

# Introduction

## 1989 and the West: revisiting the Cold War victory narrative

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### **Toward a history of Western Europe since the end of the Cold War**

‘Now we are in a situation in which what belongs together will grow back together,’ the former chancellor of West Germany, Willy Brandt, said on November 10, 1989, the day after the Berlin Wall came down. His remarks naturally referred in the first place to the prospect of a unified Germany that had suddenly opened up. Yet in the context of the chain of remarkable events of the previous years—the announcement of perestroika, the election victory of Solidarity in Poland, the ‘Pan-European Picnic’ on the Austrian–Hungarian border—his words also captured the sentiment of the dawn of a new era that many felt at the time. An era in which not only Germany, but Europe as a whole, could suddenly ‘grow back together’ seemed to have begun.

While often portrayed in terms of a ‘unification,’ few people at the time expected that East and West would simply merge into one new political and economic model after they had been divided for decades. Rather, the prevalent mood at the time was that ‘the Cold War did not end, it was won,’ as the then-US president, George Bush Sr., stated. The end of the Cold War seemed to equal the victory of the West and should therefore mean nothing less than the conversion of Central and Eastern Europe to the Western model of liberal democracy and capitalism. In no place was this more obvious than in Germany itself, where the states of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) simply acceded to the existing Federal Republic’s political institutions, and experts launched the ‘conversion’ of its economy based on West German capitalist principles.

This particular understanding of the end of the Cold War in terms of the victory of the West not only circulated among political leaders, but it also remained the dominant paradigm in scholarly perspectives on the topic. As a consequence, most scholarly attention has been devoted to developments in Eastern Europe since the late 1980s, where the impact of the collapse of communism and the end of East–West hostility was, of course, much more dramatic than in Western Europe.<sup>1</sup> The end of the Cold War changed national borders, parliamentary democracy was introduced, and Central and Eastern European countries eventually joined the two paradigmatic Western organizations, namely the European Union (EU) and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Recent domestic and international developments have firmly relaunched the question of to what extent the West and its values of democracy and a liberal international order actually ‘won’ the Cold War,<sup>2</sup> while the fact that Eastern Europe witnessed momentous changes as a consequence of the end of the Cold War remains beyond doubt.

Scholars of Western Europe’s history since 1989 have described its development mostly in terms of continuity and success. Most famously and controversially, this strand of thinking has become associated with the ‘end of history’ thesis put forward by the American thinker, Francis Fukuyama, who posited that there was no longer a genuine alternative for Western-style liberal democracy and capitalism after communism collapsed.<sup>3</sup> These notions of continuity and victory also appeared, albeit more subtly, in the historiography of the 1990s and early 2000s. Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza concluded that after 1989 Europe was becoming ‘conscious of one European identity.’<sup>4</sup> In his history of twentieth-century Europe, Richard Vinen concluded that Europe ‘united around the values of democracy’ once the Cold War was over.<sup>5</sup> Some historians even choose to ignore the ‘1989’ caesura altogether and instead talk of a ‘long twentieth century’ to emphasize the lack of structural consequences the fall of the Berlin Wall had in the West.<sup>6</sup> In any case, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War made evident that Europeans had learned how to tame the demons of its past, so that ‘the twenty-first century might yet belong to Europe.’<sup>7</sup>

This particular understanding of the place of 1989 in Western European history not only sees the West as the clear winner of the Cold War, but also seems to assume that the Western half of the continent was left fundamentally unaffected by the end of the Cold War. This book aims to problematize this reading of post-1989 history and argues that the end of the Cold War has been a formative event, not only for Eastern Europe, but for Western Europe as well. The Western political and economic model was far from static and was itself deeply affected by the end of the Cold War. The chapters in the book discuss a wide range of countries, phenomena, and developments of post-1989 Western European history that substantiate these claims, and the book as a whole has a methodological and theoretical focus that deserves to be discussed.

