To be magnanimous and grateful
The Entanglement of Cities and Empires in the Hellenistic Aegean

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An inscription of Miletos from 288/7 records the acceptance of gifts donated by Seleukos I to the sanctuary of Apollo at Didyma.\(^1\) The inventory of gifts is impressive. There is a variety of gold and silver vessels and other cultic objects, some of them Persian in style; precious incense from Arabia and India; and 1,000 sheep and 12 bulls for sacrifices (likely purchased locally). The inscription comprises a letter of king Seleukos to the Milesians, on whose territory the sanctuary of Apollo and Artemis was located, brought by the king’s Greek agent, Polianthes:

King Seleukos to the council and the people of Miletos, greetings. We have sent to the sanctuary of Didymaean Apollo, as offerings to the Savior Gods, the great lamp-stand and cups of gold and silver bearing inscriptions; ... [D]eposit them in the sanctuary, so that you may use them for libations and other uses on behalf of our health and fortune and the safety of the city, for which I wish and you pray. Carry out the written instructions of Polianthes and dedicate the objects sent to you and perform the sacrifice... I have written the list of the gold and silver vessels sent to the sanctuary so that you may know the type and the weight of each one. Farewell.\(^2\)

Seleukid patronage of the Didymaion is well attested, and the magnificence of the gifts is in keeping with Seleukos’ status and the vast resources at his disposal. But there is a problem. The inscription is unambiguously dated to the year 288/7 (ll. 1–6, not cited here), which means that the letter was sent more than five years before the Battle of Koroupedion (281), that is, at a time when western Asia Minor according to our historical atlases was part of the short-lived Lysimachid Empire. The inscription postdates by one year a well-known Milesian decree honoring Hippostrates of Miletos, Lysimachos’ stratēgos ‘of the Ionian cities’.\(^3\) Rather than accepting that an important polis like Miletos maintained

\(^{1}\) All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.
\(^{2}\) I.Didyma 424 (OGI 214), ll. 10–29 = RC 5.
\(^{3}\) I.Didyma 123, l. 29; Lund (1992) 136.
links with several dynasties simultaneously, historians have tried to save the alleged nation-state–like nature of ancient empires by assuming that Seleukos’ donations were ‘not political’.4

A comparable historical anomaly, in modern views, is the construction of the Olympieion in Athens by Antiochos Epiphanes, about a century later. Replacing a smaller, unfinished building of the Pisistratid era, this huge temple was not yet completed at the king’s death in 164.5 Vitruvius, however, described the Olympieion even in its unfinished state as ‘a work not only universally esteemed, but counted among the rarest specimens of magnificence’, and equated it with the Temple of Artemis at Ephesos and the Temple of Apollo at Didyma.6 Modern scholars often find it hard to reconcile Antiochos’ building activity with the perceived idea that at this time the Seleukid Empire was no longer part of the political landscape of mainland Greece. Antiochos’ benefactions to cities in mainland Greece, therefore, have been dismissed as apolitical, ‘cultural’ patronage. But can the construction of the biggest Greek temple of all times, located in the middle of the Pan-Hellenic center, Athens, and designed to house a colossal statue of the most powerful of the gods (and a symbol of kingship especially in Antiochos IV’s reign) really be thought of as a politically neutral act?7

The cases of the Didymaion and Olympieion illustrate two major themes that will be central to this chapter. The first is the crisscrossing of personal networks that could link a single polis to several imperial powers at the same time, often through the agency of distinct, rivalrous elite families or factions within that polis. The second theme is the entanglement of city and empire in the Hellenistic Aegean. I argue that cities and empires were mutually dependent, and that there was much less of an antithesis between them than is generally assumed. Often, the people dominating the imperial courts were the same people who dominated the cities. A decade or so before the acceptance of Seleukos’ donations to the Didymaion by the Milesian démos, Demodamas, a powerful citizen of Miletos and a guest friend of Seleukos I, had proposed a decree in honor of Seleukos’ son and later co-ruler, Antiochos I,8 and had been one of three

4 See Lund (1992) 136–8, with further references. 5 Vitru. De arch. 7.17; Strabo 9.1.17.
6 Vitru. De arch. 7.15; cf. Livy, 41.20.
7 Antiochos IV funded a theater and city walls at Tegea and Megalopolis, respectively (Livy, 41.20.6; the wall in Megalopolis was actually built, see Bringmann and Von Steuben (1995) no. 56); cf. Bringmann (1993) 15–16; Mittag (2006) 103–18. On the nature of Seleukid imperialism in Asia Minor and mainland Greece under Antiochos IV, see Strootman (2019) 187–92.
8 I.Didyma 479 (300/299 BCE).
commissioners charged with setting up a statue of Antiochos’ mother, Queen Apama. In 388/7, the personal networks that connected the Seleukids and powerful families within Miletos apparently were still operational (Demodamas at that time represented the Seleukids as stratēgos in Central Asia; we will return to him later).

This chapter departs from the premise that with few exceptions pre-modern Eurasian empires were not states. I approach empires instead as dynamic and intersecting networks of interaction and as essentially negotiated enterprises. In imperial situations, access to resources was commonly mediated by personal, often ritualized relationships rather than through formalized institutions because imperial rulers commonly invited local elites to participate in the imperial project. The idea that elites did so to preserve their privileges and social status is too simple: imperial conquest often coincided with shifts in the power balances within local communities as new persons or families rose to power. The network approach to empire allows us to see that in the Hellenistic Aegean distinct imperial projects were active at the same time, as Seleukids, Antigonids and Ptolemies, and eventually Romans too, competed to bring the same poleis into their respective spheres of influence. In this world of competing empires and a multitude of internally divided cities, royal euergetism was instrumental in the ensuing processes of negotiation.

To explore the significance of local royal euergetism in the wider context of ‘global’ empire, this chapter will focus on the cities of western Asia Minor in the early Hellenistic period. Owing to the relative abundance of epigraphic sources, it is here that we see most clearly the correlation between the conflicting interests of empires and shifting power relations among local elites. After a brief overview of the status quaestionis, we will first look at the actual practice of royal euergetism, and the different types of (material and immaterial) gifts and counter-gifts. We will then examine these benefactions in the context of the entanglement of city and empire in the Hellenistic Aegean.

I argue that royal benefactions to cities were part and parcel of a system of reciprocal gift exchange that regulated city–empire relations, and that the connections between imperial and civic elites were established

9 I. Didyma 480 (299/8 BCE).
10 Foundational is Mann (1986) with Tilly (1990); successful case studies include Wallace-Hadrill (1989); Hintze (1997); D’Altroy (2001); Barfield (2008); Barkey (2008); Hämäläinen (2008); Faruqui (2012). Cf. Gellner (1983), pointing out that the elites on top of communities were often linked horizontally with other local elites.
11 Strootman (2006a) (Jerusalem) and (2013b) (Babylon).
primarily by means of personal connections such as ritualized friendship (*philia*) and guest-friendship (*xenia*). As a result, the relation between polis and dynasty was framed in friendship terminology too. I furthermore argue that because of the inter-imperial competition converging in the Aegean, the representatives of poleis in this region had a relatively strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the imperial dynasties and that the outcome of the ensuing negotiations often was the actual protection of civic rights by powerful royal patrons.

**Cities and Empires in the Hellenistic Aegean**

The Hellenistic Age, like the preceding Achaemenid period, was an age of empire. The Macedonian dynasties that dominated the political geography of western and central Afro-Eurasia from the mid-fourth to mid-second centuries – first the Argeads and later the Seleukids, Ptolemies and Antigonids – were different from their Persian predecessors in many respects. One of the most striking differences was their relatively greater reliance on cities and on civic elites. Cities were cornerstones of Macedonian hegemony. The Hellenistic empires were military organizations above all; cities were loci of surplus accumulation where these empires could obtain the capital, manpower and other resources that they needed for the upkeep of their military capabilities.¹²

The key to understanding royal benefactions in Aegean cities lies in assessing the place of cities within the imperial projects of the respective empires. The interaction between city and empire has been a central problem in Hellenistic scholarship since the appearance of Heuss’s *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus* (1937) and Bickerman’s *Institutions des Séleucides* (1938). While Bickerman presented a rather legalistic and unitary image of the Seleukid ‘state’, Heuss saw a more complex and pluralistic world and suggested that kings protected poleis because of their pivotal place in the international political order. Aalders elaborated this point by arguing that kings favored poleis because polis society was congenial to the subjects on whom they most relied: the Greeks.¹³

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¹² For the dynamics of Hellenistic inter-imperial warfare and the role of cities, see Strootman (2014a) 49–53; cf. Austin (1986); Strootman (2011a) 145. For the omnipresence of war in Hellenistic Greece and Asia Minor, see Chaniotis (2005) 1–17.

