

– INSURGENT PLANNING IN PANDEMIC TIMES: The Case of Rio de Janeiro

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Abstract

Given the growing importance of populism in cities both empirically and in scholarly discourse, planning is increasingly grappling with this ‘unsettling era’, focusing on how to respond to these times. This opening provides an opportunity to re-engage with the idea of insurgent planning—practices that are counter-hegemonic, transgressive, and imaginative—within populist contexts. I explore the case of mobilizations by community communicators in Complexo da Maré, a set of favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, during the spread of COVID-19 in 2020. In contrast to these mobilizations, Brazil’s federal right-wing populist government failed to attend to the needs of favela residents. Through the case of Maré’s communicators, I highlight the need for planning to account for the role of insurgent planning as a response to populist contexts in cities of the global South.

Introduction

Around the world, right-wing populist movements have become ubiquitous, often facilitating the rise of charismatic leaders skilled in instituting effective connections with their followers, mobilizing and convincing them with an energetic, emotional and bold political style (Nai and Martinez i Coma, 2019). As research shows, the rise of populism has a distinct geography, exhibiting an urban/non-urban divide (Scala and Johnson, 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). In such contexts, populist movements often find support in rural and peripheral regions (Cramer, 2016), while cities are considered places where immigrants, liberal elites and cosmopolitanism thrive. However, populism is often more multifaceted, and urban contexts thus play a key role in this phenomenon (Rossi, 2018; Crețan and O’Brien, 2019). While populism varies considerably around the world, Rivero *et al.* (2019) note that scholarship on populism focuses on several features. First, populism responds to a perception of an ungovernable crisis—an ‘evocation of emergency’—related to a breakdown between citizens and their representatives (Laclau, 2005; Moffitt and Tormey, 2014: 391). In Brazil, for example, the 2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro’s far-right populist government was facilitated by a perceived crisis connected to ongoing corruption plaguing the country, a failing economy, and rising social polarization and crime (Hunter and Power, 2019). Second, populist movements link this perceived crisis with a set of symbols generating a collective identity associated with ‘the people’. Finally, the creation of ‘the people’ also relies on constructing an ‘other’ (Laclau, 2005). As Panizza (2005: 3) notes, this ‘anti-status quo discourse ... simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between “the people” (as the “underdogs”) and its “other”’.

Together with the spread of populism globally, recent scholarship on populism in contemporary cities has proliferated. Growing research has grappled with this ‘unsettling’ era of widespread anxiety, discontent, and the ensuing social polarization, inequality, and environmental challenges, calling on planners to respond to these times (Barry *et al.*, 2018). In this hyper-polarized context, ‘planning in our current contentious moment provides a vexing problem’ as progressive planning goals diverge considerably from those of local

I would like to thank the research participants in Complexo da Maré for their time and effort in helping me with this essay. In particular, I would like to thank the members of Frente de Mobilização da Maré for sharing their stories. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

leaders (Trapenberg Frick and Myers, 2018: 581). While cities feature more strongly in the narrative on populism, they are also the locale that might provide an answer to this dilemma. As Rivero *et al.* (2019: 11) note, ‘cities are sites of political encounter and experimentation that are especially well-suited to this purpose’. To overcome this unsettling era, one answer is to underscore practices of insurgent planning—those that are counter-hegemonic, transgressive, and imaginative (Miraftab, 2009). In contexts where populist governments take power, planners need to take insurgent planning seriously as a practice opposing the state. Given this context, what can be done in the face of populist discontent? Moreover, drawing on Freitas (2019), can planning be transformative?

The spread of COVID-19 in 2020 provides a compelling context to view this phenomenon. As Sandercock (1999) notes in introducing insurgent planning, theory needs to develop in tandem with practice and stories of change. I explore the case of Brazil, where, despite a federal right-wing populist government that denied the existence of the pandemic, favela organizations around the country organized to respond to state inaction. Framing this case in the context of broader debates on insurgent planning, I focus on mobilizations by community communicators in Complexo da Maré, a collection of 16 favelas in Rio de Janeiro’s north zone.¹ The government’s ‘political articulation’ (Richmond, 2020) during the 2020 pandemic—rejecting the use of masks, championing untested treatments on television, and denying evidence of the threat of the virus—reinforces its existing populist stance by fostering polarization through disinformation among residents of Brazilian peripheries. This results in a situation of state neglect, inaction, and the government’s unwillingness to serve its functions. To counter such state inaction, I argue that planning needs to account for the role of insurgent planning.

