

European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ)

Réseau européen des Conseils de la Justice (RECJ)



# Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary

# **ENCJ/CCBE Survey**

among lawyers on the independence of Judges

2018-2019



Co-funded by the Justice Programme of the European Union

This publication has been produced with the financial support of the Justice Programme of	
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# Summary of the survey<sup>1</sup>

In 2019, the survey among the lawyers of Europe about the independence of the judiciary took place for the second time. The survey was organised in co-operation with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE). The survey has achieved moderate success, as it proved difficult to get lawyers to participate, despite the efforts of the ENCJ, CCBE and national bar and law societies. Despite a low threshold, 21 jurisdictions remained of the 29 participating jurisdictions. Relatively high participation was achieved in Hungary, Poland, Sweden and Norway. Consequently, outcomes cannot be presented for all countries that participated, and the outcomes that are presented need to be interpreted with caution.

Still, the results are informative about the state of the indepence and accountability of the judiciary in Europe. The perspective of lawyers is an important addition to that of judges. In addition the participation in this survey by countries that did not participate in the survey among judges, in particular Poland, but also Cyprus, fills an important information gap. The main conclusions are the following.

- 1. On a 10-point scale lawyers rate the independence of the judges in their country on average between 5.2 and 9.0. Most countries get a positive score, but several score just above 6.
- 2. In general, the lawyers are more critical than the judges<sup>2</sup>, overall and on most aspects of independence.
- 3. Especially, with regard to the appointment and promotion of judges many lawyers believe that such decisions are not solely based on ability and experience. Particularly, Poland, Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia have low scores on these aspects.
- 4. As to an aspect of accountability, the handling of judicial corruption by the judicial authorities is considered by lawyers not to be effective in many countries.

In future editions of the survey, attempts must be made to increase the number of respondents.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This report was composed by the Netherlands Council for the Judiciary; Frans van Dijk, Bart Diephuis and Sarah Koolen. The data were gathered by the CCBE secretariat in Brussels in cooperation with the ENCJ Office.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> ENCJ (20190, Independence and accountability of the judiciary, ENCJ Survey on the independence of the judiciary.

#### 1. Introduction

Central to the mission of the ENCJ is the reinforcement of independent, yet accountable judiciaries in the European Union to guarantee access to fair, independent and impartial courts. To this end the ENCJ is working systematically to develop standards and guidelines for the governance of the judiciary and the conduct of essential functions such as the appointment of judges. To assess the extent to which standards and guidelines are realised a set of indicators on independence and accountability has been developed and implemented. These indicators focus, on the one hand, on the formal safeguards and mechanisms that protect judicial independence and provide for accountability and, on the other hand, on the perceptions of independence by stakeholders. The lawyers are one of the groups of stakeholders.

For the second time, the ENCJ, together with the CCBE, conducted a survey among the lawyers of Europe about the independence of judges. This survey was conducted parallel to the ENCJ survey among judges, which also took place in 2019. The survey asked the lawyers to give a general assessment of the independence of the judges in their country. It also asked them to assess the aspects that affect independence, of which it was thought they were able to observe these as lawyers. A new question was added with regard to the Implementation by government of judgments that go against the interest of the government. The survey also addressed some aspects of the accountability of the judiciary. The questions formulated for the lawyers are, as far as possible, the same as those included in the judges survey. The comparison of the views of judges and lawyers is particularly interesting to get a broader perspective on judicial independence and accountability.

Lawyers from 29 jurisdictions participated in the survey, in total 4,489 lawyers. Eliminating the jurisdictions that did not reach the threshold and combining England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland left 4.121 lawyers from 21 countries answering the first and most substantive question. The outcomes that are presented still need to be interpreted with caution.

## 2. Methodology and questions

First the methodology of the survey is addressed, and then the questions posed in the survey are presented.

#### 2.1 Methodology

The ENCJ and the CCBE discussed and agreed the content of the survey, taking the judges survey as a starting point and retaining only the questions lawyers can be expected to be able to answer. The CCBE then asked all national bar and law societies to translate the survey in their languages. For each language a separate survey was created using SurveyMonkey. The national organisations subsequently invited the lawyers to participate in the survey and provided them with a link to the relevant survey. As the response was low in some countries, the CCBE urged the national organisations to promote the survey several times, and the closing date of the survey was postponed.

#### 2.2 Survey questions

The survey was designed in such a way that it asked lawyers to give a general assessment of the independence of judges, to provide the data for the relevant Independence indicator (I12)<sup>3</sup>, but also to explore a range of aspects of independence in depth. In addition, some questions concerned personal characteristics (gender and experience) or were work related (type of court the lawyer frequented and area of law). Two questions regarding accountability were included to fill in the new accountability indicator A12.<sup>4</sup>

Most questions were posed in de form of propositions. Unless indicated otherwise, answer categories were: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Not sure, Agree and Strongly agree. The questions were the following, in logical order:

#### Independence

#### Overall perception of independence

1. Rate the independence of the professional judges in your country on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

#### Aspects of independence: implementation of judgments

2. In the last two years, I believe judgements that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See for the indicators: ENCJ, Report on independence, Accountability and Quality of the Judiciary, 2018-2019.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> As fn 3.

#### Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure

- 3. During the last two years I believe judges have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur by whom: Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Court Management, Government, Media, Other judges (including an association of judges), Parliament, Parties and their lawyers, Prosecution, Social Media or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation.
- 4. I believe that in my country during the last two years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly.
- 5. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio).
- 6. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, actions using social media (for example, Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn).

#### Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure

- 7. I believe during the last two years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.
- 8. I believe that during the last two years the management of the court has exerted pressure on judges to decide individual cases in a particular way

#### Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

- 9. I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years.
- 10. I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years.
- 11. I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years. (Note experience may include seniority).

#### Governance

12. I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively.

#### **Accountability**

- 13. In my country judicial misconduct is appropriately dealt with by the judicial authorities
- 14. In my country judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

#### Personal and professional characteristics

15. Gender

- 16. My practicing experience as a lawyer is: categories of years.
- 17. How often does your practice bring you into contact with courts?
- 18. I primarily have contacts with: Court of first instance, Appeal Court or Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation
- 19. I primarily deal with: criminal cases, administrative cases, civil (including family cases) cases or all of these in equal measure

## 3. Response rate and representativeness

Figure 1 gives the number of respondents per jurisdiction, in as far as these numbers exceed a threshold. This threshold was set at 45 respondents. While we would have preferred a higher threshold, this would have caused the exclusion of a disproportionate number of jurisdicitions. The data is informative in as far as the reponse is unbiased. This cannot be guaranteed, but bias would have been a risk also with a much higher threshold. Lawyers in Hungary and Poland show relatively strong participation, reflecting the urgency of the issues regarding the independence of the judiciary in these countries. Low participation can be found in, for instance, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, where the independence of the judiciary is not/less at stake. As usual in these surveys, response is high in Sweden and Norway. With regard to the UK it should be noted that the response rate is too low to distinguish between England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Furthermore, the number of respondents relative to the total number of lawyers is low even in the countries with many respondents: 1.2% in Poland and 2.8 % in Hungary with Sweden (8.4%) and Norway (4%) at the high end. At the low end are, for instance, France (0.1%), the Netherlands (0.3%) and Ireland (0.5%). However, the total number of lawyers does not reflect the number of lawyers actually representing clients in court. While by definition lawyers are authorised to do so, many are primarily involved in advisory work.

The relatively high response rate for Poland is particularly relevant, as Poland, due to the suspension of the KRS from the ENCJ, could not participate in the judges survey. Given the legal reforms in Hungary, the high response rate for that country is also of interest.




Figure 1 Number of respondents per country

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Cepej (2018), European juidical systems; efficiency and quality of justice, Cepej studies 26, Table 3.52.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See Recommentation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.

#### 3.1 Characteristics of respondents

The characteristics of respondents are in particular important in as far as they may affect the outcome of the survey. Experiences with different types of courts or areas of law may differ. If this is the case, under- or overrepresentation of lawyers with experience in specific courts or areas of law relative to other countries may affect outcomes, although this can also reflect differences in the caseload at the courts. It should be noted first that nearly all lawyers that participated in the survey actually do cases at the courts, and thus have direct experience (figure 4). Furthermore it should be noted that the differences between types of courts are relatively small (figure 5). The differences between areas of law is a more complicated matter, as judicial systems differ, for instance with respect to specialisation. The differences among jurisdictions are substantial (figure 6), but seem to be in line with patterns of economic development and urbanisation of the countries concerned. While to some extent subjective, these characteristics do not give rise to concerns about bias.

Apart from the potential influence on representativeness, some differences are interesting in themselves. With regard to specialisation of judges, the differences between systems are huge with the Scandinavian and common law judiciaries being generalist, and the other systems specialist.<sup>7</sup> This dichotomy does not exist at all for lawyers. As to judicial experience, lawyers with long experience (longer than 20 years) are more common in West and South Europe than in East Europe. On average judges have a longer experience than lawyers.<sup>8</sup> Lawyers are more often male than judges.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For judges see ENCJ (2019), Survey among judges on independence, data 2019, figure 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For judges see ENCJ (2019), Survey among judges on independence, data 2019, figure 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For judges see ENCJ (2019), Survey among judges on independence, data 2019, figure 3.