Methodologically, the approach of this book is emphatically *historical*. Given its contemporary nature, the research of the post-1989 world has been largely the terrain of political scientists. For historians, the subject matter obviously harbors major pitfalls. To research the history of such a recent period might entail the abandonment of some historical tools, such as some types of archival research, and, in particular, a most cherished asset, namely the ability to observe with the benefit of hindsight. Put simply, historians usually study developments of which they know the end. But ends are much less obvious in the study of such a contemporary topic as the consequences of 1989 for the West. It is for a large part, not even history. And yet, historians are equipped with skills that could make an important contribution to research on this topic. Historical research can avoid the problems of causality and endogeneity often associated with comparative

politics.<sup>8</sup> It can also make comparisons through time as well as through space. As such, historians are often more sensitive to historical continuities and discontinuities, which are of key importance in assessing the significance and impact of such a major event as the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This means that, in contrast to political science and international relations studies of contemporary Europe, which do not usually apply a long-term historical perspective but rather use history mostly as an illustration to explain present-day issues, this book starts from the assumption that only history can help us understand where Europe's contemporary challenges come from. In other words, what we do is to 'read history forward,' tracking the long-term consequences of reforms, actions, and decisions made by historical actors in the 1980s (and sometimes earlier) to see how they were affected by the end of the Cold War and how they have shaped contemporary Western Europe. This is in contrast to reading 'backward,' seeking potentially coincidental precedents for contemporary phenomena, as is often the case in political science research. This *longue durée* perspective of at least four decades allows us to highlight issues of causality that would remain under the surface otherwise. In practical terms it also means that the historical method, in terms of the study and analysis of historical material (archival or otherwise), is central to all the chapters of this volume.

Theoretically, this long historical perspective and concern with causality allows for a new understanding of the importance of 1989 in Western European history that has insufficiently been offered in historiography. This book puts forward the concept of the end of the Cold War as an accelerator of three distinctive (geo-)political and economic processes in Western Europe. These processes were already clearly underway in the 1980s, but were reinforced by the post-1989 victory mood at the end of the Cold War. The first was the consolidation of the Western system of security politics, which, after 1989, thanks to the missile crisis and major steps in European integration, confirmed the importance of the Atlantic military alliance and economic and political integration under the leadership of Brussels. The second development consisted of the belief in the superiority of Western Europe's neoliberal capitalist narrative, which was already on the rise in the 1980s but was boosted by the end of the Cold War. Finally, the end of the Cold War seemed to confirm the success of a 'restrained' model of liberal democracy, characterized by a distance between electorates and elected, as resistance against this model had been successfully suppressed in Cold War Europe.

Based on these central methodological and theoretical tenets, this book sheds new light on contemporary concerns about the viability and success of Western Europe's political and economic model.<sup>9</sup> The genuine historical perspective of the volume allows for greater understanding of the causal links between the processes that were accelerated by the end of the Cold War and present-day concerns about the viability of the political and economic model of Western Europe. The chapters of this book, therefore, not only problematize the notion of historical continuity, but also question the idea of an unproblematic Western victory. The sections within this book address this question in four spheres, questioning the

post-1989 era as the age of Germany, the age of neoliberalism, the age of multi-lateralism, and the age of democracy. This book shows how current-day concerns about the viability of the Western European model are neither new nor contingent, but rather deeply entangled with the course of Western European history at least since the 1980s.

In this introduction we first outline the three major processes accelerated by 1989, which, thanks to the end of the Cold War, played into the Western victory narrative in the 1990s. We then proceed to discuss questions that have come to the surface more recently about the viability and success of these three hallmarks of the Western success narrative. These three developments outline the structure of this book as they are the topics of the three sections that follow the initial section on Germany, which was, of course, at the epicenter of the changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall. We conclude this introduction by mapping the chapters grouped in the four sections of this volume.

### **The end of the Cold War as accelerator**

The timing of the end of the Cold War proved to be crucial for Western Europe's history in the 1990s and beyond. It occurred at the end of the 1980s, a decade in which Western Europe had just briefly emerged from its most serious political and economic crisis since the end of World War II.<sup>10</sup> The first three decades after the war are generally referred to as *les trente glorieuses*, Europe's golden age of democracy, prosperity, and progress.<sup>11</sup> This success story ended rather abruptly in the mid-1970s. Many observers feared that parliamentary democracy was unable to integrate the many new social movements that increased their demands on the state and asked for recognition and participation.<sup>12</sup> The economic situation also deteriorated significantly over the course of the 1970s, in which the Keynesian paradigm lost appeal, and protests, strikes, and rising unemployment made a comeback.<sup>13</sup> The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, moreover, terminated the period of international détente, visible in the deployment of medium-range missiles, which raised the stakes in an international arms race between the Soviet Union and the West.