This essay is reflective and exploratory, and grounded in the author’s previous work on cities and urban mobilizations in Brazil (Friendly, 2016; 2017; 2020). To explore the case of Maré, in June 2020, I interviewed community activists, non-governmental organization leaders, and one politician in Maré to understand the key objectives, methods, and lessons learned from the mobilizations (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviews). The essay is organized as follows. In the next section, I focus on insurgent planning as an entry point into the mobilizations in Rio as a response to state failure, which I discuss in the following section. I conclude, highlighting reflections on the role of insurgent planning in populist contexts.

Insurgent planning

The idea of insurgent urbanism has roots in work by urban anthropologist James Holston (1989) on ‘insurgent citizenship’ in Brasilia of the 1980s. For Holston (1998), insurgent urbanism referred to new sources of legitimacy in opposing modernist politics, highlighting the invention of practices and narratives dealing with belonging and participating in society. In this context, the use of ‘insurgent’ referred to opposition of ‘spaces of citizenship to modernist spaces that physically dominate’ cities, and to ‘the modernist political project that absorbs citizenship into a plan of state building and that, in the process, generates a certain concept and practice of planning itself’ (Holston, 1998: 157). By the 1990s, the idea of insurgency was articulated by others in the planning world (Friedmann, 2002; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2009). Indeed, Sandercock (1999) explains how work on insurgent planning is part of a radical planning for the twenty-first century, highlighting the economic and socio-cultural side of globalization. This understanding foregrounds the varied spaces of citizenship and insurgent practices that become visible in response to neoliberal urbanism (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Insurgent practices work at the margins, confronting existing power relations, and are distinguished from radical planning as such practices are oppositional by mobilized communities (Sandercock, 1999).

1 In Portuguese, the term *complexo* (‘complex’) designates a set of favelas, yet it is important to note that it has a stigmatizing connotation because it was originally used for prison complexes.

Inspired by discourse on insurgent urbanism, insurgent planning is counter-hegemonic by unsettling the normalized order, but also transgressive and imaginative, signifying that it transgresses time and place, locating historical memory and transnational consciousness as the focus (Miraftab, 2009). This framing of insurgent planning offers material support to citizens' insurgencies to plan their livelihoods through actions of situated citizenship (Miraftab and Wills, 2005). Thus, insurgent practices are proposed as a type of planning (Roy, 2009; Meth, 2010; Miraftab, 2018). For Sandercock (1999: 42), insurgency requires a broader definition of 'planning': 'insurgent planning practices are instigated by mobilized communities, acting as planners for themselves'. This idea reflects a construct to understand how people manoeuvre outside formal planning practices through resistance and counter-hegemony, and a theoretical paradigm supporting planning in the face of spatial injustice (Miraftab, 2018). Insurgent practices may materialize through peripheral urbanization, highlighting residents' roles in producing urban space as modes of urbanization, working within formal planning, and in transversal ways whereby people 'make themselves into citizens and political agents, become fluent in rights talk, and claim the cities as their own' (Caldeira, 2017: 3).

These discussions on insurgent planning often draw on the right to the city and on 'rights language' (Friedmann, 2002; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Holston, 2008; Freitas, 2019; Friendly, 2020). This orientation is apparent in contexts where progressive constitutions confer citizenship rights, yet fail to reach a majority of the population due to inequalities (Watson, 2012). Holston's (2008) continued work on insurgency in Brazil refers to differentiated citizenship, producing inequalities, vulnerabilities and destabilizations, and a mode to challenge them through insurgence. Given considerable income inequalities, this distinctly Brazilian version of differentiated citizenship is inclusive in membership, yet unequal in distribution. Referring to how insurgent planning is reflected in Brazil, Earle (2017) shows that mobilization among some of Brazil's poorest populations is a demand for equality, to be achieved through constitutional rights. Earle (*ibid.*) thus uses the term 'transgressive citizenship', showing how movements advance, defend, and implement a right to the city by opposing the state through civil disobedience and a politics of rights.

This framing of insurgent planning by rights is indicative of its orientation as a response to state failure. As Freitas (2019: 286) notes in reference to Brazil, 'in response to states' failure to fulfil the promises of substantive inclusion, the non-official, insurgent, and conflictual practices of collectively organized groups have been capable of shifting city-building process balance toward public interest in a myriad of ways'. Furthermore, that insurgent planning organizes against the state—or even the market—highlights its significance for planning (Meth, 2010). As such, insurgent planning practices 'parody' state-like functions, yet are embedded within governance structures which are never entirely separated from state practices (Holston, 1998; Meth, 2010).

