# Whose land is it?

## Perceived ownership and territorial compensation in settler societies

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# Whose land is it?

Perceived ownership and territorial compensation in settler societies

**Van wie is het land?**

Collectief eigenaarschap en territoriale compensatie in *settler societies*

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

**Proefschrift**

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## 1.1 Introduction

> *'It is my father's land, my grandfather's land, my grandmother's land. I am related to it; it gives me my identity. If I don't fight for it, then I will be moved out of it and [it] will be the loss of my identity.'* ~ Father Dave Passi, plaintiff in the landmark 'Mabo' case on the land rights of the Indigenous Meriam People in Australia (Graham, 1989, 0:02:08).

The hardships faced by Indigenous Peoples in settler societies such as Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa as a consequence of colonialism are complex and multifaceted. Many Indigenous Peoples are in far worse socio-economic positions, and they are more likely to be impoverished, unhealthy or incarcerated compared to their non-Indigenous peers, which—among other things—has been attributed to the enduring legacy of colonialism (González et al., 2022; Paradies, 2020). Furthermore, in most settler societies, Indigenous Peoples have been dispossessed of the majority of their lands, and intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous (settler) people have been shaped by conflicts about the ownership of territory (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Bravo, 1996). The right of Indigenous Peoples to own their lands is an important aspect of the United Nations declaration on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN General Assembly, 2007), and calls for territorial restitution or increased autonomy are central to the demands of many Indigenous Peoples (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999). For example, for Mapuche in Chile, territorial and cultural losses is the main narrative that connects past and present, and this fuels their current demands for territorial restitution (Figueiredo et al., 2019). Indigenous Peoples' demands for territorial restitution can be partially driven by material considerations, such as the desire to continue subsistence activities[1], but this is only one aspect (Andrade, 2019). In the above quote, Father Dave Passi explains why he fights for the recognition of Indigenous ownership over the Mer islands in Australia. He emphasizes both his ancestral connection to the land and the importance of the land for defining who he is. Indigenous Peoples often feel that their identities are strongly connected to the land (Giguère et al., 2012), and they emphasize the importance of this connection in territorial conflicts with settlers (Banerjee, 2000; Bauer, 2016; Kana'iaupuni & Malone, 2006). Territory provides a way for people to 'anchor' their identity (Toft, 2014), and as many Indigenous Peoples argue, territory plays a vital role for their survival as culturally distinct groups (Rojas Pedemonte & Miranda, 2015). Furthermore, because Indigenous Peoples often occupy marginalized societal positions, the instrumental (e.g., economic) value of land can also have an impact on reducing inequality. However, although territorial restitution has become an increasingly salient subject in many settler societies, there are many non-Indigenous inhabitants who are opposed to it (Rotz, 2017).

Historically, colonization and the taking of Indigenous lands have been justified in a variety of ways, depending on the context. However, there are also commonalities. A recurring theme is the denial that Indigenous Peoples owned the land in the first

1 It should be noted that for many Indigenous Peoples, subsistence activities are not just socio-economic activities, but also have cultural importance.

place, which happens in different ways. The Mabo case in Australia, and the discourse surrounding it, provides a particularly illustrative example. This landmark case resulted in the recognition of the land rights of the Meriam people in the Torres Strait. It effectively resulted in the recognition that some Indigenous Australians continue to hold rights in land and water according to their traditional laws and customs (Strelein, 2005). It is now often said that the British justified the colonization of Australia by arguing that it was *terra nullius* ('no one's land'), and that the Mabo case is the moment where the doctrine of *terra nullius* was 'officially overturned' (Secher, 2007). However, although some of the first British colonizers did claim that the continent was only sparsely populated, Australia was of course far from uninhabited, and this fact did not escape early settlers (Banner, 2005). In fact, the term *terra nullius* was not used at the time, and the current usage is somewhat of a simplification of the actual arguments that were then used. Instead, the usurpation of Indigenous Australians' lands was officially justified with the assertion that the continent was 'legally uninhabited' (Secher, 2007): The British claimed that because Indigenous Australians did not cultivate the land, they also could not own it (Short, 2003). They utilized the Lockean theory of property, which argued that the acquisition of property arises from labour (Corcoran, 2007).

A second common claim is that Indigenous Peoples were either transient or had themselves displaced the 'real Indigenous Peoples' (and were thus themselves not 'first' either). This claim crops up in surprisingly many contexts. For example, the vacant land myth in South Africa posits that South Africa was settled by Europeans and Bantu-speaking Africans at roughly the same time (Crais, 1991); the Argentinian anthropologist Rodolfo Casamiquela claimed that Mapuche were not indigenous to Argentina because they killed and replaced the indigenous Tehuelche (Lenci, 2019); and in 2015, Australian senator David Leyonhjelm claimed that Aboriginal people were not the first to arrive in Australia (Yaxley, 2015). Although these narratives have been debunked as part of a broader decolonialization process, there are people in, among other places, Canada (Rotz, 2017), Chile (Richards, 2010), New Zealand (Brett, 2020), and South Africa (AfriForum, 2019) who continue to make similar claims.

The territorial conflicts are further complicated by different conceptions of the utility of land by states and Indigenous Peoples. Land use policy frequently prioritizes the economic utility of land, while Indigenous Peoples additionally emphasize its symbolic importance (Andrade, 2019). For example, the Mapuche ancestral lands in Chile fall within an area of the country that has seen large-scale hydroelectrical and forestry projects, developed mainly during the Pinochet dictatorship and afterwards. Pinochet revoked all rights to communal property of the land, thus violating principles of the Mapuche way of living and organizing within the territory they still held. At present, Mapuche communities have the right to reclaim lost ancestral territory through proposals made to an agency of the Chilean state that deals with Indigenous rights. In practice, when Indigenous demands clash with industrial interests, state agencies have perpetuated the dictatorship-era patterns of siding with the interests of private companies rather than those of Indigenous communities (Rodríguez & Carruthers, 2008).

There are several reasons for why states favor economic development. Land reform efforts in Latin America have largely been driven by the desire to improve economic

productivity, promote rural development, and reduce economic inequality (Bauer, 2016). In some cases, policies that focus on economic land use can turn out to be beneficial for Indigenous Peoples. For example, mining agreements can allow Indigenous Peoples to share in the wealth generated by mining on their lands (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). However, these policies often do not consider the needs or desires of Indigenous Peoples, and in many cases economic productivity is prioritized over the explicit desires of Indigenous Peoples. For example, a native title grant in Australia only gives Indigenous Australians the right to negotiate about the development of their lands (often mining), without granting them the crucial right to veto developments (Cleary, 2014).

It is also argued that returning Indigenous lands, or not using these lands for economic development, would be unfair to the majority of the population. For example, opponents of 'Indigenous lands' in Brazil argue that allocating so much land to Indigenous Peoples is unfair, because they constitute only a small fraction of the total population (Le Tourneau, 2019). Politicians in other countries have made similar arguments. For example, the Australian politician Pauline Hanson has often claimed that Indigenous Australians are afforded a disproportionate amount of resources (Dahre, 2008).

Despite the central role that territory and territorial disputes play in settler societies, as illustrated by the examples above, the importance of a sense of territorial ownership has received relatively little attention in the social sciences and social psychological research in particular (Meagher, 2020). The primary aim of this thesis is to examine different understandings of collective territorial ownership that people can have in settler societies, and how these relate to support for territorial compensation (e.g., territorial restitution, increased autonomy). I examine this by considering three aspects of collective ownership: *who* is seen as the owner, *why* is that group seen as the owner, and *what* are the implications of collective ownership.

#### 1.1.1 Collective psychological ownership

The first aspect of collective ownership concerns the question *who* people perceive as the owners of a territory. A sense of ownership derives from the psychology of possession (Furby, 1978), and concerns the *perception* that a certain object, place, or idea belongs to someone (Shaw et al., 2012; Snare, 1972). However, ownership is a social normative construct that goes beyond a sense of possession in *being a social claim in relation to others*. Ownership is a key aspect of social reality that structures relationships between individuals with respect to objects (Blumenthal, 2010), as it implies asserting a sense of control and power over these objects (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), e.g., 'this is my car', or 'my job' (Pierce et al., 2001). Furthermore, just as people can feel that they personally own something ('mine'), they can also think that something belongs to their group ('ours'). This is referred to as collective psychological ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2011a), such as ownership of territories like 'our beach' (Due & Riggs, 2008), 'our neighborhood' (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020), and 'our country' (Brylka et al., 2015).

As demonstrated by the ongoing struggles of many Indigenous Peoples regarding the recognition of their territorial ownership claims (Haughney, 2012), people can feel that certain places belong to them in the absence of legal recognition, and regardless of whether they currently occupy those places. A sense of ownership is thus distinct

from property, the legal recognition of ownership, in that people can feel like they own something irrespective of whether they legally own it (Pierce et al., 2003).

People do not only have an awareness of what belongs to them or their group but can also recognize other people or groups as owners. Research shows that the recognition of other's ownership already develops at a young age (Kanngiesser et al., 2020), and that children spontaneously reference ownership to explain why it is or is not acceptable for someone to use an object (Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017). Building upon this previous research, I argue that people can not only perceive their own group to own a place, but that they can also recognize other groups as owners of that place. In the context of settler societies this means that I argue that Indigenous and settler people can perceive both Indigenous Peoples and settlers as the owners of the land.



### 1.1.2 Principles of ownership

The second aspect of ownership (*why*) relates to the reasons that people have for claiming and inferring ownership. A sense of collective ownership can be based on different general principles (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), which implies different understandings of why groups are considered to own particular territories. In settler societies, three principles of ownership are of particular importance for why people infer or justify perceived (collective) ownership of land: autochthony (first arrival), investment (e.g., working the land), and formation (primacy of the territory in forming the collective identity).

#### *1.1.2.1 Autochthony belief*

Research has shown that in the absence of additional information on the ownership of an object, people assume that the first person seen to possess it, is its owner (Friedman, 2008). Similarly, people tend to see the original occupants of a territory as owning the land because they were 'there first'. In the anthropological literature, the general belief in ownership based on primo-occupancy is called autochthony belief (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). Autochthony is one of the most basic and pervasive ways of inferring ownership, often perceived as being self-evident or even 'natural' (Geschiere, 2009). Terms such as 'Indigenous', 'Aboriginal', 'sons-of-soil', 'First Nation', and 'autochthonous' all refer to the first inhabitants of a particular place. While these terms have different connotations and are used in specific ways depending on the country, they all describe the native inhabitants of a place with an (implied) related ownership claim. The word 'Indigenous' is generally used to refer to the earliest known inhabitants of territories that were colonized by a now-dominant group (Ojong, 2020). Because of international treaties on the rights of Indigenous Peoples (e.g., ILO 169, see Anaya, 2004), (inter)national recognition as an Indigenous group can help in the struggle for territorial compensation. Consequently, official recognition as Indigenous can be quite contentious. For example, Indigenous Peoples in Chile are not officially recognized as such in the constitution (Richards & Gardner, 2013), and the claims to Indigenous status of the Negev Bedouin in Israel are hotly contested (Yiftachel et al., 2016).

Because first-occupancy is not a transient characteristic, belief in autochthony may create a particularly sharp distinction between those who are seen as relatively more entitled (first-comers) and those who are not (later-comers). Consequently, autochthony belief can present territorially established groups with a strong (perceived) justification

for excluding groups that arrived later (Ceuppens, 2011; Garbutt, 2006; Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). The majority of previous research on autochthony belief has examined it from the perspective of groups which consider themselves the first occupants of the territory. For members of these groups, support for autochthony equates to seeing their ingroup as relatively more entitled to ownership of the territory than newcomers. Research has found that autochthony is used to claim rights for the ingroup, and functions as an argument for the exclusion of non-autochthonous others (such as immigrants). For example, anthropological research in Belgium has shown that autochthony is used by the Flemish far-right as justification for the exclusion of francophone Belgians in Flanders (Ceuppens, 2011). In Côte D'Ivoire and Cameroon autochthony has been used to exclude from political participation ethnic groups that allegedly arrived later (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). Furthermore, social psychological studies show that endorsement of autochthony belief is associated with prejudice towards immigrants (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) and collective action against refugees (Hasbún López et al., 2019) among native majority members in Europe, as well as with support for movements defending the majority status quo in Malaysia (Selvanathan et al., 2021).

However, previous research has not examined the role of autochthony belief in settler societies, where the dominant group is not autochthonous. Rather, appeals to autochthony ('we were here first') have frequently been utilized by Indigenous groups as part of their struggles for rights and sovereignty (Gagné & Salaün, 2012), and against wrongful dispossession (Meisels, 2003). For example, Mapuche spokeswoman Soraya Maicoño explained that, '...we existed before the State, we have a different, real, ancient, ancestral connection with the territory' [my translation from Spanish] (Korol, 2022). The autochthony principle is generally perceived to provide a strong basis for claiming ownership, even by people who are not Indigenous themselves. Although the autochthony principle undermines settlers' territorial ownership claims, research shows that people generally do not try to deny the validity of this principle (Gans, 2001). In fact, even though support for autochthony belief may not be in the best interests of their group, experimental research in the Netherlands has shown that people recognize first arrival as a valid argument for ownership not only when their own group arrived somewhere first but also when a rival outgroup is presented as the first occupant (Martinović et al., 2020). The perceived strength of autochthony may also explain the prevalence of the denial of Indigenous Peoples' primo-occupancy, e.g., Indigenous lands were sparsely populated at the time of colonization (Richards, 2010), or Indigenous Peoples were transient (Rotz, 2017), or had themselves displaced the 'real Indigenous Peoples' (Lenci, 2019; Yaxley, 2015).

In my research I add to the previous literature by examining how endorsement of autochthony belief relates to territorial ownership perceptions in settler societies. I examine the impact of endorsement of autochthony as the general belief—independent of the particular intergroup context—that those who were first to inhabit any given territory should be entitled to own it (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). As a general principle, support for autochthony belief should relate to seeing the primo-occupant group of a territory as relatively more entitled to ownership of that territory, regardless of whether one is a member of the first-occupant group or a group that arrived later.

Expanding on the previous literature, I argue that support for autochthony belief will be related to perceiving more Indigenous territorial ownership and less settler ownership, among both settler and non-settler groups.

#### *1.1.2.2 Investment belief*

Creating an object or investing time, effort, and resources into changing and developing it, is an important general principle that people use to infer or claim territorial ownership (Toft, 2003). Experimental research in different countries has shown that people judge that the creator of an object owns it (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Kanngiesser et al., 2014; Levene et al., 2015). Past investment into a territory or contribution to the development of the territory can similarly be used to claim territorial ownership or recognize another group as a rightful owner. Furthermore, there is some indication that people can perceive investment as a legitimate reason for transferring ownership from the first-possessor to the one who has invested in it. This was certainly argued in settler societies such as Australia (Short, 2003) and South Africa (Boisen, 2017; Crais, 1991), where the usurpation of Indigenous lands was justified with the assertion that Indigenous Peoples could not own the land, because they did not cultivate it. Experimental research has found that children perceive their own investment in an object as a legitimate reason for transferring ownership from the first-possessor to themselves (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). Non-Indigenous people may similarly perceive their past investment in a territory as legitimate grounds for challenging first inhabitants' territorial ownership.

Whereas first arrival is usually presented as a historical fact that creates a binary division between those who were first and those who were not (Geschiere, 2009), investment into a territory can be claimed by multiple groups in a multitude of ways and to different degrees, also increasing or decreasing over time. Consequently, there is a greater possibility of contrasting narratives and differing views on the degree that groups have invested into a territory compared to the first-occupancy principle. This could mean that investment as a general belief will likely not relate to concrete territorial ownership inferences and compensation in the same way for non-Indigenous and Indigenous Peoples. In my research I add to the previous literature by examining how endorsement of investment belief relates to territorial ownership perceptions and support for compensation in settler societies, and how this differs for Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. I examine the impact of endorsement of investment as the general belief—not related to a particular context—that those who invested in a territory the most should be entitled to own it.

In Western thought, progress has often entailed making wilderness into civilization by mastering and transforming nature (Mackey, 1998). Furthermore, when one ascribes to the Lockean notion that land exists to be used (Bauer, 2016), economic development becomes an improvement that adds value to the land. In settler societies, large scale development of land has been driven by the state and settlers themselves. It is therefore reasonable to assume that non-Indigenous people feel that they have invested more in the land. I therefore argue that non-Indigenous people who think that past investment is an important basis for ownership claims will perceive their own group as relatively more entitled to ownership over the land in question.

For Indigenous Peoples, I consider two contrasting possibilities. According to system justification theory, both majorities and minorities are motivated to justify the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 2004), and it is therefore possible that some Indigenous people may agree with the Western notion of development and accept the notion that settlers have invested more in the territory. In line with this reasoning, it can be argued that for Indigenous people endorsement of investment belief in general also relates to perceiving the settlers as relatively more entitled to owning the territory. However, Indigenous Peoples and settlers may also have different understandings of what constitutes an improvement to land, and therefore have different understandings of investment. In particular, some Indigenous people might consider (economic) development the opposite of improving the land. This is especially likely in the many contexts in which states prioritize development over the express wishes of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous Peoples interests in protecting their lands often align with those of environmentalists (Whyte, 2017). While this may be partially for practical reasons (a shared desire to prevent the destruction of land and resources), many Indigenous Peoples also believe that it is their responsibility to protect the land (Hill, 2016; Pérez & Marsico, 2021). Thus, they may consider protecting the land as a form of investment. Therefore, in contrast to the above, if Indigenous Peoples have this different understanding of investment, it can be expected that investment belief will for them relate to perceiving their own group as relatively more entitled to own the territory.

#### *1.1.2.3 Formation belief*

There tends to be a strong subjective association between what is 'me' and what is 'mine', to the extent where it can feel like possessions define who you are (Beggan, 1992; Ye & Gawronski, 2016). Furthermore, research shows that possessions can provide a way for people to maintain a sense of continuity of the self across time (Price et al., 2000). The same may apply on a collective level. As discussed previously, Indigenous Peoples often emphasize the importance of their ancestral territory for their group identity (Kana'iaupuni & Malone, 2006). Importantly, it has been theorized that this link between identity and possession in turn gives rise to a feeling of ownership of an object (Pierce et al., 2003). On the level of groups and territories, the constitutive role that the land plays, or has played, in forming the identity of the group reflects the third important general principle (formation belief) that people use to infer and claim territorial ownership (Toft, 2003; Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

Although the identity aspect of territories is frequently made secondary to other (e.g., economic) considerations in settler societies (Bauer, 2016), the notion that a territory is particularly important for being a 'homeland', is not unique to Indigenous Peoples. In research on nationalism, a homeland is considered a specific type of territory about which a specific group of people (the 'nation') asserts that it should be under their control because that territory is part of who they are (Shelef, 2015). For example, Jews sometimes claim territorial ownership rights of Israel because the land was of primary importance in forming the Jewish identity (Gans, 2001), and similar claims are made in most nation states. Importantly, people behave differently in conflicts over their homeland than in conflicts over other lands, because they view the right to control their homeland as an

issue of survival as a culturally distinct group (Toft, 2003). It should therefore come as no surprise that Indigenous Peoples continue to fight for the restitution of those lands that they view as their homelands, even when those fights come at a high price. For example, a group of Q'eqchi' people in Guatemala have recently built homes on a palm oil plantation to reclaim their ancestral lands, lands which officially belong to a palm oil company. In defence of her decision to remain on the land, one of the community members said 'My husband died for the land. I am not leaving here. If the police come, they will have to kill us all' (Matilde Ac, in Cuffe, 2021).

It is likely that settlers recognize that Indigenous Peoples feel strongly connected to the land, and I therefore argue that settler support for the formation belief in general will be associated with perceiving higher Indigenous ownership. At the same time, descendants of White settlers can also feel that they belong to the land and that the land has profoundly shaped who and what they are, such as with Afrikaners in South Africa (Verwey & Quayle, 2012) and among White Australians (Moran, 2002). Expanding on this literature, I argue that settler support for formation belief will also be associated with perceiving higher settler ownership, in addition to higher Indigenous ownership.



### 1.1.3 The implications of territorial ownership perceptions

#### *1.1.3.1 Perceived rights and responsibilities*

In addition to the questions of who owns a particular territory and why, there is the question of what territorial ownership entails. This third aspect ('what') concerns the implications of territorial ownership perceptions. Because ownership is about what is owned in relation to others, it implies a bundle of entitlements and rights that one holds towards others (Pierce et al., 2003), such as the right to occupy, use, transfer, and exclude others from that which is owned (Blumenthal, 2010; Merrill, 1998). Importantly, the right to exclude is often emphasized as the most essential right implied by ownership (Merrill, 1998). Accordingly, on the level of countries and territories, collective psychological ownership can have important consequences for intergroup relations (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), including the perceived right to exclude 'outsiders' such as immigrants (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). Furthermore, in addition to these rights, ownership is associated with a feeling of responsibility for that which is owned (Pierce et al., 2003). Qualitative research has found that responsibility for the care of possessions and the right to control them are frequently mentioned as two central aspects of what it means to own something (Furby, 1978), and land owners report feeling a moral responsibility to take care of their land (Spears et al., 2021). Experimental research has found that a sense of personal ownership of products (Kamleitner & Rabinovich, 2010) and public places (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020) is related to greater perceived responsibility. Expanding on this literature, I argue that similar to perceived ingroup ownership involving ingroup rights and ingroup responsibilities, perceived outgroup ownership will involve perceiving outgroup rights and outgroup responsibilities.

#### *1.1.3.2 Support for compensation*

Calls for territorial restitution or increased autonomy (territorial compensation) are central to the demands of many Indigenous Peoples (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999). The extent to which people perceive a territory as belonging to an Indigenous group

or rather to the settlers is likely to influence their support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous group. There are both social and legal norms about what are acceptable justifications for the transference of ownership, and taking someone's property without permission is generally considered theft. Research shows that an awareness of these norms already develops at a young age: young children argue that things that were taken away should be returned to the owner, and that the owner should be compensated when something is damaged, broken or stolen (Blake & Harris, 2009; Rossano et al., 2011). I argue that people feel similarly about stolen objects and stolen lands: The right of restitution of wrongfully taken land is the most common justification for territorial claims against neighboring states (Murphy, 1990). Indeed, settlers commonly justify their opposition to territorial restitution by arguing that the land was not wrongfully taken, e.g., 'it was a fair trade' (Rotz, 2017), or by denying that Indigenous Peoples even owned the land in the first place.

Settlers may offer different forms of compensation in an attempt to improve relations with Indigenous Peoples. These reparations can take a symbolic (e.g., institutional apologies) or instrumental form (e.g., territorial restitution, financial compensation). Apologies aim to restore a sense of justice by condemning past harms, while compensation aims to restore justice by repairing those harms. Apologies are a way for groups to take responsibility for events in the past and to express remorse for those events (Doosje et al., 2006), and can help improve intergroup relations (Auerbach, 2004). Official government apologies may or may not include offers of compensation (Blatz et al., 2009), and research suggests that reparations are most effective at improving intergroup relations and promoting reconciliation when they combine apologies with compensation (Okimoto & Tyler, 2016; Philpot et al., 2013). Expanding on the previous literature, I argue that when people perceive a territory as belonging to the Indigenous group, they will be more supportive of compensating this group. Conversely, when they perceive it to belong to the non-Indigenous group, I expect that they will be less supportive of compensation.

## 1.2 A note on naming

Before giving an overview of the research contexts and introducing the empirical chapters of my dissertation, I will briefly discuss the terms that I use to refer to the subjects of my research. The first inhabitants of settler societies are referred to by many different names depending on the context or on the literature in question. Some of the most commonly used terms are Indigenous Peoples[2] (used throughout this thesis), Native (often used in North America), American Indians (United States), First Nations (commonly used in Canada), and Aboriginal (primarily, but not exclusively, in Australia), among others. The terms 'indigenous' and 'autochthonous' are analogous in that both refer to first-comers, literally those who 'sprung from the land itself' (the former being derived

2 In keeping with style guides such the one from the American Psychological Association, I capitalize all designations for ethnic groups, because they are used as proper nouns (American Psychological Association, 2021).

from Latin and the latter from Greek). However, 'autochthonous' is generally used to refer to primo-occupant peoples who are dominant in a given territory, while 'indigenous' is generally used to refer to primo-occupant peoples who have been colonized (Ojong, 2020).

Whenever possible I will refer to a group using their endonym. However, in many cases it is necessary to use an umbrella term to refer to multiple groups at the same time, in which case I will use the term Indigenous Peoples, or somewhat more specific terms such as Indigenous Australians. Unfortunately, there is no general term that is accepted by every Indigenous person, and that includes the use of the term 'Indigenous' (Carlson et al., 2014). Furthermore, it is important to note that some Indigenous people take offense to being called, for example, Indigenous Australian because they do not consider themselves Australian. I would therefore like to emphasize that my usage of terms like 'Indigenous Australians' or 'Indigenous Chileans' is not intended as a statement about the legitimacy of settler societies. A more accurate interpretation of my intention in using such terms might be 'Indigenous Peoples who are from lands that are currently part of a particular sovereign state, regardless of whether or not these lands legitimately belong to said state'. Of course, that is quite a mouthful, which is why I use the proposed terms as a concession to readability.

I have similar considerations for the terms that I use to refer to the various non-Indigenous groups that I examine. Whenever I discuss a specific group, I use a commonly used term in the particular national context, i.e., Anglo-Celtic Australian, European New Zealander, non-Indigenous Chilean, and White South African. When referring to multiple of these groups at the same time, I generally use the terms 'settler' and 'non-Indigenous' interchangeably.



## 1.3 An overview of the contexts

In this dissertation, I examine how perceptions of territorial ownership relate to support for territorial compensation in settler societies. Settler societies are countries which were founded through colonialism. I examine four different national contexts, all of which can be characterized as settler societies. In Australia (Chapters 2 and 4), South Africa (Chapter 4), and New Zealand (Chapter 5), I examine the perspective of settlers, and in Chile (Chapter 3) I compare the settler (non-Indigenous Chilean) and Indigenous (Mapuche) perspectives.

### 1.3.1 Australia

The British colonization of Australia is quite distinct from their colonization elsewhere. For example, in North America, the British officially acknowledged Indigenous Peoples as possessors of property rights, and in New Zealand they officially recognized the Māori as owners of their lands. In contrast, in Australia they neither attempted to buy land, nor to form any sort of treaty with the Indigenous population (Banner, 2005). One reason for this difference may be that the British considered Indigenous Australians to be the least civilized of all Indigenous Peoples that they had encountered (Banner, 2005). An important consequence is that Indigenous Australians cannot use any treaties (broken or otherwise) to substantiate their territorial claims. This is why the landmark Mabo

case was so significant: It provided the legal acknowledgement that some Indigenous Australians continued to hold rights to land (Strelein, 2005).

In Australia, Indigenous territorial claims based on ancestral possession (native title claims) can only be made on government owned land (National Native Title Tribunal, 2021). Furthermore, native title can co-exist with non-Indigenous property rights, such as pastoral rights. Although granting native title over a certain area, therefore, has relatively few consequences for non-Indigenous Australians, it is certainly not without controversy and not supported by all Anglo-Celtic Australians (Pedersen et al., 2000). Although the last few decades have seen some progress in land restitution, many Aboriginal claimants have yet to see any resolution. For example, it is estimated that it will take around 100 years[3] to resolve the backlog of 37,000 Aboriginal land claims in the state of New South Wales (Allam, 2020).

### 1.3.2 Chile

The Mapuche resisted colonization by the Spanish between the 16th and 19th century, and their lands were only fully conquered between 1861-1883, during the military occupation of Araucanía (Marimán et al., 2006). Araucanía has been the focal point of the ongoing struggle between the Mapuche and the Chilean state over the ownership of the land. The land restitution process has been quite slow, and has been hampered by economic interests in the area. As the main owners of Mapuche lands, forestry companies are one of the primary forces in the region (Nahuelpán et al., 2021). Mapuche activists have responded to land dispossession with violent and non-violent actions, including marches, land occupations, arson attacks, and the sabotage of forestry equipment (Rojas Pedemonte & Miranda, 2015). The Chilean state has used a controversial anti-terrorism law to justify the use of force and the imprisonment of Mapuche activists (Amnesty International, 2021; Richards & Gardner, 2013).

The conflict over territory has intensified after massive protests broke out in 2019 due to the current political system increasingly losing legitimacy in the eyes of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, which propelled a process of constitutional change. A new Constitution is being drawn and 17 seats have been reserved for representatives of indigenous groups, of which 7 belong to Mapuche people. If the proposed constitutional changes are accepted, they may improve Indigenous rights and lead to their full constitutional recognition.

### 1.3.3 New Zealand

Unlike many other settler societies, New Zealand is in many ways a bicultural nation. For example, the Māori language is formally recognized as an official language, and many European New Zealanders consider their ingroup and Māori as equally indispensable parts of New Zealand national identity and culture (Sibley & Liu, 2007). The idea of biculturalism can be traced back to the historical treaty of Waitangi between the Māori

3 I first read about this backlog when doing research for the first chapter of my dissertation. At the time, it was estimated that it would take around 90 years to resolve the backlog of 29,000 claims (M. Brown, 2016), so at least things are changing. Unfortunately, they are not changing for the better.

and the Crown[4] concerning the ownership of the land, which is now considered New Zealand's founding document. However, the English and Māori versions of this treaty are not direct translations and the differences between the versions have been a point of contention with some arguing that the English (Treaty of Waitangi) and Māori versions (*Te Tiriti o Waitangi*) should be viewed as two separate treaties. Furthermore, similar to Indigenous Peoples elsewhere, Māori have lost the majority of their lands (Brooking, 2001), and their struggle for land retention and restoration has played a central role in the intergroup relations between Māori and European New Zealanders. Although the conflict over territory in New Zealand is often framed as a conflict between Māori and the Crown, there is also opposition to compensation for Māori by New Zealand European citizens (Kirkwood et al., 2005). For example, opponents of land restitution have argued that recognition of Māori rights would constitute inequality based on race (Suszko, 2015), or even that this would be akin to apartheid (Ruru, 2004).



### 1.3.4 South Africa

In South Africa, land ownership is highly divided by race as a consequence of centuries of colonialization and apartheid, and with White South Africans owning the majority of the land (South African Government, 2018). In an attempt to ameliorate racial inequalities related to land ownership, the first law passed by South Africa's first post-apartheid government was the Restitution of Lands Rights Act (South African Government, 2021). This law sought to catalyze a process of land restitution to those who were dispossessed of land based on their race, based on a principle of 'willing buyer, willing seller' whereby the government buys the land for restitution from willing sellers. However, the pace of land reform has been much slower than anticipated (Lahiff, 2007), and in recent years, land expropriation without compensation has been proposed as a solution to speeding up this process (Makhado, 2012). This possibility is currently being discussed in the South African parliament (Felix, 2021), and it has been quite controversial. For example, the prominent White South African civil society organization, AfriForum, has called land redistribution without compensation racist against White South Africans (AfriForum, 2019). In general, opinions on land redistribution in South Africa are highly divided by race: While only about a third of White South Africans support land redistribution, it is supported by more than 80% of Black South Africans (Gibson, 2010).

### 1.3.5 Comparing the contexts

For this dissertation, I could only provide a very brief overview of the history of each context, because all of the conflicts are quite complex, spanning multiple centuries and multiple actors. However, all four countries have been colonized by European settlers, Indigenous Peoples have lost much of their lands, and the ongoing conflict over the ownership of land continues to shape relations between groups. Yet, there are also important differences between the countries that might affect the conflicts around territorial compensation. In addition to historical, political, legal, and economic differences, one important difference is the relative power and size of the groups involved.

4 The British crown at the time. These days, this term is used to refer to the government of New Zealand.

In Chile, the Mapuche are the largest of several Indigenous groups, comprising roughly 10% of the Chilean population (and over 80% of the total Indigenous population) while the non-Indigenous population is roughly 88.9% (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017). Similar to the Mapuche, the Indigenous Māori (16.5%) in New Zealand also constitute a minority of the population, compared to the majority of New Zealand Europeans (70.2%; Statistics New Zealand, 2018). The various Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples make up a much smaller minority of the population in Australia (2.8%), compared to Māori and Mapuche. Similar to Chile and New Zealand, Anglo-Celtic Australians comprise the majority (56.4%) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017a). Because the Māori and Mapuche constitute far larger minorities than Indigenous Australians do, it is possible that they have relatively more power to enact change. The demographic distribution is quite different in South Africa. Black South Africans (80.8%) comprise the majority of the South African population, while White South Africans (7.8%) are a minority (Statistics South Africa, 2020). Furthermore, the conflicts in Australia, Chile, and New Zealand are typically characterized as conflicts between the state and Indigenous Peoples, with the Indigenous Peoples fighting for territorial compensation. In contrast, in South Africa the process of territorial compensation is led by the government. In the fourth Chapter, I will examine whether the structure and role of ownership perceptions in South Africa are similar to the other contexts, despite these differences.

## 1.4 Overview of the book

The primary aim of this dissertation is to examine different understandings of collective territorial ownership that people can have in settler societies, and how these relate to support for territorial compensation. I examine this in four empirical chapters (Chapters 2-5) by considering three aspects of collective ownership: *who* is seen as the owner, *why* is that group seen as the owner, and *what* are the implications of perceived collective ownership (see Table 1.1). In this section, I describe how each of the empirical chapters contribute to this overall aim, and how they build upon each other.

### 1.4.1 Chapter 2

The main aim of chapter 2 is to examine for the first time the association between perceiving Indigenous ownership based on first arrival and support for compensation in Australia, a settler society. Specifically, in this chapter I examine how endorsement of autochthony belief by non-Indigenous group members (i.e., settlers) relates to the willingness to make amends to Indigenous Peoples. When settlers believe that primo-occupancy is a relevant basis for inferring and claiming ownership, they might perceive the appropriation of Indigenous lands as having been a wrongdoing in conflict with the moral values of their ingroup. Wrongdoings committed by the ingroup may evoke collective emotional responses regardless of one's personal involvement in these events (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), because the self can be linked to the wrongdoings through a shared group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In examining the relationship between autochthony belief and support for compensation, I therefore consider the intermediate role of guilt, moral shame, and image shame, which respectively derive from viewing

**Table 1.1**

*Outline of research questions, type of analysis, groups and countries, main findings, and measures, per empirical chapter.*

| Ch. # | Research Questions | Samples | Main findings | Measures |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | To what extent does settler endorsement of autochthony relate to the willingness to make amends to Indigenous Peoples? What role to moral emotions play in mediating this relationship? | Australia: Anglo-Celtic Australians | I found that majority members who endorsed autochthony belief experienced more guilt (Study 1 and 2), moral shame (Study2) and image shame (Study 2). In turn, guilt and moral shame were related to more support for reparations and less topic avoidance, whereas image shame was related to more topic avoidance, thereby partially suppressing the negative association between autochthony belief and topic avoidance. | Principles: Autochthony |
| 3 | To what extent does Indigenous and settler endorsement of autochthony and investment beliefs relate to territorial ownership perceptions, and through those perceptions, to support for compensating the Indigenous group? | Chile: Mapuche (S2) & Non-Indigenous Chileans (S1 & S2) | I found that autochthony belief was related to a greater support for compensating the Mapuche, whereas investment belief was related to a lesser support for territorial compensation. For both groups, autochthony belief related to greater support for compensation via higher recognition of Indigenous territorial ownership. For non-Indigenous Chileans, investment belief related to less willingness to compensate, whereas for Mapuche it was related to more claims for compensation via higher perceived Indigenous territorial ownership. | Principles: Autochthony Investment<br>Ownership: Difference scale |
| 4 | How does settler endorsement of autochthony, investment, and formation belief relate to perceptions of ingroup (settler) and outgroup (Indigenous) territorial ownership? And to what extent does this relate to support for territorial compensation, through these ownership perceptions? | Australia: Anglo-Celtic Australians (S1)<br>South Africa: White South Africans (S2) | Endorsement of autochthony was related to stronger support for territorial compensation through higher perceived outgroup ownership, whereas investment was related to lower support through higher perceived ingroup ownership. Agreement with the formation principle was related to stronger support for compensation through higher outgroup ownership, and simultaneously to lower support through higher ingroup ownership. | Principles: Autochthony; Investment; Formation<br>Ownership: Ingroup & outgroup |
| 5 | To what extent can different subgroups of people be identified based on their support for ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership? To what extent are those different subgroups characterized by their support for autochthony and investment; and to what extent are they characterized by their support for ingroup and outgroup rights and responsibilities? To what extent do the subgroups meaningfully differ in their support for compensation, and in their support for stricter immigration policies? | New Zealand: New Zealand Europeans | Using latent profile analysis, I found four different subgroups of individuals based on their perceived ingroup (NZ European) and outgroup (Māori) ownership. Most people (75.9%) perceived shared territorial ownership, while the rest either predominantly recognized ingroup ownership (8.2%), outgroup ownership (6.4%), or no territorial ownership (9.4%). These subgroups differed in expected ways in their support for the principles of ownership, perceived rights and responsibilities, and compensation for Māori and strict immigration policies. | Principles: Autochthony; Investment<br>Ownership: Ingroup & outgroup |

the ingroups' wrongdoing (1) as a failure of the group's behavior ('we did something wrong'), (2) as a failure of the group's moral standing ('we are bad people'), and (3) as harmful to the image of the group in the eyes of others ('we are seen by others as bad people'). I expect that settler support for autochthony belief will be related to stronger experience of guilt, moral shame and also image shame. In studying the willingness to make amends I examine support for reparations while simultaneously considering the opposing desire to avoid the topic.

I found that Anglo-Celtic Australians who endorsed autochthony belief experienced more guilt (Study 1 and 2), moral shame (Study 2), and image shame (Study 2). In turn, guilt and moral shame were related to more support for reparations and less desire to avoid the topic, whereas image shame was related to a greater desire to avoid the topic, thereby partially suppressing the negative association between autochthony belief and topic avoidance. As expected, these results show for the first time that settler support for autochthony belief relates to more support for reparations.

#### 1.4.2 Chapter 3

Chapter 3 builds upon the previous one in three ways. First, as calls for territorial restitution or increased autonomy are central to the demands of many Indigenous Peoples (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999), I examine how perceptions of who is the rightful owner of the territory—settlers or Indigenous Peoples—matter for people's attitudes towards territorial compensation of the Indigenous group, in the context of Chile. In the previous chapter, I did not directly assess perceptions of Indigenous ownership, but I used autochthony belief to indirectly measure perceived Indigenous ownership based on first arrival. In this chapter I therefore directly measure ownership perceptions using a relative measure (non-Indigenous Chilean vs. Mapuche ownership).

Second, in addition to autochthony, I considered the role of support for investment belief. Autochthony belief has an exclusive character since, in most situations, there is only one true first comer, and thus one owner ('group A arrived before group B'). In contrast, investment belief does not have to be exclusive as multiple groups could have, throughout the history, invested in a territory. Due to these differences, I propose that autochthony and investment beliefs can differently inform ownership inferences in concrete territorial disputes.

Third, most of the research on territorial compensation focuses on the demands made by Indigenous Peoples and the response of the State (e.g., Yashar, 1999), and there is a lack of research into the perspectives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous group members, and in particular a comparison of these perspectives. I examine for both the indigenous Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chileans how their endorsement of autochthony and investment beliefs relate to their perceptions of who is the rightful owner of the territory of Araucanía (the Mapuche homelands), and via ownership perceptions, to support for territorially compensating the Indigenous groups.

As expected, I found that for both groups autochthony belief was related to greater support for territorial compensation via higher recognition of Indigenous territorial ownership. Interestingly, for non-Indigenous Chileans, investment belief was related to *less* willingness to compensate, whereas for Mapuche it was related to *more* claims for

compensation via stronger perceptions of Indigenous ownership. Together, these findings show that endorsement of autochthony belief is an argument that validates Indigenous ownership among both groups, whereas different dimensions of the investment belief can be used by both groups to claim more positive outcomes for their ingroup.

### 1.4.3 Chapter 4

In this chapter, I use samples of Anglo-Celtic Australians (Study 1) and White South Africans (Study 2) to expand upon the previous chapter in two ways. First, in Chapter 3 I assessed perceived ownership using a relative scale, which measured perceptions of non-Indigenous Chilean vs. Mapuche ownership. However, a relative measure of ownership is limited, e.g., it is not possible to assess whether people can perceive ingroup and outgroup ownership independently. Therefore, in order to better capture the complexity of people's perceptions of territorial ownership, I separately examine their perceptions of ingroup (settler) and outgroup (Indigenous) ownership.

