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Cynic Origins of the Stoic Doctrine of Natural Law?

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the origins of the Stoic notion of natural law had an antecedent in Cynicism, which was closely linked to early Stoicism: the school founder Zeno of Citium wrote the work that made him famous in Cynic fashion, his immediate followers would also endorse Cynic doctrines. For the Stoics, humans can develop an awareness of the 'common law' as the rational force in nature that shapes everything in it; virtue consists in living in accordance with that law. In stark contrast to later 'Roman' Stoics, or thinkers influenced by them, like Cicero, who would use the notion of natural law to justify conventions, such as respect for private property, the early Stoics, following the Cynics, were willing to overturn conventional norms by appealing to nature. In addition to this anti-conventionalist strand, I suggest that the Cynics also advanced the doctrine further developed by the early Stoics that perfect humans would live in an ideal community governed by the common or natural law.

1 Introduction

The doctrine of natural law is often considered to have its origins with the Stoics (see e.g. Striker 1996). Here I would like to discuss the possible Cynic antecedents of this doctrine. As is well known, the Stoics shared the *negative* evaluation of law as convention with their Cynic teachers. Focusing on the negative elements Zeller (1922, 335) put it thus: "Die Wissenschaft hatte von dieser Bettlerphilosophie vorerst wenig zu erwarten; erst in der Stoa, als er durch anderweitige Elemente ergänzt, gemässigt und in den Zusammenhang einer umfassenden Weltsicht aufgenommen war, wurde der Cynismus in's grosse fruchtbar." The question that I will focus on here is whether there is more to Cynicism than anti-conventionalism, whether the Cynics also had a more constructive contribution to make, such that the early Stoics would have been able to develop their doctrine of law, starting out from these positive Cynic beginnings.

Before I start discussing this question it may be helpful to sketch briefly the Stoic doctrine of natural law, as it has been interpreted over the last decades,[1]

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[1] Vander Waerdt 1989; Inwood 1999; Vogt 2008, 161–216; Brouwer 2011; Boeri 2013. For a different interpretation as a set of rules see Striker 1986; Mitsis 1999.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110730944-008

with the use of the bits and pieces that survived from or rather more often about the early Stoics in other authors.[2] The doctrine is this: the Stoics, from Zeno of Citium (334 – 262), the founder of their school, onwards, used 'law' (*nomos*) as one of the different names, including 'god', 'reason', 'fate' and 'Zeus' (see Diogenes Laertius 7.135, *SVF* 1.102, 2.580), they gave to the active principle within nature that shapes the world, each name bringing out a different aspect of this principle. For law see e.g. Aristocles of Messene (1st century CE?) *ap.* Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 260 – 339), *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.14.1 – 2 (*SVF* 1.98, LS 45G, 46G), but above all Cicero (104 – 43), *On the Nature of the Gods*, at 1.36 (*SVF* 1.162): "Zeno […] thinks that the law of nature is divine and that it has the power to order the right things and to forbid the opposite things" (*Zeno* […] *naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria*). This interpretation of the law as a divine power can also be found in the *Hymn to Zeus* (*SVF* 1.537, LS 54I; for the most recent edition see Thom 2005), which was written by Cleanthes of Assos (c. 330–c. 232), Zeno's successor as head of the school. At l. 2, formulated in terms of traditional Greek religion, Cleanthes describes the law as the instrument of Zeus, "steering everything with his law" (νόμου μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν). Pivotal in the Stoics' doctrine of law is the connection with 'reason' (*logos*), which they understood in a substantive, materialist sense as 'creative' fire, pervading everything and thus ordering the world (Sharples 1984; Brouwer 2014, 76 n. 90).

According to Stoic doctrine, human beings stand in a special relationship vis-à-vis this rational force in nature. Up till the age of seven or fourteen years onwards (the sources differ here), they naturally develop a faculty of reason.[3] However, thereafter they themselves need to develop this reason further. According to the Stoics, then, the highest end in life is the perfection of human rationality such that the good human being acquires a completely rational or virtuous disposition, and thus becomes an active part of this rational force (Brouwer 2014, 91).

Furthermore, alongside the Stoic understanding of law as the rational force in nature, and the Stoic interpretation of the highest end as living in accordance with it, those human beings who have developed this perfectly rational disposition will form a community or city of sorts, consisting of all other perfect human beings, governed by the 'common law', as reported by Plutarch, *On the Luck or Virtue of Alexander*, at 329 A-B (*SVF* 1.262, LS 67A):[4]

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[2] von Arnim 1903 – 1905 (= *SVF*) is still the standard collection of the extant evidence, Long and Sedley 1987 (= LS) offer a valuable selection, with commentary. In this chapter references will be made to both collections, wherever possible. For the extant evidence on the Cynics I will make reference to Giannantoni 1990 (= G.).

[3] For a list of sources see further Brouwer 2014, 74 n. 75.

> The much admired *Politeia* of Zeno [...] is aimed at this one main point that we should not live together on the basis of cities or parishes, marked by their own interpretation of what is just, but we should regard all human beings as citizens and members of the parish, and there should be a single way of life and one order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law.

This passage can be read as a proposal for a universal community embracing all human beings that have brought their rational faculty to perfection.[5] That interpretation should at any rate be ascribed to Chrysippus, for which the evidence can be found in e.g. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 2.154, by Arius Didymus (presumably 1st century CE) *ap.* Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation to the Gospel* 15.15.4–5, and in the Plutarchean corpus, *On Homer* 119. I will return to these passages in Section 3.

