THIS PLACE IS OURS

Collective psychological ownership and its social consequences

Tom Nijs

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This place is ours

Collective psychological ownership and its social consequences

Deze plek is van ons

De sociale gevolgen van collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. H.R.B.M. Kummeling, ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op vrijdag 22 april 2022 des middags te 2.15 uur

door

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geboren op 29 oktober 1992

te Winterswijk

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Contents

Chapter 1.

Synthesis

1.1. Research objectives

Congratulations! You have received this book and can call yourself the owner of it. But what does this mean? You probably have the intuitive idea that you as the owner are the one who can determine what happens with the book. For example, it would be considered strange if someone else would just take it from you, give it away, or even sell it without asking for your permission. It is *yours* and others should respect that. This illustrates that most people intuitively understand what ownership means (Furby, 1978). A sense of ownership is argued to be a human universal that shapes how people interact and relate to one another (Friedman & Ross, 2011; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). An understanding of ownership develops early in life and societies function around it (Fasig, 2000; Kim & Kalish, 2009; Ross, Friedman, & Field, 2015). People can be legally recognized as owners based on laws and regulations, but can also *perceive* to own something, irrespective of legal recognition. Such a perception is referred to as psychological ownership (Pierce, Rubenfeld, & Morgan, 1991).

People do not only perceive that something is owned by them personally, but they can also perceive that things are owned by the group they are a member of (i.e., their ingroup). You might experience a sense of collective ownership of this book if you and your co-workers (or your family or friends) have decided to order only one copy to share amongst each other. You might feel that the book is 'ours' rather than 'mine'. Just as individual psychological ownership, collective psychological ownership can be experienced in relation to immaterial and material targets. Immaterial targets can be ideas, proposals, songs, or jokes (e.g., intellectual property; Friedman & Ross, 2011; Olson & Shaw, 2011; Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012), while material targets can be objects, like this book, a car, and artefacts, but also a particular place. People often also have an intuitive understanding of collective ownership of territories. Just as it would be considered strange if someone took your book without asking, a similar feeling of indignation could arise when neighbours start making use of *our* garden, or when people from a different department are sitting in *our* office that 'belongs' to us (G. Brown & Zhu, 2016). You and your co-workers might not be the legal owners of the office but still have a *sense* of ownership over it. Collective psychological ownership of places and territories more generally ('this place is ours') has received relatively little social scientific attention, while it may play a critical role in social relations (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Ownership of territory is an inherently social phenomenon as it involves the claim and usage of a physical space in relation to others (Blumenthal, 2010; Meagher, 2020). It does not only determine how an individual relates

to a territory but also how individuals and groups relate to each other. Therefore, in this dissertation, I am interested in the social consequences of collective psychological ownership of territories.

I aim to answer the following overarching research question: Does collective psychological ownership of territories have exclusionary and prosocial consequences, and if so why and when? I focus on both exclusionary and prosocial consequences to draw a comprehensive picture of collective psychological ownership and its social implications. I pose two sets of sub-questions.

The first set is concerned with the exclusionary social consequences. The first sub-question is: *Does collective psychological ownership have exclusionary social consequences?* (*RQ1a*). To answer this question, I focus on different aspects of ownership. I examine the exclusionary consequences of both a sense that the territory belongs to the ingroup (collective psychological ownership) and of the general ideological belief in ownership entitlements for firstcomers (autochthony). I do not only aim to examine *whether* collective psychological ownership has exclusionary consequences, but also *why* that is the case. Therefore, I examine whether collective psychological ownership is accompanied by a perceived exclusive right to determine what happens with the territory, and whether this exclusive determination right, in turn, results in exclusion of outgroups. Thus, the second sub-question is: *Does perceived determination right explain why collective psychological ownership can have exclusionary social consequences?* (*RQ1b*). Moreover, a sense of ownership implies the possibility of losing control of what is considered to be 'ours'. When this possibility becomes more likely it can be expected that a sense of collective ownership threat is triggered which makes exclusionary social reactions more probable. Thus, to answer the *when* question, the third sub-question is: *Do situations that pose a threat to collective ownership trigger stronger exclusionary social consequences?* (*RQ1c*).

The second set of sub-questions is concerned with prosocial consequences such as investing time and money in the territory. The first sub-question of this set is: *Does collective psychological ownership have prosocial consequences?* (*RQ2a*). In order to answer the *why* question, I examine whether collective psychological ownership is also accompanied by a sense of group responsibility, and whether this has prosocial implications. This implies the sub-question: *Does perceived group responsibility explain why collective psychological ownership can have prosocial consequences?* (*RQ2b*). The question *when* collective psychological ownership has prosocial consequences is not addressed in this dissertation (see Section 1.5.3 for suggestions for future research).

I aim to answer these research questions in relation to different types of territories. By examining collective psychological ownership of the country, neighbourhood, local park, and hangout place, I offer insights in various social situations that are relevant in people's day-to-day lives. For example, a sense of 'this country is ours' can help to explain important political attitudes and behaviours, such as the exclusion of immigrants, and a belief that 'this is our hangout place' can influence the social lives of adolescents. Moreover, focusing on territories at different levels of abstraction can increase confidence in the theoretical mechanisms that I examine.

The remainder of this first chapter is structured as follows. First, I offer a theoretical background based on existing literature. I will define the different aspects of collective psychological ownership and explain why I expect them to influence social attitudes and behaviours. Second, I will discuss how collective psychological ownership plays a role in relation to different territorial contexts. Using real-life examples, I will demonstrate how country ownership claims are used in the political arena, and how local ownership claims can shape social processes on the local level. Third, I will give an overview of the empirical findings discussed in Chapters 2 to 5 that form the heart of this dissertation. Fourth, I will close this chapter by discussing the overall conclusions, implications, and new directions for future research. Chapters 2 to 5 are written in such a way that they can be read on their own.

1.2. Theoretical background

1.2.1. Psychological ownership

Ownership is a concept of theoretical and empirical interest in different disciplines. Legal scholars have analysed how ownership is codified in laws and legal regulations (Mattei, 2000; Sprankling, 2014) and sociologists discuss how ownership plays a role in different economic systems and inequalities (see Carruthers & Ariovich, 2004; Veblen, 1898). Economists have written about the effects of shareholders taking ownership of firms (Hansmann, 1988), the effects of private or public ownership of banks (Altunbas, Evans, & Molyneux, 2001), and the importance of home ownership (Megbolugbe & Linneman, 1993). Consumer researchers have examined the effects of ownership of products, and have robustly found that the price people demand when selling a product is higher than the price they are willing to pay for acquiring the same product (referred to as the endowment effect; Marzilli Ericson & Fuster, 2014; Morewedge & Giblin, 2015).

These studies predominantly focused on legal ownership (a target of ownership formalized in legal rules is often referred to as property), but other studies have also examined psychological ownership, which is the concept of interest in this dissertation. Experiments show that people do not value their possessions because they legally own it but rather because of their subjective sense of ownership (Reb & Connolly, 2007). Psychological ownership has its basis in the psychology of possession and is considered to be basic and universal (Friedman & Ross, 2011; Rochat, 2014). Already two-year-old children understand that something is 'mine' and not 'yours' (Ross et al., 2015; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). It is proposed that a basic feeling of ownership might even be rooted in evolutionary history. Various species are found to have a territorial instinct as they for example use scent marks or strip the bark off trees to communicate what is 'theirs' to other animals (Bothma & Coertze, 2004; Edney, 1974; Hinde, 1970; Kile & Marchinton, 1977).

The importance of psychological ownership is broadly acknowledged in organizational contexts (Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). Employees can have a sense of ownership of their organization or of their job (Mayhew, Ashkanasy, Bramble, & Gardner, 2007; Ramos, Man, Mustafa, & Ng, 2014), which predicts employees' attitudes and behaviours (Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). Most organizational studies have examined a personal sense of ownership ('it is mine') and its favourable consequences for organizations, such as increased quality of role performance, organizational commitment, psychological empowerment, and job satisfaction (Han, Chiang, & Chang, 2010; Pierce & Jussila, 2011).

But what does ownership mean? Philosophers and legal scholars generally agree that ownership comes with certain rights (Katz, 2008; Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). Snare (1972) has argued that ownership is accompanied by a bundle of rights consisting of the right to use what is owned, transfer it, and exclude others from using it, while Merrill (1998) considered the latter right to be the central feature that defines ownership. As the owner, you have an exclusive determination right: you are the only one who can decide how your target of ownership is to be used and by whom (Waldron, 1988). Owners are entitled to this right, meaning that they do not need to earn or achieve it but can infer it from a consensually shared framework of societal laws, rights, and norms (Feather, 2003). Importantly, the relationship between ownership and the right to control is intuitive to most people (Furby, 1978). Three-year-old children start to recognize that a person who decides who may use a toy is likely to own that toy (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009).

Scholars have argued that the exclusive determination right is not the only important feature of ownership, but that ownership also comes with responsibilities (Pierce et al., 2001; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). A qualitative study by Furby (1978) shows that people across different cultures often mention responsibility as an important element of ownership, next to the right to control. As people can regard what they own as an important part of their sense of self, they might consider taking care of what they own as a way to take care of the self (Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Moreover, they might feel morally obliged or perceive normative pressure to take care of what they own. Children are taught to take responsibility for the things that are theirs (Furby, 1978). For example, parents often argue that pet ownership teaches their children responsibilities (Fifield & Forsyth, 1999).

1.2.2. Collective psychological ownership

Most studies on psychological ownership have focused on a personal sense of ownership. However, organizational scholars have argued that whereas an individual employee can have a sense of 'mine', a team of employees can have a collectively held sense of 'ours' (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce, Jussila, & Li, 2017; Su & Ng, 2018). This group sense of collective ownership implies shared agreement that would result from shared experiences and interpersonal relations within an intimately linked group (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017). It is measured with items such as 'we (my team members and I) collectively agree that this is OUR job' (Pierce et al., 2017). However, people can also have a sense of collective ownership which can exist independent of shared agreement within the ingroup (Henssen, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Koiranen, 2014). For example, members of an ethnic group can have a personal sense of collective ownership of a territory ('*I* believe this land is ours'), irrespective of whether all or most members of their ethnic group agree with this. I examine this individual sense of collective ownership as I am also interested in ownership perceptions of more abstract social groups (such as ethnic groups) in which shared agreement about collective ownership is unlikely and making adequate estimations of the degree of shared agreement is almost impossible.

For a sense of 'ours', a sense of 'we' is a necessary condition (Pierce et al., 2017; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). People can self-categorize at the personal level ('I') and at the group level ('we') (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A sense of group identity distinguishes collective psychological ownership from common or public ownership. Whereas collective psychological ownership is concerned with a target of

ownership belonging to a specific group, common ownership is concerned with what is freely available to all people (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, public sport areas or parks are not claimed by a clearly identified group. Although group identity is a necessary condition of collective psychological ownership, the two are conceptually distinct constructs. Whereas group identity concerns the question 'who we are', related to the psychology of intergroup similarities and differences (Brewer, 1991; Turner et al., 1987), collective psychological ownership is about 'what we control', related to the psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Collective psychological ownership offers a powerful justification for a group to determine what happens with their target of ownership, whereas group identity is concerned with the norms, values, and beliefs that define the group.

In this dissertation, I specifically focus on collective psychological ownership of territories. Territorial ownership has received attention from different scientific angles. Philosophers have studied historical justifications used to claim territorial ownership of states (Meisels, 2003; Murphy, 1990) and developmental studies have shown how children and teenagers claim ownership of playgrounds (Factor, 2004; O'Neal, Caldwell, & Gallup, 1977) and public spaces (Childress, 2004). There is also much geographical and organizational work on territoriality. For example, youth gangs establish, communicate, and maintain the ownership of neighbourhood territories using graffiti (Ley & Cybriwsky, 1974). Employees tend to communicate ownership of their workspace by leaving their jacket on a chair or putting family photos on their desk (G. Brown, 2009; G. Brown, Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005). Although psychological ownership is argued to be implicit to territoriality (G. Brown & Zhu, 2016), systematic research into the psychological experience of ownership of territories is mostly lacking. Only a limited number of studies have examined perceptions of personal ownership of workspaces (G. Brown & Zhu, 2016) and public parks (Peck, Kirk, Luangrath, & Shu, 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020) and the importance of *collective* psychological ownership of territories is mainly discussed theoretically (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). This is surprising, given that relevant territories, such as countries, neighbourhoods, local parks, or hangout places are generally perceived to belong to a group or community rather than to someone personally.

It is important to distinguish collective psychological ownership of territories from related constructs, such as place attachment and adherence to sovereignty. Place attachment is also concerned with how people relate to a territory. It is a much examined concept in environmental psychology and is defined as a positive bond between an individual and a

certain place (Scannell & Gifford, 2010). It is characterized by a sense that 'I belong to this place', while collective psychological ownership is about the sense that 'this place belongs to us', which comes with the related feeling and claim of control. Furthermore, both sovereignty and ownership claims can be used to argue why a group can decide about a territory, and both claims are often made interchangeably in relation to the country (Ringeisen-Biardeaud, 2017). However, the two concepts have a different psychological basis (Ripstein, 2017). Whereas sovereignty concerns the political principle that the supreme authority should decide what is best for society without outside interference, collective psychological ownership concerns the feeling that the place simply belongs to 'us' and is therefore 'ours' to control.

Some empirical studies have examined individuals' feeling that a territory is owned by their ingroup (collective psychological ownership; Brylka, Mähönen, & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015; Storz et al., 2020; Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinovic, 2020), but a larger number of studies have examined ownership claims as the general belief in ownership entitlements for firstcomers (autochthony; Gattino, Tartaglia, Rollero, & De Piccoli, 2019; Hasbun Lopez et al., 2019; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Nooitgedagt, Martinović, Verkuyten, & Jetten, 2021; Selvanathan, Lickel, & Jetten, 2020; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015). Autochthony is an ideological belief that does not only relate to what is owned by the ingroup but can also be used as a basis to recognize outgroup ownership (Nooitgedagt et al., 2021). Even though groups of people can use different beliefs for inferring, claiming, or recognizing ownership such as 'the place belongs to those who made it as it is today' (investment principle), or 'to those whose identity was shaped by the place' (formative principle), beliefs about first arrival ('the place belongs to those who were here first') are particularly powerful (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Deriving ownership claims from first arrival is seen as a historical right (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009) and children use first arrival and first possession to determine who owns what (Friedman & Neary, 2008; Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & Neary, 2013; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinovic, 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2019).

Intrinsic to ownership is the possibility to be dispossessed (Rochat, 2014). International territorial conflicts are found to determine social attitudes across the globe (Gibler, Hutchison, & Miller, 2012; Igarashi, 2017) and disputes over physical spaces are found to play an important role in relationships between neighbours (Stokoe & Wallwork, 2003). Collective ownership threat can arise in situations where an ingroup's exclusive

determination right is challenged or disputed. A large body of literature has shown that different types of intergroup threats play a role in intergroup relations (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Scholars often distinguish between a fear that the ingroup's self-defining norms, values, beliefs and traditions are challenged, changed, or lost (symbolic threat), and a fear to lose what the ingroup needs due to competition over scarce resources (realistic threat) (Rios, Sosa, & Osborn, 2018; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Based on Verkuyten and Martinovic (2017), I argue that the fear of losing control of collective ownership is a specific type of realistic intergroup threat that can offer a more detailed understanding of how different types of threat drive negative intergroup relations.

1.2.3. The social consequences of collective psychological ownership

Collective psychological ownership of territories can have both exclusionary and prosocial consequences. Intergroup relations can generally be expected to be negatively influenced by collective psychological ownership. The group position model posits that for prejudice to arise, an ingroup needs to feel a sense of proprietary claim over certain exclusive rights in important areas of life (Blumer, 1958). As collective psychological ownership is accompanied by an exclusive determination right (Merrill, 1998), owners might see the exclusion of outgroup members as self-evident and acceptable. They can use ownership to justify the exclusion of non-owners from their target of ownership. For example, house owners can refuse people access to their house without offering reasons other than 'this is our house'. Collective psychological ownership can be used to define group boundaries between owners and non-owners and might therefore lead to more negative attitudes towards those who are perceived as non-owners. Who are considered non-owners might depend on which principles are used to determine ownership. The autochthony principle offers a clear boundary between first comers and those who arrived later. Applied to country ownership, those who adhere to autochthony may see migrants, who, by definition, are not the first inhabitants, as non-owners of the country, and might therefore have more negative attitudes towards them (Hasbun Lopez et al., 2019; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes et al., 2015).

I consider different types of exclusionary consequences. Collective psychological ownership of territories can relate to more negative attitudes towards outgroups in general, but also to more specific attitudes. For example, people might oppose granting welfare benefits to immigrants, labelled welfare chauvinism (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012), based on ownership beliefs. Ownership can offer a justification to exclusively use 'our'

welfare benefits and to exclude non-owners from these benefits. Moreover, collective psychological ownership might not only influence exclusionary attitudes, but also exclusionary behaviour. People can engage in exclusionary behaviour to prevent infringement of collective ownership (G. Brown et al., 2005), which is specifically likely to happen in situations where collective ownership is threatened (G. Brown & Robinson, 2011). People who fear to lose control of their territory can anticipate on potential infringement to maintain their ownership or can react to restore it. They can mark their territory using physical symbols or by telling others that the target of ownership is 'ours'. Putting up a fence around territory (as shown on the cover of this dissertation) is a typical example of behaviour to exclude non-owners from 'our' place.

Collective psychological ownership might not only have exclusionary but also prosocial consequences. More specifically, as owners generally feel responsible for what is theirs, they might want to invest time and money in it. Owners might act in the best interest of their shared territory, instead of their own interest, and this is referred to as stewardship behaviour. Hernandez (2012) argues that psychological ownership plays a pivotal role in stewardship behaviour. Although organizational and environmental literature has demonstrated the link between psychological ownership and prosocial behaviour (Henssen et al., 2014; Preston & Gelman, 2020; Ramos et al., 2014; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle et al., 1995; Zhu, Chen, Li, & Zhou, 2015), only one study has examined whether this is due to increased responsibility. Peck et al. (2020) have found that increased psychological ownership of a public park led to more perceived responsibility, which in turn motivated donating money and cleaning up litter.

In sum, ownership has received much attention in different scientific disciplines, and the importance of collective psychological ownership of territories has been discussed theoretically (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). However, no empirical studies have systematically examined the exclusionary and prosocial implications of different aspects of collective psychological ownership of territories, and whether rights and responsibilities function as important mechanisms that explain these associations.

1.3. Research contexts

1.3.1. Country ownership

I aim to answer my research questions by examining collective psychological ownership of different territories. More specifically, I examine country ownership (i.e., of The

Netherlands and the United Kingdom [UK]), and local ownership (i.e., of a neighbourhood, a local park, and a hangout place). Existing literature has acknowledged the importance of country ownership. Ideas about who can claim to own the country play a central role in many intergroup conflicts and wars around the world (Toft, 2014). Anthropological research has shown how native populations perceive themselves to be 'sons of the soil' and claim to be rightful owners of their land when new immigrants arrive (Côté & Mitchell, 2015; Geschiere, 2009). Opposing ownership claims play a key role in territorial disputes such as in Israel-Palestine and Kosovo and in conflicts between indigenous peoples (e.g., Aboriginals, Maori) and settler majorities in for example Australia or New Zealand.[1] Whereas more than one group claims ownership of a country in such contexts, country ownership can also play a role in societies where ownership claims of the dominant ethnic majority are generally not contested, like in Western Europe.

I specifically focus on The Netherlands and the UK. Although both countries have become increasingly diverse in the past decades (Maxwell, 2012; Sobolewska, Galandini, & Lessard-Phillips, 2016), they have an ethnic majority of white natives (CBS, 2021; O'Brien & Potter-Collins, 2011), who are generally considered the most powerful group in society. The native majority is the main group that is expected to make strong country ownership claims, as they perceive themselves as the firstcomers, and might consider those who came later (i.e., migrants) as non-owners or at least to own the country less. Additionally, they might also see themselves as those who have made the country as it is today and whose identity is linked to the place, while immigrants might not meet these requirements. Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine feelings of country ownership amongst members of the native majority and consider immigrants as the most relevant outgroup.

The importance of country ownership claims is exemplified by the frequent use of ownership rhetoric in the Dutch and British political arenas, specifically by right-wing populists. The Freedom Party (PVV), a stable force in Dutch politics since 2006 led by Geert Wilders, uses slogans such as 'The Netherlands OURS again' (PVV, 2017a). These ownership claims are mainly advanced to argue against immigration and European unification. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the most prominent populist radical right party in British politics since 2014, campaigned with their slogan

[1] See the dissertation by Nora Storz to learn more about the role of collective psychological ownership in (post)conflict countries, and the dissertation by Wybren Nooitgedagt for more information about the role of collective psychological ownership in settler societies.

'Take back control of our country' (UKIP, 2014). Such ownership rhetoric, mainly used by UKIP's leader Nigel Farage, played a prominent role in the 2016 Brexit referendum, campaigning for United Kingdom's withdrawal from European Union (EU) membership.

Populist radical right parties argue that 'we' are the rightful owners and that we are losing control. In a PVV campaign video, Geert Wilders argues: 'Because this is *our* country. And it should remain our country! Together we will reconquer The Netherlands' (PVV, 2018). Wilders explicitly uses ownership arguments such as 'we were here first' and 'we made it as it is today': '[This is] the land of our ancestors, the land of generations who turned a swamp into a miracle. The only land we have. Our only homeland' (PVV, 2017b). Ownership rhetoric is used by populist radical right parties across the globe. The Alternative für Deutschland (2017) used the slogan 'Our country, our rules!' and Donald Trump, former president of the United States, repeatedly tweeted that it is 'time to take back our country' (2016). By explicitly comparing the country to a house (referred to as domopolitics, see Walters [2004]), populist radical right parties imply that the same rights apply and that the exclusion of immigrants is not discriminatory or unjust. For example, Geert Wilders (2017a) argued:

> 'When you give away the keys of your own house to someone who does not lock the door, you should not be surprised when unwanted guests come in. (…) The Netherlands is the house of the Dutch. It is the only house we have. And we should take back control of our own borders and immigration policies.'

The same line of argumentation was used by the populist radical right Australian politician Pauline Hanson (1996) in her maiden speech: 'If I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country'. Collective psychological ownership can offer a novel angle to literature on the populist radical right as ownership claims can be used to make populist distinctions between the people and the elite, or between natives and immigrants (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2007; Mudde, 2007).

Apart from anecdotal evidence from the populist radical right, a quantitative assessment of Dutch manifestos offers preliminary evidence that ownership rhetoric is most frequently used by populist radical right parties. Using an app designed by the Dutch public broadcasting organization NOS (https://app.nos.nl/op3/ctrl-f/), I found that 1.6% of the words in the 2021 PVV party manifesto were 'ons' or 'onze' ('our' or 'ours'), a share that is

2.5 times higher than the average share in the party manifestos of other Dutch parties.[2] Moreover, among the Dutch electorate, voters for populist radical right parties have the strongest feelings of country ownership. In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2021 (Jacobs, Lubbers, Sipma, Spierings, & Van Der Meer, 2021), consisting of a representative sample of Dutch citizens, 71% of the voters for populist radical right parties PVV, Forum for Democracy, and JA21, agreed or fully agreed with the statement 'I think that we, the Dutch, own this country'. In comparison, 47% of the voters for all other parties represented in the Dutch parliament (fully) agreed with this item.

However, the populist radical right are not the only parties making ownership claims. Whereas populist radical right parties mainly use ownership rhetoric to argue for the exclusive right to determine what happens to the country and who is welcome, other parties have used it to foster feelings of collective responsibility. They argue that 'we' are responsible to take care of the country and invest in it. For example, in the 2009 German Federal elections, the campaign poster of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) read 'Getting things done. For our country' (2009). In the 2021 Dutch general elections, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) compared the country to a house to argue that we should take care of 'our' country. On their social media channels, they stated: 'In this house (…) we do our best, we keep our promises. This is our home' (2021).

These ownership claims made by politicians suggest that country ownership may influence social attitudes and behaviours amongst the public and this has received initial scientific attention in the past years. Studies have mainly focused on the detrimental consequences of country ownership for relations with ethnic minorities (Brylka et al., 2015; Selvanathan et al., 2020; Storz et al., 2020; but see also J. D. Wright [2018] for a study that relates country ownership to voting intentions and buying national products). I add to this emergent literature by systematically examining both the exclusionary and prosocial consequences of country ownership, and by identifying the mechanisms that might explain these consequences.

[2] Note that the words 'ons' and 'onze' do not always indicate ownership claims. For example, 'our future' or 'our people' can also be used to emphasize a shared identity. Moreover, in Dutch, the word 'ons' can also be used in a sentence as a personal pronoun, or as a direct or indirect object.

1.3.2. Local ownership

Collective psychological ownership can also be experienced in relation to local territories (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinovic, 2020). People might feel that their city belongs to them and their fellow city residents, that their neighbourhood or their local park belongs to the neighbours, or that a hangout place belongs to their group of friends. Just as country ownership, such local ownership claims might have both exclusionary and prosocial consequences. For example, a strong sense of collective ownership of a local park or community garden can lead to behaviour to exclude non-owners. Qualitative studies have shown that in community gardens, generally intended to be open and inclusive, intergroup conflict and exclusion can result from ownership claims (Schmelzkopf, 1995; Spierings, Van Liempt, & Maliepaard, 2018). Groups can be regarded non-owners when they do not live in the local territory, when they do not invest in it, but also when they are new to the area. The classic ethnographic fieldwork by Elias and Scotson (1994) showed how established neighbourhood residents exclude newcomers solely based on their later arrival. Moreover, in an interview with Dutch newspaper NRC, Massih Hutak, resident of Amsterdam Noord, argues that new residents of his neighbourhood seem to be taking over control (Koelewijn, 2020). To illustrate this, he gives the example of new residents organizing a neighbourhood party and deciding on their own that the street can do without parking lots, without consulting the established residents. Such behaviour can be considered incompatible with the exclusive determination right of the established residents and can elicit intergroup conflict with newcomers. As another example, inhabitants of the Rotterdam Tweebosbuurt demonstrated against the municipality's plans to demolish their houses with banners such as 'hands off our neighbourhood', suggesting that the original inhabitants should have a say about 'their' neighbourhood (BNNVARA, 2021).

But next to exclusionary consequences, local ownership claims might also foster group responsibility and stewardship behaviour. To call on people to attend a local litter clean-up event, posters saying 'Our place. Our planet. Our responsibility.' were used (Bhopal Smart City, 2019). A sign saying 'help keep *our* park clean' is another example where people are reminded of the shared responsibility of 'their' park. Further, social workers try to give local youth a sense of neighbourhood ownership for preventing neighbourhood vandalism by these youngsters. Urban policies generally pay much attention to the participation of residents to solve local issues (Dekker, 2007). The Dutch government explicitly assigns neighbourhood ownership to local residents by arguing that 'they are facilitated (…) to take their co-responsibility for "their" neighbourhood.' (Tweede

Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2001, p. 1, as cited in Dekker, 2007, p. 356). The quotation marks were used in the official documentations.

Recently, Toruńczyk-Ruiz and Martinovic (2020) examined collective psychological ownership of the neighbourhood and showed that it relates to both intentions to exclude newcomers and to participate locally. I add to the literature by considering collective psychological ownership of other local territories (i.e., a local park and a hangout place) and by examining to what extent rights and responsibilities can explain why collective psychological ownership of local territories can have exclusionary and prosocial consequences.

1.4. Overview of the empirical chapters

In Chapters 2 to 5, I empirically answer the overarching research question of this dissertation: Does collective psychological ownership of territories have exclusionary and prosocial consequences, and if so why and when? Table 1.1 shows an overview of the four empirical chapters. In Chapter 2, I start off by answering whether ownership beliefs have exclusionary consequences (*RQ1a*). More specifically, I examine whether, among the native majority population, the endorsement of autochthony (the general belief in ownership entitlements for firstcomers to a country) is related to opposition to granting welfare benefits to immigrants (welfare chauvinism) and to longer established ethnic minorities (welfare ethnocentrism). Amongst British and Dutch natives, I find that autochthony is related to higher welfare chauvinism, even after taking into account a range of existing explanations, such as economic egalitarianism, political orientation, citizenship conceptions, and economic insecurity. Moreover, among Brits, I find that autochthony not only explains welfare chauvinism towards immigrants but also welfare ethnocentrism towards established ethnic minorities and Muslims. Yet, autochthony does not explain welfare ethnocentrism towards black Britons, suggesting that black Britons might be perceived to be part of a superordinate category of Britons. Although people who endorse autochthony do not exclude all minority groups, I generally conclude from Chapter 2 that country ownership beliefs can have exclusionary consequences.

Table 1.1. Overview of the four empirical chapters

Chapter	Research question	Territory	Consequences	Sample	Data type
2	- Does autochthony have exclusionary consequences? (*RQ1a*)	- Country	- Welfare chauvinism - Welfare ethnocentrism	- 3516 British adult natives - 1241 Dutch adult natives	- Correlational
3	- Does collective psychological ownership have exclusionary consequences (*RQ1a*), and can these be explained by a perceived determination right (*RQ1b*)?	- Country	- Immigrant attitudes - EU attitudes - Brexit voting	- 572 Dutch adult natives - 495 British adult natives	- Correlational
4	- Does collective psychological ownership have exclusionary consequences (*RQ1a*) and prosocial consequences (*RQ2a*), and can these, respectively, be explained by a perceived determination right (*RQ1b*) and perceived group responsibility (*RQ2b*)?	- Country - Neighbourhood - Local park	- Outgroup exclusion - Stewardship behaviour	- 617 Dutch adult natives - 784 Dutch adults - 384 Dutch adult natives	- Correlational - Experimental
5	- Do situations that pose a threat to collective ownership trigger stronger exclusionary consequences? (*RQ1c*)	- Hangout place - Country	- Marking and defending behaviour	- 227 Dutch adolescents - 338 Dutch adult natives	- Experimental

In Chapter 3, I again examine *whether* a sense of country ownership has exclusionary consequences (*RQ1a)* but I build upon Chapter 2 in three regards. First, I examine country ownership as a sense that the country is owned by the ingroup specifically (collective psychological ownership), rather than as a general belief in ownership for firstcomers (autochthony). Second, I do not examine opposition to minorities' welfare entitlements, but more general attitudes towards immigrants. I additionally examine attitudes towards European unification and Brexit voting. European unification and withdrawal from the EU are important topics in European politics (De Wilde, 2011; Hobolt, 2016). As ownership claims are frequently made in debates around these topics, I expect collective psychological ownership to be of added value to explain Euroscepticism and Brexit voting. Third, I do not only examine *whether* collective psychological ownership has exclusionary consequences, but also try to answer *why* that is the case (*RQ1b*). I examine whether the relations are explained by an increased sense that 'we' have the exclusive right to determine what happens with the country. Amongst British and Dutch natives, I find that collective psychological ownership of the country is related to more negative attitudes towards immigrants and European unification, even after taking into account related but distinct constructs, such as national identification, place attachment, and adherence to sovereignty. Amongst the Dutch, these relationships are explained by increased perceptions of having an exclusive determination right. Amongst Brits, collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right are too strongly related to be empirically distinguished. This is likely due to the timing of the data collection. In the heat of the Brexit debate, claims about ownership and determination rights were very prominent in the British media, making these concepts more intertwined in people's minds. Additionally, I find that both negative attitudes towards immigrants and towards European unification account for voting 'leave' in the 2016 Brexit referendum in the British sample. Based on Chapter 3, I conclude that collective psychological ownership of the country has exclusionary consequences, and this seems to be due to increased perceptions of having an exclusive determination right. Under certain political circumstances, ownership and determination right are even so strongly connected that they cannot be distinguished empirically.

In Chapter 4, I again aim to answer whether (*RQ1a*) and why (*RQ1b*) collective psychological ownership has exclusionary consequences, but I build upon Chapters 2 and 3 in three ways. First, I also examine whether collective psychological ownership has prosocial consequences to answer *RQ2a*, and whether these can be explained by perceived group responsibility (*RQ2b*). Second, I do not only examine this in relation to the country, but additionally consider local ownership (i.e., ownership of a neighbourhood and local

park). Third, whereas I use cross-sectional data in Chapters 2 and 3, I additionally use an experimental design in Chapter 4 to establish causality. Amongst Dutch people, I find that collective psychological ownership leads to perceived determination right, and indirectly to the intention to exclude outsiders from 'our' place. Simultaneously, however, collective psychological ownership also leads to perceived group responsibility, and indirectly to the intention to engage in stewardship behaviour to invest time and money in the territory. These associations are found in relation to the country, the neighbourhood, and the local park. I conclude from Chapter 4 that collective psychological ownership can have both exclusionary and prosocial consequences, and that these can be explained, respectively, by increased perceived rights and responsibilities on both the country and local level.

Finally, to examine the question *when* ownership beliefs have exclusionary consequences (*RQ1c*), I focus on collective ownership threat in Chapter 5. I experimentally examine whether situations that pose a threat to collective ownership indeed trigger intentions to engage in behaviour to mark and defend the territory. As in Chapter 4, these expectations are tested in relation to both country and local ownership (i.e., ownership of a hangout place). Amongst Dutch adolescents, I find that infringement of a hangout place owned by a group of friends leads to higher perceived collective ownership threat, which is in turn related to more marking and anticipatory defending behaviour. In the same way, amongst Dutch adults, framing Turkish EU accession as an infringement of the collective ownership of the country leads to higher perceived collective ownership which is in turn related to stronger opposition to Turkey's possible accession. Whereas Chapters 2–4 show that exclusionary attitudes and behaviours can result from a belief in autochthony and a sense of collective ownership, Chapter 5 shows that exclusionary consequences are specifically triggered in situations that pose a threat to collective ownership.

In all chapters, I rely on large scale survey data collected among Dutch and British participants. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I use correlational data, whilst I use experimental data in Chapters 4 and 5. Correlational data can be used to examine how different variables relate to each other but cannot be used to infer causality. Collective psychological ownership can be argued to be a general underlying belief that can translate into more specific attitudes and behaviours (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), similar to, for example, ideological beliefs (Jost, 2006) or nationalism influencing intergroup relations (Wagner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2010). However, as ownership might also be used to justify social attitudes and behaviours (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), testing the causal direction is important.

I use structural equation modelling (SEM) to analyse the data, which combines factor analysis and multiple regression analysis (Ullman & Bentler, 2013). SEM offers the advantage of analysing structural relationships between directly measured variables and indirectly measured latent variables that are inferred from other directly measured variables. By treating psychological constructs (such as collective psychological ownership) as latent variables, I am able to explicitly assess and take into account the measurement error of the used scales. Moreover, SEM can be used to test path models with indirect effects which is useful to examine the mechanisms that might explain why ownership has social consequences (answering *RQ1b* and *RQ2b*). All data and syntax files needed to reproduce the analyses reported in Chapters 2 to 5 can be found here: https://osf.io/8s7g6/.

1.5. General discussion

1.5.1. Overall conclusions

The central premise of this dissertation is that collective psychological ownership of territories has important social implications and can help to advance social scientific theory and research. Ownership can determine individuals' relations with objects (e.g., this is *your* book), but this dissertation shows that perceptions of collective territorial ownership can also help to understand intergroup relations and prosocial behaviour in various situations. By testing the same theoretical mechanisms with cross-sectional and experimental data, and in relation to ownership of the country and local territories, I offer a conceptual replication that increases confidence in the findings (Crandall & Sherman, 2016).

Collective psychological ownership can lead to the exclusion of outsiders and that this can be explained by an increased sense of having the exclusive right to determine what happens with the territory. Not only the sense that a territory is owned by the ingroup (collective psychological ownership), but also the general belief in ownership entitlements for firstcomers (autochthony) can help to explain exclusionary attitudes and behaviours. Situations that pose a threat to collective ownership specifically trigger exclusionary behaviours. This shows that ownership beliefs can be of added value to the intergroup relations literature, for example on welfare chauvinism and intergroup threat. Moreover, I also show that territorial ownership beliefs do not only have exclusionary consequences but also prosocial consequences. Next to an exclusive determination right, collective psychological ownership is accompanied by perceptions of group responsibility which functions as an important mechanism explaining why ownership indirectly stimulates stewardship behaviour to invest time and money in the territory. Therefore, collective

psychological ownership is not only relevant for explaining negative intergroup relations but can also be of added value to the literature on prosocial behaviour.

1.5.2. Practical implications

'Because it is ours' might be considered an acceptable answer both to questions such as 'why are you and your neighbours taking care of that local park?', and to questions such as 'why are immigrants not welcome in your country?'. The multifaceted nature of collective psychological ownership makes it rather difficult to formulate general policy recommendations. Such recommendations will depend on the aims policy makers pursue. When the aim is to improve intergroup relations, it might be worthwhile to decrease a sense of collective ownership of territories. One possible strategy to achieve that is to convince people that the territory is *not owned by anyone*. Such an argument is used by political philosopher Joseph Carens (1987) when arguing for open borders but can also be used to solve intergroup conflicts about a hangout place on public property. However, when policy makers aim to stimulate a sense of responsibility and investment in the territory, they can consider to try to increase collective psychological ownership, instead of decreasing it. More research is needed to examine how collective psychological ownership can be increased. I have successfully manipulated a sense of collective ownership of an imaginary local park in Study 3 in Chapter 4, but when piloting different experimental designs, I found out that it is not easy to manipulate collective psychological ownership of the country and neighbourhood. This suggests that people have rather stable ownership beliefs about relevant real-life territories. See Appendix 1.1 for the designs and null findings of five pilot experiments.

Policy makers need to be aware of the different faces of collective psychological ownership. Reducing it to improve intergroup relations can decrease perceived responsibility as a side effect, while increasing it to foster responsibility can deteriorate intergroup relations. Left-wing political parties have made the argument that the territory belongs to *all of us* (Asscher, 2017; Friedrichs, 2019), a strategy that might increase a sense of responsibility without making group boundaries. More research is needed to examine whether stimulating such an inclusive sense of ownership has the anticipated effects. A potential side effect is that sharing ownership with a bigger number of people can lead to diffusion of responsibility (Peck et al., 2020).