Second, in addition to autochthony and investment belief, I also focus on the endorsement of formation belief. It is likely that settlers will believe that both the identity of their ingroup as well as the identity of the Indigenous outgroup are connected to the land. Consequently, I expect that stronger support for formation belief is related to more support for territorial compensation through higher outgroup ownership, and simultaneously to less support for territorial compensation through higher ingroup ownership.

Furthermore, although there are people in Australia (Yaxley, 2015) and in South Africa (AfriForum, 2019) who believe that Indigenous Australians and South Africans were not actually there first, these are not the dominant views. I therefore expect that settler support for autochthony belief is associated with more support for territorial compensation through perceiving higher outgroup ownership. Conversely, I expect that settler support for investment belief is associated with less support for territorial compensation through perceiving higher ingroup ownership.

The results showed that endorsement of autochthony was indeed related to stronger support for territorial compensation through higher perceived outgroup ownership, whereas investment was related to lower support through higher perceived ingroup ownership. Furthermore, as expected, agreement with the formation principle was related to stronger support for compensation through higher outgroup ownership, and simultaneously to lower support through higher ingroup ownership.

### 1.4.4 Chapter 5

The findings from chapter 4 showed that people can perceive both ingroup and outgroup ownership of a territory at the same time. In the previous chapters I used a variable-centered approach, which examines associations between variables for assessing the relative contributions of ingroup and outgroup ownership in explaining support for territorial compensation. However, a variable-centered approach cannot properly examine the different possible subjective constellations of ingroup and outgroup ownership beliefs, nor how these relate to support for territorial compensation. For example, while the previous chapter tells us that ingroup ownership relates to lower support for compensation, and outgroup ownership relates to higher support for

compensation, we do not know how perceiving both ingroup and outgroup ownership relates to support for compensation.

The first and primary aim of this chapter is therefore to examine in depth the different understandings of territorial collective ownership that people can have in settler societies, by taking a different methodological approach. In this chapter I use a person-centered approach to examine different ways in which ingroup (New Zealand European) and outgroup (Māori) territorial ownership beliefs can be subjectively combined. This approach allows for a more nuanced and qualitatively different understanding of the nature and implications of territorial ownership beliefs by identifying subgroups of individuals based on how different configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions are organized within individuals (see Osborne & Sibley, 2017). For example, while some settlers may feel like the country belongs only to their group, others may feel like it only belongs to the Indigenous group, others may feel shared ownership and yet others may feel like nobody owns the country.

Second, the principles of ownership imply different understandings of why groups are considered to own particular territories, and I therefore examine how the latent profiles relate to the two central principles of autochthony and investment belief. Furthermore, ownership implies a bundle of rights that one holds towards others (Merrill, 1998), as well as a feeling of responsibility for that which is owned (Pierce et al., 2003). I therefore examine whether different subgroups of individuals can be characterized by differences in the degree to which they perceive their ingroup and the outgroup to have determination rights and to hold responsibilities for the territory. Finally, I examine the implications of the different configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions for attitudes towards two social issues that are relevant in settler societies: support for compensation for Indigenous Peoples, and support for stricter immigration policies.

As expected, I found among New Zealand Europeans four different subgroups of individuals based on their perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership. Most people (75.9%) perceived shared territorial ownership, but there were also individuals who predominantly perceived ingroup ownership (8.2%), outgroup ownership (6.4%), or no territorial ownership (9.4%). Furthermore, these subgroups differed in expected ways in their support for principles of ownership, perceived rights and responsibilities, and compensation for Māori and stricter immigration policies.

## 1.5 Data sources and methodological approach

The empirical chapters of this book are based on cross-sectional surveys from six different data sources, and four different national contexts. With the exception of Study 1 in Chapter 2, and both studies in Chapter 3, all data were collected during the process of writing this dissertation. All data and syntax used for the analyses (for the published chapters) are publicly available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/wkqa6/). The complete data and codebooks are stored in the archive of the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER) of Utrecht University, and are available upon request. In Chapters 2 – 4, I used structural equation modelling and in

Chapter 5, I used latent profile analysis to examine the different ways in which ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership beliefs can be combined within individuals.

In Chapter 2, I used two datasets of Australian adults with at least one parent of Anglo-Celtic origin (English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish) and no Indigenous ancestry, to examine how endorsement of autochthony belief by settlers, via collective guilt, relates to their willingness to make amends to Indigenous Peoples. The data for Study 1 were collected online in March 2016 by an Australian research consultancy company (Taverner Research). In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between autochthony belief and support for reparations, for Study 2 I designed a new survey where I considered a wider array of outcomes and emotions. Specifically, in addition to collective guilt, I included measures tapping the emotions of collective moral shame and image shame. I designed the scales for collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame, based on previous research on these emotions (e.g., Allpress et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2008; Rees et al., 2013). The data for Study 2 were collected online in 2018 by Qualtrics, an international research consultancy company. Both datasets were national samples, although due to our constraint of only selecting Anglo-Celtic Australian participants, neither research agency was able to provide a representative sample.

In Chapter 3, I used data collected by my collaborators Karina Marambio (Study 1) and Ana Figueiredo (Study 2) among non-Indigenous Chilean and Mapuche participants in Chile. The data for Study 1 were collected in 2018, among Chilean students from three universities in Santiago and three in Temuco. These cities were chosen because the conflict over the ancestral Mapuche territory is likely more salient there than in other cities: Santiago is the city with the largest population of Mapuche and Mapuche descendants, and Temuco is the capital of Araucanía, the Mapuche ancestral territory. The data for Study 2 were collected in Santiago and Araucanía among non-Indigenous Chileans and Mapuche participants. The Mapuche participants were recruited through invitations made towards different Mapuche organizations, snowballing, and personal contact networks. It is much more difficult to collect data among Mapuche participants than among non-Indigenous participants for several reasons. Formal contact between researchers and Mapuche communities needs to be established, and research teams need to spend a significant amount of time in the communities in order to obtain the data. Furthermore, the study was part of a state funded research project, which decreased participation intention among Mapuche people, due to distrust of the Chilean state. For a detailed description of this issue, please see Figueiredo et al. (2020).

The data for Study 1 in Chapter 4 were part of the same dataset that I designed for Study 2 of Chapter 2. When designing this survey, I included questions on the principles of ownership and collective psychological ownership, which I intended to use in this empirical chapter. For this survey, I also designed a new scale to measure formation belief, based on the existing autochthony and investment scales. The aim of Study 2 in Chapter 4 was to replicate the results from Study 1 in a different national context (South Africa). The participants were recruited in 2020 by my collaborator Sibusiso Maseko among White students from the University of South Africa. The university's IT department sent invitation emails to White undergraduate and graduate students

registered for various degrees. Students who consented to taking part after reading the invitation email were redirected to the online survey.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I used data from a survey that I designed and collected for the purpose of this chapter. In order to examine what different perceptions of ownership imply, I designed new scales to measure perceived ingroup and outgroup rights and responsibilities. The data collection targeted a national sample of New Zealanders who were born in New Zealand, with at least one parent of European origin and no Indigenous ancestry. The data were collected online by Kantar, an international research consultancy agency. The sample mirrored the NZ European population rather well in terms of gender, age, education, and region of residence (see Appendix A5.1 for more information).

## 1.6 Main findings and insights

### 1.6.1 Who is seen as the owner?

The first aspect of ownership that I studied in this dissertation was the question of *whom* people perceive as the owners of a territory. Previous quantitative research on territorial ownership and relations between groups has primarily focused on perceptions of ingroup ownership (e.g., Brylka et al., 2015; Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020). In Chapter 3, I used a relative scale to show how perceived non-Indigenous Chilean vs. Mapuche territorial ownership related to support for territorial compensation, and I found that when people perceived relatively more Mapuche ownership, they were more supportive of territorial compensation. This finding shows that perceptions of territorial ownership matter in settler societies. In Chapter 4, among Anglo-Celtic Australians and White South Africans, I used Confirmatory Factor Analysis to show that perceived ingroup (settler) and outgroup (Indigenous Australian & Black South African) territorial ownership formed separate factors. This shows that people do make a distinction between perceiving ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, and that it is not simply a matter of perceiving a linear relationship where land either belongs to one group or to the other. I expanded upon this finding in Chapter 5, by using a person-centred approach to examine in more detail which configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership exist. This approach allowed me to examine the type and number of distinct ways in which perceptions of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership are organized within different subgroups of individuals. I identified four subgroups of individuals based on the combination of their perceptions of ingroup (NZ European) and outgroup (Māori) territorial ownership. These four subgroups can be clustered into two dichotomies. First, I identified two subgroups of people who primarily perceived ownership for one group: 'ingroup ownership' or 'outgroup ownership'. The other two subgroups perceived similar levels of territorial ownership for both groups: 'shared ownership' or 'no ownership' for either group. The results from this chapter showed for the first time that people need not just perceive ingroup and outgroup ownership independently, but that it is also possible to identify distinct groups of individuals based on the different ways that they combine perceived territorial ownership.

### 1.6.2 Why are they seen as the owner?

Regarding the second aspect of ownership, *why* is a certain group seen as the owner of a territory, I examined the relationships of autochthony, investment, and formation belief with perceived territorial ownership. The findings consistently show that when people endorse autochthony belief as a general principle, they also perceive more Indigenous territorial ownership in particular. In the second Study of Chapter 3, I showed that for both non-Indigenous Chileans and Mapuche, greater endorsement of autochthony belief was related to greater recognition of Mapuche territorial ownership relative to non-Indigenous Chileans. Furthermore, in Chapter 4 I showed that the endorsement of autochthony belief by settlers in Australia (Study 1) and in South Africa (Study 2) was related to greater recognition of Indigenous Australian and Black South African ownership. Finally, in Chapter 5 I found that the subgroup of people who primarily perceived Indigenous (Māori) ownership was characterized by relatively high support for autochthony belief, compared to the other subgroups. These findings are in line with previous experimental research which shows that children (Friedman et al., 2013; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015) and adults (Martinović et al., 2020) infer ownership from first possession and first occupancy.

As expected, the results largely support the expectation that the opposite is the case for the investment principle. In Chapter 4, I showed that, in Australia and South Africa, greater endorsement of investment belief in general was related to stronger perceived ingroup (settler) ownership and lower outgroup (Indigenous Australian/Black) ownership. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 I showed that the subgroup of people who primarily perceived settler ownership was characterized by high support for investment, compared to the other subgroups. However, in Chile, the findings were somewhat more equivocal. The results from Study 2 in Chapter 3 indicate that Mapuche perceived a clear difference between investing by administrating and investing by developing a territory. When Mapuche participants endorsed administrative investment more, they more strongly perceived Araucanía as belonging to non-Indigenous Chileans rather than Mapuche, while the reverse was true for Mapuche endorsement of development investment. Overall, these results support the expectation that for settlers, investment belief validates ingroup ownership. This is in line with previous experimental research which has found that already children perceive their own investment in an object to be a legitimate reason for transferring ownership from the first-possessor to themselves (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). At the same time, the results from Chapter 3 indicate that Indigenous Peoples may hold multiple different types of investment belief, and that these may differently relate to perceptions of territorial ownership.

Finally, in Chapter 4 I showed that for non-Indigenous people in Australia and South Africa, stronger endorsement of the formation principle in general relates to both higher perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership. These findings indicate that for settlers, formation belief validates both Indigenous and settler ownership. These findings are consistent with my expectation that the descendants of settlers will recognize that Indigenous Peoples' identities are strongly connected to the land, while at the same time feeling like the land has also profoundly shaped who they themselves

are as an ethnic group (Moran, 2002; Verwey & Quayle, 2012), and that they will therefore think that both groups own the land.

In summary, the results from all four empirical chapters show for the first time that the general ideological principles of autochthony, investment, and formation belief inform territorial ownership perceptions in settler societies. The findings indicate that for settlers, autochthony belief validates Indigenous ownership, investment belief validates settler ownership, and formation belief validates both Indigenous and settler ownership. For Indigenous Peoples, the results from Chapter 3 indicate that autochthony belief also validates Indigenous ownership, while investment belief may validate either settler or Indigenous ownership, depending on the type of investment.

**1.6.3 What are the implications of collective ownership?**

The third and final aspect of ownership that I examined is the question of *what* the implications are of the different territorial ownership perceptions. In all four chapters, these perceptions are associated with attitudes towards compensation. In Australia (Chapters 2 & 4), Chile (Chapter 3), and South Africa (Chapter 4), I found that settler majority's endorsement of autochthony as a general ideological belief plays a positive role in attitudes towards reparations for Indigenous Peoples. In each context, settler endorsement of autochthony belief was consistently related to greater support for compensating Indigenous Peoples, through either moral emotions (Chapter 2) or perceptions of territorial ownership (Chapter 4). Conversely, in Chile (Chapter 3), Australia and South Africa (Chapter 4), I found that settler endorsement of investment belief consistently related to lower support for compensation. Furthermore, in Australia and South Africa I found that perceptions of territorial ownership mediate the relationships between the principles and support for compensation, as expected. These findings indicate that people are in favor of compensation if they feel that the Indigenous group owns the land, and that they oppose compensation if they feel like the settler group owns the land.

The results from Chapter 5 shed further light on the relationship between territorial ownership perceptions and support for compensation. In line with the previous findings, people who primarily perceived Indigenous ownership were most supportive of territorial compensation, and those who primarily perceived settler ownership were most strongly opposed. However, interestingly, neither people who perceived shared ownership nor people who perceived that no-one owned the land were supportive of compensation. These findings indicate that perceiving Indigenous territorial ownership appears to only be associated with support for territorial compensation for people who do not also perceive settler territorial ownership.

Furthermore, ownership implies not only that one holds certain rights towards others but also that one has certain responsibilities (Merrill, 1998; Pierce et al., 2003). Consequently, I expected that perceiving a group as owner should be associated with believing that this group has both rights over and responsibilities to the territory in question. In Chapter 5, I found that the subgroup of individuals who perceived primarily ingroup ownership was indeed characterized by the highest perceived ingroup rights and relatively low perceived outgroup rights, while the reverse was true for the subgroup

of individuals that perceived primarily outgroup ownership. However, contrary to my expectations, there were no meaningful differences between the subgroups in the levels of perceived ingroup and outgroup responsibilities, when controlling for perceived rights. These findings may indicate that perceived group responsibilities are not closely tied to territorial ownership, at least not in the context of New Zealand. There may also be other important factors that affect people's perceptions of territorial responsibility, such as a general feeling of civic responsibility (Jelin, 2019).

## 1.7 Considerations for future research

I want to highlight six main directions for future research on territorial ownership perceptions and compensation, and reflect on some limitations of my empirical studies. First, throughout my dissertation, I have investigated autochthony, investment, and formation as general principles, independent of the intergroup context and the groups involved. The main reason for this is to prevent using one type of specific group beliefs to predict another type of specific group beliefs which would not provide a sufficiently 'deep' explanation. As general principles, people's endorsement of them should particularly guide territorial ownership inferences in relation to target groups who are seen as, respectively, having arrived first, having invested more, and being more connected to the territory. As I have argued, in settler societies it is reasonable to assume that settlers believe that the Indigenous People arrived first, that their own group has invested the most, and that both Indigenous and settlers have been shaped by the country. The empirical results support this assumption. However, it is possible that there are some people who, for example, do not believe that Indigenous Peoples arrived first, or who do not believe that settlers are the ones who have invested the most. For example, although the first arrival of the Indigenous Peoples in the contexts that I have studied is well established, this is sometimes also contested. In both Australia (Short, 2003) and South Africa (Boisen, 2017), part of the historical justification for colonization was that the land was either unoccupied or at most sparsely populated. Furthermore, actual evidence notwithstanding, there are people in Australia (Yaxley, 2015), Chile (Richards, 2010), New Zealand (Brett, 2020), and South Africa (AfriForum, 2019) who claim that Indigenous Peoples were either transient or that they themselves displaced the 'real Indigenous Peoples'. Furthermore, there are other contexts where the question of first arrival is more contested. For example, both Serbs and Albanians claim ownership of Kosovo by right of first occupancy, while simultaneously denying the other group's claim (Daskalovski, 2004). Therefore, I suggest that future research could not only consider the role of general principles for inferring and claiming, but also in relation to specific groups and the specific intergroup context. However, in doing so it is important to use a research design (e.g., experiments, longitudinal) in which one set of beliefs (e.g., about group ownership) is not part of a cluster of another set of beliefs (e.g., group rights) because otherwise the findings might become rather tautological.

Second, future research could examine the different ways that people claim ownership in more detail. For example, future research could consider different dimensions and interpretations of investment belief: investment through taking care

of the land (e.g., guardianship, or kaitiakitanga, see Kawharu, 2000), or investment through different ways of utilizing the land (e.g., utilitarian usage vs. social identity use of the land). Furthermore, there is research from a variety of contexts which shows that some non-Indigenous people are starting to lay claim to being 'native'. For example, New Zealand politician Trevor Mallard stated that 'Māori and Pākehā[5] are both indigenous to New Zealand now. I regard myself as an indigenous New Zealander' (Mikaere, 2004). It may be that such claims simply represent a particularly strong version of arguing for an intrinsic connection between the group identity and the land. However, future research could examine the possibility that when settlers feel like they are also indigenous, they also feel like it is not valid to claim ownership based on first-occupancy.

Third, in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, I investigated perceptions of territorial ownership in relation to the countries as a whole, because territorial ownership on the national level was the most relevant level for non-Indigenous participants. However, in most cases, Indigenous Peoples' ancestral territories do not overlap with the borders of modern nation states. Consequently, Indigenous Peoples generally claim ownership of specific territories rather than the country as a whole, and questions about regional ownership are therefore likely to be more meaningful to Indigenous participants. In Chile I therefore examined perceived ownership of the Mapuche ancestral lands, in present-day Araucanía. Furthermore, there are different ways of thinking about the ownership of land. For example, some Indigenous Peoples insist that land cannot be 'owned', while others claim that they have owned their land since 'time immemorial' (see Todd, 2008). It may therefore be the case that the concept of owning land will be less relevant for some groups of people. Therefore, in order to ensure that the questions and research are relevant to all participants, especially Indigenous participants, it is useful that future research focuses on a particular Indigenous group and region, and carefully considers the relevance and phrasing of questions on perceived collective ownership of territories. Furthermore, in doing so, it is very useful to collaborate with Indigenous Researchers, which can also be important for ethical reasons. Practically, Indigenous researchers can provide insights that non-Indigenous researchers simply are not able to provide, and ethically it is important for researchers to prevent perpetuating the exclusion of Indigenous people and knowledge from academic discourse (González et al., 2022).

Fourth, I have investigated perceptions of settler and Indigenous collective ownership in my dissertation. However, in recent years, there appear to be an increasing number of people who object to being labeled, e.g., 'Anglo-Celtic Australian' or 'European New Zealander'. Instead, they are reimagining their identity in line with a national category, e.g., 'New Zealander', 'Australian', or 'American' (Kukutai & Didham, 2012). Identification with such overarching identities is associated with opposition to compensation for Indigenous Peoples. After all, if 'we are all New Zealanders', then it follows that treating Indigenous and non-Indigenous people differently would amount to inequality based on race (Ruru, 2004). Future research may want to examine how identification with an overarching identity relates to territorial ownership perceptions. Furthermore, I

5 Pākehā is a Māori-language term generally used to refer to New Zealanders of European descent.

have examined a binary distinction between non-Indigenous and Indigenous groups, but it is important to note that there are also people who identify as both, and that non-Indigenous and Indigenous groups are not homogenous communities in which all people think alike (Figueiredo et al., 2020).

Fifth, I used correlational survey data in all four empirical chapters. Survey results can be affected by social desirability concerns, but given that the majority of our data was collected anonymously online, social desirability probably did not play a large role. The provision of complete anonymity in online surveys has been found to minimize social desirability pressures on self-report measures (e.g., Lautenschlager & Flaherty, 1990; Stark et al., 2019). However, the data collected among Mapuche participants is a notable exception, as the majority of Mapuche respondents completed the questionnaire in the presence of an interviewer. However, multiple steps were taken during the data collection to minimize these concerns, such as hiring two Mapuche research assistants to assist in the recruitment of participants and the collection of data (see Figueiredo et al., 2020). Furthermore, given the cross-sectional nature of the data, I cannot make causal claims about the direction of influence, and reverse mediation testing is not a useful strategy for determining causality either (Lemmer & Gollwitzer, 2017). However, my predictions on the directionality of the relationships between the principles of ownership and perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership were theoretically derived (Geschiere, 2009; Toft, 2014; Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017) and are supported by experimental research (e.g., Friedman & Neary, 2008; Levene et al., 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). Importantly, I examined how endorsement of general principles of ownership—which did not refer to the intergroup context in question—predicted specific group ownership perceptions. A reverse causal order where the perception that a certain group owns a territory predicts endorsement of the general principles of ownership seems less likely. It is also more likely that perceiving more Indigenous ownership drives support for compensating the Indigenous group rather than the other way around. Still, it is possible that there are mutual directions of influence. For example, people who strongly feel like the country belongs to their ingroup may more strongly endorse principles of ownership (e.g., investment) which justify their sense of collective ownership. Hence, longitudinal, and experimental research is needed to further establish the directions of influence. Experimental research could also help to rule out the influence of other variables.

Sixth, it is likely that the main findings are generalizable to other settler societies: The results presented here are based on four different national contexts, and in Chile we collected data among the Indigenous Mapuche, a difficult to reach population. Furthermore, as discussed, the overall pattern of results was similar across the four countries. However, there were also some notable descriptive differences. For example, support for territorial compensation was lower in South Africa than in New Zealand, and much lower than in Australia, whereas perceived outgroup ownership was higher in Australia compared to South Africa and New Zealand. These country differences might have substantial meanings, but they might also be due to the samples. Although the data in Australia and New Zealand are based on national samples, the data are not truly representative, and in South Africa and the first study in Chile the data are based on student samples. To be able to compare the opinions across the four contexts it would

be necessary to have representative national samples. Furthermore, simultaneously investigating ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions may not be meaningful in all contexts. For example, looking beyond the settler societies examined in this dissertation, in contexts with intractable territorial conflicts, such as Kosovo or Israel, people are most likely to perceive ingroup ownership, and very unlikely to recognize outgroup ownership (Storz et al., 2021). Finally, given that I only examined the perspective of one Indigenous group, it is especially important to be careful about generalizing those findings to other Indigenous groups. To summarize, there are three ways in which future research could use data collection to improve on my research: (1) Using representative samples would allow for a direct comparison and test of the average differences between contexts; (2) data from other contexts, both settler societies and otherwise, would allow for a further understanding of the generalizability of the main findings; (3) additional Indigenous samples have the potential to be particularly informative, especially when compared to a non-Indigenous sample from the same context.

## 1.8 Conclusion

In the four empirical chapters I have provided the first empirical evidence that the general principles of autochthony, formation, and investment can inform territorial ownership perceptions and, indirectly, support for territorial compensation in settler societies. The findings indicate that territorial ownership perceptions matter for intergroup relations and therefore may have implications for promoting intergroup justice and improving group relations in settler societies. The different principles that people use to infer and claim group ownership have different intergroup implications and can be put forward but also challenged in political and public debates. Furthermore, the research may have consequences for policies and strategies aimed at resolving territorial conflicts. In particular, the results indicate that strategies that further emphasize the first-occupancy or territorial investment of Indigenous Peoples are likely to broadly increase support for territorial compensation. Such strategies could include (increased) attention to Indigenous history in education, or the official constitutional recognition of Indigenous Peoples.

# Chapter 2.

## Autochthony and making amends to Indigenous Peoples: The role of collective moral emotions[6]

Intergroup relations in settler societies have been defined by historical conflict over territorial ownership between Indigenous Peoples and settler majorities. However, the Indigenous groups were there first, and first arrival is an important principle for assigning ownership to a group. In two studies among Australians of Anglo-Celtic origin (*N*=323 and *N*=475) we argued and found that the general belief in entitlements for first comers (i.e., autochthony) is related to more support for reparations in terms of apology and instrumental compensation for Aboriginal Australians, as well as to less topic avoidance. We further proposed that the group-based emotions of collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame account for these associations. We found that majority members who endorsed autochthony belief experienced more guilt (Study 1 and 2), moral shame (Study 2), and image shame (Study 2). In turn, guilt and moral shame were related to more support for reparations and less topic avoidance, whereas image shame was related to more topic avoidance, thereby partially suppressing the negative association between autochthony belief and topic avoidance. Our research points at the importance of considering autochthony belief and different types of moral emotions in research on past transgressions and current attempts to restore social justice for Indigenous Peoples.



6 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published as: Nooitgedagt, W., Martinović, B., Verkuyten, M., & Jetten, J. (2021). Autochthony and making amends to Indigenous Peoples: The mediating role of collective moral emotions. *Social Justice Research, 34*, 53-80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-021-00362-3. Wybren Nooitgedagt designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Borja Martinović, Maykel Verkuyten, and Jolanda Jetten were involved in the study design and theorizing, and critically reviewed the manuscript.

## 2.1 Introduction

In the same way that being the first one to possess an object is generally seen as a valid claim to ownership (Friedman et al., 2013), people tend to see the original occupants of a territory as owning the land because they were 'there first'. In the anthropological literature, this general belief in entitlements for first comers is called autochthony belief (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005) and first arrival is seen as an 'historical right' for claiming ownership of a territory (Gans, 2001). Deriving entitlements from first-arrival is often taken as self-evident and natural (Geschiere, 2009), and even children perceive first comers to own the land more than those who arrived later (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). Furthermore, experimental research has shown that people not only assign territorial ownership based on first arrival, they even transfer ownership to an outgroup (at the expense of the ingroup) when this outgroup is presented as the primo-occupant (Martinović et al., 2020).

Autochthony belief presents territorially established groups with the possibility of excluding groups that arrived later (Ceuppens, 2011; Garbutt, 2006). Anthropological research has shown that autochthony is used by the far-right party in the Flemish part of Belgium to exclude francophone Belgians (Ceuppens, 2011), as well as to exclude non-autochthonous others in Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). Furthermore, social psychological studies in Europe show that endorsement of autochthony belief among native majority members is associated with prejudice towards immigrants (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) as well as collective action against refugees (Hasbún López et al., 2019). However, previous research has not examined the role of autochthony belief in societies where the dominant group is not autochthonous, such as settler societies. These societies are formed by colonialism, where the original (Indigenous) inhabitants have often lost most of their lands to the settlers. Rather than being an ideology that justifies majority ownership, in such contexts, autochthony belief might instead undermine it because the settler majority cannot lay claims to primo-occupancy against Indigenous Peoples.

The main aim of the current research is to examine how endorsement of autochthony belief among a settler majority relates to the willingness to make amends to Indigenous Peoples. We studied this among the Anglo-Celtic majority in relation to Aboriginal Australians in Australia, and we considered the intermediate role of moral emotions. In studying the willingness to make amends we examine support for reparations while simultaneously considering the opposing desire to avoid the topic. Even though it is up to the government and leaders to make decisions about reparations, it is important to examine majority attitudes, as research has shown that public opinion can have a substantive impact on public policy (Burstein, 2016).

### 2.1.1 Autochthony belief and making amends to Indigenous Peoples

Indigenous peoples in settler societies often occupy marginalized positions and have in many cases lost most of their lands to the colonizers and their descendants. Appeals to autochthony ('we were here first') have frequently been utilized by these Indigenous groups as part of their struggles for rights and sovereignty (Gagné & Salaün, 2012), and against wrongful dispossession (Meisels, 2003). Though marginalized primo-occupant

peoples are called 'indigenous' rather than 'autochthonous', both terms refer to first comers (one being derived from Latin and the other from Greek) and the primary distinction is that 'autochthonous' is generally used to refer to primo-occupant peoples who are dominant in a given territory (Zenker, 2011). We define autochthony belief as the general ideological principle that the primo-occupants of any given territory are the ones who are most entitled to that land, irrespective of context or specific groups involved. As a general principle, autochthony belief can be used to attribute ownership to first-comers across a range of contexts, including Aboriginal Australians in Australia.

The British at the time justified the colonization of Australia and the claiming of territory by arguing that Australia was *terra nullius* ('no one's land'), and therefore not owned by Indigenous Australians (Banner, 2005). The impact of Indigenous Australians' autochthony claims on current Australian society is illustrated by the repeal of the doctrine of *terra nullius* in 1992 (Banner, 2005). This repeal is part of a larger reconciliation process in Australia and represented an important change in the Australian ownership conflict between Indigenous Peoples and the settler majority. The repeal officially acknowledged that the land was not empty when the settlers arrived, that the taking of Aboriginal lands was illegitimate, and that Indigenous Peoples should have certain entitlements as Australia's first occupants (Attwood, 2005). The official repeal also resulted in the acknowledgement of 'native title', the recognition that Indigenous Australians can make claims to territory based on their primo-occupancy. Since then there have been over 40.000 Indigenous land claims just in the state of New South Wales in Australia (Brown, 2016).

The conflict over territory has shaped the relationships between Indigenous Peoples and majority populations in settler societies (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005), and processes of reparation have been a main feature of attempts to improve relations between the settler majority and Indigenous Australians. Reparations can take a symbolic (e.g., institutional apologies) and instrumental form (e.g., financial compensation). Apologies aim to restore justice by condemning past harms, while compensation aims to restore justice by repairing those harms. Apologies are a way for perpetrator groups to take responsibility for events in the past and to express remorse for those events (Doosje et al., 2006), and can help improve intergroup relations and promote intergroup forgiveness (Auerbach, 2004). Official government apologies may or may not include offers of (financial) compensation (Blatz et al., 2009), and research suggests that reparations are most effective at improving intergroup relations and promoting reconciliation when they combine apologies and compensation (Okimoto & Tyler, 2016; Philpot et al., 2013).

However, while some research has found that majority people in settler societies tend to be supportive of compensation (Gomersall et al., 2000; Halloran, 2007) and institutional apologies (McGarty et al., 2005), these remain controversial issues (Moses, 2011; Pettigrove, 2003). Consequently, people may also react defensively to reminders of ingroup wrongdoing (Peetz et al., 2010), and wish to avoid the topic altogether (Gausel et al., 2012), which could be detrimental for processes of reconciliation. Therefore, in this chapter we examine the desire to avoid the topic in addition to support for both symbolic and instrumental reparations. Just as the repeal of *terra nullius* forced the Australian government to address reparations, we expect that White majority's

endorsement of autochthony belief will be related to more support for institutional apologies and instrumental compensation, and to less desire to avoid talking about the past transgressions. We argue that moral emotions play a role in these relationships, as we discuss below.

#### 2.1.2 The role of moral emotions

To the extent that settler majority members believe that primo-occupancy is a relevant basis for claiming ownership, they might perceive the appropriation of Indigenous lands as having been illegitimate and in conflict with the moral values of their ingroup. That is, the appropriation of Aboriginal lands by British colonizers can be construed as a wrongdoing committed by the ingroup. According to social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), group memberships and their associated category attributes can become internalized into an individual's self-concept, and intergroup emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2000) proposes that emotions can derive from self-categorization as a member of a social group. Therefore, the actions of other ingroup members, including one's ancestors, can have affective implications for that individual and generate feelings of 'vicarious' remorse or regret (Lickel et al., 2005) as well as shame and guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). Thus, wrongdoings committed by the ingroup may evoke collective emotional responses regardless of one's personal involvement in these events (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), because the self can be linked to the wrongdoings through a shared group identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this chapter we consider guilt, moral shame, and image shame, which respectively derive from viewing the ingroups' wrongdoing (1) as a failure of the group's *behavior* ('we did something wrong'), (2) as a failure of the group's *moral standing* ('we are bad people'), and (3) as harmful to the *image* of the group in the eyes of others ('we are seen by others as bad people'). We expect that settler majority support for autochthony belief will be related to stronger experience of guilt, moral shame and also image shame.

Self-conscious moral emotions originating from a (real or perceived) wrongdoing by the ingroup are aversive (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Tangney et al., 2007), and therefore motivate behavior aimed at reducing these feelings through seeking out positive affect and avoiding negative affect (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). In other words, moral emotions could motivate support for institutional apologies and instrumental compensation (Gomersall et al., 2000; Halloran, 2007; McGarty et al., 2005), as well as the desire to avoid the topic (Gausel et al., 2012), but this will depend on the type of emotion, as we argue below.

First, the appraisal that one's group is responsible for the wrongdoings committed against another group can elicit feelings of collective guilt (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2007). Because feeling guilty originates from feeling responsible for specific acts and how this has affected the victims (Baumeister et al., 1994; Iyer et al., 2004), guilt motivates seeking forgiveness, taking responsibility, and compensating for the specific wrongdoing. At the same time, guilt is considered an approach oriented emotion (Schmader & Lickel, 2006), and avoiding the topic should not directly help reduce feelings of guilt (but note that research on this is still limited). Instead, apologies allow perpetrator groups to take responsibility, express feelings of guilt, and seek forgiveness for the wrongdoing (Iyer et

al., 2004), and offering compensation allows perpetrator groups to attempt to repair the damage caused (Doosje et al., 2006). Research has indeed found that guilt is associated with increased support for institutional apologies (Haidt, 2003; Schmader & Lickel, 2006) and compensation (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Halloran, 2007; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). We therefore expect that collective guilt will be associated with greater support for offering apologies and instrumental compensation, as well as a lower desire to avoid the topic.

Second, people have a need to see their group as moral (Leach et al., 2007), and immoral behavior by the ingroup, past or present, undermines this self-image (Branscombe et al., 1999), which can lead to feelings of collective moral shame (Allpress et al., 2014). Consequently, moral shame should motivate behavior that helps restore the self-perceived morality of the group. This includes offering apologies whereby one expresses their respect for morality (Barlow et al., 2015), but also acts of instrumental compensation that are consistent with the group's moral values (Ding et al., 2016; Jordan et al., 2011). However, we also expect that moral shame would discourage topic avoidance, because self-perceived morality can only be restored by acting more moral in the present, and avoiding the topic is not moral behavior. In previous research moral shame has indeed been shown to be associated with a greater willingness to compensate and apologize, as well as a lower desire for self-defensive behavior (Allpress et al., 2014; Gausel et al., 2012; Silfver-Kuhalampi et al., 2015). We therefore expect that moral shame will be associated with greater support for offering apologies and compensation, and a lower desire to avoid the topic.

Third, the real or imagined public exposure of the wrongdoing and the perception that one is (or will be) judged by others for the wrongdoing can be experienced as a threat to the image of the group (Gausel & Leach, 2011), which can lead to feelings of collective image shame (Allpress et al., 2014). Image shame is therefore associated with behavior aimed at reducing the perception that one's group is judged by others. Offering institutional apologies and instrumental compensation, all of which are public acts, could therefore help perpetrator groups restore their damaged social-image (Benoit & Drew, 1997; Brown et al., 2008). However, research suggests that these may not be the most likely consequences of experiencing image shame. In many cases the restoration of the (perceived) social image in the eyes of others is most easily and least costly achieved through self-defensive behavior in the hopes that the issue will simply be forgotten (Allpress et al., 2014; Lickel et al., 2005; Rees et al., 2013). We therefore expect that image shame will be associated with more support for apologies and reparations, but at the same time we expect it to be particularly associated with a greater desire to avoid the topic.

Bringing together the reasoning on autochthony, moral emotions, and reparations, we expect that the positive associations between autochthony and apology and instrumental compensation will be accounted for primarily by guilt and moral shame, and to a lesser degree by image shame. Furthermore, we expect the negative association between autochthony and topic avoidance to be accounted for by guilt and moral shame, while being suppressed by image shame. We tested our propositions in two studies using samples of Australians of Anglo-Celtic (English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh) descent. In Study

1 we only considered the associations between autochthony, guilt, and instrumental compensation, whereas in Study 2 we also examined moral and image shame, as well as apologies and topic avoidance. The data and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/efqxk/.

## 2.2 Study 1

Our main aim in Study 1 was to establish the relationship between endorsement of autochthony as a general ideological belief and support for reparations for Aboriginal Australians. In particular, we examined support for instrumental compensation, and we focused on the intermediate role of collective guilt, as this is the most likely moral emotion with regards to support for reparations (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Halloran, 2007).

### 2.2.1 Method

***Data and participants***

Participants for Study 1 ($N$ = 326) were recruited in Australia from a nationally representative sample in terms of age, gender, and socio-economic status. The participants were recruited in March 2016 through an Australian research consultancy company (Taverner Research) that maintains a panel of people who can be approached for a survey. The target group was adults with at least one parent of Anglo-Celtic origin (English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish)—295 participants (90%) had two parents of Anglo-Celtic origin[7]. Of the participants with one Anglo-Celtic origin parent, the second parent had other European roots (e.g., Italian). Due to concerns about the potential sample size in the panel, foreign born Australians of Anglo-Celtic descent were also approached, and 106 of the participants (32.5%) were not born in Australia. We excluded four participants who happened to be younger than 18, and one participant aged 112[8], for a final sample size of 322. After excluding those participants, the mean age was 46.7 ($SD$ = 18.3), the youngest participant was 18, and the oldest was 89, and 52% of participants were female.

***Measures***

Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were measured using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = 'completely disagree' to 7 = 'completely agree', so that higher scores on the items indicated stronger support.

We used five items to assess the degree to which participants in general endorsed *autochthony belief*, based on Martinović and Verkuyten (2013). The items were: 'The earliest inhabitants of a country are more entitled than newcomers to decide about important national matters'; 'Every country belongs primarily to its first inhabitants'; 'The earliest inhabitants of a country should have the most right to define the rules of the game'; 'The ones who arrived first in a country can be considered more rightful owners

7 There was only one participant with a parent of non-European origin (Indian). We kept this person in the analytic sample.

8 As of January 2015, only one verified supercentenarian lived in Australia, but she died in December 2015 (Gerontology Research Group, 2015).

of the country than those who arrived later'; and '"We were here first" is an important principle for determining who decides on what happens in a country'.

We measured *collective guilt* with two items (Branscombe et al., 2004; Doosje et al., 1998), with higher values denoting greater feelings of collective guilt about the appropriation of Aboriginal peoples' land. The items used were: 'I feel bad when I think about how Anglo-Celtic conquerors dealt with the Aboriginal people and the land that was at that time rightfully theirs'; and 'I feel guilty when I reflect on the harm inflicted on Aboriginal people by Anglo-Celtic conquerors'. These items were part of a larger set of questions on moral emotions (6 in total), and for theoretical reasons we excluded those that did not directly measure collective guilt. Two tapped appraisals about the act, namely that one's group is responsible for the wrongdoing (Iyer et al., 2007), 'Due to my Anglo-Celtic descent I somehow feel accountable for the violent ways in which my ancestors confiscated the Aboriginal people's land', and the appraisal that the act was illegitimate 'The land that was taken away from Aboriginals by my ancestors was often rightfully conquered (reversed)'. The other two items tapped shame and regret: 'I am ashamed of the fact that my ancestors forcibly removed Aboriginal children (the so-called Stolen Generations) from their families, their communities, and the land on which they were born'; 'I regret the fact that my Anglo-Celtic ancestors deprived Aboriginals of their land rights'. The main results were, however, not substantively different when using the full 6-item factor (see Table A2.1, Appendix A2).

Support for *instrumental compensation* was measured with 6 items based on Swim and Miller (1999): 'I believe that the damage caused to Aboriginals by my ethnic group should be repaired'; 'Aboriginals should receive entitlements such as affirmative action and other forms of compensation for the past injustices committed by Anglo-Celtic immigrants in Australia'; 'A certain quota of Aboriginal students, even if not all are qualified, should be admitted to universities'; 'I am against policies such as affirmative action that give preference to Aboriginal people (reversed)'; 'Aboriginal culture should not receive any form of protection (reversed)'; and 'Aboriginal people's spiritual interest regarding land use should always matter more than any industrial or commercial interests advocated by Australian businesses, regardless of how lucrative these may be for the Australian economy'.