¹³ Aalders (1975) 294–5; I owe this reference to Andrew Erskine, who himself argued that Hellenistic royal courts resembled poleis in their sociocultural setup because of the predominance of Greek *philoi* (lecture at Pennsylvania State University, April 25, 2015).
Lately, the study of the Seleukids’ relationships with Babylonian cities has become an additional major focus of research.\textsuperscript{14}

Royal benefactors have been described as powerful outsiders, encroaching, so to speak, upon the internal affairs of the poleis. It is safe to assume that these Macedonian kings were not primarily motivated by altruistic considerations. But were they outsiders? And was royal interference really bad for polis autonomy? To briefly address the first question (the second will be this chapter’s main issue): Hellenistic kings acted as the figureheads of dynasties rather than as autonomous individuals. When dealing with these dynasties, poleis in fact dealt with sociopolitical groups, more specifically the core members of royal household and court society, and the wider network of imperial agents converging at the dynastic center(s). A polis similarly is not a monolithic entity. Poleis consist of people who are likely divided by social hierarchies and economic inequality, and often by ethnocultural diversity as well.\textsuperscript{15} Civic elites in particular were disunited time and again by conflicting political and familial interests.\textsuperscript{16} Empires took advantage of this disunity, supporting oligarchic or popular regimes as fitted them best.

In the Aegean region, the intermediaries between city and court – the so-called philoi of the king – predominantly came from poleis in the region itself.\textsuperscript{17} These philoi had Greek identities. Some of them became imperial leaders and belonged to both social systems, the court and the polis.\textsuperscript{18} They represented the interests of the cities at court and the interests of the court in the cities.\textsuperscript{19} For instance in a letter to Miletos, Seleukos II assures the citizens that he is well disposed to them because the friends of his deceased predecessor (πατρικοὶ φίλοι), Antiochos II, informed him about the attitude of Miletos toward his family.\textsuperscript{20} Moreover, the older view that the Hellenistic kings were cultural shapeshifters who never actively promoted ‘Hellenization’ is no longer tenable. Following the example of the Hekatomnids and Argeads, a distinct form of Hellenic elite culture did develop at the royal courts of the Seleukids and especially the Ptolemies. Ptolemaic court poetry overwhelmingly deals with local mythologies from

\textsuperscript{14} Kuhrt and Sherwin-White (1991); cf. Boiy (2004); more recently Erickson (2011); Strootman (2013b); Clancier and Monerie (2014); Kosmin (2014b); Stevens (2014).
\textsuperscript{15} Schuler (1998) 195–6; Bertrand (2005); Zuiderhoek, Chapter 9 in this volume.
\textsuperscript{16} Ober (2000); Börm (2015).
\textsuperscript{18} On Hellenistic court society, see Herman (1997); Weber (1997); Strootman (2013a), (2014a).
\textsuperscript{19} Strootman (2011a) 148–50.
\textsuperscript{20} Welles, RC 22, II. 7–9.
western Asia Minor and southern Greece, and there can be no doubt that the elites of Greek, Hellenized and Hellenizing poleis in the Aegean were an important audience for these writings. Evidence from the Seleukid Empire furthermore reveals that the imperial ‘Greekness’ of the court was emulated by non-Greek local elites. From an emic point of view, these elites selectively adopted the Hellenism of the court as a prestigious, cosmopolitan identity that made them appear, literally, as ‘men of the world’ and distanced them from less successful groups; from an etic point of view, imperial Hellenism – including the use of koinē Greek as an international language – created cohesion among culturally disparate elites and facilitated transcultural, horizontal interactions between these elites.

Court emulation coincided with the wide geographical spread of polis institutions and citizenship, particularly in the second-century Seleukid Empire. Due to these developments, old Aegean poleis became models for new ones. Athens especially became a ‘cultural capital’ of the expanding Hellenistic world.

Thus, two interrelated phenomena profoundly influenced the geopolitical importance of the Aegean. First, philoi from the Aegean poleis had leading roles in the establishment of Seleukid and Ptolemaic hegemony through worldwide networks of connectivity. Second, aspects of Greek polis culture became pervasive in these cosmopolitan empires. As a result, the Aegean was transformed from a frontier zone of empire under the Achaemenids into a central hub of imperial ‘globalization’, a vibrant contact zone where the rival ambitions of three empires met and often clashed.

A further difference from the relative unity upheld previously by the Achaemenids has already been pointed out: the severe inter-imperial competition that made Hellenistic history so very turbulent and violent. Present scholarly interpretations of the age have radically abandoned the image of a ‘balance of power’, intentionally maintained by a variety of bounded, centralized states that looked conspicuously like modern

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21 See Strootman (2017c), with references to current debates.
22 Strootman (2006a), (2013a), (2013b); cf. Canepa (2017) and Strootman (2017a) on the emergence of Iranian dynastic identities in the later Seleukid Empire.
23 See Hoo (2018), arguing that in Ay Khanoum Greek style was used for public architecture, while it significantly was not adopted in the religious sphere.
24 Schmitz (2011); Teearden (2013) 220; see also Bringmann (2002).
25 On ancient globalization, see Pitts and Versluys (2013) and Versluys (2015); for Hellenistic Eurasia as a ‘globalized’ world of transcultural exchange, see Manning (2011); Strootman (2013b); Hoo (2013), (2018); and Versluys (2016).
26 Already Lévêque (1968); also Austin (1986). Against the notion of a ‘balance of power’, see more recently Ager (2003); Meeus (2014); Strootman (2014c).
nation-states in their alleged recognition of a multistate international order (and were accordingly labeled ‘Syria’ or ‘Egypt’). New views, by contrast, emphasize the universalistic, imperial nature of these empires, as well as the diversity of lesser polities arranged under the aegis of imperial overlordship in an ever-shifting hierarchical order. Using Realist international-relations theory, Arthur Eckstein has analyzed the ‘Hellenistic world of war’ as a multipolar interstate anarchy. But there was system in this apparent chaos. After the tumultuous warfare of the Diadochs, the core conflict of the Hellenistic world consistently was the relentless antagonism of the Ptolemies and Seleukids, who confronted each other directly in six major wars between 274 and 168. These wars are known as the Syrian Wars, but that is a misnomer: much more was at stake than the control of (southern) Syria. Smaller and bigger wars in the eastern Mediterranean were directly or indirectly connected to the Seleukid-Ptolemaic antagonism. The principal arena for the military and diplomatic clashes between the two powers and their various vassals and allies was the Aegean, and what was mainly at issue there was the goodwill and support of the poleis.

The Hellenistic Polis: The State of the Question

The enduring vitality of the polis after ‘Chaironeia’ (338) has been amply demonstrated, particularly by Philippe Gauthier and Louis Robert. The number of poleis in fact increased substantially owing to city foundations and refoundations by Alexander and his successors. The Hellenistic period moreover saw the widespread adoption of polis institutions and ideology by non-Greek communities, as well as the spread of civic monuments associated with the polis – gymasion, theater, bouleuterion – to Central Asia and the western Mediterranean. It is clear that the polis did not

30 Gauthier (1983); also see (1989) and (1993), persuasively arguing that the majority of Hellenistic poleis were democracies. For current trends and debates, see Zuiderhoek, Chapter 9 in this volume, and the introduction in Wallace (2014); see further Zuiderhoek (2008); Hamon (2009); Alston and Van Nijf (2011); Strootman (2011a).
31 On the significance of public space in the post-classical polis, see Dickenson and Van Nijf (2013); cf. Dickenson (2012) on the monumentalization of the agora as expression of changing power
simply ‘survive’ despite the emergence of Hellenistic kingship, but that civic autonomy and democratic institutions flourished because of the protection offered by the monarchies, and there indeed may have been a ‘Hellenistic democratic revolution’, particularly in Asia Minor. But were the Hellenistic poleis really democratic? Recent investigations have shown that they were. Democratic institutions spread widely in the Hellenistic period. We should not equate Ancient Greek democracy with the radical supremacy of the ekklēsia over other political bodies as it had sometimes existed in Athens. As Paolo Tucci has shown, the contemporary term dēmokratia was a technical term for the combined legislative and administrative institutions of the polis, and in narrative sources more generally denoted republican (i.e. non-monarchical) polities of any form.

This does not imply that we should understand the Hellenistic polis in terms of continuity. A noticeable new trend is, for instance, the growing emphasis on civic autonomy as signified by the prominence of the concepts autonomia, eleutheria and dēmokratia in public decrees. Throughout the Hellenistic period, imperial leaders from Alexander to Antony presented themselves as liberators of cities, deriving substantial popularity and political success (not to mention divine honors) from actually keeping their promises. By making the ‘freedom of the Greeks’ the key idea in their propaganda vis-à-vis the poleis in and around the Aegean, Macedonian rulers continued an earlier Achaemenid practice but hugely increased its significance, elaborating the polis ideal in interaction with the representatives of local elites with whom they negotiated alliances.

relations; Heinle (2008) examining monumental beautification as a means to boost the prestige of a polis; and Zuiderhoek (2014) on the role of civic elites in the monumentalization of public space in the Roman period. In the Hellenistic period, the agora became a Mediterranean-wide, transcultural phenomenon expressing civic communal identity; cf. Thomsen (2008); Cavalier, Descat and Des Courtils (2011); and Wolf (2014). Rheidt (2015) shows that the increasing autonomy of Pergamon and other poleis in Asia Minor found expression in building activities in the public spaces of these cities.