1.5.3. Limitations and new directions

My work has several limitations that can be addressed in future research. In this dissertation, I only examine the consequences of collective psychological ownership of territories and future research should examine its antecedents. For example, researchers can focus on background characteristics, such as gender, age, or socio-economic status, and on psychological needs for efficacy, self-identity, and a sense of place (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). Moreover, it might be relevant to examine whether the same antecedents explain collective psychological ownership of different territories. For example, whereas a more conservative political orientation might relate to stronger perceptions of country ownership, perceptions of ownership of a local park might not be influenced by political ideologies.

I focus on collective psychological ownership of territories in this dissertation and future research can examine whether the theoretical mechanisms found generalize to other targets. For example, it can be examined whether the same mechanisms apply to collective psychological ownership of objects, and whether these mechanisms are influenced by legal recognition of ownership. People might, for example, show more exclusionary behaviour when their sense of having the exclusive right to determine about their object is supported by legal regulations. Investigating collective psychological ownership of immaterial targets can be another direction for future research. As an example, examining collective psychological ownership of culture could be of added value to the literature on cultural appropriation and the intergroup sensitivity effect. Collective ownership of culture is implicit to cultural appropriation, which occurs when a culture's defining features are used or taken by members of another culture (Mosley & Biernat, 2020; Rogers, 2006). Explicitly examining the extent to which people perceive collective ownership of culture can help to understand why groups feel culturally appropriated. In a similar fashion, also the literature on the intergroup sensitivity effect can be advanced by examining collective psychological ownership of culture. People are generally more sensitive to ingroup criticism from outgroup members than from ingroup members, which is explained by perceptions that ingroup members are giving more constructive critique and are more qualified to make judgements (Adelman & Verkuyten, 2020; Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002). Another explanation that has to my knowledge not been offered for this intergroup sensitivity effect is that ingroup members feel to have an exclusive right to criticize what is 'their own' culture, while outgroup members do not have that right.

Relatedly, more research is needed to understand how different types of intergroup threat interact with each other, especially in relation to the country. In Chapter 5 I show

that collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat are closely intertwined in people's minds. Although not part of the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I have further explored to what extent and why the three threats are related. These analyses (reported in Appendix 1.2) show that collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat were very strongly related, independent of variations in the measurements. Although Chapter 5 shows that different psychological processes are at stake in collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat, more research should examine when and why different threats become less or more relevant and become less or more strongly intertwined.

Throughout this first chapter, I referred to the examined social attitudes and behaviours as consequences. However, I experimentally determine causality in only three studies (in Chapters 4 and 5). Although the causal structure is convincingly shown in these studies and is likely to also underlie the correlational findings, future research should delve deeper into this. For example, additional experiments can determine whether collective psychological ownership functions as a cause of social attitudes and behaviours, or also as a justification (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Jetten, Ryan, and Mols (2017) have asked participants to step in the shoes of populist right-wing politicians and to argue for anti-immigration policies. They found that participants tended to use ownership claims in times of economic prosperity, suggesting that ownership can also function as a justification of outgroup exclusion. Another limitation is that I only examine country ownership claims among the native majority. Although this will be the main group to make strong country ownership claims in Western societies, collective psychological ownership can also be endorsed by immigrant minorities. Country ownership items were presented to Dutch citizens with a migration background (first and second generation) participating in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2021 (Jacobs et al., 2021). Preliminary analyses of these data suggest that 38% of them agreed or fully agreed with the statement 'I think that we, the Dutch, own this country'. Although that percentage is higher among those without a migration background (53%), it indicates that country ownership can also be endorsed by immigrant minorities. Elaboration on country ownership claims of ethnic minorities might contribute to explaining integration processes and intergroup relations from a two-sided perspective (see Brylka et al., 2015).

Furthermore, I examine *when* collective psychological ownership has exclusionary consequences, but not when it has prosocial consequences. This is an important question to answer in future research. For example, a supportive social norm might function as a

necessary condition for prosocial behaviour (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Smith et al., 2012). When people perceive that fellow group members do not believe that their group owns the territory and do not feel responsible for taking care of it, people might be less likely to invest in the territory. Also for policy implications, it is relevant to investigate under which conditions the diverse consequences of collective psychological ownership are more likely to emerge. For example, when does collective psychological ownership increase a sense of responsibility, without increasing intergroup hostility? Finally, qualitative research can help understand collective psychological ownership further, for example by examining the different understandings that people have and the ways in which ownership arguments are used for inclusion and exclusion. Forms of discourse analysis on political speeches and manifestos can show how ownership arguments are employed by politicians representing different ideologies. For example, do politicians primarily make ownership claims to justify their anti-immigration stances, or also to foster a sense of responsibility? Whereas my contribution to the literature on collective psychological ownership is valuable and substantial, my findings also give rise to all these additional relevant questions which I hope will be picked up by the research community in the years to come.

Chapter 2.

'These benefits are ours because we were here first': Relating autochthony to welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism[3]

[3] A slightly different version of this chapter has been submitted to an international journal as Nijs, T., Martinovic, B., Ford, R., & Coenders, M. "These benefits are ours because we were here first": Relating autochthony to welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism. Nijs wrote the chapter and conducted the analyses. The idea of the study was developed by Nijs and Martinovic. The data were collected by Ford and Coenders. All authors contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript. I thank Maykel Verkuyten for his feedback and suggestions on drafts of this chapter.

2.1. Introduction

The welfare state is a central institution in Western societies that aims to protect and promote the economic and social well-being of citizens. Welfare provisions are scarce, which makes exclusion criteria inevitable, and political discussion concerning those criteria increasingly focuses on issues of migration and ethnicity (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006; Newton, 2007). A substantial portion of European citizens see immigrants as less entitled to welfare benefits than the rest of the population (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). This attitude, labelled welfare chauvinism[4], has received increasing scientific attention, and studies have explained individual differences in welfare chauvinism with ideological beliefs, attitudes towards ethnic relations and migration, and economic insecurity (Ford, 2016; Kros & Coenders, 2019; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2006). Moreover, people do not only oppose welfare entitlements for migrants but also for longer established ethnic minority groups whose migration status is less salient (welfare ethnocentrism, Ford, 2016). Although empirical work on welfare ethnocentrism is scarce, explaining it is of increasing relevance in European societies where ethnic diversity is rising (Castles & Miller, 2009), and large established ethnic minority communities have existed for several generations.

The current paper introduces autochthony as a neglected but potentially very relevant ideological belief that may explain welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism. Autochthony is a belief in entitlements for first comers. 'We were here first' is often considered a valid argument for claiming ownership of a country and for being entitled to determine what happens within its territory (Geschiere, 2009). Based on autochthony, natives may feel entitled to exclusive use of 'their' welfare state, and bar newcomers from it, simply because they arrived later and are therefore not regarded as rightful owners (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013).

Anthropological studies have pointed out the importance of autochthony in Western European populist discourse in justifying welfare chauvinism (Ceuppens, 2006). Although systematic quantitative studies have shown that autochthony can explain prejudice towards migrants, opposition towards Muslim expressive rights, and support for

[4] The term chauvinism is often used to refer to a blind, uncritical attachment to the ingroup combined with a downward comparison of outgroups (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003). Although welfare chauvinism as we define it is not necessarily blind or uncritical, we chose to use the label given the broad use in existing literature and welfare chauvinism's downward comparison of immigrants to natives.

collective action against refugees (Hasbun Lopez et al., 2019; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes et al., 2015; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2019), no study has yet examined the importance of autochthony as a basis for welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism among the general public. This is surprising because autochthony and the exclusive right to 'our' resources suggest an intuitive link to views about social welfare, one of the main resources provided by modern states to their citizens.

In the current study, we test whether autochthony helps explain welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism. We relate autochthony to welfare chauvinism using a representative sample of British (N = 3516) and Dutch (N = 1241) natives, which also enables us to examine whether autochthony is a relevant explanation for welfare chauvinism in national contexts with very different welfare regimes. Using the British sample, we furthermore examine whether autochthony explains opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants only (welfare chauvinism), or also for ethnic minorities, Muslims, and black Britons, whose migration status is assumed to be less salient (welfare ethnocentrism). Whereas welfare ethnocentrism has not been studied much, there is an extensive literature on welfare chauvinism, and we build our theoretical framework primarily around this literature.

2.2. Theoretical background

2.2.1. Explaining welfare chauvinism

In Western European democracies, citizens consent to contributing parts of their income to a common pool with the aim of assisting fellow citizens who are ill, unemployed, or at an age to be entitled to receive a pension (Ford, 2016). This welfare state system is resource intensive and demands a high level of solidarity between citizens. The qualification criteria for assistance have become intensely debated in developed democracies (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). Migration and ethnicity have become important topics in these discussions (Gilens, 1999; Kymlicka & Banting, 2006; Newton, 2007; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012), due to increasing cultural diversity in western societies (Schmidt-Catran & Spies, 2016). Western welfare states were generally founded in times of greater cultural homogeneity. Mass migration and rising diversity are introducing new strains on these systems (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). The idea that immigrants are less deserving of or entitled to welfare support has become a popular and effective political message employed by populist radical right parties (De Koster, Achterberg, & Van Der Waal, 2012). Sympathy with this message is widespread among voters from the native majority (Van Oorschot, 2006). On average,

76% of citizens of twenty-four European countries believe immigrants' rights to social benefits should be conditional in some way, which is referred to as welfare chauvinism in the *soft sense* (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). Moreover, 7.5% adhere to welfare chauvinism in the *strict sense*, meaning that immigrants should never obtain rights to social benefits.

Welfare chauvinism is traditionally explained by ideology, ethnic attitudes, and economic insecurity (Ford, 2016; Kros & Coenders, 2019; Van Oorschot, 2006). The ideology argument approaches welfare chauvinism as a manifestation of general ideas about how society should function. Welfare chauvinism generally coincides with general welfare redistribution preferences. For example, the ideology of egalitarianism relates to less endorsement of welfare chauvinism, as it strives for economic equality for everyone, without distinguishing between natives and migrants (Frankfurt, 1987; Kros & Coenders, 2019). Furthermore, right-wing voters are found to be more welfare chauvinist than left-wing voters (De Koster et al., 2012). Also, authoritarianism relates to more welfare chauvinism as excluding immigrants from the welfare state can be seen as a way to restrict the rights of outgroups who challenge the existing social and political order, using authoritarian and punitive measures (Crepaz, 2020; Kehrberg, 2020). In accordance, people who adhere to economic egalitarianism, who have a left-wing political orientation, and who are less authoritarian are less welfare chauvinistic (Crepaz, 2020; Kros & Coenders, 2019; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2006).

Other scholars argue welfare chauvinism is rooted in general attitudes towards ethnic relations and migration. White Americans' attitudes towards welfare policies were found to be better predicted by attitudes towards African Americans than ideology or self-interest (Gilens, 1999). In Europe, ethnic threat, which is one of the most important predictors of attitudes towards immigration (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), is found to predict welfare chauvinism (Kros & Coenders, 2019). In a similar vein, social norms against racism might relate to more inclusive attitudes towards immigrants' welfare entitlements, as those who express a strong commitment to anti-racism may consider discriminating against migrant welfare claimants to be a violation of this norm (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010). Another explanation related to ethnic attitudes concerns conceptions of national citizenship. M. Wright and Reeskens (2013) have proposed that for solidarity to exist, citizens should have a sense of national identity and the extent to which people show solidarity with immigrants depends on their conceptions of the national 'we'. Specifically an ethnic conception, with national identity bounded by ethnic ties, is found to relate to

higher welfare chauvinism. White majority members with an ethnic conception of the nation perceive no nationality ties with immigrants because of their different ethnic descent, which results in a lack of solidarity with immigrants, and a lower willingness to support this group.

Finally, welfare chauvinism is also rooted in economic insecurity. Natives who are, or perceive to be, in more insecure economic positions oppose granting social assistance to immigrants, to prevent the scarce resources to be unavailable when they themselves need them (Ford, 2016; Van Oorschot, 2006). Although economic risk confounds with ideology and ethnic attitudes, it can also independently predict welfare chauvinism (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Both objective indicators (unemployment, welfare dependency) and perceptions of economic insecurity can play a role.

2.2.2. Autochthony and welfare chauvinism

We argue that welfare chauvinism is also related to beliefs about the basis of entitlement to assistance: why do some majority members feel themselves entitled to exclusive use of the welfare state? The literature on collective psychological ownership provides possible answers (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). A group of people can have a sense of possessiveness about an object, place, or idea that they perceived to be 'theirs' (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). Such feelings of collective ownership are grounded in the psychology of possession which develops early in life (Rochat, 2014; Ross et al., 2015; Rossano et al., 2011). A collective sense of ownership can also be expressed with regards to a country (Brylka et al., 2015; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Ownership is typically accompanied by certain rights, such as the right to use what is owned and to prevent others from using it (Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). Therefore, a sense of collective ownership over a nation-state might translate into perceived entitlements to exclusively use 'our' welfare state and exclude others from these benefits, since the welfare state can be argued to lie at the centre of what 'our' country entails (Ford, 2016).

People have different reasons for perceiving their group as rightful owners, but first arrival (i.e., autochthony) is generally the most important principle for claiming territorial ownership. 'We were here first' is used by children, for example to claim ownership of a piece of land where flowers can be picked, or a place on the beach where a sandcastle can be built (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Martinovic, 2015; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015), and claims of country ownership follow similar logic (Geschiere, 2009; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Autochthony is expected to specifically

underpin welfare chauvinism because it implies a clear boundary between natives, who were 'here first', and migrants, who arrived later (Ceuppens, 2006, 2011). Migrants, by definition, are not the first inhabitants, and those who adhere to the principle of autochthony will therefore see migrants as less entitled to a share of resources that are owned by firstcomers (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013). Moreover, the welfare state is provided via long-established institutions founded by earlier generations, which can establish a sense that the welfare state should be exclusively used by natives. In short, we hypothesize that:

Autochthony is positively related to welfare chauvinism among British and Dutch natives (H1), over and above the other ideological, ethnic, and economic determinants of welfare chauvinism.

2.2.3. Autochthony and welfare ethnocentrism

Discussions concerning welfare entitlements focus not only on recently arrived migrants, but also on established minority groups. In the United States, race has been a salient feature of welfare debates with arguments concerning overrepresentation of black Americans in poverty and stereotypical beliefs about their work ethics being prominent drivers of white opposition towards welfare provision (Gilens, 1999). European discussions focus more on migration, with reciprocity being an often-heard argument ('newcomers did not contribute yet'), though there is evidence that white Europeans are also less willing to provide welfare to ethnic minority claimants (Ford, 2016; Ford & Kootstra, 2017; Kootstra, 2016). As European societies become more diverse, and ethnic minorities become more established, race, ethnicity, or religion may become more salient dividing lines, used to define outsiders and exclude them from access to welfare.

Whereas the theoretical reasoning underlying the link between autochthony and welfare chauvinism is clear given that migrants (by definition) cannot claim to be autochthonous in their new place of residence, the argumentation behind the link between autochthony and welfare ethnocentrism is more complex. Although the migration origin of some minority groups (i.e., ethnic minorities, Muslims, black Britons[5]) is less salient, these groups might not be perceived as autochthonous either. Autochthony might exclude any minority group with a migration origin from welfare entitlements, because first

[5] The data allows us to explore this on the British sample only.

occupant status cannot be earned by working hard, trying to integrate, or speaking the language (i.e., ethnic minorities descended from migrants will *never* become firstcomers) (Feather, 2003). Therefore, we expect autochthony to also be related to opposition to welfare entitlements of Muslims, ethnic minorities, and black Britons.

However, autochthony might be a comparatively less relevant driver of welfare ethnocentrism than of welfare chauvinism. Autochthony offers a clear us-them distinction between natives and migrants but might not equally strongly activate opposition towards minorities who are longer established and whose migration origins are less salient. The us-them distinction in welfare ethnocentrism is not primarily based on first occupancy, but more on ethnic, racial, or cultural differences. We therefore expect the relationship between autochthony and opposition to welfare entitlements to be stronger with respect to immigrants than with respect to established minorities.

Additionally, autochthony might be a less relevant explanation of welfare ethnocentrism towards black Britons than towards ethnic minorities and Muslims. Based on self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), we expect that white Britons perceive black Britons as part of a superordinate category of Britons, which leads to more solidarity, a stronger sense that they contributed to society, and therefore, a smaller chance that this group is excluded from welfare entitlements based on autochthony (Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & Banker, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Transue, 2007). Black Britons have a long-established status in British society (Perry, 2015), suggesting that the group is indeed part of the category Britons, and the use of the label 'black *Britons*' for this group might have a priming effect. To sum up, we hypothesize that, independently of other ideological, ethnic, and economic determinants:

Autochthony is the strongest predictor of welfare chauvinism (towards immigrants), followed by welfare ethnocentrism towards ethnic minorities and Muslims, followed by welfare ethnocentrism towards black Britons (H2).

2.2.4. Great Britain and The Netherlands

We test our hypotheses among British and Dutch white majority natives. In both countries, welfare chauvinism has become an important message for right-wing populist parties with the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) as notable examples (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2018). Moreover, both countries have long histories of post-colonial and labour immigration and a persistent influx of new immigrants (Maxwell, 2012; Sobolewska et al., 2016). However, they have very different welfare regimes (Kootstra,

2016). Great Britain is a liberal welfare regime, whilst The Netherlands is often categorized as a corporatist regime with socio-democratic characteristics (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Differences in attitudes between citizens of both countries can be expected. People living in liberal and conservative regimes are generally more welfare chauvinistic than those living in social-democratic ones (Van Der Waal, De Koster, & Van Oorschot, 2013), which means that British natives are expected to be more welfare chauvinistic than Dutch natives. Nevertheless, we do not have clear reasons to expect differences in the autochthony-welfare chauvinism association across the two countries. Therefore, we examine the possible country differences in an exploratory fashion.

2.3. Data and methods

2.3.1. Sample and procedure

We used data from the Welfare State Under Strain (WESTUS) survey that consists of five waves collected over a period of 16 months in 2014 and 2015 in Great Britain and The Netherlands (Ford, Coenders, Kootstra, & Van Setten, 2015).[6] As questions about autochthony were asked only in wave 4 in the Dutch sample and wave 5 in the British sample, all measures used in our analyses were obtained from these waves, unless mentioned otherwise in section 3.2. The samples were recruited from panels maintained by YouGov in Great Britain and TNS-NIPO in The Netherlands. With weights applied, the samples were representative for the British population as a whole in terms of age, gender, region, social class, party identity and the readership of newspapers, and for the Dutch population as a whole in terms of age, gender, region, and education level.

In total, 4468 British people participated in wave 5 and 1512 Dutch people in wave 4. We selected only native born participants with two native born parents and who indicated 'white British' or 'Dutch' as their ethnicity (3714 British participants and 1341 Dutch participants). H1 was tested on both country samples and H2 was tested on the British sample only, because the measure used as the dependent variable to test H2 was only presented to British participants. To test H1, we used a multi-item measure of welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable and selected participants who answered at least one of the items used to construct this measure. We also excluded four Dutch participants who

[6] This survey was also used by Kros and Coenders (2019). They used the same measure of welfare chauvinism and some measures that we used as control variables.

did not answer the unemployment item used as a control variable.[7] This left a sample size of 3516 British and 1241 Dutch participants to test H1 (total $N = 4757$).

To test H2, we used a measure of opposition towards welfare entitlements for specific target groups as the dependent variable. The item used for this measure was presented later in the questionnaire than the items measuring welfare chauvinism and was answered by less participants than the welfare chauvinism items used to test H1. We selected participants who answered the item used for this measure, which left a total sample of 3338 Brits to test H2.

In the experiment used to test H2, British participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions. Every participant was asked about the deservingness of welfare support of one of six different target groups. These target groups differed per condition and were 'migrants', 'ethnic minorities', 'Muslims', 'black Britons', 'white Britons', and 'people'. We focused on comparing the conditions with migrants (i.e., welfare chauvinism), ethnic minorities, Muslims, and black Britons (i.e., welfare ethnocentrism) as target groups. The target groups 'white Britons' and 'people' were not the focus but were kept in the analyses for exploratory comparisons. 'White Britons' are the ingroup for our participants and 'people' can include all groups.

2.3.2. Measures

Welfare chauvinism

To test H1, we assessed welfare chauvinism with four items. Participants were asked to indicate how long they thought immigrants should work and pay taxes before they were entitled to four different welfare benefits: disability benefits, housing benefits, unemployment support, and income support (Kros & Coenders, 2019). These items were measured on 12-point scales that ranged from 0 'They should always be entitled to this benefit' to 11 'They should never be entitled to this benefit'. The intermediate options specify the number of years (1 – 10 years). Higher scores indicated more welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism was treated as a latent factor in a structural equation model.

[7] Because the control variable unemployment could not be endogenized when testing H1. Also see footnote 8.

Group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlements

To test H2, opposition towards welfare entitlements was measured in relation to a specific target group, with the item 'I believe [target group] on welfare are deserving of receiving the support they receive from the government' (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The target group randomly differed per condition. When the item was measured in relation to immigrants, it was treated as an indicator of welfare chauvinism, and when it was measured in relation to ethnic minorities, Muslims, or black Britons, it was treated as an indicator of welfare ethnocentrism. The item was reverse coded so higher scores indicated more opposition.

Autochthony

We assessed the main predictor with four items developed by Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013): 'The original inhabitants of a country are more entitled than newcomers', 'Every country belongs to its original inhabitants', 'The original inhabitants of a country have the most right to define the rules of the game' and ''We were here first' is an important principle for determining who decides on what happens in a country' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*). The construct was validated and found reliable across countries (Hasbun Lopez et al., 2019; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013), and we treated it as a latent factor.

Political ideology

We controlled for three different indicators of political ideology. Economic egalitarianism was measured with the statement 'For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small', using a 5-point continuous scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *Strongly agree*) (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Political orientation was measured by asking participants to place themselves on a 7-point scale (1 = *Very left-wing*; 4 = *Centre*; 7 = *Very right-wing*) (Jost, 2006; Van Oorschot, 2006). Authoritarianism was measured with three statements, using a 5-point continuous scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*) (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012). A sample item was 'People should do what they're told. People should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching'. A mean score of authoritarianism was computed out of the three items.

Ethnic attitudes

We also accounted for different indicators of ethnic attitudes. Ethnic threat was measured with two items tapping into symbolic and realistic threat (Kros & Coenders, 2019). Symbolic threat was measured by asking 'Would you say Britain's/the Netherlands' cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people who come to live here from other

countries?', using an 11-point continuous scale (0 = *Cultural life undermined*, 10 = *Cultural life enriched*). Realistic threat was measured by asking 'Would you say it is generally bad or good for Britain's/The Netherlands' economy that people come to live here from other countries?', using an 11-point continuous scale (0 = *Bad for the economy*, 10 = *Good for the economy*). The items correlated strongly (r = .74), and we computed a mean score after reversing the items, so that higher scores indicated more threat. Ethnic citizenship conception was measured with two items (M. Wright & Reeskens, 2013). Participants were asked how important each of the following are for being truly British/Dutch. The statements were 'To have been born in Britain/The Netherlands' and 'To have British/Dutch ancestry'. Five-point continuous scales were used (1 = *Very unimportant*; 5 = *Very important*). A mean score was created out of the two items. Anti-racism norms was measured with four statements, using a 5-point continuous scale (1 = *Strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*) (Ivarsflaten et al., 2010). A sample item was 'I don't want to appear racist, even to myself'. One of the items was reverse coded ('Using stereotypes is OK by my personal values'), so that higher scores indicated stronger anti-racism norms. A mean score was created out of the four items. Anti-racism norms were measured in wave 3.

Economic insecurity

We also took into account different indicators of economic insecurity. Unemployment was constructed as a dummy based on a question about the participants' current employment status (0 = *not unemployed*; 1 = *unemployed*). Welfare dependency was measured using the question 'Do you currently claim any of the following welfare benefits from the government?'. Answer categories were 'disability benefits', 'housing benefits', 'unemployment support', and 'income support', and participants could tick multiple answers. We created a count variable (0 = *claims no welfare benefits*; 4 = *claims all four welfare benefits*) (Kros & Coenders, 2019; Van Der Waal, Achterberg, Houtman, De Koster, & Manevska, 2010). Economic insecurity perceptions was measured with the question 'how likely or unlikely is it that during the next 12 months there will be some periods when you don't have enough money to cover your household necessities?' using a 5-point continuous scale (1 = *very unlikely*; 5 = *very likely*) (Kros & Coenders, 2019).

Background characteristics

We also controlled for basic background characteristics. Age was measured in years and gender was measured as a dummy (0 = *male*, 1 = *female*). Religiosity was measured by asking 'Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?', using an 11-point continuous scale (0 = *not at all religious*; 10 = *very religious*).

Education was measured as a 7-point continuous variable, harmonized with the ES-ISCED scale, with higher scores indicating higher education. Religiosity and education were both measured in wave 1.

2.3.3. Data analytic strategy

We analysed the data in five steps. First, we performed confirmatory factor analysis using Mplus software (version 8.3; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) to test whether the concepts measured with multiple items, i.e. welfare chauvinism, autochthony, authoritarianism, ethnic threat, ethnic citizenship conception, and anti-racism norms captured separate latent constructs. We tested this on the pooled sample of British and Dutch participants. Second, we tested for the invariance of the main constructs welfare chauvinism and autochthony across both country samples. Third, we examined the descriptive statistics of all variables for the two countries separately. Fourth, to test H1, we regressed the latent construct welfare chauvinism on the latent construct autochthony and on the control variables. These analyses were performed using multigroup structural equation modelling to test the invariance of the coefficients between both country samples. Fifth, to test H2, we regressed the one item measuring group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlements on autochthony and all control variables, using the six experimental conditions as groups in multigroup analyses. We tested for significant differences in the coefficients of autochthony across conditions by testing whether constraining two coefficients to be equal significantly increased the chi-square of the model, meaning it has a worse fit. This way, we could inspect whether the positive association between autochthony and opposition to welfare entitlement was strongest in relation to migrants, followed by ethnic minorities and Muslims, followed by black Britons (H2).

In all analyses, we used full information maximum likelihood which allows missing values in endogenous variables. Exogenous variables were therefore endogenized by estimating their variance.[8] We employed weights for the last wave of data used (i.e., wave 4 in The Netherlands, wave 5 in Great Britain). We conducted ordinary least squares

[8] We did not endogenize the dichotomous control variables unemployment and gender when testing H1, as this would pose numerical problems for Mplus. Unemployment and gender were therefore uncorrelated with all other predictors, and four missing values on unemployment were excluded from all analyses. The two variables were endogenized when testing H2.

regression analysis with robust maximum likelihood estimation (MLR) to be able to employ these weights and handle non-normally distributed variables.

2.4. Results

2.4.1. Measurement model

The expected 6-factor model (autochthony, welfare chauvinism, authoritarianism, ethnic threat, ethnic citizenship conception, anti-racism norms) with the 19 items loading on their respective factor fitted the data well according to conventional rules of thumb, when British and Dutch participants were pooled together (χ^2 = 1065.670 (137), p < .001, CFI = .973, RMSEA = .038, SRMR = .048). See Appendix 2.1 for the full results. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor with all standardized loadings above .51. We estimated different sets of alternative models in which we combined either (a) the autochthony items together with the items of one of the other latent constructs into one factor, or (b) the welfare chauvinism items together with the items of one of the other latent constructs into one factor. All of these alternative models fitted the data significantly worse. This shows that our measure of autochthony is empirically distinct from all other latent constructs, and the same holds for our measure of welfare chauvinism. In subsequent models, we treated all multi-item control variables as manifest mean scores, to reduce complexity. Such a model with only welfare chauvinism and autochthony as latent factors fitted the data well, χ^2 = 125.510 (19), p < .001, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .034, SRMR = .016.

2.4.2. Measurement invariance

To examine whether British and Dutch participants interpreted the items measuring welfare chauvinism and autochthony in a similar way, we tested for measurement invariance of this two-factor model. A scalar invariant measurement model with equal loadings and equal intercepts fitted the data well (χ^2 = 353.522 (50), p < .001, CFI = .980, RMSEA = .051, SRMR = .032).[9] See Appendix 2.2 for all model fit statistics. Modification indices suggested that freeing the intercepts of the welfare chauvinism item about housing

[9] A metric model with free intercepts fitted significantly better than a scalar model (TRd = 187.457 (6), p < .001). However, as the Chi square difference test is sensitive to sample size (Putnick & Bornstein, 2016) and all other fit indices suggest a good fit of the scalar model, we did not continue with the full metric invariant model.

benefits lead to a significantly better fit (χ^2 = 246.919 (49), p < .001, CFI = .987, RMSEA = .041, SRMR = .030). British natives scored significantly higher on welfare chauvinism with regards to housing benefits (M = 5.72) than Dutch natives (M = 4.71), t(4619) = 8.65, p < .001. We used this model with partial scalar invariance as our final measurement model, which allows us to meaningfully compare mean scores and regression coefficients across countries.

2.4.3. Descriptive statistics

Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables, separated by country. British natives tended to agree slightly but significantly more with both the welfare chauvinism (t(4666) = 4.48, p < .001) and autochthony (t(4603) = 3.74, p < .001) items than Dutch natives. Only 7.6% of the British and 3.4% of the Dutch sample indicated that immigrants should never be entitled to all four welfare benefits, indicating little support for welfare chauvinism in the strict sense. However, only 2.3% of the British and 2.5% of the Dutch sample indicated that immigrants should always be entitled to all four benefit, indicating substantial support for some degree of welfare chauvinism in the soft sense. Correlations between all variables were generally in the expected direction. The correlation between autochthony and welfare chauvinism was positive in both the British (r = .52) and Dutch (r = .45) sample. See Appendix 2.3 for the correlations between all variables.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics per country

		Great Britain				The Netherlands			
	Range	*Valid n*	*Mean/ proportion*	*SD*	*α*	*Valid n*	*Mean/ proportion*	*SD*	*α*
Welfare chauvinism	0–11	3516	6.05	3.10	.93	1241	5.59	2.97	.91
Group–specific opposition towards welfare entitlements	1–5	3338	3.01	1.07	-	-	-	-	-
Autochthony	1–5	3471	3.47	1.08	.94	1232	3.34	.99	.91
Economic egalitarianism	1–5	3424	3.54	1.01	-	1224	3.42	.99	-
Political orientation	1–7	3048	4.01	1.38	-	1146	4.11	1.26	-
Authoritarianism	1–5	3505	3.78	.72	.66	1232	4.02	.57	.63
Ethnic threat	0–10	3474	4.96	2.68	.77[b]	1234	5.17	2.15	.66[b]
Ethnic citizenship conception	1–5	3480	3.45	1.19	.71[b]	1231	2.77	1.13	.77[b]
Anti-racism norms	1–5	3238	3.56	.77	.79	1219	3.60	.70	.73
Unemployment	0/1	3516	.04	-	-	1241	.03	-	-
Welfare dependency	0–4	3516	.21	.55	-	1241	.20	.48	-
Economic insecurity perceptions	1–5	3395	2.51	1.30	-	1210	2.51	1.25	-
Age	18–86 / 19–94[a]	3516	49.50	16.25	-	1241	48.85	17.46	-
Gender (1 = female)	0/1	3516	.51	-	-	1241	.49	-	-
Religiosity	0–10	3487	2.93	2.90	-	1217	3.55	3.34	-
Education	1–7	3516	4.91	1.93	-	1241	3.98	1.74	-

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores. *α* is Cronbach's alpha. All statistics were based on the weighted data. [a] Range before the slash is for the British sample, after the slash for the Dutch sample. [b] Correlation between the two items in the construct.

2.4.4. Explaining welfare chauvinism

The latent dependent variable welfare chauvinism was regressed on the latent independent variable autochthony and all manifest control variables. A model in which all path coefficients were constrained to be equal across the British and Dutch sample fitted the data well (χ^2 = 984.201 (267), p < .001, CFI = .970, RMSEA = .034, SRMR = .030), and did not fit significantly worse than a model in which all coefficients were free to vary across countries (TRd = 20.710 (14), p = .109).[10] This suggests that the coefficients are invariant across the British and Dutch sample and that we can use the structurally constrained model in subsequent analyses.

Table 2.2 shows all unstandardized regression coefficients of three models. In the first model, welfare chauvinism was regressed on background characteristics only. Lower educated people were more welfare chauvinistic. Age, gender, and religiosity were not significant predictors. In the second model, control variables concerning political ideology, ethnic attitudes, and economic insecurity were added. People who were less economically egalitarian, more right-wing, and more authoritarian, were more welfare chauvinistic. Ethnic threat and ethnic citizenship conception were associated with more welfare chauvinism. Social norms against racism were related to less welfare chauvinism. Finally, in terms of economic insecurity, unemployment and economic insecurity perceptions were not significantly related to welfare chauvinism, whilst more welfare dependency was associated with less welfare chauvinism, which is unexpected based on self-interest. We will return to this issue in our discussion.

In the third model, autochthony was added as a predictor to test our first hypothesis. In line with our expectation, a stronger autochthony belief was associated with more welfare chauvinism (B = .565, SE = .073, p < .001), even after controlling for a wide range of other predictors of welfare chauvinism.

[10] See Appendix 2.4 for the results of the model in which all coefficients were free to vary across countries.

Table 2.2. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model with welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Welfare chauvinism	Welfare chauvinism	Welfare chauvinism
Autochthony			.565 (.073)***
Economic egalitarianism		–.202 (.049)***	–.219 (.048)***
Right-wing political orientation		.217 (.043)***	.174 (.043)***
Authoritarianism		.387 (.067)***	.278 (.067)***
Ethnic threat		.453 (.024)***	.377 (.026)***
Ethnic citizenship conception		.336 (.045)***	.194 (.048)***
Anti-racism norms		–.366 (.078)***	–.264 (.079)***
Unemployment		.016 (.218)	–.047 (.225)
Welfare dependency		–.250 (.096)**	–.270 (.097)**
Economic insecurity perceptions		.054 (.039)	.051 (.039)
Age	.007 (.004)	–.002 (.003)	–.004 (.003)
Gender (female)	.171 (.103)	.273 (.087)**	.270 (.087)**
Religiosity	–.024 (.017)	–.049 (.015)**	–.047 (.014)**
Education	–.345 (.029)***	–.082 (.026)**	–.060 (.027)*
R^2 Great Britain	.051	.383	.397
R^2 The Netherlands	.047	.296	.313
N Great Britain	3516	3516	3516
N The Netherlands	1241	1241	1241

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Looking at the relative effect size, autochthony has – next to ethnic threat – the largest effect on welfare chauvinism. The standardized coefficients reported in Appendix 2.5 show that autochthony was the second strongest predictor of welfare chauvinism (β = .187, *SE* = .024, p < .001 in Great Britain and β = .177, *SE* = .024, p < .001 in The Netherlands[11]), after ethnic threat (respectively β = .323, *SE* = .022, p < .001 and β = .272, *SE* = .020, p < .001). These results suggest that autochthony is a relevant predictor of welfare chauvinism over and above existing explanations of welfare chauvinism. The general patterns were invariant between British and Dutch majority members, showing the robustness of our results.

[11] Although the coefficients were constrained to be equal across country samples, the standardized coefficients slightly differed across country samples, because they were standardized in the group.

2.4.5. Explaining welfare ethnocentrism

First, we examined the mean opposition toward welfare entitlements across the six experimental conditions that referred to different target groups. In each condition, people were asked about the welfare entitlements for one of six target groups (i.e., migrants, ethnic minorities, Muslims, black Britons, white Britons, people). As the superscripts in Table 2.3 indicate, participants were significantly more opposed to welfare entitlements for migrants than for all other groups. Opposition towards welfare entitlements for ethnic minorities and Muslims was higher than towards black Britons, white Britons, and people. Opposition towards welfare entitlements for ethnic minorities and Muslims did not significantly differ and opposition towards welfare entitlements for black Britons, white Britons, and people did not significantly differ.

Next, we performed a multigroup structural equation model and performed chi-square difference tests to test for significant differences in the relationship between autochthony and opposition towards welfare entitlements across the six conditions.

Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics of group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlement, separated by condition

	Range	*Valid n*	*Mean*	*SD*
Group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlements	1–5			
Migrants		598	3.48[a]	1.10
Ethnic minorities		559	3.14[b]	1.13
Muslims		531	3.05[b]	1.11
Black Britons		535	2.74[c]	.92
White Britons		564	2.80[c]	.98
People		551	2.79[c]	.96

Note: Means with the same superscript are not significantly different from each other at the $p < .05$ level, based on post-hoc tests in ANOVA's.

All coefficients were free to vary across conditions.[12] Figure 2.1 shows the unstandardized regression coefficients of autochthony, separated by condition. The coefficients of the control variables were not included in the figure but can be found in Appendix 2.6.[13]

[12] The predictors were likely to be differently related to opposition towards welfare entitlements depending on the different target groups. For example, ethnic threat is likely to be more strongly related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for Muslims than it is to opposition towards welfare entitlements for white Britons.

[13] Unlike the model testing H1, we endogenized all exogeneous variables including the dichotomous control variables unemployment and gender.

Autochthony was significantly related to more opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants after controlling for all other predictors (B = .241, SE = .061, p < .001), which once again confirms the autochthony-welfare chauvinism relationship. Autochthony was also positively related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for ethnic minorities (B = .186, SE = .059, p = .002) and Muslims (B = .168, SE = .064, p = .008), but not to opposition towards welfare entitlements for black Britons (B = .091, SE = .059, p = .124).

The coefficients at first glance seem to be in line with H2, as they suggest that autochthony was able to explain opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants best, followed by ethnic minorities and Muslims, followed by black Britons. However, most of these coefficients did not significantly differ from each other, as indicated by the superscripts in Figure 2.1. The only significant difference shows that autochthony was more related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants than for black Britons (TRd = 4.251 (1), p = .039). H2 was therefore partially accepted. Although not fully in line with our hypothesis, the results suggest that those who adhere to autochthony do not bluntly exclude every minority group with a migration origin.