We controlled for four standard demographic characteristics: *gender* (0 = 'male', 1 = 'female'), *age* (in years), *educational level* ('year 10 or less'; 'year 12'; 'certificate or diploma'; 'bachelor level'; 'postgraduate level'), and the often used *political self-placement* scale *(ranging from 1 = 'strongly left' to 5 strongly right', see Jost, 2006)*; which have been linked to support for reparations (González et al., 2011) as well as to collective guilt in Australia (McGarty et al., 2005). We anticipated that participants who were not born in Australia, or who have only one Anglo-Celtic parent, might experience less collective guilt, and may also differ in their support for compensation. We therefore controlled for the effects of *country of birth* (0 = 'born abroad', 1 = 'born in Australia') and *parent's ethnicity* (0 = 'one Anglo-Celtic parent', 1 = 'both parents Anglo-Celtic') on collective guilt and support for instrumental compensation. We additionally controlled for the association between feelings towards Aboriginal Australians and support for instrumental compensation, so that we could differentiate between behaving positively towards an outgroup because

one evaluates them positively, and doing so because of a moral imperative (Lalljee et al., 2009). The variable *feelings towards Aboriginals* was assessed with a so-called 'feeling thermometer', which are commonly used in research on intergroup relations (e.g., Haddock et al., 1993; Ward & Masgoret, 2008), including research on attitudes towards Aboriginal Australians and other minorities in Australia (Islam & Jahjah, 2001). Participants were asked to indicate how warm their feelings were towards Aboriginal Australians on an 11-point scale (ranging from 0° to 100°) and were instructed that scores of 50° indicate neutral feelings.

### 2.2.2 Results

***Measurement model***

We performed a confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus (version 8) to test whether the latent factors *autochthony belief*, *collective guilt*, and *instrumental compensation* were empirically distinct constructs. This initial model showed that the two reverse coded items from the compensation factor loaded poorly and had low explained variance ('I am against policies such as affirmative action…' $R^2$ = .16; 'Aboriginal culture should not receive any form of protection' $R^2$ = .11), whereas all other items had an $R^2$ > .45. Excluding these two items resulted in an acceptable model fit ($\chi^2(41, N = 323) = 117.17$, $p <$ .001, RMSEA = .076 [90 % CI .060, .092], CFI = .951, TLI .934, SRMR = .036). We estimated several alternative models to verify that the factors represented distinct constructs. Because we used the MLR estimator in Mplus, the models are compared using the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference test. All alternative factor specifications yielded a worse fit (see Table A2.2), which indicates that the proposed model provides the best representation of the data.

***Descriptive results***

Bivariate correlations, means/proportions, standard deviations are presented in Table 2.1, and so are composite scale reliabilities (ρ, see Raykov, 2016), which are superior to the more commonly reported Cronbach's alpha that does not account for measurement error. All correlations between the main variables were significant and in the expected directions. The mean scores show that, on average, support for instrumental compensation (Wald (1) = 8.22, $p$ = .0041), and collective guilt (Wald (1) = 38.76, $p <$ .001) were significantly higher than the neutral mid-point of the scales, while autochthony belief did not significantly differ from the neutral mid-point (Wald (1) = 3.760, $p$ = .0525).

***Support for instrumental compensation***

We estimated a structural equation model with latent constructs in which we regressed instrumental compensation on collective guilt and autochthony belief, and we additionally regressed collective guilt on autochthony. We controlled for gender, age, educational level, political orientation, parents' ethnicity, whether participants were born in Australia, and feelings towards Aboriginal Australians, as manifest variables, both in relation to guilt and instrumental reparations. Missing values were accounted for using Full Information Maximum Likelihood. We tested indirect effects by means of the significance of all individual coefficients (also known as the joint-significance test), as well as bootstrapping procedures with 10,000 samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008;

**Table 2.1**

*Correlations, means/proportions, standard deviations and scale reliabilities of the main constructs, Study 1 (N=323)*

| | 1. | 2. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | | *Range* | *M/p* | *SD* | ρ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. *Autochthony belief* | — | | | | | | | | | 1 — 7 | 3.86 | 1.49 | .94 |
| 2. *Collective guilt* | .59*** | — | | | | | | | | 1 — 7 | 4.58 | 1.66 | .78 |
| 3. *Instrumental compensation* | .62*** | .80*** | — | | | | | | | 1 — 7 | 4.24 | 1.73 | .87 |
| 4. Gender (0 = male) | .16** | .22*** | .15* | — | | | | | | 0 — 1 | .48 | — | — |
| 5. Age (in years) | -.22*** | -.09 | -.06 | .08 | — | | | | | 18 — 89 | 46.44 | 18.30 | — |
| 6. Educational attainment | -.02 | .06 | .06 | -.02 | -.10† | — | | | | 1 — 5 | 3.11 | 1.13 | — |
| 7. Political orientation | -.19** | -.29*** | -.25*** | -.06 | .14* | -.13* | — | | | 1 — 5 | 2.91 | 0.91 | — |
| 8. Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | .01 | .01 | .00 | .00 | -.29*** | .14* | .02 | — | | 0 — 1 | 0.68 | — | — |
| 9. Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | -.16** | -.07 | -.06 | .03 | .04 | .01 | .06 | -.02 | — | 0 — 1 | 0.90 | — | — |
| 10. Feelings towards Aboriginal Australians | .29*** | .31*** | .37*** | .22*** | .09† | .02 | -.01 | .05 | .05 | 0 — 10 | 7.24 | 2.74 | — |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Latent variable names are italicized. Indicated means for dichotomous variables are the proportions.

**Figure 2.1**
*Structural equation model Study 1 (N=323) with standardized coefficients, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, political orientation, parents' ethnicity, and whether participants were born in Australia.*




*Note:* Control variables omitted from the figure. The total relationship between autochthony and compensation is displayed between square brackets. ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Table 2.2**

*Structural Equation Model predicting support for instrumental compensation by autochthony belief, mediated by collective guilt, Study 1 (*N *=323).*

| | Collective guilt | | Support for instrumental compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .66*** | (.08) | .25** | (.09) |
| Collective guilt | | | .64*** | (.09) |
| *Indirect relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → collective guilt → | | | .42*** | (.08) |
| *Total relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .67*** | (.07) |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .53*** | (.08) | .27** | (.09) |
| Collective guilt | | | .62*** | (.09) |
| *Indirect relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → collective guilt → | | | .33*** | (.07) |
| *Total relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .60*** | (.07) |
| *Control variables* | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | .30† | (.16) | -.17 | (.13) |
| Age (in years) | .00 | (.01) | .01 | (.00) |
| Educational level | .04 | (.07) | .05 | (.06) |
| Left-right orientation | -.27* | (.11) | -.07 | (.08) |
| Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | -.05 | (.18) | .01 | (.14) |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = 1 parent) | -.08 | (.23) | .11 | (.19) |
| Feelings towards Aboriginal Australians | .14*** | (.04) | .03 | (.03) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

Yzerbyt et al., 2018). Significance of both coefficients, and a 95% confidence interval (CI) which does not include 0, indicate a significant indirect effect.

The structural equation model had an acceptable fit ($\chi^2(112, N = 323) = 271.98$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .067 [90 % CI .057, .077], CFI = .922, TLI = .908, SRMR = .058)[9]. Figure 2.1 shows the standardized coefficients for the model, including control variables, and Table 2.2 shows the unstandardized coefficients and indirect relationships. In addition, in Table 2.2 we also show the results of the model without the control variables, as a robustness check.

9 Using pwrSEM (Wang, 2021), we performed a power analysis to determine the power of our model to detect small effect sizes (0.3) for each path coefficient. We utilized the observed factor loadings, residual (co)variances, and total variance, and performed 1000 simulations using the real sample size ($N$ = 323). Based on this analysis we had 99% power to detect small effects, which is above the commonly accepted threshold of 80%.

As expected, the total association between autochthony belief and support for instrumental compensation was significant and positive: participants who more strongly endorsed autochthony belief also tended to support instrumental compensation more strongly. Furthermore, stronger support for autochthony belief was significantly related to higher levels of collective guilt, which was in turn related to more support for instrumental compensation.

Autochthony belief was thus indirectly related to more support for instrumental compensation through collective guilt, and this indirect association was significant, unstandardized 95% CI [.21, .52]. Finally, there was a remaining positive direct association between endorsement of autochthony belief and support for instrumental compensation. Table 2 also shows that the findings were relatively unaffected by the control variables, as the main relationships are very similar in a model without control variables.

#### 2.2.3 Discussion

We provided evidence for the predicted positive relationship between settler endorsement of autochthony as a general ideological belief and support for instrumental compensation for the Indigenous group. Specifically, stronger support for autochthony belief by Anglo-Celtic Australians was related to greater support for instrumental compensation of Aboriginal Australians, and this relationship was accounted for by collective guilt. These relationships were robust while controlling for gender, age, educational level, political orientation, and feelings towards Aboriginal Australians.

## 2.3 Study 2

In Study 2 we considered a wider array of outcomes and emotions, which allowed us to examine whether autochthony belief is overall related not only to stronger support for instrumental reparations for Aboriginal Australians, but also to support for institutional apologies and a lower willingness to avoid the topic of land appropriation. At the same time, we tested whether autochthony belief is also related to higher topic avoidance through image shame, to gain a better understanding of the overall relevance of autochthony belief for support for reparations. Therefore, in addition to collective guilt, we included measures tapping the emotions of collective moral shame and image shame. Furthermore, we adjusted our measurement of collective guilt to focus explicitly on collective guilt about land appropriation and to differentiate it clearly from the other moral emotions. Both the broader investigation of reparations as well as the differentiation between three different moral emotions allow for the development of a more fine-grained picture of the relationship between autochthony belief and support for reparations.

#### 2.3.1 Method

***Data and participants***

Participants for Study 2 were recruited in 2018 through an international research consultancy company (Qualtrics), which used panel aggregation of 45 Australian panels. The target group was again people with at least one parent of Anglo-Celtic origin (English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish). Twenty participants indicated that they had

some Indigenous ancestry, and were therefore removed from the sample, which left a remaining sample of 475. Approximately two-thirds of the participants (65.2%) had two parents with Anglo-Celtic ancestry. Of those with one Anglo-Celtic origin parent, the second parent had other European roots in the majority of cases[10]. As in Study 1, foreign born Australians of Anglo-Celtic descent were also approached, due to concerns about the potential sample size in the panel. Approximately half (49.7%) of the participants were women, and ages ranged from 18 to 85 ($M$ = 41.32, $SD$ = 16.03). Seventy-three participants (15.3%) were not born in Australia. We controlled for country of birth and parent's ethnicity to determine whether this affected the results.

***Measures***

All variables were measured using seven-point scales ranging from 1 = 'completely disagree' to 7 = 'completely agree' unless otherwise stated, with higher values indicating stronger support. Each of the latent variables were measured using 3 items, unless otherwise specified.

The three items for *autochthony belief* were based on those used in Study 1: 'Every territory belongs primarily to its first inhabitants'; 'Those who arrived first in a territory are its owners'; and '"We were here first" is a good argument for determining who owns the territory'.

The items for *collective guilt* were: 'I feel guilty that my Anglo-Celtic Ancestors deprived Aboriginals of their land rights'; 'Due to my Anglo-Celtic descent I somehow feel guilty that my ancestors confiscated Aboriginal peoples' land'; and 'I feel guilty when I think about how Anglo-Celtic settlers dealt with Aboriginal peoples and the land that was theirs'.

Next, we measured two types of shame with items adapted from previous research on these emotions (e.g., Allpress et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2008; Rees et al., 2013). *Collective moral shame* was measured with the following items: 'Our treatment of Aboriginal peoples' land rights makes me doubt the moral character of Anglo-Celtic Australians'; 'Anglo-Celtic Australians' appropriation of Aboriginal peoples' land makes me less proud of what it means to be Australian'; and 'I feel ashamed about being Anglo-Celtic Australian because of the way in which my Anglo-Celtic Ancestors deprived Aboriginals of their land rights'. *Collective image shame* was captured with the items: 'It bothers me that other nations might think of Anglo-Celtic Australians negatively because of the way Anglo-Celtic conquerors dealt with Aboriginal peoples' and the land that was theirs'; 'I am concerned that the confiscation of Aboriginal lands by Anglo-Celtic Australians might create a bad image of Anglo-Celtic Australians in the eyes of the world'; and 'I worry about the negative image that the international community might have of Anglo-Celtic Australians because my Anglo-Celtic ancestors deprived Aboriginals of their land rights'.

We measured three constructs relating to support for reparations as latent factors. *Support for institutional apologies* was measured with the following three items adapted from Allpress et al. (2010) and McGarty et al. (2005): 'I believe the government of Australia was right to apologize to the Indigenous Australians for the past harmful

10 Of those with non-European roots, 22 had Asian heritage, 6 African, 4 South American, and 8 had other ancestry.

actions committed by Anglo-Celtic Australians'; 'I think that the Australian government should apologize for the appropriation of Indigenous Australians' lands in the past'; and 'We should recognize more explicitly the appropriation of Indigenous Australians' lands on National Sorry Day'. Support for *instrumental compensation* was measured with questions adapted from Swim and Miller (1999): 'A certain quota of Indigenous Australian students should be admitted to higher education'; 'In case of equal skills and qualifications, companies should give preference to Indigenous Australian applicants'; and 'Indigenous Australians should receive entitlements, such as affirmative action and other forms of financial compensation'. *Topic avoidance* was measured with the following items adapted from Gausel et al. (2012): 'I think we have talked enough about land appropriation in this country'; 'When we talk about the relations between Indigenous Australians and Anglo-Celtic Australians we should not focus on the past so much'; and 'It would be better to put this negative past behind us'.

We controlled for the same variables as in Study 1 (*gender*, *age*, *educational attainment*, *political self-placement*, *born in Australia*, *parents' ethnicity*, and *feelings towards Aboriginal Australians*), and measured them in the same way in Study 2.

### 2.3.2 Results

***Measurement model***

We performed a confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus (version 8) to test that the latent factors autochthony belief, collective guilt, moral shame, image shame, support for institutional apologies, instrumental compensation, and topic avoidance were distinct constructs. This 7-factor model fit the data well ($\chi^2(168, N = 475) = 302.74$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .041 [90% CI .033, .048], CFI = .976, TLI = .970, SRMR = .036). Though the moral emotions collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame were strongly positively correlated, multicollinearity was not a concern (guilt VIF 3.56; moral shame VIF 3.73; image shame VIF 2.12), and they each formed highly reliable scales (respectively, $\rho = .92$; .91; .91). We estimated several alternative models where we combined any two factors in order to verify that they were distinct constructs, as well as a model where the three moral emotions were forced to load as a single factor (see Table A2.2 in Appendix A2). The alternative models all fit worse, which supports our assertion that the constructs are empirically distinct (see Table A2.2).

***Descriptive results***

The bivariate correlations are presented in Table 2.3, and means/proportions, standard deviations and composite reliability are presented in Table 2.4. All bivariate correlations between the main variables of interest were significant and in the expected directions. Compared to the neutral mid-point of their respective scales, support for autochthony belief was high (Wald (1) = 189.21, $p < .001$). On average, participants were supportive of institutional apologies (Wald (1) = 208.844, $p < .001$) and compensation (Wald (1) = 66.352, $p < .001$), but support for avoiding the topic was also relatively high (Wald (1) = 342.206, $p < .001$). Finally, participants on average experienced some collective guilt (Wald (1) = 107.314, $p < .001$), moral shame (Wald (1) = 14.426, $p < .001$) and image shame (Wald (1) = 48.457, $p < .001$).

**Table 2.3**

*Bivariate correlations between variables used in the analysis for Study 2 (*N*=475).*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | 07. | 08. | 09. | 10. | 11. | 12. | 13. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. *Autochthony belief* | — | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. *Collective guilt* | .50*** | — | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 03. *Collective moral shame* | .55*** | .84*** | — | | | | | | | | | | |
| 04. *Collective image shame* | .41*** | .69*** | .70*** | — | | | | | | | | | |
| 05. *Support for public apology* | .48*** | .77*** | .74*** | .57*** | — | | | | | | | | |
| 06. *Instrumental compensation* | .58*** | .72*** | .80*** | .59*** | .17** | — | | | | | | | |
| 07. *Topic avoidance* | -.16* | -.40*** | -.45*** | -.19** | -.15** | -.48*** | — | | | | | | |
| 08. Gender (0 = male) | -.01 | -.19*** | -.11* | -.15** | -.10* | -.13** | -.04 | — | | | | | |
| 09. Age (in years) | -.01 | -.16*** | -.24*** | -.20*** | .02 | -.20*** | -.14** | .19*** | — | | | | |
| 10. Political left-right orientation | -.05 | -.13** | -.15** | -.04 | -.11* | -.20*** | -.18*** | .35*** | -.07 | — | | | |
| 11. Educational attainment | .05 | .09† | .16** | .07 | .02 | .10* | .16** | -.07 | .12** | -.12* | — | | |
| 12. Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | -.01 | -.04 | -.04 | .00 | -.09* | -.01 | -.03 | -.03 | .00 | -.15** | .03 | — | |
| 13. Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | .00 | -.02 | -.05 | -.08† | .04 | -.03 | -.05 | .01 | .00 | .18*** | -.06 | .14** | — |
| 14. Feelings towards Aboriginal Australians | .11† | .25*** | .14*** | .14** | .31*** | .17** | -.15** | -.10* | .02 | -.11* | .02 | -.09* | .04 |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Latent variable names are italicized.

**Table 2.4**

*Correlations, means/proportions, standard deviations, and composite reliabilities of the variables used in the analysis for Study 2 (*N*=475).*

| | Range | *M* | *SD* | *N* | ρ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Autochthony belief* | 1 — 7 | 4.36 | (1.34) | 475 | .80 |
| *Collective guilt* | 1 — 7 | 4.40 | (1.81) | 475 | .92 |
| *Collective moral shame* | 1 — 7 | 3.84 | (1.73) | 475 | .91 |
| *Collective image shame* | 1 — 7 | 4.03 | (1.63) | 475 | .91 |
| *Support for public apology* | 1 — 7 | 4.71 | (1.77) | 475 | .93 |
| *Instrumental compensation* | 1 — 7 | 4.14 | (1.65) | 475 | .88 |
| Topic avoidance | 1 — 7 | 4.82 | (1.62) | 475 | .90 |
| Gender (0 = male) | 0 / 1 | .49 | — | 475 | |
| Age (in years) | 18 — 85 | 40.90 | (16.03) | 474 | |
| Political left-right orientation | 1 — 6 | 3.57 | (1.57) | 390 | |
| Educational attainment | 1 — 5 | 3.26 | (1.13) | 465 | |
| Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | 0 / 1 | .62 | — | 475 | |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | 0 / 1 | .65 | — | 475 | |
| Feelings towards Aboriginal Australians | 0 — 10 | 6.98 | (2.64) | 473 | |

*Note.* Latent variable names are italicized. Indicated means for dichotomous variables are the proportions.

***Attitudes towards reparations***

We first ran a structural equation model with latent variables examining to what extent autochthony belief was associated with support for instrumental compensation by autochthony, through collective guilt, to see if we could replicate the results from Study 1. We controlled for the same manifest variables as in Study 1 in relation to guilt and instrumental compensation. The model fit was good ($\chi^2(79, N = 475) = 179.67$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .051 [90 % CI .041 .062], CFI = .958, TLI = .947, SRMR = .043), and the results were very similar to the first study. We again found that autochthony belief had a total positive relationship with instrumental compensation ($B = .57$, $p$-2s < .001), that this was partially accounted for by collective guilt, unstandardized 95% CI [.22, .41], and there was a leftover direct relationship between autochthony and instrumental compensation ($B = .34$, $p$-2s < .001).

We then tested a full structural equation model in which we examined to what extent autochthony belief was related to support for institutional apologies, instrumental compensation as well as topic avoidance, through the three moral emotions. These constructs were all treated as latent variables. We furthermore controlled for the same variables as in the previous model. The unstandardized coefficients and indirect relationships are displayed in Table 2.5, and Figure 2.2 shows the standardized coefficients

of the main associations in the model. The model fit was good ($\chi^2(281, N = 475) = 554.27$ $p < .001$, RMSEA = .045 [90 % CI .039 .051], CFI = .960, TLI = .949, SRMR = .039)[11].

The results show that autochthony belief had a total positive relationship with support for apologizing and with support for compensation, and a total negative relationship with the desire to avoid the topic, in line with our expectations. Furthermore, autochthony belief was positively associated with collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame, which was also in line with our expectations.

Looking at the paths between moral emotions and the reparations, we found that guilt was positively related to support for institutional apologies, as hypothesized. Guilt was furthermore also positively related to instrumental compensation, but this relationship, though still positive, was not significant anymore in the model with all three emotions included. The relationship between collective guilt and topic avoidance was not significant, which was not in line with expectations. Moral shame, however, was associated to higher support for apologies and compensation, as well as lower topic avoidance, in line with our expectations. Furthermore, image shame was not significantly associated to apologies and compensation, which was against our expectations. However, in line with our expectations, image shame was associated with a higher desire to avoid the topic of land deprivation.

Indirect paths show that support for autochthony belief was associated with greater support for institutional apologies through higher collective moral shame and guilt, as expected, but contrary to our hypothesis not through image shame, 95% CIs [.05, .31], [.18, .43], [-.05, .04], respectively. Furthermore, support for autochthony belief was positively associated with instrumental compensation through moral shame, as expected, but contrary to expectations not through guilt or image shame, [.20, .50], [-.04, .19], and [-.03, .06], respectively. Finally, as expected, autochthony belief was related to less topic avoidance through collective moral shame [-.51, -14] and to more topic avoidance through image shame [.07. .22]. Contrary to expectations, collective guilt did play a significant role in this relationship [-.29, .04].

To get a better sense of the relative importance of each emotion, we compared the strengths of the paths from emotions to reparations. Guilt and moral shame were related to apologies more strongly than image shame (Wald (1) = 17.964, $p < .001$; Wald (1) = 6.218, $p = .013$, respectively), but the coefficients of guilt and moral shame were not significantly different (Wald (1) = 0.763, $p = .382$). Moral shame was related to support for instrumental compensation significantly more strongly than guilt or image shame (Wald (1) = 4.739, $p = .0295$; Wald (1) = 13.626, $p < .001$, respectively), and the relationship between moral shame and topic avoidance was not significantly different from the relationship between guilt and topic avoidance (Wald (1) = 3.241, $p = .064$).

11 Using pwrSEM (Wang, 2021) we performed a power analysis to determine the power of our model to detect small effect sizes (0.3) for each path coefficient. We utilized the observed factor loadings, residual (co)variances, and total variance, and performed 1000 simulations using the real sample size ($N = 475$). Based on this analysis we had 81% power to detect small effects, which is above the commonly accepted threshold of 80%. See Table A2.4 in Appendix A2 for a complete list of the power values per coefficient.

**Table 2.5**

*Structural Equation Model predicting support for institutional apologies, topic avoidance, and instrumental compensation by autochthony belief, through collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame (N=475).*

| | Collective guilt | | Collective moral shame | | Collective image shame | | Support for institutional apologies | | Support for instrumental compensation | | Topic avoidance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .67*** | (.07) | .69*** | (.07) | .47*** | (.07) | .12† | (.06) | .23*** | (.06) | .09 | (.08) |
| Collective guilt | | | | | | | .44*** | (.08) | .12 | (.08) | -.17 | (.12) |
| Collective moral shame | | | | | | | .25** | (.09) | .48*** | (.10) | -.44*** | (.12) |
| Collective image shame | | | | | | | -.01 | (.05) | .04 | (.05) | .29*** | (.08) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony → collective guilt → | | | | | | | .29*** | (.06) | .08 | (.06) | -.11 | (.08) |
| Autochthony → c. moral shame → | | | | | | | .17** | (.06) | .33*** | (.07) | -.31** | (.09) |
| Autochthony → c. image shame → | | | | | | | 0.00 | (.02) | .02 | (.02) | .14*** | (.04) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autotchtony belief | | | | | | | .59*** | (.07) | .66*** | (.08) | -.19* | (.08) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | .57*** | (.14) | .31* | (.13) | .37** | (.13) | .02 | (.10) | -.09 | (.09) | -.16 | (.13) |
| Age | -.02*** | (.00) | -.02*** | (.00) | -.02*** | (.00) | -.01† | (.00) | 0.00 | (.00) | .01** | (.00) |
| Educational level | .08 | (.06) | .15** | (.06) | .07 | (.06) | -.01 | (.04) | .06 | (.04) | .04 | (.06) |
| Left-right orientation | -.11* | (.04) | -.13** | (.04) | -.03 | (.04) | -.09** | (.03) | -.05† | (.03) | .28*** | (.05) |
| Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | -.28 | (.20) | -.26 | (.18) | -.07 | (.18) | .13 | (.13) | .05 | (.11) | -.22 | (.19) |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | .00 | (.14) | -.11 | (.13) | -.18 | (.13) | -.03 | (.11) | -.08 | (.10) | .00 | (.13) |
| Feelings towards Aboriginal Australians | .11*** | (.03) | .04 | (.03) | .05* | (.02) | .09*** | (.02) | .02 | (.02) | -.04 | (.03) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Figure 2.2**
*Structural equation model Study 2 (N=475) with standardized coefficients, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, political orientation, parents' ethnicity, and whether participants were born in Australia.*




*Note:* Control variables omitted from the figure. The total relationship between autochthony and compensation is displayed between square brackets. † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

Finally, there was a positive left-over direct relationship between autochthony belief and support for instrumental compensation, and there were no significant left-over relationships with support for institutional apologies and topic avoidance. The main paths were not substantively different in a model without control variables (see Table A2.5, Appendix A2).

### 2.3.3 Discussion

Study 2 provides further support for the expected positive relation between settler majority's support for autochthony as a general ideological belief and their support for reparations for Aboriginal Australians. The findings show that autochthony belief is associated with both more support for symbolic and instrumental reparations, as well as an overall lower desire to avoid the topic of land appropriation.

At the same time, the findings show the importance of considering collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame in parallel, as they have different implications. Most importantly, whereas moral shame accounted for the negative association between autochthony belief and the desire for topic avoidance, image shame suppressed this association. The findings also demonstrate that, while there are no meaningful differences between the roles of collective guilt and moral shame with regards to institutional apologies, there are differences in relation to instrumental compensation, as autochthony belief was related to support for instrumental compensation via moral shame rather than guilt.

## 2.4 General discussion

Autochthony, the belief that a territory belongs to those who were there first, is a pervasive ideological belief that is often self-evidently used by territorially established groups to exclude non-autochthonous others (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009; Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). Previous research has primarily examined how autochthony is utilized by groups that claim primo-occupancy, and to our knowledge there has been no systematic research on autochthony belief in a setting where the majority group is not the primo-occupant. In such a setting, endorsement of autochthony as a general ideological belief implies support for the primacy of Indigenous ownership. As a result, the acquisition of Indigenous territories could be perceived as unjust and in conflict with the values of the ingroup. We set out to investigate if and how settler majority endorsement of autochthony belief is associated with support for reparations for Indigenous Peoples, and whether this association is accounted for by the self-conscious moral emotions of collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame.

In two studies using samples of Anglo-Celtic Australians we demonstrate that autochthony belief consistently relates to more support for reparations for Aboriginal Australians, which we examined in terms of instrumental compensation (both studies) and institutional apologies (Study 2). We also considered a less favorable, though still likely attitude, namely, the desire to avoid the topic of land appropriation (Study 2) and we found autochthony belief to be related to less topic avoidance. These relationships were found to be robust when controlling for gender, age, educational attainment,

political orientation, and feelings towards Aboriginal Australians. To our knowledge, this research provides the first evidence for the claim that settler majority's endorsement of autochthony as a general ideological belief plays a positive role in attitudes towards reparations for Indigenous Peoples. These findings not only confirm the notion that first arrival is generally considered a valid basis for inferring ownership (Martinović et al., 2020), they also suggest that support for this belief might have implications for current-day intergroup relations in the contexts with past transgressions of Indigenous ownership.

Our findings further show that autochthony belief relates to stronger feelings of collective guilt (Study 1 and 2) as well as of moral and image shame (Study 2). This supports our assertion that majority members' endorsement of autochthony means that they perceive the appropriation of Indigenous lands as illegitimate and in conflict with the values of their ingroup. Furthermore, the relationships between autochthony belief and different attitudes towards reparations were largely accounted for by these three group-based emotions. These results suggest that moral emotions are an important link to consider between autochthony belief, which by definition takes the past into account, and attitudes towards making amends to Indigenous Peoples in settler societies in the present.

Importantly, we found that collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame were differently related to support for reparations. The differences may be due to the different origins of these moral emotions, which therefore motivate different types of behavior. First, collective guilt was found to be more strongly related to institutional apologies than to instrumental compensation or topic avoidance. This may be due to the focus of guilt on the specific wrongdoing and how this act affected the victims, which may also foster empathic concern for the victims (Tangney et al., 2007). Apologies usually directly address the victims and the specific act one is apologizing for (in our studies, land appropriation) whereas instrumental compensation can be conceptualized in a broader sense, and we measured it primarily in terms of support for affirmative action. This form of compensation may also be seen as a means to address present day inequalities rather than rectify the past wrongdoing. Future research could examine whether guilt would be more strongly related to support for land restitution, which would be the most direct way to rectify the specific wrongdoing of land appropriation.

Second, moral shame was found to be related to more support for apologies and instrumental compensation and to less topic avoidance. Because moral shame stems from perceiving a failure in the morality of one's group ('we are bad people'), and because people have a need to see their group as moral, they will be highly motivated to act in a moral way to restore the self-image of their group, and this may be a stronger motivator for pro-social behavior than feelings of guilt (Allpress et al., 2010). This can be done by offering apologies, which can help perpetrator groups restore their self-image by showing their (renewed) respect for morality (Barlow et al., 2015), but also by fixing other 'wrongs', not necessarily the ones related to the past (e.g., present-day inequalities). The latter may be the reason why in Study 2, when considering all three moral emotions in parallel, we found moral shame to be positively related to support for instrumental compensation

to improve the position of Aboriginal Australians in the Australian society, whereas the initially positive relationship between guilt and compensation disappeared.

Third, when it comes to image shame, we argued that the need for the restoration of the public image could be achieved by publicly demonstrating that one is (again) a moral person by publicly apologizing or compensating for the wrongdoing (Barlow et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2016; Jordan et al., 2011), or by attempting to avoid the topic of the wrongdoing altogether (Gausel et al., 2012). We found that image shame was positively related to the desire to avoid the topic, and there was no significant association between image shame and offering symbolic or instrumental reparations in the multivariate model when guilt and moral shame were accounted for (but see Table 2.3 for positive bivariate correlations). Whereas offering compensation might reduce actual judgement by others, image shame primarily stems from perceived judgement by others. If perpetrators see avoiding the topic as an effective strategy, they may therefore be less inclined to support compensation, which may explain why we did not find any significant association between image shame and offering symbolic or instrumental compensation. It remains an open question whether image shame also predicts support for apologies and compensation when avoiding the topic is not perceived as a viable strategy.

### 2.4.1 Limitations and future directions

We want to highlight four main directions that future research on the topic of autochthony belief and reparations could take and reflect on some limitations of our studies. First, we considered three moral emotions in the current manuscript, but there are others, and in particular the role of existential guilt may be worth considering in relation to instrumental compensation. Existential guilt is a moral emotion experienced when one profits from advantages that are perceived as not fully deserved (i.e., illegitimate) as a consequence of being a member of a certain group, and feeling at least some level of responsibility for the continuation of inequality (Montada & Schneider, 1989). Therefore, existential guilt is not necessarily past-oriented, and one can experience existential guilt even if one does not feel responsible for causing the inequality in the first place. Previous research among non-Indigenous Australians in Australia has indeed found that simply perceiving the ingroup as advantaged was associated with higher levels of guilt, which was in turn associated with more support for compensation (Leach et al., 2006). Future research on reparations and social justice in settler societies—particularly instrumental compensation—could simultaneously examine the role of moral emotions experienced for past misdeed and existential guilt for the present-day inequalities, to see whether these two types of moral emotions independently relate to this form of reparations.

Second, we only considered the ownership ideology based on first arrival, namely, autochthony belief (e.g., Geschiere, 2009; Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). While we have shown that in a settler society majority endorsement of autochthony belief is related to more support for making amends to Aboriginal Australians, it might be that the majority population uses other arguments to justify ownership claims for their own group. For example, part of the argument for declaring Australia *terra nullius* was that Aboriginal Australians had not worked the land, and therefore could not claim to own it (Short, 2014). Having invested in and developed the land might be used as an argument

to justify ownership by majority members (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017) and future research could consider autochthony and investment beliefs in parallel.

Third, we did not take into account the role of group identification, which can be important for experiencing group-based moral emotions (Doosje et al., 1998). Furthermore, research shows that higher identifiers are more likely to have self-defensive reactions when confronted with ingroup wrongdoings, so that they can keep a more positive image of their group (Zebel et al., 2004), and research in the Netherlands has shown that stronger national identification was related to stronger claims of autochthony among the native Dutch majority (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). It would be interesting for future research to examine how majority group identification relates to autochthony belief, moral emotions, and reparations, as well as whether is qualifies the relationships between these constructs in a setting where the majority is not autochthonous.

Fourth, we used correlational survey data in our research. Surveys results can be affected by social desirability concerns but given that our data collection was online and anonymous, social desirability probably did not play a big role. Yet, given the cross-sectional nature of the design, we cannot make causal claims about the direction of influence, and reverse mediation testing with cross-sectional data is not a useful strategy for determining causality (Lemmer & Gollwitzer, 2017). However, we derived our predictions based on theories and experimental (e.g., Rees et al., 2015) and longitudinal research (e.g., Brown et al., 2008) that supports the directionality of the proposed relations between moral emotions and compensation, as well as between past wrongdoings and moral emotions (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998). A reverse causal order from greater support for compensation to moral emotions is less likely. Still, it is possible that there might be mutual directions of influence. Participants who experience greater feelings of guilt and shame may come to more strongly endorse autochthony belief, or people may justify their support for reparations by this belief. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that a third variable partly accounted for the relationship between autochthony and more support for reparations and less topic avoidance. Hence, longitudinal and experimental research is needed to further establish the directions of influence and to rule out the influence of other variables. For example, an experiment could manipulate autochthony belief by presenting the participants with a text that emphasizes the importance of first arrival as a principle for determining entitlement in a multitude of settings (e.g., cutting in line, taking someone's usual parking spot). In this way we could find out whether support for autochthony belief is higher in the experimental compared to the control condition, and whether this translates to more support for compensating Indigenous Peoples.

Ideally, future research would also measure actual behavior instead of attitudes, for instance, signing a petition to encourage the Government to apologize or donating money to compensate the Indigenous groups. This would solve not only the problem of a mismatch between attitudes and behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1973), but also help us further disentangle the causality in the proposed relationships. Finally, we only focused on Australia, and future research should examine the generalizability of our results by considering different contexts, like other settler societies (e.g., the United States, New Zealand), but also contexts where it may not be clear who arrived first (e.g., Kosovo).

### 2.4.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, we have provided the first empirical evidence on the importance of autochthony as a general ideological belief for settler majority member's attitudes toward Indigenous peoples. Whereas previous studies have shown that autochthony belief can be related to the exclusion of newcomers (e.g., Geschiere, 2009), the present research shows that, in a settler society, settler majority's endorsement of autochthony belief is associated with support for compensating the groups that were there first, namely, the Indigenous Peoples.

# Chapter 3.

## Autochthony and investment beliefs as bases for territorial ownership and compensation in settler societies: The case of Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in Chile[12]

We examined how autochthony belief (entitlements from first arrival) and investment belief (entitlements from working the land) guide attitudes towards territorial compensation of Indigenous groups in settler societies. We expected autochthony and investment beliefs to be respectively related to more and less territorial compensation, via higher and lower perceptions of Indigenous ownership. We tested this in Chile among non-Indigenous Chileans and Indigenous Mapuche. In Study 1 among non-Indigenous Chilean students ($N$ = 611) we found that autochthony belief was related to a greater support for territorial compensation of the first inhabitants, the Mapuche, whereas investment belief was related to a lesser support for territorial compensation. In Study 2 we contrasted self-identified non-Indigenous Chileans ($N$ = 121) with self-identified Indigenous Mapuche ($N$ = 226) and found that for both groups autochthony belief was related to greater support for territorial compensation via higher recognition of Indigenous territorial ownership. Interestingly, for non-Indigenous Chileans, investment belief was related to *less* willingness to compensate, whereas for Mapuche it was related to *more* claims for compensation via stronger perceptions of Indigenous ownership. Together, these findings show that endorsement of autochthony belief is an argument that validates Indigenous ownership among both groups, whereas different dimensions of the investment belief can be used by both groups to claim more positive outcomes for their own ingroup.



12 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published as: Nooitgedagt, W., Figueiredo, A., Martinović, B., & Marambio, K. (2021). Autochthony and investment as bases for territorial ownership in intergroup conflicts: The case of Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in Chile. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2021.10.002 Wybren Nooitgedagt drafted the paper and conducted the analyses. Ana Figueiredo and Karina Marambio collected the data. Borja Martinović and Ana Figueiredo were involved in the study design and theorizing, and all co-authors critically reviewed the manuscript.

## 3.1 Introduction

Conflicts over the ownership of territory have shaped intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in settler societies (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Bravo, 1996). Settler societies are countries that were colonized by predominantly European settlers, where the settler population has largely supplanted the original inhabitants, who now often find themselves in the minority position. Previous research on relations between Indigenous Peoples and settlers[13] has focused on various factors that shape processes of reconciliation, such as the role of representations of history (Attwood, 2005; Figueiredo et al., 2019), and ethnic and national identity (Gerber et al., 2016; Halloran, 2007; Moran, 2002; Pehrson et al., 2011). However, despite the central role that territory plays in conflicts between Indigenous Peoples and settlers, there is a lack of research on how perceptions of territorial ownership inform people's opinions about territorial compensation, that is, the restitution of Indigenous lands and the rights associated with the land.

Collective psychological ownership of territories—a sense that a territory belongs to a group—shapes the way people relate to and interact with that territory (Brylka et al., 2015; Pierce et al., 2001; Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020). Recent research in (post-) conflict settings has shown that when groups are engaged in a territorial conflict, the feeling that a territory belongs to the ingroup can inhibit the willingness to forgive the rival group or to promote good relations between the groups (Storz et al., 2020). We add to this emergent literature by focusing on group ownership and intergroup relations in three ways.

First, we consider the context of settler societies and examine how perceptions of who is the rightful owner of the territory—settlers or Indigenous Peoples—matter for people's attitudes towards territorial compensation of the Indigenous groups. Thereby we look at support for actual changes in territorial ownership, as calls for territorial restitution or increased autonomy are central to the demands of many Indigenous Peoples (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999).

Second, we consider the role of two general beliefs that people tend to rely on when inferring ownership of objects and places, and that might be particularly relevant in the context of territorial disputes in settler societies: entitlements derived from primo-occupancy (autochthony) and from historically investing in and developing the land (investment) (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Geschiere, 2009). Autochthony belief has a particularly exclusive character since, in any situation, there could always be only one true first comer, and thus one owner ('group A arrived before group B'). In contrast, investment belief is not by definition as exclusive as multiple groups could have, throughout the history, invested in a territory. Due to these differences, we propose that autochthony and investment beliefs can differently inform ownership inferences in concrete territorial disputes. While previous theoretical work has distinguished between autochthony and investment beliefs (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), to our knowledge, there is no empirical research exploring the outcomes of autochthony and investment beliefs in settler societies.

13 The terms 'settler' and 'non-Indigenous' are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

Third, most of the research on territorial compensation focuses on the demands made by Indigenous Peoples and the response of the State (e.g., Yashar, 1999), and there is a lack of research into the perspectives of Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups, and a particular lack of research comparing these perspectives. We aim to fill these gaps by examining for both Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups how their endorsement of autochthony and investment beliefs relate to their perceptions of who is the rightful owner of the territory, and via ownership perceptions, to support for territorially compensating the Indigenous groups. We draw evidence from Chile by examining both the perspective of non-Indigenous majority and of the Indigenous Mapuche participants.

### 3.1.1 Perceptions of group ownership and territorial compensation

As demonstrated by the ongoing struggles of many Indigenous Peoples regarding the recognition of their territorial ownership claims (Haughney, 2012), people can feel that certain places belong to them in the absence of legal recognition. This sense of ownership is distinct from legal ownership in that people can feel like they own something regardless of whether they legally own it (Pierce et al., 2003). A sense of ownership thus concerns the *perception* that a certain object, place, or idea belongs to an individual or a group (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Shaw et al., 2012; Snare, 1972), e.g., 'my car', 'my job' (Pierce et al., 2001), 'our neighborhood' (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020), or 'our land' (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

Perceptions of group ownership, or collective psychological ownership, have important consequences for intergroup relations, as ownership not only prescribes how people should relate to objects, but also influences how they relate to each other (Blumenthal, 2010). Ownership implies the right to use the object, the right to transfer ownership, and the right to exclude others from using the object (Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). Many societies have institutionalized ownership, and as such, the legal owner of a territory decides who can access or use it and for what purposes. However, the consequences of ownership also extend beyond legal ownership. For example, research shows that people claim ownership over objects or places that they do not legally own to justify the exclusion of outgroup members, e.g., 'this is our beach' (Due & Riggs, 2008).