33 Dmitriev (2005); Grieb (2008); Carlsson (2010); Mann and Scholz (2012); Zuiderhoek (2014). Ma (2013) argues that the point of honorific decrees is to make clear who is doing the honoring: ‘any individual name occurred [only] once, but the community (ho dēmos) recurred’ (125).
34 Tucci (2003). Also see Robinson (1997), showing that popular government was not originally an Athenian phenomenon, but a gradual and widespread development in a number of poleis from the sixth century; cf. Robinson (2011) on the even wider spread of democracy among poleis in the classical period.
35 On eleutheria as a political slogan, see Dixon (2007); Dmitriev (2010); Meissner (2013); Bugh (2014); Wallace (2014). The conventional view that the slogan of Greek freedom was fake is defended, e.g. by Dmitriev (2010) and Luraghi (2013) 11–12, who holds that monarchy was anathema to the Greek mind and that the single most important characteristic of a polis was ‘an environment of relative flat hierarchies with a strong underlying current of egalitarianism’.
It was normal for cities in the Ancient World to have self-rule. To make cities ‘unfree’ was costly and risky – and in most cases pointless. The conventional assertion, expressed most strongly by Orth,36 that Greek cities lost their independence to the powerful Macedonian kings, still lacks an explanation why these rulers desired to do that and how they were able to do it, that is, how the alleged imperial governing of cities was accomplished in actual practice and what it meant. This question applies also to Bickerman’s more sophisticated argument that poleis after being conquered were stripped of their formal rights and then received them back by the grace of the benevolent king.37 Were these warlords really that powerful? But at least Bickerman challenged the simplistic idea that royal benevolence toward cities was a charade to cover up ruthless exploitation. In 1941 Magie questioned the modern juxtaposition of city and empire more forcefully, arguing instead that the relationship between monarchy and polis ‘was that of an “alliance” for mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a third Power’.38

The subjugation of so many cities simply was beyond the military capabilities of the empires. Of course, premodern empire-builders from the Assyrian kings to the Mongol khans selectively used extreme violence against cities, and the Macedonian basileis were no exception. But they could attack with full force only one major city at a time. They did so only if they had no other choice or to set an example, usually in retaliation for alleged treachery (and any resistance to empire qualified as such). The severity of the Macedonian punishment of Thebes and Tyre in 335 and 332 are well-known examples. Legitimization for these acts of violence was derived from the kings’ religious duty to safeguard what the Persian imperial inscriptions called arta (‘truth’), known to the Greeks as kosmos, the divinely ordained situation of worldwide peace and order. In both royal letters and honorific decrees for kings, order/chaos terminology is omnipresent: termination of internal stasis, liberation from tyranny and restoration of ‘ancestral’ laws, relieving a city from famine, and more generally the establishment of universal peace.39 Often the aim was to restore overthrown, ‘legitimate’ regimes.

37 Bickerman (1938) (who also was keenly aware that Seleukid power rested primarily on the mutual ‘goodwill’ (eunoia) between ruler and ruled; cf. Bickerman (1983) 7).
38 Magie (1941) 185–6.
39 See Ober (2000) on the importance of stasis anxiety in Greek political thought and Börm (2015) on internal power struggles in Aegean poleis during the Roman Civil Wars.
The use of force against walled cities moreover could result in humiliating failure even for the most powerful of kings. This was a risk typical of Hellenistic warfare, where cities could potentially obtain the help of rival kings. The current rethinking of the post-classical polis in terms of increasing vitality has led to a better awareness of the considerable military capabilities of poleis. Cities like Sparta, Byzantion and Rhodes were military middle powers in international conflicts; other poleis successfully joined forces in military confederacies, for instance, the Achaian League. The decisive roles of poleis in the big wars of the big empires stimulated the improvement of civic military institutions, most of all the *ephebeia*. Indeed, defensive capability came to be seen as a precondition for being a polis, as this was directly connected to both the ideology and the practice of autonomy. From the late fourth century, more and more cities were transformed into heavily fortified strongholds, as Hellenistic sites like Messene, Kaunos and Perga still impressively show. Such fortifications were not merely defensive. They turned cities into weapons of war. That too made the support of poleis so very important for rulers.

Free cities could of course be liable to royal interference and could be subjected to taxation or garrisoning. Paradoxically, the standardized desire of cities to be ‘ungarrisoned’ at first sight appears to be more ideologically motivated than the idea of autonomy. Garrisons were not inevitably disadvantageous for cities. Garrisons provided protection, and mercenary garrisons were therefore sometimes hired by cities themselves. The principal dispute probably was the question of who controlled the garrison and whom the garrison itself was supposed to control. A comprehensive and systematic comparison of the specific historical circumstances that led to the establishment of garrisons and the

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41 Shipley and Hansen (2006) 60 describe the *ephebeia* as ‘the most important public institution’ of the Hellenistic polis; also νέοι, νεώτεροι, νεανίσκοι etc. were institutions aimed at training citizen soldiers, and the distinctions between these age groups and ephebes is often unclear; cf. Chankowski (2010) 236–317 and Kennell (2013). For the military functions of the *ephebeia*, see Chankowski (2010) 319–82; Boulay (2014) 33–47; Knoepfler (2015).


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impositions of restrictive measures or sanctions, however, is a venture that lies beyond the scope of this chapter.

The Financial Resources of Kings and Cities

As we saw above, Hellenistic poleis often had sufficient resources for troops and fortifications. The typical Hellenistic monumentalization of public space, too, required massive investments. It has been assumed that in the early Hellenistic period kings paid for all this and that only with the decline and disappearance of the big empires local benefactors assumed this role. Though it remains difficult to assess the precise impact of private benefactors, it can no longer be assumed that Hellenistic poleis were dependent on external support to finance public buildings and military installations.  

Let us also consider whether kings were able to bestow rich material benefactions on cities. Were their financial resources sufficient to fund building activities on a grand scale in so many cities? Kings of course were not rich simply because they claimed to be rich in public presentations of imperial ἑρμήνευσις such as the Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphos. The modern historian should be wary of taking these standard claims, like the claim of autocratic power, too literally. In previous publications, this author has argued that despite the riches of Mesopotamia or Egypt, the massive military expenses of the overextended Seleukid and Ptolemaic Empires exceeded the little regular revenue they had. Contrary to a view once held by economic historians, the Hellenistic empires were not centralized states, and there was no structural ‘state intervention’ in economic activity or an elaborate system of taxation outside a limited number of regions like the Fayum and Babylonia. The upkeep of the court, too, required vast status expenditures. To acquire sufficient capital, kings had to beg, steal and borrow from, respectively, cities, opponents and courtiers. Narrative sources consistently point out financial problems of kings. Ptolemy V, when asked by one of his courtiers where he would find sufficient funds for an upcoming campaign against the Seleukids, ‘pointed

46 Meier (2011) emphasizes the role of private benefactors; for a different view, see Eck (1997), suggesting that public buildings in the later Hellenistic period were mainly financed from public rather than private funds. On these debates, see Zuiderhoek (2005), evaluating the economic impact of private donations to the polis, and von Reden, Chapter 3 in this volume.  

to his *philoi* and said: “There, walking about, are my money-bags”.

Antiochos III’s campaign against an uprising of Macedonian governors in the Upper Satrapies (the so-called Revolt of Molon, 223–221) was financed by a single courtier, Hermeias, whose influence at court increased accordingly. In the Treaty of Apameia (189), the same king agreed to pay the Romans 15,000 talents for the expenses of the war, but we are told that the king had to ‘press for funds’. Lack of means could partially be resolved by distributing immaterial gifts that only kings could give. For instance, they could allocate status to individuals by granting them honorific titles, accompanied by such material tokens of favor as purple robes or bowls and dishes from the king’s table. Successful warfare was a means to acquire booty, slaves and land to give to military leaders in return for their loyalty and support. But warfare was not always successful.

The relatively weak financial position of kings, generally speaking, is consistent with their reluctance to give to cities money or things that cost a lot of money (not counting gifts to deities and incidental gifts of oil, grain or timber). In exceptional cases, kings made surprisingly rich benefactions, usually following successful warfare and territorial expansion. But, looking over the evidence, this seems to have been quite uncommon. Instead, kings in general preferred to confer immaterial benefactions upon cities. Bringmann has repeatedly made this point, emphasizing that cities honored kings most often for protecting their autonomy and other essential aspects of being a polis, and rarely for material benefactions. Material euergetism is mostly a later Hellenistic phenomenon, to be associated, not with the big empires, but with localized, lesser kingdoms like Pergamon, Bithynia or Pontos, and with civic benefactors.

