

Maves Braithwaite and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “When Organizations Rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence (FORGE) Dataset,” *International Studies Quarterly* 64 [1], 2020). By focusing on this earlier period before the onset of mass protest and on the development of online activism then, the book also fills in an important empirical gap in the study of Syrian politics. Finally, in highlighting the role of media assistance programs in developing a more professional Syrian media and engaged Syrian public, *New Media and Revolution* also intervenes in ongoing debates about the efficacy of US and international democracy promotion, particularly in the Middle East (Sunn Bush, *The Taming of Democracy Assistance*, 2015).

New Media and Revolution also raises several questions that could be taken up by future scholarship, particularly systematic empirical research that could better substantiate some of the book’s theoretical arguments. First, future scholarship could further develop the links that Brownlee begins to trace between online and offline activism. For example, it could explore the role of journalists and online activists during the initiation of mass protest, as well as the relative importance of online and offline networks for protest participation (Elizabeth R. Nugent and Chantal E. Berman, “Ctrl-Alt-Revolt? Online and Offline Networks during the 2011 Egyptian Uprising,” *Middle East Law and Governance* 10 [1], 2018). Such research is important in understanding the role of online media in driving real-world activism and assessing its importance vis-à-vis other contributing factors. Similarly, further comparative research is needed to determine the conditions under which new media may or may not contribute to protest. Both the rise of new media and the political opportunities for protest that Brownlee sees as instrumental to the Syrian uprising were relatively common throughout the MENA region; yet, protests varied significantly in incidence, size, and scope (see, e.g., Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, 2012, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” *Journal of Democracy* 23 [4], 2012). How did Syria’s media landscape differ from these other contexts, and do these differences help explain the occurrence, nature, or extent of mobilization? Or are other contextual factors more important? Additional comparative scholarship is needed to answer these questions, particularly given the book’s major policy implication that, by transforming the Syrian media sector, media assistance projects played an important role in catalyzing mass protest.

By challenging the conventional narrative of pre-uprising Syria as a “kingdom of silence,” *New Media and Revolution* makes a valuable contribution to the study of Syrian politics and to our general understanding of the emergence of mass protest in highly repressive regimes. Befitting the book’s own disciplinary pluralism, it is likely to meet with wide interest from a diverse set of scholars

studying contentious politics, authoritarian regimes, Middle East politics, and social media and media studies. In addition, the book’s conclusions concerning the role of media assistance programs in changing the media landscape and social fabric in Syria should be essential reading for democracy-promotion practitioners and relevant policy makers.

Global Jihad: A Brief History. By Glenn E. Robinson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020. 264p. \$85.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups. By Alexander Thurston. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020. 349p. \$84.99 cloth, \$24.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592721003388

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The two books under review superficially seem to deal with the same topic, but they are actually quite different. *Global Jihad*, by Glenn E. Robinson, is a broad historical and analytical overview of global jihad that offers an interesting and compelling theory on how to view its main subject. Alexander Thurston’s *Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel*, in contrast, takes a far narrower approach to transnational—yet simultaneously very local—politics among rebellious groups in a specific region. Both books are also very good but for different reasons.

Global Jihad consists of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion that is, in fact, the longest chapter in the entire book, followed by a short epilogue. The introduction provides background information about the Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Revolution, and jihadism against the “near enemy” (i.e., supposedly apostate regimes in the Muslim world itself). It also introduces the author’s idea of jihadism as developing in four distinct though overlapping waves, as well as his contention that global jihad can be seen as a “movement of rage.” The rest of the book is spent explaining these four waves and why each of them represents a movement of rage.

The first chapter deals with the first wave, which the author calls “Jihadi International” (1979–90): the efforts by ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam (1941–89) to rally Arabs to the cause of jihad in Afghanistan and beyond. Chapter 2 focuses on the second wave, the “America First!” strategy (1996–2010), which refers to Osama bin Laden’s (1957–2011) move away from the failed revolutionary jihads against the regimes of the Muslim world (the “near enemy”) to attack the alleged source of their strength: the West (the “far enemy”). The third wave, discussed in chapter 3, is labeled “Caliphate Now!” (2003–17) and is mostly associated with Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (1966–2006), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971–2019), and the Islamic State (IS). Chapter 4 deals with the fourth wave, which Robinson calls “Personal Jihad” (2001–present); it is strongly rooted

in the ideas of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri (b. 1958) and revolves around the far less organized lone wolf attacks committed by only vaguely connected individuals.