Figure 2 Gender of respondents




Figure 3 Experience as a lawyer of respondents




Figure 4 Contact with the courts




Figure 5 Respondents by type of court they are working with as lawyers




Figure 6 Respondents by area of law

## 4. Overall perception of independence of judges by lawyers

On a 10-point scale, the participating lawyers rated the independence of the judges in their country on average between 5.2 for Hungary and 9.0 for the UK. Five countries, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Cyprus, have scores between 5.2 and 6. No scores are above 9. The scores are in general (much) lower than the scores given by the judges (average across the countries that participated in both surveys 6.7 vs 8.3). The correlation between the scores of judges and lawyers is, however, high (0.75): judges and lawyers largely think the same about the relative position of their judiciaries, but differ on absolute independence. It should be stressed that the outcomes for Poland, Sweden, Norway and Hungary are more reliable than those for the other countries, due to differences in response. This is indicated in figure 7. The score for Hungary is substantially lower than that for Poland. Overall, the scores are positive.




Figure 7 Independence of judges in general, according to lawyers

Note: dark blue: number of respondents n > 300, blue: 100 < n < 300 and light blue: 45 < n < 100

## 5. Implementation of judicial decisions

Independence cannot be separated from the authority of the judge. <sup>10</sup> When judicial decisions are not executed, independence of the judge may be guaranteed, but it has no practical value: independence implies that power resides in the judge. In the survey lawyers were asked to give their assessment of the implementation by the government of judicial decisions that go against the interests of that government. On average across countries, 41% of lawyers agree with the statement that judgments against the interests of the government are usually executed (figure 8). The variation between countries is very large. Percentages range from 22% in Cyprus to 88% in the UK. In Hungary few lawyers are convinced about implementation (26%), while the percentage for Poland is close to the average (40%). The results show that across Europe there is a serious problem with regard to the implementation of judicial decisions.

The average for the judges is 45% vs 42% for the lawyers in the countries that participated in both surveys. While the correlation is high (0.85), the percentages for some countries are very different. In the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden judges are much more convinced than lawyers about implementation (respectively, 74% vs 53%, 75% vs 49% and 78% vs 54%). For other countries the differences are smaller and go both ways, for instance in the UK (77% vs 88%).




Figure 8 Implementation of judicial decisions

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> J. Rios-Figueroa and J.K. Stanton (2012), An evaluation of cross-national measures of judicial independence, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 30/1 p 104-137.

## 6. Aspects of independence according to lawyers: case related

The relatively low scores on independence in general are reflected in lower scores on the diverse aspects of accountability. The following figures illustrate this. Many lawyers report inappropriate pressure on judges to influence decisions in judicial procedures (see figure 9): across countries on average 40% with extreme scores of 65% for Hungary and 64% for Spain. These outcomes are strikingly different from the outcomes of the judges. The vast majority of judges in Europe report that they do not experience inappropriate pressure. Across all countries only 5% of the judges report inappropriate pressure. Percentages of 10% and higher are reported for Croatia (15%), Latvia (19%) and Lithuania (13%). The fact that judges are under inappropriate pressure does not say anything about whether or not they yield to that pressure.




Figure 9 Inappropriate pressure on judges

When lawyers experience inappropriate pressure, the most given answers - across all countries - as to who exerts this pressure are 'government', 'media' and 'parties and their lawyers'. Judges give another list, reflecting different perspectives: 'court management', 'parties and their lawyers', and at the same level 'other judges' and 'media'.

Table 1 Actors that exert inappropriate pressure, most given answers

	No.1	No.2	No.3
Country			
Belgium	Media	Government	Parties and their lawyers
Cyprus	Parties and their lawyers	Government	Other judges (including
			an association of judges)
Czech Republic	Parties and their lawyers	Media	Government
France	Government	Court Management	Other judges (including
			an association of judges)
Germany	Media	Government	Court Management
Greece	Government	Parties and their lawyers	Other judges (including
			an association of judges)
Hungary	Court Management,	Other judges (including	Media
	Government	an association of judges)	
Ireland	Government	Media	Parties and their lawyers
Italy	Media	Other judges (including	Government
		an association of judges)	
Latvia	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
Lithuania	Parties and their lawyers	Media	Government
Netherlands	Government	Media	Social Media
Norway	Government	Parties and their lawyers	Court Management
Poland	Government	Parliament	Court Management,
			Media
Portugal	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
Romania	Government	Court Management	Media
Slovakia	Parties and their lawyers	Government	Other judges (including
			an association of judges)
Slovenia	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Court Management
Spain	Government	Media	Social Media
Sweden	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
United Kingdom	Government	Media, Other judges	Court Management
		(including an association	
		of judges)	
Total	Government	Media	Parties and their lawyers

#### **External pressure**

Turning to external pressure, the first issue is corruption. Around 50% of the lawyers positively believe that corruption does not occur in their countries (average across countries). The percentage that believes that corruption occurs on a regular basis is generally low (see figure 10).