Although not the focus of our study, Figure 2.1 also shows no significant difference in how autochthony associates with opposition towards welfare entitlements for black Britons and white Britons (TRd = .620 (1), p = .431). We did find that autochthony was more related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants (TRd = 10.053 (1), p = .002) and ethnic minorities (TRd = 4.241 (1), p = .039) than for white Britons. Surprisingly, autochthony was also positively related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for people as a general category (B = .152, SE = .074, p = .039).



Figure 2.1. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the multigroup model with group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlements as the dependent variable, separated by condition. Control variables are included but not reported.

Note: Coefficients with the same superscript are not significantly different from each other at the $p < .05$ level. The value of low [high] autochthony is the mean of the dependent variable minus [plus] the standard deviation of the independent variable multiplied by the regression coefficient. $^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

2.5. Discussion

As a lack of solidarity among co-citizens puts a strain to the viability of the welfare state, it is important to understand why people oppose welfare entitlements for newcomers and established ethnic minorities (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). Although existing literature has offered important insights, our research is the first to show that autochthony drives welfare chauvinism, and to some extent, welfare ethnocentrism. People who believe in the entitlements of first comers are more welfare chauvinistic towards migrants and more welfare ethnocentric towards ethnic minorities and Muslims. These relationships exist even when taking into account a great range of existing explanations. Moreover, the relationship

between autochthony and welfare chauvinism is found to be robust across British and Dutch natives.

One could argue that welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism are rather hard to tackle when driven by autochthony. The principle of autochthony might be rather engrained in people's minds as it is based on the intuitive psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014) and is used to establish ownership in a range of contexts. This might make it very hard to debunk autochthony as a meaningful principle. Also, autochthony can be argued to be a strict principle as first occupant status cannot be earned by later comers in any way. Migrants will never become firstcomers.

However, there are three reasons why our study shows a more nuanced picture. First, we find that only a very small portion of Dutch and British natives support welfare chauvinism in the strict sense (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012), meaning that immigrants should *never* obtain rights to social benefits. Even those who strongly believe in autochthony are still generally in favour of granting conditional social benefits to migrants.

Second, autochthony is not the only driver of welfare chauvinism. All included indicators of ideology and ethnic attitudes were related to welfare chauvinism in the expected directions over and above the effect of autochthony. Except for welfare dependency, other indicators of economic insecurity did not relate to welfare chauvinism. Contrary to what we expected, people who themselves are dependent of welfare were less welfare chauvinistic, which suggests that empathy feelings with fellow welfare recipients plays a more pronounced role in explaining welfare chauvinism than self-interest considerations (Van Oorschot, 2008). The associations found between most control variables and welfare chauvinism suggest that autochthony is one of many drivers of welfare chauvinism.

Third, our experimental findings showed that native Brits who endorse autochthony do not bluntly exclude every minority group with a migration origin from welfare entitlements. Although autochthony was associated with more welfare ethnocentrism towards ethnic minorities and Muslims, it was unrelated to welfare ethnocentrism towards black Britons. The latter finding is in line with our argument deduced from self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), that white Britons could perceive black Britons as part of a superordinate category of Britons, which would lead to more solidarity and a lower inclination to exclude this group from welfare entitlements based on claims of autochthony. Minority groups might at a certain point be seen as sufficiently established to be included in a superordinate category of the national population and therefore, to be

granted welfare entitlements. This idea was supported by our finding that autochthony did not predict opposition towards welfare entitlements for both black Britons and white Britons, and that these relations did not differ from each other (Wenzel, 2004). These results are expected to be partly due to the priming effect of the label 'black Britons' used in our experiment. Using the labels 'blacks' for this group or otherwise emphasizing the common identity for other groups (e.g., 'British Muslims') might have yielded different results (see Verkuyten & Thijs, 2010).

Related to this, we generally found that native Brits were surprisingly open to granting welfare entitlements to black Britons. They opposed welfare entitlements for black Britons as much as they opposed welfare entitlements for white Britons and people in general, and less than they opposed welfare entitlements for migrants, ethnic minorities, and Muslims. Next to the aforementioned argument about a superordinate social categorization, there are at least two additional possible explanations. First, most black Britons descend from the Caribbean and their closeness to British culture, partly resulting from Britain's Caribbean colonial history and their predominantly Christian denomination, can increase solidarity (Van Oorschot, 2008). This seems to resonate with findings from countries such as The Netherlands where cultural differences pose a larger barrier than racial differences for contact between immigrants and natives (Martinovic, 2013). Second, native Brits might refrain from speaking out explicitly against black Britons to prevent feeling overtly racist. Opposing rights of migrants, Muslims, or ethnic minorities might be more normalized in political discourse and might therefore be less subject to social desirability.[14]

We found that autochthony was significantly better able to explain opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants than for black Britons which suggests that those who adhere to autochthony distinguish between minority groups. However, we found no other significant differences across the different groups in the relationship between autochthony and opposition towards welfare entitlements. This could be partly due to the fact that the labels used in our experiment are open for interpretation. Different minority groups can overlap in people's minds (see Braun, Behr, Meitinger, Raiber, & Repke, 2019).

[14] Indeed, as displayed in Appendix 2.6, anti-racism norms were strongly related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for black Britons ($p < .001$), but not significantly related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for migrants ($p = .485$). Anti-racism norms were also, but with a lower significance level, related to opposition towards welfare entitlements for ethnic minorities ($p = .013$), Muslims ($p = .003$), and white Britons ($p = .038$).

As the participants answered the item measuring opposition towards welfare entitlements in relation to only one group and did not receive questions about other groups, participants might have been less inclined to differentiate that group from other groups. Still, the strengths of the relationships were in the expected directions.

Although not the focus of our study, another notable finding of our experiment is that native Brits who endorsed autochthony were more opposing of welfare entitlements for *people* in general (and not for white Brits). This suggests that when native Brits answer a question about granting welfare entitlements for people in general, they might overall not have native welfare recipients in mind but might think of people with a migration status in particular, as they perceive welfare policies as mainly benefiting this group. A similar pattern is found in the United States where discussions about welfare benefits have focused around race and white Americans' attitudes towards welfare policies strongly depend on their attitudes towards African Americans (Gilens, 1999). This is an indication that in Western democracies, ideologies such as autochthony can not only help to explain possible eroding support for group-targeted welfare policies, but for the welfare state in general. Public support for an extensive welfare system might erode the more migrants and minorities are overrepresented among welfare dependants or are strongly perceived as such. Political debates about immigration and 'welfare tourism' of migrants might in the end lower general support for the welfare state.

Our study has several limitations. We are unable to make claims about causality and cannot rule out the possibility of bidirectional associations. As our main predictor autochthony was not repeatedly measured in different waves, we were unable to use the full potential of the longitudinal data. We assume autochthony to be a general underlying belief that translates into more specific attitudes (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017) but it is possible that autochthony is also used to justify pre-existing welfare chauvinism (see Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Experimental designs manipulating the importance of autochthony or first occupancy of a country could inform causality.

Also, the measure of welfare chauvinism could be argued not to exactly fit our theoretical argument. In the measure, participants were asked how long immigrants should *work and pay taxes*. Part of our argument was based on the idea that people who endorse autochthony can oppose immigrants' welfare entitlements based on first occupancy and independent of immigrants' contribution. Although our measure used was proven to be valid (Kros & Coenders, 2019), an even stronger autochthony-welfare chauvinism relationship might be found if welfare chauvinism was measured in terms of accepting or

opposing welfare entitlements in general, instead of in terms of years having to work and pay taxes before one is entitled to these benefits. An advantage of the applied measure was that we could show that *welfare chauvinism in the soft sense* is very widespread among the general public: most people view migrants' right to social benefits as conditional (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012).

There are several possible directions for future research. First, autochthony is not the only principle to determine collective ownership. 'We made the country as it is today' or 'the country made us who we are', referred to as the investment and formative principle (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), can also be used as arguments for country ownership, and therefore, as arguments to determine who is entitled to welfare support. The interplay between autochthony and other principles can shed more light on the importance of ownership claims for welfare chauvinism. Testing the robustness of our results in other contexts is another possible future direction. For example, autochthony might have a different effect in settler societies, in which the majority group is not the autochthonous population (Nooitgedagt et al., 2021). Finally, to understand the challenges of the welfare state in multicultural societies, it is crucial to understand attitudes towards the welfare state and welfare chauvinism among minority groups (Galle, 2019). It is worth investigating how a minority status influences autochthony and its relationship to welfare chauvinism.

In closing, our study showed that autochthony can help explain welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism among Western Europeans. Our findings indicate that the argument 'we were here first' is not only relevant in people's day-to-day lives, but that it can also help to shed light on public support for group-targeted welfare policies and the perceived legitimacy and viability of the welfare state in modern Western societies.

Chapter 3.

'This country is ours': The exclusionary potential of collective psychological ownership[15]

[15] A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Nijs, T., Martinovic, B., Verkuyten, M., & Sedikides, C. (2021). 'This country is OURS': The exclusionary potential of collective psychological ownership. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 60*(1), 171-195. doi:10.1111/bjso.12386. Nijs wrote the chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea and design of the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

3.1. Introduction

Through such political campaign slogans as 'Take back control of our country' and 'The Netherlands ours again', right-wing populist parties (United Kingdom Independence Party and Dutch Party for Freedom, respectively) endeavour to appeal to beliefs that the country is 'ours' and therefore 'we' are its rightful owners. These political parties appeal to people's sense of ownership and the (arguably) related exclusive determination right to back up opposition to immigration and European integration (PVV, 2012; Vlaams Belang, 2019). The United Kingdom Independence Party also used ownership rhetoric in European Union (EU) 'leave' campaigns (Cap, 2017; Portice & Reicher, 2018). Indeed, people may feel not only that objects, places, or ideas are 'theirs', but also that their in-group owns a complex entity such as a country (Brylka et al., 2015; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). This in-group perception, labelled *collective psychological ownership* (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), implies a right to control what is 'ours' – *exclusive determination right* – and can contribute to the strong 'us-them' distinction that is characteristic of right-wing populism. We examined whether collective psychological ownership implies an exclusive determination right that accounts for anti-immigration and anti-EU attitudes of the Dutch (Study 1) and the British (Study 2), as well as whether these attitudes, in turn, explain voting behaviour in the 2016 Brexit referendum (Study 2). We additionally examined whether a sense of collective ownership is especially related to exclusionary attitudes and behaviour among politically right-wing people.

3.2. Theoretical background

3.2.1. Collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right

Psychological ownership implies the subjective sense of control and power over things. It is being tethered to the object, place, or idea perceived to be one's own, even if one does not own something in legal terms (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2017; Pierce et al., 2001). The sense of ownership has its foundations in the psychology of possessions (Rochat, 2014), develops very early in life, and probably has roots in evolutionary history, as is illustrated in the territorial instinct that is found in many species (Hinde, 1970). Children as young as two understand that something is 'mine' and not 'yours' (Ross et al., 2015; Rossano et al., 2011), and 3-year-olds recognise the person who controls the use of an object as the owner (Neary et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2012).

People not only experience personal psychological ownership but can also perceive something to be owned by their group. When people have a sense of 'us', they can also have a sense of 'ours', referred to as collective psychological ownership. Organizational scholars have argued that team members in an organization can perceive their team to have collective ownership of their work, their working space, and their work outcomes (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017).[16] These perceptions relate to the question of 'what we control', which differs from questions of group identity ('who we are') and group resources ('what we need') (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Crucially, people can also perceive collective ownership of a country (Brylka et al., 2015; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Although legal regulations about historical sovereignty rights often serve as a basis for such ownership claims (Gans, 2001), perceptions of 'our' country can exist independently of legal regulations. These perceptions are expected to be relatively stable individual dispositions, as some individuals have stronger general tendencies to experience ownership than others (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003).

Given that ownership rhetoric is frequently implemented by right-wing populist politicians, collective psychological ownership may help to explain the attractiveness of right-wing populist messages. Right-wing populism is an ideology defined by a (1) vertical 'us-them' distinction between 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite' (Mudde, 2007), and (2) horizontal 'us-them' distinction in which 'the pure people' are distinguished from immigrant and ethnic minority groups, sometimes labelled 'the dangerous others' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2007; Brubaker, 2019). Right-wing populism has appropriated these distinctions as a basis of morality, but also as a basis of entitlement. 'The people' are not only distinct from 'the corrupt elite' or 'the dangerous others' because they are morally good, but also because they are entitled to be 'masters in their own homes' (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2007, p. 6).

Collective psychological ownership legitimises the populist 'us-them' distinction, as it implies specific rights. Ownership confers rights and privileges with respect to that which is owned and thereby determines the entitlements of owners in relation to non-owners. Philosophers have argued that ownership is accompanied by the right to use one's property, transfer it to others, and exclude others from using it (Snare, 1972). The latter is considered

[16] We examine individual and not group-level perceptions of collective psychological ownership or perceived in-group norms about whether 'we' are the owners. Although individual perceptions might depend on perceived in-group norms (Bennett, 2014), we focus on individual perceptions that we expect to be most relevant in explaining individual attitudes and behavioural intentions.

the defining feature of ownership (Merrill, 1998), and so we focus on it. We conceptualise exclusive determination right as an owner's right to determine what happens with the 'property', and hence to exclude non-owners (Katz, 2008). The idea that 'the people' have the exclusive right to determine the fate of the nation lies at the heart of populism (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2013; Mudde, 2010). This right affords a sense of power and control, which is part of the psychology of possession and a central motive behind the endorsement of collective psychological ownership (Rochat, 2014; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Given that ownership contains not only the exclusive determination right, but also other rights (right to use and transfer; Snare, 1972), we distinguish conceptually and empirically between collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right, while acknowledging the centrality of the exclusive determination right for collective psychological ownership.

3.2.2. Ownership and attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration

Populist right-wing politicians often refer explicitly to collective psychological ownership and the exclusive determination right when combining their opposition to two key issues, immigration and European integration (Lubbers & Coenders, 2017; Mudde, 2007). This point is illustrated by a quote from a speech given by the leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom: 'When leaving the EU and Eurozone we will be in charge of our own rules again, like about who enters our country, immigration, and our own currency' (Wilders, 2012). Given that collective psychological ownership is often based on arguments of autochthony ('we were here first') and investment ('we built this country') (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015), right-wing populism may not consider newcomers as rightful owners of the country. Therefore, this ideology may not regard the exclusion of immigrant minorities as unjust or discriminatory, but rather as a self-evident right that accompanies ownership (Merrill, 1998; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Collective psychological ownership can be used to define group-based hierarchies without raising moral questions, because ownership involves a consensually shared understanding about how to determine entitlements (Costa-Lopes, Dovidio, Pereira, & Jost, 2013). General senses of both personal and group entitlement are related to more negative outgroup attitudes, as they imply acceptable differences between individuals and groups (Anastasio & Rose, 2014; Blumer, 1958). Right-wing populists, then, may use the rhetoric of ownership and its exclusive determination right as a basis for opposing immigrants (Fine, 2013).

Collective psychological ownership and its exclusive determination right may also be associated with opposition to European integration. Involvement of the EU in what are perceived to be national matters may be regarded as international elite interfering with the exclusive right to make decisions about one's own country, which taps into the vertical 'people-elite' distinction of right-wing populism (Føllesdal, 1998). European integration has led to common policies in a range of domains, such as security (Europol) and monetary (the Euro; European Parliament, 2014) all of which can be seen as examples of 'interference' by the EU elite not listening to the people (Harmsen, 2010). In particular the Schengen Agreement that assured the free movement of European citizens across European nation states (Baldoni, 2003), and increasingly centralised immigration and asylum policies concerning immigration from outside the EU (Hatton, 2015), may, from the perspective of 'our' country, be regarded as incompatible with 'our' right to determine about the entry of newcomers. Consequently, we hypothesise that:

Collective psychological ownership is associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities (H1a) and European integration (H1b), and that the perceived exclusive determination right mediates these associations (H2a and H2b).

3.2.3. Pro-Brexit vote

A key element of ownership is establishing, communicating, and maintaining what is owned (G. Brown et al., 2005). To do so, it is necessary to exclude others and take action when the exclusivity of one's rights is not guaranteed. Voting is such an action.

The 2016 Brexit referendum was a political event that may have been influenced by ownership concerns. On 23 June 2016, 51.9% of the British electorate voted to leave the EU. Many voters and politicians perceived the referendum as an opportunity to regain control over what is 'ours' (Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018; Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018; Hobolt, 2016; Portice & Reicher, 2018). Controlling national legislation and borders were the most salient themes among Leave supporters (Andreouli & Nicholson, 2018), and the United Kingdom Independence Party campaigned for 'leave' with the characteristic slogan 'Take back control of our country.'

We proceeded to examine whether the negative attitudinal consequences of ownership translate into a pro-Brexit vote, thereby focusing on behaviour. Concerns about immigrants' negative impact on the British economy, culture, and welfare state were drivers of the pro-Brexit vote (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Hutchings & Sullivan, 2019). The vote is further explained by negative attitudes towards European integration, and specifically by

cost and benefit concerns of the integration for employment, welfare, and freedom of movement (Vasilopoulou, 2016). As such, we expect that:

Collective psychological ownership is associated with a higher likelihood of pro-Brexit voting (H3) via exclusive determination right (H3a) and, in turn, negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities (H3b) and European integration (H3c).

Although it is possible that a sense of ownership is used to justify one's pre-existing negative attitudes towards immigrants and the EU or Brexit voting, we argue that ownership influences these attitudes and voting behaviour. Collective psychological ownership is a general underlying belief about what is 'ours' that translates into more specific attitudes varying in ideological relevance across context and time (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). This is similar to ideological beliefs influencing specific attitudes (Jost, 2006) and nationalism driving out-group attitudes (Wagner et al., 2010). Moreover, based on voting behaviour theory, we posit that people cast their votes motivated by their beliefs and attitudes (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980; Steenbergen, 2010), and a sense of group threat drives rather than results from right-wing populist voting (Berning & Schlueter, 2016). Admittedly, though, our research designs prevent conclusions about causality, and so we cannot rule out the possibility of bidirectional associations.

3.2.4. Political ideology

Although a substantial portion of the electorate might concur with populist politicians' slogans that the country is 'ours' and therefore 'we' have exclusive determination rights, not all people will consent with exclusionary attitudes and behaviour. Such consent may be primarily found among right-wing individuals. According to the motivated social cognition model (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), left-wing and right-wing individuals are distinguished in terms of their attitudes on two domains: tradition (vs. change) and equality (vs. dominance). People on the political right endorse traditionalism and conformity, while justifying inequalities between individuals and groups. In contrast, a left-wing orientation is associated with openness to experiences as well as preferences for greater equality and diminishing group dominance (Jost, 2006). Given that right-wing individuals generally have fewer problems with inequalities and value the status quo, they will likely translate endorsement of ownership and its exclusive determination right into exclusionary reactions (Mudde, 2007). Hence, we will use the exclusive determination right as a basis for exclusionary attitudes and behaviour. We hypothesise that:

The exclusive determination right is especially related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration among right-wing individuals (H4).

3.2.5. Potential confounds

We further examined whether these negative attitudes (and downstream consequences) are explained by collective psychological ownership above-and-beyond other relevant constructs. The exclusive determination right affords a sense of control, which is the primary need fulfilled by ownership (Beggan, 1991; Furby, 1978). However, ownership can additionally furnish a sense of identity and belongingness (Pierce et al., 2001; Porteous, 1976), and indeed collective psychological ownership is related but relatively independent from national identification and place attachment (Brylka et al., 2015; Storz et al., 2020). Furthermore, national identification is a constituent aspect of right-wing populism (Brubaker, 2019; Lubbers, 2019) that is linked to negative attitudes towards immigrants (Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009), the EU (Carey, 2002), and the pro-Brexit vote (Hobolt, 2016). Place attachment entails a positive affective bond between an individual and a specific territory (Scannell & Gifford, 2010), a sense that 'I belong to the place', whereas collective psychological ownership concerns the perception that 'the place belongs to us'.

Exclusionary reactions can further be explained by adherence to state sovereignty. Sovereignty is a political principle that refers to the supreme authority to rule without outside interference. It was used in the Brexit debate to argue against 'Brussels bureaucrats and elites' making decisions about national matters, including immigration (Ringeisen-Biardeaud, 2017). Both sovereignty and collective psychological ownership can account for 'why we get to decide'. However, whereas the former is concerned with the authority in the decision-making process of the state, the latter relates to the question whether an 'object' belongs to us and is ours to control (Ripstein, 2017). Based on the principle of sovereignty, people may oppose further European integration, because it impedes the possibility of national governments to decide on what is good for society. However, people may also oppose further European integration simply because they believe they themselves are entitled to control what is 'theirs'.

We examine whether the associations between collective psychological ownership and exclusionary outcomes are independent of national identification, place attachment, and adherence to sovereignty. We expected this to be the case because collective psychological ownership has its basis in the psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014) and is

not directly concerned with the questions of 'who we are', 'where do we belong' or 'who decides', but rather with the question 'what do we control' (G. Brown et al., 2005).

3.2.6. Overview

In two studies involving Dutch (Study 1) and British (Study 2) national majority samples, we examined whether collective psychological ownership is related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration, via exclusive determination right. In Study 2, we additionally tested whether these exclusionary attitudes accounted for voting in favour of Brexit. We considered the moderating influence of political ideology in both studies.

The Netherlands and the United Kingdom are similar in regard to their long-established liberal democracies, recent mass immigration, and rapid rise of populist right-wing parties. The most relevant difference for our purposes is that the United Kingdom citizens voted for leaving the EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum. The British data offer the opportunity to test for the role of collective psychological ownership in voting behaviour and the Dutch data allow to examine its role in attitudes towards European unification in a context where this topic is less hotly debated than in the British context.[17] Although the Dutch Party for Freedom called for a Dutch EU membership referendum, Dutch mainstream parties are pro-EU (Hobolt, 2016), and the Dutch are much less Eurosceptic than the British (Stokes, 2016), which renders 'Nexit' unlikely.

3.3. Study 1

We tested whether collective psychological ownership is related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration, and whether these associations are mediated by perceived exclusive determination right. Furthermore, we considered the moderating influence of political ideology on the association between exclusive determination right and attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration. We controlled for national identification, place attachment, and demographic characteristics.

[17] We did not consider Northern Ireland, because of its nuanced relationship with the United Kingdom and the debate about the EU border with Ireland (Coakley, 2007).

3.3.1. Data and methods

3.3.1.1. Sample

We surveyed 608 participants via the Dutch online platform Thesistools (2019). Based on sample size calculator software for structural equation modelling (Soper, 2017), the main model with 20 observed indicators and three latent variables requires 323 participants to detect a medium-sized effect (Cohen's d = 0.4) at the .05 alpha level. The final model including control variables was more complex, and so we aimed for a larger sample size. We excluded 27 participants who did not answer the political ideology question,[18] and nine participants because they, or one of their parents, were not born in The Netherlands. The final sample (N = 572), although not representative of the Dutch majority population, was diverse in terms of sex (235 [41%] women, 335 men, 2 unreported), age (19–87, M = 60.17, SD = 13.00), and education level (11% low secondary school or less, 29% high school or vocational training, and 60% [applied] university).

3.3.1.2. Measures

Collective psychological ownership

We adapted four items from a measure designed to assess collective psychological ownership in organizational settings (Pierce et al., 2017). Participants read: 'Think about the house, automobile, workspace, or some other item that you own or co-own with someone, and the experiences and feelings associated with the statement 'THIS IS MINE/THIS IS OURS!'. The following statements refer to the feeling of being a co-owner of a country, The Netherlands. Indicate the degree to which you personally disagree or agree with these statements.': 'I think that this country is owned by us, the Dutch,' 'I feel that this country belongs to us, the Dutch,' 'I feel that this country is collectively owned by us, the Dutch,' 'I feel as though we, the Dutch, own this country together' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .95). Beforehand, participants were informed that, by 'The Dutch', we referred to people with no migration background.

Exclusive determination right

We asked participants to what extent they disagreed or agreed that the Dutch can claim the following rights: 'The exclusive right to determine matters that concern The Netherlands,'

[18] Given that political ideology is an exogenous variable used in a latent interaction model, we could not retain cases with missing values in the analysis.

'The exclusive right to determine the rules of the game in The Netherlands,' 'The exclusive right to determine who will be allowed in The Netherlands,' and 'The exclusive right to determine what happens to The Netherlands in the future' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .96).

Immigrant minority attitudes

We used a feeling thermometer, a reliable measurement (Alwin, 1997) that correlates with subtle prejudice assessments (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001). It ranged from 0º (cold) to 100º (warm), with 10º increments (11-point scale), Participants rated their feeling towards 10 immigrant minority groups in The Netherlands: Antilleans, Bulgarians, Moroccans, Poles, Surinamese, Turks, refugees, asylum seekers, people who entered The Netherlands illegally, people who overstayed their resident permits (α = .94).

European integration attitudes

We used an item from the European Social Survey (2018): 'Concerning the European Union, some people think European integration should go further. Others think it has already gone too far. What describes your position best?' (1 = *European integration has gone way too far*, 7 = *European integration should go a lot further*).

Political ideology

We asked participants to place themselves on a 5-point scale (1 = *political left*, 2 = *centre left*, 3 = *middle*, 4 = *centre right*, 5 = *right*) that is a useful indicator of general political orientation (Jost, 2006).

National identification

We used three items (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012): 'I strongly feel Dutch,' 'Being Dutch is important to me,' 'I identify with other Dutch people' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .87).

Place attachment

We used three items that we adjusted from measures of attachment to one's neighbourhood (Hernández, Carmen Hidalgo, Salazar-Laplace, & Hess, 2007): 'When I'm out of the country for a while, I miss The Netherlands,' 'I would regret having to move to another country,' 'When I've been out of the country for a while, I'm happy to come back' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .83).

Demographic characteristics

We controlled for sex (0 = women, 1 = men), age (in years), education level (1 = primary education, 8 = doctorate). We treated age and education as continuous variables.

3.3.1.3. Data analytic strategy

We used confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus software (version 8.3; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) to test whether the items measuring collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, immigrant minority attitudes, national identification, and place attachment captured separate latent constructs. Next, we specified a structural equation model in which we regressed immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes on collective psychological ownership, mediated by exclusive determination right. We included control variables as predictors of the dependent variables and mediator. Finally, we added political ideology as a predictor of the dependent variables and as a moderator of the relationships among exclusive determination right, immigrant minority attitudes, and European integration attitudes. Further, we used ordinary least squares regression analysis with robust maximum likelihood estimation (MLR) to account for non-normally distributed endogenous variables. We also used the full information maximum likelihood procedure (FIML), which allows missing values in endogenous variables, assuming missingness at random. We therefore endogenized exogenous variables with missing variables by estimating their variance. See Table 3.1 for the number of valid responses per variable.

Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics, Study 1

	Valid		*Mean/*				*Correlations*					
	n	*Range*	*proportion*	*SD*	*α*	*t*	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Collective psychological ownership	572	1–7	4.78	1.65	.95	11.36***	.643***	–.318***	–.397***	.342***	.564***	.324***
2. Exclusive determination right	572	1–7	4.15	1.79	.96	2.01*	1	–.407***	–.469***	.349***	.472***	.239***
3. Immigrant minority attitudes	566	1–11	6.13	1.65	.94	1.86		1	.505***	–.387***	–.263***	–.120*
4. European integration attitudes	564	1–7	3.69	1.78	-	4.14***			1	–.423***	–.293***	–.176**
5. Political ideology	572	1–5	2.75	1.17	-	5.13***				1	.279***	.126**
6. National identification	572	1–7	5.05	1.36	.87	18.56***					1	.710***
7. Place attachment	572	1–7	4.52	1.50	.83	8.23***						1
8. Sex (1 = male)	570	0/1	.59	-	-							
9. Education level		1–8	5.22	1.90	-							
10. Age	572	19–87	60.17	13.00	-							

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores. Correlations were between latent factors and manifest single-items. *α* is Cronbach's alpha. *t* is the t-statistic of difference from the midpoint of the scale. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

3.3.2. Results and discussion

3.3.2.1. Measurement model

The expected 5-factor model did not fit the data well (CFI = .861, RMSEA = .099, SRMR = .064). Modification indices suggested that the factor for immigrant minority attitudes did not sufficiently account for variation in the 10 items. Thus, we specified five meaningful factors of two items each (Antilleans and Surinamese; Bulgarians and Poles; Moroccans and Turks; asylum seekers and refugees; people who entered The Netherlands illegally; people who overstayed their resident permits) and loaded them on a second order factor. This allowed us to account for the multidimensionality within the factor while using general immigrant minority attitudes as the dependent variable. A second-order factor is a more parsimonious solution than specifying error covariances, and it reflects better the theoretically meaningful multidimensionality (T. A. Brown, 2015). We obtained a model fit (CFI = .960, RMSEA = .054, SRMR = .056) that was significantly better than the previous model and better than alternative 4-factor solutions (Appendix 3.1). All items loaded significantly on their respective factor with loadings above .74.

3.3.2.2. Descriptive statistics

Table 3.1 shows that participants held neutral attitudes toward immigrant minorities and thought that European integration had gone a bit too far. Further, they slightly agreed with the collective psychological ownership items and the exclusive determination right items. Ownership and exclusive determination right were positively related (r = .64). All correlations were significant and in the expected direction.

3.3.2.3. Structural model

We regressed immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes on collective psychological ownership, mediated by exclusive determination right and including all control variables. The standardised total effects show that ownership was related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities (β = −.244, SE = .052, p < .001) and European integration (β = −.341, SE = .052, p < .001), consistent with H1a and H1b (see all results, including all control variables, in Appendix 3.2). To compare the magnitude of these results, we also obtained standardised total effects of the main control variables. These show that collective psychological ownership was a stronger predictor than national identification ($\beta_{immigrants}$ = −.214, SE = .088, p = .014 and β_{EU} = −.119, SE = .083, p = .155) and place attachment ($\beta_{immigrants}$ = .152, SE = .078, p = .051 and β_{EU} = .074, SE = .072,

p = .304). Furthermore, indirect associations indicate that the association between ownership and immigrant minority attitudes was mediated by exclusive determination right (β = –.169, *SE* = .036, p < .001, 95% CI [–.238, –.099][19]), in line with H2a. No direct relationship remained (β = –.076, *SE* = .059, p = .198). Consistent with H2b, the association between collective psychological ownership and European integration attitudes was partially mediated by exclusive determination right (β = –.182, *SE* = .035, p < .001, 95% CI [–.249, –.115]), given that a direct negative path remained (β = –.159, *SE* = .061, p = .009).

Figure 3.1 shows the standardised coefficients of the full model with interactions with political ideology. The negative relationship between exclusive determination right and immigrant minority attitudes was especially strong for right-wing participants, as indicated by the negative interaction term (β = –.091, *SE* = .041, p = .026). The unstandardised simple slopes in Figure 3.2 show that, for left-wing participants (one standard deviation [SD] below the mean of political ideology), exclusive determination right was related to more negative immigrant minority attitudes (*B* = –.135, *SE* = .061, p = .026), but this association was stronger for right-wing participants (1 SD above the mean of political ideology) (*B* = –.279, *SE* = .055, p < .001). This finding is consistent with H4. However, the relationship between exclusive determination right and European integration attitudes was not moderated by political ideology (β = –.021, *SE* = .037, p = .572).

[19] We calculated all confidence intervals in both studies using bootstrapping with 1000 iterations and using an ML estimator, which did not substantially change the results.



Figure 3.1. Standardised coefficients of the main paths of the final structural equation model in Study 1 (*N* = 572). Included control variables were not reported. **p* < .05; ****p* < .001.



Figure 3.2. Simple slopes from the interaction between political ideology and exclusive determination right on immigrant minority attitudes in Study 1. Low determination right is 1 standard deviation below the mean of exclusive determination right (–1) and high determination right is 1 standard deviation above the mean (1). The Y-axis represents the standardised scale of the latent dependent variable.

3.4. Study 2

We examined the cross-national robustness of the findings by re-testing the hypotheses that collective psychological ownership is related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities (H1a) and European integration (H1b), and that these associations are mediated by exclusive determination right (H2a and H2b). Additionally, we tested whether these negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities and European integration in turn accounted for pro-Brexit voting (H3). We again considered the moderating influence of political ideology (H4). Moreover, we controlled for adherence to sovereignty along with national identification, place attachment, and demographic characteristics.

3.4.1. Data and methods

3.4.1.1. Sample

We recruited a sample of native British adults via the Kantar Public (2019) online platform, which targeted a sample that would match the British population in terms of sex, age, education level, and country (England, Scotland, Wales). We collected these data between 25 February and 5 March 2019, approximately one month before the initial Brexit deadline. In total, 502 participants completed the survey.[20] To test the main model with 21 observed indicators and three latent variables we needed a minimum of 400 participants for detecting a medium-sized effect (Cohen's $d = 0.4$) at the .05 alpha level (Soper, 2017). We aimed for a larger sample size, because the final model that included control variables was more complex. We excluded seven participants who gave uniform answers to all questions, resulting in a final sample of 495 (249 [50%] women, 246 men), ranging in age from 18–84 years ($M = 47.60$, $SD = 16.54$). Of them, 11% had lower educational level (no education, primary school, or lower secondary education), 49% intermediate educational level (secondary education oriented towards vocational training or upper secondary education), and 40% higher educational level (tertiary higher professional education or university education). We added weights to correct for deviations from the targeted quotas, thereby making the findings representative for the British majority population.[21]

[20] The dataset included another 516 participants who received a different version of the questionnaire. This version did not contain the measures pertaining to the current study.

[21] These weights were unavailable for Study 1.

3.4.1.2. Measures

Collective psychological ownership

Participants viewed the same instructions as in Study 1 and responded to four items: 'We the Brits own this country,' 'This country belongs to us Brits,' 'I would agree with someone who says this country is collectively owned by us Brits,' 'I feel as though we Brits own this country together' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; $\alpha = .96$).

Exclusive determination right

We assessed this construct as in Study 1, only in reference to the British ($\alpha = .96$).

Immigrant minority attitudes

We used the same feeling thermometer as in Study 1, but with 10 immigrant minority groups that are relevant in the British context: Caribbean Blacks, Bangladeshis, Indians, Pakistanis, Poles, Refugees, Romanians, Russians, Muslims, Turks ($\alpha = .97$).

European integration attitudes

We measured this construct as in Study 1, except that we rephrased it in past tense (e.g., 'European integration should have gone a lot further'), given that the electorate had already voted for Brexit.

Brexit voting

We assessed this construct with the question: 'What did you vote in the 2016 Referendum?'. The options were as follows: *leave*, *remain*, *I chose not to vote*, *I was not allowed to vote*, and *prefer not to say*. We treated this variable as a dummy in which we coded 'leave' as 1 and 'remain' as 0. Four hundred twenty-one participants voted either 'leave' or 'remain', and we treated the responses of the remaining 74 participants on this variable as missing. We used this voting question in our main analyses as a proxy for voting behaviour, meaning that we predicted past voting behaviour with current attitudes. Therefore, in an alternative model, we ran the analyses with a different dependent variable, asking 'if a second referendum were to be held today, what would you vote?'. We again treated this variable as a dummy in which we coded 'leave' as 1 and 'remain' as 0. Sixty-six participants answered they would not vote or preferred not to answer and were treated as missing.

Political ideology

We measured this construct as in Study 1.

National identification

We measured this construct as in Study 1 ($\alpha = .91$).

Place attachment

We used three items that were similar to the ones in Study 1: 'I feel attached to Great Britain as a country,' 'I would regret having to move to another country,' 'Great Britain feels like my home' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .85).

Adherence to sovereignty

We generated four items to assess this construct based on definitions of sovereignty: 'International organizations should never interfere in national political decisions,' 'National decision making should never be subject to international rules or regulations,' 'An independent state should be free from external control,' 'National decisions should be based on what the people want, instead of what international companies want' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .86).

Demographic characteristics

We again controlled for sex (0 = *women*, 1 = *men*), age and education (1 = *primary education not completed*, 14 = *PhD doctorate*). We also controlled for country of residence (England, Scotland, Wales), with England as the reference category.

3.4.1.3. Data analytic strategy

We tested via confirmatory factor analysis whether the items measuring collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, immigrant minority attitudes, national identification, place attachment, and adherence to sovereignty captured separate latent constructs. Subsequently, we specified a structural equation model of sequential mediation in which we regressed Brexit voting on collective psychological ownership, mediated by (1) exclusive determination right and (2) immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes. We included control variables as predictors of all endogenous variables. Next, we added political ideology as a predictor of immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes, and as a moderator of the relationship between exclusive determination right and immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes. We used logistic regression because of the dichotomous dependent variable Brexit voting, and employed maximum likelihood estimation with a robust estimator (MLR) to account for non-normally distributed endogenous variables. We opted for full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which allows missing values in endogenous variables, assuming missingness at random. So, we included cases with missing values on Brexit voting in the full model, but the missing value points were implied by the

observed values of all other variables (Enders & Bandalos, 2001).[22] Except for Brexit vote, no other variables had missing values.

3.4.2. Results and discussion

3.4.2.1. Measurement model

The expected 6-factor model fitted the data well (CFI = .940, RMSEA = .058, SRMR = .041) and significantly better than several alternative 5-factor solutions (see Appendix 3.4). All items loaded significantly on their respective factor with standardised loadings above .64. To reduce complexity of the final model,[23] we treated multiple-item control variables as manifest mean scores. A model with only collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, and immigrant minority attitudes as latent factors fitted the data well (CFI = .941, RMSEA = .073, SRMR = .037).

3.4.2.2. Descriptive statistics

Table 3.2 shows that participants held slightly negative immigrant minority attitudes and thought that European integration had gone a bit too far. Further, participants slightly agreed with both the collective psychological ownership items and the exclusive determination right items. These two constructs were strongly positively related (r = .81).

[22] A model in which we deleted cases with missing values on Brexit voting yielded similar results (Appendix 3.3).

[23] Model fitting with a categorical dependent variable regressed on several latent predictors posed numerical problems for Mplus.

Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics, Study 2

	Valid		*Mean/*				*Correlations*							
	n	*Range*	*proportion*	*SD*	*α*	*t*	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Collective psychological ownership	495	1–7	5.05	1.58	.96	14.71***	.810***	–.334***	–.328***	.311***	.257***	.589***	.559***	.486***
2. Exclusive determination right	495	1–7	5.16	1.56	.96	16.57***	1	–.312***	–.317***	.341***	.213***	.516***	.487***	.550***
3. Immigrant minority attitudes	495	1–11	5.34	2.13	.97	6.93***		1	.307***	–.340***	–.158**	–.118*	–.063	–.290***
4. European integration attitudes	495	1–7	2.80	1.59	-	16.81***			1	–.518***	–.297***	–.203***	–.151**	–.361***
5. Brexit vote	435	0/1	.51	-	-					1	.296***	.211***	.170***	.401***
6. Political ideology	495	1–5	2.98	1.06	-	.48					1	.219***	.172***	.232***
7. National identification	495	1–7	5.44	1.43	.91	22.40***						1	.760***	.309***
8. Place attachment	495	1–7	5.47	1.37	.85	23.97***							1	.320***
9. Adherence to sovereignty	495	1–7	5.07	1.20	.86	19.95***								1
10. Sex (1 = male)	495	0/1	.49	-	-									
11. Education level		1–14	8.15	3.57	-									
12. Age	495	18–84	46.05	17.09	-									
13. Country	495				-									
England	495	0/1	.88	-	-									
Scotland	495	0/1	.08	-	-									
Wales	495	0/1	.04	-	-									

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores. For the correlations, only collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, and immigrant minority attitudes were treated as latent, as in the final model. *α* is Cronbach's alpha. *t* is the t-statistic of difference from the midpoint of the scale. All statistics were based on the weighted data.
*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

3.4.2.3. Structural model

A sequential mediation model in which we regressed Brexit voting on collective psychological ownership, mediated by exclusive determination right and subsequently by immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes, suggested that the particularly high correlation between ownership and exclusive determination right led to multicollinearity issues. For example, whereas bivariate correlations of both collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right with European integration attitudes were significant ($r = -.33$ and $r = -.32$, respectively), they became non-significant ($\beta = -.221$, $SE = .108$, $p = .051$ and $\beta = -.146$, $SE = .102$, $p = .150$ respectively) when simultaneously added as predictors of European integration attitudes, most likely as they cancelled each other out due to shared variance (see Appendix 3.5 for the full results). The large standard errors suggest multicollinearity (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004), making the results unreliable. We focused therefore only on collective psychological ownership in our subsequent models (but see footnote 26 for an alternative model with exclusive determination right as the sole predictor). Consequently, we did not test the mediation via exclusive determination right (H3a), but we did test moderation of the relationships among (1) collective psychological ownership and immigrant minority attitudes, and (2) collective psychological ownership and European integration attitudes, by political ideology.

We regressed Brexit voting on collective psychological ownership, mediated by immigrant minority attitudes and European integration attitudes and including all control variables.[24] The standardised results show that ownership was related to more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities ($\beta = -.344$, $SE = .065$, $p < .001$) and the EU ($\beta = -.214$, $SE = .068$, $p = .002$), consistent with H1a and H1b as in Study 1 (see all results, including control variables, in Appendix 3.6). The standardised total effects also indicate that collective psychological ownership was related to a higher likelihood of having voted 'leave' in the Brexit referendum ($\beta = .194$, $SE = .075$, $p = .009$), consistent with H3. This association was mediated by both attitudes towards immigrant minorities ($\beta = .054$, $SE = .021$, $p = .010$, 95% CI [.010, .098]) and attitudes towards European integration ($\beta = .092$, $SE = .032$, $p = .004$, 95% CI [.026, .159]), consistent with H3b and H3c. No direct

[24] We did not endogenize dichotomous control variables (i.e., sex, Scotland, Wales), because such practice would pose numerical problems for Mplus. Therefore, these variables were uncorrelated with the latent predictor collective psychological ownership.

relationship remained (β = .048 *SE* = .069, *p* = .487). Comparisons between standardised associations suggest that ownership was a stronger predictor of immigrant minority attitudes than national identification (β = .004, *SE* = .072, *p* = .958), place attachment (β = .195, *SE* = .069, *p* = .005), and adherence to sovereignty (β = –.157, *SE* = .057, *p* = .005). It was also a stronger predictor of European integration attitudes and Brexit vote than national identification (β_{EU} = –.081, *SE* = .079, *p* = .302 and β_{Brexit} = .062, *SE* = .084, *p* = .455) and place attachment (β_{EU} = .136, *SE* = .079, *p* = .083 and β_{Brexit} = –.133, *SE* = .086, *p* = .188). However, sovereignty was a stronger predictor than ownership of both European integration attitudes (β = –.245, *SE* = .061, *p* < .001) and Brexit vote (β = .361, *SE* = .068, *p* < .001).



Figure 3.3. Standardised coefficients of the main paths of the final structural equation model in Study 2 (*N* = 495). Included control variables were not reported. **p* < .05; ***p* < .01; ****p* < .001.

Figure 3.3 shows the standardised coefficients of the full model along with interactions with political ideology. We found no moderation of the relationship between collective psychological ownership and immigrant minority attitudes (β = –.009, *SE* = .042, *p* = .831),

in contrast to Study 1.[25] Political ideology was also unrelated to immigrant minority attitudes, when the interaction was excluded (β = –.053, *SE* = .048, *p* = .273). Unexpectedly, the negative relationship between collective psychological ownership and European integration attitudes was especially strong among left-wing participants, as indicated by the positive interaction term (β = .121, *SE* = .039, *p* = .002). The unstandardised simple slopes in Figure 3.4 show that, for left-wing participants (1 SD below the mean of political ideology), collective psychological ownership was significantly related to more negative European integration attitudes (*B* = –.285, *SE* = .080, *p* < .001), but that this association was less strong and non-significant for right-wing participants (1 SD above the mean of political ideology) (*B* = –.044, *SE* = .072, *p* = .543).



Figure 3.4. Simple slopes for the interaction between political ideology and collective psychological ownership on European integration attitudes in Study 2. Low CPO is 1 standard deviation below the mean of collective psychological ownership (–1) and high CPO is 1 standard deviation above the mean (1).

[25] When we substituted collective psychological ownership for exclusive determination right as the main predictor (Appendix 3.7), all the results, including the interactions with political orientation, were similar with the results of the final model we discuss in the main text.

3.4.2.4. Alternative model

In the original model, we predicted past voting behaviour on the basis of current attitudes. Participants, however, might have changed their attitudes or voting preferences. Therefore, we ran the analyses with an alternative dependent variable, asking what participants would vote today. The results did not differ substantially from the final model discussed (Appendix 3.8). This is unsurprising, given that only 7% of the 'leave' voters in the 2016 referendum indicated they would change their vote to 'remain' and 6% of the 'remain' voters would change their vote to 'leave'.

3.5. General discussion

Our research suggests that the right-wing populist horizontal (natives vs. immigrants) and vertical (people vs. elite) 'us-them' distinctions can be based not only on morality (the people are 'good'; Mudde, 2007), but also on entitlement derived from ownership. Most people, for example, would endorse the notion that the owner of a house can decide who is welcome, and our findings suggests that people apply this logic to their country as a basis for their exclusionary attitudes and behaviours.

We demonstrated that exclusive determination right is in part responsible for the anti-immigrant and anti-EU attitudes and behaviours. We found high correlations between collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right in both studies, and indirect effects of collective psychological ownership through exclusive determination right in Study 1. These findings are consistent with exclusive determination right being a core facet of ownership. The high correlations, especially in Study 2, raise the prospect of construct (in)distinguishability. However, although there will often be a close psychological connection between perceived ownership and exclusive determination right, ownership involves various other rights (right to use and transfer; Snare, 1972), and people with a sense of collective ownership may also grant others the right to (co-)determination. Further, the association between ownership and determination rights differed between our two studies, and the stronger association in Study 2 is probably due to the specific national context. We collected the Study 2 data in the heat of the Brexit debate, in which ownership rhetoric and determination rights were highly prominent in the United Kingdom media.

We also examined whether those oriented to the political right were more likely to translate collective psychological ownership to anti-immigrant and anti-EU attitudes, assuming that they have fewer problems with inequalities and value the status quo more than those oriented to the political left. In Study 1's Dutch sample, gatekeeper right and

exclusionary attitudes towards immigrant minorities were positively related for participants on both ends of the political spectrum, but, as expected, this relation was stronger among right-wing people. However, the association between gatekeeper right and negative attitudes towards European integration was not conditional upon political ideology.

This pattern of findings was reversed among Study 2's British participants. Right-wing and left-wing British were similarly likely to translate collective psychological ownership into more negative attitudes towards immigrant minorities. This could be explained by the finding that political orientation was unrelated to immigrant minority attitudes, which is consistent with the result from focus groups that left- and right-wing British do not have markedly different immigration stances (Leruth & Taylor-Gooby, 2019). In contrast to this and to what we expected, specifically for left-wing people, collective psychological ownership was related to opposition to European integration and, in turn, to voting 'leave' in the referendum. Right-wing people might already have been strongly opposed to European integration to the extent that their attitudes were not affected by individual differences in ownership beliefs. In contrast, left-wing people might be more pro-EU, but, if they happened to endorse collective psychological ownership, they could turn against the EU. The relatively Eurosceptic attitudes among the British participants suggests such a ceiling effect. From the perspective of a populist right-wing politician, then, right-wing individuals may already be on board, whereas left-wing individuals can be mobilised to agree with his or her anti-EU agenda. The 'leave' camp in the Brexit debate – mostly driven by the United Kingdom Independence Party – might have adopted an effective strategy in using ownership rhetoric to win over the doubting left-wing voters, crucial in a majority rule referendum. Along these lines, research has shown that left-wing New-Zealanders opposed more strongly pro-bicultural policy when reading a political speech in which historical injustices were negated (vs. recognised), whereas right-wing New-Zealanders were not moved by such a speech (Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008). There might be other reasons why the role of political orientation was inconsistent across our studies. The meaning of the left-right dimension can vary across countries (Huber & Inglehart, 1995) – although not as much in established liberal democracies such as The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Caprara et al., 2017; Piurko, Schwartz, & Davidov, 2011). Further, attitudes toward specific issue that are based in underlying political orientations vary in their ideological relevance across space and time (Jost, 2006).

Notably, the importance of collective psychological ownership in explaining exclusionary attitudes was robust across cultural contexts. Our research design did not allow

for testing directly country differences, but British participants appeared to have a stronger sense of collective ownership and especially adhered more to the exclusive determination right than Dutch participants. This may be due to cultural and historical reasons, but it may also be due to the ownership-fuelled 'Leave' campaign in the British media or the overrepresentation of higher educated Dutch participants. A study comparing representative samples from several countries, and using a longitudinal design, could provide more insight into country differences as well as temporal fluctuations of collective psychological ownership.

Adherence to sovereignty was a strong predictor of European integration attitudes and the Brexit vote. A reason is that the sovereignty items triggered attitudes towards the EU and Brexit. The items explicitly mentioned 'international organizations' and 'international rules or regulations' and were presented after the questions about the EU and Brexit, thus being subject to order or framing effects. There is another reason. The idea that national governments should decide on what is good for society, which is a crucial feature of sovereignty, was perhaps not sufficiently emphasised in the sovereignty measures (Ripstein, 2017). Such an emphasis might have lessened the overlap between sovereignty and ownership.

Our work has several limitations. First, collective psychological ownership can be a contributor to exclusionary attitudes, but can also be used to justify negative attitudes towards immigrants, the EU, and the Brexit vote (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Experimental work indicates that people can use intergroup threat to justify attitudes towards minorities (Bahns, 2016), and longitudinal research suggests that a reason voting behaviour influences attitudes is because voters are more likely to adjust their opinions to political messages they are most exposed to (Rooduijn, Van Der Brug, & De Lange, 2016). The ownership-fuelled 'Leave' campaign, then, might have increased the probability of Brexit voters using collective psychological ownership to justify their vote. Our cross-sectional design prevents conclusions about the direction of influence, with bidirectionality being likely. Instead, our findings support a theoretically plausible and important direction of influence, which is also bolstered by experimental work. For example, experiments on the endowment effect and mere ownership effect have found that ownership causally affects the value attached to an object (Morewedge & Giblin, 2015). Although ownership of the country might be harder to manipulate, manipulating ownership rhetoric in a political speech could inform causality. Furthermore, longitudinal investigations could examine associations among these constructs across time.

Second, we do not suggest that socially and politically complex phenomena, such as the Brexit vote, can be explained primarily by collective psychological ownership. Instead, we argue that collective psychological ownership is one of several key factors that is likely to have assisted the 'leave' camp to win over the majority of votes. Our results indicate that collective psychological ownership is a more critical predictor of the Brexit vote than national identification and place attachment, but not as critical as adherence to sovereignty. Future research should examine populist attitudes (Hobolt, 2016), intergroup threat (Van de Vyver, Leite, Abrams, & Palmer, 2018), and national nostalgia (Sedikides & Wildschut, 2019), along with their interaction with collective psychological ownership.

Third, we focused on the exclusionary consequences of collective psychological ownership. Follow-up research could address its inclusionary side. A sense of ownership can be shared, which can strengthen the belief that a country belongs to 'all of us' and that we are collectively responsible for how it functions. Collective psychological ownership can be accompanied by a sense of responsibility (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017) cascading into prosocial consequences, such as willingness to be politically active, volunteer, and make a contribution to society more generally.

In closing, our findings indicated that collective psychological ownership can help explain negative attitudes towards immigrants and the EU, due to ownership implying an exclusive determination right. These attitudes were translated into Brexit voting. A sense of collective ownership might have contributed to swaying the vote in favour of Brexit.

Chapter 4.

The different faces of collective psychological ownership: Rights, responsibilities, and behavioural intentions[26]

[26] A slightly different version of this chapter has been submitted to an international journal as Nijs, T., Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. The different faces of collective psychological ownership: Rights, responsibilities, and behavioural intentions. Nijs wrote the chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the idea and design of the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

4.1. Introduction

People can feel that something belongs to them personally ('mine'), but also that it belongs to their ingroup ('ours'). This latter feeling is labelled collective psychological ownership (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017) and can be experienced in relation to territories such as 'our' country (Brylka et al., 2015; Selvanathan et al., 2020; Storz et al., 2020), 'our' neighbourhood (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinovic, 2020), and 'our' park (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020). The importance of a sense of ownership of a specific territory has received little attention among social psychologists (Meagher, 2020), but is a central issue in many intergroup conflicts (Toft, 2014) and in stewardship behaviour (Hernandez, 2012). A sense of ownership is omnipresent, and structures social situations because it involves not only a psychological connection to what is owned but also social relationships in relation to the things that are owned (Blumenthal, 2010). In the current paper, we argue that collective psychological ownership is accompanied by both perceived rights and responsibilities, and that these different aspects can have exclusionary and prosocial implications respectively.

First, we posit that collective psychological ownership implies a perceived exclusive right to determine what happens with what is ours and who can use it (Merrill, 1998; Waldron, 1988). This determination right can serve as a basis for excluding non-owners, such as international migrants or those not living in 'our' neighbourhood. Second, we argue that collective psychological ownership is accompanied by perceived responsibility for taking care of what is 'ours'. This perceived responsibility can increase stewardship behaviour to place the collective interest ahead of one's self-interest, for example, by donating money or doing voluntary work for the benefit of maintaining or improving a particular territory (Hernandez, 2012).

In three studies among Dutch adults, we tested these propositions both cross-sectionally and experimentally in relation to three types of territories. Using cross-sectional data, we focused on collective psychological ownership in relation to the country in Study 1 and in relation to the neighbourhood in Study 2. In experimental Study 3, we tested our hypothesis in relation to a local park. By testing the same model in relation to these different territorial targets of ownership and by using different methods, we aim to provide a conceptual replication that enhances our confidence in the theoretical propositions (Crandall & Sherman, 2016). Furthermore, whereas social psychologists have so far mainly focused on the detrimental consequences of collective psychological ownership for intergroup relations (Brylka et al., 2015; Selvanathan et al., 2020; Storz et al., 2020),

organizational psychologists have mainly focused on involvement and investment in the target of ownership (Henssen et al., 2014; Pierce & Jussila, 2010, 2011). By examining both the rights and responsibilities of collective psychological ownership, we aim to make a novel contribution to social psychology and to offer a more comprehensive picture and a more systematic investigation of the diverse implications of collective psychological ownership.

4.2. Theoretical background

4.2.1. Collective psychological ownership

People can experience a sense of ownership of objects, ideas, and places (Pierce et al., 2001). A feeling of 'this is mine' is based on the psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014) and generally develops in the early years of life (Ross et al., 2015; Rossano et al., 2011). Societies function around a common understanding of ownership, as ownership organizes the physical environment, shapes social interactions, and is codified in laws and legal regulations (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). However, even without being the legal owner, individuals can experience psychological ownership and feel that a target of ownership is 'theirs' (Pierce et al., 2001).

People do not only feel that something belongs to them personally, but also that something is owned by their group. This collective psychological ownership ('this is *ours*') is based on a sense of 'us' (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, in the work and organization context, employers can have a personal sense of ownership of their work ('this is my work') and a collective sense with their team members ('this is our work'; Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017).

Collective psychological ownership can be experienced in relation to territories. The role of territories has received little attention among social psychologists, whilst many social behaviours are territorially embedded (Meagher, 2020) and territories are central in many intergroup conflicts (Toft, 2014). As ownership of territory involves the use of a specific place with respect to others, territories are inherently social. Ownership claims of the country are frequently made in the political arena. Specifically right-wing populists argue that 'this country is ours' or 'we should take back our country'. Feelings of collective ownership are also relevant in a local context. Given the sometimes relatively high residential mobility between neighbourhoods (Van Ham & Clark, 2009), questions of 'to

whom does this neighbourhood belong?' are important. Also, ownership claims of local parks or community gardens influence social behaviours (Spierings et al., 2018).

4.2.2. Collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right

Philosophers and legal scholars agree that ownership is accompanied by specific rights (Katz, 2008; Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972; Waldron, 1988). Some argue that ownership comes with a bundle of rights, including the right to use one's property, transfer it to others, and exclude others from using it (Snare, 1972), while others argue that the right to exclusion (Merrill, 1998) or exclusivity (Katz, 2008) is the central defining feature of ownership: owners have the right 'to determine how the object shall be used and by whom' (Waldron, 1988, p. 39).

Empirical research has offered support for the link between ownership and perceived exclusive determination right. Regarding personal ownership, pre-school children were found to understand that when someone controls the use of a toy, that person is probably the owner of it (Neary et al., 2009). Six to eight-year-olds also apply this logic to ownership of ideas (Shaw et al., 2012). Regarding collective ownership, Dutch and British natives who believe the country is 'theirs' were found to generally think that their ingroup has the exclusive right to determine matters that concern their country, for instance, who is allowed to enter (as found in Chapter 3 of this dissertation).

The perception that 'we' have an exclusive determination right can lead to the behavioural tendency to exclude outsiders. Collective psychological ownership implies group boundaries between owners and non-owners based on arguments such as 'we were here first' (autochthony) and 'we made it as it is today' (investment) (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Established inhabitants might perceive themselves to be the rightful owners of a territory and therefore to be entitled to exclude outsiders, such as international migrants or those not living in 'our' neighbourhood. Excluding outsiders from what is 'ours' can be considered a self-evident consequence of the exclusive determination right, that is not unjust or discriminatory (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Research found that collective psychological ownership of the country and of the neighbourhood is related to more negative attitudes towards outsiders (Brylka et al., 2015; Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinovic, 2020). In the current study we examine the behavioural intention to exclude outsiders. Exclusionary behaviour can be regarded an anticipatory defence response to prevent infringement of a group's ownership (G. Brown et al., 2005).

In sum, we hypothesize that:

Collective psychological ownership of a territory leads to higher perceived exclusive determination right (H1a), which in turn is associated with the behavioural tendency to exclude outsiders (H1b).

4.2.3. Collective psychological ownership and group responsibility

Next to an exclusive determination right, collective psychological ownership is often accompanied by perceived responsibility (Furby, 1978; Peck & Shu, 2018; J. D. Wright, 2018). People might feel a moral obligation or duty to take care of what is theirs or might perceive normative pressure to do so. Parents teach their children to take responsibility for what they own (Fifield & Forsyth, 1999; Furby, 1978) and experiments show that those who do not take responsibility for an object (Beggan & Brown, 1994) or territory (i.e., by abandoning it; Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015) are considered to own it less. Moreover, people can regard personal ownership an important part of their sense of self which might mean that that they consider taking care of what they own as a way to maintain, protect, or enhance the self (Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Employers who have a sense of personal ownership over their work were found to experience more personal responsibility for work outcomes (Pierce & Jussila, 2011).

Whereas people can feel personally responsible for their individual ownership, we argue that they can also feel that their group is responsible for what they collectively own. A general idea that 'we should take care of what is ours' might imply perceived normative pressure from fellow co-owners to take responsibility. Moreover, just as people can regard personal ownership as an important part of their personal sense of self, they can also regard collective ownership as an important part of their group self. Therefore, taking care of what is 'ours' can be perceived as taking care of 'ourselves' (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Although studies have shown that collective psychological ownership of products and jobs relates to personal responsibility (Kamleitner & Rabinovich, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017), to our knowledge, no study has examined the link between collective psychological ownership and perceived group responsibility.

A sense of group responsibility can in turn manifest itself in the behavioural intention to engage in stewardship behaviour. Those who feel that they together are responsible for what is 'ours' are likely to take an active role as 'stewards' and act in the best interest of what is collectively owned, instead of their personal interest (Hernandez, 2012; Pierce et al., 2017). Organizational psychologists have demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between psychological ownership and stewardship behaviour. Employers who

have a sense of personal ownership of their work or company are more likely, for example, to commit to extra-role behaviour (Henssen et al., 2014; Ramos et al., 2014; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004; Vandewalle et al., 1995; Zhu et al., 2015). In relation to territories, a sense of personal ownership of public natural areas has been found to increase the willingness to protect the area and oppose exploitation (Preston & Gelman, 2020). Additionally, two studies have established a positive relationship between *collective* psychological ownership and stewardship behaviour. A sense of collective ownership of an organization was shown to be related to more stewardship behaviour for that organization (Henssen et al., 2014), and collective psychological ownership of a neighbourhood was related to higher local participation (Toruńczyk-Ruiz & Martinovic).

Although in these studies it is argued that the positive association between psychological ownership and stewardship behaviour is due to an increased sense of responsibility, to our knowledge, only Peck et al. (2020) empirically examined this mediation process. In an experimental study, they found that triggering a sense of ownership of a public park (e.g., by using a sign saying 'Welcome to YOUR park') increased experienced personal responsibility for that park, which in turn was related to increased stewardship behaviour, such as picking up trash or donating money.

In sum, we hypothesize that:

Collective psychological ownership of a territory leads to higher perceived group responsibility (H2a), which in turn is associated with the intention to engage in stewardship behaviour (H2b).

4.2.4. Overview of studies

The hypotheses were tested cross-sectionally in relation to the country (Study 1) and the neighbourhood (Study 2), and experimentally in relation to a local park (Study 3). The territories examined have in common that the group ('we') that claims ownership of that territory ('ours') can be rather clearly demarcated. The established native majority can be identified as the group that typically claims country ownership and local residents can be identified as the group that claims ownership of the neighbourhood and of a local park. This makes these contexts different from previously studied territories, such as public natural areas (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020), where there is no clearly identified ingroup who claims ownership of the territories.

4.3. Study 1[27]

4.3.1. Data and methods

4.3.1.1. Sample

We surveyed a total sample of N = 617 Dutch natives via research agency Kantar.[28] Participants were invited from the online panel NIPObase. It was part of a bigger data collection and the agency stopped collecting data when they reached a sample of approximately 600 participants. The response rate was 42%, which is similar to other survey research in The Netherlands (Stoop, 2005). All participants were eighteen years or older and both of their parents had an ethnic Dutch background. The sample was diverse in terms of gender (48% women) age (18-92, M = 50.57, SD = 18.11), and education level (19% low secondary school or less, 51% high school or vocational training, and 30% [applied] university). With weights applied, the sample was representative for the Dutch population in terms of gender, age, and education level. All relevant measures and exclusions are reported for all studies.

4.3.1.2. Measures

Collective psychological ownership

The main independent variable was adapted from Chapter 3 of this dissertation, which in turn was based on a measure of collective psychological ownership in organizations (Pierce et al., 2017). Three items were used (e.g., 'I think this country is owned by us, the Dutch'). See an overview of all items used in the four studies in Appendix 4.2. Answer categories ranged from *strongly disagree* (1) to *strongly agree* (7; α = .89).

Exclusive determination right

Three items were used. For example, participants were asked to what extent they disagreed or agreed that Dutch people 'have the exclusive right to determine matters that concern The Netherlands' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .94).

[27] We piloted the design of Study 1. Results of this pilot study were not substantially different, and we have included these in Appendix 4.1.

[28] The questionnaire included other versions that were used for Study 3.

Group responsibility

Three items were designed for the purpose of this research (e.g., 'We the Dutch are responsible for The Netherlands' (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .85).

Exclusion of outsiders

We assessed exclusion of outsiders with three items preceded by the general question: 'On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following now or in the future?' A sample item was 'vote for a political party that is committed to reducing immigration in The Netherlands' (1 = *0%*, 11 = *100%*; α = .76).[29]

Stewardship behaviour

To measure stewardship behaviour, we posed the following general question: 'On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that in the future you will support a charity (by volunteering or donating money) that is committed to…'. Four items followed, such as '… maintaining and preserving Dutch natural landscapes' (1 = *0%*, 11 = *100%*; α = .89).

Control variables

To examine whether the hypothesized associations existed above-and-beyond other relevant constructs, we controlled for group identification, place attachment, political orientation, national sovereignty, and philanthropy. Whereas collective psychological ownership has its basis in the psychology of possession (Rochat, 2014), group identification is concerned with the question of 'who are we?' (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Previous studies have demonstrated collective psychological ownership and national identification to be empirically distinct constructs (Brylka et al., 2015; Storz et al., 2020). We measured group identification with three items (e.g., 'I strongly feel Dutch'; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .85).

Place attachment concerns a positive affective bond between an individual and a place (Scannell & Gifford, 2010). Whilst collective psychological ownership concerns a sense that 'the place belongs to us', place attachment concerns a sense that 'I belong to the place' (Storz et al., 2020). It was measured with three items, such as 'If I have been outside the country for a while, I am always happy to come back' (Hernández et al., 2007) (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .82).

[29] For balance purposes, the matrix including the items measuring exclusion of outsiders also included three items to measure inclusion of outsiders, which were not used.

We also controlled for political orientation. Left-wing individuals generally endorse equality and change, while right-wing individuals endorse tradition and conformity (Jost, 2006). Political orientation has been previously linked to both exclusion of immigrants (Pettigrew, Wagner, & Christ, 2007) and stewardship behaviours, such as volunteering and donating to charity (Brooks, 2006; Clerkin, Paynter, & Taylor, 2009). Participants were asked to place themselves on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly left-wing*, 4 = *middle*, 7 = *strongly right-wing*) (Jost, 2006).

Sovereignty refers to a political principle about the state's supreme authority to rule without interference from outside and can, next to collective psychological ownership, account for 'why we get to decide about this country' (Ripstein, 2017). It has been found to be an empirically distinct construct from collective psychological ownership (in Chapter 3 of this dissertation) and was measured with three items (e.g., 'a country is sovereign and international organizations should not interfere with national regulations'; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .87).

We measured philanthropy based on a scale designed to capture 'the attitude of personal responsibility to the public good' (Schuyt, Smit, & Bekkers, 2004, p. 4). Philanthropy can be an alternative reason to engage in stewardship behaviour, next to collective psychological ownership. We used three items (e.g., 'We have to make this world a better place for the next generation'; 1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*; α = .74). We also controlled for gender (0 = *men*, 1 = *women*), age (in years), and education level (1 = *no primary education*, 9 = *doctorate*).

4.3.2. Results

4.3.2.1. Measurement model

We performed confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus software (version 8.3; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) to test whether all multi-item variables (collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, group responsibility, exclusion of outsiders, stewardship behaviour, group identification, place attachment, sovereignty, and philanthropy) reflected separate latent constructs. To account for non-normal distributions of endogenous variables, we employed robust maximum likelihood estimations (MLR) in all subsequent analyses of all three studies. The expected nine-factor model fitted the model well (CFI = .968, RMSEA = .035, SRMR = .037). Standardized loadings were .67 or higher.

Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics, Study 1

						Correlations			
	Valid n	*Range*	*Mean/ prop.*	*SD*	*α*	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Collective psychological ownership	617	1–7	4.87	1.43	.89	.688***	.550***	.493***	.049
2. Exclusive determination right	617	1–7	4.31	1.59	.94	1	.445***	.531***	–.015
3. Group responsibility	617	1–7	5.78	.90	.85		1	.243***	.245***
4. Exclusion of outsiders	617	1–11	3.40	2.44	.76			1	.199***
5. Stewardship behaviour	617	1–11	6.09	2.60	.89				1
6. Group identification	617	1–7	5.48	1.11	.85				
7. Place attachment	617	1–7	4.63	1.44	.82				
8. Political orientation	534	1–7	4.17	1.41	-				
9. Sovereignty	617	1–7	4.85	1.32	.87				
10. Philanthropy	617	1–7	5.59	.89	.74				
11. Gender (1 = female)	617	0/1	.50	-	-				
12. Age	617	18–92	50.18	18.37	-				
13. Education level	617	1–9	4.70	1.75	-				

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores, correlations were between latent variables. α is Cronbach's alpha. Statistics were based on the weighted data. ***$p < .001$.

4.3.2.2. Descriptive statistics

Table 4.1 shows that participants tended to 'slightly agree' with the collective psychological ownership items. All constructs that we hypothesized to be related were significantly correlated with each other in the expected positive direction. The strongest correlations was .69 between collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right, which is similar to the correlation found in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

4.3.2.3. Structural model

We specified a mediation model by regressing exclusion of outsiders and stewardship behaviour on determination right, group responsibility, and collective psychological ownership, and by regressing right and responsibility on ownership. All control variables were included as predictors of the mediators and dependent variables. Seventy-two participants who indicated 'don't know/don't want to answer' on the political orientation variable were coded missing. We used full information maximum likelihood (FIML) to allow for these missing values. We endogenized all exogenous variables, meaning that all variables were allowed to covary.[30]

Figure 4.1 shows that collective psychological ownership of the country was positively related to perceived determination right, which in turn was related to higher intentions to exclude outsiders, in line with H1a and H1b. This led to a significant indirect effect of ownership on exclusion of outsiders via determination right ($\beta = .136$, $SE = .039$, $p = .001$[31]). There was also a significant positive total effect and a positive direct effect of ownership on exclusion of outsiders. There was no significant indirect effect via group responsibility ($\beta = -.006$, $SE = .026$, $p = .822$).

[30] When endogenizing the dichotomous variable gender, Mplus warned that standard errors may not be trustworthy. However, results did not substantially change when gender was not endogenized.

[31] See Appendix 4.3 for the confidence intervals in all studies.



Figure 4.1. Standardized coefficients of the path model of Study 1. Total effects were reported between square brackets. Included control variables were not reported. $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

Simultaneously, collective psychological ownership was positively related to group responsibility, which in turn was related to higher intentions to engage in stewardship behaviour, in line with H2a and H2b. This led to a positive indirect effect of ownership on stewardship behaviour via group responsibility (β = .086, *SE* = .031, *p* = .006). However, there was no significant total effect of ownership on stewardship behaviour. There was also no significant direct effect, nor indirect effect via exclusive determination right (β = –.022, *SE* = .040, *p* = .580). All results concerning control variables were shown in Appendix 4.4. Note that a model without control variables (See Appendix 4.5) showed the same pattern of results, except that exclusive determination right was additionally negatively related to stewardship behaviour (β = –.135, *SE* = .065, *p* = .038).

4.3.3. Discussion

As expected, collective psychological ownership of the country goes together with both a perceived exclusive determination right and perceived group responsibility. Determination right in turn was related to higher intentions to exclude outsiders (i.e., immigrants), while responsibility was related to higher intentions to engage in stewardship behaviour.

4.4. Study 2

Study 1 offered novel insights into the importance of collective psychological ownership for different behavioural intentions. In Study 2, our aim was to conceptually replicate the same model in relation to another relevant territory – the neighbourhood.

4.4.1. Data and methods

4.4.1.1. Sample

Via research agency Motivaction we recruited a sample of 831 Dutch adults from an online panel called StemPunt. It was part of a bigger data collection and the agency stopped collecting data when they reached a sample of approximately 800 participants. We excluded 47 participants because they did not pass the speeding check leading to a final sample of N = 784.[32] All participants were 18 years or older, no one had both parents born abroad and 45 (6%) had one parent born abroad. We kept in those with one parent born abroad, as ethnicity was not relevant in this study. The sample was not representative of the Dutch population as weights were not available. However, the sample was diverse in terms of gender (53% women) age (18–79, M = 51.10, SD = 16.51), and education level (20% low secondary school or less, 44% high school or vocational training, and 36% [applied] university).

4.4.1.2. Measures

We adapted the measures from Study 1 to the neighbourhood context (see Appendix 4.2). Example items were 'I strongly feel like this is our neighbourhood' (collective psychological ownership; r = .88), 'My neighbours and I have the right to determine matters that concern our neighbourhood' (exclusive determination right; α = .83), 'My neighbours and I are responsible for our neighbourhood' (group responsibility; α = .87), 'support a local initiative that first offers vacant housing to current neighbourhood residents' (exclusion of outsiders; α = .87), and 'maintain a flowerbed or garden in your neighbourhood' (stewardship behaviour; α = .90).

[32] Participants who were faster than one-third of the median duration of the full survey were considered speeders (Miller, Guidry, Dahman, & Thomson, 2020).

Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics, Study 2

						Correlations			
	Valid n	*Range*	*Mean/ prop.*	*SD*	*α*	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Collective psychological ownership	783	1–7	4.91	1.46	.88[a]	.390***	.513***	.061	.314***
2. Exclusive determination right	784	1–7	4.14	1.24	.83	1	.566***	.233***	.248***
3. Group responsibility	784	1–7	4.77	1.17	.87		1	.140**	.558***
4. Exclusion of outsiders	784	1–11	2.67	2.14	.87			1	.270***
5. Stewardship behaviour	784	1–11	5.52	2.66	.90				1
6. Group identification	784	1–7	3.40	1.46	.84				
7. Place attachment	784	1–7	4.28	1.52	.84				
8. Gender (1 = female)	783	0/1	.53	-	-				
9. Age	784	19–79	51.10	16.51	-				
10. Education level	783	1–9	5.21	1.89	-				
11. Mixed ethnic background	784	0/1	.06	-	-				
12. Place of residence size	784								
Big city	784	0/1	.25	-	-				
Average city	784	0/1	.21	-	-				
Small city	784	0/1	.16	-	-				
Village (reference category)	784	0/1	.38	-	-				
13. Length of neighbourhood residence	781	0–70	18.04	14.60	-				
14. Share of newcomers	783	0–100	23.83	21.56	-				
15. Social cohesion	784	1–5	3.49	1.04	-				

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores, correlations were between latent variables. *α* is Cronbach's alpha. $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

[a] Correlation between two items, instead of Cronbach's alpha.

We controlled for group identification, place attachment, gender (0 = *men*, 1 = *women*)[33], age (in years), education level (1 = *no primary education*, 9 = *doctorate*), and mixed ethnic background status (1 = one parent not born in The Netherlands, 0 = both parents born in The Netherlands). Moreover, we controlled for self-reported characteristics of the participants' neighbourhood and place of residence, as these characteristics might influence all variables in the model. We asked participants to indicate the size of their place of residence: a big city (> 100,000 residents); an average city (50,000 – 100,000 residents); a small city (< 50,000 residents); a village. The variable was treated as categorical, with village as the reference category. We measured length of residence in the neighbourhood in years.[34] Share of newcomers was measured by asking participants to estimate the percentage (0–100%) of people in the neighbourhood who have been living there for less than three years. Additionally, we measured social cohesion by asking participants to indicate how often they have a conversation with at least one neighbour (1 = *every day*, 5 = *never or barely*) (Dassopoulos & Monnat, 2011). The item was reverse coded so that a higher score indicated more social cohesion.

4.4.2. Results

As in Study 1, we first performed confirmatory factor analyses to test whether all multi-item variables captured separate latent constructs. The expected seven-factor model fitted the data well (CFI = .962, RMSEA = .048, SRMR = .047). Standardized loadings were .69 or higher. Table 4.2 shows all descriptive statistics. Participants tended to 'slightly agree' with the collective psychological ownership items. Participants scored low on the exclusion of outsiders.[35] All constructs that we hypothesized to be related correlated in the expected positive direction. Moreover, collective psychological ownership correlated strongly with both group identification (r = .63) and place attachment (r = .68).

[33] One participant who indicated 'other' as their gender was coded missing, for statistical reasons only. As it is the only participant answering 'other', we cannot treat this answer as a separate category in our analyses.

[34] Two participants were coded missing as they indicated 100 years as their length of neighbourhood residence, while aged 39 and 51.

[35] As in all other studies, non-normality is handled by using MLR estimator in all subsequent analyses.



Figure 4.2. Standardized coefficients of the path model of Study 2. Total effects were reported between square brackets. Included control variables were not reported. $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$.

We specified the same mediation model as in Study 1. We endogenized all exogenous variables.[36] Collective psychological ownership of the neighbourhood was positively related to exclusive determination right, which in turn was related to higher intentions to exclude outsiders, in line with H1a and H1b (Figure 4.2).[37] Moreover, collective psychological ownership of the neighbourhood was also positively related to perceived responsibility, which in turn was associated with more intentions to engage in stewardship behaviour, again in line with H2a and H2b. Both the indirect effect of ownership on exclusion of outsiders via determination right ($\beta = .066$, $SE = .024$, $p = .006$) and on stewardship behaviour via perceived responsibility ($\beta = .108$, $SE = .032$, $p = .001$) were significant. As in Study 1, there was no significant total effect nor direct effect of ownership on stewardship behaviour.