The conclusion of the book states that global jihad can be compared to other violent social movements, but that the categories usually employed to analyze such movements do not always suffice. After discussing several comparative frameworks that the author finds lacking, Robinson uses the term “movements of rage” that, following Ken Jowitt, he defines as “a neomillennarian amalgam of charismatic leadership and apocalyptic ideology, combined with a strategy of nihilistic violence” (p. 164). Robinson then compares the four waves of global jihad discussed in chapters 1–4, concluding that each one constitutes a movement of rage, though to varying degrees.

Thurston’s *Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel* treats jihadists as political actors who “fight in wars and have radical visions of politics” and “also participate in local, national, and regional politics,” including “through the management of strategic relationships. They negotiate with power brokers, build alliances, and respond to the demands of constituencies. They are, meanwhile, prone to politicking within their own ranks” (p. 2). More specifically, this book focuses on politics within jihadist organizations, their engagement with the surrounding politics, and the interaction between these two.

Although many publications take a macro-level approach to jihadism by focusing on, for example, the views of major ideologues (as Robinson also does) or take a micro-level approach by concentrating on the radicalization of individuals, Thurston applies a meso-level analysis by looking at jihadist field commanders. They may not control or guide entire organizations, but they are the daily decision makers who are far more susceptible to local political demands than the heads of global groups or individual fighters. Thurston analyzes jihadist groups internally and externally: he looks at vertical hierarchies within groups, horizontal relationships between field commanders, and external relations with other political actors.

Through this lens, the author examines jihadists in six countries. The first two chapters focus on Algerian jihadists: chapter 1 concentrates on the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) and the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whereas chapter 2 deals entirely with the latter and its successor, Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The way these groups spill over into and affect local groups in Mali and its immediate neighbors is the subject of chapters 3 (Northern Mali), 4 (Central Mali), and 5 (the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso borderlands). Finally, chapters 6 and 7 examine how these organizations and local governments behaved in the Libyan town of Derna and Mauritania; the book ends with a policy-relevant conclusion.

Both books are highly recommended reading for students of jihadism: Robinson’s book can be compared with similar broad studies of radical Islamism, globalized Islam,

or Jihadi-Salafism, such as those by Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, and Shiraz Maher. Although readers can benefit from all these books, Robinson’s is at once narrower and broader than those: it focuses on a smaller subset of groups (global jihadists) yet is more appealing to a broader audience because it integrates the political science literature on violent organizations in general. Although scholars of jihadism will find little new information on the subject in the book’s first four chapters, it does provide a well-written and well-structured overview of the phenomenon of global jihad. Moreover, the author’s lengthy conclusion on movements of rage rightly tries to demystify jihadist organizations by comparing them to other violent groups: it deserves to be taken seriously, even by those who disagree with it.

Thurston’s work is equally well structured and well written, yet is the mirror image of Robinson’s work because it provides a new and highly original analysis of the type of everyday politics that rebellious groups in North Africa and the Sahel engage in, yet ends with a conclusion that should be of broad interest to scholars and policy makers alike. As such, he provides a crucial bridge between the work done by scholars such as Robinson, who focus on the big picture and major historical developments, and psychologists and sociologists who focus on the radicalization of individuals. His work provides a fascinating analysis of how local field commanders bargain with, concede to, negotiate with, cajole, pressure, and sometimes even kill those around them to achieve their goals, which often involve self-preservation.

This does not mean that the books under review are without faults, however. Although Robinson’s analysis of the four waves of global jihad is solid, he does push his findings too far sometimes. The link he establishes between ‘Azzam’s ideas on a caravan of fighters going from Afghanistan to other Muslim countries to liberate them from non-Muslim occupation and Sayyid Qutb’s view of permanent revolution (pp. 44–45) seems far-fetched, for example. Although ‘Azzam’s caravan may possibly be described as “permanent,” it was certainly not a revolution against (nominally) Muslim regimes, which is precisely what Qutb intended. Similarly, the author misses the mark when he tries to tie ‘Azzam’s ideas on jihad and *tawhid* (the unity of God) to Salafism (pp. 17, 45–46), which can only be done when one approaches this rather superficially. Likewise, his attempt to describe, albeit carefully, *all* four waves as movements of rage, even though only the Islamic State can really be said to have a truly apocalyptic ideology, seems a bit of a stretch.