Figure 10 Judicial corruption

A very different but also important source of external influence on decisions is the media and social media. Many lawyers (45% on average) see an inappropriate impact on judicial decisions of, in particular, the traditional media. The impact of social media is seen an inappropriate by less respondents (22%), but still by 59% in Portugal.




Figure 11 Influence of the media




Figure 12 Influence of social media

#### Internal pressure

Pressure from within the judiciary is probably more difficult to observe for lawyers, who are external to the organisation. The focus is here on two aspects, case allocation (figure 13) and the influence of court management including the president on the content of decisions (figure 14). The answers to both survey questions follow the samen pattern as before. Many lawyers see problems, and they are much more critical than judges. While few judges see these aspects as problematic (8% about case allocation and 3% on influence of court management on decisions, average across countries), lawyers are worried (25% and 26%). Correlations are weaker than before (0.43 and 0.31).




Figure 13 Case allocation




Figure 14 Influence of court management

# 7. Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

Very high percentages of lawyers believe that appointment and promotion decisions about judges are not only based on ability and experience. The following three figures present the outcomes. Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia score particularly negative on all three questions, but other countries have low scores as well on one or two of the questions. Again, the lawyers are more critical than judges, but the correlation between the answers of both groups is higher than we saw in the previous section (0.52 for first appontments, 0.77 for appointments to the Supreme Court and 0.71 for promotion).




Figure 15 First appointment of judges




Figure 16 Appointment to Supreme Court/Court of Cassation




Figure 17 Promotion of judges

# 8. Aspects of judicial governance and accountability

The survey contains the question whether the Council for the judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures to defend judicial independence effectively. The answers of the lawyers are very much in line with the answers of the judges. As Poland and Cyprus have participated only in the lawyers survey, the picture from the judges survey becomes less favourable. Figure 18 shows that many lawyers do not believe that protection is effective with percentages going up to 60% in Hungary, Poland and Spain and even 70% in Cyprus. It should be noted that in countries in which independence is not stake, councils have not been put to the test. This is likely to explain the large numbers of respondents that are unsure.




Figure 18 Mechanisms of Councils for the judiciary to defend judicial independence




Figure 19 Handling of judicial misconduct by the judicial authorities

Figure 10 dealt with judicial corruption. The related issue under the heading of accountability concerns the effectiveness of the judicial authorities in addressing corruption. Large percentages of lawyers believe that corruption is not effectively addressed (figure 19). Especially in Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus this is the case, but for many other countries as well, albeit less extreme.




Figure 20 Handling of judicial corruption by judicial authorities

# 9. Results per question in tables

#### Independence

#### Overall perception of independence

1. Rate the independence of the professional judges in your country on a scale of 0 - 10 (where 0 means "not independent at all" and 10 means "highest possible degree of independence").

	Response	Av	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	rtooponoo	/			_	Ü		Ü	Ĭ	•			10
Belgium	206	7,6	2	0	5	1	2	15	12	36	67	57	9
Cyprus	137	5,4	11	5	3	16	14	19	10	25	13	14	7
Czech Republic	186	6,3	9	3	6	12	13	18	17	38	36	26	8
France	62	5,9	1	0	2	4	6	15	9	10	11	3	1
Germany	175	7,0	3	1	2	12	10	15	14	24	38	40	16
Greece	176	5,3	6	4	14	16	16	38	24	26	22	8	2
Hungary	287	5,2	14	10	23	35	30	47	28	41	27	19	13
Ireland	64	8,2	1	0	0	1	0	3	3	9	11	20	16
Italy	218	6,6	1	0	2	8	12	34	29	55	58	15	4
Latvia	117	6,2	3	1	4	3	7	19	17	28	28	7	0
Lithuania	87	5,9	3	1	4	11	4	12	10	15	16	7	4
Netherlands	52	7,7	1	0	2	1	0	4	0	7	16	13	8
Norway	350	8,2	1	0	8	7	3	14	11	24	86	126	70
Poland	538	6,3	5	12	25	40	38	89	44	96	92	46	51
Portugal	156	6,1	3	1	10	9	10	27	12	28	39	15	2
Romania	104	6,2	1	2	2	9	8	15	15	18	25	6	3
Slovakia	178	5,4	5	5	6	18	23	37	23	30	19	4	8
Slovenia	149	6,1	2	5	4	10	8	20	23	34	35	3	5
Spain	73	6,2	2	0	4	5	8	7	11	8	15	8	5
Sweden	479	8,2	0	5	13	8	4	18	11	34	108	158	120
United Kingdom	41	9,0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	10	11	17
Total	3.835	6,7	74	55	139	226	216	467	323	588	772	606	369