However, there were also some findings that we did not anticipate. Concerning exclusion of outsiders, we found negative direct and total effects of collective psychological ownership. Note that the negative total effect only appeared when controlling for group

[36] Endogenizing the dichotomous variables (i.e., gender, mixed ethnic background, and place of residence size) caused the same warning in Mplus as in Study 1, but the results did not substantially change when the dichotomous variables were not endogenized.

[37] As part of an experimental manipulation that was not used in this study, a random half of the participants were asked to do a short task related to their neighbourhood. To check whether this manipulation influenced our results, we included the versions as predictors of all endogenous variables in Appendix 4.6. This showed that our results were not influenced by the experimental manipulations.

identification, which is significantly positively related to exclusion of outsiders (β = .445, *SE* = .072, $p < .001$). When no control variables were taken into account, the direct and total effects of ownership on exclusion of outsiders were not significant, in line with the non-significant bivariate correlation shown in Table 4.2. With regard to stewardship behaviour, we found that stronger perceived determination right was associated with less stewardship behaviour and there was a significant negative indirect effect of ownership on stewardship behaviour via determination right (β = –.043, *SE* = .016, $p = .009$). See all other results concerning control variables in Appendix 4.7. We found the same pattern of associations when no control variables were taken into account (see Appendix 4.8), except for a positive total effect of ownership on stewardship behaviour (β = .312, *SE* = .037, $p < .001$).

4.4.3. Discussion

Study 2 conceptually replicated the findings of Study 1. Similar to country ownership, neighbourhood ownership was accompanied by a perceived exclusive determination right which in turn was related to higher intentions to exclude outsiders (i.e., those not living in the neighbourhood). Simultaneously, neighbourhood ownership was accompanied by perceived group responsibility, and indirectly to more intentions to engage in stewardship behaviour.

4.5. Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 showed that the mechanisms central in our hypotheses apply to country ownership and neighbourhood ownership. However, these findings were based on cross-sectional data which prevents conclusions about the direction of influence. Therefore, in Study 3, we used a survey-embedded experiment to examine the effect of collective psychological ownership on rights and responsibilities, and subsequently on behavioural intentions. The same mediation model was tested as in the previous studies, but in relation to yet another context, namely, an imaginary local park.

4.5.1. Data and methods

4.5.1.1. Sample and procedure

We recruited 384 adult Dutch natives via research agency Kantar.[38] All participants were eighteen years or older and both their parents had an ethnic Dutch background. Assuming a small to moderate effect size (Cohen's $d = 0.3$), a priori power calculations (aiming for a power of .80 at the alpha .05 level) suggested a required sample size of 352 (176 participants per experimental condition). The experiment was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework.[39] The sample was diverse in terms of gender (52% women), age (18–93, $M = 51.07$, $SD = 16.89$), and education level (23% low secondary school or less, 42% high school or vocational training, and 35% [applied] university). With weights applied, the sample was representative for the Dutch population in terms of gender, age, and education level.

In recent studies, researchers have manipulated individual psychological ownership by asking participants to think of a (nick)name for the target of ownership, by showing signs such as 'Welcome to YOUR park', by investing time and energy in it, or by using it (Peck et al., 2020; Preston & Gelman, 2020). In our study, participants were randomly assigned to either an ownership condition ($N = 205$) or a control condition ($N = 179$). In both conditions, we asked participants to imagine that there was a small park in their street. In the ownership condition designed to increase a sense of collective ownership of the park, they read that not much happened there before, and that 'you and your neighbours' have renewed it and put a picknick table there. It was explained that 'you and your neighbours' go there a lot, really feel like it is 'your park', and even gave it the name 'our green park'. In the control condition, we only mentioned that 'the people in your street' hardly use the park. In both conditions, a photo shows the same little park with a picknick table. See the exact wording of the experiment in Appendix 4.9.

[38] The questionnaire included another version that was used for Study 1.

[39] See https://osf.io/e4bg6/?view_only=c54326d8832c457092ad6526eb5ac2ae. As can be read in the pre-registration, we also explored how the experiment influenced participation in the decision-making process of the park (e.g., 'Participate in a meeting of the municipality about the future of the park'; $\alpha = .90$). We found that it was heightened by the manipulation (total effect: $\beta = .197$, $SE = .056$, $p < .001$), which was explained by more responsibility (indirect effect: $\beta = .190$, $SE = .051$, $p < .001$) and not by determination right (indirect effect: $\beta = -.018$, $SE = .014$, $p = .199$). We decided to not add it as another dependent variable in the main model, as we do not consider it a measure of stewardship behaviour. However, adding it to the model does not change our results.

4.5.1.2. Measures

After the manipulation, participants answered two items (e.g., 'If I think about the park, I really feel that it is owned by us, neighbours', r = .78) to check whether the ownership condition increased collective psychological ownership of the local park, compared to the control condition. All measures were adapted to the context of the imaginary local park (Appendix 4.2). Subsequently, items measuring exclusive determination right (e.g., 'It is up to me and my neighbours to determine what happens in the park', α = .89) and group responsibility (e.g., 'My neighbours and I are responsible for the park', α = .92) were presented in a random order. This was followed by the items on the exclusion of outsiders and stewardship behaviour which were also presented in a random order. Exclusion of newcomers was measured as follows: 'Now imagine that the park is recently used more and more by people who do not live in your street. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following?' A sample item was 'Place a sign that reads 'for local residents'' (1 = *0%*, 11 = *100%*; α = .88). Stewardship behaviour was measured by asking about the chance that they will for example 'clean up litter in the park' (α = .89).

4.5.2. Results

Confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the expected four-factor model fitted the data well (CFI = .947, RMSEA = .072, SRMR = .057). Standardized loadings were .75 or higher. Table 4.3 shows mean scores and standard deviations of the variables by experimental condition. Confirming that the manipulation was successful, participants scored higher on the collective psychological ownership items in the ownership condition compared to the control condition ($t(382) = 6.52$, $p < .001$). Moreover, participants in the ownership condition also scored significantly higher on all the variables, compared to participants in the control condition.

Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics, Study 3

			Ownership condition		Control condition		
	Range	*α*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*
Collective psychological ownership (manipulation check)	1–7	.78[a]	5.25	1.16	4.38	1.47	6.52***
Exclusive determination right	1–7	.89	4.25	1.39	3.81	1.41	3.04**
Group responsibility	1–7	.92	5.08	1.12	3.64	1.44	11.02***
Exclusion of outsiders	1–11	.88	3.74	2.48	2.89	2.14	3.55***
Stewardship behaviour	1–11	.89	6.61	2.37	4.66	2.59	7.70***

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores. *α* is Cronbach's alpha. *t* is the t-statistic of difference in mean across the two conditions. Statistics were based on the weighted data. **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

[a] Correlation between two items, instead of Cronbach's alpha.

We specified a mediation model by regressing exclusion of outsiders and stewardship behaviour on exclusive determination right, group responsibility, and the ownership manipulation (1 = ownership condition; 0 = control condition), and by regressing right and responsibility on the ownership manipulation. Figure 4.3 shows that participants in the ownership condition had stronger perceptions of exclusive determination right, which in turn was related to higher intentions to exclude outsiders, in line with H1a and H1b. This led to a significant indirect effect of the ownership condition on exclusion of outsiders via perceived determination right (β = .057, *SE* = .025, *p* = .021). The ownership manipulation also led to stronger perceptions of group responsibility, which in turn was associated with higher intentions to perform stewardship behaviour, in line with H2a and H2b. This led to a significant indirect effect of the ownership manipulation on stewardship behaviour via perceived responsibility (β = .385, *SE* = .049, *p* < .001). These findings were in line with our findings of Study 1 and 2.

One unexpected finding was that exclusion of outsiders was not only increased by stronger perceptions of determination right, but also by stronger perceptions of group responsibility, which led to a significant indirect effect of the ownership manipulation on exclusion of outsiders via responsibility (β = .113, *SE* = .039, *p* = .004). Additionally, unlike the previous studies, we found a significant positive total effect of the ownership manipulation on stewardship behaviour. See all results in Appendix 4.10.



Figure 4.3. Standardized coefficients of the path model of Study 3. Total effects were reported between square brackets. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

4.5.3. Discussion

In Study 3, we experimentally showed that increasing a sense of collective ownership of an imaginary local park causes a higher perception of exclusive determination right, and indirectly, stronger intentions to exclude outsiders. At the same time, increasing ownership of the park also led to higher perceived group responsibility, and indirectly, to stronger intentions to engage in stewardship behaviour.

4.6. General discussion

Our research demonstrates that collective psychological ownership has different faces. By examining both perceived rights and responsibilities and exclusionary and prosocial behavioural implications, we offered a comprehensive picture of the diverse consequences of collective psychological ownership. Additionally, by focusing on territorial ownership, we illustrated the importance of taking the physical environment into account in social psychology research (Meagher, 2020).

We confirmed the intuitive link between collective psychological ownership and the exclusive determination right (Katz, 2008; Merrill, 1998) that was found in relation to the country in Chapter 3 of this dissertation but not yet in relation to other territories. Perceived exclusive determination right, in turn, predicted the behavioural tendency to exclude outsiders. At the same time, we found that collective psychological ownership was

also accompanied by higher group responsibility (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). In organizational psychology, psychological ownership has been linked to personal responsibility (Kamleitner & Rabinovich, 2010; Peck et al., 2020; Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Pierce et al., 2017), but the association between collective psychological ownership and a sense of group responsibility had not been considered before. Group responsibility, in turn, predicted the intention to engage in stewardship behaviour. Those who had a more pronounced sense of 'ours' felt more strongly that their group was responsible for what they collectively owned and were therefore more willing to take care of 'what is ours' by investing in it. To our knowledge, this is a first set of studies to show that a sense of collective ownership of territories is accompanied by both perceived group rights and group responsibilities.

Our expectations were confirmed using both cross-sectional and experimental designs. Examining the causal direction experimentally is important as bidirectionality is likely. Whereas the intention to exclude outsiders and stewardship behaviour can be outcomes of collective psychological ownership, people might also justify their intentions and behaviours with collective ownership beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In Study 3, we found that collective psychological ownership causes higher perceived exclusive determination right and also stronger group responsibility. Peck et al. (2020) have experimentally shown that psychological ownership of a public park leads to increased personal responsibility, and subsequently, stewardship behaviour. To our knowledge, this is the first research to show that collective psychological ownership can lead to both increased group responsibility and exclusive determination right.

Our main finding that collective psychological ownership has different faces was conceptually replicated across three territories at different levels of abstraction, using different methods, and using partly different phrasings in the measures. By repeatedly testing the same theoretical mechanisms in varying ways, we increased confidence in the generalizability of our observations and the theoretical propositions underlying them (Crandall & Sherman, 2016). Therefore, we believe that our conclusions are not limited to the territories examined but can be expected to be found in relation to diverse territories, such as regions or cities, or shared housing or offices. However, the findings also tell us something specific about ownership of the country, the neighbourhood, and a local park specifically. Concerning the country, Study 1 showed that a sense that 'this country is ours' is not only associated with the exclusion of immigrants, but also with more group responsibility and investment in the country. Ownership rhetoric might therefore not only

be used by politicians to argue for anti-immigration measures, but also for the importance of citizens' involvement in taking care of their country.

Concerning neighbourhoods, we showed that ownership relates to group responsibility and indirectly stimulates stewardship behaviour. Many urban policies in various countries focus on encouraging local residents to take responsibility for and to be involved in 'their' neighbourhood as this can achieve safety, liveability, and social cohesion (Dekker, 2007). Our study suggests that a sense of collective ownership can help achieve this goal. Moreover, bivariate correlations showed that neighbourhood ownership did not relate to intentions to exclude outsiders and total effects even showed that ownership was related to less intentions to exclude outsiders when controlling for group identification. This was an unexpected finding. One possible explanation is that in the neighbourhood, a sense of 'we' was strongly related to more exclusion of outgroups and confounded the exclusionary side of ownership. Policy makers and community workers might conclude that we should try to increase collective psychological ownership of the neighbourhood as it stimulates shared responsibility – and in turn stewardship behaviour – and does not increase intentions to exclude outsiders. However, our research did not distinguish between native newcomers moving to the neighbourhood from other regions of the country and international migrants. Toruńczyk-Ruiz and Martinovic (2020) found that neighbourhood ownership related to more openness to newcomers from within the country but to less openness to international migrants. Our research design prevented us from testing this difference. Although we did not explicitly mention the outsiders' backgrounds in our measures related to the neighbourhood, it can be expected that participants thought of newcomers from within The Netherlands. One other unexpected finding specific to neighbourhood ownership was that those who felt that they and their neighbours had the right to determine what happens to their neighbourhoods were less likely to be engaged in stewardship behaviour. It might be that they felt that they properly controlled their neighbourhood, and therefore, did not find it necessary to improve the neighbourhood with any of the stewardship behaviours.

Study 3 examined the role of collective psychological ownership of a local park. Local residents do not always recognize themselves as responsible for areas that are public property (Moskell & Allred, 2013). Facilitating residents to put time and effort into a local area to make it 'their own' can help to foster responsibility and stewardship behaviour, which can strengthen a local community and can improve the neighbourhood. However, our study shows that a sense of ownership of a local setting can also lead to the intention

to exclude outsiders. These results are in line with geography research that in addition to prosocial consequence, points at the exclusionary consequences of shared ownership of community gardens (Spierings et al., 2018; Van Holstein, 2016). Unexpectedly, the intention to exclude outsiders from the local park was not only predicted by higher perceived determination right, but also by higher group responsibility. Residents might assume that people from outside the neighbourhood will not take proper care of the park and therefore feel like taking responsibility by sending them away.

Our study has several limitations that provide directions for future research. We did not measure actual behaviour (Peck et al., 2020) but rather behavioural intentions that do not always translate into actual behaviour (Sheeran, 2002). Another limitation is that there was no weight available in Study 2 (on neighbourhood ownership). Although the sample was diverse and we have no reason to expect that this influenced the structural relations found, we must be cautious with generalizing the descriptive results of Study 2 to the Dutch population. Relatedly, we have no reasons to expect that our findings are limited to the Dutch context, but research in other societies is needed to inspect the generalizability of our findings.

In conclusion, attention to the role of the physical environment has been limited in the social psychology literature (Meagher, 2020). Our research demonstrates that perceived territorial ownership can play an important role in social attitudes and behaviours. We have shown that the feeling that a place is 'ours' has different faces and that these faces can have distinct behavioural implications in different contexts. Collective psychological ownership of territories should not only be regarded as an obstacle to peaceful intergroup relations but can also stimulate people to invest into 'their' place.

Chapter 5.

'Losing what is ours': The intergroup consequences of collective ownership threat[40]

[40] A slightly different version of this chapter is published as Nijs, T., Verkuyten, M., & Martinovic, B. (2021). Losing what is OURS: The intergroup consequences of collective ownership threat. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*. doi:10.1177/1368430220980809. Nijs wrote the chapter and conducted the analyses. All authors jointly developed the design of the study and contributed substantially to the content of the manuscript.

5.1. Introduction

Although ownership is a fundamental aspect of social life structuring social relations between individuals and groups, a sense of ownership is little researched in social psychology (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). People intuitively understand that being an owner implies having the right to determine what happens to entities that are owned and who can use them. A sense of ownership is based on the psychology of possession and is argued to be basic and universal (Rochat, 2014). A psychological association between the owner and the target of ownership makes owners value their possessions 'simply because they are theirs' (Beggan, 1992; Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009, p. 948), and makes children as young as two protest when their possession is interfered with or taken away from them (Rossano et al., 2011).

The possibility of being dispossessed is intrinsic to ownership (Rochat, 2014) and people can fear to be deprived of or lose the right to decide about their target of ownership. They can fear car theft, losing their mobile phone, burglary, their ideas or songs being used without permission, or infringement of their territory, such as their garden, office, neighbourhood or country. This fear, labelled ownership threat, can have important social psychological implications. Existing literature has examined the consequences of losing personal ownership (G. Brown & Robinson, 2011; Weinstein, 1989) but we aim to make a novel contribution to the social psychological literature by focusing on the fear to lose collective ownership. As group members, people can have a sense that a target of ownership is 'theirs' and can fear to lose control over it (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017). More specifically, we examine the intergroup consequences of threats to the collective psychological ownership of a *territory* as one of the most important targets of collective ownership that leads to intergroup conflicts in many parts of the world (Toft, 2014).

We argue that the focus on collective ownership threat can improve our understanding of the psychological processes involved in intergroup threat that drive negative intergroup relations (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). A variety of intergroup threats have been distinguished in the literature (see Riek et al., 2006) and in addition to the much studied symbolic and economic threats, we argue for the theoretical and empirical distinctiveness and importance of collective ownership threat (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Whereas in situations of symbolic and economic threat our identity and our resources are at stake, in situations of collective ownership threat our sense of being in control is at stake. We further argue that collective ownership threat and economic threat might both be considered specific types of realistic threat.

In two studies, we examine the consequences of threat to the collective ownership of territories at different levels of abstraction, i.e., a hangout place and a country. Focusing on both a concrete and a more abstract territory offers a conceptual replication of the psychological processes involved in collective ownership threat. In a first study, among adolescents, we experimentally test whether infringement of a hangout place owned by a group of friends, leads to more perceived collective ownership threat and whether this, in turn, relates to intentions to engage in marking and defending behaviour. We also consider symbolic threat to examine whether the relationship found is specific to collective ownership threat. Next to this concrete everyday life context, in a second experimental study, we examine whether similar processes play a role in threat to country ownership among a demographically diverse sample of participants. We test whether framing Turkish accession to the EU as an infringement of the collective ownership of the country (i.e., The Netherlands) elicits stronger perceptions of collective ownership threat, and thereby generates more opposition towards Turkish accession. In this study, we additionally consider symbolic and economic threats to examine the unique contribution of collective ownership threat.

5.2. Theoretical background

5.2.1. Collective psychological ownership

Legal scholars, philosophers and sociologists have argued that ownership is a central organizing principle in society with profound implications for human behaviour (Ye & Gawronski, 2016). Ownership implies normative and moral rights, privileges, and responsibilities and is codified in laws and legal regulations concerning, for example, theft, trespassing, and copyright. Ownership is accompanied by a 'determination right' (Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). The right to determine and control what one owns is rather intuitive, and developmental research has shown that preschool children already recognize that the person who controls the use of an object, owns it (Neary et al., 2009).

A sense of ownership can be experienced in the absence of legal recognition (G. Brown & Zhu, 2016). People may have the feeling that it is 'their' parking spot in the street, 'their' sandcastle they built on the beach (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Thijs, 2015), or 'their' idea they came up with (Shaw et al., 2012), even if they do not legally own it. This psychological sense of ownership manifests itself not only at the personal level, but also at the group level in the form of collective psychological ownership – a sense that an object, idea, or place belongs to 'us' (Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017). Ownership is a

powerful justification for what 'we' can rightfully do with what is 'ours', including the right to exclude others.

Ownership can be challenged, disputed, or threatened, which can lead to ownership disputes and conflicts. Ownership threat refers to the question of '*what do we control?*' and is expected to have profound attitudinal and behavioural consequences. Perceptions of ownership threat can arise following an act of infringement of what is owned. Such an infringement can threaten the owner's sense of possession, self-efficacy, and control (G. Brown et al., 2005). Infringement leads to a loss of control that instigates behavioural responses to retain or regain ownership. For example, burglary or car theft triggers investments in locks or bars on windows, alarms, and surveillance to protect the target of ownership (Weinstein, 1989). Further, individual psychological ownership of 'my' working space is related to marking and defending behaviour (G. Brown et al., 2005; G. Brown & Zhu, 2016), especially when there are threats and concerns of infringement (G. Brown, Crossley, & Robinson, 2014; G. Brown & Robinson, 2011).

Threats to collective psychological ownership are also expected to trigger marking and defending behaviours to communicate and (re)claim ownership (G. Brown & Robinson, 2011; Pierce & Jussila, 2010; Pierce et al., 2017). Group members can defend their shared ownership by anticipating on infringement, in the form of, for example, placing a fence around a community garden (Schmelzkopf, 1995) or defend their ownership in a reactionary way, by asking others not to use the target of ownership or by physically expelling them. They can also mark their ownership physically by, for example, placing graffiti in the neighbourhood (Ley & Cybriwsky, 1974), or socially by telling others that the target of ownership is 'theirs'.

5.2.2. Collective ownership threat and other intergroup threats

There is a large literature on the nature and importance of realistic, symbolic, and other forms of intergroup threats, which are distinguished, for example, in integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Symbolic intergroup threat relates to the question 'who are we?' and involves the perception and feeling that our self-defining norms, values, beliefs and traditions are challenged, changed, or lost (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2002). Symbolic threat can be experienced when encountering other groups with conflicting values and beliefs or when other groups undermine the distinctiveness, value, and continuity of the ingroup identity (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Riek et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner,

1979). Collective ownership threat can arise when others challenge or dispute the right to control what is 'ours', without self-defining norms and values having to be at stake.

Realistic intergroup threat has been conceptualized in different ways in the literature, and we can distinguish between a broad and a more narrow understanding. The broad understanding includes threats related to scarce material resources, political power, and the very existence and physical safety of one's group (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Stephan et al., 2002). This conceptualization implies that collective ownership threat can be considered as a form of realistic threat. However, in this conceptualization quite different phenomena that tap into different psychological processes are grouped together (Rios et al., 2018). Competition over scarce resources, competition over power, and the perception that outgroups are violent and dangerous (the latter being labelled safety threat, see Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007), are likely to trigger quite different concerns and coping strategies. Instead, a more narrow and common understanding of realistic threat emphasizes competition over scarce material and economic resources such as housing, jobs, and welfare (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Riek et al., 2006; Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004), and is also referred to as economic threat (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). In this paper, we specifically distinguish ownership threat from economic threat. The central issue that is at stake in this economic understanding of realistic threat relates to the question 'what do we need to live our lives in a comfortable way?' (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). This is different from collective ownership threat in which perceived infringements and the sense of one's exclusive determination right are at stake. People can fear to lose control over what is theirs, even if they are not concerned with economic competition over scarce resources. Jetten et al. (2017) found that in times of economic prosperity, people are less inclined to reason against immigration in terms of economic competition and more in terms of the unfairness of having to share what is 'ours', which suggest that a distinction between different psychological processes can be made.

5.2.3. Threat to local ownership

A local context in which collective ownership threat may have clear social psychological consequences is a hangout place. Such a place can be perceived to be owned by a group of friends and can play an important role in the social lives of young people. Especially for teenagers, hangout places can foster a sense of autonomy, identity and feeling of belonging (Matthews, Taylor, Percy-Smith, & Limb, 2000). Therefore, we experimentally tested

whether infringement of one's collective hangout place leads to more perceived collective ownership threat, which in turn relates to stronger intentions to engage in marking and defending behaviour. By examining this indirect effect, we can test if the behavioural consequences are due to the theorized collective ownership threat perceptions.

Next to collective ownership threat, people can also experience symbolic threat in relation to a hangout place. However, marking and defending behaviours are expected to be specifically triggered by a fear of losing control over what is ours and not by symbolic threat. One way in which people might feel that the value of an important group membership (e.g., friends) is threatened, is when others are dismissive about group-defining features (in this case, the hangout place). Such a symbolic threat to the value of social identity might not trigger intentions to engage in ownership marking and defending behaviour, but can be expected to affect individual perceptions of collective self-esteem negatively (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). As people strive for a positive sense of self (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), a threat to the value of the ingroup identity is likely to trigger negative feelings about belonging to the ingroup, rather than proactive behavioural responses that communicate and (re)claim ownership. To test this, we also examined whether outgroup derogation leads to higher perceived symbolic threat (and not collective ownership threat), which in turn relates to decreased collective self-esteem.

5.2.4. Threat to country ownership

People can have a sense of collective ownership of a country, despite the abstract nature of 'the country' as an entity (Brylka et al., 2015; Selvanathan et al., 2020; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, a vast majority of Dutch and British natives were found to have at least some sense of collective ownership of their country (as shown in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation). A threat to country ownership can result in marking and defending behaviour by using ownership rhetoric, exhibiting country flags, implementing stricter border controls, or building a wall. Right-wing populist politicians appeal to collective ownership threat to mobilize opposition to immigration and the European Union (EU): 'We are losing our country and have to reconquer it' (Wilders, 2017b); 'Our country is being stolen from us and we have never been asked for our permission' (Robert Kilroy-Silk, 2005, as cited in Mudde, 2007, p. 66).

In the context of the European Union (EU) the possible enlargement of the EU with the Turkish accession is one important issue that might elicit feelings of collective

ownership threat. Negotiations about Turkish accession started in 2005 and led to much debate and media coverage. The thought of accession might induce collective ownership threat among European citizens because they fear that they cannot exclusively decide about Turkey's membership and will lose their determination right when it comes to Turkish migration to their own country. In terms of population, Turkey would become the largest member state of the EU and their related influence on European policies may incite a fear of Turkey taking over the EU and thereby taking over European citizens' country. As a result, people might oppose Turkish accession, which can be regarded as an anticipatory defence response (G. Brown et al., 2005). We experimentally tested whether framing Turkish accession as an infringement of the collective ownership of one's country leads to more perceived collective ownership threat, which in turn relates to higher opposition towards Turkish accession to the EU.

However, this opposition need not only be based on collective ownership threat. Turkish accession is also likely to be a source of symbolic and economic threats. A content analysis of newspapers in six countries found that negative articles about Turkish EU membership were framed in terms of cultural and religious differences (a 'clash of civilizations') and also in terms of negative economic consequences (Koenig, Mihelj, Downey, & Gencel Bek, 2006). Turkey would be the first Muslim majority European member state which might be regarded as a symbolic threat to the value, distinctiveness, and continuity of the historically Christian and increasingly secular (West) European nation states. Furthermore, the opposition to Turkey's accession can be triggered by economic concerns as Turkey has a relatively weak economy and relatively high unemployment rates.

Experimental research that presented Turkish accession to the EU in a symbolic or economic threat frame found that both frames had negative effects on attitudes toward Turkish accession (De Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011) and Turkish immigrants (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, Phalet, & Kuppens, 2009). Therefore, we also framed Turkish accession as conflicting with European identity and as a burden to economic and material resources and examined whether these frames elicit more perceived symbolic and economic threat respectively, and in turn generate more opposition towards Turkish accession. More importantly, we predict that the effect of the ownership infringing frame on opposition towards Turkish accession is specifically due to increased perceptions of ownership threat, and not to increased perceptions of symbolic and economic threat. We further predict that the effects of the symbolic and economic threat framing are due to

increased perceptions of symbolic and economic threat respectively, and not to increased perceptions of collective ownership threat.

To sum up, in two studies we test our central hypothesis that situations in which a collectively owned territory is infringed, trigger perceived collective ownership threat, which in turn relates to intentions to mark and defend the territory.

5.3. Study 1

In Study 1, we experimentally tested whether infringement of an imaginary hangout place owned by one's group of friends leads to more perceived collective ownership threat (and not symbolic threat), and whether this in turn relates to more intentions to engage in marking and defending behaviour. We additionally tested whether a situation threatening to the value of the ingroup identity leads to more perceived symbolic threat (and not collective ownership threat), which in turn relates to decreased collective self-esteem.

5.3.1. Data and methods

5.3.1.1. Sample and procedure

The data were collected among Dutch adolescents aged 16 to 19 ($M = 16.54$, $SD = 0.69$) from a Gymnasium (the highest level of secondary education in The Netherlands). Based on a priori power calculations, assuming a medium-sized effect ($F = .25$) and aiming for a power of .80 and an alpha of .05, the required sample size was 147.[41] As we were uncertain about the expected effect size due to the lack of similar existing experiments on this topic, we decided to recruit at least 200 participants. Ultimately, we reached a total of 227 participants. The study was pre-registered on the Open Science Framework.[42] Of the sample, 46% was female, 0.4% (1 person) were in 4th grade of secondary school, 55% in 5th grade, and 45% in 6th grade, which is the last year of secondary school at the Gymnasium level. Eight people (4%) were not born in The Netherlands.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: collective ownership threat, symbolic threat, and no threat (control) condition. Intergroup threats have been previously invoked by manipulating different features and we

[41] These calculations are based on the global effects of a MANOVA with three groups and six response variables.

[42] Some elements of the final analyses were not explicitly mentioned in the pre-registered research plan. See Appendix 5.1 for an explanation and a justification.

manipulated the behaviour of a relevant outgroup since this enables a clear distinction between forms of threat (Rios et al., 2018; see the manipulation in Appendix 5.2).[43] Each condition consisted of a short text about an imaginary hangout place. Participants were asked to read the text carefully and try to imagine the situation, and they were told that, afterwards, they would be asked questions about this text. More specifically, they read about a place where they and their group of friends always go to after school and in the weekends. They were told that it was a separate place in a park in their neighbourhood that had not been used before: a place that really felt like it is their own and where they had put an old picknick table (a picture of a picknick table in a park was shown next to the text). The collective ownership threat condition had an additional paragraph in which the participants were informed that another group of youngsters had been sitting at the table in the last few weeks and that they acted like it was 'their' place and wanted to take it over. In contrast, the symbolic threat condition had a paragraph in which participants were informed that other youngsters were dismissive and negative about their ingroup as they found the hangout place childish.

5.3.1.2. Measures

After the manipulation, participants answered two direct questions on perceived threat. Perceived collective ownership threat was measured with 'I would be afraid that others want to take our place away from us' (M = 2.81, SD = 0.97). Perceived symbolic threat was measured with 'I would be afraid that others try to make fun of us' (M = 1.91, SD = 0.96). The use of rather simple and straightforward single questions reduces the problem of meaning and interpretation inherent in more complex measures and has been shown to have adequate validity and reliability in measuring perceived discrimination (Noh, Beiser, Kaspar, Hou, & Rummens, 1999; Stronge et al., 2016). The answer scales ranged from (1) certainly not to (5) certainly, with higher scores indicating more perceived threat. Perceived symbolic threat was skewed towards the right (skewness = 1.01). The threat perceptions were positively but weakly associated (r = .17, p = .010).

[43] We called the conditions 'collective ownership threat condition' and 'symbolic threat condition' after the specific threats we aimed to manipulate, not after the acts of infringement and derogation described in the manipulations.

Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics, Study 1

	Valid n	*Range*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Standardized loading*
Physical marking	227	1–5	2.42	0.87	.69[a]
Place a sign so it is clear that it is your hangout place.	227	1–5	1.89	0.96	.59***
Write your names on the table.	227	1–5	3.04	1.18	.69***
Place a name or 'tag' of your group of friends on the table with paint or graffiti.	227	1–5	2.32	1.17	.64***
Leave some things lying around to show that it is your hangout place.	227	1–5	2.10	1.06	.41***
Social marking	227	1–5	3.46	0.80	.65[a]
Make very clear to others that it is your place and table	227	1–5	3.04	1.02	.81***
Let others know that you put the table there yourself	226	1–5	3.55	1.09	.65***
Always speak of 'OUR hangout'	227	1–5	3.78	1.00	.47***
Give the place its own name and always call it that way	227	1–5	3.76	0.96	.27**
Anticipatory defence	227	1–5	2.91	0.97	.69***[b]
Always go to the place as quickly as possible to prevent others from sitting there	227	1–5	3.10	1.04	.85***
Make sure there is one of you so that others cannot sit there	227	1–5	2.73	1.06	.80***
Place a sign with 'no entry'	227	1–5	1.65	0.90	.24**
Reactionary defence	226	1–5	2.69	0.94	.77[a]
Try to make people who are sitting at your hangout place go away, by obviously looking at them	221	1–5	2.85	1.15	.59***
Ask people to leave when they are sitting at your hangout place	225	1–5	2.92	1.13	.87***
Make clear to people that they are allowed to sit there, but that it is your hangout place	226	1–5	2.98	1.08	.38***
Send people who are sitting at your hangout place away	226	1–5	2.32	1.12	.72***
Collective self–esteem	221	1–5	3.52	1.03	.91[a]
I would like it to be my group of friends	221	1–5	3.70	1.12	.87***
It would give me a good feeling that it is my group of friends	219	1–5	3.62	1.14	.97***
It would make me proud that it is my group of friends	219	1–5	3.24	1.12	.78***
Perceived collective ownership threat	227	1–5	2.81	0.97	
Perceived symbolic threat	227	1–5	1.91	0.96	

Note: Bold items were used to construct mean scores. **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. [a] Cronbach's Alpha of bold items; [b] correlation between bold items.

Participants were then asked how likely it would be that they and their friends would engage in a set of actions (G. Brown et al., 2005). These included physical marking (four items, e.g., 'Place a sign so it is clear that it is your hangout place'), social marking (four items, e.g., 'Always speak of 'OUR hangout''), anticipatory defence (three items, e.g., 'Always go to the place as quickly as possible to prevent others from sitting there'), and reactionary defence (four items, e.g., 'Ask people to leave when they are sitting at your hangout place'). All items and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.1. Items were answered on 5-point scales (1 = *certainly not*, 5 = *certainly*), with higher scores indicating more intentions to engage in these behaviours.

Our collective self-esteem measure was based on the existing private collective self-esteem scale of Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), measuring private judgements of one's social groups. Participants were asked 'Imagine that this is really your group of friends. Would you agree or disagree with the following statements?' There were three items (e.g., 'It would give me a good feeling that it is my group of friends' (see Table 5.1). The answer scale ranged from (1) totally disagree to (5) totally agree, with higher scores indicating higher collective self-esteem.

As some items loaded poorly on their respective factor, we used only some items (boldfaced in Table 5.1), thereby reaching Cronbach's alphas of .65 or higher. A measurement model with all bold items loading on five latent variables had a satisfactory fit, $\chi^2(67) = 107.094$, $p = .001$, CFI = .968, RMSEA = .051, SRMR = .051, which was significantly better than a model in which all items were included, $\Delta\chi^2(58) = 217.181$, $p < .001$. We used mean scores rather than latent factors to reduce complexity.

5.3.2. Results

We estimated indirect effects with the collective ownership threat condition (= 1, vs control condition = 0) and symbolic threat condition (= 1, vs control condition = 0) as independent variables, perceived collective ownership threat and symbolic threat as two parallel mediators, and physical marking, social marking, anticipatory defence, reactionary defence, and collective self-esteem as dependent variables. We tested this model using structural equation modelling in Mplus software (version 8.3; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). We used full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which allows missing values in endogenous variables, assuming missingness at random.

Table 5.2. Standardized regression coefficients for the full model, Study 1

	Perceived collective ownership threat	Perceived symbolic threat	Physical marking	Social marking	Anticipatory defence	Reactionary defence	Collective self-esteem
Direct effects							
COT condition (vs control)	.267 (.072)***	–.023 (.077)	–.031 (.078)	.132 (.075)	.047 (.075)	.103 (.078)	–.005 (.079)
ST condition (vs control)	–.015 (.074)	.106 (.076)	–.081 (.076)	–.006 (.073)	–.113 (.073)	.012 (.076)	.031 (.076)
Perceived COT			.175 (.068)*	.252 (.065)***	.212 (.065)**	.096 (.069)	.127 (.069)
Perceived ST			–.043 (.067)	–.010 (.065)	.135 (.064)*	–.050 (.067)	–.223 (.065)**
Indirect effects							
COT condition → perceived COT			.047 (.022)*	.067 (.025)**	.057 (.024)*	.026 (.020)	.034 (.021)
COT condition → perceived ST			.001 (.004)	.000 (.002)	–.003 (.010)	.001 (.004)	.005 (.017)
ST condition → perceived COT			–.003 (.013)	–.004 (.019)	–.003 (.016)	–.001 (.007)	–.002 (.009)
ST condition → perceived ST			–.005 (.008)	–.001 (.007)	.014 (.012)	–.005 (.008)	–.024 (.018)
Total effects							
COT condition (vs control)			.016 (.077)	.200 (.074)**	.100 (.076)	.130 (.076)	.034 (.078)
ST condition (vs control)			–.088 (.076)	–.011 (.075)	–.102 (.076)	.005 (.076)	.005 (.078)
R^2	.076	.014	.037	.100	.101	.025	.054
N	227						

Note: COT = collective ownership threat; ST = symbolic threat. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

As shown in Table 5.2, the collective ownership threat condition led to more perceived collective ownership threat compared to the control condition (β = .267, *SE* = .072, *p* < .001).[44] Perceived collective ownership threat, in turn, was related to stronger intentions for physical marking (β = .175, *SE* = .068, *p* = .010), social marking (β = .252, *SE* = .065, *p* < .001), and anticipatory defence (β = .212, *SE* = .065, *p* = .001), but not to significantly more reactionary defence intentions (β = .96, *SE* = .069, *p* = .165). We obtained significant indirect effects of the collective ownership threat manipulation via perceived collective ownership threat on physical marking (β = .047, *SE* = .02, *p* = .037, 95% CI [.001, .092][45]), social marking (β = .067, *SE* = .025, *p* = .008, 95% CI [.014, .121]), and anticipatory defence (β = .057, *SE* = .024, *p* = .016, 95% CI [.009, .104]). Contrary to our expectation, there was no significant indirect effect on reactionary defence. It is important to further note that there were no indirect effects of the collective ownership threat manipulation via perceived symbolic threat. Finally, we found no significant total or direct effects of the collective ownership threat manipulation on any of the dependent variables except for the total effect on social marking (β = .200, *SE* = .074, *p* = .007).

We were unable to trigger perceived symbolic threat with the symbolic threat manipulation (β = .106, *SE* = .076, *p* = .164) (note that perceived collective ownership threat was not triggered by this manipulation either, β = –.023, *SE* = .077, *p* = .765). However, as expected, perceived symbolic threat was negatively related to collective self-esteem (β = –.223, *SE* = .065, *p* = .001), while perceived collective ownership threat was not.[46] Moreover, perceived symbolic threat was unrelated to the behavioural intentions except to more anticipatory defence (β = .135, *SE* = .064, *p* = .035). We found no significant indirect or total effects of the symbolic threat manipulation on any of the dependent variables.

[44] Using a Wald test, we also found that the effect of the collective ownership threat manipulation (compared to the control manipulation) on perceived collective ownership threat was significantly stronger than the effect of the symbolic threat manipulation (compared to the control manipulation) on perceived collective ownership threat, *Wald* = 14.67(1), *p* < .001.