In sum, considerable wealth was accumulated in the cities, and kings by means of immaterial benefactions tried to tap into that wealth. This is not a surprising conclusion. Honorific inscriptions regularly mention gold or silver crowns given by cities to the kings. Other epigraphic and narrative sources mention a variety of tribute (φόρος), regular taxes (τα βασιλικα τέλη) and incidental contributions (συντάξεις or εἰσφοραί) paid by the cities to the dynasties. This suggests a more ‘symbiotic’ relationship between city and empire: poleis needed formal acknowledgment

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48 Diod. Sic. 29.29; cf. 30.15. 49 Polyb. 5.50–51; cf. Herman (1997); Strootman (2011b).
50 Diod. Sic. 29.10 and 15; cf. Polyb. 21.40; Livy, 38.37.
52 See Boulay (2014) 309–35.
and effective protection of civic rights; kings needed money and support against their rivals.

**Material Benefactions and the Patronage of Sanctuaries**

Material benefactions more often than not were given to sanctuaries, preferably sanctuaries with a wider, supra-local radius. These were either sanctuaries that created cohesion among communities in a particular region, such as the Letoon (Lykia), Panionion (Ionia) or Esagil (Babylonia). Or they were transregional, namely, pan-Hellenic sanctuaries like Delphi, Olympia or Didyma.\(^{53}\) Kings could strengthen the position of particular cities like Miletos or Xanthos by favoring sanctuaries on their territory (here, respectively, the Didymaion and the Letoon), or even promote a cult’s wider appeal, as, for example, in the case of Achaemenid and Hekatomnid support of the pan-Karian sanctuary of Zeus Karios at Labraunda, or the Seleukid patronage of Hierapolis-Bambyke.\(^{54}\)

A good example of the first category – patronage of regional sanctuaries – are the Seleukid benefactions to the central Judean cult of Yahweh–Zeus Olympios at Jerusalem, about which the second book of Maccabees says that ‘the kings themselves honored the place and glorified the temple with the finest presents, so that even Seleukos (IV), the King of Asia, defrayed from his own revenues all the expenses connected with the service of the sacrifices’.\(^{55}\) ‘The famous ‘Jerusalem Charter’, a letter of Antiochos III to an official called Ptolemaios (after 200), combines the language of Aegean polis decrees with local ideology and law to the benefit of both empire and local priesthood:

King Antiochos to Ptolemaios, greetings. Since the Jews, upon our first entrance in their country, demonstrated their munificence (*philotimia*) towards us, and when we came to their city, received us in a splendid manner, and came to meet us with their council (*gerousia*) and gave abundant provisions to our soldiers, and to the elephants, and joined with us in ejecting the garrison of the Egyptians that were in the citadel, we have thought fit to reward them, and to retrieve the condition of their city... First, we have determined, on account of their piety towards God, to bestow on them, as a pension, for their sacrifices of animals that are fit for sacrifice, for wine, and oil, and frankincense, the value of 20,000 pieces of silver, and [six] sacred artabae of fine flour, with one 1,460 medimni of


\(^{54}\) Carstens (2011); Karlsson (2015).

\(^{55}\) 2 Macc. 3:2–3.
wheat, and 375 medimni of salt... I also want the work on the Temple to be finished, and anything else to be rebuilt that needs to be rebuilt... and let the entire people live according to their own laws; and let the council, and the priests, and the scribes of the Temple, and the sacred singers, be discharged from poll-tax and the crown tax and all other taxes.\textsuperscript{56}

Several themes that are familiar aspects of the Aegean inscriptions occur here too: the liberation from an allegedly hostile garrison, the restoration of a traditional order through the granting of the right to live in accordance to one’s own laws, and the benefactions made to the deity and his sanctuary, rather than directly to the people.

The preference for the religious sphere as ‘contact zone’ between local and ‘global’ elites is typical of early Hellenistic imperialism.\textsuperscript{57} Sanctuaries constituted neutral spaces where people could interact under the impartial supervision of a collectively recognized divine power, having accepted in advance certain ritualized modes of behavior. This does not mean that religious patronage was apolitical.

A Milesian decree from the 290s honoring Antiochos (the future king Antiochos I Soter) shows how the religious sphere, namely, Apollo’s sanctuary at Didyma, serves as neutral zone for the interactions between dynasty and polis in the Aegean:

Resolved by the \textit{demos}. Motion of the \textit{synedroi}. Demodamas, son of Aristeides, proposed the motion. Since Antiochos, the eldest [son] of King Seleukos, previously displayed great goodwill and zeal continuously for the Milesian people and now, seeing his own father exerting every effort on behalf of the sanctuary at Didyma (and) judging that it would be good to follow his father’s [policy], promises to construct a stoa one \textit{stadiōn} (in length) for the god in the city from which shall be derived every year income, to be spent for the maintenance of the sanctuary at Didyma... It has been resolved by the Milesians that they praise [Antiochos] for his reverence for the god and his goodwill [toward the] Greeks; and that there shall be given to him [for the stoa] whichever spot the architect who is chosen, and the men appointed by Antiochos may designate. The \textit{tamiai} and the \textit{prytaneis} in charge shall deposit the proceeds of the stoa and lease them in the way the People resolve.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} Joseph, \textit{AJ} 12.3.3–4, trans. Austin. For the Charter’s authentic core, see still Bickerman (1935); cf. (1948); and Gauger (1977).

\textsuperscript{57} Strootman (2013b), (2018).

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{OGI} 213 = \textit{I.Didyma} 479, trans. Burstein. For an alternative interpretation, see von Reden, Chapter 5 in this volume. The various officials and governmental bodies mentioned in the Milesian inscriptions are discussed by Dmitriev (2005) 64–76.
While the tamiai and the prytaneis in charge of the money may represent the dēmos, they are also elite figures. But they are not the most important persons here: the motion is proposed by Demodamas, a Milesian citizen and philos of Seleukos and Antiochos. Demodamas is the only individual apart from the crown prince who is mentioned by name. His leading role suggests he secured the benefaction in the first place. The execution of the building moreover is assigned to men appointed by Antiochos.

The honors voted for Antiochos, as proposed by Demodamas (not cited here), give the king a place in the city as an honorary citizen of sorts: his name is to be inscribed on the stoa; a bronze equestrian statue of him will be set up; and he will be granted free meals in the prytaneion and, interestingly, exemption from all taxes. The other honors concern the future king’s participation in local religion: front seats in the theater during the Dionysia and the Didymeia festivals and promanteia at the oracle for himself and his descendants.

The Freedom of the Greeks

In the previous section, material gifts were discussed. These were rare for kings to give and almost always connected with the religious sphere, that is, given to a deity rather than to the dēmos. But the term εὐεργεσία could allude to both material and immaterial benefactions. In honorific decrees for kings, immaterial benefactions comprised the establishment of peace; the creation, preservation or restoration of civic freedom; and a wide range of privileges such as ἔτελεια and ἁσυλία.59 Greek parlance distinguishes, more or less, between the self-rule of a polis (συνοικία), rule by citizens (δημοκρατία) and sovereignty (ἐλευθερία). For reasons discussed in the introduction to this chapter, protection of cities is a common feature of empires, and to present acts of conquest as acts of liberation is a commonplace of imperial ideology. However, the Aegean background of the Hellenistic dynasties induced them to draw upon the specific traditions of polis ideology and terminology, which subsequently became more pronounced in the language of the decrees,60 and spread beyond the

59 Bringmann (1993) 9. The epigraphical, archaeological and narrative sources for royal euergetism in Greek cities are collected by Bringmann and Steuben (1995), with full bibliography to 1990, and for discussion, see Bringmann and Steuben (2000).

60 Cf. Shipley and Hansen (2006) 62: ‘In the Classical period, independence (autonomia) was not yet an indispensable feature of the concept of the polis. Now, at the very time when most poleis were dependent rather than independent, autonomia became the explicit ideal and goal of the polis.’
Greek world, as we saw illustrated by the example of the Jerusalem Charter.

In 315 Antigonos I Monophthalmos famously proclaimed that all poleis were to be ‘free, ungarrisoned, and autonomous.’ The historicity of this passage in Diodoros is confirmed by two inscriptions from Skepsis, both dated to 311. The first contains Antigonos’ letter to the Skepsians:

we exercised [zeal for the] liberty [of the Greeks?], making for [this reason] no small concessions and distributing money besides ... We sent Aristodemos and Aischylos and Hegesias to draw up an agreement (with Ptolemy). They have now returned with the pledges, and the representative of Ptolemy, Aristoboulos, came to receive them from us. Know then that a truce has been made and that peace is established. We have written in the treaty that all the Greeks are to swear to aid each other in preserving their freedom and autonomy, [so that] freedom will be secured for all the Greeks when both they and the men in power are bound by oaths.