#### Aspects of independence: implementation of judgments

2. In the last two years, I believe judgements that went against the interests of the government were usually implemented/enforced in my country.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	205	97	71	37
Cyprus	137	30	50	57
Czech Republic	186	53	74	59
France	61	24	19	18
Germany	175	95	39	41
Greece	175	64	60	51
Hungary	287	74	95	118
Ireland	64	48	7	9
Italy	218	76	84	58
Latvia	117	29	65	23
Lithuania	87	31	36	20
Netherlands	51	27	12	12
Norway	348	170	71	107
Poland	536	212	127	197
Portugal	156	42	57	57
Romania	102	30	46	26
Slovakia	176	42	98	36
Slovenia	149	58	58	33
Spain	73	23	14	36
Sweden	473	256	116	101
United Kingdom	41	36	4	1
Total	3.817	1.517	1.203	1.097

#### Aspects of independence: case-related external pressure

3a. During the last two years I believe judges have been under inappropriate pressure to take a decision in a case or part of a case in a specific way.

	Response	Agree - Strongly	Not sure - Not	Disagree - Strongly
D 1 :	0.17	agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	217	33	46	138
Cyprus	151	78	32	41
Czech Republic	216	85	41	90
France	64	36	11	17
Germany	184	72	24	88
Greece	194	117	54	23
Hungary	305	199	36	70
Ireland	66	19	4	43
Italy	233	63	37	133
Latvia	119	46	31	42
Lithuania	88	45	21	22
Netherlands	52	15	9	28
Norway	376	36	34	306
Poland	601	247	100	254
Portugal	171	84	25	62
Romania	116	43	37	36
Slovakia	196	112	48	36
Slovenia	151	62	35	54
Spain	84	54	8	22
Sweden	488	52	19	417
United Kingdom	45	12	4	29
Total	4.117	1.510	656	1.951

3b. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur by whom: Constitutional Court, Council for the Judiciary, Court Management, Government, Media, Other judges (including an association of judges), Parliament, Parties and their lawyers, Prosecution, Social Media or Supreme Court/Court of Cassation.

#### Most given answers:

	No.1	No.2	No.3
Country			
Belgium	Media	Government	Parties and their lawyers
Cyprus	Parties and their lawyers	Government	Other judges (including an association of judges)
Czech Republic	Parties and their lawyers	Media	Government
France	Government	Court Management	Other judges (including an association of judges)
Germany	Media	Government	Court Management
Greece	Government	Parties and their lawyers	Other judges (including an association of judges)
Hungary	Court Management, Government	Other judges (including an association of judges)	Media
Ireland	Government	Media	Parties and their lawyers
Italy	Media	Other judges (including an association of judges)	Government
Latvia	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
Lithuania	Parties and their lawyers	Media	Government
Netherlands	Government	Media	Social Media
Norway	Government	Parties and their lawyers	Court Management
Poland	Government	Parliament	Court Management, Media
Portugal	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
Romania	Government	Court Management	Media
Slovakia	Parties and their lawyers	Government	Other judges (including an association of judges)
Slovenia	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Court Management
Spain	Government	Media	Social Media
Sweden	Media	Parties and their lawyers	Government
United Kingdom	Government	Media, Other judges (including an association of judges)	Court Management
Total	Government	Media	Parties and their lawyers

4a. I believe that in my country during the last two years individual judges have accepted bribes (receiving money) or have engaged in other forms of corruption (accepted non-monetary gifts or favours) as an inducement to decide case(s) in a specific way.

	Response	Agree -	Not sure -	Disagree -
		Strongly	Not	Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	213	17	37	159
Cyprus	144	59	42	43
Czech Republic	200	89	51	60
France	63	10	17	36
Germany	179	18	34	127
Greece	185	99	65	21
Hungary	294	40	157	97
Ireland	65	0	3	62
Italy	230	56	66	108
Latvia	118	62	36	20
Lithuania	88	42	24	22
Netherlands	52	6	1	45
Norway	368	12	22	334
Poland	579	57	100	422
Portugal	163	60	44	59
Romania	111	54	39	18
Slovakia	186	98	66	22
Slovenia	149	60	47	42
Spain	83	25	27	31
Sweden	487	13	34	440
United Kingdom	43	0	1	42
Total	4.000	877	913	2.210

4b. If you agree or strongly agree, did this occur very rarely, occasionally or regularly.