[45] We calculated all confidence intervals in both studies using bootstrapping with 1000 iterations.

[46] We also included a measure of ingroup identification. Perceived collective ownership threat was positively related to ingroup identification, while perceived symbolic threat was not. See Appendix 5.3 for the full results.

5.3.3. Discussion

The results of Study 1 indicate that collective ownership threat can have consequences for behavioural intentions. A situation in which a collectively owned territory is infringed is indirectly related to marking and anticipatory defending behavioural intentions via higher perceived collective ownership threat and not via perceived symbolic threat. However, we found no indirect effect of the collective ownership threatening situation on reactionary defence behaviour. People might perceive reactionary defences as a last resort that one only engages in when marking and anticipatory defence behaviour do not have the desired effect. Trying to make others go away can be regarded as a rather confrontational strategy that is only necessary when ownership is lost and should be reclaimed, which remained ambiguous in the current manipulation. Participants might have kept the possibility open that the infringers were not aware that they were violating a proprietary claim, which decreases the chances of involving in reactionary defence behaviour (G. Brown et al., 2005). Moreover, where adolescents might have been able to imagine responding to the collective ownership threat by physical and social marking and anticipatory defence, they might have found it harder to imagine responding in a rather confrontational manner by trying to make others go away.

Further, we were unable to trigger perceived symbolic threat. Adolescents were generally not very afraid to be made fun of in any of the conditions, or at least, did not report this fear. However, when they did experience symbolic threat, they felt less collective self-esteem and, unexpectedly, they were also more likely to engage in anticipatory defence behaviour. A possible explanation for the latter result is that adolescents were inclined to respond to a threat to the value of their ingroup and simultaneously wanted to prevent further dismissal. Anticipatory defence behaviour (e.g., making sure that there is always one of 'us' at the place), can be used as an identity management strategy in which group members 'display subtle collective responses as a means of reinforcing or displaying their commitment to the group' (Branscombe et al., 1999, p. 48). Reactionary defences (e.g., making others go away), social marking (e.g., communicating their hangout place to others), or physical marking (e.g., putting up a sign), might be perceived too outspoken and susceptible to further outgroup dismissal, since these responses might be regarded as rather 'childish'.

5.4. Study 2

In Study 2 we aimed to conceptually replicate our findings in relation to a country (The Netherlands) as a more abstract target of ownership and by using Turkish accession to the EU as the source of threat. We focused on explaining opposition towards Turkish accession as a form of anticipatory defence and compared collective ownership threat to both symbolic and economic threat. This offers a stricter test of whether collective ownership threat can add to the existing intergroup threat literature, since the importance of symbolic and economic threat in the context of EU enlargement has been established in previous research (De Vreese et al., 2011; Meeus et al., 2009).

5.4.1. Data and methods

5.4.1.1. Sample and procedure

The data were collected among adult native Dutch participants from a panel maintained by research agency Kantar. The sample of invited participants was diverse in terms of age, gender, education level, and region. The participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.[47] We removed eleven participants with at least one parent not born in The Netherlands, thereby retaining 404 participants.

Participants were presented with one of four fictive newspaper articles, based on the manipulation of Meeus et al. (2009) and De Vreese et al. (2011). As in Study 1, we manipulated the behaviour and characteristics of the source of threat as this enables a clear distinction between forms of threat (Rios et al., 2018). In three of the four articles, Turkish accession was framed either as an infringement of the collective ownership of the country (collective ownership threat condition), as a burden to economic resources (economic threat condition), or as conflicting with European culture and identity (symbolic threat condition). In the three articles, the heading ('the consequences of Turkish accession to the EU'), introduction, and layout were identical. In the control condition, the general EU procedure of accession to the EU, not specifically related to Turkey, was discussed in a neutral way. The articles were presented in a realistic layout and introduced as if they had been published in a Dutch newspaper. See Appendix 5.4 for the manipulations.

As a reading check, participants were asked in which domain the most important challenges of possible Turkish accession to the EU lie, according to the text. The three

[47] The questionnaire included four other versions that did not contain the experiment.

possible answer categories were economic domain, cultural domain, and domain of control. Those who did not answer this question correctly were expected not to have read or understood the article well enough. Seventeen percent of the participants in the collective ownership threat condition, 20% of the participants in the economic threat condition, and 32% of the participants in the symbolic threat condition did not answer the question correctly. Twenty-one percent of those who read the symbolic threat condition thought the article mainly dealt with the domain of control.[48] After removing incorrect answers, we retained 338 participants. Of the sample, 50% was female, 15% was low educated, 44% was middle educated, and 41% was high educated. The average age of this adult sample was 51.51 (SD = 16.67) and the sample was significantly more left-wing oriented than the neutral midpoint 'centre' (3), M = 2.81, $t(295) = -2.71$, $p = .007$. The experiment was part of a larger survey and sensitivity analyses suggest that with this sample we were able to obtain an effect size of .41 when comparing the mean of opposition towards Turkish accession between the collective ownership threat and control conditions.[49]

5.4.1.2. Measures

After the reading check, participants responded to items measuring perceived ownership, symbolic, and economic threat (7-point scale; 'not at all' (1) to 'very much' (7)). They were asked to what extent a range of issues is being threatened or under pressure because of Turkish accession to the EU (see Table 5.3 for all items). Subsequently they were asked about opposition towards Turkish accession to the EU, which was measured with four items (7-point scales). As the fourth item loaded relatively poorly on the factor, we used the three bold items in Table 5.3 which had a Cronbach's alpha of .92.

[48] We compared the level of education of those who did and those who did not answer the reading check correctly. Higher educated people might have less difficulties understanding the manipulation but might not necessarily read the manipulations more attentively. Therefore, if those who did answer the reading check correctly were higher educated than those who did not, the manipulation might have been difficult to understand. We found no significant differences in the collective ownership threat, $t(94) = -0.16$, $p = .870$, and realistic threat $t(98) = -1.59$, $p = .116$) condition, suggesting that failing these checks was due to a lack of attentive reading. However, those who answered the manipulation check in the symbolic threat condition correctly, were significantly higher educated, $t(92) = -2.04$, $p = .044$, suggesting that this manipulation was more difficult to understand.

[49] We used the standard power of .80 and alpha of .05. As the experiment was part of a larger data collection, we did not perform a priori power calculations.

Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics, Study 2

	Valid n	*Range*	*Mean*	*SD*	*Standardized loading*
Opposition towards Turkish accession to the EU	338	1–7	5.65	1.25	.92[a]
The Dutch government should support the possible accession of Turkey to the EU (reverse coded)	338	1–7	5.69	1.31	.94***
The Dutch government should try to prevent possible accession of Turkey to the EU	338	1–7	5.42	1.49	.88***
The Netherlands should put effort into facilitating accession of Turkey to the EU (reverse coded)	338	1–7	5.84	1.25	.85***
The Netherlands should leave the EU when Turkey becomes a member	338	1–7	3.39	1.90	.44***
Perceived collective ownership threat	338	1–7	4.54	1.67	.79***[b]
Dutch people being 'boss in their own house'	338	1–7	4.49	1.75	.85***
Control of Dutch people over their own country	338	1–7	4.59	1.78	.93***
Perceived symbolic threat	338	1–7	4.55	1.76	.85***[b]
The Dutch culture	338	1–7	4.62	1.83	.89***
The Dutch identity	338	1–7	4.48	1.84	.96***
Perceived economic threat	338	1–7	4.47	1.52	.71***[b]
Work and income in The Netherlands	338	1–7	4.42	1.66	.85***
The financial situation of The Netherlands	338	1–7	4.52	1.64	.83***

Note: Bold items were used to construct mean scores. ***$p < .001$. [a] Cronbach's Alpha of bold items; [b] correlation between items.

A four-factor model with the items loading on their respective factors fitted the data well, $\chi^2(21) = 35.263$, $p = .026$, CFI = .995, RMSEA = .045, SRMR = .025, and significantly better than a model in which the threats were combined in one factor, $\Delta\chi^2(5) = 76.270$, $p < .001$. We used mean scores rather than latent factors to reduce complexity. Although the confirmatory factor analysis indicated a clear three-factor structure, collective ownership threat correlated strongly with economic ($r = .71$) and symbolic threat ($r = .87$), and the correlation between economic threat and symbolic threat was also high ($r = .72$).

5.4.2. Results

We tested indirect effects with the collective ownership threat condition (= 1, vs control condition = 0), symbolic threat condition (= 1, vs control condition = 0), and economic threat condition (= 1, vs control condition = 0) as independent variables; opposition towards Turkish accession as dependent variables, and perceived ownership, economic, and symbolic threats as mediators. However, the high correlations between the three types of threats led to multicollinearity issues, making the results unreliable (see Appendix 5.5). Therefore, we ran three separate models with only one of the perceived threats included as a mediator.

Table 5.4. Standardized regression coefficients for three separate models with one of the perceived threats included at a time, Study 2

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Perceived collective ownership threat	Opposition towards Turkish accession	Perceived economic threat	Opposition towards Turkish accession	Perceived symbolic threat	Opposition towards Turkish accession
Direct effects						
COT condition (vs control)	.137 (.061)*	.107 (.055)	.087 (.060)	.131 (.056)*	.064 (.062)	.139 (.055)*
ET condition (vs control)	–.019 (.061)	.037 (.055)	.143 (.060)*	–.029 (.056)	–.049 (.062)	.050 (.055)
ST condition (vs control)	–.074 (.060)	–.019 (.054)	–.107 (.060)	–.008 (.055)	–.019 (.061)	–.043 (.054)
Perceived COT		.430 (.045)***				
Perceived ET				.402 (.046)***		
Perceived ST						.425 (.044)***
Indirect effects						
COT condition → perceived COT		.059 (.027)*				
COT condition → perceived ET				.035 (.025)		
COT condition → perceived ST						.027 (.026)
ET condition → perceived COT		–.008 (.026)				
ET condition → perceived ET				.058 (.025)*		
ET condition → perceived ST						–.021 (.026)
ST condition → perceived COT		–.032 (.026)				
ST condition → perceived ET				–.043 (.025)		
ST condition → perceived ST						–.008 (.026)
Total effects						
COT condition (vs control)		.166 (.060)**		.166 (.060)**		.166 (.060)**
ET condition (vs control)		.029 (.061)		.029 (.061)		.029 (.061)
ST condition (vs control)		–.051 (.060)		–.051 (.060)		–.051 (.060)
R^2	.031	.213	.045	.188	.009	.213
N	338		338		338	

Note: COT = collective ownership threat; ET = economic threat; ST = symbolic threat. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

As shown in Table 5.4, the collective ownership threat manipulation led to more perceived collective ownership threat, (β = .137, *SE* = .061, *p* = .023), which in turn, was related to more opposition towards Turkish accession (β = .430, *SE* = .045, *p* < .001). A significant indirect effect indicates that the collective ownership threat manipulation indirectly led to more opposition towards Turkish accession via higher perceived collective ownership threat (β = .059, *SE* = .027, *p* = .027, 95% CI [.005, .113]) but not via perceived economic (β = .035, *SE* = .025, *p* = .154, 95% CI [–.016, .087]) or symbolic threat (β = .027, *SE* = .026, *p* = .299, 95% CI [–.025, .080]). Similarly, the economic threat manipulation indirectly led to more opposition towards Turkish accession via higher perceived economic threat (β = .058, *SE* = .025, *p* = .023, 95% CI [.004, .111]) but not via perceived ownership (β = –.008, *SE* = .026, *p* = .756, 95% CI [–.064, .048]) or symbolic threat (β = –.021, *SE* = .026, *p* = .430, 95% CI [–.076, .035]). Although perceived symbolic threat was related to more opposition towards Turkish accession (β = .425, *SE* = .044, *p* < .001), we were unable to trigger perceived symbolic threat (or perceived ownership or economic threat) with the symbolic threat manipulation, leading to no indirect effects of the symbolic threat manipulation via perceived symbolic threat on opposition towards Turkish accession (β = –.008, *SE* = .026, *p* = .760). Finally, the collective ownership threat manipulation, but not the economic or symbolic threat manipulation, had a positive and significant total effect on opposition towards Turkish accession (β = .166, *SE* = .060, *p* = .006). The effect of the collective ownership threat condition (compared to the control condition) on opposition towards Turkish accession had an effect size of .42.

5.4.3. Discussion

The results of Study 2 indicate that a situation in which the collective ownership of a country is infringed, is indirectly related to more opposition towards the infringer (Turkey) via higher perceived collective ownership threat, and not via perceived economic or symbolic threat, which is consistent with the results of Study 1. Similar indirect effects were found for the economic threat manipulation via perceptions of economic threat (and not via perceived ownership or symbolic threat). We were unable to trigger perceived symbolic threat, but perceived symbolic threat was related to more opposition towards Turkish accession. This pattern of findings indicates that collective ownership threat represents a separate avenue toward stronger opposition of Turkey's accession to the EU.

5.5. General discussion

Based on the idea that people tend to have a basic and common notion of possession with an accompanying fear of being dispossessed (Rochat, 2014), this research examined the perceived threat of losing what is psychologically seen as 'ours'. In two experimental studies we found that infringement of a place that is perceived to be owned by a meaningful group leads to more perceived collective ownership threat, which relates to stronger intentions to engage in territorial marking and in anticipatory defence behaviour. To our knowledge, our research is the first to examine the consequences of a fear to lose what is collectively owned and to establish the relevance of collective ownership threat for intergroup relations.

We offered a conceptual replication of the consequences of collective ownership threat in two contexts with different levels of abstraction. Specifically, we found that (1) infringement of an imaginary hangout place, owned by a group of friends, led to more perceived collective ownership threat among adolescents, which in turn related to stronger intentions to engage in marking and defending behaviour, and that (2) framing Turkish accession as an infringement of the collective ownership of one's country led to perceived collective ownership threat, which in turn related to opposition towards Turkish accession to the EU. These findings show that collective ownership threat can help to explain intergroup behaviour in a local setting, but also discontent and scepticism about hotly debated societal topics, such as European enlargement. This suggests that right-wing populist politicians, who regularly use ownership rhetoric (PVV, 2012; see also Vlaams Belang's website: https://www.vlaamsbelang.org), might have identified a fruitful avenue for enlarging their electorate.

The findings also suggest that collective ownership threat is an important construct to consider in other settings and contexts. Questions of collective ownership and the related threats can be expected to be salient and consequential in institutions, (voluntary) organizations, working groups, neighbourhoods, and cities. In examining such contexts, it might be useful to also examine various collective emotions that might be involved in collective ownership threat, such as indignation, insecurity, and anger. For example, people tend to get upset and angry when their individually owned property is damaged, violated or used without permission (Pesowski & Friedman, 2015).

Collective ownership threat is of course not the only relevant threat in intergroup relations, and in both studies, we considered other types of intergroup threat, namely symbolic threat (Study 1 and 2) and economic threat (Study 2). We showed that economic threat plays a similarly important, though distinct, role in predicting opposition to Turkey's

accession to the EU compared to collective ownership threat, and that the two types of threat get triggered by different scenarios. Although both collective ownership threat and economic threat might fall under the same umbrella when following the broad conceptualization of realistic threat, our findings suggest that different types of threat are at stake. This suggests that the realistic threat literature might benefit from more differentiation between subdimensions that are often lumped together (Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Stephan et al., 2002).

We also showed that collective ownership threat and symbolic threat involve different processes. In both studies, a manipulation of infringement only triggered collective ownership threat and not symbolic threat. Furthermore, unlike collective ownership threat, symbolic threat was unrelated to marking behaviour, and in contrast, only perceived symbolic threat, but not perceived collective ownership threat, was related to less collective self-esteem (Study 1). However, just as collective ownership threat, symbolic threat was related to anticipatory defence intentions, both in terms of defending the hangout place (Study 1) and opposing Turkish accession to the EU (Study 2).

It should be noted that we were unable to trigger perceived symbolic threat in both studies, even though the respective manipulations focused on different aspects of symbolic threat. The imaginary situation that was designed to trigger symbolic threat in Study 1 in which other youngsters derogated the participants' group of friends might have required rather much imagination. Moreover, by manipulating the dismissal of the ingroup we tried to trigger a threat to the value of social identity, which is a specific variant of symbolic threat (Branscombe et al., 1999). A manipulation with conflicting values and beliefs between the ingroup and a particular outgroup (e.g., skinheads) might have led to more strong effects because this more directly challenges the continuity of the ingroup identity.

The newspaper article that was designed to trigger symbolic threat in Study 2 might have been ineffective because the article did not introduce much new information for the participants. As Turkish accession is frequently framed as a cultural threat in news media (De Vreese et al., 2011), the mention of cultural concerns might have been too familiar to affect attitudes. Stronger statements about Dutch identity being undermined by Muslim beliefs and practices might have resulted in a more pronounced effect. For example, Meeus et al. (2009) used strong (and probably new) information about widespread torture in Turkish prisons to successfully trigger symbolic threat. Moreover, the manipulation of symbolic threat might have been rather difficult to understand because the results of the

reading checks suggest that a substantial portion of the participants was unable to correctly identify the intended manipulation, especially the lower educated participants.

Regarding the correlations between the types of perceived threat, we found that in relation to a hangout place (Study 1), perceived collective ownership threat and perceived symbolic threat were weakly associated, but in relation to the country (Study 2), these two threat perceptions seemed to be closely intertwined in people's minds, and also with perceived economic threat. In Western European public debates, ownership, economic, and symbolic threats are often used interchangeably to argue for anti-immigrant and anti-EU attitudes (PVV, 2012). Other studies also have found that economic and symbolic threats strongly correlate (.7–.8; Aberson & Gaffney, 2009; Croucher, 2013; Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, Krome, Ludlow, & Ryan, 2005; Stephan et al., 2002) and still other studies have found that these threats cannot always be empirically distinguished (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Meeus et al., 2009). The high correlations prevented us from simultaneously including the three perceived threats in our model, and from ruling out the possibility that the relationship between perceived collective ownership threat and attitudes towards Turkish accession was partly due to the relatedness with perceived symbolic or economic threat. Although our results suggest that the three threats are conceptually distinct and represent separate avenues in explaining intergroup relations, future research should examine further the distinctive nature of threat to country ownership by testing, for example, who is more likely to experience collective ownership threat, for whom this threat more strongly translates into different responses, what triggers it, and when it can be less or more clearly distinguished from other forms of threat. For example, country ownership threat might be specifically experienced by individuals who perceive a lack of control over their personal lives, and it might be triggered by various sources, such as the influx of immigrants and the interference of the EU. A more explicit examination of what is exactly at stake (ownership: what do we control?; economic: what do we need?; symbolic: who are we?) could help to grasp the specific routes that are driving the different types of threat and to reduce the strong empirical relatedness. Further, future research should disentangle collective ownership threat from other relevant types of threat, such as physical safety threat.

Examining interactions between collective ownership threat and other types of threat is another direction for future research. Experimental studies have found that attitudes towards immigrants are mainly influenced by manipulations in which realistic and symbolic threat were combined (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005). It

could be argued, for example, that collective ownership threat is not only relevant next to, but also in combination with other types of threat, and that a sense of ownership can strengthen the effects of economic and symbolic threat on intergroup attitudes. Immigrants who 'come and take *our* jobs' is an example of an economically threatening situation, that might be partly threatening because of the perceived ownership of what is considered 'ours'. Moreover, criticism on 'our' culture or traditions could be an example of a symbolically threatening situation, that is partly threatening because of the perceived right to decide about our culture or traditions. For example, the United Nations concluded in 2015 that the Dutch tradition of 'Zwarte Piet' ('Black Pete') should be changed because it 'reflects negative stereotypes of people of African descent' (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2015). Dutch Facebook users reacted to this conclusion by stating that 'the UN should get their hands off *our* culture and *our* traditions', [emphasis added] and by wondering whether 'we can still have a say in our own country' (RTL Nieuws, 2015). These possible interactions between forms of threat indicate that specific situations or outgroups can simultaneously elicit several threats and that a careful consideration of what exactly is at stake for people can improve our understanding of negative intergroup relations (Rios et al., 2018; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017).

In conclusion, our study demonstrates that collective ownership threat is relevant in different situations, as it helps to understand intergroup behaviour in a local context, and right-wing populist rhetoric and discontent in a country-level context. We believe that these contexts are two of many possible contexts in which collective ownership threat can play an important role. Taking collective ownership threat into consideration adds to our understanding of what exactly drives intergroup attitudes and behaviours. A sense of ownership is mostly ignored in the intergroup literature although it is a fundamental and intuitive aspect of social life structuring social relations between people and groups (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Ownership implies normative and moral rights and provides a powerful justification for what 'we' can rightfully do with what is 'ours', including the right to exclude others (Merrill, 1998; Snare, 1972). Yet, perceived ownership can be challenged, disputed, or threatened, which can lead to ownership disputes and conflicts and negative intergroup relations more generally.

Appendices

Appendices Chapter 1

Appendix 1.1. Overview of piloted experiments

I have piloted five experiments aimed to manipulate collective psychological ownership of the country or the neighbourhood. In four of the five experiments I measured a sense of collective ownership as a manipulation check, and in all five experiments I measured exclusive determination right and group responsibility as outcomes. These outcomes were all expected to increase after the ownership manipulations. However, Table A1.1 shows that none of the experiments increased collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, or group responsibility. In the third experiment, participants assigned to the control condition scored significantly higher on group responsibility than those assigned to the treatment condition ($t(387) = -2.24$, $p = .026$). This was not in line with my expectation. There were no other significant differences across conditions, indicating that I was unable to manipulate collective psychological ownership with these experiments.

Table A1.1. Results of pilot experiments

	Treatment		Control		
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*t*
Experiment 1: Country ownership – story experiment					
Collective psychological ownership	4.78	1.47	4.87	1.37	–.62
Exclusive determination right	4.43	1.59	4.65	1.54	–1.44
Group responsibility	5.86	.93	5.86	.97	.02
Experiment 2: Country ownership – questions as treatment (collective psychological ownership)					
Exclusive determination right	4.49	1.70	4.67	1.60	–1.08
Group responsibility	6.00	.88	5.97	.92	.42
Experiment 3: Country ownership – questions as treatment (collective ownership threat)					
Collective psychological ownership	4.71	1.37	4.77	1.44	–.44
Exclusive determination right	4.49	1.67	4.62	1.70	–.73
Group responsibility	5.91	.92	6.11	.85	–2.24*
Experiment 4: Neighbourhood ownership – naming					
Collective psychological ownership	4.82	1.53	5.00	1.38	–1.16
Exclusive determination right	4.15	1.27	4.11	1.16	.30
Group responsibility	4.73	1.24	4.82	1.15	–.73
Experiment 5: Neighbourhood ownership – making a plan					
Collective psychological ownership	4.98	1.47	5.00	1.45	–.18
Exclusive determination right	4.29	1.23	4.13	1.27	1.26
Group responsibility	4.87	1.17	4.80	1.09	.55

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores. *t* is the t-statistic of difference in mean across the two conditions. *$p < .05$.

A possible explanation for the null findings is that people have a rather strong and stable sense of collective ownership of relevant real-life territories such as the country and neighbourhood. Peck et al. (2020), who successfully manipulated psychological ownership of public places, argued that they specifically chose public places that were not often repeatedly used by the same person, to reduce 'the likelihood that participants would feel an existing sense of ownership due to frequent experience' (p. 6). The rather high mean scores of the ownership items used as manipulation checks in my experiments also suggest that people generally have rather strong pre-existing ownership feelings about the country and neighbourhood and that a ceiling effect might have played a role. Future experimental designs could focus on imaginary territories (as in Chapter 4, Study 3 and Chapter 5, Study 1 of this dissertation) or on existing territories that do not come with pre-existing ownership claims. A possible strategy to prevent ceiling effects is to focus on decreasing collective psychological ownership of existing territories instead of increasing it.

I discuss the designs of the five pilot experiments in more detail in the following paragraphs. The first three experiments were aimed at manipulating collective psychological ownership of the country. They were part of the same data collection as the pilot study discussed in Chapter 4. A diverse sample of adult Dutch natives was approached by research agency Motivaction via the online panel StemPunt. In the first experiment, I used a framing technique in which a random half of the participants were asked to read a short text on why Dutch people can claim to own the country (manipulation) and the other half did not read any text (control). The story focused on the investment of Dutch people into The Netherlands and their long history. It read: 'The Dutch have inhabited The Netherlands for centuries and as the original inhabitants, they have literally made the country by building dikes and polders. Moreover, they have built The Netherlands into a relatively prosperous and well-functioning country. As a result, many Dutch people have the feeling that the country is theirs.' A total of 205 participants were assigned to the treatment condition, 203 were assigned to the control condition.

In the second experiment, I aimed to prime people into thinking in terms of collective psychological ownership with a questions-as-treatment design (see Bloom, Arikan, & Courtemanche, 2015). A random half of the participants answered items about country ownership (treatment), right before they answered items measuring exclusive determination right and group responsibility. The other half answered these items at the end of the questionnaire, so after the items measuring exclusive determination right and group responsibility (control). Asking about country ownership before measuring the

outcome variables was expected to prime people into thinking in terms of country ownership and making this salient in their minds. It was not possible to include a manipulation check measuring collective psychological ownership in this experiment. In total, 212 participants were assigned to the treatment condition, 204 were assigned to the control condition.

In the third experiment, I again used a questions-as-treatment design, but with the aim to prime people into thinking in terms of losing country ownership. A random half of the participants answered the following question, right before they answered items measuring exclusive determination right and group responsibility (treatment): 'Some people sometimes feel that their country is being taken away from them. Other people don't feel that way. How would you feel if the Dutch were less and less in charge in their own country?' Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they felt angry, sad, indignant, powerless, and surprised. The other half answered this question at the end of the questionnaire (control). I expected that the question would make people more aware of what they owned when reminded of the possibility to lose it. A total of 202 participants were assigned to the treatment condition, 187 were assigned to the control condition.

The fourth and fifth experiments were designed to manipulate collective psychological ownership of the neighbourhood. The experiments were part of the survey that was also used in Study 2 of Chapter 4. In the fourth experiment, I asked a random half of the participants to come up with a new name for their neighbourhood together with other neighbours (treatment). The other half was not asked to think of a new name (control). Name-giving was found to increase a sense of psychological ownership of a public park in a study by Peck et al. (2020), so I expected to find the same. The exact wording was: 'Suppose you are asked to come up with a new name for your neighbourhood, together with other local residents. Take a few minutes to think about what name you would suggest. The name should be usable, for example to put on signs in your neighbourhood and in your place of residence. So try to come up with a name that characterizes your neighbourhood.' Two open questions followed: 'What name did you come up with?' and 'Why did you choose this name?' Thirty-four participants were excluded as their answers showed that they did not take the task seriously, leading to 160 participants assigned to the treatment condition and 204 to the control condition.

In the fifth experiment, I asked a random half of the participants to make a plan for what the neighbourhood should look like in ten years, together with other neighbours (treatment). The other half was not asked to make such a plan (control). The design was

again inspired by the finding by Peck et al. (2020) that investing time and effort into a territory increases a sense of psychological ownership. The exact wording was: 'Suppose you are asked to make a plan for the future of your neighbourhood, together with other residents. What should your neighbourhood look like in 10 years? Take a few minutes to think about what your proposal would be. You can mention things you would like to keep as they are as well as things you would like to change.' Subsequently, participants were asked to 'describe the plan for the future of your neighbourhood in 50 to 200 words'. An analysis of the answers showed that 19 participants did not take the task seriously and were therefore excluded, leading to 166 participants assigned to the treatment condition and 192 to the control condition.

Appendix 1.2. Overview of correlations between collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat

To explore what determines the extent to which collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat are correlated, I measured the three types of threat in two samples, using variations in measurements. The first sample was also used in Study 1 of Chapter 3 of this dissertation. It concerned a diverse sample of 599 native Dutch participants. The participants randomly received one of four different types of measurements of the intergroup threat items.

First, I explored whether the use of the word 'our' in the threat items would influence the extent to which the three types of threats correlated. Including ownership related words in economic threat and symbolic threat items might trigger thinking in terms of ownership entitlements and might make these items more strongly related to collective ownership threat items. A total of 139 participants were randomly assigned to a version of the questionnaire in which all threat items included the words 'our' or 'our own'. A total of 143 other participants received the same items, except that the ownership words were not mentioned in the economic threat and symbolic threat items. Every type of threat was measured with three items (see sample items in Table A1.2). Confirmatory factor analyses showed that both when ownership words were mentioned in all items (CFI = .984, RMSEA = .053, SRMR = .026) and when these words were only mentioned in the collective ownership threat items (CFI = .974, RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .019), the expected three-factor model fitted the data well. At the same time, Table A1.2 shows that all factors measuring the different types of threat were highly correlated. The factors seemed even a bit more highly correlated when 'ours' was only mentioned in the collective ownership threat items than when 'ours' was mentioned in all threat items.

Table A1.2. Correlations of collective ownership threat, symbolic threat, and economic threat using variations in measurements

Sample	Measurement variation	Threat type	Sample item	α	*M*	*Correlation* ET	*Correlation* ST
1	Mentioning 'our'	COT	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch are losing the say in our own country	.96	3.77	.841	.862
		ET	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch have less and less of a chance to get our own jobs	.95	3.59	1	.796
		ST	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that our Dutch norms and values are going to be lost	.95	4.23		1
	Not mentioning 'our'	COT	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch are losing the say in our own country	.98	3.87	.911	.951
		ET	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch have less and less of a chance to get jobs	.96	3.45	1	.878
		ST	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that Dutch norms and values are going to be lost	.97	4.33		1
	Coupled to EU	COT	Due to the growing interference of the EU I fear that we Dutch are losing the say in our own country	.96	4.38	.923	.913
		ET	Due to the growing interference of the EU I fear that we Dutch have less and less of a chance to get jobs	.93	3.99	1	.879
		ST	Due to the growing interference of the EU I fear that Dutch norms and values are going to be lost	.97	4.24		1
	Coupled to immigrants	COT	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch are losing the say in our own country	.97	3.79	.900	.913
		ET	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that we Dutch have less and less of a chance to get jobs	.94	3.42	1	.841
		ST	Due to the persisting immigration I fear that Dutch norms and values are going to be lost	.97	4.29		1
2	Decoupled	COT	I feel that Britain is owned less and less by the British people	.95	4.89	.812	.897
		ET	I feel that it is increasingly difficult for British people to find a good job	.82	5.14	1	.797
		ST	I feel that British norms and values are changing	.93	4.86		1

Note: Means were based on manifest mean scores, correlations were between latent factors. COT = collective ownership threat; ET = economic threat; ST = symbolic threat. α = Cronbach's alpha.

Second, I explored whether the source of threat would influence how strongly the three types of threat correlated. Different types of threat are often interchangeably used in arguments against immigration, which might make the threats very strongly related in people's minds when coupled to the influx of immigrants. The correlations might be weaker when the EU is mentioned as the source of threat. Three items were used per type of threat. A total of 166 participants were randomly assigned to a version of the questionnaire in which threat items were coupled to the growing interference of the EU, while 151 participants answered threat items coupled to the persistent influx of immigrants. In both the version in which the items were coupled to the EU (CFI = .964, RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .023) and to immigrants (CFI = .948, RMSEA = .101, SRMR = .024), the expected three-factor model fitted the data well. However, Table A1.2 shows that the three factors measuring the different types of threat were also highly correlated, independent of the source of threat.

The second sample consisted of 1005 British participants. Part of this sample was also used in Study 2 of Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The threat items measured did not specifically refer to any source of threat. Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) have shown that intergroup threats are more correlated when a common source of threat is mentioned, since they all pick up people's general dislike of that source of threat next to measuring the specific feeling of threat. Therefore, I expected the threats to be less correlated in this sample. Every type of threat was measured with four items. The expected three-factor model fitted the data well (CFI = .944, RMSEA = .085, SRMR = .047), but the three factors measuring the different threats were again highly correlated.

Concluding, these results showed that collective ownership threat, economic threat, and symbolic threat were very strongly related, and that this was rather independent of variations in measurements. Future research should determine whether the same high correlations are found in other contexts than Western Europe, when using other samples than majority members, when examining other targets of threat than the country and when examining other sources of threat than immigrants or the EU.

Appendices Chapter 2

Appendix 2.1. Results of confirmatory factor analyses on the pooled sample

Model	χ^2 (*df*)	*TRd*	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*SRMR*
A: 6 factors: autochthony, welfare chauvinism, authoritarianism, ethnic threat, ethnic citizenship conception, anti-racism norms	1065.670 (137)***		.973	.038	.048
B: 5 factors: autochthony and welfare chauvinism combined	9250.553 (142)***	3304.635 (5)***	.737	.116	.093
C: 5 factors: autochthony and authoritarianism combined	2147.230 (142)***	972.093 (5)***	.942	.054	.054
D: 5 factors: autochthony and ethnic threat combined	2921.427 (142)***	1592.084 (5)***	.920	.064	.067
E: 5 factors: autochthony and ethnic citizenship conception combined	2847.645 (142)***	1485.887 (5)***	.922	.063	.060
F: 5 factors: autochthony and anti-racism norms combined	3696.014 (142)***	1729.016 (5)***	.897	.073	.081
G: 5 factors: welfare chauvinism and authoritarianism combined	2569.306 (142)***	1231.861 (5)***	.930	.060	.068
H: 5 factors: welfare chauvinism and ethnic threat combined	3648.457 (142)***	1988.487 (5)***	.899	.072	.088
I: 5 factors: welfare chauvinism and ethnic citizenship conception combined	3988.292 (142)***	2248.930 (5)***	.889	.075	.091
J: 5 factors: welfare chauvinism and anti-racism norms combined	4194.013 (142)***	2136.640 (5)***	.883	.077	.097

Note: TRd = Sattora-Bentler Scaled Difference compared to Model A; ***$p < .001$

Appendix 2.2. Results of measurement invariance of the welfare chauvinism and autochthony latent constructs, across the British and Dutch samples

Model	χ^2 (*df*)	*TRd*	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*SRMR*
Configural: Free loadings, free intercepts	166.452 (38)***		.992	.038	.018
Metric: Equal loadings, free intercepts	186.595 (44)***	18.777 (6)**	.991	.037	.024
Scalar: Equal loadings, equal intercepts	353.522 (50)***	187.457 (6)***	.980	.051	.032
Partial scalar: Equal loadings, equal intercepts (except the welfare chauvinism item about housing costs)	246.919 (49)***	111.397 (1)***	.987	.041	.030

Note: TRd = Sattora-Bentler Scaled Difference compared to the model above; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Appendix 2.3. Correlations between latent and manifest variables

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Welfare chauvinism	1	.519***	–.241***	.356***	.178***	.574***	.392***	–.383***
2. Autochthony	.453***	1	–.158***	.383***	.268***	.643***	.566***	–.435***
3. Economic egalitarianism	–.128***	–.066	1	–.455***	.023	–.238***	–.107***	.303***
4. Political orientation	.259***	.267***	–.302***	1	.165***	.383***	.262***	–.369***
5. Authoritarianism	.120**	.210***	.036	.121**	1	.145***	.197***	.069**
6. Ethnic threat	.451***	.565***	–.097*	.301***	.121***	1	.483***	–.496***
7. Ethnic citizenship conception	.375***	.569***	–.044	.237***	.084*	.467***	1	–.324***
8. Anti–racism norms	–.330***	–.425***	.185***	–.367***	–.023	–.437***	–.379***	1
9. Unemployment	.028	.045	.041	–.022	–.039	–.004	.029	–.029
10. Welfare dependency	–.034	.028	.121***	–.152***	–.023	.059	.070*	.017
11. Economic insecurity perceptions	.120**	.178***	.174***	–.037	–.035	.144***	.184***	–.127***
12. Age	–.035	–.016	.115**	–.103**	.124**	.005	.000	–.104**
13. Gender	–.095**	–.047	.088**	–.126***	–.041	–.048	–.064	.080*
14. Religiosity	–.071	–.042	.059	.071*	.167***	–.012	.001	.128***
15. Education	–.245***	–.289***	–.162***	–.099*	–.070*	–.284***	–.250***	.220***

Note: Results of the British sample were reported above the diagonal, of Dutch sample below the diagonal.*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 2.3. Correlations between latent and manifest variables (continued)

	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.
1. Welfare chauvinism	–.002	.011	.032	.129***	.065**	.015	–.210***
2. Autochthony	.042	.108***	.048*	.256***	–.001	.086***	–.318***
3. Economic egalitarianism	.065***	.125***	.172***	–.109***	.030	–.028	.013
4. Political orientation	–.048**	–.024	–.077***	.158***	–.023	.106***	–.105***
5. Authoritarianism	.010	.021	–.039*	.178***	.071***	.144***	–.091***
6. Ethnic threat	.020	.081***	.088***	.218***	.016	.068***	–.300***
7. Ethnic citizenship conception	.014	.105***	.067**	.141***	–.033	.076***	–.243***
8. Anti–racism norms	–.031	–.002	–.009	–.049*	.143***	.054**	.195***
9. Unemployment	1	.166***	.154***	–.079***	–.035	–.042*	.049*
10. Welfare dependency	.211***	1	.325***	.016	.007	.044*	–.184***
11. Economic insecurity perceptions	.188***	.335***	1	–.205***	.062**	.036	–.119***
12. Age	–.030	.082**	–.105**	1	.017	.223***	–.275***
13. Gender	.004	.106	.057	–.043	1	.082***	.022
14. Religiosity	–.064*	–.002	–.034	.182***	.062	1	–.003
15. Education	.002	–.131***	–.256***	–.105*	.006	–.006	1

Note: Results of the British sample were reported above the diagonal, of Dutch sample below the diagonal.*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 2.4. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the model in which all coefficients were free to vary across countries, separated by country