This debate is remarkable given the many interpretations describing insurgent planning, realized by diverse agents resisting socio-political forces in cities. Sweet and Chakars (2010) use insurgent planning to refer to 'everyday' responses to urban contexts (Watson, 2012). By contrast, Meth (2010) includes vigilantism as a form of insurgent planning, noting that repressive and transformative insurgency can be mutually constitutive, or performed by the same community. Challenging the often celebratory nature of insurgent planning, Meth (*ibid.*) shows that oppositional practices are not necessarily liberating or democratic, highlighting a more nuanced approach. As Roy (2009: 85) notes, 'insurgence is not an antidote to the exclusionary city, particularly not to the types of exclusion that are deepened and maintained through the informalized practices of the state'. This reflection highlights the danger of romanticizing insurgency, its inherently ambiguous nature (Davy, 2019), and the need to embed theory within stories of change (Sandercock, 1999). Given these diverse meanings of insurgence from various contexts and their complexity, calls have emerged to understand insurgent strategies within varying

political and economic environments (Meth, 2010; Shrestha and Aranya, 2015). With this reflection in mind, I turn to the case of Rio under a populist national government amid the growth of COVID-19. I explore the case of Frente de Mobilização da Maré, which emerged in March 2020 to deal with the consequences of the pandemic.

Insurgent planning in times of COVID-19

Social distancing rules in response to COVID-19 are challenging to implement from the perspective of informal settlements, where there is no alternative other than for residents to live in close proximity to their neighbours. As an emerging literature suggests, the combination between population density, inadequate access to water and sanitation, and limited infrastructure is alarming, requiring locally appropriate solutions (Wilkinson, 2020). In the case of Rio, COVID-19 arrived via wealthier neighbourhoods, yet its impacts have a distinct spatial component (Barbosa *et al.*, 2020). In favelas, therefore, housing conditions, basic infrastructure, unequal income distribution, combined with the necessity of moving around the city due to employment, accentuate the already-accelerated speed of contagion towards favelas. Commenting on these conditions, a movement leader from Maré notes that ‘in the peripheries and mainly in the favelas, there are smaller spaces, houses on top of each other, verticalization ... So the family grows up to be able to cope with growth, and consequently, several families have no space to be able to do isolation’ (Interview 4). As Barbosa *et al.* (2020) explain, the greatest impacts of socio-spatial inequality are present in the dynamics of contagion. Historically, the considerable mortality from disease in favelas ‘served as quiet testimony to the deficiencies in the city’s socioeconomic well-being’ (Adamo, 1998: 218). These conditions already raised alarm bells in April, while media quickly claimed Brazil as the new ‘epicentre’ of the pandemic (Lenharo, 2020).

From the beginning, however, Jair Bolsonaro denied the severity of the pandemic, insisting that COVID-19 is merely a ‘little flu’, dismissing it as media ‘hysteria’, and refusing to impose stronger measures to fight the pandemic. Indeed, an editorial in *The Lancet* (2020) noted, ‘perhaps the biggest threat to Brazil’s COVID-19 response is its president, Jair Bolsonaro’. The editorial referred to a comment by Bolsonaro on April 28, 2020. When asked about the record deaths that day, Bolsonaro said, ‘I’m sorry. What do you want me to do?’ (Garcia *et al.*, 2020). While Bolsonaro claimed that people could continue their daily routines, fake news made it increasingly difficult for residents to understand the necessity to isolate. Alongside this stance by Bolsonaro, investments by state level health systems, including expanding emergency bed capacity in intensive care units, helped to sustain Brazil’s health system, while an unconditional emergency basic income (*auxílio emergencial*) by the Senate gave some relief to those affected by the pandemic.² Nevertheless, Bolsonaro’s failure to respond has profoundly affected the on-the-ground experience in Brazil during the pandemic.

In reaction to the state failure by Brazilian governments, favela communities across the country began implementing local solutions in reaction to the gap in public services.³ As a statement by innumerable organizations noted, ‘WE HIGHLIGHT the deliberate omission of the Federal Government, which ignores the abundant scientific evidence to control the pandemic’.⁴ The pandemic, seen from the perspective of Rio’s favelas, exposes the most inhumane aspects of living in an unequal city such as Rio. Next, I explore mobilizations by community communicators (*comunicadores comunitária*) in Complexo da Maré, highlighting the insurgent practices that emerged in response to the pandemic.