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Very rarely	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	214	2	4	12	37	159
Cyprus	147	20	26	16	42	43
Czech Republic	205	17	38	39	51	60
France	66	2	7	4	17	36
Germany	183	2	7	13	34	127
Greece	199	34	66	13	65	21
Hungary	298	8	17	19	157	97
Ireland	65	0	0	0	3	62
Italy	232	1	37	20	66	108
Latvia	120	6	48	10	36	20
Lithuania	97	6	27	18	24	22
Netherlands	54	2	4	2	1	45
Norway	367	3	3	5	22	334
Poland	603	12	35	34	100	422
Portugal	167	19	26	19	44	59
Romania	120	10	36	17	39	18
Slovakia	192	15	71	18	66	22
Slovenia	161	1	27	44	47	42
Spain	85	6	11	10	27	31
Sweden	495	0	5	16	34	440
United Kingdom	43	0	0	0	1	42
Total	4.113	166	495	329	913	2.210

5. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by the actual, or anticipated, actions of the media (i. e. press, television or radio).

	Response	Agree - Strongly	Not sure - Not	Disagree - Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	210	61	68	81
Cyprus	139	63	38	38
Czech Republic	188	103	40	45
France	62	36	18	8
Germany	176	85	38	53
Greece	180	122	44	14
Hungary	290	144	67	79
Ireland	65	20	8	37
Italy	222	116	37	69
Latvia	118	63	34	21
Lithuania	87	49	28	10
Netherlands	52	14	11	27
Norway	355	54	82	219
Poland	545	197	141	207
Portugal	157	126	17	14
Romania	104	40	36	28
Slovakia	181	67	49	65
Slovenia	149	91	37	21
Spain	75	41	13	21
Sweden	481	137	144	200
United Kingdom	41	8	4	29
Total	3.877	1.637	954	1.286

6. I believe that in my country decisions or actions of individual judges have, during the last two years, been inappropriately influenced by actual, or anticipated, actions using social media (for example, Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn).

	Response	Agree - Strongly	Not sure - Not	Disagree - Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	210	30	74	106
Cyprus	139	33	52	54
Czech Republic	188	38	74	76
France	62	19	27	16
Germany	176	41	60	75
Greece	180	53	82	45
Hungary	290	46	123	121
Ireland	65	6	13	46
Italy	222	69	67	86
Latvia	118	32	48	38
Lithuania	87	13	42	32
Netherlands	52	9	14	29
Norway	355	20	83	252
Poland	545	105	166	274
Portugal	157	92	37	28
Romania	104	22	41	41
Slovakia	181	25	62	94
Slovenia	149	42	58	49
Spain	75	26	22	27
Sweden	481	76	160	245
United Kingdom	41	3	4	34
Total	3.877	800	1.309	1.768

#### Aspects of independence: case-related internal pressure

7. I believe during the last two years cases have been allocated to judges other than in accordance with established rules or procedures in order to influence the outcome of the particular case.

	Response	Agree -	Not sure -	Disagree -
		Strongly	Not	Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	213	24	57	132
Cyprus	144	52	55	37
Czech Republic	200	76	55	69
France	63	21	19	23
Germany	179	32	41	106
Greece	185	106	58	21
Hungary	294	153	101	40
Ireland	65	6	11	48
Italy	230	16	59	155
Latvia	116	52	42	22
Lithuania	88	27	33	28
Netherlands	52	7	11	34
Norway	368	25	55	288
Poland	579	161	177	241
Portugal	164	74	50	40
Romania	111	41	39	31
Slovakia	186	51	72	63
Slovenia	149	51	58	40
Spain	81	9	9	63
Sweden	487	34	58	395
United Kingdom	43	4	5	34
Total	3.997	1.022	1.065	1.910

# 8. I believe that during the last two years the management of the court has exerted pressure on judges to decide individual cases in a particular way

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	206	31	68	107
Cyprus	137	41	58	38
Czech Republic	186	57	72	57
France	62	24	25	13
Germany	175	50	49	76
Greece	176	87	73	16
Hungary	287	168	77	42
Ireland	64	9	8	47
Italy	218	37	83	98
Latvia	117	28	53	36
Lithuania	87	30	35	22
Netherlands	52	9	10	33
Norway	350	27	51	272
Poland	538	171	222	145
Portugal	156	45	61	50
Romania	104	15	40	49
Slovakia	178	69	77	32
Slovenia	149	38	74	37
Spain	73	33	27	13
Sweden	479	32	89	358
United Kingdom	41	3	3	35
Total	3.835	1.004	1.255	1.576

#### Aspects of independence: appointment and promotion of judges

9. I believe judges in my country have entered the judiciary on first appointment other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years.