This perfection is difficult to achieve, however: the Stoics maintained that the perfect human being had not yet come into existence (Brouwer 2014, 92–135), with the exception perhaps of Socrates at the end of his life, in prison (Brouwer 2014, 163–166). Rational human beings, who have not yet achieved that virtuous and perfectly rational disposition, can have a true insight into their place in the order of things, but lacking that solid disposition they will most of the time have to live according to the order of the whole, like dogs tied behind a cart – as in the famous Stoic image reported by Hippolytus of Rome (fl. 200 CE), *Refutation of All Heresies* 1.21.2 (*SVF* 2.975, LS 62A): ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων – and suffer if they attempt to go against the course of the wagon. The Stoic theory of the emotions as incorrect judgments about one's place in the order of things finds its origins here (Graver 2007).

An implication of this demand for perfection is that the law as the one rational force in nature cannot be fully captured in terms of general prescriptions, since these do not take into account the specific circumstances. Zeno introduced new terminology for human beings who act in accordance with the law: only the sage performs 'right actions' (*katorthōmata*), in accordance with the specific circumstances, whereas imperfect human beings can at best perform 'proper functions' (*kathēkonta*, also rendered as 'duties'), which have a reasonable justification only.[6] Laws as general prescriptions can at best offer an imperfect account of the actual course of this force in the world order.[7] The Stoics hence criticized *all* existing laws and constitutions in no uncertain terms. Zeno presumably did so in his *Politeia*, where we have to infer this from his prohibition of law courts, as reported in Diogenes Laertius 7.33 (*SVF* 1.267); Chrysippus did so, too, as can e. g. be inferred from the reproach that Diogenianus *ap.* Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel* 6.8.14 (*SVF* 3.324) directs at him: "How can you say that all positive laws and constitutions are wrong?" (πῶς δὲ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους ἡμαρτῆσθαι φῄς ἅπαντας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας;)

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[4] καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία [...] Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μηδὲ δήμους οἰκῶμεν ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ᾖ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ συντρεφομένης.

[5] See e.g. Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991; Schofield 1999, 64–92; Brouwer 2006, 2015a; Sellars 2007, 19; Vogt 2008, 161–216.

In their rejection of current laws and political arrangements, the early Stoics went so far as to state that perfect human beings could perform all kinds of 'embarrassing' or 'disturbing' actions, such as eating human flesh or having free sexual relationships, including incest. In later Stoicism these traits are often downplayed, especially among the 'Roman' Stoics, from Panaetius to Seneca, with the argument (among others) that these traits would merely represent an early phase in Zeno's thought.[8] According to these Stoics, whereas Zeno may have written the *Politeia*, his first work, 'on the dog's tail' (see Diogenes Laertius 7.4), a clear reference to his Cynic or doggish intellectual ancestry, later in his life Zeno would have abandoned his earlier, Cynic doctrines.

However, these attempts at downplaying were and must be in the end unsuccessful. The "disturbing theses" (Vogt 2008, 20) are an integral part, not only of Zeno's thought, but also of that of his successors, Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Evidence can be found in e. g. Diogenes Laertius, at 7.31–34 and 7.187–9, and in hostile sources, such as in *Against the Professors*, at 11.192–4, written by the Sceptic Sextus Empiricus (2nd century CE) and – perhaps most importantly – in *On the Stoics*, written by the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (1st century BCE), which survived in a mutilated papyrus from Herculaneum, brilliantly edited by Dorandi (1982). In this treatise, Philodemus attacks his philosophical adversaries by making clear that, first, other Stoics, such as Cleanthes, Chrysippus and Antipater, held the same opinions as Zeno in his *Politeia*, and that, second, they held these opinions in common with Diogenes of Sinope (mid 4th century), the founder of Cynicism. It is Diogenes' *Politeia* that Philodemus takes as a starting point. Since the authenticity of Diogenes' work was also subject to debate, Philodemus proceeds as follows: he first establishes the authenticity of Diogenes' *Politeia* by means of quoting the Stoics quoting the *Politeia*, and then continues with the 'embarrassing' similarities in doctrine.

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[6] See Diogenes Laertius 7.107 (*SVF* 1.230); Cicero, *Varro* 37 (*SVF* 1.231).

[7] See Vogt 2008, Chapter 4; Brouwer 2011; Boeri 2013.

[8] See Mansfeld 1986, 321, 347–349; Sellars 2007, 21–22; Brouwer 2008, 12–15.

In Chapter 6 (of Dorandi's edition), Philodemus starts with Cleanthes' *On Dress*, in which Cleanthes mentioned and praised Diogenes' *Politeia*. He moves on to Chrysippus, presumably in order to make clear that the prolific Chrysippus referred to Diogenes' *Politeia* in several of his works. According to Philodemus, in his *On City and Law* Chrysippus makes mention of Diogenes' *Politeia*, where Chrysippus would have stated that weapons are useless (imagine the reactions of Philodemus' Roman readers!), for which Chrysippus in his *On Politeia* would have invoked Diogenes as an authority. Furthermore, in *On Things Not to Be Chosen for Their Own Sake* and in the first book of *To Those Who Think Differently about Practical Wisdom,* Chrysippus would have quoted Diogenes' doctrine on dice as currency. Perhaps with regard to these titles it could still be maintained that Chrysippus only recalls yet does not endorse these doctrines. But then Philodemus states that in his *On Life According to Nature* Chrysippus not only makes mention of Diogenes' *Politeia* but also agrees with it, even praising it in the fourth book of his *On the Virtuous and Pleasure*. The text becomes even more mutilated here, but the doctrine of man-eating is introduced from Chrysippus' *On Justice*. In Chapter 7 Philodemus then continues "to write about the good things of the men mentioned above" (τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἤδη παραγράφωμεν, col. 18.1–2), i.e. Diogenes, Zeno and his followers. Sexual matters get most of the attention (masturbation in public; free sexual intercourse, with sisters, mothers and other members of the family, brothers as well as sons – sometimes even by force), but also their approval of killing fathers.