Western European political leaders did not remain passive in the face of these challenges, but carved out responses to the complex political, economic, and geopolitical situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. These responses shaped the political constellation of the 1980s that was in place when the Wall came down, and which therefore had long repercussions for the 1990s and beyond. Indeed, each of these challenges was met with a particular response that, in turn, was reinforced by the buoyant mood of victory in the West. In particular, we can distinguish three such distinct political and economic processes.

The first process was geopolitical in nature. European integration, EU expansion, and NATO emerged as the answers to Europe's (geo-)political challenges of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this period, the European integration process had halted. Euroscepticism was on the rise and many questioned whether further cooperation was the answer to Europe's economic problems, resulting in

a situation that was labeled eurosclerosis.<sup>14</sup> It was only under the leadership of Jacques Delors, who was president of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, and thanks to the enactment of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, that European integration got a major boost, both as a (geo-)political and economic project.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the SEA is generally considered a stepping stone to the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European Union.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, Europe got its first experience of absorbing former dictatorships into its midst with the accessions of Greece, Spain, and Portugal to the European Community (EC) in the 1980s.<sup>17</sup>

The end of the Cold War occurred at a moment in which European integration and expansion were increasingly seen as solutions to Europe's problems. Equally important in this regard was the growing significance of NATO. The arms race of the 1980s and the American stationing of medium-range nuclear missiles across Europe had caused massive popular protests, but also underlined Europe's dependence on the American nuclear umbrella for its security. Therefore, notwithstanding future doubts on NATO's post-Cold War role, the alliance was recognized as the cornerstone of European security in the 1980s and subsequently credited for having won the Cold War.<sup>18</sup> To conclude, the principles of European foreign policy and security were firmly in place in the 1980s and offered Western Europe a blueprint on how to meet with the challenges posed by the events of 1989.

The second process catalyzed by 1989 was the growing self-confidence of the ideological movement that underpinned Europe's economic recovery in the 1980s. Rising unemployment figures and high inflation rates had undermined the Keynesian narrative of *les trente glorieuses* in the 1970s.<sup>19</sup> The economic recession terminated what Tony Judt has called the 'social democratic moment,' and ushered in the age of what we generally define as neoliberalism.<sup>20</sup> The neoliberal paradigm has most famously become associated with the reign of the two most prolific political leaders of the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. But also, on the European continent, faith in the free market had become more firmly established in the decade preceding the fall of the Berlin Wall. This applied not only to conservative politicians such as Helmut Kohl,<sup>21</sup> but also to socialists such as Bettino Craxi in Italy or even François Mitterrand in France, who all, in the words of historian Donald Sassoon, adopted 'neoliberal economic policies.'<sup>22</sup>

So if, in Ronald Reagan's terms, the West could win the Cold War because it was able to 'outspend' Moscow, this was supposedly only thanks to the vitality of free market capitalism, which, by the end of the 1980s, had taken on a very distinct neoliberal form.<sup>23</sup> By the time the Berlin Wall fell, state intervention and regulation had come to look increasingly suspicious.<sup>24</sup> The end of the Cold War buttressed the neoliberal narrative of deregulation, privatization, and free market capitalism. The historian Mark Mazower has even argued that the 'real victor' of 1989 was capitalism,<sup>25</sup> and this was indeed the view of many in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this regard, as with its geopolitical effects, the chronology of the end of the Cold War was crucial, as the politics of free market capitalism were a response to the economic problems of the 1970s.

Finally, next to European integration and capitalism, ‘democracy’ established itself as the third major ‘victor’ of 1989. Democracy now enjoyed ‘a global monopoly as the basis of legitimate rule.’<sup>26</sup> The number of democratic countries rose to historically unprecedented levels.<sup>27</sup> However, in Western Europe, it was not simply ‘democracy’ as such that the end of the Cold War seemed to have buttressed. Rather, a specific model of democracy had reasserted its dominance in the 1980s after being challenged by social and political movements in the decades before. Indeed, the 1960s and 1970s were a time of great social upheaval in which the particular forms of democracy that had evolved in Europe after 1945 came under attack.<sup>28</sup> This postwar notion of democracy, which centered not so much on popular participation but on what has been called the rule of ‘middle-class and middle-aged men in suits’<sup>29</sup> on parliaments, parties, and professional politicians, has been denoted a ‘directed democracy’<sup>30</sup> or a ‘restrained democracy.’<sup>31</sup> The challenges to this model, which advocated greater popular participation, led to a widespread sentiment that there was a ‘crisis of democracy’ in the West in the 1970s.<sup>32</sup>