Importantly, people do not only have an awareness of what belongs to them or their group but can also recognize other people or groups as owners. Research shows that the recognition of other's ownership develops at a young age (Kanngiesser et al., 2020), and that children spontaneously reference ownership to explain why it is or is not acceptable for someone to use an object (Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017). Furthermore, there are both social and legal norms about what are acceptable justifications for the transference of ownership and taking someone's property without permission is generally considered theft. We therefore expect that when people feel that the group that should own the territory in fact does not have legal rights over that territory, they will desire changes in land ownership and entitlements in order to resolve this conflict. Therefore, for both Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chileans in Chile we expect that when they perceive a territory as rightfully belonging more to the Mapuche, they will be more supportive of territorial compensation for the Mapuche.

### 3.1.2 Autochthony belief

One of the most pervasive, and in some ways the most basic, ways of inferring ownership is first-possession (of objects) or first-occupancy (of places). Research shows that in the absence of additional information people assume that the first person to possess an object is its owner (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Friedman et al., 2013), and entitlements derived from first-occupancy of a place are often perceived as self-evident and even 'natural' (Geschiere, 2009). Furthermore, experimental research has shown that children also infer territorial ownership from first arrival (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015). Ownership based on first arrival is referred to in the literature as autochthony (Geschiere, 2009).

We examine the impact of Indigenous and non-Indigenous endorsement of *autochthony* as a general belief that those who were first to inhabit any territory should be entitled to own it (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). We propose that the more one endorses autochthony belief (regardless of whether one is a member of the first-occupant group or a group that arrived later), the more one should consider the first occupants of a given territory as its rightful owners, regardless of the context or groups in question. Because first-occupancy is not a transient characteristic and later comers will have forever arrived later than those who were somewhere first, autochthony belief may, for those who adhere to it, create a particularly sharp distinction between those who are seen as relatively more entitled (first-comers) and those who are not (later-comers).

Support for autochthony belief by first-occupants therefore means that they should see their own group as relatively more entitled to ownership over the territory and the accompanying rights, and this rhetoric is indeed used in various contexts. For example, in settler societies, anthropological research has shown that ownership claims based on first-occupancy have been used by Indigenous Peoples to resist and challenge occupation (Gagné & Salaün, 2012). At the same time, other research has shown that autochthony is used to claim rights for the first-occupant group, e.g., in Côte D'Ivoire and Cameroon autochthony is used to exclude from political participation ethnic groups that allegedly arrived later (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005), in Belgium it is utilized by the Flemish far-right to exclude francophone Belgians from the benefits of the welfare state (Ceuppens, 2011), and support for autochthony belief by majority members is associated with negative attitudes towards newcomers in the Netherlands (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) and with support for movements defending the status quo in Malaysia (Selvanathan et al., 2021).

In contrast, support for autochthony belief by later-comers undermines the territorial ownership claims of their ingroup. Even though support for autochthony belief may not be in the best interests of their group, experimental research in the Netherlands has shown that people recognize first arrival as a valid argument for ownership not only when their own group arrived somewhere first but also when a rival outgroup is presented as the first occupant (Martinović et al., 2020). Furthermore, recent research in Australia has shown that support for autochthony belief among the non-Indigenous majority was relatively high, and that it was related to stronger support for institutional apologies and instrumental reparations (e.g., financial compensation) for Indigenous Australians (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021), and higher support for

the Invasion Day protests, which are aimed at ending the celebration of the foundation date of modern Australia (Selvanathan et al., 2021). We therefore expect that, both for Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous Chileans in Chile, endorsement of autochthony belief will relate to perceiving the Indigenous Peoples as more rightful owners of the disputed territory, and consequently to stronger support for territorially compensating the Indigenous group.

**3.1.3 Investment belief**

Creating an object or investing effort into changing it is also used as an argument for claiming ownership, and experimental research has shown that people indeed judge that the creator of an object owns it (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Levene et al., 2015). Past investment into a territory or contribution to the development of the territory can similarly be used to claim ownership of the territory (Banner, 2005) or recognize another group as a rightful owner. Thus, parallel to the role of autochthony belief, we examine the impact of Indigenous and non-Indigenous endorsement of *investment belief*: the general belief that investing in a territory makes one its owner. When one supports investment belief, one should think that the ones who have historically invested most in a territory are relatively more entitled to own it, regardless of the context or groups in question.

People may perceive the past investment in a territory by the non-Indigenous majority as legitimate grounds for challenging first inhabitants' territorial ownership. Historically, claims of ownership through investment have been utilized to justify colonization, such as in Australia, where the usurpation of Aboriginal lands was long justified with the assertion that it was *terra nullius*, 'nobody's land'. This was based on the argument that ownership of land originated from working the land, and hence the colonizers argued that Aboriginal peoples could not own the land, because the colonizers claimed they did not work it (Short, 2014). In line with this argumentation, experimental research has found that when they were the ones investing, children perceived investment into an object as a legitimate reason for the transference of ownership from the first-possessor to the one who invested (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). Furthermore, other experimental research (Kanngiesser et al., 2014) has shown that when asked to judge in a conflict between investor and first-possessor, most people assigned ownership to the one who invested (but for contrasting findings, see Hook, 1993). However, as far as we are aware, there has been no quantitative research that has examined whether first-occupants judge investment to be a valid reason for recognizing the group that has invested more as owning the territory more.[14]

Furthermore, whereas first arrival is usually presented as an historical fact that creates a binary division between those who were first and those who were not (Geschiere, 2009), investment into a territory could be actively claimed by multiple groups in a multitude of ways and to different degrees, and the degree of investment

14 Selvanathan et al. (2021) come closest by examining the link between the endorsement of founder ownership and support for reactionary counter-movements defending the status quo. However, while founder ownership is theoretically similar to investment belief, it differs from investment belief in that it neither theoretically nor empirically distinguishes between investment as a general principle of ownership and perceptions of actual ingroup/outgroup territorial ownership.

could increase or decrease over time. Consequently, there is a greater possibility of contrasting narratives and differing views on the degree that groups have invested into a territory than on the first-occupancy of that territory, and it is possible that investment as a general belief will not relate to concrete territorial ownership inferences and compensation in the same way for non-Indigenous and Indigenous Peoples. Thus, those who see investment as an important basis for assigning ownership might, in a range of settings, recognize multiple groups as rightful owners ('both group A and group B invested in this territory'). At the same time, who invested and to what degree can be more easily contested ('group A did not invest as much as group B did'), whereas it is more difficult to deny a group's first occupancy, especially in the context of settler societies where the non-Indigenous majority have clearly arrived later.

Indeed, in different parts of the world, the investment principle has been utilized by different groups in different ways. For example, in Brazil, the Sem Terra (Without Land) Movement has claimed rights to the occupation and use of land by poor farmer families living in rural areas. In this context, since the transition to democracy in the 1980s, thousands of rural workers started occupying land that was not being used and that was owned by big companies or *latifundia* across the country and started to make a living out of traditional farming practices in this land (Chaguaceda & Brancaleone, 2010). In this case, given that these peasants did not bear rights to access the land because they were not autochthonous, we can see how the principle of investment has been used to claim territory for poor marginalized communities and generate social change in terms of power imbalances between poor communities and richer people and businesses.

Nevertheless, investment can also be seen as a principle that mostly defends the rights of majority groups and settler endeavors in different parts of the world. It is reasonable to assume that non-Indigenous people who settled in the region feel that they have invested more in the territory. After the independence of Chile, the occupation of Mapuche territory involved the government giving away or selling Mapuche lands to people with mostly European descent as a means to improve agricultural practices and, later on, from the first part of the 20$^{th}$ century onwards to develop the national forestry industry (Flores Chávez, 2012). We therefore expect that non-Indigenous Chileans who think that past investment is an important basis for ownership claims will perceive their own group as relatively more entitled to ownership over the territory in question, and consequently show less support for territorially compensating the Mapuche.

For the Indigenous group, two contrasting expectations need to be considered. According to system justification theory, both majorities and minorities are motivated to justify the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 2004), and it is therefore possible that some Mapuche people may 'buy into' the notion that settlers have invested more into the territory in order to rationalize the status quo. In line with this reasoning, we can expect that for Indigenous people endorsement of investment belief also relates to perceiving the settlers as relatively more entitled to own the territory, and indirectly to lower support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous group. However, Mapuche people and settlers may also have different understandings of investment. For instance, the Mapuche might consider nature preservation as a form of investment, and industrialization as a form of destruction. Thus, in contrast to the above, if Indigenous Peoples have this

different understanding of investment, we can expect that investment belief will for them relate to perceiving their own group as relatively more entitled to own the territory, and this would indirectly be related to *more* support for territorial compensation.

**3.1.4 The present research**

We draw evidence from Chile by examining both the perspective of non-Indigenous majority as well as that of Indigenous Mapuche participants. The Mapuche (literally: 'people of the land') are the largest Indigenous group, comprising roughly 10% of the total Chilean population (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, 2017). They resisted colonization by the Spanish between the 16th and 19th century, and their lands were only fully conquered during the military occupation of Araucanía that occurred between 1861 to 1883 (Marimán et al., 2006). During the dictatorship, Pinochet revoked all rights to communal property of the land, thus violating principles of the Mapuche way of living and organizing within the territory they still held. This led to increased impoverishment and further disintegration of Mapuche communities. In fact, for Mapuche, territorial and cultural loss are the main narrative that connects past and present and fuels the current territorial demands of the Mapuche (Figueiredo et al., 2019). Araucanía has been the focal point of this ongoing struggle between the Mapuche and the Chilean state over the ownership of the land. At present, Mapuche communities have the right to reclaim lost ancestral territory through proposals made to CONADI, an agency of the Chilean state that deals with Indigenous rights and, among other activities, launches different application processes for territorial claims.

However, the Mapuche ancestral territory falls within an area of the country that has seen large-scale hydroelectrical and forestry projects developed mainly during the Pinochet dictatorship and afterwards. In practice, when Indigenous demands clash with industrial interests, state agencies have perpetuated the dictatorship-era patterns of siding with the interests of private companies rather than those of Indigenous communities (Rodríguez & Carruthers, 2008). The conflict over territory has recently intensified after massive protests that broke out in Chile in 2019 due to increasing delegitimation of the current political system (by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people), which propelled a process of constitutional change. In this process, a new Constitution is being drawn and 17 seats have been reserved for representatives of Indigenous groups, of which 7 belong to Mapuche people. If accepted, theses constitutional changes may improve Indigenous rights and lead to their full constitutional recognition. Even though eventual changes must be implemented at the State level, it is important to examine people's opinions, as evidenced by the current process of constitutional change in Chile, and by research which has shown that public opinion has a substantive impact on public policy (Burstein, 2016). We therefore analyze claims of ownership regarding the region of Araucanía, and address these from the perspectives of both Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chilean participants.

For both groups, we expected that autochthony belief would be associated with more support for territorial compensation, and that higher perceptions of Indigenous ownership (relative to non-Indigenous ownership) would mediate this positive relationship. In contrast, we expected investment belief among non-Indigenous Chileans

to be associated with less support for territorial compensation via lower relative Indigenous ownership. We thought we might find the same for the Mapuche, but we also considered an alternative hypothesis whereby investment belief would be related to more support for territorial compensation via relatively higher perceptions of Indigenous ownership. The data and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/gw96d/.

## 3.2 Study 1

### 3.2.1 Method

***Data and participants***

Participants for Study 1 were Chilean students from three universities in Santiago and three in Temuco ($N$ = 934). These cities were chosen because the conflict over the ancestral Mapuche territory is likely more salient there than in other cities: Santiago is the city with the largest population of Mapuche and Mapuche descendants, and Temuco is the capital of Araucanía, the main city within ancestral Mapuche territory. The survey was administered in 2018 in Spanish, Chile's sole official language. No incentives were provided. Participants were not pre-selected based on their ethnicity but were asked whether they had (at least) one family member of Mapuche descent. While having Mapuche family does not necessarily mean that the participants are or consider themselves to be Mapuche, we can be fairly confident that participants without Mapuche family are non-Indigenous Chileans. We therefore excluded participants with Mapuche family ($N$ = 300)[15] and participants who did not report whether they had Mapuche family ($N$ = 23), which left a remaining sample of 611 participants. The sample comprised of 68.5% women, with ages ranging between 18-54, and an average age of 21.24 ($SD$ = 3.17).

***Measures***

All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 'totally disagree' to 7 = 'totally agree', unless otherwise indicated.

*Autochthony belief* was measured with 4 items previously used in the Netherlands (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) and Australia (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021). In order to capture support for autochthony as a general belief, these items were formulated as general statements not referring to particular groups, conflicts, or contexts: 'The first inhabitants of a territory have more rights than those who arrived later to decide on important territorial issues'; 'Each territory belongs mainly to its first inhabitants'; 'We were here first is an important principle to determine who decides what happens in a territory'; and 'Those who were first can be considered legitimate owners of the land, more than those who arrived later'.

*Investment belief* was also measured with 4 general items designed for this study: 'We built this country is an important principle to determine who decides what happens in a region'; 'Those who have contributed most to the development of a region have

15 As a robustness check we also performed the analysis for this group, see Table A3.1 in Appendix A3 for the results. The results for groups of participants with and without Mapuche family were not substantively different.

more right to define it'; 'A specific territory belongs mainly to those inhabitants who have invested the most effort to build it'; and 'The group that has invested the most in a territory has more right than the first inhabitants to decide on important territorial issues'.

*Territorial compensation* was measured with 2 items: 'The State must return to the Mapuche the territories plundered by Chilean society since the pacification of Araucanía' and 'The Chilean State should allow the self-determination and self-management of the Mapuche people in their territory'.

We controlled for *age* (measured in years), *gender* (0 = 'male'; 1 = 'female'), and *political orientation* (1 = 'extremely left' to 7 = 'extremely right', see Jost, 2006). We also controlled for *Chilean identification*, because ingroup identification is associated with autochthony (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) and support for compensation or reconciliation (Storz et al., 2020). We used one item: 'To what extent do you feel Chilean', measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 'not at all' to 7 = 'totally'.

### 3.2.2 Results

#### *Measurement model*

All analyses were conducted in Mplus version 8, using robust Maximum Likelihood estimation. Missing values were dealt with using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (Little et al., 2014). We performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis, with autochthony and investment as 4-item latent factors, and territorial compensation as a 2-item latent factor. The tests showed that the model fit well ($\chi^2$ (32, $N$ = 611) = 85.07, $p$ <.001, RMSEA = .052 [90% C.I. .039 .066], CFI/TLI = .978 / .970, SRMR = .035). All alternative factor structures had a worse fit, confirming that autochthony, investment, and territorial compensation are separate constructs (see Table A3.2, Appendix A3).

#### *Descriptive findings*

Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics, including scale reliabilities, are presented in Table 3.1. The reliability of latent variables was assessed using composite reliability (ρ, see Raykov, 2016), which is superior to Cronbach's alpha because it does not assume equal factor loadings of all items. Participants on average showed moderate support for autochthony (the mean score was not significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale), while average support for investment was rather low (below the neutral midpoint, see Table 3.10). However, they were on average in favor of territorial compensation, with a mean score higher than the neutral midpoint. Autochthony and investment belief were not significantly correlated, confirming the assumption that these beliefs can be held independently. Furthermore, autochthony correlated positively and investment negatively with territorial compensation.

#### *Explaining support for territorial compensation*

We first ran a structural equation model regressing support for territorial compensation on autochthony and investment without considering the control variables (see Table 3.2). Autochthony was positively associated with territorial compensation, in line with our expectation, whereas investment belief was negatively associated.

**Table 3.1**

*Bivariate correlations, descriptive statistics, and composite reliability scores for the variables used in the analysis, Study 1 (*N=*611).*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | *M* | *SD* | *N* | Wald(1) | ρ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. *Autochthony belief* | — | | | | | | 4.05 | (1.95) | 611 | 0.35 | .93 |
| 02. *Investment belief* | -.08 | — | | | | | 3.82 | (1.62) | 608 | 7.49 | .87 |
| 03. *Territorial compensation* | .57*** | -.22*** | — | | | | 4.69 | (1.95) | 609 | 74.94 | .85 |
| 04. Chilean identification | -.10* | .11* | -.24*** | — | | | 5.61 | (1.66) | 607 | 564.87 | |
| 05. Gender (0 = male) | .05 | -.01 | .14** | -.01 | — | | .69 | | 609 | | |
| 06. Age (in years) | .18*** | -.14** | .18*** | -.10* | -.08 | — | 21.24 | (3.17) | 611 | | |
| 07. Political left-right orientation | -.27*** | .25*** | -.58*** | .31*** | -.06 | -.16* | 3.99 | (1.35) | 578 | 0.03 | |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Latent variable names are italicized. The Wald tests test whether the mean is significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale (0.95 probability critical value = 3.84).

**Table 3.2**

*Structural equation model predicting support for territorial compensation, Study 1 (*N*=611).*

| | Without control variables | | With control variables | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| Autochthony belief | .62*** | (.05) | .48*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | -.27*** | (.06) | -.11 | (.06) |
| *Control variables* | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | | | .36** | (.14) |
| Age (in years) | | | .02 | (.02) |
| Left-right orientation | | | -.59*** | (.05) |
| Chilean identification | | | -.06 | (.04) |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

The addition of the control variables did not substantively change the relationship between autochthony and territorial compensation. However, while the negative relationship between investment and territorial compensation remained in the same direction, it was no longer significant ($p = .059$). Furthermore, women and people oriented more toward the political right showed less support for territorial compensation.

### 3.2.3 Discussion

We found that non-Indigenous participants who endorsed autochthony belief more, were more positive about territorial compensation for the Mapuche, and this relationship also held while controlling for age, gender, political orientation, and Chilean identification. However, endorsement of investment belief, though showing a negative association in a simpler model, was not significantly related to territorial compensation when control variables were included in the analysis.

In Study 2 we expanded upon these findings in two ways. First, we recruited self-identified Mapuche participants alongside self-identified non-Indigenous Chilean participants. Second, we examined whether autochthony and investment beliefs were indirectly related to compensation via perceptions of Indigenous ownership of Araucanía.

## 3.3 Study 2

### 3.3.1 Method

***Data and participants***

We collected data in Santiago and the Araucanía region among non-Indigenous Chileans and Mapuche participants between October 2017 and August 2018. The survey was administered in Spanish, Chile's sole official language. Most Mapuche speak Spanish as a first language, and virtually all speakers of Mapudungun are bilingual in Spanish

(Sadowsky et al., 2013). Participants were recruited through invitations made towards different Mapuche organizations, snowballing, and personal contact networks, and were given the equivalent of 3 dollars and 50 cents (in Chilean pesos) for participation. Most participants completed the questionnaire in paper and pencil format, and some completed it digitally. Participants were coded as non-Indigenous Chilean when both of their parents were of non-Indigenous Chilean descent ($N$ = 121), and as Mapuche when they indicated that both of their parents ($N$ = 135) or at least one of their parents ($N$ = 91) were of Mapuche descent. The final sample consisted of 226 Mapuche, aged 18-85 ($M$ = 43.4, $SD$ = 16.7), of which 67% were women, and 121 non-Indigenous Chilean participants, with ages ranging 18-83 ($M$ = 38.3, $SD$ = 18.3), 63% of which were women.

***Measures***

Unless otherwise indicated, all items were measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = 'totally disagree' to 5 = 'totally agree'.

*Autochthony* and *investment beliefs* were measured using similar items as in Study 1. Given the high reliability of these measures in Study 1, and the limited space for questions in the survey of Study 2, the number of items was reduced to three by dropping the fourth item. Furthermore, to cover more concrete aspects of investment, including the administrative role, the third item of investment belief, which in Study 1 overlapped substantially with the second item, was changed to: 'Those who administered the territory in recent years have more right to decide what to do with it'.

*Perceptions of Indigenous ownership* was measured as a single item 'In your opinion, the territory of Araucanía should belong...' (1 = 'Totally to the Mapuche'; 2 = 'More to the Mapuche than to non-Indigenous Chileans'; 3 = 'To both groups equally'; 4 = 'More to non-Indigenous Chileans than to the Mapuche'; 5 = 'Totally to non-Indigenous Chileans'). We reversed and centered the variable on 3, so that -2 stands for totally belonging to non-Indigenous Chileans and 2 for totally belonging to the Mapuche.

*Territorial compensation* was measured with four items designed for this study. We designed the items to be relevant to both Mapuche and non-Indigenous participants and based them on discussions in the political arena and civil society. The items were introduced with the text 'What kind of initiatives, measures and/or policies do you think could help solve the problems that the Mapuche people face today?'. The items were: 'The recognition of Mapuche territorial autonomy in Araucanía'; 'The political self-determination of the Mapuche people'; 'The total return of Mapuche lands in the Araucanía'; and 'The recognition of the self-determination of the Mapuche people'.

We controlled for the same variables as in the previous study, and additionally included educational attainment and Mapuche identification. *Sex* (0 = 'male', 1 = female), *age* (in years), *educational attainment* (0 = 'none'; 1 = 'basic'; 2 = 'medium'; 3 = 'higher non-university'; 4 = 'university/postgraduate')[16], *political left-right orientation* (1 = 'far left', 10 = 'far right'), and *Chilean* and *Mapuche identification*. *Chilean* and *Mapuche* identification were measured with four items each: 'I feel like I have a link with [Chile/Mapuche people]';

16 The original scale also included 'incomplete' versions of each level of education attainment. Participants who indicated an incomplete level of education as their educational attainment were coded as having one lower level of educational attainment, e.g., 'university (incomplete)' was recoded to 'higher non-university'.

**Table 3.3**

*Descriptive statistics and composite reliability scores for non-Indigenous Chileans (*N*=121) and Mapuche (*N*=226), Study 2.*

| | Non-Indigenous Chileans | | | | | Mapuche | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *M* | *SD* | *N* | Wald (1) | ρ | *M* | *SD* | *N* | Wald (1) | ρ |
| *Autochthony belief* | 3.57 | (1.23) | 121 | 25.79 | .90 | 4.13 | (1.08) | 225 | 244.16 | .87 |
| *Investment belief* | 2.68 | (0.97) | 121 | 13.27 | .80 | 2.89 | (1.06) | 225 | 2.52 | .68 |
| *Territorial compensation* | 3.53 | (0.99) | 120 | 34.57 | .89 | 4.11 | (0.76) | 224 | 477.52 | .79 |
| Perceived Indigenous ownership | 0.50 | (0.77) | 115 | 48.93 | | 1.23 | (1.11) | 202 | 447.22 | |
| Gender (0 = male) | .64 | | 118 | | | .67 | | 224 | | |
| Age (in years) | 38.26 | (18.25) | 116 | | | 43.45 | (16.71) | 219 | | |
| Political left-right orientation | 4.52 | (1.95) | 113 | 28.52 | | 4.62 | (1.87) | 201 | 44.91 | |
| Educational attainment | 2.37 | (1.14) | 119 | | | 1.85 | (1.32) | 214 | | |
| *Chilean identification* | 3.89 | (0.94) | 119 | 106.67 | .84 | 3.48 | (1.04) | 223 | 47.90 | .85 |
| *Mapuche identification* | 3.22 | (1.17) | 119 | 4.16 | .91 | 4.44 | (0.77) | 223 | 778.66 | .90 |

*Note.* Indicated mean for gender is the proportion. Latent variable names are italicized. The Wald tests test whether the mean is significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale (0.95 probability critical value = 3.84).

'I feel committed to other [Chileans/Mapuche]'; 'I have a lot in common with [other Chileans/Mapuche people]'; and 'I like to think of myself as a [Chilean/Mapuche]'. These were treated as latent constructs for the purpose of the measurement invariance test but were collapsed to mean scores for the structural model to ensure sufficient power.

### 3.3.2 Results

#### *Measurement model*

We performed a confirmatory factor analysis and tested for measurement invariance with autochthony, investment, territorial compensation, and Chilean and Mapuche identification. The fit was acceptable at the metric level, indicating the same factor structure and loadings in both groups ($\chi^2$ (263, $N$ = 347) = 464.21, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .066 [90% C.I. .056 .076], CFI/TLI = .919 / .906, SRMR = .075). All alternative factor structures had a worse fit, confirming that autochthony, investment, territorial compensation, and Chilean and Mapuche identification are separate constructs (see Table A3.2, Appendix A3).

#### *Descriptive findings*

The descriptive statistics and reliabilities (Table 3.3) and the bivariate correlations (Table 3.4) are displayed per group. The reliability of all latent variables was high, with the exception of the investment factor in the Mapuche sample, which was suboptimal (ρ = .68) and substantively lower than in the non-Indigenous sample (ρ = .80).

Comparing the mean scores against the midpoint of the respective scales, we found that on average, both non-Indigenous Chilean and Mapuche participants perceived Araucanía as belonging more to the Mapuche than to the non-Indigenous Chileans, and average support for territorial compensation was also relatively high in both groups (see Table 3.3). However, comparisons of means across groups showed that Mapuche participants endorsed both Indigenous ownership and territorial compensation

**Table 3.4**

*Bivariate correlations for non-Indigenous Chileans (below the diagonal,* N=*121) and Mapuche (above the diagonal,* N=*226), Study 2.*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | 07. | 08. | 09. | 10. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. *Autochthony belief* | — | .25** | .25** | -.17* | .29** | .31*** | .10 | .18* | -.16 | -.15* |
| 02. *Investment belief* | .15 | — | .06 | .09 | .13 | .15 | .15* | .12 | .04 | -.30*** |
| 03. *Territorial compensation* | .39*** | -.26* | — | -.28*** | .40*** | .44*** | -.05 | .21** | -.14 | -.26*** |
| 04. *Chilean identification* | -.19 | .31** | -.30* | — | .01 | -.25*** | -.14* | -.05 | .14* | .18* |
| 05. *Mapuche identification* | .39*** | .13 | .29** | .20 | — | .38*** | -.04 | .25*** | -.03 | -.21** |
| 06. Perceived Indigenous ownership | .40*** | -.01 | .53*** | -.24* | .28** | — | .00 | .30*** | -.15* | -.27*** |
| 07. Gender (0 = male) | -.08 | -.02 | .02 | -.16 | -.15 | -.03 | — | -.09 | -.11 | -.07 |
| 08. Age (in years) | .13 | .26** | -.06 | .28** | .37*** | .11 | -.20* | — | .06 | -.50*** |
| 09. Political left-right orientation | -.21 | .25** | -.37*** | .28** | -.19 | -.16 | -.08 | .12 | — | .08 |
| 10. Educational attainment | -.14 | -.18 | -.05 | -.05 | -.06 | -.05 | .12 | -.46*** | .17 | — |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Latent variable names are italicized.

more strongly than non-Indigenous Chileans (Wald (1) = 61.07, $p < .001$; 31.42, $p < .001$, respectively). On average both groups endorsed autochthony, but the Mapuche group did so more than the non-Indigenous group (Wald (1) = 17.76, $p < .001$). Finally, average endorsement of investment was slightly lower than the neutral midpoint in both groups, but not significantly so in the Mapuche group, and the means did not differ between the two groups (Wald (1) = 3.42, $p = .064$).

Most of the correlations were significant and in the expected direction. Notably, the correlation between investment and territorial compensation was not significant for the Mapuche group, whereas the correlation between investment and perceived Indigenous ownership was not significant for the non-Indigenous Chilean group.

***Explaining support for territorial compensation***

We ran a multi-group structural equation model regressing support for territorial compensation on perceived Indigenous ownership, autochthony, and investment, and regressing ownership on autochthony and investment. In a second model we controlled for gender, age, political orientation, educational attainment, and Chilean and Mapuche identification.

In the model without control variables (see Figure 3.1), endorsement of autochthony belief was related to believing that Araucanía belongs relatively more to Mapuche than to non-Indigenous Chileans, for both groups. Perceived Indigenous ownership was in turn associated with more support for territorial compensation, both in line with our expectations. Furthermore, in both groups, endorsement of investment belief was not significantly related to ownership perceptions, though in the non-Indigenous Chilean group it was directly negatively related to territorial compensation.

While the patterns of the results remained similar after the addition of the control variables, for Mapuche the relationship of autochthony belief with perceived Indigenous ownership was no longer significant ($B = .11$, $p = .082$; see Table A3.4, Appendix A3). Furthermore, for both groups, greater Chilean identification was associated with a weaker perception that the territory belonged to the Mapuche. For Mapuche, Chilean identification was also associated with lower support for territorial compensation. Finally, for Mapuche, identifying more strongly as Mapuche was strongly associated with believing that the territory belonged relatively more to the Mapuche, and with higher support for territorial compensation.

***Examining the effects of different types of investment***

Due to the suboptimal reliability of the investment belief factor in the Mapuche sample, we considered an alternative model for Mapuche. In this model we separately examined our three investment belief items, that we now respectively labelled country investment, development investment, and administrative investment.

First we considered a model without the control variables (see Figure 3.2). Interestingly, support for the notion that people who have contributed most to the development of a territory should be the ones most entitled to it, was associated with believing that the territory should belong more to Mapuche ($B = .14$, $p = .002$), and through perceived Indigenous ownership also indirectly with greater support for territorial compensation ($B = .04$, $p = .017$). At the same time, believing that administering a territory

**Figure 3.1**
*Structural equation model Study 2 without control variables, comparing non-Indigenous Chileans (N=121) and Mapuche (N=226).*




*Note:* Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets, and total effects between square brackets. Results for the Mapuche group are indicated in italics. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Figure 3.2**
*Structural equation model Study 2 without control variables for Mapuche participants (N=226).*




*Note:* Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets, and total effects between square brackets.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

makes one more entitled was associated with believing the territory should belong less to Mapuche and more to the non-Indigenous Chileans ($B$ = -.15, $p$ = .002), and indirectly with lower support for territorial compensation ($B$ = -.05, $p$ = .011). Country level investment did not play any role. These results largely held after the introduction of the control variables (see Table A3.5, Appendix A3), though the relationships became less strong, and the indirect effects were no longer significant.

#### 3.3.3 Discussion

In line with our expectations, we again found a positive relationship between autochthony belief and territorial compensation. Furthermore, we found for both groups that believing that the territory belonged more to the Mapuche than the non-Indigenous Chileans was associated with greater support for territorial compensation on behalf of the Mapuche, and this sense of territorial ownership largely explained the relationship between autochthony belief and territorial compensation.

The findings for investment were more equivocal. Whereas non-Indigenous Chileans who endorsed investment belief more were less supportive of territorial compensation, this was not explained by territorial ownership perceptions. Furthermore, Mapuche who endorsed investment belief in terms of administrative efforts saw the land as belonging relatively less to their ingroup and thus more to non-Indigenous Chileans, in line with one version of our hypothesis. However, to the extent that they endorsed the development aspect of investment, they perceived the territory to belong more to them than to non-Indigenous Chileans. This is in line with our alternative hypothesis about a positive relation between investment belief and Mapuche territorial ownership for the Mapuche participants and suggests that the Mapuche see themselves as the ones who have developed the territory of Araucanía.

## 3.4 General discussion

In the present chapter we examined Indigenous and non-Indigenous people's attitudes towards territorial compensation of the Indigenous group. We focused on the role of two specific general beliefs that people often rely on to infer ownership of places, and that might be particularly relevant in the context of territorial disputes in settler societies: autochthony belief (entitlements for first comers) and investment belief (entitlements for those who have invested in the land) (see Beggan & Brown, 1994; Geschiere, 2009). We furthermore examined whether the associations between these general beliefs and support for territorial compensation could be explained by perceptions of who is the rightful owner of a territory, namely the Indigenous or non-Indigenous group. We examined this in the Chilean context from the perspective of both non-Indigenous Chileans as well as the indigenous Mapuche and in relation to the region of Araucanía that is considered to be Mapuche ancestral territory.

Using samples of university students without Mapuche family (Study 1), and self-identified Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chilean participants (Study 2) we first showed that endorsement of autochthony belief was consistently—across studies and groups—related to higher support for territorial compensation on behalf of the Mapuche. This was

in line with our expectations, and with initial evidence among White Australians linking autochthony belief to support for institutional apology and financial compensation of Aboriginal Australians (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021). In Study 2 we additionally found that, for both groups, greater endorsement of autochthony belief was related to greater recognition of Mapuche territorial ownership relative to non-Indigenous Chilean ownership, and via these ownership perceptions, to higher support for territorial compensation. This suggests that in settler societies, endorsement of autochthony as a general belief indeed implies support for the primacy of Indigenous ownership. This finding is in line with previous experimental research among children showing that they infer ownership from first possession or first occupancy (Friedman et al., 2013; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). Importantly, we have provided first evidence that perceptions of Indigenous ownership go hand in hand with the request to return the territory to the Indigenous group, and that this holds for the Mapuche as well as non-Indigenous Chileans.

The findings for investment were more equivocal. We found that for university students without Mapuche family (Study 1), and non-Indigenous Chileans (Study 2) endorsement of investment belief was related to less support for territorial compensation on behalf of the Mapuche. However, while we expected that this opposition to territorial compensation would be the result of greater perceived non-Indigenous ownership, we did not find support for a mediation of investment through perceived territorial ownership. In turn, for Mapuche participants, there was no overall relation of investment with territorial compensation.

However, given that the measure of investment belief was not very reliable for the Mapuche group (Study 2), in addition to analyzing overall endorsement, we separately investigated three different aspects of investment belief: country investment ('building the country'), development investment ('developing the territory'), and administrative investment ('administering the territory'). Our results indicate that Mapuche perceived a clear difference between investing by administrating and investing by developing a territory. When Mapuche participants endorsed administrative investment more, they more strongly perceived Araucanía as belonging to non-Indigenous Chileans rather than Mapuche, which was in turn related to lower support for territorial compensation. The reverse was true for Mapuche endorsement of development investment which was associated with feeling that Araucanía belonged more to Mapuche than to non-Indigenous Chileans, and indirectly with stronger support for territorial compensation on behalf of the Mapuche.

Across both studies and groups, we found that endorsement of autochthony belief more strongly and consistently related to support for territorial compensation than endorsement of investment belief. These findings may be due to the inherent difference between autochthony and investment beliefs: whereas there is only one way to be autochthonous (be there first), there are many ways to invest into a territory. This suggests that autochthony belief might be a more relevant guiding belief than investment belief, especially in contexts such as settler societies, where the first arrival of Indigenous groups is generally not contested.

### 3.4.1 Theoretical and practical implications

In this article, we aimed to compare Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chileans endorsement of different beliefs about territorial ownership. Due to the challenges associated with collecting data among Indigenous participants, we used existing data in the first study, where we only selected non-Indigenous participants for analysis. For the second study we managed to collect samples of non-Indigenous Chilean participants and Mapuche participants, both in Araucanía and in Santiago. It is much more difficult to collect data among Mapuche participants than among non-Indigenous participants for several reasons. Formal contact between researchers and Mapuche communities needs to be established, and research teams need to spend a significant amount of time in the communities in order to obtain the data. Moreover, the current situation surrounding Mapuche communities in the south of Chile creates high levels of distrust towards actors that are not part of the communities. Furthermore, Study 2 was part of a research project financed by a state agency and this further decreased intentions of participation among Mapuche people, due to distrust regarding who will have access to the data and people's opinions of the Chilean state. Even though we explained that the research team does not provide the State (or any such entity) with access to the data, there were still many potential participants who rejected to participate. For a detailed description of this issue, please see (Figueiredo et al., 2020 ). Despite the challenges of the data collection, the diverging findings across the two groups highlight the added value of collecting data amongst Indigenous communities.

Our research may have consequences for policies and strategies aimed at resolving territorial conflicts. Considering the significant economic interests in the region due to forestry and hydroelectrical projects (Meza-Lopehandía, 2019), the difficulties of either having the legal documents or economic means to formalize a judicial case provide a bleak scenario for the possibility of the Mapuche to recover their ancestral territory without significant popular support among both non-Indigenous and Indigenous Chileans. Our results indicate that strategies that help further emphasize the first-occupancy or territorial investment of Indigenous Peoples are likely to broadly increase support for territorial compensation. Such strategies could include (increased) attention to Indigenous history in education, or the official constitutional recognition of Indigenous Peoples. While many countries have recognized Indigenous Peoples in their constitutions, Chile remains the only country in South America where Indigenous Peoples have not received constitutional recognition. Given the process of constitutional change that is now occurring in Chile, it will be interesting to see whether the rights and demands of the Mapuche people will be consecrated in the new constitution and how this recognition may play a role in the dynamics of territorial ownership over Araucanía.

### 3.4.2 Limitations and directions for future research

Our findings on the different aspects of investment belief raise many interesting questions for future research, which could be further examined in two ways. First, people can feel that both groups involved in a territorial conflict have invested in the territory, and therefore their endorsement of investment belief would lead them to feel that both groups are entitled to the territory. This may explain why we did not find

a relationship between non-Indigenous Chileans' endorsement of investment belief and their perceptions of territorial ownership. If they believed that both Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chileans have invested in the territory, they would feel that both groups are entitled to the territory. In other words, endorsement of investment would be related to higher perceived ingroup *and* outgroup ownership, which cannot be captured with a single item difference score. Our measurement of perceptions of territorial ownership with a single difference item (non-Indigenous Chilean ownership versus Mapuche ownership) means that we could not examine this in more detail in this study. Our findings provide a first indication of the importance of perceptions on territorial ownership in settler societies, and future research could investigate perceptions of ingroup and outgroup ownership separately to examine this further.

Second, to examine the differences in the dimensions of investment further, future research could consider the dimensions and interpretations of investment belief examined here in more detail and measure them with multiple items and using qualitative methods. In addition to these, future research could also examine investment through taking care of the land (e.g., guardianship, or *kaitiakitanga*, see Kawharu, 2000), and investment through different ways of utilizing the land (e.g., utilitarian usage vs. social identity use of the land). The effects of different types of investment belief might be stronger when they are measured in more detail, which would also make it possible to compare these dimensions of investment more thoroughly to the effect of autochthony belief.

Our findings show that Chilean and Mapuche identification were differently associated with perceived Indigenous ownership and support for territorial compensation in both groups. This finding is similar to previous research which found a negative association between ethnic identification and intentions to reconcile with the outgroup (Storz et al., 2020). Future research could investigate the role of ethnic identification in more depth by examining whether it could moderate the relationships between the principles of ownership and perceived territorial ownership. Furthermore, the direction of this moderation may differ for Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups. For example, consider our finding that both groups perceive more Indigenous ownership as a result of more strongly supporting autochthony beliefs: for the Indigenous group it may be that only those who highly identify with their ethnic group would show this link, while for non-Indigenous groups it would instead be low-identifiers.

Future research could also examine possible mediators and moderators that can help further examine the links between the principles of ownership and perceived territorial ownership and support for compensation. Based on our findings and previous research, two directions seem particularly relevant. First, previous research in Australia has found that for White Australians, higher support for autochthony was related to perceiving more collective guilt and shame, which was in turn related to greater support for compensating Indigenous Australians (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021). This research suggests that when non-Indigenous people perceiving more Indigenous ownership of land, they may perceive the appropriation of Indigenous lands as having been illegitimate. Consequently, collective guilt and shame may mediate

between perceived territorial ownership and support for compensation for Indigenous peoples.

Finally, we have shown the importance of autochthony and investment as general beliefs. Future research could also consider people's perceptions of which group(s) arrived first and which invested more (and in what way) and examine interactions between these perceptions and the general beliefs. It could be the case that autochthony and investment beliefs particularly guide territorial ownership inferences in relation to target groups who are seen as, respectively, having arrived first, and having invested more. Whereas first-arrival is less debatable in settler societies than a group's investment, there have been incidents of a denial of Indigenous Peoples' first arrival, such as by the Australian senator Leyonhjelm (Yaxley, 2015), who has claimed that Australia's Aboriginal peoples might not descend from the original group that first arrived in Australia. Furthermore, there are other contexts where first arrival is more contested. For example, both Albanians and Serbs claim Kosovo by right of first occupancy, while simultaneously denying the other group's claim (Daskalovski, 2004).

### 3.4.3 Conclusion

With the present research we have provided first evidence that first occupancy (i.e., autochthony) and investment beliefs, as general beliefs, can inform territorial ownership perceptions and, indirectly, support for territorial compensation in settler societies. Whereas endorsement of autochthony belief was consistently related to greater support for territorial compensation among both Mapuche and non-Indigenous Chileans, endorsement of investment belief was related to less support for territorial compensation among non-Indigenous Chileans, and, depending on the type of investment, with either more or less support for territorial compensation among Mapuche. These findings show that endorsement of autochthony belief is an argument that validates Indigenous ownership among both groups, whereas different dimensions of the investment belief can be used by both groups to claim more positive outcomes for their own ingroup.