	Response	Agree - Strongly	Not sure - Not	Disagree - Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	211	53	71	87
Cyprus	142	114	10	18
Czech Republic	191	91	46	54
France	63	28	13	22
Germany	177	55	53	69
Greece	183	88	51	44
Hungary	292	195	65	32
Ireland	65	43	11	11
Italy	227	85	50	92
Latvia	118	25	49	44
Lithuania	88	37	29	22
Netherlands	52	12	7	33
Norway	358	36	71	251
Poland	558	281	109	168
Portugal	159	97	34	28
Romania	108	47	27	34
Slovakia	184	114	46	24
Slovenia	149	103	29	17
Spain	76	15	15	46
Sweden	483	69	91	323
United Kingdom	43	12	6	25
Total	3.927	1.600	883	1.444

10. I believe judges in my country have been appointed to the Supreme Court/Cassation other than solely on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	211	40	75	96
Cyprus	142	97	20	25
Czech Republic	191	84	60	47
France	63	32	19	12
Germany	177	108	39	30
Greece	183	119	42	22
Hungary	292	166	88	38
Ireland	65	18	6	41
Italy	227	80	68	79
Latvia	117	27	47	43
Lithuania	88	29	29	30
Netherlands	52	10	11	31
Norway	358	40	54	264
Poland	558	407	53	98
Portugal	159	97	36	26
Romania	108	48	38	22
Slovakia	184	85	83	16
Slovenia	149	92	33	24
Spain	76	52	11	13
Sweden	483	78	85	320
United Kingdom	43	5	7	31
Total	3.926	1.714	904	1.308

11. I believe judges in my country in first instance and appeal courts have been promoted /appointed to another position other than on the basis of ability and experience during the last two years. (Note experience may include seniority).

	Response	Agree -	Not sure -	Disagree -
		Strongly	Not	Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	211	54	75	82
Cyprus	142	100	19	23
Czech Republic	189	85	53	51
France	63	34	10	19
Germany	177	68	52	57
Greece	183	114	47	22
Hungary	291	209	54	28
Ireland	64	23	13	28
Italy	227	89	47	91
Latvia	117	38	45	34
Lithuania	86	34	35	17
Netherlands	52	14	12	26
Norway	357	47	70	240
Poland	557	353	87	117
Portugal	159	100	32	27
Romania	108	42	40	26
Slovakia	184	96	67	21
Slovenia	149	97	42	10
Spain	74	26	17	31
Sweden	483	84	88	311
United Kingdom	43	10	7	26
Total	3.916	1.717	912	1.287

# 12. I believe that in my country the Council for the Judiciary has the appropriate mechanisms and procedures in order to defend judicial independence effectively.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	209	87	76	46
Cyprus	135	23	19	93
Czech Republic	100	13	45	42
France	62	13	22	27
Germany	150	57	52	41
Greece	179	58	45	76
Hungary	285	60	47	178
Ireland	41	16	7	18
Italy	222	108	44	70
Latvia	116	38	55	23
Lithuania	87	35	29	23
Netherlands	52	23	17	12
Norway	328	183	85	60
Poland	539	152	69	318
Portugal	157	43	40	74
Romania	97	34	27	36
Slovakia	180	43	61	76
Slovenia	149	21	69	59
Spain	75	20	11	44
Sweden	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	31	16	8	7
Total	3.194	1.043	828	1.323

#### Accountability

13. In my country judicial misconduct is appropriately dealt with by the judicial authorities.

	Response	Agree - Strongly agree	Not sure - Not applicable	Disagree - Strongly disagree
Belgium	206	75	77	54
Cyprus	137	14	23	100
Czech Republic	185	54	39	92
France	62	8	13	41
Germany	174	48	43	83
Greece	176	14	42	120
Hungary	284	44	87	153
Ireland	63	13	15	35
Italy	217	52	28	137
Latvia	117	56	31	30
Lithuania	86	38	24	24
Netherlands	52	30	9	13
Norway	349	239	66	44
Poland	533	244	87	202
Portugal	154	17	40	97
Romania	104	20	23	61
Slovakia	177	29	52	96
Slovenia	149	21	47	81
Spain	73	19	8	46
Sweden	476	333	72	71
United Kingdom	41	25	10	6
Total	3.815	1.393	836	1.586

#### 14. In my country judicial corruption is effectively addressed by the judicial authorities.

	Response	Agree -	Not sure -	Disagree -
		Strongly	Not	Strongly
		agree	applicable	disagree
Belgium	206	105	77	24
Cyprus	134	19	29	86
Czech Republic	185	62	48	75
France	62	28	18	16
Germany	174	93	56	25
Greece	176	17	47	112
Hungary	287	46	111	130
Ireland	64	19	29	16
Italy	217	83	55	79
Latvia	116	29	46	41
Lithuania	87	23	34	30
Netherlands	52	32	12	8
Norway	349	238	86	25
Poland	533	244	147	142
Portugal	156	32	52	72
Romania	104	21	32	51
Slovakia	178	11	33	134
Slovenia	149	16	61	72
Spain	73	21	13	39
Sweden	477	300	120	57
United Kingdom	41	30	11	0
Total	3.820	1.469	1.117	1.234