2 The *auxílio emergencial* is a payment of R \$600 per month, which was approved in April for informal, unemployed, and self-employed workers. Previously, Bolsonaro had proposed a more modest proposal to support Brazilian workers affected by the pandemic.

3 These local initiatives across Brazil are shown by ‘Corona nas Periferias’ (Favela em Pauta/Instituto Marielle Franco, 2020), listing 547 initiatives at the time of writing.

4 See the statement at <https://idec.org.br/alerta-mortes-coronavirus> (accessed 28 May 2020).

– Complexo da Maré reacts

Complexo da Maré, with a population of 140,000 residents—the size of a small Brazilian city—is a sprawling cluster of 16 favelas in Rio’s north zone with one of the highest COVID-19 mortality rates of Rio’s favelas (Frente de Mobilização da Maré, 2020), and well-served by several long-standing NGOs. Dominated by drug-trafficking gangs since the 1980s, Maré, like other favelas, experiences violence at the hands of Rio’s police. Violent police operations and militarization are a common aspect of life in Maré, part of a larger government-sponsored favela ‘pacification’ program through the military-style occupation of particular areas (Silva, 2017).

In mid-March, Maré communicators began countering government inaction with information, solidarity and self-organization, uniting existing collectives (*coletivos*) under the name Frente de Mobilização da Maré, described by one member as ‘a reasonably small collective group, but with community media power’ (Interview 4). These insurgent practices by favela organizers came together in a moment of crisis, uniting existing movements in a new form, and gaining visibility due to the crisis.⁵ The objective, therefore, is ‘to communicate, placing us as the protagonists, our problems and solutions as the protagonists of this communication, and to work in solidarity with each other’ (Interview 5). By knowing the local reality, Frente is able ‘to reach people that the government does not reach ... because [the government] doesn’t look at the favela and the periphery as if they were citizens by right’ (Interview 7).

Aiming to directly influence policymaking, communicators have been operating in Maré since the 1980s (Felix *et al.*, 2017). Brazil’s first popular communicators began in the 1960s, yet expanded in the 1980s following the 1964–85 military dictatorship (Peruzzo, 1998; Paiva, 2003). These popular communicators, who were key elements in developing what Custódio (2017) refers to as favela ‘counterpublics’, organized struggles against human rights and social injustice abuses, acting as platforms for political action. Citing similar collectives in other favelas of Rio, Prouse (2017: 635) refers to digital autoconstruction as a relational process in the absence of the state ‘to subvert and re-shape violence in complex and embodied ways’. These initiatives arise directly from favela residents as a struggle against the consequences of social inequality (Custódio, 2017).

Even before confirmation of the first case of COVID-19, communicators began prevention actions in Maré, calling attention to the need for local solutions with accessible language, adapting information to the specific reality of favelas (Velo and Martins, 2020). Given the lack of access to regular water supply, for example, frequent hand washing is not an option, and residents were encouraged to share water among neighbours. Communicators launched a virtual campaign under the hashtag #CoronaNasFavelas (CoronaInTheFavelas) to share experiences and news, and to foster debate about the need for prevention measures, but also food, water and health products in favelas, confronting the crisis based on Maré’s particular context. Maré communicators drafted a communication plan, with the favela as the key protagonist. In consultation with public health professionals, communicators posted banners and signs around the community with messages about prevention, hygiene, and the need to stay at home (see Figure 1). Communicators also produced announcements broadcast from cars around the community, and information cards about prevention. Frente also partnered with Coletivo Papo Reto to produce a frequently updated public panel documenting infection and deaths from COVID-19 for Maré residents. As Frente Maré (2020) noted on Twitter, the panel was produced for residents who are ‘forgotten and neglected by the state’ (see Figure 2). While communicators target favela residents by dealing with issues usually outside the scope of commercial media (Custódio, 2017), a key goal also involved communicating outside the favela to give Frente visibility. This outward positioning, according to Frente members, contributed to the Federal Supreme Court

5 Existing favela-based collectives in Maré include Maré Vive, Maré 0800 and AMaréVê.



FIGURE 1 A sign in Maré calls attention to the importance of hand washing and hygiene (photo by Frente de Mobilização da Maré, May 2020)

prohibiting police operations during the pandemic in early June. Exceptions to this rule to ban police operations, however, are possible, ‘which are actually many’ (Interview 4).⁶