	Great Britain	The Netherlands
	Welfare chauvinism	Welfare chauvinism
Autochthony	.556 (.083)***	.589 (.159)***
Economic egalitarianism	–.221 (.056)***	–.222 (.093)*
Right-wing political orientation	.179 (.050)***	.125 (.081)
Authoritarianism	.292 (.071)***	.222 (.189)
Ethnic threat	.395 (.028)***	.300 (.064)***
Ethnic citizenship conception	.167 (.053)***	.256 (.105)*
Anti-racism norms	–.300 (.089)***	–.172 (.168)
Unemployment	–.160 (.259)	.432 (.439)
Welfare dependency	–.213 (.101)	–.415 (.253)
Economic insecurity perceptions	.025 (.042)	.093 (.094)
Age	–.006 (.004)	–.002 (.007)
Gender (female)	.446 (.098)***	.249 (.182)
Religiosity	–.047 (.017)**	–.047 (.028)
Education	–.036 (.028)	–.166 (.066)*
R^2	.404	.301
N	3516	1241

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 2.5. Standardized regression coefficients for the model with welfare chauvinism as the dependent variable, separated by country

	Great Britain	The Netherlands
	Welfare chauvinism	Welfare chauvinism
Autochthony	.187 (.024)***	.177 (.024)***
Economic egalitarianism	–.071 (.016)***	–.073 (.016)***
Right-wing political orientation	.076 (.019)***	.074 (.018)***
Authoritarianism	.064 (.016)***	.053 (.013)***
Ethnic threat	.323 (.022)***	.272 (.020)***
Ethnic citizenship conception	.074 (.018)***	.073 (.018)***
Anti-racism norms	–.065 (.020)**	–.062 (.019)**
Unemployment	–.003 (.014)	–.003 (.013)
Welfare dependency	–.047 (.017)**	–.043 (.016)**
Economic insecurity perceptions	.021 (.016)	.021 (.016)
Age	–.022 (.017)	–.025 (.020)
Gender (female)	.043 (.014)**	–.045 (.015)**
Religiosity	–.044 (.013)**	–.053 (.016)**
Education	–.037 (.016)*	–.035 (.016)*
R^2	.397	.313
N	3516	1241

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 2.6. Unstandardized regression coefficients for the multigroup model with group-specific opposition towards welfare entitlements as the dependent variable, separated by condition

	Migrants	Ethnic minorities	Muslims	Black Britons	White Britons	People
Autochthony	.241 (.061)***	.186 (.059)**	.168 (.064)**	.091 (.059)	.023 (.063)	.152 (.074)*
Economic egalitarianism	−.145 (.039)***	−.037 (.040)	−.191 (.049)***	−.001 (.040)	−.273 (.051)***	−.135 (.050)**
Right-wing political orientation	.064 (.035)	.092 (.034)**	.013 (.039)	.132 (.031)***	.048 (.036)	.127 (.044)**
Authoritarianism	.165 (.057)**	.090 (.053)	.056 (.061)	−.034 (.060)	.134 (.060)	.058 (.066)
Ethnic threat	.166 (.020)***	.156 (.020)***	.108 (.023)***	.087 (.024)***	.006 (.023)	.037 (.023)
Ethnic citizenship conception	.048 (.039)	.018 (.037)	.125 (.040)**	.023 (.039)	.067 (.045)	−.058 (.047)
Anti-racism norms	−.046 (.066)	−.155 (.062)**	−.216 (.072)**	−.229 (.061)***	−.136 (.065)*	−.120 (.071)
Unemployment	.083 (.151)	−.196 (.196)	−.083 (.254)	−.017 (.189)	−.386 (.209)	−.381 (.214)
Welfare dependency	−.154 (.100)	−.102 (.063)	.154 (.084)	−.063 (.080)	−.418 (.075)***	−.197 (.108)
Economic insecurity perceptions	−.032 (.033)	.002 (.030)	.019 (.034)	−.009 (.034)	.017 (.035)	−.019 (.036)
Age	−.001 (.003)	.005 (.003)	.007 (.003)*	.000 (.002)	.003 (.003)	−.002 (.003)
Gender (female)	.022 (.071)	−.019 (.070)	.090 (.077)	.002 (.068)	−.029 (.078)	.178 (.079)*
Religiosity	−.015 (.012)	−.009 (.012)	.006 (.016)	−.002 (.011)	−.017 (.014)	−.003 (.013)
Education	−.005 (.021)	−.051 (.021)*	−.008 (.022)	−.026 (.020)	.029 (.024)	−.002 (.023)
R^2	.516	.553	.522	.377	.281	.270
N	598	559	531	535	564	551

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendices Chapter 3

Appendix 3.1. Confirmatory factor analyses, Study 1 ($N = 572$)

Model	χ^2 (*df*)	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Δdf)	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*SRMR*
A: 5 Factors: Collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, national identification, place attachment, immigrant minority attitudes	1601.575 (242)***		.861	.099	.064
B: 5 Factors: including a second order factor of immigrant minority attitudes	632.147 (237)***	496.388 (5)***[a]	.960	.054	.056
C: 4 Factors (including second order factor): Collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right combined	1939.553 (241)***	389.118 (4)***[b]	.826	.111	.086
D: 4 Factors (including second order factor): national identification and place attachment combined	903.835 (241)***	288.509 (4)***[b]	.932	.069	.067

[a] Difference in Chi square test ($\Delta\chi^2$) is compared to model A; [b] Differences in Chi square tests ($\Delta\chi^2$) are compared to model B; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.2. Standardized regression coefficients for the final model, Study 1

	Model 1: Model without moderation			Model 2: Model with moderation		
	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Exclusive determination right	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Exclusive determination right
Collective psychological ownership	–.076 (.059)	–.159 (.061)**	.535 (.049)***	–.043 (.056)	–.122 (.057)*	.535 (.049)***
Exclusive determination right	–.315 (.057)***	–.340 (.056)***		–.264 (.056)***	–.287 (.055)***	
Political ideology				–.255 (.047)***	–.276 (.039)***	
Political ideology * exclusive determination right				–.091 (.041)*	–.021 (.037)	
National identification	–.139 (.086)	–.037 (.081)	.239 (.076)**	–.097 (.085)	.010 (.079)	.249 (.078)**
Place attachment	.144 (.076)	.033 (.071)	–.120 (.062)	.089 (.076)	.008 (.070)	–.129 (.064)*
Sex (male)	.145 (.042)**	.147 (.036)***	.003 (.035)	.150 (.041)***	.152 (.035)***	.001 (.035)
Education level	.092 (.041)*	.165 (.038)***	–.075 (.035)*	.084 (.040)*	.155 (.038)***	–.068 (.035)
Age	.028 (.042)	–.009 (.034)	.028 (.034)	.013 (.040)	–.025 (.032)	.038 (.034)
R^2	.207	.286	.443	.260	.339	.447
N	572			572		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.3. Standardized regression coefficients for the alternative model in which cases with missing values on Brexit voting were deleted, Study 2

	Model 1: Model without moderation			Model 2: Model with moderation		
	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote
Collective psychological ownership	−.322 (.067)***	−.192 (.067)**	.048 (.070)	−.312 (.068)***	−.147 (.065)*	.049 (.070)
Immigrant minority attitudes			−.155 (.054)**			−.156 (.054)**
European integration attitudes			−.429 (.058)***			−.427 (.057)***
Political ideology				−.072 (.050)	−.202 (.053)***	
Political ideology * collective psychological ownership				−.015 (.044)	.116 (.041)**	
National identification	.029 (.077)	−.117 (.079)	.028 (.076)	.042 (.078)	−.085 (.084)	.028 (.076)
Place attachment	.202 (.072)**	.134 (.078)	−.023 (.078)	.191 (.073)**	.118 (.079)	−.023 (.078)
Adherence to sovereignty	−.216 (.059)***	−.269 (.065)***	.233 (.070)**	−.211 (.058)***	−.229 (.062)***	.234 (.071)**
Sex (male)	.050 (.046)	−.005 (.051)	−.069 (.051)	.053 (.046)	−.011 (.049)	−.070 (.051)
Education level	.184 (.055)**	.068 (.059)	−.040 (.051)	.188 (.056)**	.073 (.056)	−.040 (.051)
Age	−.059 (.057)	−.023 (.053)	.084 (.060)	−.048 (.056)	−.017 (.052)	.085 (.060)
Country (ref = England)						
Scotland	−.055 (.039)	.033 (.046)	−.139 (.059)*	−.058 (.039)	.047 (.045)	−.139 (.059)**
Wales	.032 (.037)	.048 (.031)	−.048 (.037)	.026 (.037)	.039 (.030)	−.048 (.037)
R^2	.234	.189	.520	.242	.221	.516
N	435			435		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.4. Confirmatory factor analyses, Study 2 (N = 495)

Model	χ^2 (*df*)	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Δ*df*)	*CFI*	*RMSEA*	*SRMR*
A: 6 Factors: Collective psychological ownership, exclusive determination right, immigrant minority attitudes, national identification, place attachment, sovereignty	887.767 (335)***		.940	.058	.041
B: 5 Factors: Collective psychological ownership and exclusive determination right combined	1551.097 (340)***	532.029 (5)***	.869	.085	.048
C: 5 Factors: Collective psychological ownership and sovereignty combined	1369.301 (340)***	244.112 (5)***	.889	.078	.070
D: 5 Factors: exclusive determination right and sovereignty combined	1301.032 (340)***	223.229 (5)***	.896	.076	.064
E: 5 Factors: national identification and place attachment combined	949.909 (340)***	43.780 (5)***	.934	.060	.042

Note: Difference in Chi square test ($\Delta\chi^2$) is compared to model A; ***p < .001

Appendix 3.5. Standardized regression coefficients for the alternative model with collective psychological ownership and gatekeeper right included simultaneously, Study 2

	Exclusive determination right	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote
Collective psychological ownership	.809 (.031)***	–.238 (.081)**	–.211 (.108)	.091 (.109)
Exclusive determination right		–.120 (.079)	–.146 (.102)	.177 (.107)
Immigrant minority attitudes				–.188 (.056)**
European integration attitudes				–.480 (.060)***
R^2	.655	.117	.116	.442
N	495			

**$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.6. Standardized regression coefficients for the final model, Study 2

	Model 1: Model without moderation			Model 2: Model with moderation		
	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote
Collective psychological ownership	−.344 (.065)***	−.214 (.068)**	.048 (.069)	−.328 (.067)***	−.165 (.065)*	.049 (.070)
Immigrant minority attitudes			−.158 (.055)**			−.158 (.055)**
European integration attitudes			−.431 (.058)***			−.429 (.058)***
Political ideology				−.052 (.048)	−.207 (.049)***	
Political ideology * collective psychological ownership				−.009 (.042)	.121 (.039)**	
National identification	.004 (.072)	−.081 (.079)	.028 (.077)	.006 (.073)	−.060 (.082)	.028 (.077)
Place attachment	.195 (.069)**	.136 (.079)	−.023 (.078)	.186 (.070)**	.130 (.079)	−.024 (.079)
Adherence to sovereignty	−.157 (.057)**	−.245 (.061)***	.231 (.070)**	−.160 (.055)**	−.208 (.057)***	.232 (.070)**
Sex (male)	.049 (.044)	−.029 (.048)	−.070 (.051)	.050 (.044)	−.036 (.046)	−.071 (.051)
Education level	.123 (.049)*	.035 (.055)	−.041 (.052)	.122 (.049)*	.039 (.052)	−.041 (.052)
Age	−.105 (.055)	−.086 (.052)	.087 (.062)	−.100 (.055)	−.081 (.050)	.087 (.062)
Country (ref = England)						
Scotland	−.061 (.038)	.018 (.044)	−.136 (.058)**	−.063 (.038)	.033 (.042)	−.137 (.058)**
Wales	.029 (.035)	.037 (.028)	−.046 (.034)	.025 (.035)	.028 (.027)	−.046 (.035)
R^2	.197	.174	.511	.200	.214	.507
N	495			495		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.7. Standardized regression coefficients for the alternative model with exclusive determination right as the main predictor, Study 2

	Model 1: Model without moderation			Model 2: Model with moderation		
	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote
Exclusive determination right	–.271 (.064)***	–.163 (.064)*	.093 (.073)	–.258 (.064)***	–.145 (.062)*	.093 (.073)
Immigrant minority attitudes			–.147 (.055)**			–.148 (.056)**
European integration attitudes			–.426 (.059)***			–.424 (.059)***
Political ideology				–.075 (.049)	–.209 (.049)***	
Political ideology * exclusive determination right				–.007 (.040)	.112 (.037)**	
National identification	–.033 (.074)	–.109 (.078)	.027 (.076)	–.025 (.076)	–.075 (.083)	.027 (.076)
Place attachment	.172 (.075)*	.119 (.085)	–.037 (.083)	.164 (.075)*	.110 (.085)	–.037 (.083)
Adherence to sovereignty	–.142 (.064)*	–.243 (.060)***	.214 (.067)**	–.141 (.062)*	–.195 (.056)***	.215 (.068)**
Sex (male)	.035 (.045)	–.038 (.049)	–.070 (.051)	.038 (.045)	–.042 (.046)	–.070 (.051)
Education level	.126 (.051)*	.033 (.056)	–.040 (.052)	.127 (.051)*	.033 (.053)	–.040 (.052)
Age	–.098 (.057)	–.083 (.053)	.091 (.063)	–.089 (.056)	–.082 (.051)	.091 (.063)
Country (ref = England)						
Scotland	–.061 (.042)	.018 (.043)	–.136 (.059)*	–.062 (.041)	.030 (.042)	–.136 (.060)*
Wales	.042 (.036)	.045 (.028)	–.050 (.036)	.036 (.036)	.035 (.028)	–.050 (.036)
R^2	.168	.163	.511	.173	.205	.508
N	495			495		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 3.8. Standardized regression coefficients for the alternative model with the alternative Brexit question, Study 2

	Model 1: Model without moderation			Model 2: Model with moderation		
	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote	Immigrant minority attitudes	European integration attitudes	Brexit vote
Collective psychological ownership	−.335 (.065)***	−.212 (.068)**	−.016 (.068)	−.318 (.068)***	−.163 (.065)*	−.016 (.069)
Immigrant minority attitudes			−.126 (.057)*			−.126 (.058)*
European integration attitudes			−.441 (.060)***			−.439 (.060)***
Political ideology				−.050 (.048)	−.206 (.049)***	
Political ideology * collective psychological ownership				−.010 (.042)	.121 (.039)**	
National identification	−.002 (.072)	−.082 (.079)	.108 (.079)	−.001 (.073)	−.061 (.082)	.109 (.080)
Place attachment	.192 (.070)*	.136 (.079)	.011 (.080)	.182 (.071)*	.130 (.079)	.011 (.080)
Adherence to sovereignty	−.164 (.057)**	−.247 (.061)***	.232 (.073)**	−.168 (.055)**	−.209 (.057)***	.232 (.073)**
Sex (male)	.048 (.044)	−.029 (.048)	−.040 (.052)	.099 (.089)	−.036 (.046)	−.040 (.052)
Education level	.119 (.049)*	.034 (.055)	−.008 (.051)	.117 (.049)*	.038 (.052)	−.008 (.051)
Age	−.107 (.055)	−.086 (.052)	.118 (.058)	−.101 (.055)	−.081 (.050)	.119 (.058)
Country (ref = England)						
Scotland	−.061 (.038)	.018 (.044)	−.091 (.053)	−.063 (.038)	.033 (.042)	−.091 (.054)
Wales	.029 (.035)	.037 (.028)	−.015 (.032)	.025 (.035)	.028 (.027)	−.016 (.032)
R^2	.197	.175	.504	.200	.214	.500
N	495			495		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendices Chapter 4

Appendix 4.1. Pilot Study

Sample

To pilot the research design of Study 1, we recruited a sample of 425 adult Dutch natives from the online panel used in Study 2. None of these participants also took part in Study 2. All participants were eighteen years or older and they and both of their parents were born in The Netherlands. We excluded nine participants who did not pass the speeding check,[50] leading to a final sample of $N = 416$. The sample was diverse in terms of gender (50% women), age (19–80, $M = 48.10$, $SD = 16.17$), and education level (24% low secondary school or less, 42% high school or vocational training, and 34% [applied] university). There was no weight available.

Measures

The measures were similar to those in Study 1 (see Table A4.1). We controlled for group identification, political orientation, gender (0 = *men*, 1 = *women*), age (in years), and education level (1 = *primary education*, 8 = *doctorate*). We measured group identification with one item: 'to what extent do you feel Dutch?' (1 = *not at all*, 7 = *very strongly*).

[50] As in Study 2, participants who were faster than one-third of the median duration of the full survey were considered speeders.

Table A4.1. Translations of the exact wording of the variables used in the Pilot Study.

		Think about the house, automobile, workspace, or some other item that you own or co-own with someone, and the feelings associated with the statement "THIS IS MINE/OURS!"
Collective psychological ownership	Intro	The following statements refer to the feeling of owning the country The Netherlands together with other Dutch people. Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with the following statements.
	1	I think this country is owned by us, the Dutch
	2	I feel that this country belongs to us, the Dutch
	3	I have the feeling that we, the Dutch, own this country together
Exclusive determination right	Intro	To what extent do you agree or disagree that Dutch people ...
	1	… have the exclusive right to determine matters that concern The Netherlands
	2	… have the exclusive right to determine who will be allowed in The Netherlands
	3	… have the exclusive right to determine what happens to The Netherlands in the future
Group responsibility	Intro	To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Dutch ...
	1	… have the responsibility to make sure that The Netherlands is a nice country to live in
	2	… have the duty to invest in solving problems in The Netherlands
	3	… have the responsibility to leave The Netherlands in a good state for future generations
Exclusion of outsiders	Intro	On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following now or in the future?
	1	Vote for a political party that is committed to reducing immigration in The Netherlands
	2	Sign a petition against new immigrants coming to The Netherlands
	3	Participate in a protest against growing immigration in The Netherlands
Stewardship behaviour	Intro	On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following now or in the future?
	1	Voluntarily participate in an initiative to clean up litter
	2	Participate in a protest against the arrival of a polluting company to The Netherlands
	3	Support charity to preserve Dutch natural landscapes

Table A4.2. Descriptive statistics, Pilot Study

	Valid		*Mean/*			*Correlations*			
	n	*Range*	*prop.*	*SD*	*α*	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. Collective psychological ownership	416	1–7	4.80	1.52	.88	.649***	.277***	.493***	–.082
2. Exclusive determination right	416	1–7	4.58	1.65	.93	1	.236***	.601***	–.132
3. Group responsibility	416	1–7	5.98	.91	.89		1	.132*	.271***
4. Exclusion of outsiders	416	1–11	4.63	3.16	.89			1	–.116
5. Stewardship behaviour	416	1–11	6.42	2.34	.70				1
6. Group identification	416	1–7	6.30	.94	-				
7. Political orientation	416	1–7	4.05	1.35	-				
8. Gender (1 = female)	415	0/1	.50	-	-				
9. Age	416	19–80	48.10	16.17	-				
10. Education level	416	1–8	4.12	1.89	-				

Note: Descriptive statistics were based on manifest mean scores, correlations were between latent variables. α is Cronbach's alpha. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Results

Confirmatory factor analyses showed that the expected five-factor model had an acceptable fit after freeing the covariance of the residuals of the items 'participate in a protest against growing immigration in The Netherlands' measuring exclusion of outsiders, and 'participate in a protest against the arrival of a polluting company to The Netherlands' measuring stewardship behaviour (CFI = .950, RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .053). This cross-factor covariance was added in the subsequent analyses. Standardized loadings were .54 or higher. Table A4.2 shows all descriptive statistics.

We specified the same mediation model as in Study 1. Figure A4.1 shows that the results did not substantially differ from the results in Study 1. See all results concerning control variables in Table A4.3.



Figure A4.1. Standardized coefficients of the path model of the Pilot Study. Total effects were reported between square brackets. Included control variables were not reported. $^{**}p < .01$ $^{***}p < .001$.

Table A4.3. Standardized regression coefficients for the mediation model, Pilot Study

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.577 (.053)***	.268 (.063)***	.152 (.060)*	–.006 (.087)
Exclusive determination right			.359 (.065)***	–.119 (.086)
Group responsibility			–.008 (.044)	.308 (.071)***
Group identification	–.059 (.041)	.035 (.054)	–.052 (.041)	–.120 (.056)*
Political orientation	.222 (.049)***	–.045 (.052)	.322 (.055)***	–.182 (.061)**
Gender (female)	.045 (.039)	–.047 (.053)	–.017 (.042)	.070 (.054)
Age	.032 (.042)	.057 (.054)	–.088 (.043)*	.290 (.061)***
Education	–.094 (.043)*	.032 (.053)	–.135 (.044)**	.119 (.064)
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.207 (.041)***	–.069 (.051)
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.002 (.012)	.083 (.029)**
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			.357 (.052)***	.008 (.072)
R^2	.479	.085	.484	.235
N	416			

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Appendix 4.2. Translations of the exact wording of all multi-item variables used in the three studies

		Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
Collective psychological ownership	Intro	Think about the house, automobile, workspace, or some other item that you own or co-own with someone, and the feelings associated with the statement "THIS IS MINE/OURS!" The following statements refer to the feeling of owning the country The Netherlands together with other Dutch people. Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with the following statements.	When you think about your neighbourhood and your neighbours, to what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	When you really imagine the situation, how much do you disagree or agree with the following statements?
	1	I think this country is owned by us, the Dutch	I strongly feel like this is our neighbourhood	If I think about the park, I really feel that it is owned by us, neighbours
	2	I feel that this country belongs to us, the Dutch	It feels like this neighbourhood is really ours	I have a strong feeling that this field belongs to us, neighbours
	3	I have the feeling that we, the Dutch, own this country together	-	-
Exclusive determination right	Intro	To what extent do you agree or disagree that Dutch people ...	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?
	1	… have the exclusive right to determine matters that concern The Netherlands	My neighbours and I have the right to determine matters that concern our neighbourhood	It is important to me that my neighbours and I get to decide whether or not to change the park
	2	… have the exclusive right to determine who will be allowed in The Netherlands	It is up to me and my neighbours to determine what happens to our neighbourhood	It is up to me and my neighbours to determine what happens in the park
	3	… have the exclusive right to determine what happens to The Netherlands in the future	My neighbours and I are in charge in our neighbourhood	I find it important that my neighbours and I have the say in the park

Appendix 4.2. Translations of the exact wording of all multi-item variables used in the three studies (continued)

		Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
Group responsibility	Intro	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?
	1	We the Dutch have a duty to take care of our country	It is my and my neighbours' duty to take care of our neighbourhood	It is my and my neighbours' duty to take care of the park
	2	Together with other Dutch people I feel obliged to contribute to The Netherlands	Together with my neighbours I feel obliged to contribute to our neighbourhood	Together with my neighbours I feel obliged to contribute to the park
	3	We the Dutch are responsible for The Netherlands	My neighbours and I are responsible for our neighbourhood	My neighbours and I are responsible for the park
Exclusion of outsiders	Intro	On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following now or in the future?	Some people believe that their neighbourhood should mainly be inhabited and used by original residents and that there should not be too many other people who come and live in their neighbourhood. Others do not believe that. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following in the future?	Now imagine that the park is recently used more and more by people who do not live in your street. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you would do the following?
	1	Vote for a political party that is committed to reducing immigration in The Netherlands	Convince other local residents that it is not good for the neighbourhood when too many new people come and live here	Place a sign that reads 'for local residents'
	2	Convince others that immigration is a problem	Support a local initiative that first offers vacant housing to current neighbourhood residents	Place a small fence around the park
	3	Participate in a protest against growing immigration in The Netherlands	Sign a petition to prevent too many new people from moving into your neighbourhood	Together with your neighbours, try to monitor more
	4	-	Help put up signs to prevent people who do not live in your neighbourhood from making too much use of, for example, a playground or park in your neighbourhood	Make clear to others that they cannot just make use of the park

Appendix 4.2. Translations of the exact wording of all multi-item variables used in the three studies (continued)

		Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
Stewardship behaviour	Intro	Some people would like to contribute to The Netherlands, for example by doing voluntary work or by donating money. Other people need this less. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that in the future you will support a charity (by volunteering or donating money) that is committed to…	Some people like to actively contribute to their neighbourhood, for example by doing voluntary work or donating money to neighbourhood projects. Other people need this less. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that in the future you will actively commit to…	Some people would like to actively contribute to the park. Other people need this less. On a scale from 0% (definitely not) to 100% (definitely), what are the chances that you …
	1	… maintain and preserve Dutch monuments and historic buildings	… reduce litter in your neighbourhood	… will help to maintain the park
	2	… support foundations, associations or healthcare institutions	... maintain a flowerbed or garden in your neighbourhood	... will clean up litter in the park
	3	… maintain and preserve Dutch natural landscapes	… preserve characteristic places or buildings in the neighbourhood	… will put in money for a new picnic table if the old one is broken
	4	… reduce litter in The Netherlands	... keep the streets as clean as possible	

Appendix 4.2. Translations of the exact wording of all multi-item variables used in the three studies (continued)

		Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
Group identification	Intro	For some people their Dutch identity is important, for others not. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	The following questions are about your neighbours. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	-
	1	I strongly feel Dutch	I identify with other neighbours	-
	2	Being Dutch is important to me	I often say "we" instead of "them" when I talk about residents of our neighbourhood	-
	3	I identify with other Dutch people	When someone criticizes residents of our neighbourhood, I feel personally offended	-
Place attachment	Intro	Some people feel strongly attached to the country where they live, others less so. To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements? If you have never been abroad, try to imagine it.	To what extent do you disagree or agree with the following statements?	-
	1	When I'm abroad for a while, I get homesick for The Netherlands	When I am gone, I miss my neighbourhood	-
	2	I would hate to move to another country	I would not want to move to another neighbourhood	-
	3	If I have been outside the country for a while, I am always happy to come back	When I have been away, I am always happy to come back to my neighbourhood	-

Appendix 4.3. Confidence intervals in all studies

In all three studies, we applied bootstrapping with 1,000 iterations and used a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator to calculate 95% confidence intervals. Using ML, as opposed to MLR in the main results, did not substantially change the results.

Table A4.4. Standardized 95% confidence intervals of the mediation model, Study 1

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.456, .655	.284, .520	.027, .296	–.118, .188
Exclusive determination right			.104, .387	–.186, .106
Group responsibility			–.145, .116	.068, .358
Group identification	–.066, .153	.207, .474	–.139, .121	–.125, .191
Place attachment	–.075, .126	–.104, .096	–.058, .165	–.155, .111
Political orientation	–.086, .078	–.073, .104	.124, .367	–.163, .085
Sovereignty	.186, .375	–.155, .025	.066, .283	–.259, –.023
Philanthropy	–.126, .056	.216, .426	–.188, .079	.018, .279
Gender (female)	–.115, .013	–.066, .086	–.147, .022	–.114, .064
Age	–.159, –.017	–.066, .086	–.187, –.009	–.020, .163
Education level	–.055, .078	–.039, .113	–.061, .094	–.006, .159
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.055, .218	–.104, .059
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.060, .048	.021, .150
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			.184, .399	–.017, .213
N	617			

Table A4.5. Standardized 95% confidence intervals of the mediation model, Study 2

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.196, .449	.102, .339	–.360, –.087	–.167, .052
Exclusive determination right			.087, .319	–.226, –.043
Group responsibility			–.207, .070	.391, .595
Group identification	.186, .456	.238, .490	.297, .593	.197, .455
Place attachment	–.244, .028	–.078, .214	–.198, .089	–.184, .081
Gender (female)	–.069, .071	–.065, .068	–.165, –.028	–.100, .028
Age	–.092, .068	–.043, .105	–.149, .033	–.122, .028
Education level	–.062, .079	.025, .156	–.180, –.029	.006, .137
Mixed ethnic background	–.056, .085	–.081, .077	–.074, .067	.005, .133
Place of residence size				
Large city	–.012, .150	–.165, –.007	–.058, .119	–.049, .109
Average city	–.039, .119	–.080, .061	–.041, .117	–.074, .068
Small city	–.060, .084	–.064, .059	–.042, .115	–.075, .059
Length of neighbourhood residence	–.175, –.017	–.156, –.021	.013, .193	–.093, .050
Share of newcomers	–.046, .091	–.081, .056	–.017, .128	–.072, .070
Social cohesion	–.173, –.001	–.032, .127	–.084, .087	–.020, .143
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.017, .114	–.077, –.009
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.048, .018	.042, .175
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			–.302, –.044	–.104, –.119
N	784			

Table A4.6. Standardized 95% confidence intervals of the mediation model, Study 3

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Ownership manipulation (1 = ownership condition)	.029, .267	.423, .594	–.119, .150	–.103,.110
Exclusive determination right			.229, .545	–.209, .051
Group responsibility			.078, .369	.629, .885
Indirect effects				
Ownership manipulation → exclusive determination right			.006, .109	–.034, .010
Ownership manipulation → group responsibility			.036, .191	.287, .483
Total effects				
Ownership manipulation			.073, .300	.276, .477
N	384			

Appendix 4.4. Standardized regression coefficients for the mediation model, Study 1

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.556 (.051)***	.402 (.057)***	.161 (.066)*	.035 (.077)
Exclusive determination right			.246 (.068)***	–.040 (.072)
Group responsibility			–.015 (.065)	.213 (.071)**
Group identification	.043 (.056)	.341 (.065)***	–.009 (.067)	.033 (.080)
Place attachment	.026 (.050)	–.004 (.049)	.054 (.055)	–.022 (.060)
Political orientation	–.004 (.040)	.015 (.042)	.245 (.059)***	–.039 (.058)
Sovereignty	.280 (.048)***	–.065 (.048)	.174 (.052)**	–.141 (.056)*
Philanthropy	–.035 (.045)	.321 (.051)***	–.055 (.065)	.148 (.063)*
Gender (female)	–.051 (.033)	–.011 (.036)	–.063 (.042)	–.025 (.044)
Age	–.088 (.036)*	.010 (.038)	–.098 (.046)*	.072 (.046)
Education level	.011 (.033)	.037 (.037)	.016 (.038)	.077 (.044)
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.136 (.039)**	–.022 (.040)
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.006 (.026)	.086 (.031)**
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			.292 (.054)***	.098 (.059)
R^2	.547	.503	.419	.129
N	617			

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 4.5. Standardized regression coefficients for a model without control variables, Study 1

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.688 (.031)***	.547 (.036)***	.274 (.066)***	–.034 (.070)
Exclusive determination right			.370 (.068)***	–.135 (.065)*
Group responsibility			–.076 (.051)	.322 (.055)***
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.254 (.048)***	–.093 (.045)*
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.041 (.028)	.176 (.034)***
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			.487 (.038)***	.050 (.047)
R^2	.473	.300	.309	.079
N	617			

*$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 4.6. Standardized regression coefficients for the mediation model of Study 2, including versions of the questionnaire as predictors of all endogenous variables

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.326 (.063)***	.217 (.059)***	–.222 (.065)**	–.059 (.055)
Exclusive determination right			.203 (.058)***	–.134 (.045)**
Group responsibility			–.065 (.070)	.492 (.051)***
Group identification	.323 (.068)***	.367 (.063)***	.438 (.073)***	.326 (.064)***
Place attachment	–.100 (.074)	.069 (.072)	–.050 (.071)	–.051 (.065)
Gender (female)	.000 (.036)	.000 (.033)	–.096 (.036)**	–.036 (.032)
Age	–.013 (.040)	.030 (.037)	–.058 (.046)	–.047 (.037)
Education level	.008 (.037)	.092 (.034)**	–.110 (.037)**	.072 (.033)*
Mixed ethnic background	.014 (.035)	–.003 (.040)	–.001 (.037)	.069 (.032)*
Place of residence size				
Large city	.069 (.041)	–.085 (.039)*	.029 (.043)	.030 (.039)
Average city	.042 (.040)	–.008 (.036)	.037 (.038)	–.003 (.036)
Small city	.011 (.036)	–.004 (.032)	.039 (.038)	–.008 (.034)
Length of neighbourhood residence	–.098 (.040)*	–.090 (.034)**	.104 (.045)*	–.023 (.037)
Share of newcomers	.024 (.034)	–.013 (.034)	.054 (.036)	–.001 (.036)
Social cohesion	–.087 (.042)*	.046 (.041)	.004 (.043)	.061 (.041)
Version (reference category = Version 1)				
Version 2	–.004 (.043)	.040 (.040)	–.079 (.042)	.009 (.040)
Version 3	.055 (.042)	.039 (.041)	–.055 (.042)	.006 (.039)
Version 4	–.009 (.042)	.031 (.037)	–.016 (.043)	.016 (.038)
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.066 (.024)**	–.044 (.017)**
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.014 (.016)	.107 (.032)**
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			–.170 (.063)**	.004 (.057)
R^2	.227	.385	.197	.393
N	784			

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

Appendix 4.7. Standardized regression coefficients for the mediation model, Study 2

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.322 (.063)***	.220 (.059)***	–.223 (.065)**	–.058 (.055)
Exclusive determination right			.203 (.058)***	–.134 (.045)**
Group responsibility			–.069 (.070)	.493 (.051)***
Group identification	.321 (.068)***	.364 (.063)***	.445 (.072)***	.326 (.063)***
Place attachment	–.096 (.074)	.068 (.072)	–.054 (.071)	–.052 (.065)
Gender (female)	.001 (.035)	.001 (.033)	–.096 (.036)**	–.036 (.032)
Age	–.012 (.040)	.031 (.036)	–.058 (.046)	–.047 (.037)
Education level	.009 (.037)	.091 (.034)**	–.105 (.038)**	.072 (.033)*
Mixed ethnic background	.014 (.036)	–.002 (.040)	–.003 (.037)	.069 (.032)*
Place of residence size				
Large city	.069 (.041)	–.086 (.039)*	.031 (.043)	.030 (.039)
Average city	.040 (.040)	–.009 (.036)	.038 (.038)	–.003 (.036)
Small city	.012 (.036)	–.003 (.031)	.036 (.038)	–.008 (.034)
Length of neighbourhood residence	–.096 (.039)*	–.088 (.034)**	.103 (.046)*	–.022 (.037)
Share of newcomers	.023 (.033)	–.013 (.034)	.056 (.036)	–.001 (.036)
Social cohesion	–.087 (.042)*	.048 (.041)	.002 (.043)	.061 (.041)
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.066 (.024)**	–.043 (.016)*
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			–.015 (.016)	.108 (.032)**
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			–.173 (.063)**	.007 (.057)
R^2	.224	.384	.192	.393
N	784			

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 4.8. Standardized regression coefficients for a model without control variables, Study 2

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Collective psychological ownership	.387 (.039)***	.513 (.036)***	–.045 (.054)	–.051 (.044)
Exclusive determination right			.228 (.056)***	–.106 (.045)*
Group responsibility			.035 (.065)	.590 (.047)***
Indirect effects				
Collective psychological ownership → exclusive determination right			.088 (.024)***	–.041 (.018)*
Collective psychological ownership → group responsibility			.018 (.033)	.302 (.035)***
Total effects				
Collective psychological ownership			.061 (.045)	.312 (.037)***
R^2	.150	.263	.054	.318
N	784			

*$p < .05$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendix 4.9. Translations of the exact wording of the experiment, Study 3

Introduction to all participants:

We would like to ask you to read a short piece of text on the next page and to **really imagine the situation**. The situation may not correspond to your own neighbourhood. But because we want to see how people react to neighbourhood characteristics, it is important that you imagine the situation as good as possible. **Really take some time for this.**

Ownership condition:

Imagine there is a little park in your street. It used to be just a piece of land where nothing happened, but you and your neighbours have tidied it up and put up a picnic table (see the photo). People living in your street use it a lot. You really have the feeling that it is 'your park' and have given it the name 'our green park' ['ons groenplantsoen'].

Note: We got permission to use this photo taken by Houtcomposietdiscount.nl.

Control condition:

Imagine there is a little park in your street with a picnic table (see the photo). The people living in your street hardly use the park.

Appendix 4.10. Standardized regression coefficients for the mediation model, Study 3

	Exclusive determination right	Group responsibility	Exclusion of outsiders	Stewardship behaviour
Direct effects				
Ownership manipulation (1 = ownership condition)	.148 (.058)*	.509 (.045)***	.016 (.069)	.003 (.053)
Exclusive determination right			.387 (.080)***	–.079 (.062)
Group responsibility			.223 (.074)**	.757 (.063)***
Indirect effects				
Ownership manipulation → exclusive determination right			.057 (.025)*	–.012 (.010)
Ownership manipulation → group responsibility			.114 (.039)**	.385 (.049)***
Total effects				
Ownership manipulation			.186 (.059)**	.376 (.050)***
R^2	.022	.259	.298	.517
N	384			

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Appendices Chapter 5

Appendix 5.1. Pre-registration Study 1

The research plan of Study 1 was preregistered in the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/gmzku). Although our final analyses were in line with the broad idea of the pre-registered research plan, we did not mention explicitly that we were planning to examine indirect effects through perceived threat. The pre-registered general hypothesis focused on the total effects of the collective ownership threat manipulation on the behavioural outcomes. Based on suggestions of colleagues, we realized that it was crucial to examine whether the found effects were due to the expected psychological processes. Therefore, we decided to test for indirect effects in Study 1 and also followed this logic in Study 2.

Appendix 5.2. Manipulations of Study 1

Version collective ownership threat

Veel jongeren hebben een eigen 'hangplek' in hun buurt waar ze vaak afspreken met vrienden. Stel je eens voor dat jij ook zo'n plek hebt. Jij en je vrienden zien elkaar na school en in het weekend altijd op dezelfde plek. Het is een aparte plek in een park bij jullie in de buurt die eerst niet gebruikt werd. Jij en je vrienden zijn er als eerste gaan 'chillen' en hebben er zelf een oude picknicktafel neergezet (zie de foto). Het voelt echt als jullie eigen plek. Jullie hebben het vaak over 'onze tafel' en 'onze hangplek' en mensen in de buurt weten dat jullie er vaak te vinden zijn.

Sinds enkele weken is er soms echter een andere groep jongeren die aan de tafel zit. Ze zitten op een andere middelbare school en gaan steeds vaker op jullie hangplek eten, muziek draaien en 'chillen'. Ze doen net of die plek van hen is en of ze die over willen nemen.

Translation to English:

Many young people have their own 'hangout' in their neighbourhood where they often meet with friends. Imagine that you also have such a place. You and your friends always meet at the same place after school and on weekends. It is a separate place in a park in your neighbourhood that was not in use before. You and your friends were the first to 'chill' there and you put an old picnic table there (see the photo). It really feels like your own place. You often talk about 'our table' and 'our hangout' and people in the neighbourhood know that you are often hanging out there.