# Chapter 4.

## Collective psychological ownership and territorial compensation in Australia and South Africa[17]

Collective psychological ownership as a sense that a territory belongs to a group might explain attitudes of the White majority towards territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples in settler societies. Ownership can be inferred from different general principles, and we considered three key principles: autochthony (entitlements from first arrival), investment (entitlements from working the land), and formation (primacy of the territory in forming the collective identity). In two studies, among White Australians (Study 1, *N*=475), and White South Africans (Study 2, *N*=879), we investigated how support for these general principles was related to perceived ingroup (Anglo-Celtic/White South African) and outgroup (Indigenous Australian/Black South African) territorial ownership, and indirectly, to attitudes toward territorial compensation for the Indigenous outgroup. Endorsement of autochthony was related to stronger support for territorial compensation through higher perceived outgroup ownership, whereas investment was related to lower support through higher perceived ingroup ownership. Agreement with the formation principle was related to stronger support for compensation through higher outgroup ownership, and simultaneously to lower support through higher ingroup ownership.



17 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been published as: Nooitgedagt, W., Martinović, B., Verkuyten, M., & Maseko, S. (2021). Collective psychological ownership and territorial compensation in Australia and South Africa. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220221211051024 Wybren Nooitgedagt designed the studies, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Sibusiso Maseko collected the data for the second study and was involved in the design of that study. Borja Martinović and Maykel Verkuyten were involved in the study design and theorizing, and all co-authors critically reviewed the manuscript.

## 4.1 Introduction

> *'It is my father's land, my grandfather's land, my grandmother's land. I am related to it, it gives me my identity'* ~ Father Dave Passi, plaintiff in the landmark 'Mabo' case on the land rights of the Indigenous Meriam People in Australia (Graham, 1989, 0:02:08).

In this quote, Father Dave Passi explains why he fights for the recognition of Indigenous ownership over the Mer islands in Australia by emphasizing his ancestral connection to the land and the importance of the land for defining who he is. These arguments reflect some of the general beliefs, or principles, that people use for inferring and claiming ownership of territories. Three principles are proposed to be particularly relevant: ownership derived from primo-occupancy (autochthony), from historically investing in and developing the land (investment), and from the formative meaning of the territory for the group identity (formation) (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Gans, 2001; Geschiere, 2009; Murphy, 1990; Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

Debates about land ownership of Indigenous Peoples are prominent in settler societies, such as Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa, that were colonized by White Europeans. The original (Indigenous) inhabitants call for the return of their ancestral lands and claim compensations, while the descendants of White settlers can argue that they have invested and developed the land into what it is today. These debates about land ownership exist not only between original inhabitants and Whites, but also within the White group. Because of the more powerful position of Whites in settler societies, the latter debates are particularly important for territorial compensation, i.e., the restitution of Indigenous lands and the rights associated with the land. Some Whites might be inclined to give territorial compensation to original inhabitants because these inhabitants were 'here first' and were formed by the land, and therefore own the land more than the White group. However, other Whites might be reluctant to give compensation because they feel that their group owns the territory based on the believe that they have developed the land and were also formed by it. Thus, the degree to which White people endorse the general principles of autochthony, investment, and formation can be expected to matter for inferring ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership and thereby for their attitude towards territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples.

We examined whether Whites' endorsement of the general principles of autochthony, investment, and formation are indeed related to perceptions of ingroup (White) and outgroup (Indigenous) ownership of the territory, and via these ownership perceptions, to support for territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples. We focus on two settler societies—Australia (Study 1) and South Africa (Study 2)—which allows us to compare the findings across two different contexts. In Australia, White Europeans are the numerical majority, whereas in South Africa, they represent a numerical minority. Furthermore, White Europeans in both contexts have a powerful position in regard to land: In Australia, they are the dominant group in society, and while White South Africans are not the politically dominant group in South Africa, they do continue to hold the majority of land.

### 4.1.1 Collective psychological ownership and support for territorial compensation

Ownership is a key aspect of social reality that structures relationships between individuals and groups. Ownership involves a bundle of rights that one holds towards others, including the right to determine what happens to that which is owned (Merrill, 1998). People can have a sense of ownership which involves the perception that a certain object or place belongs to someone with absolute rights over that which is owned (Pierce et al., 2003). A sense of ownership implies, for example, the right to occupy, use, profit from, sell and exclude others and thereby structures the relationships between people in relation to those rights (Blumenthal, 2010). Thus, a sense of ownership involves not only a connection to what is owned but importantly also relationships between individuals in relation to the things that are owned. Ownership involves a social arrangement in which individuals refrain from taking or using what belongs to someone else.

Furthermore, just as people can feel that they personally own something ('mine'), they can also think that something belongs to their group ('ours'). This is referred to as collective psychological ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2011b), such as ownership of territories like 'our beach' (Due & Riggs, 2008), 'our neighborhood' (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020), and 'our country' (Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021; Storz et al., 2020). Collective ownership structures relationships between groups in relation to what is owned. People do not only have a sense of what belongs to their own group, but can also recognize other groups as owners with the related entitlements and rights.

People possess enhanced memory for ownership relations (DeScioli et al., 2015) and the recognition of other's ownership already develops at a young age (Kanngiesser et al., 2020). Children spontaneously reference ownership to explain why it is, or is not, acceptable for someone to use an object owned by others (Nancekivell & Friedman, 2017). Furthermore, children argue that things that were lost and found or that were taken away should be returned to the owner (Rossano et al., 2011), and that the owner should be compensated when something is damaged, broken or stolen. Taking someone's property without permission is generally considered theft, and research shows that children develop an understanding of this at a young age and think that stolen property should be returned to the owner (Blake & Harris, 2009). When people feel that the group they perceive as owners of a territory in fact does not have the rights over that territory, they will desire changes in land ownership and entitlements in order to resolve this. Thus, we expect that, for Whites, perceiving a territory as rightfully belonging more to the outgroup (the Indigenous group), will be associated with being more supportive of territorial compensation for the Indigenous group (*H1*). At the same time, perceiving a territory as rightfully belonging more to the ingroup (Whites) should be related to less support for territorial compensation (*H2*).

### 4.1.2 Principles of ownership

A sense of collective ownership and the related ownership claims can be based on different principles (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017). In non-settler societies, members of the dominant group may feel that their group owns the territory because they arrived first, invested most, and are formed by the land. However, in settler societies there are groups with different histories of arrival, and the different principles of ownership

may therefore relate to perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership in different ways. In such a context, Whites are likely to recognize that Indigenous Peoples arrived first, whereas they may simultaneously believe that their ingroup has invested more, and that the identities of both groups are formed by the land. Thus, depending on the specific principle, White people may either see their ingroup or the outgroup as being more entitled to the territory (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). We focused on the endorsement of autochthony, investment, and identity formation as principles for inferring ownership and we measured these as general beliefs, independently of the particular intergroup context.

First, one of the most basic and pervasive principles for inferring ownership is first-possession (of objects) or first-occupancy (of territories). Entitlements and rights derived from first-occupancy (autochthony) are often perceived as self-evident or even 'natural' (Geschiere, 2009) and are central in so-called 'Sons of the soil' conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2011). Research shows that in the absence of additional information on the ownership of an object, people assume that the first person seen to possess it, is its owner (Friedman et al., 2013), and experimental research has shown that children infer territorial ownership from first arrival (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015). Support for autochthony belief should therefore relate to seeing the primo-occupant group of a territory as relatively more entitled to ownership of that territory.

The majority of previous research on autochthony belief has focused on contexts where the dominant majority group is also considered the first occupant of the territory. In these contexts, majority support for autochthony belief relates to seeing their ingroup as more entitled to ownership, and this rhetoric has indeed been used in various contexts. For example, in Côte D'Ivoire and Cameroon autochthony has been used to exclude ethnic groups that allegedly arrived later from political participation (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005), and majority support for autochthony belief is associated with negative attitudes towards newcomers in the Netherlands (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013), as well as with support for movements defending the majority status quo in Malaysia (Selvanathan et al., 2021).

In contrast, in settler societies, support for autochthony belief should undermine settler territorial ownership. Anthropological research has shown that ownership claims based on first-occupancy have indeed been used by some Indigenous Peoples to resist and challenge occupation (Gagné & Salaün, 2012). Furthermore, although the autochthony principle undermines settlers' territorial ownership claims, research shows that people generally do not try to deny the validity of this principle (Gans, 2001). In fact, experimental research in relation to real and disputed territories has shown that people recognize first arrival as a valid argument for claiming land ownership not only when their own group arrived first but also when a rival outgroup is presented as the first occupant (Martinović et al., 2020). Furthermore, research in Chile has shown that support for the autochthony principle by the White majority is related to stronger support for territorial compensation for Indigenous People because the latter group is seen as owning the land relatively more (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021). We add to this previous research by examining how endorsement of the principle of autochthony relates to ingroup and

outgroup ownership separately. We expect that higher endorsement of this principle is related to *more* support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous group (*H3a*), both via higher perceived outgroup (Indigenous) ownership (*H3b*) and lower ingroup (non-Indigenous) ownership (*H3c*).

Second, creating an object or investing time, effort, and resources into changing and developing it, is also an important general principle for inferring and claiming ownership. For example, experimental research in different countries has shown that people judge that the creator of an object owns it (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Kanngiesser et al., 2014; Levene et al., 2015). Past investment into a territory or contributing to the cultivation of the land can similarly be used to infer and claim territorial ownership (Banner, 2005) or to recognize another group as a rightful owner. Furthermore, experimental research has found that children perceive their own investment into an object as a legitimate reason for transferring ownership from the first-possessor to themselves (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). Additionally, other experimental research (Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014) has shown that when asked to judge in a conflict between first-possessor and investor over the ownership of an object, most people assign ownership to the one who invested in it (but see Hook, 1993).

In line with these findings, the investment principle has been used by settlers to claim territorial ownership. For example, in Australia the usurpation of Indigenous lands was long justified with the assertion that it was *terra nullius*, 'nobody's land' (Short, 2014), and in South Africa the 'empty or vacant land theory' was propagated by European settlers to support their claims to land (Boisen, 2017; Crais, 1991). In both cases, ownership of land was considered to originate from (long-term) cultivation of the land and because the colonizers claimed that Indigenous Peoples did not cultivate the lands, they argued that they did also not own it[18]. Research has found that White majority members in Chile who endorsed the investment principle were less supportive of territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021), and White Australians endorsing this principle were less supportive of the Invasion Day protests against the celebration of the foundation date of modern Australia (Selvanathan et al., 2021). We separately examined the role of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions in the association between the endorsement of the investment principle and support for territorial compensation. We expect that stronger endorsement of this principle is related to *less* support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous group (*H4a*), via lower perceived outgroup (Indigenous) ownership (*H4b*) and also higher perceived ingroup (non-Indigenous) ownership (*H4c*).

Third, ownership claims can be based on the constitutive role of the land in forming the identity of the group (Toft, 2014). For example, Jewish people claim territorial ownership rights of Israel because the land was of primary importance in forming the Jewish identity (Gans, 2001). Furthermore, Indigenous Peoples often feel that their identities are strongly connected to the land (Giguère et al., 2012), and they emphasize

18 The vacant land myth in South Africa additionally posits that South Africa was settled by Europeans and Bantu-speaking Africans at roughly the same time (Crais, 1991), which is akin to denying primo-occupancy rather than denying the legitimacy of claiming ownership based on primo-occupancy.

the importance of this connection in territorial conflicts (Banerjee, 2000; Kana'iaupuni & Malone, 2006). At the same time, descendants of White settlers can also feel that they belong to the land and that the land has profoundly shaped who and what they are, such as with Afrikaners in South Africa (Verwey & Quayle, 2012) and among White Australians (Moran, 2002). We therefore expect that Whites' stronger endorsement of the formation principle will be related to both higher perceived outgroup (Indigenous) ownership as well as higher ingroup (non-Indigenous) ownership (*H5a*). Consequently, we expect that stronger endorsement of the formation principle is related to *more* support for territorial compensation through higher outgroup ownership (*H5b*), and simultaneously to *less* support for territorial compensation through higher ingroup ownership (*H5c*).

#### 4.1.3 Research context: Australia and South Africa

To test our hypotheses, we draw evidence from two countries with a colonial history, Australia and South Africa, where we examine the perspectives of Whites (Anglo-Celtic Australians[19] and White South Africans) on territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples.

In Australia, the conflict over ownership of Indigenous lands has been shaped by the official overturning of *terra nullius* in the landmark Mabo case (Strelein, 2005), which resulted in the recognition that some Indigenous Australians continue to hold rights in land and water according to their traditional laws and customs (native title). Native title claims can be made on land owned by the government (National Native Title Tribunal, 2021) and can co-exist with non-Indigenous property rights, such as pastoral stations. Granting native title over a certain area has relatively few consequences for non-Indigenous Australians but it is not without controversy in Australia and it is not supported by all White Australians (Pedersen et al., 2000).

In South Africa, land ownership is highly divided by race as a consequence of centuries of colonialization and apartheid, and White South Africans own the majority of the land (South African Government, 2018). In an attempt to ameliorate racial inequalities related to land ownership, the first law passed by South Africa's first post-apartheid government was the Restitution of Lands Rights Act (South African Government, 2021). This law sought to catalyze a process of land restitution to those who were dispossessed of land based on their race, based on a principle of 'willing buyer, willing seller'. Opinions on land redistribution in South Africa are highly divided by race: Research shows that while only about a third of White South Africans support land redistribution, it is supported by more than 80% of Black South Africans (Gibson, 2010). Furthermore, the pace of land reform has been much slower than anticipated (Lahiff, 2007), and in recent years, land expropriation without compensation has been proposed as a solution to speeding up this process (Makhado, 2012). This possibility is currently being discussed in the South African parliament (Felix, 2021), and it has been quite controversial. For

19 Though the term 'Anglo-Celtic Australian' is commonly used in Australia, it is not necessarily endorsed by all groups that fall under it. However, we chose to recruit participants based on whether they self-identified as 'Anglo-Celtic Australian' rather than a broader sample of 'European Australians', or a narrower sample of 'Anglo-Australians', in order to target the largest group of participants who could view themselves as having some link to the original colonizers and the Crown.

example, the prominent White South African civil society organization, AfriForum, labelled land redistribution without compensation as being racist (AfriForum, 2019).

In summary, both countries have been colonized by European settlers, Indigenous Peoples have lost much of the land, and the ongoing conflict over the ownership of land continues to shape relations between groups. However, there are also important differences between the countries that affect the conflicts around territorial compensation. One difference is the relative power and size of the groups involved. Anglo-Celtic Australians (56.4%) currently constitute the majority of Australians, while Indigenous Australians (~2.8%)[20] comprise a small minority (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016, 2017b). In contrast, White South Africans comprise a minority of South Africans (7.8%) while Black South Africans (80.8%) comprise a majority (Statistics South Africa, 2020). While political power is no longer the privilege of White South Africans, they do continue to hold the majority of land. Another country difference is the nature of (the debate about) territorial compensation. In Australia, this concerns land owned by the government, while in South Africa the redistribution of land specifically concerns privately held lands.

## 4.2 Study 1

### 4.2.1 Method

***Data and participants***

Participants for Study 1 were recruited by an international research consultancy agency (Qualtrics), which aggregated 45 Australian panels. The data collection targeted Australians with at least one parent of Anglo-Celtic origin (English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish). Anglo-Celtic Australians comprise the majority of the White population in Australia and being Anglo is often portrayed as a core part of being Australian (Walton et al., 2018). Due to concerns about the potential sample size, foreign born Australians of Anglo-Celtic descent were also targeted, and seventy-three participants (15.3%) were not born in Australia. Twenty participants indicated that they had some Indigenous ancestry, and their data was therefore removed from the sample. The final sample was 475. Approximately two-thirds of the participants had two parents of Anglo-Celtic origin (65.2%). Of those with one parent of Anglo-Celtic origin, the second parent had other European roots in 80% of cases[21]. There were an equal number of women and men in the sample, and one participant identified their gender as other. Ages ranged from 18 to 85 ($M$ = 41, $SD$ = 16.14). Incentives for participating differed depending on the panel, but participants were generally awarded points which could later be redeemed for gift cards, SkyMiles, etcetera.

20 We use the term Indigenous Australians to refer to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples throughout this chapter.

21 Of the remaining participants, 22 indicated they had Asian heritage, 6 African, 4 South American, and 8 indicated other ancestry.

***Measures***

Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were measured using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = 'completely disagree' to 7 = 'completely agree', so that higher scores on the items indicate stronger support. Importantly, the three ownership principles were measured as general justifying beliefs without referring to the specific intergroup context.

*Autochthony belief* was measured with three items that have been previously used in research on autochthony in the Netherlands (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013), Great Britain (Nijs, Martinović, Ford, et al., 2021), and Australia (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021): 'Every territory belongs primarily to its first inhabitants'; 'Those who arrived first in a territory can be considered to own it more'; and '"We were here first" is a good argument for determining who owns the territory'.

*Investment belief* was measured with three items designed to be similar in general formulation to the autochthony items: 'A territory primarily belongs to the people who made it prosper'; 'The ones who developed the territory can be seen as its rightful owners'; and '"We made the territory into what it is today" is a good argument for determining who owns the territory'.

*Formation belief* was also measured with three similarly phrased items: 'A territory primarily belongs to the people who were shaped by it into who they are today'; 'A territory belongs to those whose identity is most connected to it'; and '"This territory has made us into who we are" is a good argument for determining who owns the territory'.

*Collective psychological ownership*, the extent to which participants believe that a group is the owner of Australia, was measured using two sets of three items, one set in relation to the ingroup (Anglo-Celtic Australians), and one set in relation to the outgroup (Indigenous Australians). We designed these items for the purposes of this study, based on a measure assessing collective psychological ownership in organizations (Pierce et al., 2018). The three items were 'In your opinion, how much does Australia belong to [group]?'; 'To what extent do you consider each of the following groups the rightful owner of Australia?'; and 'How strongly would you say that each of these groups has the right to claim Australia more for themselves?' Participants answered each question for each group on a scale ranging from 1 = 'not at all' to 7 = 'very much' and were instructed that giving groups the same score meant that they felt that Australia belongs to the two groups to the same degree.

*Support for territorial compensation* was measured with 3 items, which we based on the debates surrounding territorial compensation (see: Banerjee, 2000; Mercer, 1997): 'Indigenous Australians' interests regarding the usage of their lands should matter more than any industrial or commercial interest'; 'We should compensate Indigenous Australians for resources mined on their land'; 'I believe that Indigenous Australians should get complete sovereignty in their lands'.

We controlled for four standard demographic variables: *gender* (0 = 'male', 1 = 'female'), *age* (in years), *educational attainment* as a continuous variable ('year 10 or less'; 'year 12'; 'certificate or diploma'; 'bachelor level'; 'postgraduate level'), and the often used *political self-placement scale* (ranging from 1 = 'strongly left' to 5 = 'strongly right', see Jost, 2006).

We considered that participants who were not born in Australia, or who have only one Anglo-Celtic parent, might feel differently about collective ownership of Australia, and may also differ in their support for compensation. We therefore controlled for *country of birth* (0 = 'born abroad', 1 = 'born in Australia') and *parents' ethnicity* (0 = 'one Anglo-Celtic parent', 1 = 'both parents Anglo-Celtic').

### 4.2.2 Results

#### *Measurement model*

We performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in Mplus (version 8) to test whether the latent factors *autochthony*, *investment*, and *formation belief*, *ingroup* and *outgroup collective psychological ownership*, and *territorial compensation* were empirically distinct constructs. Modification indices suggested freeing the error covariance between the third items of the collective ownership scales that introduced both groups ('How strongly would you say that each of these groups has the right to claim Australia more for themselves?'). Freeing this error covariance resulted in a model fit which was significantly better ($\Delta df = 1$, $\Delta\chi^2 = 90.73$, $p < .001$) and acceptable ($\chi^2(119, N = 476) = 292.43$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .055 [90% CI .047 .063], CFI = .949, TLI .934, SRMR = .062).

We assessed scale reliability using composite reliability (ρ, see Raykov, 2016) in order to account for measurement error, and all factors were highly reliable (see Table 4.1). For verifying that the factors represented distinct constructs, we estimated alternative models where we forced any two of the ownership principles to load on one factor, as well as a model where all three principles were forced to load on a single factor, and a model where both collective ownership factors form a single factor. All alternative factor specifications yielded a significantly worse fit, which supports our assertion that the factors represent empirically distinct constructs (see Table A4.1, Appendix A4).

#### *4.2.2.2 Descriptive results*

Bivariate correlations, descriptive statistics, and composite reliability scores for the main variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.1. The mean scores show that, on average, support for autochthony and formation belief were around the neutral midpoint of their respective scales, and support for investment belief was significantly higher than the neutral midpoint. This indicates that these beliefs are recognized as principles for inferring ownership. Furthermore, support for both perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership were also significantly above the neutral midpoints, and support for outgroup territorial ownership was higher than support for ingroup ownership (Wald (1) = 31.90, $p < .001$). Finally, support for territorial compensation for Indigenous Australians was also significantly above the neutral midpoint of the scale.

Autochthony, formation, and investment belief were all positively and significantly correlated. Multicollinearity between these factors was not a concern (autochthony VIF 1.09; formation VIF 2.24; investment VIF 2.12). Most of the other bivariate correlations between the main variables were significant and in the expected directions. Autochthony belief positively correlated with outgroup ownership, but not significantly with ingroup ownership. Investment belief was positively associated with ingroup ownership but not significantly with outgroup ownership. Stronger support for formation belief was positively correlated with both ingroup and outgroup ownership. Furthermore, ingroup

**Table 4.1**

*Bivariate correlations, descriptive statistics and composite reliability scores for the main variables used in the analysis in Study 1 (*N*=475).*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | *M* | *SD* | Wald(1) | ρ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Autochthony belief | — | | | | | 4.34 | (1.35) | 0.75 | .81 |
| 2. Formation belief | .29*** | — | | | | 4.39 | (1.20) | 0.06 | .77 |
| 3. Investment belief | .17** | .73*** | — | | | 4.18 | (1.42) | 9.45 | .89 |
| 4. Perceived ingroup ownership | .03 | .54*** | .58*** | — | | 4.49 | (1.43) | 4.43 | .89 |
| 5. Perceived outgroup ownership | .47*** | .13* | -.04 | .12 | — | 5.28 | (1.27) | 30.75 | .86 |
| 6. Territorial compensation | .57*** | .02 | -.17** | -.26*** | .59*** | 4.29 | (1.57) | 15.00 | .85 |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). The Wald tests test whether the mean is significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale (0.95 probability critical value = 3.841).

ownership was negatively associated with territorial compensation and outgroup ownership positively. There was no significant correlation between ingroup and outgroup ownership, which indicates that these are distinctive and not mutually exclusive.

***Support for territorial compensation in Australia***

We estimated a structural equation model in Mplus (version 8) in which we examined whether support for territorial compensation is related to autochthony, formation, and investment beliefs through perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership. We accounted for missing values using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). The indirect effects were tested by means of the significance of all individual coefficients (also known as the joint-significance test), as well as bootstrapping procedures with 10,000 samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2018). A 95% confidence interval (CI) which does not include 0, as well as significance of both coefficients, indicates a significant indirect effect. We controlled for gender, age, educational attainment, political orientation, whether participants were born in Australia, and parents' ethnicity, in relation to the dependent variable and the mediating variables. The unstandardized coefficients for this model are presented in Table 4.2 and the standardized coefficients of the main paths of the structural equation model are presented in Figure 4.1.

As expected, and in line with *H1* and *H2*, stronger endorsement of ingroup ownership was significantly associated with less support for territorial compensation, and outgroup ownership was associated with more support. Furthermore, the total relation between endorsement of autochthony belief and support for territorial compensation was significant and positive, in line with *H3a*. Higher endorsement of autochthony belief was significantly associated with less support for ingroup ownership and with more support for outgroup ownership. Finally, consistent with *H3b* and *H3c*, autochthony belief was indirectly associated with *more* support for territorial compensation through lower ingroup ownership and higher outgroup ownership, unstandardized 95% CIs [.00, .08], [.13, .29], respectively.

In contrast to autochthony, and consistent with *H4a*, the total relationship of investment belief with territorial compensation was significant and negative. Stronger

**Table 4.2**

*Structural Equation Model Study 1, for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation through perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership (*N = *475).*

| | Perceived ingroup ownership | | Perceived outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | -.11* | (.05) | .45*** | (.06) | .36*** | (.06) |
| Formation belief | .29** | (.09) | .19* | (.09) | .08 | (.09) |
| Investment belief | .37*** | (.09) | -.22* | (.09) | -.04 | (.08) |
| Perceived ingroup ownership | | | | | -.29*** | (.06) |
| Perceived outgroup ownership | | | | | .41*** | (.06) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | .04* | (.02) |
| Autochthony belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .21*** | (.04) |
| Formation belief → Ingroup ownership→ | | | | | -.11* | (.04) |
| Formation belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .11† | (.05) |
| Investment belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.12** | (.04) |
| Investment belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | -.10* | (.05) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | .64*** | (.07) |
| Formation belief | | | | | .10 | (.13) |
| Investment belief | | | | | -.27** | (.10) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | -.04 | (.04) | .08† | (.04) | .05 | (.04) |
| Age (in years) | .11** | (.04) | -.05 | (.04) | -.11** | (.04) |
| Educational attainment | .01 | (.05) | -.05 | (.06) | -.13** | (.05) |
| Political left-right orientation | -.01 | (.04) | -.06 | (.05) | .07† | (.04) |
| Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | .03 | (.04) | -.02 | (.04) | -.02 | (.04) |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | .08* | (.04) | .02 | (.05) | .01 | (.04) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

endorsement of the investment belief was associated with more ingroup ownership and less outgroup ownership. In line with *H4b* and *H4c*, investment belief was indirectly associated with *less* support for territorial compensation through both ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, [-.21, -.05], [-.22, -.01], respectively.

The total relationship between formation belief and territorial compensation was not significant. The lack of a significant total relationship can be explained through the relationships between formation belief and ingroup and outgroup ownership: Stronger

**Figure 4.1**
*Structural equation model Study 1, with standardized coefficients (N=475).*




*Note:* The total effects of autochthony, formation, and investment belief are displayed between square brackets. Residual covariances between latent variables are displayed in italics. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

endorsement of formation belief was associated with both higher ingroup ownership and higher outgroup ownership, which was consistent with *H5a*. Furthermore, in line with *H5b* and *H5c*, formation belief was significantly indirectly associated with *less* support for territorial compensation through ingroup ownership [-.22, -.04], and with *more* support for territorial compensation through outgroup ownership [.01, .22].

Finally, most of the control variables were not significantly related to support for territorial compensation or with ingroup or outgroup ownership. Age was associated with greater support for ingroup ownership and less support for territorial compensation. Having two (rather than one) Anglo-Celtic parent was associated with greater support for ingroup ownership. The coefficients of the main paths of the model were not substantively different in a model without control variables (see Table A4.2, Appendix A4).

### 4.2.3 Discussion

Study 1 provides first empirical evidence for the importance of three ownership principles for perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership and support for territorial compensation among Whites in Australia. Autochthony and investment principles had contrasting effects: whereas endorsement of the general principle of autochthony was related to more support for territorial compensation via higher Indigenous and lower White ownership, endorsement of the investment principle was related to less support for territorial compensation via lower Indigenous and higher White ownership. To the extent participants endorsed the formative principle, however, they considered both their ingroup and the Indigenous outgroup as owning Australia more, and therefore formative principle was not decisive in the question of territorial compensation.

## 4.3 Study 2

The aim of Study 2 was to replicate the findings from Study 1 in South Africa as a different national context. The question of territorial compensation is an ongoing issue in this country but the context differs in terms of the nature of the political debate surrounding territorial compensation (Banerjee, 2000; Gibson, 2010) and the fact that Whites are a numerical minority in South Africa and Black South Africans the majority.

### 4.3.1 Method

#### *Data and participants*

Participants for Study 2 were recruited among White students from the University of South Africa in 2020. The university's IT department sent invitation emails to White undergraduate and graduate students registered for various degrees. Students who consented to taking part after reading the invitation email were redirected to the online survey. There was no incentive for participating in the survey. In total, 889 participants completed the survey. We excluded participants who indicated that they were not South African ($N = 10$)[22], which left a remaining sample of 879 White South African participants.

22 A further 102 participants did not answer the question on their nationality. An additional analysis in which these participants were excluded did not substantively differ from the analysis with the full sample, see Table A4.5, Appendix A4.

Roughly two-thirds of the participants identified as female ($N$ = 548), one third as male ($N$ = 212), and 12 participants identified their gender as other. Ages ranged from 18 to 73 ($M$ = 30, $SD$ = 11).

***Measures***

*Autochthony*, *investment*, and *formation belief* were measured with the same items and the same 7-point scale as in Study 1. *Collective psychological ownership* was also measured with the same scale as in Study 1, and the items differed only in that they referred to South Africa instead of Australia, and White and Black South Africans instead of Anglo-Celtic and Indigenous Australians.

*Support for territorial compensation* was measured with 2 items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = 'completely disagree' to 7 = 'completely agree'. We based these items on the items from Study 1 and adapted them to the public debate on territorial compensation in the South African context (e.g., South African Government, 2021): 'Redistributing land back to Black South Africans'; and 'Land should be given back to Black South Africans'.

We again controlled for *gender* (0 = 'male', 1 = 'female') and *age* (in years), but due to space constraints in the survey a question for *political left-right orientation* was not available. Furthermore, because all participants were university students, we did not control for *educational attainment* in Study 2.

### 4.3.2 Results

***Measurement model***

We again performed a CFA in Mplus (version 8) to test whether the latent factors *autochthony*, *investment*, and *formation belief*, *ingroup* and *outgroup collective psychological ownership*, and *territorial compensation* were empirically distinct constructs. Due to an error in the data collection, for roughly the first two-thirds of participants ($N$ = 595) the third item assessing formation belief was a duplicate of the third autochthony belief item. These answers were treated as missing. We accounted for missing values using FIML. This initial model did not fit the data well. Similar to Study 1, a model where the error covariances between the third items of the ingroup and outgroup ownership factors were freed fit the data better than the initial model ($\Delta df$ = 1, $\Delta\chi^2$ = 125.09, $p$ < .001), and this model had an acceptable fit ($\chi^2(103, N = 777) = 501.79$, $p$ < .001, RMSEA = .071 [90% CI .064 .077], CFI = .935, TLI .914, SRMR = .061).

We explored several alternative models in which we forced any two principles to load as one factor, as well as an alternative model where the ownership factors were forced to load on a single factor. All alternative factor specifications yielded a significant worse fit, which supports our assertion that the factors represent empirically distinct constructs (see Table A4.3, Appendix A4 for all model fit statistics).

***Descriptive results***

The descriptive statistics, composite reliabilities, and bivariate correlations between the main variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.3. On average, endorsement of autochthony and formation belief were both below the neutral midpoint, while endorsement of investment belief was not significantly different from the neutral midpoint. Support for ingroup and outgroup ownership was higher than the neutral

**Table 4.3**

*Bivariate correlations, descriptive statistics and composite reliability scores for the main variables used in the analysis in Study 2 (*N*=879).*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | *M* | *SD* | W(1) | ρ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Autochthony belief | — | | | | | 2.93 | (1.52) | 433.59 | .85 |
| 2. Formation belief | .26*** | — | | | | 3.62 | (1.63) | 48.08 | .87 |
| 3. Investment belief | .38*** | .51*** | — | | | 4.06 | (1.70) | 1.12 | .91 |
| 4. Perceived ingroup ownership | .08** | .13** | .15*** | — | | 4.35 | (1.58) | 41.35 | .78 |
| 5. Perceived outgroup ownership | .15*** | .02 | .16*** | .90*** | — | 4.42 | (1.56) | 63.23 | .78 |
| 6. Territorial compensation | .41*** | -.13** | .24*** | -.03 | .12** | 2.56 | (1.57) | 685.87 | .87 |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). W = Wald test, which tests whether the mean is significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale (0.95 probability critical value = 3.841).

midpoint, and support for outgroup territorial ownership was higher than support for ingroup ownership (Wald (1) = 8.62, $p = .0033$). Finally, support for territorial compensation was lower than the neutral midpoint of the scale.

Autochthony, formation, and investment beliefs all correlated significantly and positively. Multicollinearity between these factors was not a concern (autochthony VIF 1.18; formation VIF 1.49; investment VIF 1.37). Most of the other bivariate correlations between the main variables were significant and in the expected directions. Outgroup ownership was positively correlated with autochthony and formation belief, but not with investment belief. Ingroup ownership was positively associated with formation and investment belief, and contrary to expectations also with autochthony belief. Furthermore, perceived outgroup ownership was positively associated with support for territorial compensation, but ingroup ownership was not.

Finally, perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership were strongly positively correlated, and the majority of participants (72.7%) supported ingroup and outgroup ownership equally. Ingroup ownership was more strongly supported by 8.7% of participants, and outgroup ownership by 18.6%. Therefore, and although the CFA indicated that a model with ingroup and outgroup ownership as separate factors fit the data best (see Table A4.3, Appendix A4), we additionally explored an alternative model with a relative territorial ownership score (perceived outgroup ownership – perceived ingroup ownership) so that a higher score indicates relatively higher outgroup than ingroup ownership.

***Support for territorial compensation in South Africa***

We estimated a similar structural equation model as in Study 1. The unstandardized coefficients for this model are presented in Table 4.4, and the standardized coefficients of the main paths are presented in Figure 4.2.

Consistent with our hypotheses (*H1 and H2*) and similar to Study 1, stronger ingroup ownership was significantly associated with less support for territorial compensation, and stronger outgroup ownership was associated with more support.

**Table 4.4**

*Structural Equation Model Study 2, for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation, through perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership (*N*=879).*

| | Perceived ingroup ownership | | Perceived outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .02 | (.04) | .09** | (.03) | .38*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | .08† | (.04) | .11** | (.04) | .24*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | .06† | (.04) | -.06† | (.03) | -.27*** | (.05) |
| Perceived ingroup ownership | | | | | -.56*** | (.12) |
| Perceived outgroup ownership | | | | | .58*** | (.13) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.01 | (.02) |
| Autochthony belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .05* | (.02) |
| Formation belief → Ingroup ownership→ | | | | | -.04† | (.03) |
| Formation belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .07* | (.03) |
| Investment belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.03 | (.13) |
| Investment belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | -.03 | (.12) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | .42*** | (.01) |
| Formation belief | | | | | .26*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | | | | | -.34*** | (.05) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | -.13 | (.10) | -.06 | (.10) | .14 | (.12) |
| Age (in years) | .01 | (0.00) | .01 | (0.00) | .01† | (.01) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

Furthermore, the total relationship between autochthony belief and support for territorial compensation was significant and positive, in line with our expectations (*H3a*). Endorsement of autochthony belief was also positively associated with perceived outgroup ownership, but not with ingroup ownership. Therefore, consistent with *H3b* and Study 1, autochthony belief was indirectly associated with *more* support for territorial compensation through higher outgroup ownership ($p = .005$), unstandardized 95% CIs [.01, .10]. However, autochthony belief was not indirectly associated with territorial compensation through ingroup ownership ($p = .611$), [-.05, .03], which does not support *H3c*, in contrast to Study 1.

**Figure 4.2**
*Structural equation model Study 2, with standardized coefficients (N=879).*




*Note:* The total effects of autochthony, formation, and investment belief are displayed between square brackets. Residual covariances between latent variables are displayed in italics. † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

In contrast to autochthony belief, the total relationship of investment belief with territorial compensation was negative, consistent with *H4a* and Study 1. Further, while stronger endorsement of investment belief was associated with both lower perceived outgroup ownership and higher ingroup ownership, these associations were not significant ($p$ = .092; $p$ = .099, respectively). Furthermore, in contrast to Study 1, investment belief was not significantly related with support for territorial compensation through outgroup or ingroup ownership, [-.09, .01], [-.08, .01], respectively, which does not support *H4b* and *H4c*.

The total relationship between endorsement of the formation belief and territorial compensation was positive and significant. Further, formation belief was positively and significantly associated with outgroup ownership ($p$ = .004), and also positively (but not significantly) with ingroup ownership ($p$ = .061), which supports *H5a*. Consistent with *H5b* and Study 1, formation belief was significantly indirectly related to *more* support for territorial compensation through outgroup ownership [.02, .13]. However, formation belief was not significantly indirectly related to territorial compensation through ingroup ownership, [-.10, .00], which does not support *H5c* and is not in line with the findings from Study 1.

Finally, neither age nor gender were significantly associated with ingroup ownership, outgroup ownership, and support for territorial compensation. There were only minor differences between the main model and a model where the control variables were excluded (see Table A4.4, Appendix A4). In the model without control variables, formation belief was significantly associated with perceived ingroup ownership and thus indirectly with support for territorial compensation both through outgroup and ingroup ownership. Further, the negative association between investment belief and outgroup ownership was also significant.

***Relative group ownership***

Because of the high correlation between ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, we performed an additional analysis with a relative group ownership score whereby a higher score indicates relatively higher outgroup than ingroup ownership. The unstandardized results are displayed in Table A4.6, Appendix A4[23]. The analysis shows that perceiving relatively more outgroup than ingroup ownership was significantly associated with greater support for territorial compensation, in line with our expectations. Furthermore, the relationships between the three ownership principles and relative perceived ownership were also in line with our expectations. Autochthony belief was significantly associated with perceiving relatively more outgroup ownership than ingroup ownership, whereas investment belief was significantly associated with perceiving relatively more ingroup ownership. Finally, formation belief was not significantly associated with more strongly perceiving territorial ownership for either group.

23 For the sake of comparison to Study 1, we also examined a model using a relative ownership scale using the data from Study 1 and included the results in Table A4.6. The results were similar in both contexts, with the exception of the total relationship between formation belief and support for territorial compensation: This was positive but not significant in Study 1, while it was positive and significant in Study 2.

#### 4.3.3 Discussion

In a different national context, we again found that more strongly believing that the territory belongs to the ingroup (White South Africans) was associated with lower support for territorial compensation, while stronger belief in outgroup (Black South African) ownership was associated with greater support for territorial compensation. Furthermore, the pattern of associations between ownership principles, ingroup and outgroup ownership and territorial compensation were descriptively similar to Study 1, but not all associations were significant. Specifically, autochthony, investment and formation belief were not significantly indirectly related to territorial compensation through ingroup ownership, and investment belief did not indirectly relate to support for compensation through outgroup ownership. We further discuss these findings in the General Discussion. Because of the high correlation between perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership we also examined an alternative model with relative group ownership. The results of this model were in line with our expectations and similar to Study 1.

## 4.4 General discussion

We examined the relationship between Anglo-Celtic Australians' (Study 1) and White South African's (Study 2) attitudes towards territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples and their perceptions of the degree to which the White ingroup and the Indigenous outgroup own the country. Furthermore, we focused on the role of three general principles for inferring and claiming place ownership that may be particularly relevant in the context of territorial disputes in settler societies: entitlements derived from primo-occupancy (autochthony), from historically investing in and developing the land (investment), and from the formative meaning of the territory for the collective identity (formation) (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Gans, 2001; Geschiere, 2009; Murphy, 1990). We examined these as general beliefs, independently of the particular intergroup context.

We found that greater perceived ingroup ownership of the land relates to lower support for territorially compensating the Indigenous outgroup, while greater perceived outgroup ownership relates to greater support for territorial compensation. The latter finding indicates that people are in favor of territorial compensation if they feel that the Indigenous group owns the land but does not have full rights over it. Previous research on territorial ownership and relations between groups has primarily focused on the perceptions of ingroup ownership (Brylka et al., 2015; Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021; Storz et al., 2020; Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020) or relied on a relative measure of ingroup versus outgroup ownership (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021). Ours is the first study that shows that ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions independently matter for intergroup relations, and more specifically, that these are associated with attitudes toward territorial compensation in settler societies.