Cynicism is thus not just a phase in Zeno's thought, it is part and parcel of early Stoicism. About the role of the Cynic doctrines different interpretations are on offer, such as that the early Stoics would advocate outright anti-conventionalism (Goulet-Cazé 2003, 106–108) or that they would do so with regard to specific circumstances only (Goulet-Cazé 2017, 600). Even if the latter position may well be the correct one, the point, however, surely is that – just as for the Cynics themselves – the anticonventional doctrines allow for a radical rethinking of received opinions (the Stoics used the term 'paradox' here, in the literal sense of going 'against opinion'), even of what perhaps from a conventional point of view ought not be said or done, such that the perfect human being does the right thing in the given circumstances, for which the evidence can be found in Cicero, *Lucullus* 136 (*SVF* 3.599), Origen (c. 184–c. 253), *Commentary on the Gospel of John* 2.112 (*SVF* 3.544), and Diogenes Laertius 7.123 (*SVF* 3.642). The early Stoics thus followed the Cynics (or Socrates, for that matter) in advocating radically rethinking received opinions, and in specific circumstances also going against them.

The doctrine of law as developed by the early Stoics is thus more Cynic, more anticonventional than later versions or interpretations of this doctrine suggest. For students of the natural law tradition the anti-conventionalist aspect of the Stoic doctrine of law is often surprising and stands at any rate in stark contrast with the use of the Stoic doctrine by e. g. Cicero in the first century BCE or by Ulpian's pupil Marcian at the beginning of the third century CE, who both linked the notion of Stoic natural law with Roman law.

With regard to Cicero: in his *On the Laws*, Cicero made an attempt to connect the Stoic doctrine of law with Roman law.[9] In Book 1 Cicero makes the connection in a general sense; in Book 2 and 3 the connection is made with Roman law in the field of religion and magistrates respectively. Towards the end of his life, in his *On Proper Functions* Cicero offered a comparable connection between Stoicism and Roman law. A telling example is Cicero's presentation of justice as a Stoic virtue on the one hand and the protection of private property, one of the cornerstones of Roman law, on the other hand (Kaser 1971, 205; Capogrossi Colognesi 2016, 524). Whereas for the Stoics property is at best indifferent, in Cicero's presentation, the protection of private property would be one of the two main tasks derived from this virtue (see Pierson 2013, 45–52; Brouwer 2021, 103–125).

With regard to Marcian: in his *Teaching Manual*, Book 1, Marcian, a pupil of Ulpian, offers us the often-quoted passage from the beginning of Chrysippus' *On Law*, which is transmitted via Justinian's *Digest*, at 1.3.2 (*SVF* 3.314, LS 67R), and runs thus:[10]

> Law is king of all human and divine matters. Law must preside over things both fine and base as ruler and as guide, and thus be the standard of right and wrong, ordering animals that are political by nature to do as they should, and prohibiting them from what they should not do.

The definition is in fact a variant on the formulation that goes back to the 6th century BCE poet Pindar, which he (fr. 169 Mähler) introduced in the context of an account of Heracles' erratic behaviour. Chrysippus picked up on Pindar's formulation and – following Zeno and Cleanthes – reinterpreted law in terms of the force in nature, as reason pervading the world. The Stoic understanding of law in which perfect human beings participate could hardly be more different from the Roman context of law as a systematic set of rules, in which the passage survived (Brouwer 2015b). In Lenel's reconstruction of the surviving passages from Marcian's *Teaching Manual* (numbers 42–183), it is placed among the first passages (number 44, Lenel 1889 1:652) and is followed – as usual in the tradition of the teaching manuals – by a systematic overview of the rules of law in sixteen books. Also in the *Digest*, in which these bits and pieces of Marcian's teaching manual can be found, Justinian – or rather Tribonian and his collaborators – place this quote from Chrysippus in the context of further general characterisations of the Roman legal sources, that is of statutes, *senatus consulta* and customary law.

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[9] See Vander Waerdt 1989, 1994; Mitsis 1994; Asmis 2008; Schiavone 2017, 287.

[10] ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεμόνα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν φύσει πολιτικῶν ζῴων προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.

Why the conservative Romans became so fond of such an unconventional school of thought remains an intriguing question, to which an answer may not so easily be given (Long 2018, 254). The softening up of Stoic doctrine by among others Panaetius and Cicero must have helped, such that at least some Romans might have lost sight of the controversial beginnings of Stoicism (Brouwer 2021, 35–36).

2 Positive doctrines in Cynicism

Whereas the influence of the Cynics in their radical anti-conventionalism on the early Stoics can thus not be denied, here I would like to deal with the question whether the Cynics also exercised a more constructive influence on Stoicism, notably in relation to the Stoic conception of law as the force of nature, with which perfect human beings live in accordance, and – if there are more than one of them – that these perfect human beings form a community. If so, the Stoics might have taken on board not only the Cynics' radical critique of existing arrangements, but also their alternative approach formulated in more positive terms, which they would then have developed further.

