Latin America and have had little interest in Africa. However, one asset of this research is to show that the representations of gender and sexuality that are considered in Senegal as belonging to African traditions and cultures are an extension of a set of transformations of African societies through colonisation. Gender was at the heart of the colonial enterprise. The coloniality of gender thus offers a new analytical framework to understand the historical trajectory of gender inequalities in Africa. This approach makes it possible to leave spontaneous considerations that surround the problem of homophobia and obey multiple agendas. A long-term analysis has the advantage of offering a more dynamic and comprehensive understanding of the homosexual issue in Africa. But what distinguishes my work from those conducted in South America is that it is about homosexuality. Until now, work on coloniality of gender has been mainly concerned with the construction of inequalities between men and

women. But in my analysis, I show that it is possible to trace homophobia in Africa to the imperial expansion of capitalism.

This research also stresses the importance of the media in building representations on homophobia. Research on the role of the media has mainly focused on the use of newspaper archives. But in this work, beyond the importance of archives collected, I also draw data from interviews with journalists. Engaging with the journalists who produce press articles on homophobia makes it possible to understand the roots of homophobic discourses in the Senegalese media. Still, my research suggests that, by acting in the name of the preservation of heterosexism, the Senegalese media constitute an obstacle to freedom and democracy.

II- Limitations of the present research and directions for future research

The following discusses the limitations of the present study and suggests potential research directions not only for those who study homophobia, but also for cultural criminologists.

One of the limitations of this study is the lack of data on social media and the online press. Ideally, research that focuses on the study of representations and meanings that guide social reactions, discourses, and behaviours requires an interest in the structures that shape their development. In this respect, we cannot limit the study to the analysis of conventional media. Social media and the online press are nowadays important tools in the making of imaginations and representations of groups. I was able to see in data collection that it was on Facebook and in articles published online that reactions were most visible and numerous on homosexuality.

Had I extended my research to online media and social networks, I would have been able to open other analytical tracks around homophobia. Nevertheless, I thought that it was possible to extract meanings and representations through the study of newspapers and interviews with young heterosexuals. This does not prevent me from pointing out that future research should include the study of social media and the online press to complete the analysis of mediatised representations of homophobia.

This aspect could be more interesting for research in criminology given that, in Africa, social media, mainly Facebook and WhatsApp, have become the main mediums of public expression. In societies where the voices of young people or social cadets are silenced, social networks allow them to express their feelings, representations, and opinions. The restrictions

on who can speak and publicly express their opinions are lifted somewhat. It would also be interesting to understand how homophobic violence is expressed and lived on social networks and its impact on everyday life.

Another limitation of this work is the fact that I could have extended the research to the homosexual population to have a complete reading of the situation. This approach would have made it possible to complete the work by providing an understanding of the consequences of homophobia on homosexuals. How do these negative representations of homosexuality affect their daily lives? How do they live their sexuality in a context of rejection and exclusion? What are the updated coping mechanisms for dealing with violence? So many questions related to victimology. However, I will say that it was not my goal. I wanted to understand the logic and dynamics that shape a system of oppression and exclusion of homosexuals in Senegalese society. With the framework described in this work, it would be interesting for further research to examine the impact of these power dynamics on the homosexual population in Senegal as well as on the rest of Senegalese society.

Research on homosexuality in Africa that addresses homophobia is mainly limited to its psychological, social, or even familial impacts. I think it is time to have more studies on the economic impact of homophobia in Africa. Homosexuals comprise a category of the population that also produces resources and wealth. Their exclusion, which in some cases leads to emigration, also affects society. It could therefore be interesting to conduct economic studies on homophobia that assess what the state loses through its exclusion policies.

A final aspect that could have been mentioned here is that of LGBT associations and the issue of human rights. It would be important and useful to analyse how these associations in charge of the defence of the rights of homosexuals evolve in a context of structural homophobia. This would have led me to be more interested in the actions of non-governmental organisations and Western states to push the homosexual cause despite local opposition. However, even though this was not part of my research objectives, in this work I was able to highlight the fact that sexual nationalism and cultural anger are limiting factors for the work of human rights organisations. This does not prevent future research from exploring the funding mechanisms of LGBT associations, their local deployment strategies, as well as their relations with other institutions and human rights organisations.