The second inscription records a Skepsian decree in which Antigonos is awarded cultic honors in return for his benefactions:

Resolved by the démos, since Antigonos has been responsible for great goods for the city and for the rest of the Greeks, to praise Antigonos and to rejoice with him over what has been done; and for the city to rejoice also with Greeks at the fact that, being free and autonomous, they will continue [for] the future to exist in peace. In order that Antigonos may be honored in a manner worthy of what has been done and that the démos may be seen to render thanks for the good things it has already received, (be it resolved) to set aside a precinct for him and to make an altar and to set up as fine an image as possible; and for the sacrifice and the festival to take place in his honor each year, just as it was even formerly carried out; and to crown him with a gold crown of 100 gold [staters]; and to crown also Demetrios and Philip, each with (a crown of) fifty gold pieces; and to proclaim the crowns [at the] contest during the festival; and for the city to sacrifice (the offering for the) glad tidings sent by Antigonos; and for all the citizens to wear garlands; and for the treasurer to provide the expenditure for these things. (Resolved) also to send him gifts of friendship ... Expressions of joy abound in this decree, and, with the emphasis on his establishment of universal peace in Antigonos’ original letter, they place the concept of freedom firmly in the world of imperial ideology; to be noted in particular is the eschatological image of empire as a situation of enduring peace and prosperity. Important too is the description in this

62 RC 1 = OGI 5, ll. 1–3, 47–61; trans. Welles.  
63 OGI 6, ll. 10–38; trans. Welles.  
text of the interaction between city and king as a form of reciprocal gift exchange in the context of *philia*.

The establishment of peace is not often seen as a form of euergetism. But it is presented in these famous inscriptions as the principal benefaction, and as prerequisite for freedom and autonomy. The granting of autonomy, and the awarding of honors in return, are local phenomena. But they result from developments on a wider, global scale. The increasing international standardization of the rhetoric of freedom in civic decrees shows that the context was more than local.⁶⁵ Already in the Achaemenid Empire, cities had been autonomous,⁶⁶ and when dealing with cities in the Aegean, the Achaemenids and their representatives usually adhered to local concepts and institutions, too. The fact that the autonomy of poleis had never been curbed by the Achaemenid rulers accounts for the importance of the theme of liberation from *internal* tyranny in Macedonian propaganda.⁶⁷

Neither was the idea of freedom restricted to Greek poleis. In 334, Alexander had granted to ‘the Sardians and the other Lydians . . . the use of their ancestral laws and allowed them their freedom.’⁶⁸ Under the Hellenistic kings, Jerusalem and Babylon were autonomous cities too. But Aegean poleis became models for cities elsewhere in the world, so that in the later Hellenistic period ‘Philhellenism’ came to denote protection of cities rather than of Greeks per se.⁶⁹

The theme of liberation was widespread. In 319/18, Polyperchon had proclaimed the universal freedom of the Greeks; he did so some three years before Antigonos and in the name of the minor Argead king, Alexander IV, reviving Alexander the Great’s earlier policy of liberation.⁷⁰ The same source that we also rely on for Antigonos’ imperial proclamation, Diodoros, also recorded that when the Thebans declared war on the Macedonians in 335, they called upon all the Greeks to join ‘the Thebans and the Great King in liberating the Greeks and destroying

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⁶⁵ Cf. Bringmann (1993) 9, arguing that a generalized idiom of euergetism was consciously developed to present the king as common benefactor of all the Greeks.

⁶⁶ On the autonomy of Babylonian cities, see Van de Mieroop (1997); on Achaemenid Jerusalem, e.g. Bernett (2004); Vanderkam (2004); Lipschits (2005).

⁶⁷ See e.g. Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 34.2, on Alexander’s expressed aim to abolish all ‘tyrannies’, viz., pro-Persian regimes. The fourth-century background to the idea that the ‘Greeks of Asia’ had to be liberated from the Persians is examined by Seager and Tuplin (1980). On liberation from tyranny as royal ideology, see Versnel (1990); Niebergall (2011); Teegarden (2013); Wallace (2014).


⁷⁰ Diod. Sic. 18.55–6; on Alexander’s protection of civic freedom, see Thonemann (2013).
the tyrant of Greece [sc. Alexander]. The Diadochs naturally accused each other of being tyrants. In the third century, the Ptolemies equated the Seleukids with the Persians.

When Seleukos added western Asia Minor to his empire and crossed the Hellespont into Thrace, he claimed to have come to restore democracy and autonomy to the poleis, as would later his descendant Antiochos III when he invaded Greece in 192. Seleukos’ son and successor, Antiochos I, was awarded divine honors by the Ionian League; a copy of the decree found at Klazomenai stresses that Antiochos in return was expected to protect the eleutheria, autonomia and dēmokratia of the Ionian cities.

In order that [King Antiochos and] Queen Stratonike may know [what has been decreed by the koinon of the] Ionians in respect to the honors, (be it resolved) to choose immediately two (men) from each city who have [before this time] served as ambassadors to King [Antiochos, and for these] to deliver [to the king] this decree [from the koinon] of the Ionian cities . . . [and for them to accomplish whatever good] they may be able to for the koinon [of the cities]. And let the ambassadors [call upon] King [Antiochos] to take [every] care for the [Ionian] cities [in order that (the cities) being free and [being] democracies, may [with concord] continue to conduct their own internal political affairs according to (their) ancestral [laws] . . . And to have this decree inscribed on a stele, and (on it) the names and patronymics of the synedroi who have come from the cities, and placed in the sacred precinct by the altar of the kings; and that the dēmoi in the individual cities have this decree inscribed, and (on it) the names and patronymics of the synedroi, [and set up in whatever place] may seem most conspicuous.

Although their names are not given, the decree highlights the role of the intermediaries traveling between cities and court. These ambassadors are given a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the League. This implies that they may have been selected for their connections with the court and possibly their access to the king’s inner circle.

In a decree of Smyrna for Seleukos II the city presents itself as the benefactor of the king. The context is the Third Syrian War (246–241), when Smyrna fought Magnesia-by-Sipylos because the troops stationed

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71 Diod. Sic. 17.9.5; cf. Plut. Vit. Alex. 11.7–8. During the Peloponnesian War, both Athens and Sparta claimed to champion the eleutheria of poleis (Raaflaub (2004) 166–202).
73 Funck (1994).
74 I.Erythrai 504, ll. 7–45; OGl 222 (c. 265 BCE).
75 Compare the Athenian decree in honor of Pharmacès (I.Délos 1497; discussed by Noreña, Chapter 8 in this volume), explicitly urging the king to make proper benefactions in return; in the context of the court, it was normal to ask gifts or benefactions from a person of higher status: see Strootman 2017c 63–73. In both the Jerusalem Charter, cited above, and the letter of Ptolemy II to Miletos, below, kings acknowledge benevolences of cities toward themselves.
there had gone over to Ptolemy III. The leaders of Smyrna remained loyal to Seleukos, and they finally negotiated a peace settlement in the king’s name with the troops that occupied the citadel of Magnesia. The inscription consists of three parts. The first two deal with the aforementioned negotiations and the awarding of citizenship to the soldiers in Magnesia in return for their surrender. The part quoted here honors Seleukos II for supporting Smyrna’s autonomy and his efforts to find universal recognition for the asylia of the sanctuary of Aphrodite Stratonikis.

Resolved by the démos, proposal of the stratēgoi. Whereas previously, at the time when King Seleukos crossed over into the Seleukis [sc. NW Syria], when many and great perils beset our city and territory, the démos maintained its good-will (eunoia) and friendship (philia) toward him . . . , as has been its way from the beginning; wherefore King Seleukos too, being disposed piously toward the gods and lovingly toward his parents, being magnanimous and knowing how to return gratitude to those who benefit him, honored our city, on account of the good-will of the démos and the zeal which it evinced for his affairs . . . ; and he confirmed for the démos its autonomia and dēmokratia, and he wrote to the kings and the dynasts and the cities and the leagues, asking that the temple of Aphrodite Stratonikis be inviolable and our city sacred and inviolable.

The philia between Smyrna and Seleukos is no hollow phrase. In its dealings with Magnesia, Smyrna represented Seleukos and defended his interests as their own. This is what philoi are supposed to do for each other. The emphasis on reciprocity in this inscription shows how cities were entangled with empires, rather than unilaterally subjugated by empires.

The Entanglement of Civic and Imperial Elites

Kings may have been the embodiment of justice; they never prescribed cities the law. Not even the rich contemporaneous documentation from Babylon – a city centrally located and firmly integrated in the Seleukid

76 Wörrle (2004).
77 I.Smyrna 573.1 + II 2 p. 376, ll. 1–12; a favorable response to this request has been preserved in Delphi (OGL 228).
78 On philia, see Herman (1987); Konstan (1997); Belfiore (2008).
79 The Hellenistic image of the king as ‘Law Incarnate’ (Nomos Empsuchos; cf. e.g. Arr. Anab. 4.9.7–8; Plut. Vit. Alex. 52.3–7; Mor. 781a) has nothing to do with (city) government and can better be understood as the king being the embodiment of Justice in the context of imperial universality; pace Aalders (1969), Ramelli (2006) and Brock (2013), who all believe that this commonplace derives
imperial framework – contains any indication that the dynasty or its surrogates ever actually took the government of that city in their own hands. What these sources reveal instead is a complex, reciprocal system of local-imperial negotiations.