Before starting the discussion of the evidence regarding the constructive approach in Cynicism the problem of the sources cannot go unmentioned. Apart from the loss of most of the writings of the early Cynics, and apart from the fact that much of what survived is in the form of anecdotes, it is also important to be aware of the fact that the sources on Cynicism may have been misrepresented. Just as the Cynicizing traits of the early Stoics were played down by later generations, so Cynic doctrine was brushed up by later Stoics, who would thus have idealized Cynic doctrine, especially in the doxographies in Book 6 of Diogenes

Laertius, at 60 – 63, 70 – 73, and 103 – 105. In this idealising context Antisthenes (c. 445–c. 365) is often brought up, too, yet again as a moderating influence: with no extant direct references to this proto-Cynic by early Stoics, he is rather inserted in later doxographies, especially in the literature on successions (Brancacci 1992, 4072). In a recent overview article on the sources on Diogenes of Sinope (unfortunately somewhat perfunctory on the evidence in Diogenes Laertius, Book 6, and without reference to Philodemus), Overwien (2011, 120) may have stretched it a bit, where he answers the question as to "What Diogenes would have made of his Nachleben?" rhetorically, thus: "Diogenes würde vermutlich nur noch den Kopf schütteln und vor allen Dingen lachen." Shaking one's head is no option here, and we will have to deal with the tradition as best we can.

In discussing the positive doctrines in Cynicism, I will focus on the evidence of the two earliest generations of Cynics and pay particular attention to Diogenes of Sinope as the first Cynic and his pupil Crates of Thebes (c. 365–c. 285) as Zeno's first teacher. I will discuss the evidence under four headings: first, living according to nature, second, cosmopolitanism, third, interest in physics, and finally – more controversial – the evaluation of law as 'civilized' (*asteios*) in Diogenes Laertius 6.72 – 73.

2.1 Living according to nature

The first of these four headings, living according to nature, is reported in Diogenes Laertius, at 6.71 (fr. 271 G.). Diogenes not only characterises the good life as living according to nature, he also puts it into practice, valuing things according to nature:[11]

> In order to live the good life it is necessary to choose those efforts that are in accordance with nature rather than useless ones. Such things he said, and this is how he apparently lived, [...] by valuing things according to nature rather than those according to law.

The expression 'according to nature' of course raises the question what Diogenes meant by nature here. In his book on the Cynics, Desmond (2008, 132 – 159) offers a succinct overview of some different interpretations of nature among ancient thinkers. As for the Cynics, Desmond rightly focuses on the interpretation of simplicity, "stripping away unnecessary desires and customs" (Desmond 2008, 150, cf. Helmer 2017, 52–54), which brings about freedom, independence and self-sufficiency (Desmond 2008, 150, cf. Rich 1956, 24).

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[11] δέον οὖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων πόνων τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν ἑλομένους ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως. τοιαῦτα διελέγετο καὶ ποιῶν ἐφαίνετο, [...] μηδὲν οὕτω τοῖς κατὰ νόμον ὡς τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν διδούς.

It will suffice to mention just a couple of examples from the extant evidence on the Cynics' living the simple life, and hence of freedom, independence and self-sufficiency. A vivid account of Diogenes living the simple life is extant in Jerome (347–420), *Against Jovinian* 2.14 (fr. 175 G.). Jerome refers to Satyrus as his source, a 3rd century BCE Peripatetic author, one of the first to write biographies, with whose work he presumably was familiar via the lost end of Book 4 of Porphyry's *On Abstinence.*[12] This is the account:[13]

> He folded his cloak double to guard against the cold and had a backpack for a larder. [...] He was commonly known as someone who lived from day to day, begging for his needs from anyone whom he encountered, and thus acquiring his food.

As for Crates, typical for him are the accounts in which he renounces his property, thus 'setting himself free'. See Origen, *Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew* 15.15 (fr. 9 G.): "They say that he presented all his property to the people of Thebes, saying 'Crates on this day sets Crates free'" (φασὶν ἀποδόμενον πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ Θηβαίων δήμῳ δεδωρῆσθαι, μετὰ τοῦ εἰρηκέναι ὅτι 'σήμερον ὁ Κράτης Κράτητα ἐλευθεροῖ') and Epiphanius, *Against All Heresies* 3.2.9 (fr. 16 G.): "Crates of Thebes (Boethia), who was a Cynic, too, said that poverty is the beginning of freedom" (Κράτης ἀπὸ Θηβῶν τῶν Βιωτικῶν καὶ αὐτὸς κυνικὸς ἔλεγεν ἐλευθερίας εἶναι τὴν ἀκτημοσύνην).

2.2 Cosmopolitanism

Another Cynic theme is cosmopolitanism. According to Diogenes Laertius 6.63 (fr. 355 G.), "When he [Diogenes the Cynic] was asked where he came from, he said: 'I am a citizen of the world'" (ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη, 'κοσμοπολίτης,' ἔφη). This report is echoed in later, 2nd century CE sources, such as Lucian and Maximus of Tyre. In *Ways of Life for Sale*, at 8 (fr. 80, ll. 27–9 G.), Lucian presents Diogenes in the setting of an auction, and makes Diogenes answer the buyer's questions in the following manner: "You are looking at a citizen of the world [...] striving to emulate Heracles" (Buyer: ποδαπὸς εἶ; [...] Diogenes:

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[12] See Bernays 1866, 32, 159–163; Leo 1901, 118–124; Patillon, Segonds, and Brisson 1995, 40–41. Clark 2000, 194 is sceptical about Porphyry as Jerome's intermediate source here.