Thurston does not have a similar overarching framework in which he analyzes his case studies but—oddly for a book focusing on jihadists—fails to define precisely what he means by “jihadism.” To be sure, the author does mention in footnote 1 on page 1 that he uses the term “to designate various movements that have arisen since the 1980s. These movements talk about jihad in ideological

terms that break with the mainstream Sunni tradition's restrictions on how jihads should be conducted." This definition is, however, not only vague—what are these breaks with Sunni tradition, for example, and what does he mean by "Sunni tradition," which is highly diverse?—but also incorrect in the sense that many of the jihadist practices that, say, al-Qa'ida has employed, have roots in or can be traced back to classical Islam, even if they are applied in a different time and context and with modern technology. This also makes one wonder why the diverse bunch of people dealt with in this book—apart from the fact that they are all African, Muslim, and engaged in violence—should all be gathered under the label of "jihadist."

These are not trivial issues. Many studies on the subject suffer from the lack of a specific definition of "jihadism," which raises the question whether the term really has much explanatory value, even to those who use it. Yet none of these points takes away from the fact that both books are very good and sophisticated analyses of a phenomenon that is still misunderstood by many. As such, both are must-reads for scholars and policy makers alike.

Prisons and Crime in Latin America. By Marcelo Bergman and Gustavo Fondevila. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021. 261p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper.
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Security is a top public policy issue in Latin America. In response, political leaders increasingly offer a tough-on-crime response. Their policies define more acts as crime, put more police on the streets, and, ultimately, place more people in prison. Indeed, Latin America's inmate population almost quadrupled from 1992 to 2017 from 408,000 to 1,519,000 (p. 1). Although not yet at levels seen in the United States, the trend is alarming and has led to a growing number of studies on prison conditions and punitivism in the region. In *Prisons and Crime in Latin America*, Marcelo Bergman and Gustavo Fondevila offer quantitative evidence that not only questions the effectiveness of prisons in reducing crime but also reveals how they facilitate increases in crime. Their book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the role of prisons in crime and offers original statistics that will be valuable to scholars and policy makers alike.

The book is grounded in an impressive quantitative study of the region. As the authors note, correctional institutions in Latin America are "typically opaque" and "neither gather detailed information nor publicize their data" (pp. 22–23). As a result, qualitative or ethnographic studies of prisons are more common. Bergman and Fondevila have compiled administrative data, which are often difficult to access, on 18 countries from governments,

public agencies, and international organizations. But more importantly, the findings of the book rest on an original survey of sentenced and pretrial inmates in eight countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru. In each country nearly 1,000 inmates were interviewed and asked 300 questions about themselves, their alleged crime, life before prison and in prison, their families, and their current and past experiences with the criminal justice system. Thus, the data presented in this book will be valuable to scholars and practitioners seeking quantitative evidence of what mass incarceration looks like in specific countries and across the region and will help identify issues worth exploring in more depth.

For the purposes of the authors, the detailed statistics enable them to present a nuanced argument of when and why prisons create crime. The vast majority of people in prison are there for low-level theft and drug-related crimes. When they are put in jail, a new recruit quickly replaces them, expanding the numbers of people involved in crime. Because sentences are short and debts are incurred while in jail, most inmates return to these profit-driven crimes after they are released. Thus, the types of crimes committed, high turnover, and high rates of recidivism are factors contributing to rising crime rates.

Prison conditions also matter. Many studies have examined the poor prison conditions in Latin America. Bergman and Fondevila's survey contributes to this research by providing cross-country comparative measurements of the poor conditions as described by prisoners themselves. More importantly, their study moves beyond exposing human rights abuses to linking them to rising crime. Among other issues, they provide data on overcrowding, poor provision of basic needs, insufficient rehabilitative programs, and limited reentry supports. This state neglect, the survey shows, leads inmates to turn to their families and gangs for support. Both these alternatives contribute to more crime.

Families are an understudied area of the crime puzzle, and this book should encourage more work in the area. The authors find that families of the incarcerated, who are often poor to begin with, become indebted while supporting the relative (often the breadwinner) in prison. Once released, the family frequently pressures the former inmate to become involved in crime again to pay off these debts. Moreover, children suffer emotionally from the imprisonment of a parent (78% of inmates have children) and often leave school (p. 78). Prisons become familiar to children who visit their parents there, and crime becomes a more likely path.

Gangs also provide an alternative governance structure in prison. Given the paucity of resources in prison, a substantial illegal market emerges that controls the distribution of all the goods one could want, from fresh drinking water to drugs. The data show that this market is enabled by family members who supply goods from the