A mutually dependent system of local and royal support existed in Seleukid Jerusalem too. Here, imperial engagement with local politics was restricted to supporting particular individuals and factions in the context of local concepts and institutions, combined with benefactions to the sanctuary of the city’s tutelary deity, Yahweh. Jerusalem’s location in a contested frontier zone and the coexistence of pro-Seleukid and pro-Ptolemaic factions within the Judaic elite explains why, in contrast to Babylon, power struggles in Jerusalem eventually became so violent.

O’Neil has shown that in civic inscriptions from Hellenistic poleis kings occasionally appear in the capacity of mediators but avoided giving direct orders and made sure to embed their ‘suggestions’ in local law and institutions, often delegating decisions to the dēmos. A revealing example is provided by the so-called Tyrants Dossier from Eresos, a series of inscriptions recording how (the descendants of) exiles, who had been banished from Eresos in the early years of Alexander’s reign, appealed to a succession of kings – Alexander III, Philip III and Antigons I – to be granted permission to return; the kings, however, consistently deferred the decision to the Eresian dēmos, which on each occasion refused. The only known instances of kings actually influencing civic law are late and concern cities highly integrated in the monarchical framework (Larisa and Thessalonike in the reign of Philip V).

All this does not yet tell us who made, or influenced most, the decision of the ‘people’. Recent scholarship has emphasized the reciprocal, interactive nature of regime change after the Macedonian conquests. This usually was a complex, prolonged process in which the co-opting of disenfranchised elite groups was key. Agut-Labordère recently showed how the

from Greek, viz., Platonic or Stoic philosophy (Achaemenid royal ideology provides a more plausible background: see Xen., Cyr. 8.1.22; App. Cyr. 10.61).


81 Kosmin (2013), (2014b); Strootman (2013b); Stevens (2014). Also see Hoover (2005), arguing that the iconography on civic coins from Seleukid Phoenicia can be studied as a form of negotiation between city and empire.

82 For the latter point: Strootman (2006a); Honigman (2011). On the dynamics of city–empire interactions in Seleukid Jerusalem, see Ma (2006b).


Ptolemies assumed the role of liberators in Egypt by amalgamating local anti-Assyrian traditions and Greco-Macedonian ideas about the oppressive Persians (with whom the Seleukids could then be conveniently equated) in cooperation with the Memphite priesthood.86 This author has argued that the alleged ‘traditional’ kingship assumed by the Seleukids in Babylon was in fact a composite cultural memory created through a process of negotiation between local and imperial agents, in which local and imperial ideologies merged.87 The pattern that emerges is that when conquest took place, empires co-opted on an ad hoc basis elites that had been alienated by the former imperial rulers, or at least tried to benefit from factional strife within civic elites. Through their contacts with the court, and often their use of koinē Greek, along with the adoption of courtly behavior and sometimes additional Greek personal names, these local imperial agents ‘code switched’ between imperial and local identities until these finally and inevitably merged.88

In the Aegean something different was going on. We already saw the inscription from Miletos honoring Antiochos for planning to build a stoa for the benefit of the Didymaion. We saw how in this decree a Milesian, Demodamas, proposed the motion. This Demodamas is the same as the famous Seleukid stratēgos who campaigned in Central Asia and is mentioned by Pliny because he ordered the construction, or reconstruction, of sanctuaries for Apollo Didymaios on the banks of the river Jaxartes (Syr Darya) to symbolically demarcate the extent of the Seleukid world empire.89 The identification is confirmed by another Milesian decree, issued a year later:

Concerning those things which Demodamas son of Aristeides gave public notice, that Apame wife of Seleukos, the king, should be honored, the boulē and the démos have decided: Since Apame the queen formerly showed much goodwill and kindness concerning those of Miletos campaigning with King Seleukos . . .90

The decrees mentioning Demodamas are dated shortly after Seleukos’ and Lysimachos’ joint victory against the Antigonids at Ipsos. This victory more or less ended the Third War of the Diadochs (315–301). Seleukos’

90 I.Didyma 480 (299/8 BCE), ll. 2–7. Because Apama, daughter of Spitamenes, belonged to the east Iranian nobility, Seleukos’ campaigns in eastern Iran/Central Asia (308/7–303) presumably are referred to here; cf. Robert (1984). On Apama’s role as queen in the west, see Harders (2016) and Ramsey (2016).
Milesian commanders apparently returned home after the battle and arranged the *philia* between Miletos and the victorious Seleukids.

An important observation can be made here: in the polis–empire negotiations taking place in early third-century Miletos, the person representing the polis and the person representing the empire turns out to be the same person. Miletos was for the Seleukids what Edinburgh was for the British Empire in the nineteenth century: not a city subjugated and exploited by a foreign colonial power but a cornerstone of the empire. This makes the case of Miletos fundamentally different from Babylon or Jerusalem, where local elites were co-opted by the empire. In Aegean cities like Miletos, local elites by contrast were the empire.

As a powerful *philos* of the Seleukid house, Demodamas of course may have been a special case – and Miletos and Didyma certainly were especially important for the early Seleukids. But evidence from other poleis reveals a pattern. Of the approximately seventy-five high-ranking Seleukid officials whose names and cities of origin have been recorded in the narrative sources, 70 percent came from poleis in and around the Aegean; for the Ptolemies, the total number of leading Greeks identifying themselves with Aegean poleis is on average about 50 percent (the others are mainly citizens of Alexandria).

That there was indeed dissension within the elite of Miletos is suggested by a decree of the Ionian League in honor of the Milesian Hippostratos, a leading *philos* and *stratēgos* of Seleukos’ enemy, Lysimachos. The decree, preserved in two copies, one from Smyrna and one from Miletos, was issued a decade after the last proposal by Seleukos’ man, Demodamas:

Resolved by the *koinon* of the Ionians. Whereas Hippostratos, son of Hippodemos, of Miletos, a *philos* of King Lysimachos and appointed *stratēgos* in charge of the cities of the Ionians, continues to treat in a friendly and beneficent way each city individually and the Ionians as a whole, with good fortune, be it resolved by the *koinon* of the Ionians: to praise Hippostratos son of Hippodemos for his virtue and the good-will which he continues to hold toward the *koinon* of the Ionians. . . . And to erect a bronze equestrian statue of him in the Panionion; and for two cities to be chosen to see to it that the statue of Hippostratos is erected. . . . The cities chosen were Miletos and Arsinoecia.

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93 *Syll.* 368A (289/8 BCE); trans. Burstein.
Though here honors are not given to the king directly but to his local representative, the pattern is similar as in the two Demodamas inscriptions: the imperial general honored for his goodwill toward the Ionian poleis is himself a man from one of the Ionian poleis.

With the defeat and death of Lysimachos at Koroupedion in February 281, Seleukos acquired the Macedonian royal title, and the Seleukid house must have been seen by all as the single most powerful dynasty in the Aegean and beyond. Seleukos spent the following months organizing the western parts of his empire, sending out generals to Phrygia and Pontos and receiving embassies from poleis, before traveling on to Thrace and Macedon. We do not know where Seleukos resided after Koroupedion – Miletos or Ephesos being likely candidates – but the nearness of the court induced also smaller communities to send envoys in order to obtain (confirmation of) polis rights. The Athymbrians, a community whose identity focused on a cult of Hades and Kore, requested ἱκεσία, ἀσύλια and ἐπέλεικα for their communal sanctuary. The preserved reply – issued in the name of both kings, Seleukos and his son Antiochos – instructs a certain Sopatros, presumably a Seleukid stratēgos in Karia, to give the Athymbrians a favorable reply:

[King] Seleukos and Antiochos to Sopat[ros, greeting]. The Athymbrians [having sent] to us [as envoys] Iatrokles, Artemidoros and Timotheos concerning their [right of receiving suppliants, their inviolability, and their tax-exemption] ... [For it has always been our policy] through benefactions [to please] the citizens [of the Greek cities] ... and to join in increasing [the honors] of the gods, [so that we may be the object of goodwill] transmissible for all time [to those who come after] us. We are convinced that in previous times we have given [many great] proofs of (our) personal [reverence, and] now also, to be consistent with [our actions from the beginning, we grant] to all the temples which [have received the right of inviolability] ... 