Yet, by the 1980s, this ‘restrained’ democracy seemed to have recovered rather well from the challenge to its legitimacy. The social movements of the 1980s no longer questioned representative democracy as such, but only placed specific issues on the political agenda.<sup>33</sup> So in this regard, it is possible to speak of 1989 as a catalyst for a ‘directed’ model of democracy and the continued rule of professional politicians that stood at some distance from the electorate. In other words, 1989 seemed not only to be a victory for democracy, but also advanced a specific form of democracy that seemed particularly resilient in the 1980s, having overcome the challenges of previous decades.

The chapters in this book show how the end of the Cold War catalyzed these three processes that seemed, at the time, to prove the success of Western Europe’s geopolitical organization, the supremacy of its economic system, and the virtues of its model of democracy. However, all of these developments have been facing a backlash over the past few years, whereby the ‘victory’ of the West after 1989 has been increasingly questioned. In contrast to the scholarship of the 1990s and 2000s, concepts such as divergence, crisis, and conflict are on the rise in recent studies on the fate of European politics.<sup>34</sup> The election of Donald Trump, the Eurozone, and migration crises catalyzed questions over the viability of EU-integration and the future of NATO. The economic crisis, resistance against austerity politics, and growing concerns about inequality have started to jeopardize the post-1989 hegemony of neoliberalism. And new political movements, populist or otherwise, have raised alarmist concerns about the state of Western-style democracy.

### **The legacy of the end of the Cold War today**

The 1990s optimism about the supremacy of the Western European political and economic models of the 1980s has evaporated. Instead, the question of whether the West has really won the Cold War at all is now frequently asked, sometimes

alongside expressions of existentialist doubt as to whether ‘the West’ even still exists.<sup>35</sup> By deploying a long-term perspective, the chapters in this book embed these contemporary concerns into the trajectory of Western European history over the last four decades. They do so in the context of the three dimensions of the supposed Western success story catalyzed by the events of 1989, around which we have organized the structure of this book. We have preceded these three sections with a special section on Germany, which was not only at the heart of these developments, but whose recent history also provides a window into these (geo-)political and economic developments at large.

First, seen from today’s vantage point, the post-1989 era does not seem to be the ‘age of multilateralism’ that many believed it would be. Indeed, Europe’s geopolitical status, once seen as the epitome of a ‘postmodern’ world order, free of conflict,<sup>36</sup> looks more and more fragile. The EU seems to be increasingly divided, between North and South in terms of economic reforms, and between East and West regarding questions of migration and national sovereignty.<sup>37</sup> Parties of various ideological backgrounds question the European integration process, principally in countries that stood at the cradle of Europe’s integration.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, expansion of the EU with new members—so obviously desirable in the 1990s and early 2000s—has become almost an anathema. Brexit has even shown that there is a way out, despite its practical drawbacks. The cornerstone of the European Union’s foreign policy, namely to build a ‘ring of friendship’ around the EU’s borders, has met with bloodshed extending from Ukraine to Libya. This means that internal divisions and external threats all cast a different light on how deeply European unity, lauded in the aftermath of 1989, was actually rooted. It imposes on historians the imperative to understand how the current drive toward the disintegration of Europe’s political and security structure relates to the choices made at the end of the Cold War.

Second, belief in the superiority of free market capitalism as the dominant economic paradigm has endured a major setback in the last few years. Influential economists, anti-austerity movements, and left-wing governments have all questioned whether austerity, privatization, and welfare cuts are an answer to the great economic recession that has plagued large parts of Europe. Indeed, some hold that the economic crisis was caused in the first place by the massive deregulation of the financial markets, which was underpinned by the same neoliberal narrative that now prescribes austerity as a medicine. It is far from clear which, if any, economic narrative will surface as an alternative to the neoliberal one. Yet recent developments have surely eroded the confidence of free market capitalism and pointed to its pitfalls.<sup>39</sup>