[13] *Diogenes palliolo duplici usus sit propter frigus: peram pro cellario habuerit:* [...] ἡμερόβιος *vulgo appellatus est, in praesentem horam poscens a quolibet, et accipiens cibum.*

τοῦ κόσμου πολίτην ὁρᾷς. Buyer: ζηλοῖς δὲ δὴ τίνα; Diogenes: τὸν Ἡρακλέα). Maximus of Tyre, *Oration* 32.9 (fr. 298 G.) presents Diogenes' cosmopolitanism in this manner: "Liberated from all distress, free, without a worry, without needs, without pain, he [Diogenes] inhabited the whole earth as if it were a single house" (ἄφετος παντὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ, ἐλεύθερος, ἄφροντις, ἀδεής, ἄλυπος ἐνέμετο τὴν πᾶσαν γῆν ὡς οἶκον ἕνα).

Cynic cosmopolitanism has been much discussed, and surprisingly enough, more often than not interpreted in a negative sense as an expression of the rejection of actual cities.[14] These interpretations are often based on the quote offered by Diogenes Laertius at 6.38 (fr. 263, 7 G.), which is introduced as follows:[15]

> He used to say that all curses of tragedy had happened to him. He was therefore:
> "Without a city, without a house, deprived of a country,
> a beggar, a wanderer, living from day to day."

The negative interpretation is obviously based on the first part of the quote, dominated by the adjectives with the negating alpha privative.

However, the statement of Diogenes is already coloured more positively, if we look at how Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435–c. 356), one of Socrates' followers, and the founder of the Cyrenaic school, rejected traditional political communities. Since Aristippus was a contemporary of Diogenes, although from an older generation, some scholars even suggested a debate between Aristippus and Diogenes here. This is at any rate Aristippus' formulation of the rejection of particular communities, which can be found in Xenophon (c. 430 – 354), *Memorabilia* 2.1.13: "I do not shut up myself within a particular community but am a stranger everywhere" (οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν κατακλείω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πανταχοῦ εἰμι). In this context of Aristippus being a stranger everywhere, Diogenes' declaration that he is a citizen of the world already has a more positive connotation as an alternative to local citizenship. Rather than being a stranger, Diogenes the Cynic considers himself to be at home in the world, and that he as such is a citizen of the world (Moles 1996, 109 – 111; Sellars 2007).

In one of the doxographical sections of Book 6 of Diogenes Laertius at 72 (fr. 353 G.) this is expressed thus: "There is only one, real community, and that is the one in the world" (μόνην τε ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ). At Diogenes Laertius 6.105, in another doxographical passage, the end of living in accordance with nature is given a social dimension. Those who live the simple life, at home in the world, live in friendship with others who live the simple life, too: “The sage is a friend to his kind” (καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ). Rather than a brotherhood of human beings, which is a theme among later thinkers, such as Panaetius and Cicero,[16] this passage speaks of a community of sages, of perfect human beings. Of course, these doxographical passages may have been stoicised; some scholars even outright attributed them to Chrysippus (Schofield 1999, 14; Pons Olivares 2009, 578). However, the positive account of cosmopolitanism can also be found in the extant evidence from Crates of Thebes (c. 365–c. 285), which is clearly reliable, and to which I will now turn.

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[14] Rudberg 1936, 1; Tarn 1939; Goulet-Cazé 1999, 733; Schofield 1999, 144; Overwien 2005, 333.

[15] εἰώθει δὲ λέγειν τὰς τραγικὰς ἀρὰς αὐτῷ συνηντηκέναι· εἶναι γοῦν·
'ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος,
πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοὐφ' ἡμέραν.'

For Crates’ cosmopolitanism two short texts actually written by Crates himself can be taken into account: the so-called “Pera passage” and a fragment from a tragedy (see further Moles 1995, 143–144). This is the Pera fragment, preserved in Diogenes Laertius 6.85 (fr. 4 Diels 1901, fr. 80 G.):[17]

> There is a city, Pera, in the wine-dark sea of folly,
> beautiful and fat, though filthy, with nothing much inside.
> Never does there sail to it any foolish stranger,
> Or lewd fellow who takes delight in the rumps of whores,
> But it merely carries thyme and garlic, figs and loaves,
> Things over which people do not fight or go to war,
> Nor do they stand to weapons for copper coins or glory. (tr. Hard 2012, 229)

The Greek Pera is a variation upon Crete in the *Odyssey*, at 19.172–173, on which the first two lines are modelled. Pera, as retained or transliterated in the modern translations,[18] thus evokes a non-existent ‘utopian’ island, which is in the state of *tuphos* (l. 2). *Tuphos* can be understood both literally as ‘mist’ or ‘smoke’ as well as metaphorically as ‘illusion’ or ‘folly’.[19] However, if Pera is taken literally, that is as ‘backpack’, the lines refer no longer to an ideal place somewhere else. The interpretation becomes thus, still in Hard’s, but now adapted translation:

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16 Giannantoni 1990, 4:545; Sellars 2007; Brouwer 2015a.

17 Πήρη τις πόλις ἐστὶ μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι τύφῳ,
καλὴ καὶ πίειρα, περίρρυπος, οὐδὲν ἔχουσα,
εἰς ἣν οὔτε τις εἰσπλεῖ ἀνὴρ μωρὸς παράσιτος,
οὔτε λίχνος πόρνης ἐπαγαλλόμενος πυγῇσιν·
ἀλλὰ θύμον καὶ σκόρδα φέρει καὶ σῦκα καὶ ἄρτους,
ἐξ ὧν οὐ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους περὶ τούτων,
οὐχ ὅπλα κέκτηνται περὶ κέρματος, οὐ περὶ δόξης.

18 See e.g. Hicks 1925; Apelt 1967; Gigante 1998; Jürß 2010; Hard 2012, 94.

19 Decleva Caizzi 1980; Brouwer 2014, 153–157.

“The backpack as a refuge in the midst of a world of illusion that most people inhabit.” With his backpack, then, fair and fat, the whole world has become Crates’ city, with Crates being at home everywhere.