Our findings furthermore show that, as expected, the three general ownership principles relate differently to perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership. First, the endorsement of autochthony belief by Whites in both Australia (Study 1) and South Africa (Study 2) was consistently related to higher support for territorial

compensation for the Indigenous outgroup. This finding was in line with our expectations and with research in Chile where endorsement of autochthony belief was related to higher support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous Mapuche (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021). Furthermore, we found that endorsement of autochthony belief was related to greater recognition of outgroup ownership in both studies. This has also been found in experimental research showing that children infer ownership from first possession and first occupancy (Friedman et al., 2013; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). In Australia, autochthony belief was also related to perceiving less ingroup ownership, which suggests that endorsing the idea that first-comers should be entitled to the land can undermine settler ownership. However, in South Africa no relation was found between endorsement of the autochthony belief and ingroup ownership. This might be due to the different historical context and the fact that some White South Africans nowadays still draw on the empty land myth to argue that the land was vacant when their ancestors settled in South Africa, and that they are therefore primo-occupants as well (AfriForum, 2019; Boisen, 2017).

Second, we showed that endorsement of investment belief by Whites in Australia and South Africa was related to lower support for territorial compensation. This finding is in line with our expectations and also with research in Chile (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021). Furthermore, in both countries, greater endorsement of investment belief was related to stronger perceived ingroup ownership and lower outgroup ownership. The findings for South Africa were weaker, however, and the indirect paths from investment to territorial compensation did not reach significance in that sample. Yet, the results from the additional analysis with the relative measure of territorial ownership showed that when White South Africans endorsed investment more, they perceived South Africa as belonging relatively more to their ingroup and this, in turn, was related to lower support for territorial compensation. Thus, in settler societies having invested in and developed the land might be used by Whites to justify territorial ownership for their ingroup and therefore reject territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

Third, we showed that for both Whites in both countries, stronger endorsement of formation belief relates to both higher ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, though the former association was weak in the South African context. These findings are consistent with our expectation that the descendants of White settlers will also feel that the land has profoundly shaped who they are as an ethnic group (Moran, 2002; Verwey & Quayle, 2012), and that they therefore feel ownership of the country. Furthermore, in both studies, greater endorsement of the formation belief was related to lower support for territorial compensation through ingroup ownership (marginally so in South Africa) and to higher support for territorial compensation through outgroup territorial ownership.

#### 4.4.1 Future directions and limitations

We want to highlight three possible directions for future research on ownership perceptions and support for territorial compensation and also consider some limitations. First, while the overall pattern of results was similar in both countries, there were also some notable differences. One difference relates to the average scores in both countries

(Tables 4.1 and 4.3). For example, support for territorial compensation was much lower in the South African sample compared to the Australian sample, whereas perceived outgroup ownership was higher in Australia compared to South Africa. Additionally, scores for autochthony, investment and formation beliefs were more varied in the South African sample compared to the Australian sample. These country differences might have substantial meanings but might also be due to the different samples in both studies (general population in Australia and students in South Africa). Further research using representative samples would allow for a direct comparison and test of these average differences.

However, differences in average scores do not have to imply differences in the proposed associations. The results show that the relationships between the ownership principles and perceptions of territorial ownership largely followed the same pattern in Australia and South Africa, although the relationships were weaker and not always significant in South Africa. Additionally, while perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership were not significantly related in Australia, they were highly correlated in South Africa. These country differences might have to do with the specifics of the national contexts. At the fall of the apartheid regime, South Africa adopted the non-racial ideal of a 'rainbow nation' which argues for identification with the superordinate national category, rather than with a racial group (see Sidanius et al., 2018). Because of this political context, White South African participants might have the tendency to think of themselves as members of a common national ingroup and as a result do not believe that either racial group should own South Africa more.

Furthermore, it is possible that Whites in Australia and in South Africa experience different levels of threat to their ingroup's territorial ownership (see Nijs, Verkuyten, et al., 2021). Anglo-Celtic Australians (56.4%) outnumber Indigenous Australian (~2.8%; (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016, 2017b), but White South Africans (7.8%) are a much smaller group compared to Black South Africans (80.8%, Statistics South Africa, 2020). Politically this means that White South Africans are much less powerful compared to White Australians. Furthermore, Indigenous Peoples in Australia can only claim government owned land (National Native Title Tribunal, 2021), while in South Africa the debate explicitly includes land privately owned by White South Africans (Gibson, 2010) and there have been proposals in the South African parliament for land expropriation without compensation in order to speed up the process of land reform (Makhado, 2012). Acknowledging relatively more outgroup ownership may therefore represent a larger threat to ingroup entitlements for Whites in South Africa than in Australia. Future comparative research on perceived territorial ownership may want to consider examining perceived territorial ownership threat as a possible explanation for country differences in the relation between ingroup and outgroup ownership.

Second, we used correlational survey data in our research. This means that we cannot make claims about the direction of influence, and reverse mediation testing with cross-sectional data is not a useful strategy for determining causality (Lemmer & Gollwitzer, 2017). However, our predictions on the directionality of the proposed relationships between the principles of ownership and perceived ownership were theoretically derived (Geschiere, 2009; Toft, 2014; Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017) and are supported by experimental research (e.g., Friedman & Neary, 2008; Levene et al.,

2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015). Furthermore, we examined endorsement of general principles of ownership—which did not refer to the intergroup context in question—to predict specific group ownerships. A reverse causal order from perceptions of specific group ownerships to general principles of ownership seems less likely. It is also more likely that lower perceived ingroup ownership drives support for outgroup compensation rather than the other way around. Still, it is possible that there are mutual directions of influence. For example, people who have a strong sense of ingroup ownership of the country may more strongly endorse principles of ownership (i.e., investment) which justify their sense of collective ownership. Longitudinal and experimental research is needed to further examine the directions of influence.

Third, we focused on Whites' perceptions of White and Indigenous ownership. Future research could examine both sides of the debate by additionally examining Indigenous participants' perceptions of territorial ownership. However, there are different ways of thinking about the ownership of land. For example, some Indigenous Peoples insist that land cannot be 'owned', while others claim that they have owned their land since 'time immemorial' (see Todd, 2008). It may therefore be the case that the concept of owning land will be less relevant for some Indigenous groups and their members. Furthermore, we phrased our items on collective ownership in relation to the countries as a whole, as territorial ownership on the national level was the most relevant level of ownership for White participants. However, Indigenous Peoples in many countries claim ownership of specific territories rather than the country as a whole. In order to ensure that the questions and research are relevant to the participants, it would therefore be best if future research with Indigenous participants focused on a particular Indigenous group and region, as questions on local ownership are likely to be more meaningful to Indigenous participants than questions on ownership in relation to the whole territory of a nation-state. In conclusion, research with Indigenous Peoples should carefully consider the relevance, phrasing, and focus of questions on perceived collective ownership of territories.

#### 4.4.2 Conclusion

With the present research we have provided the first empirical evidence that the general ideological beliefs of autochthony, formation, and investment can indirectly inform support for territorial compensation in settler societies both through ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership perceptions. The findings indicate that for Whites in Australia and in South Africa, endorsement of autochthony belief validates Indigenous ownership, investment belief validates White ownership, and formation belief validates both Indigenous and White ownership. These findings also have implications for promoting intergroup justice and improving intergroup relations in Australia and South Africa, and in other settler societies. Importantly, the findings indicate that territorial ownership perceptions matter. The different principles that people use to infer and claim group ownership have different intergroup implications and can be put forward but also challenged in political and public debates. The different principles shape people's understanding of who can claim territorial ownership differently, making it important to recognize and discuss these principles with the related ownership claims of the groups involved.

# Chapter 5.

## Who owns the land? Understanding perceived territorial group ownership using a person-centered approach[24]

Conflicts over the ownership of territory have shaped intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in settler societies. Collective psychological ownership—a sense that a territory belongs to a group—might explain attitudes of the White majority towards territorial compensation for Indigenous Peoples in settler societies. We examine majority member's perceptions of ingroup and outgroup (Indigenous) territorial ownership using a person-centered approach. Using latent profile analysis, we found five different subgroups of individuals among a sample of European New Zealanders ($N$=821). Most people (85.6%) perceived comparable levels of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership: i.e., low-low (8.3%); moderate-moderate (53.0%) high-high (24.3%). Two distinct subpopulations diverted from this pattern, instead fitting a high ingroup/low outgroup ownership (7.4%) or low ingroup/high outgroup ownership (7.1%) profile. Furthermore, we show that these subgroups differ on their support for principles of ownership and ethnic and national identification.



24 A slightly modified version of this chapter has been submitted as: Nooitgedagt, W., Martinović, B., Verkuyten, M., & Yogeeswaran, K. Who owns the land? Understanding perceived territorial group ownership using a person-centered approach. Wybren Nooitgedagt designed the study, conducted the analyses, and drafted the paper. Borja Martinović and Maykel Verkuyten were involved in the theorizing, and together with Kumar Yogeeswaran they were involved in the study design and critically reviewed the manuscript.

## 5.1 Introduction

People can have a perception of ownership which involves the sense that a certain object or place belongs to them (Pierce et al., 2003). Just as one can feel that they personally own something ('mine'), one can also think that something belongs to their group ('ours'). This is referred to as collective psychological ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2011a), such as ownership of territories like 'our beach' (Due & Riggs, 2008), 'our neighborhood' (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020), and 'our land' (Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021). Importantly, people do not only have a sense of what belongs to them or their own group, but also recognize other individuals or groups as owners (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021; Storz et al., 2021).

Collective psychological ownership perceptions can have important implications in settler societies that were colonized by predominantly European settlers, and where disputes and conflicts over the ownership of territory have shaped intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous (settler) groups (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005). However, not much is known about how people combine perceptions of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership in such settings. The first and primary aim of the current study is to examine different understandings of territorial collective ownership that people can have in settler societies, by considering three key aspects of collective ownership: who is seen as the owner, why is that group seen as the owner, and what ownership implies in terms of perceived rights and responsibilities.

The first aspect of collective ownership ('who') refers to the question which group is considered to own a territory and we will examine different ways in which ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership beliefs can be combined. Previous research has used a variable-centered approach, which examines associations between variables for assessing the relative contributions of ingroup and outgroup ownership in explaining support for matters such as territorial compensation (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021) and conflict reconciliation intentions (Storz et al., 2021). In contrast, we will use a person-centered approach to examine the possibility that ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership perceptions are combined in different ways within subgroups of individuals. This approach allows for a more nuanced and qualitatively different understanding of the nature and implications of territorial ownership beliefs by examining how configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions are organized within individuals (Osborne & Sibley, 2017).

The second aspect ('why') relates to the reasons that people can have for their ownership perceptions. A sense of collective ownership can be based on different general principles (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), which implies different understandings of why groups are considered to own particular territories. We will focus on the two central principles of primo-occupancy (autochthony) and having historically invested in and developed the land (investment).

The third aspect ('what') concerns the implications of territorial ownership perceptions. Ownership implies a bundle of rights that one holds towards others (Merrill, 1998), as well as a feeling of responsibility for that which is owned (Pierce et al., 2003). We therefore examine whether different subgroups of individuals can be characterized

by differences in the degree to which they perceive their ingroup and the outgroup to have determination rights and to hold responsibilities for the territory.

Finally, our second aim is to examine the implications of the different configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions for attitudes towards two social issues that are relevant in settler societies: support for compensation for Indigenous Peoples, and support for immigration policies. We draw evidence from the context of New Zealand and from the perspective of New Zealand Europeans, where we examine their understandings of ingroup (New Zealand European) and outgroup (Māori) territorial ownership.

### 5.1.1 Ingroup and outgroup ownership beliefs: Possible latent profiles

Person-centered approaches identify distinct unobserved subgroups of people who respond similarly to two or more indicator variables. For example, previous research has identified subgroups of individuals that qualitatively differ in the particular ways in which they combine or organize right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Osborne & Sibley, 2017), in their constellation of internal motivation and external motivation to respond without prejudice (Bamberg & Verkuyten, 2021), in the evaluation of a range of Muslim minority practices (Dangubić et al., 2020), and in tolerance of different groups and behaviors (McCutcheon, 1985). Importantly, person-centered research does not assume linear relations between the perceptions and attitudes used to group individuals, but allows for more complex constellations. For example, a study examining people's attitudes towards various minority groups found five qualitatively distinct subgroups that could not be organized along a linear continuum of a more versus less negative dispositions (Meeusen et al., 2017).

A person-centered approach can provide a detailed understanding of 'who' is considered to own a particular territory, that is, which configurations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions exist. It allows us to examine the type and number of distinct ways in which perceptions of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership are organized within different subgroups of individuals, as well as the proportion of people in each subgroup. We expect to find four subgroups based on the most logical possible combinations of ingroup and outgroup ownership beliefs. The first is a 'shared ownership' subgroup, where individuals perceive high ingroup together with high outgroup ownership. There are also likely to be people who perceive neither ingroup nor outgroup territorial ownership ('no ownership'). Additionally, there can be two contrasting subgroups of individuals: A subgroup that primarily beliefs that the territory belongs to their own group ('ingroup ownership') and a group of people who primarily believe that it belongs to the other group ('outgroup ownership'). Using a person-centered approach, we examine whether these qualitatively different subgroups of individuals do indeed exist and how many respondents fall in each of the subgroups. We furthermore examine how these subgroups can be characterized in terms of the reasons for their ownership perceptions and the implications for their social attitudes.

### 5.1.2 Principles of ownership

Collective ownership not only involves the question who owns a particular territory, but also why this is considered to be the case. Territorial ownership perceptions can be based on different principles (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), and we focus on two general principles that are likely to be most important in the specific context of settler societies for inferring whether the ingroup (settlers) or the outgroup (Indigenous) owns the territory more: primo-occupancy (i.e., first arrival to the territory; also referred to as autochthony) and past investment.

Inferring or deriving ownership from first-occupancy (autochthony belief) is often perceived as self-evident or even 'natural' (Geschiere, 2009; Lynch, 2011), and research has shown that in the absence of additional information on the ownership of an object, people assume that the first person seen to possess it, is its owner (Friedman, 2008). Furthermore, experimental research shows that already children infer ownership of places from first arrival (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinović, 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015).

A second important general principle is inferring and claiming ownership of an object because of investing time, effort, and resources into changing and/or developing it (investment belief). For example, experimental research in different countries has shown that people perceive the creator of an object as its owner (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Kanngiesser et al., 2014; Levene et al., 2015). Past investment into a territory or cultivating the land can similarly be used to infer or claim ownership of territories (Banner, 2005) or, in contrast, to recognize another group as a rightful owner.

Because autochthony and investment belief are general principles, support for autochthony or investment should be associated with believing that a given territory belongs more to the group(s) that are perceived as first occupants or as having invested most. In some settings, people may believe that a certain group both arrived first and also invested most. For example, majority group members in many Western European countries may feel that their group owns the territory because they are the original inhabitants and have also invested the most. In settler societies, however, settlers are likely to recognize that Indigenous Peoples arrived first, while they may simultaneously believe that their ingroup has invested more. Research in Australia and South Africa has shown that Whites' support for the autochthony principle was related to perceiving more Indigenous ownership, while support for the investment principle was related to perceiving more non-Indigenous ownership (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021).

Thus, depending on the specific principle, White European people in New Zealand may either see their ingroup or the Māori outgroup as being more entitled to the territory: Those who perceive primarily ingroup ownership are likely to be characterized by high support for the general principle of investment and low support for autochthony because this combination of these principles provides a justified reason for why the ingroup is considered to own the land. Conversely, people who primarily perceive outgroup ownership are likely to be characterized by low support for the principle of investment and high support for autochthony, which provides a strong reason for Indigenous ownership. People who perceive shared ownership are likely to support both

investment and autochthony belief as two different principles for why the settler ingroup and the Indigenous outgroup are considered to jointly own the territory. Finally, people who perceive no ownership are likely to consider neither investment nor autochthony as valid bases for ownership claims.

#### 5.1.3 Perceived rights and responsibilities

In addition to the questions of who owns a particular territory and why, there is the question of what territorial ownership entails. Ownership implies a bundle of rights that one holds towards others, as well as a feeling of responsibility for that which is owned (Pierce et al., 2003). A sense of ownership implies, for example, the right to occupy, use, and exclude others from that which is owned (Blumenthal, 2010; Merrill, 1998), as well as a responsibility to protect and take care of the object of ownership. Qualitative research has found that responsibility for the care of possessions and the right to control them are frequently mentioned as part of the definition of possession (Furby, 1978), and land owners report feeling a moral responsibility to take care of their land (Spears et al., 2021). These findings have been further corroborated by quantitative cross-sectional research which found that a sense of collective ownership of the country or a neighborhood relates to perceived exclusive determination rights as well as a sense of collective responsibility to take care of these territories (Nijs, Martinović, & Verkuyten, 2021). Furthermore, experimental research has found that a sense of personal ownership of products (Kamleitner & Rabinovich, 2010) and public places (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020) is related to greater perceived responsibility. Finally, experimental research has found that a sense of collective ownership of a park leads not only to stronger perceived responsibility to take care of it, but also stronger perceived determination rights (Nijs, Martinović, & Verkuyten, 2021).

Expanding on this literature, we argue that just as perceived ingroup ownership involves ingroup rights and ingroup responsibilities, perceived outgroup ownership will involve perceived outgroup rights and outgroup responsibilities. We therefore expect that the subgroup of individuals that perceives shared ownership is likely characterized by high support for both ingroup and outgroup rights and responsibilities. In contrast, individuals who perceive no ownership are expected to be characterized by low support for both ingroup and outgroup rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, those who primarily perceive ingroup ownership are likely to be characterized by high support for ingroup rights and responsibilities, as well as low support for outgroup rights and responsibilities. The opposite pattern is expected for people who primarily perceive outgroup ownership.

#### 5.1.4 Attitudes towards compensation and immigration in New Zealand

Beyond identifying subgroups of individuals, and as a matter of construct validity (Osborne & Sibley, 2017), we further examine whether these expected subgroups are meaningfully distinct from one another in their attitudes towards two social issues that have been typically considered in research on feelings of territorial ownership, and which are both relevant in the context of New Zealand: attitudes towards compensation for Indigenous Peoples (Devos et al., 2020; Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021) and attitudes towards immigration (Johnston et al., 2010; Nijs, Martinović, & Verkuyten, 2021).

Previous research has found that perceiving more outgroup ownership is related to higher support for compensating the Indigenous outgroup among Whites in Australia and South Africa (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021), and among non-Indigenous Chileans in Chile (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021), while perceiving more ingroup ownership was related to lower support for compensation. We therefore expect that the outgroup ownership subgroup is likely to report high support for compensation, while the ingroup ownership subgroup is likely to report low support for compensation. Furthermore, because people in the 'no ownership' subgroup do not perceive outgroup ownership, this subgroup likely also has low support for compensation. It is more difficult to formulate a clear expectation about whether people in the shared ownership subgroup will be supportive of compensation because of the competing implications of ingroup and outgroup ownership.

Perceptions of ownership can also play a role in people's attitudes towards newcomers, such as immigrants. The exclusion of newcomers is often justified by references to 'our' ownership of the land (e.g., Murphy, 2013), and research has found that perceptions of ingroup ownership are associated with the exclusion of newcomers (Due & Riggs, 2008; Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021). Because ingroup ownership tends to be related to the exclusion of outsiders, the 'ingroup ownership' subgroup is likely to be characterized by high support for more restrictive immigration policies. While it is difficult to predict how the 'outgroup ownership' subgroup thinks about immigration policies, it is likely that the shared ownership subgroup will be characterized by relatively high support for more restrictive policies compared to the 'outgroup' and 'no ownership' subgroups.

### 5.1.5 Research context

Similar to Indigenous Peoples elsewhere, Māori have lost the majority of their lands (Brooking, 2001), and their struggle for land retention and restoration has played a central role in the intergroup relations between Māori and European New Zealanders. Unlike many other settler societies, New Zealand is in many ways a bicultural nation. For example, the Māori language is formally recognized as an official language, and European New Zealanders explicitly rate their ingroup and Māori as equal contributors to new Zealand national identity and culture (Sibley & Liu, 2007). The ideal of biculturalism can be traced back to the treaty of Waitangi between the Māori and the Crown[25] concerning the ownership of the land in New Zealand. The treaty is now considered to be New Zealand's founding document.

However, the English and Māori versions of this treaty are not direct translations and the differences between the versions have been such a point of contention that some argue that the English (Treaty of Waitangi) and Māori versions (*Te Tiriti o Waitangi*) should be viewed as two separate treaties. Importantly, the English version states that the British crown has full sovereignty, while in the Māori version the British crown gets full governorship. Furthermore, in the English version, Māori were promised 'exclusive and undisturbed possession' of their lands, whereas the Māori version grants them *tino rangatiratanga*, which can be interpreted as 'absolute sovereignty' (Stokes, 1992).

25 The British crown at the time. These days, this term is used to refer to the government of New Zealand.

Potential compensation for Māori remains an ongoing issue in New Zealand (Devos et al., 2020; Hill, 2016). Although the conflict over territory in New Zealand is often framed as a conflict between Māori and the Crown, there is also opposition to compensation for Māori by individual New Zealand Europeans (Kirkwood et al., 2005), and public opinion has a substantive impact on public policy (Burstein, 2016). At the same time, New Zealand is a 'classic immigrant society' which has sought to build a nation state through immigration. Over the years, the influx of immigrants has increasingly changed from primarily European immigrants to an increasing number of immigrants from Asian and Pacific Island countries. These changes have led to an increase in opposition to immigration (Johnston et al., 2010).

## 5.2 Method

### 5.2.1 Data and participants

Participants were recruited by an international research consultancy agency (Kantar). The data collection targeted New Zealanders who were born in New Zealand and with at least one parent of European origin. The total sample was 821 participants.[26] Of those recruited, 66 participants indicated that they were also Māori and were therefore excluded from the data analysis, leaving a final sample of 755. There were slightly fewer women (48.7%) than men (50.7%) in the sample, and four participants identified their gender as other. Ages ranged from 18 to 88 years ($M$ = 46.54, $SD$ = 16.78). Our sample mirrored the NZ European population rather well in terms of gender, age, education, and region of residence (see Appendix A5.1 for more information).

### 5.2.2 Measures

Unless otherwise indicated, all constructs were measured on a scale ranging from 1 = 'completely disagree' to 7 = 'completely agree', so that a higher score indicates stronger support.

*Ingroup* and *outgroup ownership perceptions*, the extent to which participants believe that a group is the owner of New Zealand, were measured using two sets of three items,

26 Part of these participants were randomly selected to be part of a survey embedded experiment ($N$ = 354) designed to test whether we could manipulate ownership perceptions. Approximately half of these participants therefore received a short text emphasizing the investment of New Zealand Europeans after answering the questions on autochthony and investment belief, while the other half received no such text. However, participants in the investment condition did not score significantly higher on ingroup ownership ($M$ = 4.29, $SD$ = 1.54) compared to those in the control condition ($M$ = 4.37, $SD$ = 1.44), $t(354) = 0.50$, $p = .618$. There was also no significant effect on outgroup ownership perceptions, $t(389) = -.58$, $p = .565$, and the average scores differed only slightly between the experimental ($M$ = 4.30, $SD$ = 1.68) and control conditions ($M$ = 4.20, $SD$ = 1.55). We therefore decided to combine the sample from the experiment with the correlational questionnaire. However, due to space constraints the participants in the experiment did not receive questions on perceived rights and responsibilities. Therefore, the analyses on rights and responsibilities are done using only the participants from the correlational part of the questionnaire. The full survey also contained another survey embedded experiment ($N$ = 361), but the participants of that experiment did not receive questions on outgroup ownership.

adapted from previous research on collective psychological ownership in relation to territories (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021; Storz et al., 2020). The first set of items referred to the 'ingroup' (European New Zealanders), and the second to the Indigenous 'outgroup' (Māori) (ρ = .83; .85, respectively).[27] The three items were: 'In your opinion, how much does New Zealand belong to [group]?', 'To what extent do you consider each of the following groups the rightful owner of New Zealand?'; and 'How strongly would you say that each of these groups has the right to claim New Zealand more for themselves?' Participants answered each question for each group on a scale ranging from 1 = 'not at all' to 7 = 'very much' and were instructed that giving groups the same score meant that they felt that New Zealand belongs to the two groups to the same degree.

*Autochthony* and *investment beliefs* were measured in a general way independent of the particular intergroup context with three items each (ρ = .91; .87, respectively). The items were based on previous research in the Netherlands (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013), Great Britain (Nijs, Martinović, Ford, et al., 2021), Chile (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021), and Australia (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021). The items for the two general principles were: (1) 'A territory belongs primary to [its first inhabitants / the people who made it prosper]'; (2) '[Those who arrived first in a territory / The ones who developed the territory] are its rightful owners'; and (3) '['We were here first' / 'We made the territory into what it is today'] is a good argument for determining who owns the territory'.

*Perceived ingroup* and *outgroup determination rights* were measured with three items each (ρ = .85; .87, respectively). Participants were asked to what extent they personally disagree or agree that New Zealand Europeans and/or Māori can claim the following rights: 'The right to determine who will be allowed to enter New Zealand'; 'The right to decide what happens in New Zealand in the future'; 'The right to decide about matters that concern New Zealand'.

*Perceived ingroup* and *outgroup responsibilities* were measured with three items each (ρ = .93; .92, respectively). Participants were asked to what extent they personally disagree or agree that New Zealand Europeans and/or Māori have the following responsibilities: 'The responsibility to protect New Zealand'; 'The responsibility to take care of problems in New Zealand'; 'The responsibility to make sure that New Zealand is a nice place to live'.

We measured support for two types of compensation with three items each. *Support for territorial compensation* was measured using the following three items (ρ = .84): 'Māori interests regarding the usage of their lands should matter more than any industrial or commercial interest'; 'We should compensate Māori for resources mined on their land' and 'I believe that Māori should get complete sovereignty in their lands'. *Support for symbolic compensation* was also measured with three items (ρ = .82): 'We should rename more places in New Zealand to Māori names to show due respect for the first inhabitants of this country'; 'Controversial labels, symbols or statues celebrating historical figures

27 We assessed scale reliability using composite reliability (Raykov, 2009) in order to account for measurement error.

who were responsible for the treatment of Māori should be removed' and 'Schools should pay more attention to the injustices committed against Māori in the past'.

Finally, *support for stricter immigration policies* was measured with four items (ρ = .87): 'The New Zealand government should allow more immigrants to come and live here' (reversed); 'The New Zealand immigration policy should become less strict' (reversed); 'The New Zealand government must continue to make it difficult for migrants to enter New Zealand'; and 'It's good that in the past decades the New Zealand government has put a lot of effort in preventing immigrants from entering New Zealand'.

## 5.3 Results

### 5.3.1 Ingroup and outgroup ownership

We first performed a confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus version 8.3 with *ingroup* and *outgroup collective psychological ownership* each as 3-item latent factors, to determine whether they formed separate empirical constructs. The initial fit was poor. The modification indices suggested freeing the error covariance between the third items of the collective ownership measures that introduced both groups ('How strongly would you say that each of these groups has the right to claim New Zealand more for themselves?'). Freeing this error covariance resulted in a significantly improved model fit (Satorra-Bentler scaled $\Delta\chi^2$ (1, $N$ = 755) = 212.56, $p$ < .001; Satorra-Bentler scaled $\chi^2$ (7, $N$ = 755) = 131.22, $p$ < .001, RMSEA = .153 [90% CI .131 .177], CFI = .910 TLI .806, SRMR = .060). Modification indices showed that freeing additional error covariances could further increase the fit. However, we decided against further modifications to the factor structure because those modifications made less sense from a theoretical perspective. The third items of the scales are slightly different from the first two in that it is the only item which asks to what extent each group could claim the country 'more for themselves'. Furthermore, there is a substantial amount of research showing that people try to be consistent in their responses (Podsakoff et al., 2003), and because the questions were presented in a fixed order, this consistency bias could have especially affected responses to the third items of the scales. Finally, a model where ingroup and outgroup ownership were combined into a single factor fitted the data significantly worse (Satorra-Bentler scaled $\Delta\chi^2$ (1, $N$ = 755) = 442.34, $p$ < .001), confirming that a two-factor solution represents the data better. See Table A5.2.1, Appendix A5.2 for the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables in the total sample.

### 5.3.2 Latent profile analysis

We then conducted a Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) in Mplus to examine whether we could identify the four expected subgroups of respondents based on different combinations of ingroup and outgroup collective psychological ownership. Ingroup and outgroup collective psychological ownership were included in the LPA as latent variables rather than as summed scores or as individual items, because these latent constructs most accurately represent the ownership constructs that we are interested in. Table 5.1 shows the findings for profile estimates up to 6 profiles.

**Table 5.1**

*Latent profile analysis model fit statistics and profile membership distribution (*N=*755).*

| Model fit statistics | | | | | | | | Profile membership distribution | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| #prof | LogL | #par | c | AIC | BIC | Entropy | VLMR | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 2 | -7618.64 | 23 | 1.56 | 15283.29 | 15389.70 | .95 | .01 | .05 | .95 | | | | |
| 3 | -7496.24 | 26 | 1.58 | 15044.47 | 15164.77 | .96 | .00 | .06 | .08 | .86 | | | |
| 4 | -7463.59 | 29 | 1.43 | 14983.17 | 15112.72 | .91 | .00 | .06 | .08 | .09 | .76 | | |
| 5 | -7338.80 | 32 | 1.48 | 14741.60 | 14889.66 | .94 | .00 | .07 | .08 | .08 | .24 | .54 | |
| 6 | -7316.49 | 35 | 1.47 | 14702.98 | 14864.91 | .93 | .12 | .03 | .06 | .08 | .08 | .23 | .52 |

*Note.* LogL = log likelihood; #prof = number of profiles; #par = number of free parameters; c = scaling correction factor for MLR; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; VLMR = Vuong-Lo-Mendell-Rubin log likelihood ratio test

Each additional profile resulted in a reduction in the AIC and BIC values, and the three, four, and five-profile solutions provide meaningful clusters. The three-profile solution identified a subgroup with both ingroup and outgroup ownership (shared ownership), a high ingroup ownership, low outgroup ownership profile (ingroup ownership), and a low ingroup ownership, high outgroup ownership profile (outgroup ownership). The four-profile solution additionally identified a subgroup with low ingroup and outgroup ownership (no ownership). The four profiles in this solution therefore match those that we expected on a theoretical level. The five-profile solution splits the shared ownership profile into a high-shared ownership subgroup and a moderate (or ambivalent) shared ownership subgroup. The proportions of participants in the ingroup ownership and outgroup ownership profiles remain relatively consistent across the three, four, and five-profile solutions. The six-profile solution did not increase interpretability.

We selected the four-profile solution as this solution has the highest interpretability and is more parsimonious than a five-profile model. Figure 5.1 displays the means of ingroup and outgroup ownership for each of the profiles and the corresponding percentages of respondents in each of the four profiles. These percentages indicate that around three in four respondents fall in the shared ownership profile and that the percentages in the other three profiles are quite similar and below 10%. Table Appendix A5.2.2, Appendix A5.2 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables per profile, and Tables A5.2.4 and A5.2.5 show the bivariate correlations per profile.

### 5.3.3 Principles of ownership

We included the general principles of ownership as correlates of class membership in a Multinominal Logistic Regression (MLR) model estimated using the three-step weighting approach (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014). This allowed us to examine to what extent these constructs were connected to the likelihood of being in any one profile relative to a reference profile, without the constructs themselves affecting the estimation of the profiles. The results of the analysis (see Table 5.2) show that the principles are significant correlates of class membership for most of the comparisons.

**Figure 5.1**

*Mean levels of ingroup and outgroup ownership across profiles*




Individuals in the 'outgroup ownership' profile were more likely to support the general principle of autochthony compared to participants in all other profiles. They were also less likely to the investment principle than participants in all other profiles, other than the 'no ownership' profile. Participants in the 'outgroup ownership' profile thus appear to understand collective ownership in terms of the general principle of autochthony rather than investment. This fits with our expectations based on previous research and theory.

Also as expected, individuals in the 'ingroup ownership' profile were more likely to strongly support the general principle of investment than participants in all other profiles. They were also less likely to support the autochthony principle than participants in almost all other profiles, with the exception of the 'no ownership' profile. Participants in the 'ingroup ownership' profile therefore appear to base their ownership perceptions on the general principle of investment rather than autochthony.

Finally, participants in the 'shared ownership' profile were more likely to strongly support autochthony and investment beliefs than those in the 'no ownership' profile. Thus, these participants appear to be characterized by high support for both general principles of ownership which corresponds to considering both groups as owing the territory. The reverse applies to participants in the 'no ownership' profile: they appear

**Table 5.2**

*Results of multinominal logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of belonging to a given profile relative to the reference profile, as a function of autochthony and investment belief (*N*=755).*

| | Model A 'Shared ownership' as reference profile | | | Model B 'No ownership' as reference profile | | | Model C 'Ingroup ownership' as reference profile | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* |
| *1. Shared ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | .37** | (.11) | 1.45 | .41** | (.13) | 1.50 |
| Investment belief | | | | .42** | (.12) | 1.52 | -.38** | (.13) | 0.69 |
| *2. No ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | -.37** | (.11) | 0.69 | | | | .04 | (.16) | 1.04 |
| Investment belief | -.42** | (.12) | 0.66 | | | | -.79*** | (.17) | 0.45 |
| *3. Ingroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | -.41** | (.13) | 0.67 | -.04 | (.16) | 0.96 | | | |
| Investment belief | .38** | (.13) | 1.46 | .79*** | (.17) | 2.21 | | | |
| *4. Outgroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | 1.11*** | (.18) | 3.03 | 1.48*** | (.20) | 4.38 | 1.51*** | (.22) | 4.55 |
| Investment belief | -.85*** | (.17) | 0.43 | -.43* | (.21) | 0.65 | -1.23*** | (.21) | 0.29 |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized. OR = Odds ratios

to be characterized by low support for both ownership principles, which corresponds to seeing both groups as *not* owning the territory.

### 5.3.4 Rights and responsibilities

We performed an additional MLR, using the same procedure, where we included ingroup and outgroup determination rights and responsibilities as correlates of class membership using the tree-step weighting approach (see Table 5.3). We examined rights and responsibilities separately from the general principles with a more restrictive sample ($N$ = 401), because some of the participants did not receive the questions on rights and responsibilities ($N$ = 354).

As expected, individuals in the 'outgroup ownership' profile were characterized by higher perceived Māori determination rights and lower perceived NZ European rights in comparison to all other profiles. In contrast, those in the 'ingroup ownership' profile were characterized by higher perceived NZ European determination rights and lower perceived Māori rights in comparison to all other profiles. There were no differences between the 'shared ownership' and 'no ownership' profiles in terms of support for either NZ European or Māori determination rights. Interestingly, average support for perceived ingroup and outgroup rights was higher than the neutral midpoint of the scale in all profiles, with the exception of Māori determination rights in the 'ingroup ownership' profile (see Table A5.2.2, Appendix A5.2).

**Table 5.3**

*Results of multinominal logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of belonging to a given profile relative to the reference profile, as a function of autochthony and investment belief (*N*=755).*

| | Model A 'Shared ownership' as reference profile | | | Model B 'No ownership' as reference profile | | | Model C 'Ingroup ownership' as reference profile | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* |
| *1. Shared ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | | | | -.27 | (.39) | 0.77 | -1.71** | (.59) | 0.18 |
| Rights Māori | | | | .79† | (.41) | 2.20 | 1.88*** | (.53) | 6.56 |
| Resp. NZ Europeans | | | | -.42 | (.33) | 0.66 | -.39 | (.44) | 0.68 |
| Responsibilities Māori | | | | -.07 | (.20) | 0.94 | .12 | (.29) | 1.12 |
| *2. No ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | .27 | (.39) | 1.31 | | | | -1.44** | (.52) | 0.24 |
| Rights Māori | -.79† | (.41) | 0.46 | | | | 1.09* | (.46) | 2.99 |
| Resp. NZ Europeans | .42 | (.33) | 1.52 | | | | .03 | (.58) | 1.03 |
| Responsibilities Māori | .07 | (.20) | 1.07 | | | | .18 | (.38) | 1.20 |
| *3. Ingroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | 1.71** | (.59) | 5.51 | 1.44** | (.52) | 4.21 | | | |
| Rights Māori | -1.88*** | (.53) | 0.15 | -1.09* | (.46) | 0.34 | | | |
| Resp. NZ Europeans | .39 | (.44) | 1.47 | -.03 | (.58) | 0.97 | | | |
| Responsibilities Māori | -.12 | (.29) | 0.89 | -.18 | (.38) | 0.83 | | | |
| *4. Outgroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | -3.02*** | (.80) | 0.05 | -3.29*** | (.86) | 0.04 | -4.72*** | (.98) | 0.01 |
| Rights Māori | 3.35*** | (.95) | 28.51 | 4.14*** | (1.02) | 62.61 | 5.23*** | (1.08) | 186.94 |
| Resp. NZ Europeans | .37 | (.33) | 1.45 | -.05 | (.42) | 0.95 | -.02 | (.55) | 0.99 |
| Responsibilities Māori | -.44† | (.26) | 0.64 | -.51† | (.28) | 0.60 | -.33 | (.36) | 0.72 |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized. OR = Odds ratios

Contrary to expectations, neither perceived ingroup nor outgroup responsibilities were significant correlates of class membership for any of the comparisons. This may be due to multicollinearity, given that ingroup and outgroup rights and responsibilities were highly correlated in the total sample, and even more highly correlated in the 'shared' and 'no ownership profiles' (see Table A5.2.4). Furthermore, average support for perceived ingroup and outgroup responsibilities was higher than the neutral midpoint of the scale in all profiles (see A5.2.2). We inspected the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), and these ranged between 3.26 and 4.59. Different cut-off values for VIF are commonly considered indicative of multicollinearity, such as 5 or 10 (e.g., James et al., 2013), or a more conservative 2.5 (e.g., Johnston et al., 2018). As a robustness check, we therefore ran two additional multinominal logistic regressions, respectively predicting profile

**Figure 5.2**

*Mean levels of support for territorial compensation, symbolic compensation, and stricter immigration policies as a function of latent profile membership.*




*Note:* All pairwise comparisons were significantly different from each other, with one exception: Support for stricter immigration policies did not differ between the 'shared' and 'no ownership' profiles (Wald (1) = 0.995, $p$ = .319).

membership by ingroup and outgroup determination rights or by ingroup and outgroup responsibilities (see Table A5.2.5 and A5.2.6, respectively).

The results for the model with determination rights were not substantively different from those of the main model, with one exception: the 'shared ownership' profile was characterized by higher perceived Māori determination rights in comparison to the 'no ownership' profile. Furthermore, there were some differences in the model with ingroup and outgroup responsibilities, primarily concerning the 'ingroup' and 'outgroup ownership' profiles. In line with our expectations, the 'ingroup ownership' profile was characterized by higher NZ European responsibilities compared to the 'shared' and 'outgroup ownership' profiles, and lower Māori responsibilities compared to all other profiles. These findings indicate that lack of significant findings for responsibilities in the main model was likely in part due to rights and responsibilities being relatively strongly related.

**5.3.5 Attitudes towards compensation and immigration**

We examined whether the subgroups differed in their support for territorial and symbolic compensation, as well as in their support for stricter immigration policies. We tested for the significance of the differences in means between the subgroups by treating the outcome variables as distal outcomes which we predicted from latent class membership in Mplus (see Lanza et al., 2013). This approach tests for the significance of overall and pairwise comparisons of the differences in means between subgroups while treating class membership as latent, which allowed us to take into account the uncertainty with which individuals are assigned to classes. The significance of the differences in means between subgroups was then tested using Wald's test.

Differences in the mean levels of support for territorial and symbolic compensation, and for stricter immigration policies by profile are shown in Figure 5.2. The overall Wald's tests indicate that average support for territorial and symbolic compensation and stricter immigration policies was significantly different between the subgroups (Wald (3) = 610.47, $p < .001$; Wald (3), = 558.77, $p < .001$; Wald (3) = 50.70 $p < .001$, respectively).

People in the 'outgroup ownership' profile were most supportive of territorial and symbolic compensation, followed by those in 'shared ownership', then those in 'no ownership profile', whereas people in the 'ingroup ownership' profile were least supportive. Importantly, only people in the 'outgroup ownership' profile were characterized by relatively high support for territorial and symbolic compensation, as support for compensation was also low (below the neutral point of the scale) for people in the 'shared' and 'no ownership' subgroups. The pairwise tests indicated that all means were significantly different from each other.