Third, the virtues of the ‘directed’ model of democracy that seemed so resilient in the 1980s are increasingly questioned. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that the electoral advances of the *Lega Nord*, the *Front National*, and the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* were no one-time successes of protest parties in the 1980s. Instead, they were the beginnings of a long wave of populist electoral victories that came fully to the surface in the 2000s.<sup>40</sup> Their electoral breakthroughs have come to epitomize the ‘crisis of political representation,’ in

which, rightly, the ‘rule of parties, parliaments and politicians’ is the main object of populist critique and contrasted with the ‘will of the people’ that these parties claim to embody.<sup>41</sup> As such, they undermine the underlying logic of post-1945 European democracy, namely that democracy belongs to professional politicians and that a certain distance between electorate and elected is beneficial or even essential.<sup>42</sup>

The recent uncertainties about the gains of the end of the Cold War have, paradoxically, also surfaced in the country where hopes were arguably highest in 1989: Germany. The country’s reunification in 1990 captured the atmosphere of optimism at the end of the Cold War. If any country symbolized the confidence of the Western model it was the Federal Republic, which absorbed the former German Democratic Republic into its political and economic system. Despite its many obvious achievements,<sup>43</sup> the history of almost three decades of German unity is also often told in terms of the crisis of the welfare state,<sup>44</sup> the persistent economic divide between the former Eastern and Western states,<sup>45</sup> continuing cultural gaps,<sup>46</sup> and even signs of nostalgia for the GDR period.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, German unification has raised qualms about Germany’s role in the new Europe, with voices concerned about the supposed lack of Berlin’s leadership contrasting with those arguing against the German-inspired austerity politics of the EU in the wake of the Eurozone crisis.<sup>48</sup>

Germany’s experience since 1989 also serves as a microcosmic view of the history of Western Europe as a whole since 1989, with its initially triumphant mood of Western superiority and the subsequent backlash, visible first in economic problems, and then in the rise of a strong populist movement. It is for this reason that Germany receives special attention in this book, in which these myriad ways in which the end of the Cold War affected the country are explored.

## **Outline**

Taken together, the erosion of the seeming securities of post-1989 Western Europe provides ample reason to reconsider how 1989 has impacted the West, and how the end of the Cold War contributed to the multiple crises that sweep across Western Europe today. Indeed, seen from the present-day vantage point, the political and economic models that the West offered to the East to unify Europe in 1989 were not perpetual values ushering in the ‘end of history.’ Instead, they appear to have been historically contingent notions that were prevalent at the end of the 1980s, which, thanks to the specific timing of the end of the Cold War, gained an enormous political significance and had profound (geo)political and economic consequences.

The first section, on Germany, shows the mixed legacy of the end of the Cold War in this country. In Chapter 1, the introduction to the section, Jacco Pekelder sketches the dual forces at work in post-1989 German history: fear, including within Germany itself, of the return of German power and identity politics that were so forcefully present in its earlier history; and caution for an overtly reluctant German leadership. Yet 1989 did not prove to be the zero hour of German



history that many people expected, and continuity with the previous decades of West Germany's civic tradition was very strong. The gap between expectation and reality is also the topic of Chapter 2 by Adam Seipp. Based on material from multiple archives, he demonstrates how the withdrawal of American troops from Germany, although desired by many for decades, raised concerns of a territorial, economic, and political nature when it eventually materialized in the 1990s. Yet, despite the fact that the troops left and military lands were converted, the enduring cultural legacy of the American presence in Germany remains tangible to this very day. German unification and the American withdrawal were part of large geopolitical shifts in the post-1989 landscape that marked the return of the 'German question' to the European agenda. In Chapter 3, Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli shows how Germany reluctantly adapted to its new role as Europe's political and economic hegemon, without greatly upsetting the balance of power of German foreign policy principles that had developed in the post-1945 era. In Chapter 4, the final contribution to this section, Christian Wicke seeks to understand what German unification meant for the question of German identity. Distinguishing between different notions of 'normality,' he shows how, despite its full acceptance in the West after 1989, and the globalization of Holocaust memory, Germany's national identity can never become fully 'normal' as a consequence of its Nazi past.