#### Personal and professional characteristics

#### 15. Gender

Gender	Response	Did not answer	Male	Female
Belgium	226	4	120	102
Cyprus	170	10	81	79
Czech Republic	224	6	128	90
France	68	4	33	31
Germany	193	13	119	61
Greece	214	10	95	109
Hungary	309	12	162	135
Ireland	69	3	45	21
Italy	236	1	134	101
Latvia	125	2	63	60
Lithuania	95	3	64	28
Netherlands	53	0	34	19
Norway	389	3	276	110
Poland	643	24	343	276
Portugal	187	5	87	95
Romania	120	2	55	63
Slovakia	207	12	124	71
Slovenia	155	5	79	71
Spain	91	4	57	30
Sweden	497	1	337	159
United Kingdom	47	4	34	9
Total	4.318	128	2.470	1.720

#### 16. My practicing experience as a lawyer is: categories of years.

Experience	Response	0-5 years	6-10 years	11-15 years	16-20 years	21-25 years	26-30 years	Over 30 years
Belgium	226	36	27	29	27	28	17	62
Cyprus	170	91	34	15	9	10	8	3
Czech Republic	224	76	39	33	26	19	20	11
France	68	9	10	11	6	10	5	17
Germany	193	15	18	27	29	41	23	40
Greece	214	54	26	30	27	29	25	23
Hungary	309	60	61	51	37	35	28	37
Ireland	69	17	14	14	5	7	5	7
Italy	236	4	16	31	49	57	30	49
Latvia	124	3	15	27	29	22	12	16
Lithuania	95	28	19	25	13	3	4	3
Netherlands	53	9	6	5	12	5	9	7
Norway	389	62	52	73	79	46	27	50
Poland	643	93	187	113	89	58	39	64
Portugal	187	33	33	30	30	22	39	0
Romania	120	24	23	32	24	9	2	6
Slovakia	207	43	51	41	41	12	12	7
Slovenia	155	26	40	32	18	12	21	6
Spain	91	16	11	14	18	10	8	14
Sweden	497	66	72	57	70	54	63	115
United Kingdom	47	5	6	6	4	3	12	11
Total	4.317	770	760	696	642	492	409	548

#### 17. How often does your practice bring you into contact with courts?

	Response	Regularly	Occasionally	Never
Belgium	226	195	29	2
Cyprus	170	144	26	0
Czech Republic	224	195	27	2
France	68	62	6	0
Germany	193	168	24	1
Greece	214	191	22	1
Hungary	309	245	61	3
Ireland	69	65	4	0
Italy	236	232	4	0
Latvia	126	110	15	1
Lithuania	95	86	8	1
Netherlands	53	43	9	1
Norway	389	257	127	5
Poland	643	503	138	2
Portugal	187	165	21	1
Romania	120	106	13	1
Slovakia	207	173	34	0
Slovenia	155	135	20	0
Spain	91	71	18	2
Sweden	497	419	70	8
United Kingdom	47	42	4	1
Total	4.319	3.607	680	32

18. I primarily have contacts with: Court of first instance, Appeal Court or Supreme Court/ Court of Cassation

Type of court	Response	Court of Appeal court instance		Supreme Court
Belgium	222	194	21	7
Cyprus	168	156	2	10
Czech Republic	224	215	8	1
France	68	58	10	0
Germany	191	186	4	1
Greece	212	164	39	9
Hungary	307	279	23	5
Ireland	69	68	1	0
Italy	232	228	3	1
Latvia	125	107	18	0
Lithuania	95	88	5	2
Netherlands	53	49	2	2
Norway	386	361	20	5
Poland	641	626	11	4
Portugal	185	181	4	0
Romania	118	94	20	4
Slovakia	206	202	2	2
Slovenia	153	149	3	1
Spain	89	83	3	3
Sweden	489	471	14	4
United Kingdom	46	39	5	2
Total	4.279	3.998	218	63

# 19. I primarily deal with: criminal cases, administrative cases, civil (including family cases) cases or all of these in equal measure

Type of cases	Response	administrative cases	civil (including	criminal cases	all of these in equal
			family)		measure
Belgium	223	18	154	18	33
Cyprus	168	10	108	5	45
Czech Republic	224	6	133	28	57
France	68	8	35	7	18
Germany	193	54	103	18	18
Greece	213	11	111	31	60
Hungary	308	25	206	36	41
Ireland	69	9	38	13	9
Italy	235	10	151	60	14
Latvia	126	10	52	29	35
Lithuania	95	4	51	11	29
Netherlands	53	6	38	7	2
Norway	389	27	283	28	51
Poland	642	52	520	7	63
Portugal	186	10	76	55	45
Romania	119	10	44	20	45
Slovakia	207	5	145	6	51
Slovenia	155	6	108	12	29
Spain	91	10	35	17	29
Sweden	491	40	230	136	85
United Kingdom	46	4	28	12	2
Total	4.301	335	2.649	556	761