Additionally, the 'ingroup ownership' subgroup was characterized by the highest support for stricter immigration policies, followed by those in the 'shared' and 'no ownership' subgroups, whereas people in the 'outgroup ownership' profile were on average least supportive. Average support for more restrictive immigration policies did not significantly differ between the 'shared ownership' and 'no ownership' subgroups (Wald (1) = 0.995, $p = .319$), but all other pairwise comparisons were significantly different from each other. On average, individuals in the 'shared ownership', 'ingroup' and 'no

ownership' subgroups were supportive of stricter immigration policies (higher than the neutral midpoint of the scale). However, average support for stricter immigration policies in the 'outgroup ownership' subgroup was not significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale (see Table A5.2.2, Appendix A5.2).

## 5.4 General discussion

Conflicts over the ownership of territory have shaped intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in settler societies. These societies are also typically countries with high levels of immigration and related debates about whether people should be allowed into the country (Johnston et al., 2010). People's perception of who is the owner of the territory—their ingroup or an outgroup—can have important consequences for intergroup relations (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017). However, ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions do not have to influence intergroup relations in the same way. Previous research found that ingroup ownership perceptions are related to more negative attitudes towards immigration (Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021), while settlers' outgroup (Indigenous) ownership perceptions are related to higher support for compensation for the outgroup in settler societies (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021).

Going beyond this research, we used a person-centered approach to develop a more detailed understanding of how constellations of perceived ingroup and outgroup ownership are organized within majority group members in settler societies. To this end, we examined three aspects of collective ownership: *who* is seen as the owner, *why* is that group seen as the owner, and *what* are the implications of ownership in terms of rights and responsibilities. Additionally, we examined the societal relevance of the various constellations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions by considering how people with different 'ownership profiles' think about compensation for Indigenous Peoples, and about immigration policies.

Concerning the question *who* owns the territory, we expected and identified four subgroups of individuals based on the combination of their perceptions of ingroup (NZ European) and outgroup (Māori) territorial ownership. These four subgroups can be clustered into two dichotomies. First, we identified two subgroups of people who primarily perceived ownership for one group: One subgroup which primarily perceived ingroup ownership (8.4%), and the other which primarily perceived outgroup ownership (6.4%). Second, we identified two subgroups of people who perceived similar levels of territorial ownership for both groups. The majority of the sample (75.9%) believed that the territory belonged to both New Zealand Europeans and Māori ('shared ownership') and another subgroup (9.4%) believed that the territory belonged to neither group ('no ownership'). It is likely that the high proportion of participants who perceive shared ownership reflects that New Zealand is in many ways a bicultural nation, and many New Zealand Europeans explicitly rate their ingroup and Māori as equal contributors to New Zealand national identity and culture (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

Second, we examined *why* people have these ownership perceptions and focused on two general principles for claiming and inferring ownership (Verkuyten & Martinović,

2017): deriving entitlements from primo-occupancy (autochthony belief) and from having invested in and developed the land (investment belief). As general principles, support for autochthony and investment should be associated with believing that a given territory belongs more to the group which is considered to have arrived first/invested most in a territory, regardless of the context or groups in question. In line with findings from previous research (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021), settlers will be likely to recognize that Indigenous Peoples arrived first, but can simultaneously believe that their own group invested more. Accordingly, we expected and found that the subgroup of people who primarily perceived ingroup ownership was characterized by relatively high support for the general principle of investment and low support for the principle of autochthony. Conversely, the outgroup ownership subgroup was characterized by high support for autochthony and low support for investment. Furthermore, the shared ownership subgroup was characterized by moderate support for both general principles, and the no ownership subgroup was characterized by relatively low support for autochthony and for investment. These findings support the meaningfulness of distinguishing between these four ownership subgroups.

Third, we examined *what* the perceived implications are of the different territorial ownership perceptions. Ownership perceptions are associated with perceived rights as well as with perceived responsibilities (Merrill, 1998; Pierce et al., 2003), and perceiving a group as owners should therefore be associated with believing that this group has entitlement rights over, and responsibilities to, the territory. Compared to all other profiles, the ingroup ownership subgroup was indeed characterized by the highest perceived ingroup rights and relatively low perceived outgroup rights, while the reverse was found for the outgroup ownership subgroup. Furthermore, the shared ownership subgroup was also characterized by relatively high perceived ingroup as well as outgroup rights. However, although support for ingroup and outgroup rights was lowest in the no ownership profile, average support for ingroup and outgroup rights was never very low: the lowest was moderate support for Māori rights in the ingroup ownership profile. This may again be due to New Zealand Europeans perceiving New Zealand as a bicultural nation, which makes it difficult to deny rights to either of the two main groups that make up the nation (Sibley & Liu, 2007).

Feelings of ownership tend to come with a sense of responsibility, and there is empirical research which shows that there is an association between ingroup ownership and ingroup responsibility (e.g., Nijs, Martinović, & Verkuyten, 2021; Spears et al., 2021). However, contrary to our expectations, there were no meaningful differences between the subgroups in the levels of perceived ingroup and outgroup responsibilities, when controlling for perceived rights. Furthermore, people in all subgroups perceived relatively high levels of ingroup and outgroup responsibilities. Yet, a separate analysis without perceived rights did indicate that the ingroup ownership subgroup was characterized by relatively high perceived NZ European responsibilities and relatively low perceived Māori responsibilities, compared to most other subgroups. These findings may indicate that perceived group responsibilities are not closely tied to territorial ownership, at least in the context of New Zealand. There might be other important factors that affect people's perceptions of territorial responsibility, such as a more general feeling of civic responsibility (Jelin, 2019). Further, the New Zealand government actively promotes

the idea that visitors should commit to acting as a guardian (*tiaki*) to help protect New Zealand (Tiaki New Zealand, 2019).

Finally, we examined the relevance of distinguishing between different understandings of collective ownership by investigating how these are combined with attitudes towards compensation for Indigenous Peoples and attitudes towards immigration policies. In line with our expectations, support for stricter immigration policies was highest in the ingroup ownership subgroup. This finding replicates and extends previous research on the relation between ingroup ownership perceptions and the exclusion of newcomers (Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021) to the context of settler societies. However, average support for stricter immigration policies was also relatively high in the shared ownership and no ownership subgroups, and more 'neutral' in the outgroup ownership subgroup. Therefore, future research examining the relative importance of territorial ownership perceptions in relation to the exclusion of outsiders could simultaneously consider other well-established drivers of attitudes towards newcomers, such as forms of threat (Riek et al., 2006). Furthermore, in line with our expectations, we found that participants in the outgroup ownership subgroup most strongly supported territorial and symbolic compensation. Additionally, on average participants in the other ownership subgroups did not support territorial and symbolic compensation. Thus, although outgroup territorial ownership perceptions have been found to be associated with higher support for compensation for Indigenous Peoples (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021), it appears that this only applies to people who do not also perceive ingroup territorial ownership.

### 5.4.1 Limitations and directions for future research

We want to highlight two main directions for future research on understandings of territorial ownership. First, additional research is needed in order to determine the generalizability of the four ownership profiles that we identified in New Zealand. Although our findings on the four subgroups were largely in line with our expectations, we need to be careful about generalizing the content and the number of profiles to other contexts and (minority) groups. Settler societies differ from each other and are also quite specific in that there are, broadly speaking, two groups[28] which tend to be in conflict over territorial ownership. While it is likely that our findings are generalizable to other settler societies in which it is meaningful to investigate combinations of ingroup and outgroup ownership perceptions, this is less likely to be the case in contexts with intractable territorial conflicts. For example, in deeply divided societies, such as Kosovo or Israel, people are most likely to perceive ingroup ownership, and very unlikely to recognize outgroup ownership (Storz et al., 2021). Furthermore, we only examined the perspective of New Zealand Europeans and we do not know whether the same four profiles would be replicated among Māori participants or other (Indigenous) minority groups. For example, findings from previous research suggest that Indigenous participants may be unlikely to perceive a territory as belonging only to the non-Indigenous outgroup (Nooitgedagt, Figueiredo, et al., 2021).

28 Indigenous Peoples in most settler societies do not form a homogenous group. However, they generally have similar conflicts over territory with settlers, and compared to settlers they generally have similar reasons for claiming ownership.

Second, the majority of participants perceived shared Māori and NZ European ownership of New Zealand. While it is not unlikely that a majority of NZ Europeans indeed perceive shared ownership, it is possible that the design of the survey made it more likely for people to respond to the items on ingroup and outgroup ownership in the same way, for example due to social desirability (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This may be especially likely in New Zealand because biculturalism is embedded into many institutions, and people are very aware of the concept of shared governance (Ward & Liu, 2012). Future research may want to change the way that the ingroup and outgroup ownership scales are assessed so that one is asked after the other, and additionally randomize the order in which participants are asked about ingroup and outgroup ownership.

**5.4.2 Conclusion**

Perceptions of territorial ownership can have important consequences for intergroup relations (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), and this may be especially relevant in settler societies. Disputes and conflicts over the ownership of territory have shaped relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups in settler societies (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005), and previous research has found that perceiving more Indigenous ownership is related to greater support for compensating Indigenous Peoples (Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Maseko, 2021). Furthermore, perceiving ingroup ownership has been found to be related to the exclusion of outsiders (Nijs, Martinović, Verkuyten, et al., 2021), and many settler societies have a large influx of immigrants from new countries of origin (Johnston et al., 2010). However, not much is known about how perceptions and understandings of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership are organized within individuals.

We showed that a person-centered approach makes it possible to examine who people perceive as the owners of a territory by identifying four unobserved groups of individuals that qualitatively differ in their configurations of perceptions of ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership. Furthermore, we showed why people might differ in their ownership perceptions by showing that the subgroups differed in their support for the general ownership principles of primo-occupancy (autochthony) and having historically invested in and developed the land (investment). This suggests that narratives about who arrived first and who invested most can affect people's perception of territorial ownership. Finally, in examining what the implications are of ownership in terms of rights and responsibilities, we found that the subgroups differed in their support for ingroup and outgroup rights, which suggests that our findings provide an accurate and meaningful representation of the types of ownership perceptions that are likely to exist for settlers in settler societies.

Our findings have implications for improving intergroup relations in New Zealand and in other settler societies. Importantly, the findings indicate that the way that people think about collective ownership matters, especially in regard to compensation for Indigenous Peoples. Only participants in the outgroup ownership subgroup were, on average, supportive of territorial and symbolic compensation. Therefore, it appears that perceiving more outgroup ownership is most strongly associated with greater support for compensation for Indigenous Peoples for those who do not also perceive ingroup territorial ownership.

# Appendices

## Appendix A2: Additional Tables Chapter 2

**Table A2.1**

*Structural equation model predicting support for instrumental compensation by autochthony belief, mediated by collective guilt (6 items), Chapter 2, Study 1 (N=323).*

| | Collective guilt | | Support for instrumental compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .58*** | (.07) | .27** | (.08) |
| Collective guilt | | | .69*** | (.09) |
| *Indirect relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → collective guilt → | | | .40*** | (.07) |
| *Total relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .67*** | (.07) |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .47*** | (.08) | .27** | (.08) |
| Collective guilt | | | .68*** | (.09) |
| *Indirect relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → collective guilt → | | | .33*** | (.07) |
| *Total relationship* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .60*** | (.07) |
| *Control variables* | | | | |
| Gender (ref = male) | .26* | (.13) | -.16 | (.12) |
| Age | .00 | (.00) | .00 | (.00) |
| Educational level | .06 | (.06) | .03 | (.06) |
| Left-right orientation | -.25** | (.08) | -.06 | (.08) |
| Born in Australia (ref = born abroad) | -.06 | (.15) | .02 | (.13) |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (ref = 1 parent) | .04 | (.20) | .04 | (.18) |
| Feelings towards Aborigines | .11*** | (.03) | .04 | (.03) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A2.2**

*Confirmatory factor analyses Chapter 2, Study 1 (*N*=322)*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | *p-2s* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. 3 factor model | 117.07 | (41) | *** | .08 | [.06, .09] | .95 | .93 | .04 | | | |
| 2. Combined autochthony belief & guilt | 250.45 | (43) | *** | .12 | [.11, .14] | .87 | .83 | .10 | 78.33 | (2) | *** |
| 3. Combined autochthony belief & compensation | 429.01 | (43) | *** | .17 | [.15, .18] | .75 | .68 | .11 | 171.98 | (2) | *** |
| 4. Combined guilt & compensation | 152.10 | (43) | *** | .09 | [.07, .10] | .93 | .91 | .04 | 30.79 | (2) | *** |
| 5. Combined all 3 | 482.90 | (44) | *** | .18 | [.16, .19] | .72 | .65 | .12 | 210.06 | (3) | *** |

*Note.* Model 1 is the main model; all other models are compared to model 1. Each other model forces the stated factors to load as one factor. The Chi-square difference tests are Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-Square tests. *** $p < .001$

**Table A2.3**

*Confirmatory factor analyses Chapter 2, Study 2 (*N*=475)*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | *p-2s* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. 7 factor model | 306.91 | (168) | *** | .04 [.03, .05] | .98 | .97 | .04 | | | |
| 02. Guilt + moral + image shame | 940.76 | (179) | *** | .09 [.09, .10] | .87 | .85 | .06 | 457.79 | (11) | *** |
| 03. Guilt + moral shame | 526.53 | (174) | *** | .06 [.06, .07] | .94 | .93 | .04 | 167.38 | (6) | *** |
| 04. Guilt + image shame | 754.77 | (174) | *** | .08 [.08, .09] | .90 | .88 | .05 | 314.05 | (6) | *** |
| 05. Moral + image shame | 747.69 | (174) | *** | .08 [.08, .09] | .90 | .88 | .06 | 312.09 | (6) | *** |
| 06. Apology + guilt | 670.57 | (174) | *** | .08 [.07, .08] | .91 | .90 | .05 | 318.36 | (6) | *** |
| 07. Apology + moral shame | 699.91 | (174) | *** | .08 [.08, .09] | .91 | .89 | .05 | 304.53 | (6) | *** |
| 08. Apology + image shame | 912.16 | (174) | *** | .09 [.09, .10] | .87 | .85 | .07 | 413.65 | (6) | *** |
| 09. Compensation + guilt | 618.43 | (174) | *** | .07 [.07, .08] | .92 | .91 | .05 | 245.61 | (6) | *** |
| 10. Compensation + moral shame | 537.40 | (174) | *** | .07 [.06, .07] | .94 | .92 | .04 | 188.59 | (6) | *** |
| 11. Compensation + image shame | 841.59 | (174) | *** | .09 [.08, .10] | .88 | .86 | .06 | 492.61 | (6) | *** |
| 12. Avoidance + guilt | 878.67 | (174) | *** | .09 [.09, .10] | .88 | .85 | .07 | 458.06 | (6) | *** |
| 13. Avoidance + moral shame | 854.26 | (174) | *** | .09 [.08, .10] | .88 | .86 | .07 | 451.57 | (6) | *** |
| 14. Avoidance + image shame | 1025.72 | (174) | *** | .10 [.09, .11] | .85 | .82 | .12 | 539.98 | (6) | *** |
| 15. Autochthony + guilt | 526.71 | (174) | *** | .07 [.06, .07] | .93 | .92 | .06 | 189.77 | (6) | *** |
| 16. Autochthony + moral shame | 539.62 | (174) | *** | .07 [.06, .07] | .94 | .92 | .06 | 203.53 | (6) | *** |
| 17. Autochthony + image shame | 624.26 | (174) | *** | .07 [.07, .08] | .92 | .91 | .08 | 264.79 | (6) | *** |
| 18. Autochthony + apology | 577.22 | (174) | *** | .07 [.06, .08] | .93 | .92 | .06 | 228.03 | (6) | *** |
| 19. Autochthony + compensation | 716.94 | (174) | *** | .08 [.07, .09] | .91 | .89 | .13 | 367.11 | (6) | *** |
| 20. Autochthony + avoidance | 514.09 | (174) | *** | .06 [.06, .07] | .94 | .93 | .05 | 180.45 | (6) | *** |

*Note.* All models are compared to the first model. Models are compared using the Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square difference test. *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Table A2.4**

*Expected power with a small effect size (0.3) based on 1000 simulations, Chapter 2, Study 2 (*N*=475).*

| | | Power |
|---|---|---|
| Collective guilt | ~ autochthony belief | 0.99 |
| Collective moral shame | ~ autochthony belief | 1.00 |
| Collective image shame | ~ autochthony belief | 1.00 |
| Institutional apologies | ~ autochthony belief | 1.00 |
| Institutional apologies | ~ collective guilt | 0.99 |
| Institutional apologies | ~ collective moral shame | 0.97 |
| Institutional apologies | ~ collective image shame | 1.00 |
| Instrumental compensation | ~ autochthony belief | 1.00 |
| Instrumental compensation | ~ collective guilt | 1.00 |
| Instrumental compensation | ~ collective moral shame | 0.99 |
| Instrumental compensation | ~ collective image shame | 1.00 |
| Topic avoidance | ~ autochthony belief | 0.90 |
| Topic avoidance | ~ collective guilt | 0.90 |
| Topic avoidance | ~ collective moral shame | 0.81 |
| Topic avoidance | ~ collective image shame | 0.97 |

*Note.* ~ "is regressed on"

**Table A2.5**

*Structural Equation Model predicting support for institutional apologies, topic avoidance, and instrumental compensation by autochthony belief, through collective guilt, moral shame, and image shame. Model without control variables. Chapter 2, Study 2 (*N*=475).*

| | Collective guilt | | Moral shame | | Image shame | | Support for institutional apologies | | Instrumental compensation | | Topic avoidance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .71*** | (.08) | .72*** | (.07) | .49*** | (.07) | .10 | (.07) | .23*** | (.06) | .14 | (.09) |
| Collective guilt | | | | | | | .50*** | (.08) | .11 | (.08) | -.20† | (.11) |
| Collective moral shame | | | | | | | .26** | (.08) | .49*** | (.09) | -.52*** | (.12) |
| Collective image shame | | | | | | | -.01 | (.05) | .02 | (.05) | .31*** | (.08) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → collective guilt → | | | | | | | .35*** | (.06) | .08 | (.06) | -.14† | (.08) |
| Autochthony belief → c. moral shame → | | | | | | | .18** | (.06) | .35*** | (.07) | -.37*** | (.09) |
| Autochthony belief → c. image shame → | | | | | | | -.01 | (.02) | .01 | (.02) | .15*** | (.04) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | | | .63*** | (.08) | .68*** | (.07) | -.23** | (.09) |

*Note.* Reported coefficients are unstandardized. † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

## Appendix A3: Additional Tables Chapter 3

**Table A3.1**

*Structural equation model predicting support for territorial compensation for participants without (*N*=611) and with (*N*=300) Mapuche family, Chapter 3, Study 1.*

| | Without control variables | | | | With control variables | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Mapuche family | | With Mapuche family | | No Mapuche family | | With Mapuche family | |
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| Autochthony belief | .62*** | (.05) | .72*** | (.06) | .48*** | (.05) | .59*** | (.06) |
| Investment belief | -.27*** | (.06) | -.18* | (.09) | -.11 | (.06) | -.05 | (.09) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | | | | | .36** | (.14) | -.03 | (.18) |
| Age (in years) | | | | | .02 | (.02) | -.02 | (.02) |
| Left-right orientation | | | | | -.59*** | (.05) | -.40*** | (.08) |
| Chilean identification | | | | | -.06 | (.04) | -.07 | (.05) |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A3.2**

*Comparison of different factor models, Chapter 3, Study 1 (N=611).*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Autochthony; investment; territorial compensation | 85.07 | (32) | *** | .05 | [.04, .07] | .98 | .97 | .04 | | | |
| 2. Autochthony + investment | 890.22 | (34) | *** | .20 | [.19, .22] | .65 | .54 | .19 | 348.91 | (2) | *** |
| 3. Autochthony + territorial compensation | 344.14 | (34) | *** | .12 | [.11, .13] | .87 | .83 | .08 | 207.81 | (2) | *** |
| 4. Investment + territorial compensation | 549.72 | (34) | *** | .16 | [.15, .17] | .79 | .72 | .17 | 410.06 | (2) | *** |

*Note.* Model 1 is the main model, all other models are compared to model 1. The Chi-square difference tests are Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-Square tests.

**Table A3.3**

*Confirmatory factor models at the metric level, for non-Indigenous Chilean (*N*=121) and the Mapuche participants (*N *226), Chapter 3, Study 2.*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Main model, 5 factors | 464.21 | (263) | *** | .07 [.06, .08] | .92 | .91 | .08 | | | |
| 2. Autochthony + investment | 672.45 | (272) | *** | .09 [.08, .10] | .84 | .82 | .10 | 166.86 | (9) | *** |
| 3. Autochthony + territorial compensation | 913.99 | (272) | *** | .12 [.11, .13] | .74 | .71 | .13 | 323.78 | (9) | *** |
| 4. Investment + territorial compensation | 685.97 | (272) | *** | .09 [.09, .10] | .83 | .81 | .11 | 169.47 | (9) | *** |
| 5. Chilean + Mapuche identification | 1282.31 | (272) | *** | .15 [.14, .15] | .60 | .54 | .17 | 455.43 | (9) | *** |

*Note.* Model 1 is the main model, all other models are compared to model 1. The Chi-square difference tests are Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-Square tests.

**Table A3.4**

*Structural equation model predicting support for territorial compensation for non-indigenous Chileans (*N*=121) and the Mapuche (*N*=226), with control variables included, Chapter 3, Study 2.*

| | Non-indigenous Chileans | | | | Mapuche | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Perceived indigenous ownership | | Territorial compensation | | Perceived indigenous ownership | | Territorial compensation | |
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .19** | (.06) | .15 | (.08) | .11 | (.06) | .05 | (.06) |
| Investment belief | -.03 | (.11) | -.30** | (.11) | .08 | (.09) | -.03 | (.09) |
| Perceived Indigenous ownership | | | .48*** | (.09) | | | .20** | (.07) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → P.I.O. → | | | .09** | (.03) | | | .02 | (.02) |
| Investment belief → P.I.O. → | | | -.01 | (.05) | | | .02 | (.02) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .25** | (.08) | | | .07 | (.06) |
| Investment belief | | | -.31* | (.12) | | | -.01 | (.09) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | .00 | (.14) | .07 | (.15) | -.07 | (.11) | -.10 | (.11) |
| Age (in years) | .00 | (.01) | -.01 | (.01) | .01* | (.00) | .00 | (.00) |
| Left-right orientation | -.01 | (.04) | -.07 | (.05) | -.05 | (.03) | -.02 | (.03) |
| Educational level | .03 | (.06) | -.06 | (.10) | -.04 | (.05) | -.06 | (.04) |
| Chilean identification | -.17* | (.07) | -.04 | (.09) | -.16** | (.06) | -.14** | (.05) |
| Mapuche identification | .11 | (.07) | .12 | (.08) | .28*** | (.07) | .24** | (.09) |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A3.5**

*Structural equation model predicting support for territorial compensation by autochthony, country, development, and administrative investment, mediated by perceived Indigenous ownership; Mapuche participants (*N*=226), with control variables included, Chapter 3, Study 2.*

| | Perceived indigenous ownership | | Territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .13* | (.06) | .04 | (.05) |
| Country investment belief | .03 | (.04) | -.04 | (.04) |
| Development investment belief | .09* | (.04) | .01 | (.04) |
| Administrative investment belief | -.11* | (.05) | 0.00 | (.04) |
| Perceived indigenous ownership | | | .18** | (.07) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → P.I.O. → | | | .02 | (.02) |
| Country investment → P.I.O. → | | | .01 | (.01) |
| Development investment → P.I.O. → | | | .02 | (.01) |
| Administrative investment → P.I.O. → | | | -.02 | (.01) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .07 | (.06) |
| Country investment belief | | | -.03 | (.04) |
| Development investment belief | | | .03 | (.04) |
| Administrative investment belief | | | -.02 | (.04) |
| *Control variables* | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | -.07 | (.11) | -.11 | (.11) |
| Age (in years) | .01* | (0.00) | 0.00 | (0.00) |
| Left-right orientation | -.05 | (.03) | -.03 | (.02) |
| Educational level | -.05 | (.05) | -.05 | (.04) |
| Chilean identification | -.13* | (.06) | -.13** | (.05) |
| Mapuche identification | .24** | (.08) | .23** | (.08) |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A4.1**

*Confirmatory factor analyses Chapter 4, Study 1 (*N*=475)*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | *p-2s* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. 6 factor model | 424.88 | (120) | *** | .07 [.07, .08] | .91 | .89 | .06 | 91.17 | (1) | *** |
| 2. 6 factor model (freed covariance 3rd ownership items) | 295.26 | (119) | *** | .06 [.05, .06] | .95 | .93 | .06 | | | |
| 3. Combined autochthony & formation belief | 713.31 | (124) | *** | .10 [.09, .11] | .83 | .79 | .13 | 1173.38 | (5) | *** |
| 4. Combined autochthony & investment belief | 1240.38 | (124) | *** | .14 [.13, .15] | .67 | .60 | .17 | -1116.35 | (5) | see note |
| 5. Combined formation & investment belief | 413.74 | (124) | *** | .07 [.06, .08] | .92 | .90 | .08 | 102.30 | (5) | *** |
| 6. Combined ingroup & outgroup ownership | 1060.82 | (125) | *** | .13 [.12, .13] | .73 | .66 | .15 | 570.87 | (6) | *** |
| 7. Combined ingroup & outgroup ownership (freed cov. 3rd items) | 1033.87 | (124) | *** | .12 [.12, .13] | .73 | .67 | .15 | 568.77 | (5) | *** |

*Note.* Model 1 is compared to model 2; all other models are also compared to model 2. Each other model forces the stated factors to load as one factor. The Chi-square difference tests are Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-Square tests. *** $p < .001$. The chi-square difference comparing model 4 and 2 was negative and therefore not trustworthy, but the other fit indices clearly show worse model fit for model 4.

**Table A4.2**

*Structural Equation Model Chapter 4, Study 1, for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation through perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, without control variables (*N*=475).*

| | Perceived ingroup ownership | | Perceived outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | -.11* | (.05) | .41*** | (.06) | .40*** | (.07) |
| Formation belief | .32** | (.11) | .20* | (.10) | .14 | (.12) |
| Investment belief | .37*** | (.08) | -.23** | (.08) | -.13 | (.09) |
| Perceived ingroup ownership | | | | | -.38*** | (.07) |
| Perceived outgroup ownership | | | | | .54*** | (.07) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | .04* | (.02) |
| Autochthony belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .22*** | (.04) |
| Formation belief → Ingroup ownership→ | | | | | -.12** | (.05) |
| Formation belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .11† | (.06) |
| Investment belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.14*** | (.04) |
| Investment belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | -.12* | (.05) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | .66† | (.00) |
| Formation belief | | | | | .13 | (.13) |
| Investment belief | | | | | -.39*** | (.10) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A4.3**

*Confirmatory factor analyses Chapter 4, Study 2 (*N*=879)*

| | $\chi^2$ | *df* | *p-2s* | RMSEA | CFI | TLI | SRMR | $\Delta\chi^2$ | $\Delta df$ | *p-2s* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. 6 factor model | 1863.03 | (104) | *** | .14 [.13, .14] | .74 | .66 | .07 | 145.53 | (1) | *** |
| 2. 6 factor model (freed covariance 3rd ownership items) | 515.31 | (103) | *** | .07 [.06, .07] | .94 | .92 | .06 | | | |
| 3. Combined autochthony & formation belief | 1203.00 | (108) | *** | .11 [.10, .11] | .84 | .80 | .11 | 567.85 | (5) | *** |
| 4. Combined autochthony & investment belief | 1525.42 | (108) | *** | .12 [.12, .13] | .79 | .74 | .13 | 702.08 | (5) | *** |
| 5. Combined formation & investment belief | 1098.24 | (108) | *** | .10 [.10, .11] | .86 | .82 | .11 | 471.00 | (5) | *** |
| 6. Combined ingroup & outgroup ownership | 1883.78 | (109) | *** | .14 [.13, .14] | .74 | .68 | .07 | 470.35 | (6) | *** |
| 7. Combined ingroup & outgroup ownership (freed cov. 3rd items) | 1012.31 | (108) | *** | .10 [.09, .10] | .87 | .83 | .05 | 235.38 | (5) | *** |

*Note.* Model 1 is compared to model 2; all other models are also compared to model 2. Each other model forces the stated factors to load as one factor. The Chi-square difference tests are Satorra-Bentler scaled Chi-Square tests. *** $p < .001$

**Table A4.4**

*Structural Equation Model Chapter 4, Study 2, for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation through perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership, without control variables (*N=*879).*

| | Perceived ingroup ownership | | Perceived outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .02 | (.03) | .09** | (.03) | .38*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | .09* | (.04) | .12** | (.04) | .24*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | .05 | (.04) | -.07* | (.03) | -.28*** | (.05) |
| Perceived ingroup ownership | | | | | -.56*** | (.12) |
| Perceived outgroup ownership | | | | | .58*** | (.13) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.01 | (.02) |
| Autochthony belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .05* | (.02) |
| Formation belief → Ingroup ownership→ | | | | | -.05* | (.03) |
| Formation belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .07** | (.03) |
| Investment belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.03 | (.02) |
| Investment belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | -.04† | (.02) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | .43*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | | | | | .26*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | | | | | -.35*** | (.04) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A4.5**

*Structural Equation Model Chapter 4, Study 2, for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation through perceived ingroup and outgroup territorial ownership. Excluded participants who did not answer the ethnicity question (*N=*777).*

| | Perceived ingroup ownership | | Perceived outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .03 | (.04) | .11** | (.03) | .37*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | .07 | (.04) | .10* | (.04) | .24*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | .07† | (.04) | -.05 | (.04) | -.27*** | (.05) |
| Perceived ingroup ownership | | | | | -.57*** | (.12) |
| Perceived outgroup ownership | | | | | .61*** | (.13) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.01 | (.02) |
| Autochthony belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .06* | (.03) |
| Formation belief → Ingroup ownership→ | | | | | -.04 | (.03) |
| Formation belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | .06* | (.03) |
| Investment belief → Ingroup ownership → | | | | | -.04 | (.02) |
| Investment belief → Outgroup ownership → | | | | | -.03 | (.02) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | | | .42*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | | | | | .26*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | | | | | -.34*** | (.05) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | -.14 | (.11) | -.07 | (.10) | .12 | (.12) |
| Age (in years) | .01 | (.00) | .01 | (.00) | .01† | (.01) |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

**Table A4.6**

*Structural Equation Models Chapter 4, robustness check 2; Study 1 & Study 2; for the relationships of autochthony, formation, and investment belief with support for territorial compensation through perceived ingroup versus outgroup territorial ownership (model 2) (*N*=475; 879).*

| | Australia | | | | South Africa | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Perceived ingroup vs. outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | | Perceived ingroup vs. outgroup ownership | | Support for territorial compensation | |
| | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* | *B* | *SE* |
| *Direct relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | .45*** | (.07) | .43*** | (.07) | .06** | (.02) | .35*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | -.13 | (.12) | .16 | (.12) | .04 | (.02) | .22*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | -.52*** | (.11) | -.03 | (.10) | -.09** | (.04) | -.24*** | (.05) |
| Ingroup vs. outgroup ownership | | | .46*** | (.06) | | | 1.12* | (.46) |
| *Indirect relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony → Ingr. vs. outgr. owner. → | | | .23*** | (.04) | | | .07*** | (.02) |
| Formation → Ingr. vs. outgr. owner. → | | | -.07 | (.06) | | | .04* | (.02) |
| Investment → Ingr. vs. outgr. owner. → | | | -.28*** | (.10) | | | -.10*** | (.02) |
| *Total relationships* | | | | | | | | |
| Autochthony belief | | | .66*** | (.07) | | | .42*** | (.05) |
| Formation belief | | | .13 | (.13) | | | .26*** | (.05) |
| Investment belief | | | -.39*** | (.10) | | | -.34*** | (.05) |
| *Control variables* | | | | | | | | |
| Gender (0 = male) | .24* | (.11) | .14 | (.10) | .03 | (.04) | .14 | (.12) |
| Age (in years) | -.01*** | (.00) | -.01* | (.00) | .00 | (.00) | .01 | (.01) |
| Educational attainment | -.05 | (.06) | -.16** | (.06) | | | | |
| Political left-right orientation | -.04 | (.06) | .07 | (.05) | | | | |
| Born in Australia (0 = born abroad) | -.13 | (.13) | -.07 | (.15) | | | | |
| Both parents Anglo-Celtic (0 = one) | -.16 | (.12) | .05 | (.11) | | | | |

*Note.* † $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized.

## Appendix A5.1: Representativeness of the Data Chapter 5

In order to investigate the representativeness of our data, we compared our sample to information about the NZ European population from the 2018 New Zealand census (Stats NZ Tauranga Aotearoa, 2018). The census contains information per ethnic group about age groups, educational attainment, and regional distribution, although our age range (18+) is more restricted than the age ranges in the census data. The median age of New Zealand Europeans in New Zealand lies between 35-44 when considering all age groups, or between 55-59 when considering ages 20 and up. This indicates that our sample is somewhat younger than the adult NZ European population of New Zealand (Mdn = 44). Our sample is quite similar in terms of educational attainment to the actual population, although somewhat more highly educated compared to NZ Europeans aged 15+ (see Table A5.1.1; Stats NZ Tauranga Aotearoa, 2018). Furthermore, the geographical distribution of participants in our sample was quite comparable to the geographical distribution of NZ Europeans in New Zealand (see Figure A5.1.1). Finally, the participants were fairly equally distributed along the left-right and liberal-conservative political spectrums (see Figures A5.1.2 & A5.1.3).

**Table A5.1.1**

*Answers to the question 'What is the highest level of education that you have completed?'*

| | Our sample (18+) | Our sample (18+) incl. recoded open answers | NZ born (15+) |
|---|---|---|---|
| No formal education | 11.80% | 11.90% | 20.10% |
| Level 1 Certificate | 5.60% | 8.10% | 14.50% |
| Level 2 Certificate | 5.80% | 6.60% | 12.30% |
| Level 3 Certificate | 11.30% | 12.10% | 11.90% |
| Level 4 Certificate | 10.60% | 11.70% | 10.10% |
| Level 5 Diploma/Certificate | 12.80% | 13.10% | 4.80% |
| Level 6 Graduate Certificate/Diploma | 10.90% | 11.30% | 5.20% |
| Level 7 Diploma/Certificate/Bachelor Degree | 15.50% | 15.60% | 12.90% |
| Postgraduate Diploma/Certificate, Bachelor Honours | 5.60% | 2.60% | 4.80% |
| Master's Degree | 2.80% | 2.90% | 2.50% |
| Doctoral Degree | 0.80% | 0.80% | 0.60% |
| Other: | 6.60% | 0.40% | 0.30% |

**Figure A5.1.1**
*Proportion of New Zealand European population per region in New Zealand*



**Figure A5.1.2**
*Distribution of responses to the 'liberal–conservative' scale*



**Figure A5.1.3**
*Distribution of responses to the 'left-right' scale*



**Table A5.2.1**

*Bivariate correlations between the variables, and means and standard deviations (*N=*755), Chapter 5.*

| | *M* | *SD* | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | 07. | 08. | 09. | 10. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Ingroup ownership | 4.36 | (1.55) | — | | | | | | | | | |
| 02. Outgroup ownership | 4.37 | (1.65) | .50*** | — | | | | | | | | |
| 03. Autochthony belief | 3.63 | (1.50) | -.06 | .30*** | — | | | | | | | |
| 04. Investment belief | 3.75 | (1.34) | .33*** | .07 | .15** | — | | | | | | |
| 05. Ingroup rights | 5.27 | (1.52) | .49*** | .32*** | .00 | .20*** | — | | | | | |
| 06. Outgroup rights | 5.12 | (1.59) | .27*** | .50*** | .18*** | .08 | .80*** | — | | | | |
| 07. Ingroup responsibilities | 6.11 | (1.24) | .30*** | .19*** | -.04 | .06 | .62*** | .50*** | — | | | |
| 08. Outgroup responsibilities | 5.87 | (1.43) | .07 | .30*** | .07 | .01 | .45*** | .64*** | .72*** | — | | |
| 09. Territorial compensation | 3.42 | (1.54) | -.19*** | .35*** | .49*** | -.11** | -.01 | .20*** | .00 | .13** | — | |
| 10. Symbolic compensation | 3.54 | (1.58) | -.18*** | .37*** | .46*** | -.15*** | -.02 | .20*** | .00 | .13** | .69*** | — |
| 11. Restrictive immigration policies | 4.57 | (1.34) | .19*** | -.07 | -.08 | .11** | .12* | .03 | .10* | .02 | -.21*** | -.29*** |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Table A5.2.2**

*Summary of means, standard deviations, and number of responses for the variables used in the analysis, per profile (N=755), Chapter 5.*

| | Shared ownership | | | No ownership | | | Ingroup ownership | | | Outgroup ownership | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *M* | *SD* | *N* | *M* | *SD* | *N* | *M* | *SD* | *N* | *M* | *SD* | *N* |
| Ingroup ownership | 4.64 | (1.25) | 588 | 1.87 | (0.84) | 60 | 5.77 | (1.16) | 60 | 2.83 | (1.13) | 47 |
| Outgroup ownership | 4.68 | (1.29) | 588 | 1.77 | (0.82) | 60 | 2.20 | (1.08) | 60 | 6.15 | (0.97) | 47 |
| Autochthony belief | 3.61 | (1.39) | 588 | 2.71 | (1.21) | 60 | 2.92 | (1.68) | 60 | 5.21 | (1.19) | 47 |
| Investment belief | 3.83 | (1.25) | 588 | 2.96 | (1.24) | 60 | 4.42 | (1.66) | 60 * | 2.87 | (1.34) | 47 |
| Ingroup rights | 5.35 | (1.39) | 303 | 4.62 | (2.03) | 32 * | 5.77 | (1.55) | 34 | 5.14 | (1.49) | 32 |
| Outgroup rights | 5.25 | (1.39) | 303 | 4.42 | (2.16) | 32 * | 3.70 | (2.01) | 34 * | 5.78 | (1.41) | 32 |
| Ingroup responsibilities | 6.07 | (1.19) | 303 | 6.26 | (1.54) | 32 | 6.48 | (0.82) | 34 | 6.19 | (1.12) | 32 |
| Outgroup responsibilities | 5.92 | (1.27) | 303 | 6.01 | (1.81) | 32 | 4.78 | (2.16) | 34 | 6.02 | (1.20) | 32 |
| Territorial compensation | 3.42 | (1.37) | 588 | 2.73 | (1.37) | 60 | 1.89 | (1.35) | 60 | 5.44 | (1.30) | 47 |
| Symbolic compensation | 3.53 | (1.43) | 588 | 2.85 | (1.27) | 60 | 1.96 | (1.00) | 60 | 5.77 | (1.29) | 47 |
| Stricter immigration policies | 4.57 | (1.30) | 588 | 4.50 | (1.33) | 60 | 5.32 | (1.26) | 60 | 3.71 | (1.40) | 47 * |

*Note.* The reported means for ingroup and outgroup ownership are based on the average scores of the items of the latent variables. * = mean is not significantly different from the neutral midpoint of the scale.