The second section discusses the triumph of neoliberalism after 1989. In Chapter 5, the introduction to this section, Annelien de Dijn points to three overarching questions that the section addresses. First, whether the post-1989 neoliberal embrace of free markets and competition impacted the East differently than the West. Second, whether an explanation of the post-1989 triumph of neoliberalism, rather than that of another system of ideas, is related to the adherence of local elites to neoliberalism and to past legacies, which determined how receptive policy-makers were to neoliberal prescriptions. And third, whether, when evaluating the success of neoliberalism since 1989, we should take into account both its economic doctrines and its political agenda. In Chapter 6, Philipp Ther views the decades between 1989 and the economic crisis of 2008 as the hegemony of neoliberalism. He analyzes why neoliberalism became so firmly established around 1989 by an innovative focus on different national perspectives and experiences and assesses the hegemony of neoliberalism from the perspective of its participation 'from below.' In Chapter 7, Bram Mellink and P.W. Zuidhof adhere to Ther's view that 'local contexts matter.' While they demonstrate a transnational neoliberal shift around the end of the Cold War from 'rollback' to 'roll-in' neoliberalism, they note that the local trajectories in which this political transformation occurred differed significantly from country to country. In particular, Mellink and Zuidhof point to the changing character of neoliberalism around the end of the Cold War, which was no longer only about pushing back the state from the market, but which introduced market principles and market measures within the state itself. In Chapter 8, Stefan Couperus and Dora Vrhoci assess East-West town twinning trajectories in Europe as a way to probe into the effects of 1989 on transnational collaboration between local communities. They show that town twinning

programs that started in the decades after World War II were more likely to persist on the basis of mutual friendship, solidarity, and rapprochement, unaffected by 1989. By contrast, town twinning programs that started around the end of the Cold War fostered mutual business and commercial opportunities.

The third section discusses the role of the European Community/European Union in the transformations of 1989. The three main chapters in this section, introduced by Federico Romero in Chapter 9, examine how the EC/EU conveyed a Western set of institutions, practices, norms, and ideas in post-1989 Europe and beyond. In Chapter 10, Cristina Blanco Sío-Lopez argues that the implementation of the EC's eastward enlargement, and the free movement of persons as part of the Schengen area, directly generated a lingering 'democratic deficit' that is clearly palpable today. She emphasizes how the end of the Cold War represents a missed opportunity to enhance and deepen the quality of democracy in these realms. In Chapter 11, Laurien Crump points to a second major missed opportunity for Western Europe around 1989, tracking the current Western European inability to deal with an increasingly assertive Russia toward the end of the Cold War. She analyzes how, in the 1990s, Western European integration soon overtook the initiative to strengthen the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which included Russia. This led to a marginalization of Russia and to the current Western European fear of a 'new Cold War.' In Chapter 12, Frank Gerits reconstructs the EC's African policies and its self-representation between the 1970s and 1990s. He shows how the EC cautiously deployed 'soft power' as a way to promote democracy until the 1980s. Yet, around the end of the Cold War, these overtly normative goals changed into structural adjustment programs, with a focus on market efficiency and private finance.

The fourth and final section turns toward domestic politics, and, more specifically, the fate of democracy in Western Europe. In the introduction, Chapter 13, Ido de Haan weaves together the two most significant developments in this regard: the demise of the European left as a much undervalued aspect of the transformation of Western Europe's political landscape, inextricably linked to the collapse of communism; and the rise of the populist right. Populism is not only seen as 'corrective' of democracy, but also as a threat to democratic systems. This section connects the current populist wave to history, questioning to what extent it is part of a European tradition in which politicians claimed to speak on behalf of one homogenous and unified people.<sup>49</sup> In Chapter 14, Martin J. Bull discusses the fate of the European radical left. Starting from the collapse of communism, he shows how parties occupying the space to the left of social democracy have reinvented themselves and, at times, flourished across Europe since 1989. In Chapter 15, Dan Stone posits how the end of the Cold War accelerated the abandonment of the postwar antifascist consensus, which had already been in decline since the 1970s, and ushered in a current 'new age of irrationalism.' Stone's chapter started its life as the thought-provoking keynote lecture of the workshop that stood as the basis of this book. It was explicitly intended to trigger discussion among participants on the question of which historical precedents exist for the current populist wave in Europe, and how the end of the Cold War and the demise of the antifascist consensus relate to the rise of the populist right.

The historical *longue durée* perspective of the contributions has unveiled slow-moving processes and causal mechanisms across a wide range of countries, phenomena, and developments. The contributors of the four sections of the book convincingly show how the end of the Cold War, as an accelerator of developments that were already underway in the 1980s, had a profound impact on Western Europe, and they help us explain the current political and economic challenges that Europe faces today.