That the three delegates are mentioned by name may seem no more than conventional. But it is a conscious choice. By being mentioned in a letter of the king, the delegates are publicly awarded the king’s favor: it is made known that they have been granted access to the king’s presence (and by

94 Memnon 7. In the same year, Seleukos granted a royal title to Mithradates I of Pontos (Strabo 12.3.1; cf.; App. Mithr. 2.9; Plut. Vit. Demetr. 4; cf. Steph. Byz. Ethnika, s. v. ‘Ancyra’).
95 On Athymbra, probably a newly founded constituent community of the city of Nysa, see Cohen (1995) 257.
96 Syll. 781, 1 (281 BCE); the preserved letter was part of a reissue of privilege documents for the Athymbrian Ploutonion in 1 BCE.
being allowed to make their request in public, their request was granted) and there can be little doubt that these men derived substantial prestige from the letter in their native city.\textsuperscript{97}

Around 262 a pro-Ptolemaic faction came to power in Miletos with the assistance of Ptolemaic troops. A letter of Ptolemy II offering benefactions to the Milesians discloses the role of intermediaries – both high-ranking agents (the king’s son and the well-known admiral Kallikrates of Samos) and \textit{philoi}:

\begin{quote}
King Ptolemy to the \textit{boulē} and the \textit{dēmos} of the Milesians, greeting. I have in former times shown all zeal on behalf of your city, both giving land and exercising care in all other matters, as was proper because I saw that our father was kindly disposed toward the city and was responsible for many benefits for you and relieved you of harsh and oppressive taxes and tolls which certain of the kings had imposed. Now also, as you have guarded fittingly your city and your friendship and alliance with us – for my son and Kallikrates and the other \textit{philoi} who are with you have written me what a demonstration you have made of your good-will (\textepsilon\upsilon\nuio\zeta) toward us – we consequently praise you highly and shall try to require your people through benefactions, and we call upon you for the future to maintain the same policy toward us so that, this being the case, we may exercise even more care for your city. We have ordered Hegestratos to address you at greater length on these subjects and to give you our greeting. Farewell.\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

Ptolemy reminds the Milesians of his father’s and his own former benefactions and kindness toward the Milesians before urging them to preserve their friendship and (military) alliance (\textphi\lambda\iota\alpha \kappa\omicron \sigma\omicron\mu\mu\alpha\chi\iota\alpha). References to past kindness often appear in royal letters and the civic decrees issued in response to them. It means quite plainly that something is expected in return.\textsuperscript{99} This places royal euergetism in Greek or Hellenized cities firmly in the context of \textit{philia} with its obligations of loyalty and mutual assistance.\textsuperscript{100} To think of this as a ‘charade’ makes no sense. The ritualized gift-exchange that is the fuel of \textit{philia} creates very real obligations for both

\textsuperscript{97} On the rules and rituals of royal audience, see Strootman (2014a) 191–8; for the Athymbrian delegation’s actual presence at court (rather than having appealed to Seleukos indirectly through Sopatros), see Orth (1977) 32–4, and for the significance of being granted an audience with the king for the social status of citizens, see Allen (2005); cf. Dreyer and Mittag (2011) 10, defining local elites as individuals or groups who tried to monopolize communication with imperial rulers on behalf of their cities. On ‘favor’, see Strootman (2017b).

\textsuperscript{98} RC 14 (c.262/1 BCE) = \textit{Milet}. I 3, 139A. Note that Ptolemy in this letter honors the Milesians for their goodwill.

\textsuperscript{99} Pace Veyne (1976) 81; the element of reciprocity is stressed by Bringmann (1993) 19.

\textsuperscript{100} For the pivotal place of \textphi\lambda\iota\alpha in the vocabulary of Greek interstate relations, see Panessa (1990) 261–7; Chaniotis (1996) 60; Paschidis (2013).
parties precisely because of its solemn and public nature and its being documented for all eternity on stone and set up in a public space. In honor-driven, premodern societies personal bonds of ritualized friendship like Greek-style \textit{philia} were strong bonds. In fact, \textit{philia} could only be broken if the other party could be convincingly accused of violating the \textit{philia}, a radical step that, for example, the Athenians took vis-à-vis Philip V in 199 (and which was exceptional enough to be recorded by Polybius and Livy). The insistence in royal letters and civic decrees on the continued fulfillment of mutual obligations stresses this aspect of perpetuity in a \textit{philia} relationship.

In a decree of Miletos in response to the letter cited above, the obligations of friendship and alliance between the Milesians and Ptolemy I are continued by his son and successor, Ptolemy II. As usual, the \textit{dēmos} is presented as the principal authority of the polis:

Resolved by the \textit{dēmos}; proposal of the \textit{epistatai}; Peithenous son of Tharsagoras spoke: ... since the \textit{dēmos} had previously chosen friendship and alliance (φιλία καὶ συμμαχία) with the god and savior Ptolemy, it happened that the city became prosperous and renowned and that the \textit{dēmos} was judged worthy of many great goods, for which reasons the \textit{dēmos} honored him with the greatest and most noble honors; and (whereas) his son, King Ptolemy, having succeeded him, and having renewed the friendship and alliance with the city, has shown all zeal in promoting the interests of the Milesians, giving land and arranging the peace for the \textit{dēmos} and being responsible for other good things for the city, and now, when many great wars overtook us by land and sea and the enemy attacked our city from the sea, the king, having learned that the city honored its \textit{philia} and alliance with him, dispatched letters and the ambassador Hegestratos and praises the \textit{dēmos} for its policy and promises to take all care for the city and to requite it even more with benefactions and calls upon the \textit{dēmos} to maintain its \textit{philia} toward him in the future as well ... Local factional strife became connected to inter-dynastic rivalry. Kings tried to bring on board the enemies of the ruling families if a city was supporting a rival empire. In 261/0, the pro-Ptolemaic Peithenous, a member of the Milesian \textit{boulê}, successfully proposed friendship and alliance between the Milesians and Ptolemy II. Although the inscription does not explicitly say so, it is likely that Peithenous was a member of Ptolemy’s network of \textit{philoi}.

\textsuperscript{101} See Noreña, Chapter 8 in this volume. On the pivotal importance of gift exchange at the Hellenistic royal courts, see Strootman (2017c) 152–9.
\textsuperscript{102} Livy, 31.44.2–6, following Polybius (cf. 31.44.9).
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Milet.} I 3, 139B (c. 261/0 BCE).
Fifteen years later, the tables were turning again in Miletos, as we read in this letter of Seleukos II in which new names turn up:

King Seleukos to the council and the people of Miletos, greetings. Whereas our ancestors and our father have conferred many great benefits upon your city because of the oracles given out from the sanctuary there of Apollo Didymaios and because of kinship to the god himself and also because of the gratitude of your people; whereas from your other measures taken with reference to our state in the past – these have been pointed out by our father’s friends – and from the speech delivered by your envos Glaukippos and Diomandros who brought the holy wreath from the sanctuary with which you had crowned us, we ourselves see that you preserve sincere and firm your esteem for your friends and that you remember the favors which you have received, we approved your policy, and as we both desired and considered it very important to raise [your city] to a more illustrious state and [to increase your present] privileges [in the way you asked].

The accepted date for this inscription, 246, suggests that the Milesian envoys, Glaukippos and Diomandros, traveled to the court for the occasion of Seleukos II’s inauguration – a typical ‘great event’ of the dynasty, announced well in advance to attract powerful people and envoys to the itinerant imperial center. There they were allowed to publicly give a gift and establish a philia bond between the Milesian dēmos and the new king. A request made to a king in public at such an occasion, whether by an individual or a polis, could not easily be refused. What a king could do, however, was to negotiate in advance and then to regulate access to his person by creating a protective shield of intermediaries around him. This means that at ceremonial occasions where gifts could be given and favors could be asked, requests made by ambassadors and other petitioners likely had been approved by the court in advance. A letter of Eumenes II in response to a resolution passed by the Ionian League reveals an interesting variant of this mechanism:

King Eu[menes to the League of the Ionians, greeting]. Of your envoys, Menekles did not appear before me, but Eirenias and Archelaos meeting me in Delos delivered a fine and generous decree in which you began by saying that I, having chosen from the start the finest actions and having shown myself a common benefactor of the Greeks, had undertaken many and great struggles against the barbarians, exercising all zeal and forethought that the inhabitants of the Greek cities might always dwell in peace and in the best

104 I.Didyma 22 = OGI 227 (c. 246 BCE).
105 For politics of access at royal courts, see Winterling (2004); cf. Strootman (2017b), for the Hellenistic imperial courts.
condition.... Wherefore, in order that you might show that you always return fitting honors to your benefactors, you have resolved to crown us with a gold crown of valor, to set up a gold statue in whatever spot of Ionia I may wish, and to proclaim the honors in the games celebrated by you and throughout the cities in the (games) held in each.... The honors I accept kindly and having never failed, as far as it lay in [my] power, to confer always something of what pertains to [honor and glory] both upon all in common and individually by city, I shall now try not to diverge from such a precedent.... I shall present you with sufficient revenues from which you will be able to [establish] our memory suitably. The gold statue I shall make myself, because I desire that [the] favor should be altogether without expense for the League.\textsuperscript{106}

What is interesting about this inscription are not the honors as such but the king’s \textit{refusal} of part of the honors: by paying for the statue from his private funds, Eumenes is able to moderate the reciprocal obligations on his own part without offending his Ionian \textit{philoi}.