**Table A5.2.3**

*Bivariate correlations between the variables used in the analysis for the 'outgroup ownership' (below the diagonal,* N*=47) and 'ingroup ownership' (above the diagonal,* N*=60) profiles, Chapter 5.*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | 07. | 08. | 09. | 10. | 11. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Ingroup ownership | — | .25* | .02 | .22 | .32 | -.23 | .56*** | -.39** | -.22 | -.13 | -.06 |
| 02. Outgroup ownership | .30* | — | .12 | .24* | .03 | .37* | .11 | .41** | .06 | .03 | .22 |
| 03. Autochthony belief | -.13 | .49*** | — | .01 | .16 | .39* | .35*** | .25 | .28 | .21 | .00 |
| 04. Investment belief | .24 | -.18 | -.07 | — | .43*** | .20 | .33* | .26 | -.04 | -.16 | .13 |
| 05. Ingroup rights | .17 | .20 | -.13 | -.03 | — | .39** | .52** | .19 | -.11 | -.14 | .06 |
| 06. Outgroup rights | .14 | .32 | .19 | -.14 | .79*** | — | .12 | .75*** | -.16 | -.01 | .24 |
| 07. Ingroup responsibilities | .14 | .17 | .09 | -.11 | .60*** | .71*** | — | .10 | .02 | -.05 | -.17 |
| 08. Outgroup responsibilities | .15 | .13 | .30 | -.24 | .48* | .63*** | .78*** | — | .00 | .04 | .17 |
| 09. Territorial compensation | -.17 | .55*** | .71*** | -.28* | -.16 | .20 | .11 | .31 | — | .48** | -.09 |
| 10. Symbolic compensation | -.08 | .39** | .28* | -.22 | .02 | .23 | .20 | .05 | .63*** | — | -.13 |
| 11. Restrictive immigration policies | .09 | -.12 | -.19 | .13 | -.06 | -.29 | -.11 | -.15 | -.33** | -.54*** | — |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Table A5.2.4**

*Bivariate correlations between the variables used in the analysis for the 'no ownership' (below the diagonal,* N=*60) and 'shared ownership' (above the diagonal,* N=*588) profiles, Chapter 5.*

| | 01. | 02. | 03. | 04. | 05. | 06. | 07. | 08. | 09. | 10. | 11. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01. Ingroup ownership | — | .78*** | -.07 | .21*** | .59*** | .50*** | .40*** | .27*** | -.13** | -.13** | .14** |
| 02. Outgroup ownership | .87*** | — | .12** | .13** | .49*** | .48*** | .36*** | .32*** | .13** | .16*** | .03 |
| 03. Autochthony belief | .26* | .29** | — | .24*** | -.06 | .01 | -.10* | -.05 | .42*** | .40*** | -.04 |
| 04. Investment belief | .21 | .01 | .28* | — | .18** | .14* | .06 | .01 | -.05 | -.07 | .03 |
| 05. Ingroup rights | .35* | .40*** | .35* | .13 | — | .92*** | .67*** | .56*** | -.06 | -.09 | .13* |
| 06. Outgroup rights | .28 | .43*** | .42** | .03 | .97*** | — | .61*** | .60*** | .04 | .01 | .11 |
| 07. Ingroup responsibilities | .26* | .20 | .22 | .19 | .48*** | .49*** | — | .87*** | -.03 | -.02 | .09 |
| 08. Outgroup responsibilities | .07 | .25* | .35* | .05 | .49*** | .59*** | .81*** | — | .03 | .07 | .03 |
| 09. Territorial compensation | .00 | .09 | .35** | .11 | .31 | .34* | .09 | .21 | — | .63*** | -.11* |
| 10. Symbolic compensation | .16 | .34** | .32* | -.06 | .50*** | .54*** | .08 | .22 | .46*** | — | -.21*** |
| 11. Restrictive immigration policies | .21 | .05 | .31* | .18 | .05 | .01 | .38* | .19 | -.19 | -.10 | — |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed).

**Table A5.2.5**

*Results of multinominal logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of belonging to a given profile relative to the reference profile, as a function of perceived ingroup and outgroup rights (*N=*401).*

| | Model A 'Shared ownership' as reference profile | | | Model B 'No ownership' as reference profile | | | Model C 'Ingroup ownership' as reference profile | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* |
| *1. Shared ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | | | | -.43 | (.38) | 0.65 | -1.92*** | (.52) | 0.15 |
| Rights Māori | | | | .78* | (.39) | 2.18 | 1.98*** | (.45) | 7.26 |
| *2. No ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | .43 | (.38) | 1.53 | | | | -1.49** | (.43) | 0.23 |
| Rights Māori | -.78* | (.39) | 0.46 | | | | 1.21** | (.39) | 3.34 |
| *3. Ingroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | 1.92*** | (.52) | 6.83 | 1.49** | (.43) | 4.45 | | | |
| Rights Māori | -1.98*** | (.45) | 0.14 | -1.21** | (.39) | 0.30 | | | |
| *4. Outgroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Rights NZ Europeans | -2.87*** | (.71) | 0.06 | -3.29*** | (.78) | 0.04 | -4.79*** | (.86) | 0.01 |
| Rights Māori | 3.14*** | (.83) | 23.06 | 3.92*** | (.91) | 50.19 | 5.12*** | (.94) | 167.46 |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized. OR = Odds ratios

**Table A5.2.6**

*Results of multinominal logistic regression analysis predicting the likelihood of belonging to a given profile relative to the reference profile, as a function of perceived ingroup and outgroup responsibilities (*N=*401).*

| | Model A 'Shared ownership' as reference profile | | | Model B 'No ownership' as reference profile | | | Model C 'Ingroup ownership' as reference profile | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* | *B* | *SE* | *OR* |
| *1. Shared ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibilities NZ Europeans | | | | -.34 | (.38) | 0.71 | -.92*** | (.22) | 0.57 |
| Responsibilities Māori | | | | .19 | (.28) | 1.21 | .75*** | (.15) | 1.75 |
| 2. No ownership | | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibilities NZ Europeans | .34 | (.38) | 1.41 | | | | -.57 | (.40) | 0.40 |
| Responsibilities Māori | -.19 | (.28) | 0.83 | | | | .56* | (.28) | 2.11 |
| *3. Ingroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibilities NZ Europeans | .92*** | (.22) | 2.50 | .57 | (.40) | 1.77 | | | |
| Responsibilities Māori | -.75*** | (.15) | 0.47 | -.56* | (.28) | 0.57 | | | |
| *4. Outgroup ownership* | | | | | | | | | |
| Responsibilities NZ Europeans | .14 | (.35) | 1.15 | -.20 | (.48) | 0.82 | -.77* | (.37) | 0.46 |
| Responsibilities Māori | -.06 | (.31) | 0.95 | .13 | (.38) | 1.14 | .69* | (.30) | 1.99 |

*Note.* * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (2-tailed). Reported coefficients are unstandardized. OR = Odds ratios

# Nederlandse samenvatting[29]

## Inleiding

De vraag die centraal staat in mijn proefschrift is: Wie zien mensen als eigenaar van het land in *settler societies*? *Settler societies* zijn landen die zijn gesticht en gevormd door kolonialisme, zoals bijvoorbeeld Australië en de Verenigde Staten. De groepsrelaties tussen inheemse en niet-inheemse mensen (*settlers*) in *settler societies* zijn gevormd door conflicten over het eigendom van territorium (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005; Bravo, 1996). In de meeste *settler societies* zijn inheemse volken het grootste deel van hun land kwijtgeraakt aan de *settlers*. Oproepen tot territoriale restitutie of meer territoriale autonomie staan centraal in de eisen van veel inheemse volken (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999), en het recht van inheemse volken om hun eigen land te bezitten is een belangrijk aspect van de verklaring van de Verenigde Naties over de rechten van inheemse volken (UN General Assembly, 2007). Territorium is namelijk voor elke groep van groot belang en dit is zeker het geval voor inheemse volken. Territorium biedt mensen een manier om hun identiteit te verankeren (Toft, 2014) en het speelt voor inheemse volken dan ook een cruciale rol voor hun overleving als groepen met een eigen cultuur en identiteit (Rojas Pedemonte & Miranda, 2015). Bovendien verkeren veel inheemse volken tegenwoordig in een relatief slechte sociaaleconomische positie, wat onder andere wordt toegeschreven aan het voortdurende effect van kolonialisme (González et al., 2022; Paradies, 2020). Restitutie van land kan daarom ook een impact hebben op het verminderen van ongelijkheid, omdat land vaak een grote instrumentele (bijvoorbeeld economische) waarde heeft. Hoewel territoriale restitutie een steeds belangrijker onderwerp is geworden in veel *settler societies*, zijn er nog steeds veel *settlers* die er tegen zijn (Rotz, 2017).

Ondanks de centrale rol die territoriale geschillen spelen in settler societies, heeft psychologisch eigenaarschap relatief weinig aandacht gekregen in de sociale wetenschappen (Meagher, 2020). Psychologisch eigenaarschap is de *perceptie* dat iets van iemand is (Pierce & Jussila, 2011). Het primaire doel van dit proefschrift is het onderzoeken van verschillende opvattingen over territoriaal eigenaarschap die mensen kunnen hebben in *settler societies*, en hoe deze zich verhouden tot steun voor territoriale compensatie (bijv. territoriale restitutie, grotere autonomie). Ik onderzoek dit aan de hand van drie aspecten van territoriaal eigenaarschap: *wie* worden gezien als de eigenaar, *waarom* worden zij gezien als de eigenaar en *wat* zijn de implicaties van territoriaal eigenaarschap. Ik onderzoek vier verschillende nationale contexten, die allemaal kunnen worden gekarakteriseerd als *settler societies*. In Australië (hoofdstuk 2 en 4), Zuid-Afrika (hoofdstuk 4) en Nieuw-Zeeland (hoofdstuk 5) onderzoek ik het perspectief van *settlers*,

29 I would like to thank Nora Storz and Evi Velthuis for their feedback on the Dutch summary.

en in Chili (hoofdstuk 3) vergelijk ik de settlers (niet-inheemse Chileense) en inheemse (Mapuche) perspectieven.

## Wie zien mensen als de eigenaren?

De eerste vraag is *wie* mensen zien als de eigenaren van een territorium. Het gaat er hierbij niet om wie de wettelijke eigenaren zijn, maar om de *perceptie* dat het territorium van iemand is. Mensen kunnen namelijk het gevoel hebben dat ze iets bezitten, ongeacht of dat wettelijk ook zo is (Pierce et al., 2003). Net zoals mensen het gevoel kunnen hebben dat ze persoonlijk iets bezitten, kunnen ze ook denken dat iets van hun groep is, bijvoorbeeld 'ons strand' (Due & Riggs, 2008), 'onze buurt' (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinović, 2020), of 'ons land' (Brylka et al., 2015). Verder hebben mensen niet alleen een besef van wat van hun eigen groep (hun 'ingroep') is, maar kunnen ze ook een andere groep (een 'uitgroep') als eigenaars erkennen. Om dit gevoel te onderscheiden van het wettelijke concept eigendom, wordt het 'collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap' genoemd (Pierce & Jussila, 2011). Eigenaarschap is een belangrijk aspect van de sociale realiteit dat relaties tussen individuen met betrekking tot objecten structureert (Blumenthal, 2010), omdat het een gevoel van controle en macht over deze objecten impliceert (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

In de context van *settler societies* betekent dit dat inheemse volken en *settlers* beide groepen in meer of mindere mate kunnen zien als de eigenaren van het land. In hoofdstuk 3 heb ik een relatieve schaal gebruikt om te laten zien hoe niet-inheems Chileens vs. Mapuche eigenaarschap gerelateerd is aan steun voor territoriale compensatie. Ik ontdekte dat wanneer mensen relatief meer Mapuche eigenaarschap waarnamen, ze ook sterker voorstander waren van territoriale compensatie. Deze bevinding laat zien dat territoriaal eigenaarschap van belang is in *settler societies*. In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik onder Anglo-Keltische Australiërs en Witte Zuid-Afrikanen afzonderlijk hun percepties van ingroep (*settler*) en uitgroep (inheems) eigenaarschap. Ik laat zien dat mensen een onderscheid maken tussen het waarnemen van territoriaal eigenaarschap van de ingroep en de uitgroep, en dat het dus niet simpelweg een kwestie is van het waarnemen van een lineaire relatie waarbij land ofwel tot de ene of de andere groep behoort.

Ik heb deze bevinding in hoofdstuk 5 uitgebreid door met een andere methodologische benadering de verschillende mogelijke opvattingen over collectief eigenaarschap in *settler societies* in meer diepgang te onderzoeken. Dat wil zeggen dat ik het type en het aantal verschillende manieren heb onderzocht waarop percepties van ingroep (Nieuw-Zeelands Europees) en uitgroep (Māori) territoriaal eigenaarschap zijn georganiseerd binnen verschillende subgroepen van individuen. Ik identificeerde vier subgroepen van individuen op basis van de combinatie van hun perceptie van ingroep (NZ Europees) en uitgroep (Māori) eigenaarschap. Deze vier subgroepen kunnen worden geclusterd in twee dichotomieën. Ten eerste identificeerde ik twee subgroepen van mensen die eigenaarschap voornamelijk voor één groep ervoeren: 'ingroep eigenaarschap' (8,2%) of 'uitgroep eigenaarschap' (6,4%). Ten tweede ervoeren de andere twee subgroepen vergelijkbare niveaus van territoriaal eigenaarschap voor beide groepen: 'gedeeld eigenaarschap' (75,9%) of 'geen eigenaarschap' (9,4%). De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk

laten zien dat mensen niet alleen ingroep en uitgroep eigenaarschap onafhankelijk kunnen waarnemen, maar dat het ook mogelijk is om groepen individuen te identificeren op basis van de verschillende manieren waarop ze ingroep en uitgroep eigenaarschap combineren.

## Waarom worden zij gezien als de eigenaar(s)?

Het tweede aspect van eigenaarschap (*waarom*) heeft betrekking op de redenen die mensen hebben om eigenaarschap te claimen en af te leiden. Collectief eigenaarschap kan gebaseerd zijn op verschillende algemene principes (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), wat impliceert dat er verschillende opvattingen bestaan over waarom groepen worden gezien als eigenaars van bepaalde territoria. In *settler societies* zijn drie principes van eigenaarschap van bijzonder belang: autochtonie ('wij waren hier als eerst'), investering ('wij hebben geïnvesteerd in het land') en vorming ('dit land heeft ons gemaakt tot wie wij zijn').

**Autochtonieprincipe**

> *'...wij bestonden vóór de staat, wij hebben een andere, echte, oude, voorouderlijke verbinding met het territorium'* ~ Mapuche woordvoerster Soraya Maicoño (Korol, 2022).

Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat bij gebrek aan aanvullende informatie over het eigendom van een object, mensen aannemen dat de eerste persoon die het bezit, de eigenaar is (Friedman, 2008). Mensen hebben ook de neiging om de oorspronkelijke bewoners van een gebied te zien als eigenaars van het land omdat zij er als eerste waren. In de antropologische literatuur wordt dit autochtonie genoemd (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005). Autochtonie is een van de meest basale en veelvoorkomende manieren om eigendom af te leiden. Het wordt zelfs vaak gezien als vanzelfsprekend of 'natuurlijk' (Geschiere, 2009). Termen zoals 'inheems' en 'autochtoon' verwijzen beide naar de eerste bewoners van een bepaalde plaats, met een (impliciete) gerelateerde eigendomsclaim. Het woord 'inheems' wordt over het algemeen gebruikt om te verwijzen naar de vroegst bekende bewoners van gebieden die werden gekoloniseerd door een nu dominante groep (Ojong, 2020).

Het merendeel van het eerdere onderzoek naar autochtonie heeft dit onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van groepen die zichzelf als de eerste bewoners van het gebied beschouwen. Leden van deze groepen kunnen autochtonie zien als een sterke rechtvaardiging voor het claimen van het territorium voor hun eigen groep, en als een rechtvaardiging voor het uitsluiten van groepen die later zijn gearriveerd (Ceuppens, 2011; Garbutt, 2006; Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). Sociaalpsychologische studies in Europa hebben bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat steun voor het autochtonieprincipe geassocieerd is met vooroordelen jegens immigranten (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013) en collectieve actie tegen vluchtelingen (Hasbún López et al., 2019).

Voorgaand onderzoek heeft echter nog niet de rol van autochtonie onderzocht in *settler societies*, waar de dominante groep niet autochtoon is. In deze contexten kan de

dominante groep autochtonie dus niet gebruiken om eigendom te claimen. In plaats daarvan is autochtonie gebruikt door inheemse volken als onderdeel van hun strijd voor rechten en soevereiniteit (Gagné & Salaün, 2012), en tegen onrechtmatige onteigening (Meisels, 2003). Uit onderzoek blijkt dat ook mensen die niet als eerste ergens waren, autochtonie over het algemeen nog steeds zien als een sterke basis om eigendom te claimen. Experimenteel onderzoek in Nederland heeft bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat mensen autochtonie zien als een geldig argument, niet alleen wanneer hun eigen groep als eerste was aangekomen, maar ook wanneer een rivaliserende uitgroep wordt gepresenteerd als de eerste bewoners (Martinović et al., 2020).

In mijn onderzoek draag ik bij aan de eerdere literatuur door te onderzoeken hoe steun voor autochtonie verband houdt met territoriaal eigenaarschap in *settler societies*. Ik onderzoek de impact van steun voor autochtonie als de algemene overtuiging—onafhankelijk van de specifieke intergroepscontext—dat degenen die als eersten een bepaald gebied bewonen het recht zouden moeten hebben om het te bezitten (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). Als een algemeen principe zou steun voor autochtonie dus gerelateerd moeten zijn aan de perceptie dat de eerste bewonersgroep relatief meer recht heeft op eigendom van het gebied, ongeacht of men zelf lid is van die eerste bewonersgroep of van een groep die later aankwam. Mijn bevindingen tonen aan dat wanneer mensen autochtonie steunen, ze inderdaad ook meer inheems eigenaarschap waarnemen. In de tweede studie van Hoofdstuk 3 laat ik zien dat voor zowel niet-inheemse Chilenen als Mapuche, sterkere steun voor autochtonie gerelateerd was aan een grotere erkenning van Mapuche territoriaal eigenaarschap in vergelijking met niet-inheems Chileens eigenaarschap. Verder laat ik in Hoofdstuk 4 zien dat steun voor autochtonie door *settlers* in Australië (studie 1) en Zuid-Afrika (studie 2) verband hield met een sterkere erkenning van eigenaarschap van inheemse Australiërs en Zuid-Afrikanen. Ten slotte toon ik in Hoofdstuk 5 dat de subgroep van mensen die voornamelijk Māori eigenaarschap ervoeren werd gekenmerkt door een relatief hoge steun voor autochtonie, vergeleken met de andere subgroepen.

**Investeringsprincipe**

> *'Onze geschiedenis vertelt ons, zoals we zouden moeten weten, dat het immigranten uit Europa waren die de afgelopen eeuwen dit land hebben opgebouwd.'* ~ Professor Salim Mansur in het 'Permanente Comité Burgerschap en Immigratie' (CIMM) in het Lagerhuis van Canada (Mansur, 2012)

Het maken van een object of het investeren van tijd, moeite en middelen in het veranderen en ontwikkelen ervan, is een belangrijk algemeen principe dat mensen gebruiken om eigenaarschap af te leiden of te claimen (Toft, 2003). Experimenteel onderzoek in verschillende landen heeft aangetoond dat mensen oordelen dat de maker van een object ook de eigenaar is (Beggan & Brown, 1994; Kanngiesser et al., 2014; Levene et al., 2015). Investeringen in een gebied of bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling ervan kunnen op dezelfde manier worden gebruikt om territoriaal eigenaarschap te claimen of een andere groep als rechtmatige eigenaar te erkennen.

Het is mogelijk dat mensen investeren ook kunnen zien als een legitieme reden om eigendom over te dragen van de eerste bezitter naar degene die erin heeft geïnvesteerd. Dit werd bijvoorbeeld beargumenteerd in Australië (Short, 2003) en Zuid-Afrika (Boisen, 2017; Crais, 1991), waar de toe-eigening van inheemse landen werd gerechtvaardigd met de bewering dat zij het land niet konden bezitten, omdat zij het land niet bewerkten. Experimenteel onderzoek heeft ook uitgewezen dat kinderen hun eigen investering in een object zien als een legitieme reden om het eigendom van de eerste bezitter aan zichzelf over te dragen (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). Niet-inheemse mensen zouden eerdere investeringen in een gebied ook kunnen zien als legitieme reden om het territoriale eigendom van inheemse volken aan te vechten. In de meeste *settler societies* is de grootschalige ontwikkeling van land namelijk voornamelijk aangedreven door de staat en de *settlers*, en het is dus aannemelijk dat *settlers* denken dat hun groep het meest in het land heeft geïnvesteerd. Ik beargumenteer daarom dat als *settlers* investeren een goede reden vinden voor eigendomsclaims, zij zullen denken dat hun ingroep relatief meer recht heeft om eigenaar te zijn van het land. In Hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat sterkere steun voor het investeringsprincipe verband hield met sterker ingroep (*settler*) en zwakker uitgroep (inheems) eigenaarschap in Australië en Zuid-Afrika. Dat wil zeggen, sterkere steun voor het investeringsprincipe door *settlers* is gerelateerd aan de (sterkere) overtuiging dat het land van de ingroep is en niet van de uitgroep. Verder laat ik in Hoofdstuk 5 zien dat de subgroep van mensen die voornamelijk *settler* eigenaarschap ervoeren werd gekenmerkt door een hoge steun voor het investeringsprincipe, vergeleken met de andere subgroepen. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de verwachting dat voor *settlers* steun voor het investeringsprincipe voornamelijk het eigenaarschap van de ingroep bevestigt.

Voor inheemse volken houd ik rekening met twee contrasterende mogelijkheden. Volgens de systeemrechtvaardigingstheorie zijn zowel meerderheden als minderheden gemotiveerd om de status-quo te rechtvaardigen (Jost & Banaji, 2004). Het is daarom mogelijk dat sommige inheemse mensen het eens zijn met het Westerse idee van ontwikkeling en dat zij het idee accepteren dat *settlers* meer hebben geïnvesteerd in het grondgebied. In lijn met deze beredenering zou steun voor het investeringsprincipe door inheemse mensen dan ook moeten relateren aan de perceptie dat de *settlers* relatief meer het recht hebben om het gebied te bezitten. Inheemse en niet-inheemse mensen kunnen echter ook verschillende opvattingen hebben over wat investeren in land precies inhoudt. Inheemse mensen zouden bijvoorbeeld (economische) ontwikkeling van land kunnen beschouwen als het tegenovergestelde van een verbetering. Dit is vooral waarschijnlijk in de vele contexten waarin staten prioriteit geven aan economische ontwikkeling tegen de uitdrukkelijke wensen van inheemse mensen in. Bovendien geloven veel inheemse mensen ook dat het hun verantwoordelijkheid is om het land te beschermen (Hill, 2016; Pérez & Marsico, 2021), en zij zouden daarom het beschermen van het land kunnen zien als een vorm van investering. Dus als inheemse volken dit andere begrip van investeringen hebben, kan in tegenstelling tot het bovenstaande verwacht worden dat steun voor het investeringsprincipe voor hen verband zal houden met de perceptie dat hun eigen groep relatief meer gerechtigd is om het grondgebied te bezitten.

De resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 3 geven aan dat Mapuche een duidelijk verschil zagen tussen twee verschillende manieren van investeren: Investeren door te administreren

en investeren door een territorium te ontwikkelen. Mapuche participanten die het ontwikkelings-investeringsprincipe steunden, steunden ook sterker ingroep (inheems) dan uitgroep (niet-inheems) eigenaarschap. Sterkere steun voor het administratieve-investeringsprincipe was daarentegen gerelateerd aan sterkere steun voor uitgroep dan ingroep eigenaarschap. Deze resultaten geven aan dat inheemse mensen meerdere verschillende manieren van investeren kunnen steunen, en dat deze verschillend gerelateerd kunnen zijn aan territoriaal eigenaarschap.

**Vormingsprincipe**

> *'Het is het land van mijn vader, het land van mijn grootvader, het land van mijn grootmoeder. Ik ben er aan verwant; het geeft me mijn identiteit. Als ik er niet voor vecht, zal ik er weg worden gehaald en dat zou het verlies van mijn identiteit betekenen.'*
> ~ Pater Dave Passi, eiser in de historische 'Mabo'-zaak over de landrechten van de inheemse Meriam in Australië (Graham, 1989, 0:02:08).

In het bovenstaande citaat legt pater Dave Passie uit waarom hij vecht voor de erkenning van het inheemse eigendom van de Mer-eilanden in Australië. Hij benadrukt daarbij zowel zijn voorouderlijke band met het land als het belang van het land voor zijn identiteit. Inheemse volken hebben vaak het gevoel dat hun identiteit sterk verbonden is met hun land (Giguère et al., 2012), en zij benadrukken vaak het belang van deze connectie in territoriale conflicten met *settlers* (Banerjee, 2000; Bauer, 2016; Kana'iaupuni & Malone, 2006). Hoewel in *settler societies* het identiteitsaspect van territoria vaak ondergeschikt wordt gemaakt aan andere (voornamelijk economische) overwegingen (Bauer, 2016), is het idee dat een territorium van bijzonder belang is omdat het een 'thuisland' is, zeker niet uniek voor inheemse volken. In onderzoek naar nationalisme wordt een thuisland beschouwd als een specifiek type territorium waarvan een specifieke groep mensen (de 'natie') beweert dat het van hen zou moeten zijn omdat het territorium deel uitmaakt van wie zij zijn (Shelef, 2015). Zo claimen Joden soms territoriaal eigendomsrechten van Israël omdat het land van primair belang was bij het vormen van de Joodse identiteit (Gans, 2001), en soortgelijke claims worden ook gemaakt in andere natiestaten. De essentiële rol die het land speelt, of heeft gespeeld, bij het vormen van de identiteit van de groep weerspiegelt het derde belangrijke principe (vormingsprincipe) dat mensen gebruiken om territoriaal eigenaarschap af te leiden en te claimen (Toft, 2003; Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017).

Het is aannemelijk dat *settlers* erkennen dat inheemse volken zich sterk verbonden voelen met het land. Tegelijkertijd kunnen *settlers* ook het gevoel hebben dat zij bij het land horen en dat het land diep heeft gevorm wie zij zijn als groep, zoals bijvoorbeeld het geval is voor veel Afrikaners in Zuid-Afrika (Verwey & Quayle, 2012). Ik beargumenteer daarom dat steun van *settlers* voor het vormingsprincipe gerelateerd zal zijn aan hogere steun voor zowel ingroep als uitgroep eigenaarschap. In Hoofdstuk 4 laat ik zien dat dit voor *settlers* in Australië en Zuid-Afrika inderdaad het geval is. Deze bevindingen geven aan dat voor *settlers* steun voor het vormingsprincipe inderdaad het eigenaarschap van zowel inheemse volken als *settlers* valideert.

**Conclusie eigenaarschapsprincipes**

Samenvattend laten deze resultaten voor het eerst zien dat de autochtonie-, investerings- en vormingsprincipes de percepties van territoriaal eigenaarschap in *settler societies* beïnvloeden. De bevindingen geven aan dat voor *settlers* steun voor het autochtonieprincipe gerelateerd is aan sterkere steun voor inheems eigenaarschap, steun voor het investeringsprincipe gerelateerd is aan sterkere steun voor *settler* eigenaarschap en steun voor het vormingsprincipe gerelateerd is aan zowel stekere steun voor inheems als *settler* eigenaarschap. Voor inheemse mensen geven de resultaten ook aan dat steun voor het autochtonieprincipe samenhangt met sterkere steun voor inheems eigenaarschap. Steun voor het investeringsprincipe kan daarentegen zowel samenhangen met sterkere steun voor *settler* als inheems eigenaarschap, afhankelijk van het soort investering.

## Wat zijn de implicaties van territoriaal eigenaarschap?

**Rechten en verantwoordelijkheden**

Het derde en laatste aspect van eigenaarschap dat ik heb onderzocht is de vraag *wat* de implicaties zijn van de verschillende eigenaarschapspercepties.

Eigenaarschap impliceert een scala aan rechten die men heeft jegens anderen (Pierce et al., 2003), zoals het recht om het eigendom te gebruiken, over te dragen, of anderen er van uit te sluiten (Blumenthal, 2010). Het recht om anderen uit te sluiten wordt vaak benadrukt als het meest essentiële recht (Merrill, 1998). Op het niveau van landen en territoria kan collectief eigenaarschap dan ook belangrijke gevolgen hebben voor relaties tussen groepen (Verkuyten & Martinović, 2017), bijvoorbeeld omdat het impliceert dat de eigenaars het recht hebben om 'buitenstaanders' zoals immigranten uit te sluiten (Martinović & Verkuyten, 2013). Verder impliceert eigenaarschap niet alleen dat men bepaalde rechten heeft, maar ook bepaalde verantwoordelijkheden (Merrill, 1998; Pierce et al., 2003). Kwalitatief onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat de verantwoordelijkheid voor de zorg voor bezittingen en het recht om ze te beheren vaak worden genoemd als twee centrale aspecten van wat het betekent om iets te bezitten (Furby, 1978), en landeigenaren geven aan dat ze een morele verantwoordelijkheid voelen om voor hun land te zorgen (Spears et al., 2021). Experimenteel onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat een gevoel van persoonlijk eigendom van producten (Kamleitner & Rabinovich, 2010) en openbare plaatsen (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020) samenhangt met een groter gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid voor die producten en plaatsen. Voortbouwend op deze literatuur beargumenteer ik dat, net zoals ingroep eigenaarschap samenhangt met ingroep rechten en ingroep verantwoordelijkheden, uitgroep eigenaarschap ook samenhangt met uitgroep rechten en verantwoordelijkheden.

Daarom verwachtte ik dat het zien van een groep als eigenaar van een gebied geassocieerd zou zijn met het geloof dat deze groep daardoor zowel bepaalde rechten als verantwoordelijkheden heeft. In Hoofdstuk 5 laat ik zien dat de subgroep van individuen die voornamelijk ingroep eigenaarschap ervoeren inderdaad werd gekenmerkt door de hoogste waargenomen ingroep rechten en relatief lage uitgroep rechten, vergeleken met

de andere subgroepen. Het omgekeerde was waar voor de subgroep van individuen die voornamelijk uitgroep eigenaarschap ervoeren. Steun voor zowel ingroep als uitgroep rechten was echter in geen van de subgroepen echt laag. Mogelijk komt dit door de specifieke context. Nieuw-Zeeland wordt vaak gezien als bi-culturele natie (Sibley & Liu, 2007), en het is mogelijk dat mensen daardoor niet snel de rechten van NZ Europeanen of Māori zullen ontkennen.

In tegenstelling tot mijn verwachtingen waren er echter geen significante verschillen tussen de subgroepen in de niveaus van waargenomen ingroep en uitgroep verantwoordelijkheden. Dit zou erop kunnen wijzen dat groepsverantwoordelijkheden niet nauw verbonden zijn met territoriaal eigenaarschap, althans niet in de context van Nieuw-Zeeland. Er kunnen ook andere belangrijke factoren zijn die van invloed zijn op de perceptie van groepsverantwoordelijkheid, zoals een gevoel van burgerlijke verantwoordelijkheid (Jelin, 2019).

**Steun voor compensatie**

Oproepen tot territoriale restitutie of meer autonomie (territoriale compensatie) staan centraal in de eisen van veel inheemse volken (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Yashar, 1999). De mate waarin mensen een territorium beschouwen als behorend tot de inheemse groep of de *settlers*, zal waarschijnlijk hun steun voor territoriale compensatie beïnvloeden. Er zijn zowel sociale als wettelijke normen over wat acceptabele rechtvaardigingen zijn voor de overdracht van eigendom, en het zonder toestemming innemen van iemands eigendom wordt over het algemeen gezien als diefstal. Ik beargumenteer dat mensen hetzelfde denken over gestolen voorwerpen en gestolen land: het recht op teruggave van onrechtmatig ingenomen land is de meest voorkomende rechtvaardiging voor territoriale claims tegen buurlanden (Murphy, 1990). Verder rechtvaardigen *settlers* hun verzet tegen territoriale restitutie vaak juist door te stellen dat het land niet onrechtmatig is ingenomen, bijvoorbeeld 'het was een eerlijke ruil' (Rotz, 2017), of door te ontkennen dat het land überhaupt van inheemse volken was. Voortbouwend op de eerdere literatuur, beargumenteer ik dat wanneer mensen een territorium als behorend tot de inheemse groep beschouwen, ze sterker voorstander zullen zijn van het compenseren van deze groep. Omgekeerd, wanneer ze een territorium juist beschouwen als behorend tot de niet-inheemse groep, verwacht ik dat ze minder sterk voorstander zullen zijn van compensatie.

De resultaten van alle vier hoofdstukken laten zien dat eigenaarschap en de eigenaarschapsprincipes geassocieerd zijn met territoriale compensatie. In Australië (Hoofdstukken 2 & 4), Chili (Hoofdstuk 3) en Zuid-Afrika (Hoofdstuk 4) ontdekte ik dat *settler* steun voor het autochtonieprincipe een positieve rol speelt in houdingen ten opzichte van compensatie voor inheemse volken. In Chili, Australië en Zuid-Afrika vond ik daarentegen dat *settler* steun voor het investeringsprincipe juist verband hield met een lagere steun voor compensatie. Zoals verwacht lieten de resultaten uit Australië en Zuid-Afrika zien dat territoriaal eigenaarschap hier een belangrijke rol in speelt: *settler* eigenaarschap houdt verband met een lagere steun voor compensatie, en inheems eigenaarschap met meer steun. Deze resultaten laten echter nog niet zien hoe het tegelijkertijd waarnemen van ingroep en uitgroep eigenaarschap verband

houdt met steun voor compensatie. In overeenstemming met de eerdere bevindingen, laten de resultaten uit Nieuw-Zeeland (Hoofdstuk 5) zien dat mensen die vooral inheems eigenaarschap ervoeren, het meest voorstander waren van territoriale compensatie, terwijl degenen die voornamelijk *settler* eigenaarschap ervoeren juist het sterkst tegenstander waren. Interessant is echter dat noch mensen die gedeeld eigenaarschap ervoeren, noch mensen die vonden dat het land van niemand was, voorstander waren van compensatie.

Samenvattend geven de bevindingen aan dat mensen voorstander zijn van compensatie als ze vinden dat de inheemse groep eigenaar is van het land, en dat ze tegen compensatie zijn als ze denken dat het van de *settlers* is. Het is echter belangrijk om op te merken dat steun voor inheems eigenaarschap echter alleen geassocieerd is met steun voor territoriale compensatie als mensen niet ook tegelijkertijd denken dat het land van *settlers* is. Dit impliceert dat voor *settlers* het idee dat het land 'van ons allemaal is' dus gerelateerd zal zijn aan lagere steun voor territoriale compensatie.

## Suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek

Om het onderzoek dat ik hier presenteer verder aan te vullen doe ik nog een aantal suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. Ten eerste zou toekomstig onderzoek de verschillende manieren waarop mensen eigenaarschap claimen in meer detail kunnen onderzoeken. Toekomstig onderzoek zou bijvoorbeeld verschillende dimensies en interpretaties van het investeringsprincipe kunnen overwegen: investeringen door voor het land te zorgen (e.g. *guardianschip* of *kaitiakitanga*, zie Kawharu, 2000), of investeringen door gebruik te maken van het land (bijvoorbeeld utilitair gebruik vs. identiteitsgebruik). Verder is er onderzoek uit verschillende contexten waaruit blijkt dat sommige niet-inheemse mensen aanspraak beginnen te maken op een inheemse identiteit. De Nieuw-Zeelandse politicus Trevor Mallard verklaarde bijvoorbeeld dat 'Māori en Pākehā[30] nu beide inheems zijn in Nieuw-Zeeland. Ik beschouw mezelf als een inheemse Nieuw-Zeelander' (Mikaere, 2004). Toekomstig onderzoek zou de mogelijkheid kunnen onderzoeken dat wanneer *settlers* het gevoel hebben dat ze ook inheems zijn, ze ook het gevoel hebben dat ergens als eerste zijn geen geldige reden is om eigendom te claimen.

Ten tweede heb ik in mijn proefschrift *settler* en inheems collectief eigenaarschap onderzocht. De laatste jaren lijken er echter steeds meer mensen te zijn die bezwaar hebben tegen labels zoals '*Anglo-Celtic Australian*' of '*European New Zealander*'. In plaats daarvan herontdekken ze hun identiteit in overeenstemming met een nationale categorie, bijvoorbeeld 'Nieuw-Zeelander', 'Australiër' of 'Amerikaan' (Kukutai & Didham, 2012). Immers, uit de uitspraak 'we zijn allemaal Nieuw-Zeelanders', volgt al snel de conclusie dat het verschillend behandelen van inheemse en niet-inheemse mensen zou neerkomen op ongelijkheid op basis van herkomst (Ruru, 2004). Toekomstig onderzoek zou kunnen onderzoeken hoe identificatie met een overkoepelende identiteit verband houdt met territoriaal eigenaarschap. Verder heb ik een binair onderscheid tussen inheemse en

30 Pākehā is een Māori term voor Nieuw-Zeelanders van Europese afkomst.

niet-inheemse groepen onderzocht, maar het is belangrijk op te merken dat er ook mensen zijn die zich als beide identificeren en dat niet-inheemse en inheemse groepen geen homogene gemeenschappen zijn waarin alle mensen hetzelfde denken (Figueiredo et al., 2020).

Ten derde is het waarschijnlijk dat de belangrijkste bevindingen generaliseerbaar zijn naar andere *settler societies*: de hier gepresenteerde resultaten zijn gebaseerd op vier verschillende nationale contexten, en in Chili hebben we gegevens verzameld onder de inheemse Mapuche, een moeilijk te bereiken populatie. Het algemene patroon van de resultaten was vergelijkbaar in de vier landen. Aangezien ik echter alleen het perspectief van één inheemse groep heb onderzocht, is het belangrijk om voorzichtig te zijn met het generaliseren van die bevindingen naar andere inheemse groepen. Ook is het gelijktijdig onderzoeken van percepties van ingroep en uitgroep eigenaarschap niet in alle contexten zinvol. Bijvoorbeeld, in contexten met hardnekkige territoriale conflicten, zoals Kosovo of Israël, is de kans groot dat mensen voornamelijk ingroep eigenaarschap waarnemen en zeer onwaarschijnlijk dat ze uitgroep eigenaarschap erkennen (Storz et al., 2021). Bovendien zijn er ook situaties waarin de kwestie van de eerste aankomst meer omstreden is. Zowel Serviërs als Albanezen claimen bijvoorbeeld dat Kosovo van hen is omdat hun eigen groep daar als eerste was (Daskalovski, 2004). Samenvattend zijn er twee manieren waarop toekomstig onderzoek gegevensverzameling zou kunnen gebruiken om mijn onderzoek te verbeteren: (1) aanvullende inheemse steekproeven hebben het potentieel om bijzonder informatief te zijn, vooral in vergelijking met een niet-inheemse steekproef uit dezelfde context; (2) gegevens uit andere contexten zouden een beter begrip mogelijk maken van de generaliseerbaarheid van de belangrijkste bevindingen.

## Conclusie

In de vier empirische hoofdstukken heb ik het eerste bewijs geleverd dat de algemene principes van autochtonie, investering en vorming van belang zijn voor territoriaal eigenaarschap. Verder heeft territoriaal eigenaarschap in *settler societies* ook een impact op steun voor territoriale compensatie. De bevindingen geven aan dat percepties van territoriaal eigenaarschap van belang zijn voor intergroepsrelaties en daarom implicaties kunnen hebben voor het bevorderen van rechtvaardigheid en het verbeteren van relaties tussen groepen. De verschillende principes die mensen gebruiken om eigenaarschap af te leiden en te claimen hebben verschillende implicaties voor groepen. Het onderzoek kan consequenties hebben voor beleid en strategieën gericht op het oplossen van territoriale conflicten. De verschillende eigenaarschapsprincipes kunnen bijvoorbeeld naar voren worden gebracht en ter discussie worden gesteld in politieke en publieke debatten. De resultaten geven met name aan steun voor territoriale compensatie waarschijnlijk sterker zal worden door te benadrukken dat inheemse volken als eerste aankwamen of dat zij geïnvesteerd hebben. Dit zou bijvoorbeeld gedaan kunnen worden door (extra) aandacht te geven aan de inheemse geschiedenis in het onderwijs, of door de officiële grondwettelijke erkenning dat inheemse volken als eerste aankwamen.

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# About the author

Wybren Nooitgedagt was born in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, on the 4th of September 1989. After completing his bachelor's degree in Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology (2014) he obtained his research master's degree in Migration Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism (2017) cum laude. In September 2017, he started working as a PhD candidate at the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology, under the supervision of Dr. Borja Martinović and Prof. dr. Maykel Verkuyten. In 2019 he was a visiting scholar for two months at the Society and Health Research Center of the Universidad Mayor in Chile under the supervision of Dr. Ana Figueiredo. His work has appeared in *Social Justice Research*, the *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, and in the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.

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In most settler societies, such as Australia or Chile, Indigenous Peoples have been dispossessed of the majority of their lands. Intergroup relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous (settler) people have been shaped by conflicts about the ownership of territory, and calls for territorial restitution or increased autonomy are central to the demands of many Indigenous Peoples. People can feel like a group owns a territory, regardless of whether they legally do. In settler societies, the extent to which people perceive a territory as belonging to an Indigenous group or to the settlers is likely to influence their support for territorial compensation for the Indigenous group. In this dissertation, using large-scale survey data collected among settlers and Indigenous people, Wybren Nooitgedagt examines different understandings of collective territorial ownership that people can have in settler societies, and how these relate to support for territorial compensation. He considers three aspects of perceived territorial ownership: *who* is seen as the owner, *why* is that group seen as the owner, and *what* are the implications of perceived ownership?

Wybren Nooitgedagt conducted the present research as part of his PhD research at the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer) at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).