## Notes

- 1 McDermott and Stibbe, *The 1989 Revolutions*; Cox, *Reflexions on 1989*; Kenney, *The Burdens of Freedom*; Pridham and Vanhanen, *Democratization in Eastern Europe*.
- 2 Pappas, 'Populist Democracies'; Weaver, 'The Communist Legacy?'; Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland*; Grigas, *Beyond Crimea*.
- 3 Fukuyama, *The End of History*.
- 4 Berstein and Milza, *Histoire de l'Europe*, vol. III, Conclusion.
- 5 Vinen, *A History in Fragments*, 630.
- 6 Di Scala, *Europe's Long Century*.
- 7 Judt, *Postwar*, 800.
- 8 Capoccia and Ziblatt, 'The Historical Turn.'
- 9 Mary Elise Sarotte notes that 'rather than bringing an end to the history that had culminated in the Cold War,' Bonn and Washington 'had perpetuated key parts of it' (Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle*; and Sarotte, *The Collapse*, 201). Following the same line of thought, Artemy Kalinovsky argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, allegations of Russian meddling in Donald Trump's election as US president, and challenges to NATO expansion are problems that have been 'decades in the making' and 'can all be traced back to differing interpretations of what happened in 1989/1991' (Kalinovsky, 'New Histories,' 150).
- 10 Kaelble, *The 1970s in Europe*.
- 11 See Conway, 'The Rise and Fall of Europe's Democratic Age'; Eichengreen, *The European Economy since 1945*, Chapters 4, 6, 7.
- 12 Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, Chapters 5–6.
- 13 Kalinovsky discerns a new school of Cold War historiography that emphasizes the role of transnational activism in the end of the Cold War, as opposed to the role of 'high politics' (Kalinovsky, 'New Histories'). Examples of this new school of Cold War historiography are Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle* and Sarotte, *The Collapse*.
- 14 Handley, 'Public Opinion and European Integration'; Griffiths, 'Under the Shadow of Stagflation.'
- 15 Ludlow, 'European Integration in the 1980s'; Varsori, 'The Re-launching of Europe.'
- 16 Geary, Germond, and Patel, 'The Maastricht Treaty.'
- 17 Preston, *Enlargement and Integration*.
- 18 Coker, 'NATO as a Postmodern Alliance.'
- 19 Eley, *Forging Democracy*, Chapter 23.
- 20 Judt, *Postwar*, Chapter 11.
- 21 Cole, 'Political Leadership in Western Europe.'
- 22 Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 396.
- 23 Swarts, *Constructing Neoliberalism*, Chapters 2–3.
- 24 Eichengreen, *The European Economy Since 1945*, Chapters 9, 11.
- 25 Mazower, *Dark Continent*, 405.
- 26 Dunn, *Setting the People Free*, 187.
- 27 Huntington, *The Third Wave*.
- 28 Horn, *The Spirit of '68*.
- 29 Conway, 'Democracy in Post-war Europe,' 60.

- 30 Stone, *Goodbye to All That?* 85.
- 31 Müller, *Contesting Democracy*, 4.
- 32 Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy*.
- 33 Della Porta, *Social Movements*; Dalton and Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order*.
- 34 Ther, *Europe Since 1989*; Stone, *Goodbye to All That?*
- 35 [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/10/west-cold-war-capitalism-eastern-bloc-populism](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/10/west-cold-war-capitalism-eastern-bloc-populism).
- 36 Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*.
- 37 See the special issue of the *Journal of European Integration*, 38, no. 3 (2016).
- 38 Fitzgibbon, Leruth, and Startin, *Euroscepticism*.
- 39 Dumenil and Lévy, *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*.
- 40 Mudde and Kaltwasser, *Populism in Europe and the Americas*.
- 41 Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy*.
- 42 Mudde and Kaltwasser, 'Populism and Liberal Democracy.'
- 43 Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie*.
- 44 Ritter, *The Price of German Unity*.
- 45 Collier, 'A Splendid Failure.'
- 46 Probst, *Differenz in Einheit*.
- 47 Bastian, 'The *Enfant Terrible* of German Politics.'
- 48 Jones, 'Merkel's folly?'; Paterson, 'The Reluctant Hegemon?'
- 49 Müller, *What Is Populism?*

## References

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