John Ma has made a compelling case for understanding the language of the decrees as discourse.\textsuperscript{107} According to Ma, honorific decrees should be seen not as mirroring negotiations but as a form of negotiation themselves: cities addressed kings with the rhetoric of \textit{philia} and \textit{euergetesia} in order to oblige them to act in accordance with this ideology; kings for their part publicly employed the same idiom in order to force the poleis to remain grateful and loyal.\textsuperscript{108} Public inscriptions evidently had this function. Generations later, inscribed or archived royal letters were still used to influence rulers or resolve internal disputes.\textsuperscript{109}

A problem with this interpretation, however, is the underlying notion of an ideological and political opposition of city and empire.\textsuperscript{110} If, however, we accept the alternative view that cities and empires were politically, economically and socially interwoven components of the same, globalizing ‘Hellenistic’ world, it is more plausible that the terms of the \textit{philia} between polis and \textit{basileus}, as expressed in civic decrees, were agreed upon, or enforced, \textit{before} the definitive formulation of these

\textsuperscript{106} RC 52, ll. 1–58 = OGI 763 (167/6 BCE); trans. Welles. \textsuperscript{107} Ma (2000a).
\textsuperscript{108} For this latter aspect, also see Ma (2000b).
\textsuperscript{109} E.g. RC 9 (cited above) and RC 70 = IGLSyr VII 402 B + C (letter of a Seleukid king to Arados concerning the granting of \textit{asylla} to the sanctuary of Zeus Baitokaikes). On the presence of Hellenistic kings in civic archives, see Boffo (2013); cf. Ellis-Evans (2012) 200–1.
\textsuperscript{110} See e.g. Ma (2000) 225–7 and 238, understanding the language of the decrees as a means for cities to present a favorable version of unfavorable and ‘potentially traumatic occurrences’, and royal euergetism more generally as a means ‘to represent, or camouflage, power as benefactions’.
decrees. We may then allow for the possibility that royal honors were negotiated and proposed by internal imperial agents.

Conclusion: World Empire and Local Autonomy

In this chapter, Hellenistic euergetism has been considered in the context of competing empires in need of civic support. Material benefactions were rare, and mainly directed toward sanctuaries, that is, given to a deity rather than the δήμος. The most common form of royal benefactions to cities in the Hellenistic world were immaterial: acknowledgment and protection of the autonomy and the rights of (urban) communities. In practice, this often entailed the patronage of specific families or groups within those communities. In return, the dynasties expected loyalty, military support and access to the resources they needed.

Royal euergetism was reciprocal in practice as well as ideology. In practical terms, royal euergetism was part and parcel of the entanglement of city and empire in the Hellenistic Aegean and the complex processes of negotiation between them. It was difficult for kings to actually subjugate poleis and near impossible to ‘rule’ them. These premodern empires lacked the necessary military capabilities, administrative sophistication and modern means of communication. The mutual goodwill (εὐνοια) that was at the root of imperial hegemonies over Aegean poleis moreover was based on the Macedonian kings’ pledge to protect civic autonomy. Imperial interventions in civic politics were typically aimed at bringing or restoring to power certain factions within the civic elites. That too could be framed as liberation (from ‘tyranny’, or from the other king’s garrison).

From an ideological perspective, the bestowing of specific forms of civic freedom – autonomia, eleutheria, δημοκρατία – on poleis was part of a wider imperial ideology of liberation and the establishment of universal peace. The Hellenistic period’s emphasis on these values as prerequisites for being a polis was thus more than the intensification of a specific set of civic concepts. It was the cross-fertilization of civic and imperial ideologies. This cross-fertilization of specifically Greek and more generic imperial ideas resulted from the importance of Aegean poleis for the empires and the predominance of Greek φιλοί at the imperial courts.

All empires made use of the same networks of ritualized friendship (xenia and philia) to approach the poleis.111 Because friends and envoys of rival dynasties could be present in a polis at the same time and because

these rival dynasties competed partly by means of beneficence, poleis had a relatively good bargaining position. In the early second century, Antiochus III’s empire for a brief period of time could be seen as the world’s single superpower: Antiochus had restored Seleukid authority over the Upper Satrapies, defeated the Ptolemies in Palestine, and was now present with his army in Asia Minor. The poleis of Asia Minor had no choice but to yield to the Great King of Asia. But soon enough his supremacy was challenged by the Romans, who appropriated Antiochus’ claim of liberating the Greek cities and took over the Ptolemaic image of the Seleukid kings as neo-Persian despots. Again, the poleis could choose between parties eager to support them, though it turned out that this time they had to choose more carefully.

Similar entanglements of city and empire existed also beyond the Aegean, for example, in Seleukid Babylonia, where comparable ideologies of liberation, restoration and protection were negotiated. What made the Aegean special is the fact that the generals and officials of the empires came from there and maintained direct lines of communication with their fellow citizens and families. In other words, imperial and local leaders often belonged to the same social groups and sometimes, as in the case of Demodamas of Miletos, were the same individuals. We still do not understand who the *synedroi* were who occupy such prominent places in the decrees, beyond their being commissioners, temporarily selected for specific purposes on an ad hoc basis. In the Milesian decrees they make legislative proposals. Because Demodamas is introduced as one of the *synedroi*, they may in similar contexts have been men chosen for their having access to international elite networks. Another elusive civic officeholder, the *epistatēs*, is sometimes given prominence too in the honorific decrees; though not to be seen as royal officials, the *epistatai* were representatives of the dynasty and members of the *boulē*; they too make legislative proposals.

That cities possessed freedom (*eleutheria*) and self-government (*autonomia*) did not inevitably mean that they were also independent from empire. But the dependency was to a significant degree mutual. As was hypothesized in the introduction to this chapter, the violent inter-imperial competition in the post-Achaemenid Aegean must have caused massive financial strains on the empires. In order to gain supremacy, the imperial dynasties had to permanently maintain standing armies, occasionally raise huge campaigning armies, assemble large fleets that consisted of bigger ships than ever before and most of all finance the massive costs of siege

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warfare (including expenditures for maintaining garrisons and for building and sustaining fortifications). It follows that empires more than ever were reliant on cities for the necessary resources and to access markets. The expansion of the use of coined money in the Hellenistic empires attest to this development. As a result, protection of cities became a pivotal element of imperial ideologies during the Hellenistic period.

A correlation existed between the two forms of ritualized friendship discussed in this chapter. On the one hand, there is the use of *philia* terminology and ideology to describe, in royal letters and civic decrees alike, the relationship between *dēmos* and *basileus*, while the dynamics of polis–dynasty interaction are presented accordingly as reciprocal gift exchange and mutual aid. On the other hand, there is the very practical use of *philia* and *xenia* arrangements to create and operate the horizontal networks of interaction that connected local elites to each other and to the royal families. In civic decrees, deals are made with the dynasty in the name of the *dēmos*, which is presented as if it were a single person. That of course is entirely fictional. Deals are made by the people who make them, and it is significant above all that inscriptions mention by name these brokers – who likely derived status and influence, at the expense of their rivals, from their being mentioned as successful intermediaries.

The dynamics of local *euergesia* and supra-local *philia* and *xenia* worked together in giving people of the poleis access to a wider world of globalizing empires. Together with Macedonian and Iranian aristocrats, these ‘Hellenes’ played leading political roles on a global stage, and their home cities derived substantial benefits from that. In the context of the Seleukid Empire they have been attested as imperial agents in eastern India (Megasthenes, a Ionian), Sogdia (Euthydemos of Magnesia), northern Iran (Nikomedes of Kos) and Italy (Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas). The widening networks of trans-regional connectivity that poleis participated in during the Hellenistic period is also exemplified by the considerable increase in the number and spread of civic *proxenia* decrees that begins c. 300 and lasts until c. 100 BCE, when the number of *proxenia* decrees drops abruptly.

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114 Megasthenes as ambassador at Pataliputra on the Ganges: Strabo 2.1.9; Euthydemos as military governor of Sogdia, and from 208 viceroy of Seleukid Central Asia: Polyb. 11.39.1-10; Nikomedes as cavalry commander in the Elburz region: Polyb. 10.29.6 (210 BCE); Hegesianax as envoy of Antiochos III at Rome: Livy, 34.57.6; App. Syr. 6 (193 BCE).

115 Mack (2015), with the interactive database published on the Proxeny Networks of the Ancient World (PNAW) website at proxenies.csad.ox.ac.uk; especially for the sharp rise in both the number of cities issuing *proxenia* and the total volume of *proxenia* decrees after 300, see the map and column chart under ‘Evidence’.
The image of a fundamental antagonism between autonomous polis and autocratic empire is wrong. In the politically divided, war-torn Hellenistic world, empires needed cities as much as cities needed empires.

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