The second passage, from an unfortunately unnamed tragedy, yet again survived in Diogenes Laertius. According to Diogenes Laertius 6.98 (fr. 15 Diels 1901, fr. 80 G.), this passage offers “philosophy of a most elevated character” (ὑψηλότατον ἐχούσας φιλοσοφίας χαρακτῆρα), which is probably directed against those who maintain that Cynicism is not serious philosophy, but only a “way of life” (see Diogenes Laertius 6.103: αἵρεσιν καὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἐγκρίνοντες τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ, καθά φασί τινες, ἔνστασιν βίου). The following lines are presented as proof thereof: “My country is not one tower, one roof, / but the entire earth is my city [*polisma*] and my home, / readily at hand to serve as my dwelling” (οὐχ εἷς πάτρα μοι πύργος, οὐ μία στέγη, / πάσης δὲ χέρσου καὶ πόλισμα καὶ δόμος / ἕτοιμος ἡμῖν ἐνδιαιτᾶσθαι πάρα). Here again, Crates shows a positive allegiance to the earth that serves him as a city and home, ‘readily at hand’, and thus markedly not utopian.

It can thus be concluded that the Cynics present cosmopolitanism not just as a critique of existing communities, but also as an alternative. Cosmopolitanism in the Cynic fashion would thus consist in (and here I follow Moles 1996) having positive relations with 1) nature or the natural world (as opposed to the life in actual cities); 2) animals – after all Diogenes called himself a dog (see further Flores-Júnior 2005; Husson 2013); 3) other human beings, in so far as they are wise, such that they form a community, in which they have all things in common; 4) and finally, even the gods.

2.3 Interest in physics

The third theme is the Cynics’ interest in physics. It is often maintained that the early Cynics were not interested in the study of nature (as e.g. by Husson 2011, 58, 161). The three following passages appear to confirm this lack of interest. Diogenes Laertius 6.103 (fr. 368 G.):[20]

> They choose to dispense with logic and physics, much like Ariston of Chios, to concentrate on ethics only.

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[20] ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τόπον περιαιρεῖν, ἐμφερῶς Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῳ, μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ.

Diogenes Laertius 6.39 (fr. 371 G.):[21]

> To someone who was talking about astronomical matters, he [Diogenes the Cynic] said, “And how many days did it take you to get down from the sky?”

Stobaeus 2.1.23 (fr. 372 G.), in which Diogenes speaks to an astronomer, who is lecturing about the planets [lit. wandering stars]:[22]

> “It is not these that are wandering, but those over there,” pointing to the people standing around.

Do these passages really imply that Diogenes had no interest in nature at all? Another, better interpretation is that Diogenes rather rejected the kind of knowledge of nature that cannot be put to moral use. A passage that survived in the Arabic tradition, fr. 374.1 Gutas,[23] in a set of sayings attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, conveys the point nicely: “He was asked: ‘Which of the sciences is the most useful?’ ‘That which is practiced.’” A similar point is reported by Diogenes Laertius, at 6.27–28 (fr. 374 G.), where Diogenes criticizes students of literature, of music, the natural sciences and rhetoric. All their efforts are misguided:[24]

> The student of literature studies Odysseus’ ills, rather than his own ills, the musician rather than tuning his lyre better tunes his soul, the natural scientist looking at the sun and the moon, overlooks things close by, and orators while talking about justice never practice it.

In a much-discussed passage, Diogenes Laertius 6.73 (fr. 132 G.), there is even evidence that Diogenes himself would have put a physical theory to use, explaining why eating flesh of animals or – indeed, here one of the disturbing theses pops up – why eating flesh of human beings is not ‘strange’ (*atopos*). It would stem from the Cynic’s tragedy *Thyestes*, ‘if really his’, Diogenes Laertius adds, a remark which might be caused by the fact that the *Thyestes* could be an alternative title of the *Atreus*, mentioned by Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, col. 16.30 Dorandi, since Thyestes and Atreus are brothers, playing opposite roles in society (Dümmler 1901, 67–71):[25]

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[21] πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, ‘ποσταῖος,’ ἔφη, ‘πάρει ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ;’

[22] ‘οὐ γὰρ οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ οὗτοι’, δείξας αὐτῷ τοὺς παρακαθεζομένους.

[23] Gutas 1993, 503; Baldacchino 2014 offers only a translation in French of Gutas’ English version.

[24] τούς τε γραμματικοὺς ἐθαύμαζε τὰ μὲν τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως κακὰ ἀναζητοῦντας, τὰ δ’ ἴδια ἀγνοοῦντας. καὶ μὴν καὶ τοὺς μουσικοὺς τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ λύρᾳ χορδὰς ἁρμόττεσθαι, ἀνάρμοστα δ’ ἔχειν τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἤθη· τοὺς μαθηματικοὺς ἀποβλέπειν μὲν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, τὰ δ’ ἐν ποσὶ πράγματα παρορᾶν· τοὺς ῥήτορας τὰ δίκαια μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι λέγειν, πράττειν δὲ μηδαμῶς.

> He said that all things are in all things and go through all: for meat is not only in bread, bread is also in vegetables; and all other bodies also, by means of certain invisible passages mass particles find their way in and unite in the form of breath.

As commentators have remarked, this explanation may well rely on "a bit of popularized Anaxagorean physics" (Dudley 1937, 30), but is at any rate "scientific" (Höistad 1948, 144). We have thus reason to assume that Diogenes showed some interest in science, under the condition that it should have an ethical payoff.