Alongside communication actions, considerable effort also focuses on collecting donations, and distributing food and hygiene products in Maré to support residents affected by the crisis. According to residents and NGOs in Maré, hunger is the key issue for the community, yet it is ultimately more severe given the crisis. Indeed, Frente and NGOs from Maré have relied on the assistance of private philanthropic and corporate donors to fund their campaigns. The role played by such donors illustrates the case’s further complexity, involving not only civil society and the state, but also the private sector. In the case of Frente, leaders frame their work in dealing with hunger as an obligation ‘to use this dialogue so that things arrive, basic food, water, gas, medication, in these spaces’ (Interview 4). The work is also framed as an issue of solidarity among neighbours, as a Frente member notes: ‘We need to seek psychological support among ourselves, food, water, medicine, alcohol. We need to work in solidarity with each other at a time like this’ (Interview 5). At the time of writing, Frente alone, a relatively small group, had already distributed more than 4,000 *cestas básicas* (literally, ‘basic baskets’ with food and other essential needs) to Maré residents.

The pandemic also opened possibilities for new alliances, including broader partnerships between movements from other favelas based on existing networks. In early May, activists from various favelas including Maré united with academics from universities to launch an action plan based on prevention, assistance and social action to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 in Rio’s favelas, noting that:

the first step is to recognize that it requires the mobilization of new ways of acting and thinking, and higher levels of public responsibility ... In defence of

6 While not the focus here, state-sponsored violence during the pandemic is a serious issue, and has aggravated favelas’ COVID-19 reality (Acebes, 2020).



FIGURE 2 Panel showing COVID-19 data for Brazil, Rio and Maré (photo by Frente de Mobilização da Maré, May 2020)

life and a minimum of social security, it is imperative to reformulate the way in which public authorities have positioned themselves in confronting COVID in favelas and peripheries.⁷

Such statements—and the evolving and changing nature of these actions—call attention to the political nature of the discourse around COVID-19 in Rio’s favelas and the creative mobilization strategies as a response. Moreover, NGOs with strong roots in the community also launched concurrent initiatives to deal with COVID-19, providing considerable support in Maré, while also responding to public policy debates. Although Frente members suggest their unique capacity to speak for the community, one NGO member notes the complexity of these relationships as the favela collectives ‘are the fruit of the organizations. Many of these collectives were students of these organizations, and they became independent’ (Interview 3). Therefore, exploring these insurgent practices also requires understanding the complex terrain of actors in Maré that work to improve living conditions for favela dwellers.

As scholarship on insurgent planning suggests, the communicators’ discourse has been framed around the issue of rights, opposing state failure. As a Frente member articulates, ‘we want quality education, quality health. This is a deficiency of the state. It is a fact of confronting the other side. We are opposed to the fascist government’ (Interview 4). Another comment from a member of Observatório de Favelas, an NGO in Maré, notes that such actions position the favela as ‘a reference to maintaining

7 See the action plan at www.abrasco.org.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PlanodeAcao_COVID19-e-FAVELAS-RJ.pdf (accessed 22 June 2020).

and guaranteeing the right to life for favela residents' (Interview 2). Moreover, as communicator Gizele Martins (2020) notes in an opinion piece:

We, who have no attention from the State, need the solidarity of each one. Now look at the city, see that without the favela it doesn't work, because we are the ones who make the economy work with our workforce. Without us, there is no city. So, please, government and society, include us in public policies, in primary care, in bills, in information, in basic sanitation ... We want to have the right to wash our hands.

These rights that are claimed by communicators, moreover, are positioned in opposition to the violence propagated by the police to 'maintain order' in Maré. Yet, as many interviewees explain, these acts are political rather than partisan, confronting the Brazilian state and its irresponsibility to favela residents during the pandemic. Favela movements such as Frente thus 'look critically at Brazilian policy on the misfortunes of the federal government and the state government in the face of their interference and inability to meet the main demands of the population' (Interview 7). According to a Frente member:

This work goes against the grain of the Brazilian government. The Brazilian government does not see us as part of the city ... And the government says something, orders people to go to the street, to respect isolation, make it more flexible. And we say the opposite, because the people who come see that the reality at a time like this, is to deal with hunger, with the lack of money to pay rent, with the lack of documentation to apply for basic income, with the lack of food, with illness, in short, with numerous problems (Interview 5).

As the insurgent planning literature suggests, this confrontation of government policy by communicators performing state-like functions make these actions highly relevant as a planning practice. Using this story of change emerging from the mobilizations in Maré, in the final section, I offer insights from this case to rethink the importance of insurgent planning in populist contexts.