However, since a few weeks, another group of youngsters is sitting at the table. They are from another high school and are coming more and more often to your hangout to eat, play music and 'chill'. They act as if that place belongs to them and as if they want to take it over.

Note: Photo by Tom Nijs.

Version symbolic threat

Veel jongeren hebben een eigen ‘hangplek’ in hun buurt waar ze vaak afspreken met vrienden. Stel je eens voor dat jij ook zo’n plek hebt. Jij en je vrienden zien elkaar na school en in het weekend altijd op dezelfde plek. Het is een aparte plek in een park bij jullie in de buurt die eerst niet gebruikt werd. Jij en je vrienden zijn er als eerste gaan ‘chillen’ en hebben er zelf een oude picknicktafel neergezet (zie de foto). Het voelt echt als jullie eigen plek. Jullie hebben het vaak over ‘onze tafel’ en ‘onze hangplek’ en mensen in de buurt weten dat jullie er vaak te vinden zijn.

Sinds enkele weken wordt er echter op een flauwe en nare manier over jullie gepraat. Andere jongeren vinden jullie kinderachtig en lachen jullie uit als het over jullie hangplek gaat. Ze zeggen bijvoorbeeld: ‘gaan jullie weer gezellig samen spelen in jullie sprookjesbos?’ en ‘wanneer houden jullie eens op met dat kindergedoe?’

Translation to English:

Many young people have their own ‘hangout’ in their neighbourhood where they often meet with friends. Imagine that you also have such a place. You and your friends always meet at the same place after school and on weekends. It is a separate place in a park in your neighbourhood that was not in use before. You and your friends were the first to ‘chill’ there and you put an old picnic table there (see the photo). It really feels like your own place. You often talk about ‘our table’ and ‘our hangout’ and people in the neighbourhood know that you are often hanging out there.

However, since a few weeks, others have been talking about your group of friends in a bland and nasty way. Other youngsters find it childish and make fun of your hangout. For example, they say: ‘are you going to play in your fairy-tale forest again?’ and ‘when will you stop with this childish stuff?’

Version control

Veel jongeren hebben een eigen ‘hangplek’ in hun buurt waar ze vaak afspreken met vrienden. Stel je eens voor dat jij ook zo’n plek hebt. Jij en je vrienden zien elkaar na school en in het weekend altijd op dezelfde plek. Het is een aparte plek in een park bij jullie in de buurt die eerst niet gebruikt werd. Jij en je vrienden zijn er als eerste gaan ‘chillen’ en hebben er zelf een oude picknicktafel neergezet (zie de foto). Het voelt echt als jullie eigen plek. Jullie hebben het vaak over ‘onze tafel’ en ‘onze hangplek’ en mensen in de buurt weten dat jullie er vaak te vinden zijn.

Translation to English:

Many young people have their own ‘hangout’ in their neighbourhood where they often meet with friends. Imagine that you also have such a place. You and your friends always meet at the same place after school and on weekends. It is a separate place in a park in your neighbourhood that was not in use before. You and your friends were the first to ‘chill’ there and you put an old picnic table there (see the photo). It really feels like your own place. You often talk about ‘our table’ and ‘our hangout’ and people in the neighbourhood know that you are often hanging out there.

Appendix 5.3. Standardized regression coefficients for a model including group identification, Study 1

	Perceived collective ownership threat	Perceived symbolic threat	Physical marking	Social marking
Direct effects				
COT condition (vs control)	.267 (.072)***	–.023 (.077)	–.031 (.078)	.132 (.075)
ST condition (vs control)	–.015 (.074)	.106 (.076)	–.081 (.076)	–.006 (.073)
Perceived COT			.175 (.068)*	.252 (.065)***
Perceived ST			–.043 (.067)	–.010 (.065)
Indirect effects				
COT condition → perceived COT			.047 (.022)*	.067 (.025)**
COT condition → perceived ST			.001 (.004)	.000 (.002)
ST condition → perceived COT			–.003 (.013)	–.004 (.019)
ST condition → perceived ST			–.005 (.008)	–.001 (.007)
Total effects				
COT condition (vs control)			.016 (.077)	.200 (.074)**
ST condition (vs control)			–.088 (.076)	–.011 (.075)
R^2	.076	.014	.037	.100
N	227			

Note: COT = collective ownership threat; ST = symbolic threat. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$. [a] Group identification was measured with the items 'It would really feel like *my* group of friends', 'If others would say something negative about my group of friends, it would feel like they are talking about me', 'I would feel strongly attached to the group of friends' (Cronbach's Alpha = .77).

Appendix 5.3. Standardized regression coefficients for a model including group identification, Study 1 (continued)

	Anticipatory defence	Reactionary defence	Collective self-esteem	Group identification[a]
Direct effects				
COT condition (vs control)	.047 (.075)	.103 (.078)	–.004 (.078)	.004 (.079)
ST condition (vs control)	–.113 (.073)	.012 (.076)	.028 (.076)	–.022 (.077)
Perceived COT	.212 (.065)**	.096 (.069)	.127 (.068)	.164 (.069)*
Perceived ST	.135 (.064)*	–.050 (.067)	–.226 (.065)**	–.069 (.068)
Indirect effects				
COT condition → perceived COT	.057 (.024)*	.026 (.020)	.034 (.021)	.044 (.022)*
COT condition → perceived ST	–.003 (.010)	.001 (.004)	.005 (.017)	.002 (.005)
ST condition → perceived COT	–.003 (.016)	–.001 (.007)	–.002 (.009)	–.002 (.012)
ST condition → perceived ST	.014 (.012)	–.005 (.008)	–.024 (.019)	–.007 (.009)
Total effects				
COT condition (vs control)	.100 (.076)	.130 (.076)	.035 (.078)	.049 (.078)
ST condition (vs control)	–.102 (.076)	.005 (.076)	.002 (.077)	–.032 (.078)
R^2	.101	.025	.056	.030
N				

Note: COT = collective ownership threat; ST = symbolic threat. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$. [a] Group identification was measured with the items 'It would really feel like *my* group of friends', 'If others would say something negative about my group of friends, it would feel like they are talking about me', 'I would feel strongly attached to the group of friends' (Cronbach's Alpha = .77).

Appendix 5.4. Manipulations of Study 2

Version collective ownership threat

Het volgende artikel stond in een Nederlandse krant. Lees het artikel goed door. Na het artikel worden er vragen gesteld over uw kijk op de huidige en toekomstige Europese Unie.

De gevolgen van Turkse toetreding tot de EU

2 Maart 2018

In 2005 zijn de onderhandelingen over de toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie (EU) officieel begonnen. Momenteel staan deze onderhandelingen op een laag pitje, maar ze zullen over niet al te lange tijd hervat worden. Volgens tegenstanders van EU-toetreding zijn er grote politieke gevolgen voor Europa en de Europese bevolking. Turkije is een groot land (80 miljoen inwoners) en heeft meer inwoners dan Duitsland. Daarmee zou het in één klap het grootste EU land zijn dat een erg belangrijke stem krijgt binnen de EU. Tegenstanders vrezen dat Turkije de EU 'in bezit' zal nemen en dat landen zoals Nederland een deel van hun zeggenschap over Europa en hun eigen land verliezen. Turkije wordt indirect mede de baas in "ons eigen huis". Een land als Nederland kan de toetreding van Turkije niet tegenhouden, zelfs al zouden Nederlanders dat willen. Daarnaast kunnen Turken op termijn vrijelijk naar andere EU-landen migreren wat er bijvoorbeeld voor zorgt dat Nederland minder zelf kan bepalen welke migranten wel en niet tot het eigen grondgebied worden toegelaten.

A photo of the Turkish and the European flag was shown here

Translation to English:

The following article was published in a Dutch newspaper. Please read the article carefully. After you read the article you will be asked about your view on the current and future European Union.

The consequences of Turkish accession to the EU

2 March 2018

In 2005, negotiations about Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) officially started. Today, the negotiations have stagnated, but will be continued soon. According to opponents of EU accession, there are considerable political consequences for Europe and the European population. Turkey is a big country (80 million inhabitants) and has more inhabitants than Germany. This means that it would instantly become the biggest EU country and would get a very important vote in the EU. Opponents fear that Turkey will 'take over' the EU and that countries such as The Netherlands will lose part of their say in Europe and in their own country. Turkey will indirectly become the boss in 'our own house'. A country like The Netherlands cannot block Turkish accession, not even if the Dutch would want to. Furthermore, Turks will be able to freely migrate to other EU countries in the future, which for example leads to the situation in which The Netherlands is less able to decide which migrants should or should not be allowed to their own territory.

Version economic threat

Het volgende artikel stond in een Nederlandse krant. Lees het artikel goed door. Na het artikel worden er vragen gesteld over uw kijk op de huidige en toekomstige Europese Unie.

De gevolgen van Turkse toetreding tot de EU

2 Maart 2018

In 2005 zijn de onderhandelingen over de toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie (EU) officieel begonnen. Momenteel staan deze onderhandelingen op een laag pitje, maar ze zullen over niet al te lange tijd hervat worden. Volgens tegenstanders van EU-toetreding zijn er aanzienlijke financiële consequenties en grote gevolgen voor de Europese arbeidsmarkt. Turkije kent een relatief zwakke economie, een relatief hoge werkloosheid (12% in Januari 2017) en rond 25% van de bevolking leeft rond de armoedegrens (meest recente "TUIK onderzoek"). De toetreding kan betekenen dat Turkije in de toekomst financieel moet worden ondersteund door andere EU lidstaten, zoals dat ook met Griekenland is gebeurd. Dit zou betekenen dat meer van het Nederlandse belastinggeld wordt besteed aan andere landen. Daarnaast kan dit leiden tot een toename van Turkse migranten die op zoek gaan naar werk in Europese landen, zoals Nederland. Dit kan betekenen dat de arbeids- en woningmarkt en ook de sociale voorzieningen in Nederland verder onder druk komen te staan.

A photo of the Turkish and the European flag was shown here

Translation to English:

The following article was published in a Dutch newspaper. Please read the article carefully. After you read the article you will be asked about your view on the current and future European Union.

The consequences of Turkish accession to the EU

2 March 2018

In 2005, negotiations about Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) officially started. Today, the negotiations have stagnated, but will be continued soon. According to opponents of EU accession, there are considerable financial consequences and big implications for the European labour market. Turkey has a relatively weak economy and relatively high unemployment rates (12% in January 2017) and around 25% of the population lives around the poverty threshold (most recent 'TUIK research'). The accession can mean that Turkey needs to be financially supported by other EU members, like has happened to Greece. This means more Dutch tax money would be spent to other countries. Furthermore, this might lead to an increase of Turkish migrants coming to try finding work in European countries, like the Netherlands. This would mean that the labour and housing market and also the social services in the Netherlands will further be under strain.

Version symbolic threat

Het volgende artikel stond in een Nederlandse krant. Lees het artikel goed door. Na het artikel worden er vragen gesteld over uw kijk op de huidige en toekomstige Europese Unie.

De gevolgen van Turkse toetreding tot de EU

2 Maart 2018

In 2005 zijn de onderhandelingen over de toetreding van Turkije tot de Europese Unie (EU) officieel begonnen. Momenteel staan deze onderhandelingen op een laag pitje, maar ze zullen over niet al te lange tijd hervat worden. Volgens tegenstanders van EU-toetreding zijn er grote culturele en religieuze verschillen tussen Turkije en de EU-landen zoals Nederland. Turkije kent een overheersend Islamitische bevolking (95%), is cultureel veel conservatiever dan de meeste EU-lidstaten en de democratie en mensenrechten staan er onder druk. De consequenties van toetreding van Turkije is dat de Joods-Christelijke identiteit van de EU verandert en dat Islamitische normen en tradities een belangrijkere rol gaan spelen binnen de EU. Daarnaast kan dit leiden tot een toename van Turkse migranten naar Europese landen, zoals Nederland. Dit kan betekenen dat de eigen cultuur en identiteit van landen zoals Nederland verder onder druk komen te staan.

A photo of the Turkish and the European flag was shown here

Translation to English:

The following article was published in a Dutch newspaper. Please read the article carefully. After you read the article you will be asked about your view on the current and future European Union.

The consequences of Turkish accession to the EU

2 March 2018

In 2005, negotiations about Turkish accession to the European Union (EU) officially started. Today, the negotiations have stagnated, but will be continued soon. According to opponents of EU accession, there are considerable cultural and religious differences between Turkey and EU countries, like The Netherlands. Turkey has a dominantly Islamic population (95%), is culturally a lot more conservative than most EU member states and democracy and human rights are under strain. The consequences of Turkish accession are that the European Jewish-Christian identity will be changing, and that Islamic norms and traditions will be playing an important role in the EU. Furthermore, this may lead to an increase in Turkish migration to European countries, like The Netherlands. This might mean that the culture and identity of countries like The Netherlands will further be under strain.

Version control

Het volgende artikel stond in een Nederlandse krant. Lees het artikel goed door. Na het artikel worden er vragen gesteld over uw kijk op de huidige en toekomstige Europese Unie.

De procedure van toetreding tot de EU

2 Maart 2018

In 1951 zijn de eerste stappen gezet naar samenwerking in Europa en de Europese gemeenschap (EU). Er zijn nu 28 landen lid. Om lid te worden moet een land een plan van aanpak volgen dat uit verschillende stappen bestaat. Eerst moet een verzoek tot toetreding worden ingediend bij de Raad van Europa. Vervolgens wordt nauwkeurig gecontroleerd of het desbetreffende land voldoet aan alle voorwaarden. Als de Raad van Europa vervolgens een positief advies geeft aan de Europese Commissie kunnen de officiële onderhandelingen over toetreding worden gestart. Tijdens die onderhandelingen wordt nagegaan of de voorwaarden overeenstemmen met de Europese wetgeving. Na goedkeuring door de Europese Commissie moet vervolgens het Europese Parlement met de toetreding instemmen. Deze zorgvuldige procedure wordt ook gevolgd bij mogelijke uitbreiding van de EU in de toekomst.

A photo of the European flag was shown here

Translation to English:

The following article was published in a Dutch newspaper. Please read the article carefully. After you read the article you will be asked about your view on the current and future European Union.

The procedure of accession to the EU

2 March 2018

In 1951, first steps were taken towards cooperation in Europe and the European community (EU). Twenty-eight states are member. To become a member, a state needs to follow an action plan which contains several steps. Firstly, a request for accession should be submitted to the Council of Europe. Afterwards, it will be contentiously checked whether the specific country complies to all these conditions. When the Council of Europe gives a positive advice to the European Commission, the official negotiations about accession can be started. In these negotiations, it is checked whether the conditions are in accordance with European jurisdiction. After the European Commission approves, the European Parliament should vote about the accession. This thorough procedure will also be followed with possible enlargement of the EU in the future.

Appendix 5.5. Standardized regression coefficients for the full model with all mediators simultaneously included, Study 2

	Perceived collective ownership threat	Perceived economic threat	Perceived symbolic threat	Opposition towards Turkish accession
Direct effects				
COT condition (vs control)	.137 (.061)*	.087 (.060)	.064 (.062)	.118 (.055)*
ET condition (vs control)	–.019 (.061)	.143 (.060)*	–.049 (.062)	.019 (.056)
ST condition (vs control)	–.074 (.060)	–.107 (.060)	–.019 (.061)	–.019 (.054)
Perceived COT				.181 (.101)
Perceived ET				.150 (.074)*
Perceived ST				.160 (.103)
Indirect effects				
COT condition → perceived COT				.025 (.018)
COT condition → perceived ET				.013 (.011)
COT condition → perceived ST				.010 (.012)
ET condition → perceived COT				–.003 (.011)
ET condition → perceived ET				.021 (.014)
ET condition → perceived ST				–.008 (.011)
ST condition → perceived COT				–.013 (.013)
ST condition → perceived ET				–.016 (.012)
ST condition → perceived ST				–.003 (.019)
Total effects				
COT condition (vs control)				.166 (.060)**
ET condition (vs control)				.029 (.061)
ST condition (vs control)				–.051 (.060)
R^2	.031	.045	.009	.234
N	338			

Note: COT = collective ownership threat; ET = economic threat; ST = symbolic threat. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

Nederlandse samenvatting

Achtergrond

Veel mensen hebben een intuïtief idee wat eigendom inhoudt. Kinderen kunnen al op jonge leeftijd een gevoel hebben dat iets 'van hen' is (Ross et al., 2015). Eigendom kan juridisch worden vastgelegd (bijvoorbeeld bij de aankoop van een huis), maar mensen kunnen ook een *gevoel* van eigendom hebben zonder juridisch eigenaar te zijn. Dit gevoel wordt psychologisch eigenaarschap genoemd (Pierce et al., 1991) en kan worden ervaren in relatie tot zowel materiële als immateriële zaken. Immaterieel eigendom kan bijvoorbeeld een idee, een liedje of een grap zijn. Materieel eigendom kan een voorwerp of een plek zijn, zoals bijvoorbeeld een hangplek, een buurtplantsoen, een buurt, of een land. Hoewel mensen het gevoel kunnen hebben dat zo'n plek van hen persoonlijk is ('van mij'), zullen de meesten van hen het gevoel hebben dat dit soort grondgebied aan een groep toebehoort ('van ons', Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). Een vriendengroep kan bijvoorbeeld spreken van 'onze hangplek' en een etnische groep kan een gevoel hebben dat een land 'van ons' is. Deze collectieve vorm van psychologisch eigenaarschap van grondgebied heeft nog weinig aandacht gekregen in de wetenschappelijke literatuur maar kan een belangrijke rol spelen in het verklaren van sociale houdingen en gedragingen (Blumenthal, 2010; Meagher, 2020). Het gevoel bepaalt namelijk niet alleen hoe een individu zich verhoudt tot een specifieke plek, maar ook hoe individuen en groepen zich verhouden tot elkaar.

In dit proefschrift staat de volgende onderzoeksvraag dan ook centraal: *Heeft collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van grondgebied sociale gevolgen, en zo ja, waarom en wanneer is dit het geval?* Ik richt me op twee soorten sociale gevolgen. Aan de ene kant onderzoek ik gevolgen voor sociale uitsluiting van andere groepen en aan de andere kant kijk ik naar prosociale gevolgen, zoals investering van tijd en geld in het grondgebied.

Om de onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden is het belangrijk om te weten wat eigendom precies inhoudt. Filosofen en juristen stellen dat een eigenaar het alleenrecht heeft om te bepalen wat er met eigendom gebeurt (Merrill, 1998). Dit recht voelt intuïtief voor de meeste mensen. Kinderen begrijpen al vanaf hun derde dat als iemand bepaalt wat er met speelgoed gebeurt, diegene waarschijnlijk de eigenaar van dat speelgoed is (Neary et al., 2009).

Een gevoel van collectief eigenaarschap van grondgebied zou er dus toe kunnen leiden dat mensen het gevoel hebben dat hun groep het alleenrecht heeft om te bepalen wat er met hun grondgebied gebeurt. Hierdoor kunnen zij het uitsluiten van andere groepen als vanzelfsprekend en acceptabel zien. Collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap kan

worden gebruikt om een onderscheid te maken tussen hen die als eigenaars worden gezien en hen die niet als eigenaars worden gezien. Welke groep wel en welke groep niet wordt gezien als eigenaar hangt af van welke argumenten gebruikt worden. 'Grondgebied is van de mensen die er als eerst waren' is een veelgebruikt en krachtig argument (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). De overtuiging dat dit argument belangrijk is om eigendom te bepalen wordt autochtonie genoemd. Deze overtuiging kan zorgen voor een duidelijk onderscheid tussen hen die er als eerst waren en hen die later zijn aangekomen. In relatie tot eigenaarschap van een land kan autochtonie leiden tot de sociale uitsluiting van immigranten die, per definitie, later in het land aankwamen en daarom niet als rechtmatige eigenaars worden gezien.

De eerste deelvragen die worden beantwoord in dit proefschrift gaan over de gevolgen voor sociale uitsluiting: *heeft collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap gevolgen voor sociale uitsluiting (deelvraag 1a) en kan dit worden verklaard door een ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen (deelvraag 1b)?* Ik richt me hierbij op het gevoel dat de eigen groep eigenaar is van een plek (collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap), maar ook op de algemene ideologische overtuiging dat een plek toebehoort aan hen die er als eerste waren (autochtonie).

Ik ben niet alleen geïnteresseerd *of* en *waarom* eigendomsgevoelens tot sociale uitsluiting leiden, maar ook *wanneer* dit het geval is. Intrinsiek aan eigendom is de mogelijkheid dat bezittingen onteigend worden. Hoe waarschijnlijker die mogelijkheid, hoe groter de kans dat mensen het gevoel krijgen dat hun collectief eigendom wordt bedreigd en dit kan tot meer sociale uitsluiting leiden. Mensen die bang zijn onteigend te worden kunnen hun grondgebied bijvoorbeeld gaan verdedigen of markeren. Een typisch voorbeeld hiervan is het plaatsen van een hek (zoals weergeven op de kaft van dit boek) om anderen van 'onze' plek te weren. De derde deelvraag gaat over deze *wanneer*-vraag: *leiden situaties die een bedreiging vormen voor collectief eigenaarschap tot meer sociale uitsluiting (deelvraag 1c)?*

Ik richt me niet alleen op de gevolgen voor sociale uitsluiting, maar ook op prosociale gevolgen. Het exclusieve recht om te bepalen is namelijk niet het enige belangrijke kenmerken van eigendom. Uit interviews blijkt dat veel mensen vinden dat een eigenaar de verantwoordelijkheid heeft om voor eigendom te zorgen (Furby, 1978). Als eigenaar van je huis bepaal je niet alleen wat er in het huis gebeurt, maar draag je ook de verantwoordelijk voor het huis. Eigenaren voelen zich vaak moreel verplicht of ervaren druk van hun omgeving om de verantwoordelijkheid voor hun eigendom te nemen. Mensen die een gevoel van collectief eigenaarschap over een plek ervaren kunnen daarom

meer geneigd zijn om in het belang van hun plek te handelen, in plaats van in het eigen belang, door zich voor hun plek in te zetten. De laatste deelvragen zijn dan ook: *heeft collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap prosociale gevolgen (deelvraag 2a) en kan dit worden verklaard door een gevoel van groepsverantwoordelijkheid (deelvraag 2b)?*

Om deze onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden, onderzoek ik eigendomsgevoelens in relatie tot verschillende typen grondgebied. Door me op eigendomsgevoelens van 'ons' land, 'onze' buurt, 'ons' buurtplantsoen, en 'onze' hangplek te richten, heb ik meer vertrouwen in de bevindingen en de theorieën die aan deze bevindingen ten grondslag liggen. Daarnaast kan mijn onderzoek bijdragen aan het begrijpen van uiteenlopende sociale situaties. Een gevoel dat een land 'van ons' is kan belangrijke politieke opvattingen en gedragingen helpen verklaren. Politici gebruiken eigendomsretoriek bijvoorbeeld om hun anti-immigratie standpunten kracht bij te zetten (de rechts-populistische Partij voor de Vrijheid gebruikte bijvoorbeeld de campagneslogan 'Nederland weer van ONS'), maar ook om een gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid aan te wakkeren (de Duitse sociaaldemocratische SPD gebruikte bijvoorbeeld de campagneslogan 'Aanpakken. Voor ons land'). Daarnaast kan het idee dat iets 'onze hangplek' is een belangrijke rol spelen in het sociale leven van jongeren, en kunnen eigendomsgevoelens over een buurt zorgen voor de uitsluiting van nieuwe buurtbewoners en meer inzet voor de buurt.

Samenvatting per hoofdstuk

In de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 van dit proefschrift beantwoord ik de onderzoeksvragen door middel van data-analyses. Hiervoor gebruik ik grootschalige enquêteonderzoeken onder Nederlanders en Britten. In hoofdstuk 2 richt ik mij op de gevolgen van collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van het land voor sociale uitsluiting (*deelvraag 1a*). Specifiek bekijk ik onder 1241 Nederlanders en 3519 Britten zonder migratieachtergrond in hoeverre autochtonie (de algemene ideologische overtuiging dat een land toebehoort aan hen die er als eerste waren) samenhangt met het idee dat immigranten minder recht zouden moeten hebben op sociale voorzieningen (welvaartschauvinisme) en met het idee dat etnische minderheden die al langer in het land wonen minder recht zouden moeten hebben op sociale voorzieningen (welvaartsetnocentrisme, Ford, 2016). De resultaten laten zien dat autochtonie inderdaad welvaartschauvinisme kan helpen verklaren, zelfs als rekening wordt gehouden met andere belangrijke verklaringen, zoals economisch egalitarisme, politieke oriëntatie, burgerschapsopvattingen en economische onzekerheid. Onder Britten zie ik verder dat autochtonie niet alleen welvaartschauvinisme ten aanzien van

immigranten verklaart, maar ook welvaartsetnocentrisme ten aanzien van etnische minderheden en Moslims. Autochtonie hangt echter niet samen met welvaartsetnocentrisme ten aanzien van zwarte Britten, wat doet vermoeden dat zwarte Britten worden gezien als onderdeel van de overkoepelende categorie 'Britten'. Hoewel mensen die autochtonie onderschrijven dus niet alle minderheden uitsluiten, trek ik uit hoofdstuk 2 de algemene conclusie dat eigendomsgevoelens over het land sociale uitsluiting tot gevolg kunnen hebben.

In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik opnieuw of eigendomsgevoelens over het land gevolgen hebben voor sociale uitsluiting (*deelvraag 1a*), maar ik bouw op drie manieren voort op de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 2. Ten eerste onderzoek ik eigendomsgevoelens in dit hoofdstuk niet als de algemene ideologische overtuiging dat een plek toebehoort aan hen die er als eerste waren (autochtonie), maar als het gevoel dat de eigen groep eigenaar is van een plek (collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap). Ten tweede richt ik me niet op de houding ten aanzien van sociale voorzieningen voor immigranten, maar op een meer algemene houding ten aanzien van immigranten. Daarnaast richt ik me ook op houdingen ten aanzien van Europese eenwording en een stem voor Brexit. Europese eenwording en het verlaten van de Europese Unie (EU) zijn belangrijke politieke thema's (De Wilde, 2011; Hobolt, 2016). Omdat eigendomsclaims vaak worden gebruikt in debatten over die onderwerpen, verwachtte ik dat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van toegevoegde waarde kan zijn in het verklaren van houdingen ten aanzien van de EU en het stemmen voor Brexit. Ten derde onderzoek ik in hoofdstuk 3 niet alleen *of* collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap gevolgen heeft voor sociale uitsluiting, maar ook of dit kan worden verklaard door een ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen wat er met het land gebeurt. Ik onderzoek dit onder 572 Nederlanders en 495 Britten zonder migratieachtergrond. De resultaten laten zien dat een sterker gevoel dat het land 'van ons' is samenhangt met negatievere houdingen ten aanzien van immigranten en Europese integratie, zelfs als rekening wordt gehouden met andere belangrijke verklaringen, zoals nationale identificatie, een gevoel van verbondenheid met het land, en het onderschrijven van principes van soevereiniteit. Onder Nederlanders kan deze relatie verklaard worden door een sterker gevoel dat 'wij' Nederlanders het alleenrecht hebben om te bepalen. Onder Britten hangen collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap en het ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen te sterk met elkaar samen om ze in de statistische analyses als twee verschillende concepten mee te nemen. Dit komt waarschijnlijk door de timing van de dataverzameling. Eigendom en het alleenrecht om te bepalen waren prominente thema's in het Brexit debat dat ervoor kan hebben gezorgd dat veel mensen de twee concepten als sterk met elkaar verweven zagen. Ten slotte

laten de resultaten zien dat Britten met negatievere houdingen ten aanzien van immigranten en Europese eenwording vaker voor 'leave' hebben gestemd in het Brexitreferendum uit 2016. Over het algemeen concludeer ik uit hoofdstuk 3 dat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van het land gevolgen heeft voor sociale uitsluiting en dat dit kan worden verklaard door een sterker gevoel dat 'wij' het hier voor het zeggen hebben. Echter, in sommige situaties zijn eigendomsgevoelens en een ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen zo sterk met elkaar verbonden dat ze niet empirisch onderscheiden kunnen worden.

In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik opnieuw *of* (*deelvraag 1a*) en *waarom* (*deelvraag 1b*) collectief psychologisch eigendom gevolgen heeft voor sociale uitsluiting, maar bouw ik hier op drie manieren op voort. Ten eerste onderzoek ik of collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap ook prosociale gevolgen heeft (*deelvraag 2a*) en of dit kan worden verklaard door een gevoel van groepsverantwoordelijkheid (*deelvraag 2b*). Ten tweede beantwoord ik deze vragen niet alleen in relatie tot het land, maar kijk ik ook naar eigendomsgevoelens in relatie tot de buurt en een buurtplantsoen. Ten derde, terwijl ik eigendomsgevoelens in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 heb gemeten door mensen verschillende stellingen voor te leggen, gebruik ik in hoofdstuk 4 ook een experimentele opzet. Met gebruik van stellingen kon ik in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 onderzoeken hoe verschillende variabelen met elkaar samenhangen (correlaties), maar een experimentele opzet is nodig om uitspraken te kunnen doen over of het één echt leidt tot het ander (causale verbanden). In de experimentele opzet leest één groep een verhaal dat eigendomsgevoelens oproept, terwijl een andere groep een verhaal krijgt te lezen wat deze gevoelens juist niet oproept. Door mensen willekeurig over de twee groepen te verdelen kan worden onderzocht wat het effect is van de opgeroepen eigendomsgevoelens. Onder Nederlanders blijkt dat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap leidt tot een sterker ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen en daarom tot de intentie om buitenstaanders uit te sluiten van 'onze' plek. Tegelijkertijd leidt collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap ook tot een sterker gevoel van groepsverantwoordelijkheid en daarom tot de intentie om tijd en geld te investeren in 'onze' plek. Deze resultaten komen voort uit drie verschillende datasets waarin collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap wordt gemeten in relatie tot het land (617 deelnemers), de buurt (784 deelnemers) en een buurtplantsoen (384 deelnemers). Op basis van hoofdstuk 4 concludeer ik dat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap zowel gevolgen voor sociale uitsluiting als prosociale gevolgen heeft en dat dit kan worden verklaard door respectievelijk een sterker ervaren alleenrecht om te bepalen en een sterker gevoel van groepsverantwoordelijkheid.

In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek ik *wanneer* eigendomsgevoelens gevolgen hebben voor sociale uitsluiting door me te richten op bedreiging van collectief eigenaarschap (*deelvraag 1c*). Ik onderzoek experimenteel of situaties die een bedreiging vormen voor collectief eigenaarschap ervoor zorgen dat mensen eerder geneigd zijn hun grondgebied te markeren en te verdedigen. Ik richt me op eigendomsgevoelens van zowel het land als een hangplek. Aan Nederlandse jongeren worden verschillende verhaaltjes voorgelegd over een denkbeeldige hangplek. Een willekeurige groep jongeren leest in het verhaaltje dat hun vriendengroep het eigenaarschap over 'hun' hangplek dreigt te verliezen. Een willekeurige andere groep jongeren leest dat hun vriendengroep niet of op een andere manier wordt bedreigd. De resultaten laten zien dat een situatie waarin andere groepen inbreuk maken op een hangplek die, in hun beleving, aan een vriendengroep toebehoort tot sterkere gevoelens van dreiging van collectief eigenaarschap leidt, en daarmee het markeren en verdedigen van de hangplek tot gevolg heeft. Op dezelfde manier zie ik onder Nederlandse volwassenen, dat als de potentiële Turkse toetreding tot de EU in een verhaaltje wordt gepresenteerd als een inbreuk op het eigendom van het land Nederland, dit leidt tot sterkere gevoelens van dreiging van collectief eigenaarschap, met meer weerstand tegen Turkse toetreding tot gevolg. Terwijl hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 4 laten zien dat sociale uitsluiting een gevolg kan zijn van het idee van autochtonie en een gevoel van psychologisch eigenaarschap, laat hoofdstuk 5 dus zien dat sociale uitsluiting specifiek wordt getriggerd in situaties die een dreiging vormen voor collectief eigenaarschap.

Discussie

Algemene conclusie

De algemene conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van grondgebied belangrijke sociale gevolgen heeft en dat onderzoek naar dit concept van toegevoegde waarde kan zijn voor de sociale wetenschappen. Het gevoel van collectief eigenaarschap kan zorgen voor negatieve relaties tussen groepen, maar stimuleert ook prosociaal gedrag in verschillende situaties.

Implicaties

'Omdat dit van ons is' wordt door veel mensen gezien als een acceptabel antwoord op vragen zoals 'waarom zorgen u en uw buren voor dat buurtplantsoen?' en 'waarom zijn immigranten niet welkom in uw land?'. Doordat collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap

twee gezichten kent, is het moeilijk om algemene beleidsvoorstellen te formuleren. Deze voorstellen hangen volledig af van het doel van het beleid. Als het doel is om relaties tussen groepen te verbeteren, kan worden geprobeerd gevoelens van collectief eigenaarschap te verminderen. Echter, als het doel is om een gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid aan te wakkeren en mensen zich meer te laten inzetten voor hun plek, kunnen beleidsmakers juist overwegen collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap te versterken. Beleidsmakers moeten zich bewust zijn van de verschillende gezichten van eigendomsgevoelens. Het verminderen van eigendomsgevoelens om relaties tussen groepen te verbeteren kan ten koste gaan van verantwoordelijkheidsgevoelens, en het versterken van eigendomsgevoelens om verantwoordelijkheidsgevoelens aan te wakkeren kan verslechterde relaties tussen groepen als bijwerking hebben.

Aanbevelingen voor vervolgonderzoek

Mijn onderzoek kent een aantal beperkingen die in de toekomst verder kunnen worden onderzocht. Zo heb ik mij enkel gericht op de gevolgen van collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap en het is minstens zo belangrijk om te begrijpen wat er ten grondslag ligt aan deze gevoelens. Onderzoekers kunnen zich richten op achtergrondkenmerken als geslacht, leeftijd, of sociaaleconomische status, maar ook op psychologische behoeftes aan controle, identiteit en een thuisgevoel (Pierce & Jussila, 2010). Daarbij heb ik me alleen gericht op collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van grondgebied en in de toekomst kan onderzocht worden of dezelfde theoretische mechanismen ook van toepassing zijn op collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap van bijvoorbeeld voorwerpen of immateriële zaken, zoals cultuur. Daarbij is er meer onderzoek nodig om beter te begrijpen hoe verschillende soorten dreiging met elkaar interacteren, vooral in relatie tot het land. In hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dreiging van collectief eigenaarschap sterk samen te hangen met andere vormen van dreiging (zoals economische en culturele dreiging). Toekomstig onderzoek kan inzicht geven wanneer en waarom verschillende soorten dreiging relevanter worden en sterker met elkaar samenhangen.

In de titel van dit proefschrift heb ik het over sociale *consequenties*, terwijl ik in sommige van de studies geen causaal verband heb kunnen testen. In de toekomst kunnen meer experimenten bepalen of collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap een oorzaak is van sociale houdingen en sociaal gedrag, of dat eigenaarschap ook kan worden gebruikt om bestaande houdingen en gedragingen te rechtvaardigen (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Een andere beperking van mijn onderzoek is dat ik eigendomsgevoelens van het land alleen heb

onderzocht onder mensen zonder migratieachtergrond. Hoewel een gevoel van collectief eigenaarschap van het land waarschijnlijk het breedst wordt gedragen onder deze groep, kan dit gevoel ook door mensen met een migratieachtergrond ervaren worden (Brylka et al., 2015). Onderzoek hiernaar kan relaties tussen groepen van twee kanten belichten en kan bijdragen aan het verklaren van sociale integratie. Verder heb ik alleen onderzocht *wanneer* collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap gevolgen heeft voor sociale uitsluiting, maar niet wanneer het prosociale gevolgen heeft. Toekomstig onderzoek kan bijvoorbeeld bekijken of sociale normen van belang zijn (Cialdini et al., 1990). Mensen zullen zich wellicht minder inzetten voor hun plek als ze het gevoel hebben dat hun groepsgenoten geen eigenaarschap over die plek ervaren en geen verantwoordelijkheid nemen. Hoewel dit proefschrift van toegevoegde waarde is voor de wetenschappelijke literatuur over collectief psychologisch eigenaarschap, heeft mijn onderzoek ook voor nieuwe vragen gezorgd en ik hoop dat deze in de toekomst beantwoord zullen worden.

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Tom Nijs was born in Winterswijk, the Netherlands on 29 October 1992. He completed his Bachelor's degree in Political Science at the Radboud University Nijmegen (2015), with an additional interdisciplinary honours programme. In 2017, he obtained his Master of Science degree in the research master programme Migration, Ethnic Relations, and Multiculturalism at Utrecht University (cum laude) and won the best student award based on his GPA. In September 2017, he started working as a PhD candidate at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer) at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS). He wrote his dissertation under supervision of Dr. Borja Martinovic and Prof. dr. Maykel Verkuyten. His work has appeared in Political Psychology, British Journal of Social Psychology, and Group Processes & Intergroup Relations.

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People can feel that their group owns a territory. For example, they can feel that a country belongs to their ethnic group ('this country is ours') or that their group of friends owns a hangout place ('this hangout place is ours'). This sense of collective ownership can have diverse social consequences. On the one hand, as ownership is accompanied by an exclusive right to determine what happens with what is owned, collective psychological ownership can lead to the exclusion of outsiders. On the other hand, as ownership also comes with a responsibility to take care of what is owned, collective psychological ownership can lead to prosocial behaviour to invest into the territory. Tom Nijs examines whether, why, and when collective psychological ownership of territories has social consequences. He uses large scale surveys and experiments to examine collective psychological ownership of the country, the neighbourhood, a local park, and a hangout place. He discusses how collective psychological ownership can offer insights in various social situations and can advance social scientific theory and research.

Tom Nijs conducted the present study as part of his PhD research at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (Ercomer) at Utrecht University, and the Interuniversity Centre for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).