In this context of putting science to use, an intriguing poem on Diogenes' death cannot remain unmentioned. It is written by Cercidas of Megalopolis, usually considered a Cynic (Goulet-Cazé 1994), who is dated firmly in the 3rd century BCE (290–220), a couple of generations after Diogenes' death. The passage survived yet again in Diogenes Laertius, at 6.76–77 (fr. 54 Livrea, fr. 60 Lomiento), whereas bits of it apparently resurfaced in the Egyptian desert towards the end of the 19th century (*P. Oxy.* 1082, fr. 19 = fr. 14 Lomiento). This is the poem, with the introductory lines by Diogenes Laertius:[26]

> About his death the accounts differ: […] One is that he controlled his breath, which is also the version of Cercidas of Megalopolis, who stated it in his *Meliambs* thus:
>
> The man from Sinope is no longer, who carried a staff,
> doubled his cloak, fed on aether, but he went up,
> after having closed his lips against his teeth and holding his breath.
> For Diogenes was truly a child of Zeus, a heavenly dog.

The starting point for Cercidas' poem appears to have been Diogenes' epitaph (preserved in the *Greek Anthology*, Book 7 no. 64 (fr. 110 G.); on the epitaph see further Häusle 1989): "Now that he [Diogenes] is dead, he has the stars as his home" (νῦν δὲ θανὼν ἀστέρας οἶκον ἔχει). Cercidas clearly plays on the cause of Diogenes' death: breath recurs in *aitheriboskas* in line 2, which has been interpreted either as 'living in the open air' (Hicks 1925; Goulet-Cazé 1999) or as 'feeding on aether' (Livrea 1991, 236). The first interpretation would obviously allude to the fact that Diogenes preferred life in the open air. If so, why would Cercidas not have chosen to refer to plain air rather than aether? Aether is after all the divine element, which also rather nicely fits in both with the wordplay on Diogenes' name, which literally means 'child of Zeus', and the phrase 'heavenly dog'. Cercidas would thus have placed Diogenes' death, on an ethical level surely the ultimate expression of one's independence (see López Cruces 1995, 23–24), in a physico-theological context.

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[25] καὶ τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ πάντ' ἐν πᾶσι καὶ διὰ πάντων εἶναι λέγων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄρτῳ κρέας εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ λαχάνῳ ἄρτον καὶ τῶν σωμάτων τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν πᾶσι διά τινων ἀδήλων πόρων [καὶ] ὄγκων εἰσκρινομένων καὶ συνατμιζομένων.

[26] περὶ δὲ τοῦ θανάτου διάφοροι λέγονται λόγοι· […] οἱ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα συγκρατήσαντα, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Κερκιδᾶς ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, λέγων ἐν τοῖς μελιάμβοις οὕτως·

οὐ μὰν ὁ πάρος γα Σινωπεὺς τῆνος ὁ βακτροφόρας,
διπλείματος, αἰθεριβόσκας ἀλλ' ἀνέβα
χεῖλος ποτ' ὀδόντας ἐρείσας καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συνδακών.
ἦς γὰρ ἀλαθέως Διογένης Ζανὸς γόνος οὐράνιός τε κύων.

Of course, Cercidas' account is by no means evidence that Diogenes himself would have maintained such views (Goulet-Cazé 1992, 3914; Billerbeck 1996, 206). It has even been suggested that Cercidas would have presented us with a 'surrogate Stoicism' (Croiset 1911, 484). However, from the little that we know about Cercidas, he appears to have been rather critical of the Stoics, castigating a certain Kallimedon (in *Meliambs* 6a Lomiento), a pupil of Sphaerus, one of Zeno's favourite pupils (see further Knox 1929, xviii). It thus seems rather more plausible that Cercidas faithfully played on Diogenes' own interests in nature.

2.4 Law as *civilized*

The fourth and final theme is the characterisation of law as 'civilized' (*asteios*), at Diogenes Laertius 6.72–73 (fr. 353 G.):[27]

> Regarding the law he said that without it, it is impossible to live as a citizen; without a city there is no benefit in something civilized; and the city is civilized. Without law there is no benefit in a city; therefore law is something civilized.

At least three different interpretations of civilized have been proposed. First, 'civilized' expresses Diogenes' negative, 'pejorative', evaluation of actual cities and their laws (Schofield 1999, 132–134). The second interpretation takes it that 'civilized' should be taken to express the Cynic's positive evaluation of the city that is the world and the law that guides it (Moles 1995, 130 and 1996, 106 n. 4). This second interpretation resembles the later Stoic interpretation of law so much that – and this is the third interpretation – it has been maintained that the argument is not Cynic at all, but rather a product of Stoics stoicising Cynicism (Goulet-Cazé 1982). Even if the passage is in itself ambiguous, in combination with the evidence under the other headings discussed here, a positive Cynic evaluation of 'civilized' – and hence of law – is at least likely.

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[27] περί τε τοῦ νόμου ὅτι χωρὶς αὐτοῦ οὐχ οἷόν τε πολιτεύεσθαι· οὐ γάρ φησιν ἄνευ πόλεως ὄφελός τι εἶναι ἀστείου· ἀστεῖον δὲ ἡ πόλις· νόμου δὲ ἄνευ πόλεως οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἀστεῖον ἄρα ὁ νόμος.

It can thus be concluded that the extant evidence *does* allow for the conclusion that the early Cynics were not just radical anti-conventionalists. Cynic notions of simplicity, cosmopolitanism, and perhaps even law itself can be interpreted as a positive allegiance to a life that is simple, that is lived in the world and thus readily at hand, and perhaps even guided by the law of nature.

