unashamedly reflect a certain view of political life" (p. 3) — a stance other philosophers in this field might emulate.

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Ethics, Money and Sport. This Sporting Mammon
ADRIAN WALSH & RICHARD GIULIANOTTI
London: Routledge, 2007
158 pp.

In this book Walsh and Giulianotti aim to show what is wrong with the commercialization of sport that has occurred in the last decades. True to the nature of their respective backgrounds they provide a philosophically firm and a sociologically informed evaluation of the role of the market in some of the most important sports.

The first innovation in their book is the introduction of the term 'hypercommodification', which refers to 'both the substantive increase in the range and number of goods that are bought and sold as well as the intensification of market understandings and attitudes toward sport itself.' (p. 14) This notion is meant to remedy the shortcomings that the authors identify with the classical definition of a commodity as a good that is bought and sold on markets; this definition ignores the independent influence of 'market rhetoric' (even when goods are not actually bought and sold) as well as the fact that in many cases it is the pervasiveness of marketization which is relevant, rather than the mere existence of a market. Hypercommodification in sports is then presented with a list of four key phenomena: the transformation of sports clubs into corporate entities, the increasing professionalization of athletes, the proliferation of advertising and merchandising and the 'venalisation' of the sport ethos, i.e. the increasing dominance of the profit motive. For each feature they show how commodification in its hyper-form is transforming the way sports are being played, watched and experienced.

In order to show what is wrong with commodification in sport, Walsh and Giulianotti reject the idea of a monistic normative approach. They present a framework that consists of four distinct moral pathologies, which each violate something of value generated in sport. The *motivational* pathology maintains that commodification corrodes the motivations of athletes to play sport for its own sake. The *instrumentalist* pathology criticizes the use of athletes and of sport itself as a mere means to commercial ends, for example when rule changes are made to allow for more advertisements during match broadcasts. The *distributive* pathology concerns distributive injustices, such as the exclusion of traditional fans from their club's matches because of excessive ticket prices. Finally, the *pragmatic* pathology addresses those instances where commercialization threatens to undermine the basis of its own success, as when rich professional leagues fail to invest in the grassroots that eventually nourish them, or when rich clubs fail to share revenues with poorer ones so that inequalities between clubs deepen and competitions become predictably boring. This pluralist framework allows the authors to capture various morally problematic developments in sport. That is a major advantage, but nonetheless one would have wished that the authors had been

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somewhat more explicit about the relationship between these pathologies: are they all a violation of morality *in the same sense*? Are they equally bad? It is a merit that Aristotelian, Kantian, Walzerian and pragmatic considerations all find their place in the pluralist framework, but one cannot help wondering about their mutual relations.

I will now focus on the motivational pathology, where their discussion is philosophically most interesting. The argument comes in three steps. (i) When sport is played for its own sake Walsh and Giulianotti maintain that it generates 'autotelic goods', which are 'realised in the performance of the activity itself, rather than being consequent upon it.' (p. 33) They mention the satisfaction derived from competing with others, developing one's skills, playing according to the rules of fair play and representing one's community. The authors argue that these autotelic goods do not constitute sport, but rather supervene on it, or emerge from it. (ii) Commodification threatens the realization of autotelic goods through the operation of two causal relations. Commodification may lead one to be predominantly focused on profit ('venality') and this motivational change in turn may corrode the motivation for playing sports because of its autotelic goods. (iii) Such a process of corrosion is pathological because autotelic goods have intrinsic value. According to Walsh and Giulianotti, such value is not something essential in the meaning of these goods but rather derives from the 'human interests' that these goods serve, their contribution to 'human flourishing' (p. 44/46). All three steps involved in this argument are important contributions to the commodification debate, but each of them also raises some further questions.

First, the concept of autotelic goods is meant to be an alternative for the MacIntyrean concept of the internal goods of a practice. Internal goods, they fear, require a 'metaphysically contentious' understanding of the social and cultural meanings of whole practices: 'in our account we do not tie the goods realized in an activity itself to more radical claims about how such goods gain their meaning through their embeddedness in social and cultural practices.' (p. 37) By contrast, with the concept of autotelic goods Walsh and Giulianotti want to focus on single activities and the goods realized therein. A problem with this seems to be that autotelic goods — just like internal goods — can be understood only when one takes into consideration the sporting practices they are embedded in. They 'supervene upon' or 'emerge from' sporting activities only when the sporting practices in question have a certain shape. For example, the autotelic good of fair play only arises when a sport is played under rules of fair play that are adequately monitored by independent and well-trained referees. Because the authors (rightfully, in my mind) choose to loosen the link between an activity and the necessary occurrence of certain goods, its seems they automatically have to take into account the practical structure necessary for the realization of the — now only potentially realizable — autotelic goods. That is not so much of a problem (to my mind), but it does bring them closer to the MacIntyrean conception of internal goods than they realize.

Second, the two causal claims about the effects of commodification are an improvement over the logical claim that these relations should be conceived as necessities. The introduction of markets only *tends to* lead to venality, which only *tends to* undermine autotelic goods. Nonetheless, this might still be too strong. Their reliance on the ancient Greeks' recognition of the 'gravitational pull of money' (p. 41) and the casuistic evidence of value corruption in sport are insufficient to prove the existence of generally holding causal tendencies. In the commodification debate the corroding

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effect of commodification upon intrinsic value is conceptualized as the 'Domino Thesis' and most authors refuse to claim the general truth of this thesis. On the other hand, the authors rightly refer to economic psychologists who have delivered some evidence that the availability of extrinsic rewards 'crowds out' intrinsic motivation. Nonetheless, the debate on this point seems still out in the open.

Third, the reliance on human interests and human flourishing as the locus of value for autotelic goods is meant to avoid the belief in essential meanings constitutive of goods that the authors attribute to the approach pursued by Michael Walzer and Elizabeth Anderson. However, at least for Anderson's theory it is questionable whether it can be characterized as detaching modes of valuation from the practical function goods have for (the good) human life. Her theory does maintain that a specific mode of valuation can be assigned to each good, but it also requires these judgments to be subject to reasoned criticism and reformulation. Substantively, the authors' reliance on human flourishing opens up questions about the weighing of values: why should the intrinsic value of autotelic goods receive priority over the monetary value generated by the commodification of sports? Can it not be the case that the latter value turns out to outweigh the former? Do the authors want to claim that the intrinsic value of autotelic goods outweighs monetary value as a matter of fact? Then a more explicit balancing exercise seems necessary to establish the point. Or does intrinsic value have some kind of lexical priority? Then an additional argument to that point seems to be needed.

In the last chapter, Walsh and Giulianotti present their preferred policy options. They expect much good to come from community ownership of clubs and associations, but they also propose non-market methods for the allocation of players amongst clubs, non-market systems for the distribution of tickets and TV coverage, and obligatory investment by elite sport clubs into their grassroots. These are proposals that deserve serious consideration. Overall, *Ethics, Money and Sport* is applied philosophy at its best. It develops a distinctive new approach to commodification issues while at every stage of the argument testing the results against the developments in the area of sport. It also discusses the normative theories from the field, most notably the role of the Amateurist ideology in the organization of sports. However, one would do injustice to the book when one would restrict its relevance to sport alone. Every moral philosopher interested in questions of commodification can benefit greatly from the general pluralist framework presented here as well as from the insightful and balanced elaboration of all of its parts.

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Environmental Virtue Ethics
RONALD SANDLER & PHILIP CAFARO (eds.)
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ix + 240 pp.

The title of this book, *Environmental Virtue Ethics*, is significant. But its significance may be lost on those outside the environmental ethics community who think of

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