Conclusion: reflections from insurgent planning under populism

In this essay, I use the context of the spread of COVID-19 to highlight insurgent planning practices by Frente de Mobilização da Maré, which emerged as a response to state inaction by Brazil's populist right-wing government. In a global context of rising populism, the Brazilian government's response to COVID-19 used political articulation (Richmond, 2020) to gain support among residents of Brazilian peripheries, ultimately leaving a majority of Brazilians behind. As I show in this essay, the actions in Maré exemplify creative strategies to counter the pandemic in local communities, which are showing considerable articulation, organization and resistance, and which may result in further possibilities to organize beyond the crisis. Performing state-like functions, these organized counter-narratives by communicators are acts of mobilization and resistance to solidify dialogue across territories. Such dialogue has occurred through partnerships with other favelas, and through the action plan bringing together numerous actors.

However, popular support for Bolsonaro changed considerably over the course of the pandemic. While opposition to Bolsonaro increased among higher educated Brazilians, those on lower incomes seem to have been won over by the President, whether due to economic incentives by the government in response to the pandemic—the *auxílio emergencial*—or to an opening of the economy to support informal workers (Richmond and Fiori, 2020; XP/Ipespe, 2020). While this tendency will likely become increasingly

evident as the pandemic progresses, it is already clear that the changing political subjectivities of residents in Brazil's urban peripheries rely on place-specific experiences (Richmond, 2020).

Drawing on the notion that theory needs to be developed in tandem with stories of change, the case of Frente de Mobilização da Maré suggests several lessons to view insurgent planning within populist contexts. First, the practices by Frente exemplify actions of solidarity and self-organization through helping neighbours, focusing on the source of these actions emerging from Maré. Situating the favela as the protagonist of the narrative, one Frente member explained their role as 'the blood within the veins' (Interview 4). Indeed, a politician from Maré notes that the lessons relate to the 'self-organization and self-management of the favela, to understand the favela as a technology of solidarity, a human technology for understanding this very specific moment' of the pandemic, alongside a government acting irresponsibly in response to COVID-19 within favelas (Interview 7). As reflected in the planning literature, insurgent planning emerges from within a marginalized community (Miraftab, 2009). While the literature has highlighted the formative practices of marginalized communities, such leadership by the communities themselves is rarely highlighted under populist contexts. Second, the strategies of Frente communicators are political in that they counter deficiencies within the formal system as a response to state failure, yet also engage outside the favela to directly affect public policy. The case highlights that these political acts by Frente are key to unsettling the normalized order, and for that reason, the role played by a more political notion of insurgent planning is crucial. Third, these acts of insurgent planning closely resemble Holston's (1989) model of insurgent citizenship, which can be characterized as assertions of citizenship in the face of governing arrangements and challenges of governability that reduce the power of ordinary citizens.

Finally, the actions of insurgent planning by Frente can be seen as a transformative process. The practices by favela communicators form part of a collective insurgent planning effort that may evidence long-lasting effects in Rio, even providing lessons for cities beyond Brazil. As the interviewees attest, the mobilizations that emerged as a response to state failure in Maré 'bring new ways of acting in this territory, and are certainly influencing the composition of opponents in the city' (Interview 2). While collective action in favelas in Rio existed before the pandemic, the recent actions documented in this essay reflect a reconfiguration of political forms from those preceding the pandemic and Bolsonaro's regime. Moreover, seeing the case from the context of the pandemic highlights that insurgent citizenship remains possible even under extreme conditions of duress, but also that such a context may even provoke the emergence of new forms of insurgent citizenship. Therefore, as I show in this essay, planning needs to reflect on the role of insurgent planning to counter state inaction within populist contexts in cities of the global South. These new ways of acting bring to the fore the counter-hegemonic practices of movements, such as those in Maré, as a broader and more politicized definition of planning practices that need to be heard in such times.

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Appendix 1—List of interviews

Sector		Organization	Date of Interview
Non-governmental organizations	Interview 1	Luta Pela Paz	8 June 2020
	Interview 2	Observatório de Favelas	11 June 2020
	Interview 3	Redes da Maré	11 June 2020
Activist movements	Interview 4	Frente de Mobilização da Maré	9 June 2020
	Interview 5	Frente de Mobilização da Maré	17 June 2020
	Interview 6	Frente de Mobilização da Maré	18 June 2020
Politicians	Interview 7	State Deputy, Partido Socialism e Liberdade (PSOL)	17 June 2020