III- Implications of the research for policy and reform

It is difficult here to suggest reforms and policies that can be undertaken by the State of Senegal to fight against homophobia because it is itself a perpetrator of homophobic violence. It is therefore up to non-state actors, human rights organisations, LGBT associations, and Western states to build strategies that can eventually lead to the decriminalisation of homosexuality and greater acceptance of homosexuals in Senegal.

The first thing to do is to avoid the paternalistic logic that is all too common in the discussions and debates between Western and African states of the topic homosexuality. Local actors feel infantilised. There is therefore a need for international organisations and institutions to adopt a process around the issue that allows African partners to feel respected and not feel they are being dictated to. For example, the conditioning of British aid to Uganda on reforms to the country's treatment of homosexuals was counterproductive. We must be able to give the feeling to African leaders that their attitudes are respected while working to set up forums for debate.

That said, international institutions, and especially the European Union, should invest heavily in Senegalese education and training. This is one of the crucial aspects of homophobia. Young people who did get the chance to go to school, refer to religious people and are indirectly subjected to indoctrination. We must be able to make education a pillar in a strategy of cooperation because it is these young people who will ultimately reproduce the homophobia they were taught from an early age. It is therefore necessary to have an educational system that exposes young people to questions of freedom and human rights.

Training is essential because it can encourage influential groups, such as journalists, religious and civil society actors, to raise the public's awareness of human rights and homosexuality. As opinion leaders and actors in the production of representations, greater attention to these social categories over the long term can influence discourses. Because their homophobic reactions are regularly motivated by religion, it is necessary for the European Union and other Western states to finance training courses on sexuality, freedoms, human rights, and democracy.

One last point concerns LGBT associations. It is important to fund and train them so that they can become professionals of activism. One of the problems they face, beyond funding, is the

lack of education and adequate training of their members. Creating support mechanisms that go beyond financial subsidies is vital to build their capacity to spark debate and reforms.

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APPENDIX 1

This table gives information on the interviewees whose data were used directly in this work.

Code	**Age**	**Date interviewed**	**Location**	**Contact type**
R1	+45	December 12, 2018	Dakar	In person
R2	+50	January 14, 2018	Dakar	In person
R3	43	October 12, 2017	Dakar	In person
R4	42	February 2, 2018	Dakar	In person
R5	38	January 16, 2018	Dakar	In person
R6	35	January 22, 2018	Dakar	In person
R7	42	January 7, 2018,	Dakar	In person
R8	+60	January 7, 2018	Dakar	In person
R9	+45	November 14, 2017	Dakar	In person
R10	36	February 22, 2018	Dakar	In person

R11	+55	December 17, 2017	Dakar	In person
R12	+40	October 22, 2017	Dakar	In person
R13	28	December 13, 2017	Dakar	In person
R14	37	January 22, 2018	Dakar	In person
R15	27	January 24, 2018	Dakar	In person
R16	32	April 17, 2018	Dakar	In person
R17	29	February 3, 2018	Dakar	In person
R18	22	January 12, 2018	Dakar	In person
R19	21	January 22, 2018	Dakar	In person
R20	30	January 22, 2018	Dakar	In person
R21	25	January 17, 2018	Dakar	In person
R22	26	December 14, 2017	Dakar	In person
R23	22	September 19, 2018	Dakar	In person
R24	24	September 19, 2018	Dakar	In person
R25	26	January 22, 2018	Dakar	In person

R26	+40	February 3, 2018	Dakar	In person
R27	25	January 12, 2018	Dakar	In person
R28	30	January 17, 2018	Dakar	In person
R29	31	January 29, 2018	Dakar	In person
R30	30	May 20, 2018	Dakar	In person
R31	42	January 11, 2018	Dakar	In person
R32	53	January 28, 2018	Dakar	In person
R33	26	January 27, 2018	Dakar	In person