3 The constructive Cynic doctrines and early Stoicism

I will round off by discussing these positive Cynic doctrines as they reappear in Stoicism. As for the first theme, 'simplicity', the Stoic sage is characterised as simple. The evidence preserved by Stobaeus, at 2.108.11 (*SVF* 3.630), in which the sage is called – among other things – 'simple' (*haplous*), and capable of friendship, which well reflects the theme in Cynicism as discussed earlier. The sage lives the simple life, not needing anything but a virtuous disposition. It is in this context that his (or her) knowledge is also described as a 'simple good' (ἁπλοῦν δ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμη, Diogenes Laertius 7.98 (*SVF* 3.102), see further Brouwer 2014, 158). All other things which are usually considered good are at best indifferent. As Tad Brennan (2004, 184) succinctly put it, in the phrase '*salva virtute*', indifferent things may allow for moral deliberation in relation to virtue, but in the end it is virtue only that counts.

As for the second theme, cosmopolitanism, as already noted in Section 1, the early Stoics developed this further, too. The sage's reason is fully in line with cosmic reason, and if possible contributes actively to it. If there is more than one sage, these sages will affect each other. The manner in which this happens is literally 'far-reaching'. This is how Plutarch, *On Common Conceptions* 1068F (*SVF* 3.627) states it:[28]

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[28] ἄν εἷς σοφὸς ὁπουδήποτε προτείνῃ τὸν δάκτυλον φρονίμως, οἱ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην σοφοὶ πάντες ὠφελοῦνται. τοῦτο τῆς φιλίας ἔργον αὐτῶν, εἰς τοῦτο τοῖς κοινοῖς ὠφελήμασι τῶν σοφῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τελευτῶσιν.

> If a sage anywhere extends his finger using his practical wisdom, all the sages throughout the world will benefit. This is the work of their friendship, into which the virtues of the sages for their common benefit end.

Hermann Diels (1917, 6) rightly characterized this statement as ‘etwas abenteuerlich’, but the point is surely that sages related in this way are therefore also said to form a community, a Stoic doctrine preserved – via Eusebius of Caesarea, *Preparation for the Gospel* 15.15.5 (*SVF* 2.528, LS 67L) – by Arius Didymus, too: “A community exists amongst them, because they participate in reason, that is the law by nature” (κοινωνίαν δ’ ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διὰ τὸ λόγου μετέχειν, ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος). A similar formulation can be found in Ps.-Plutarch, *On Homer* 119 (not in *SVF*): “This is the familiar doctrine of the Stoics, that there is one order, in which by nature gods and men rule together participating in justice” (ἐστὶ τὸ δόγμα ἐκεῖνο τῶν Στωικῶν, τὸ δὴ ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει). The Stoics’ ideal community of sages thus does not refer to a political utopia in the sense of a group of sages that set up and form a local community together (see above n. 4). Rather, once a human being has perfected his or her own rational capacities, he or she will by virtue of having become perfect be a ‘world citizen’, participating on the highest level of being. If more human beings achieve perfection, they will be part of a community of sages, however far removed they may be from each other.

As for our third theme, interest in nature, this hardly needs further explanation: for the Stoics the study of nature is one of the three main areas of research (or parts of philosophy, as Zeno called it in his *On Reason* (see Diogenes Laertius 7.39, *SVF* 1.45, LS 26B, cf. Aëtius 1 Preface 2, *SVF* 2.35, LS 26A), alongside ethics and logic. Zeno and his followers would thus already have become interested in nature, due to the Cynics, an interest they would have developed further by their study of Heraclitus or Plato’s *Timaeus*.[29] Fourth, and finally, the Stoic usage of ‘civilized’ (*asteios*) in connection with the city and law is developed in Stobaeus 2.103.12–17 (*SVF* 1.587, LS 67I):[30]

> The law [...] is good, and likewise so is the city. With regard to the city being good, Cleanthes adequately put the following argument: “If a city is a habitable construction to which peo-

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29 For Heraclitus see Long 1996; for the *Timaeus* see Betegh 2003.

30 τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι [...] σπουδαῖον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἠρώτησε τοιοῦτον· ‘πόλις μὲν <εἰ> ἔστιν οἰκητήριον κατασκεύασμα, εἰς ὃ καταφεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστεῖον δὴ πόλις ἐστίν; ἀλλὰ μὴν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ πόλις οἰκητήριον· ἀστεῖον ἄρ’ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις.’

> ple may have recourse for the dispensation of justice, then a city is surely civilized. A city is that sort of habitation. So a city is civilized."

Different from the *asteios*-passage brought up above, in Section 2.4, the meaning of *asteios* is here without a doubt a positive one, which is easily explained if we take both city and law to refer to the world. The theme was developed further with regard to the inferior person, who is inexperienced with the life in the city that is the world, and not familiar with the law pervading it. In the continuation of the Stobaeus-passage, at 103.24 – 104.5 (*SVF* 3.677), the non-sage or 'inferior person', who is the opposite of *asteios*, is introduced. This *agroikos* ('rustic') person lacks experience of the customs and laws of the city:[31]

> They also say that every inferior person is rustic. For rusticity is inexperience of the customs and laws in a city: of which every inferior person is guilty. He is also wild, being hostile to that lifestyle which is in accord with the law, bestial, and a harmful human being. And he is uncultivated and tyrannical, inclined to do despotic acts, and even to cruel, violent, and lawless acts when he is given the opportunities.

In the lines preceding Cleanthes' argument, at 2.103.9 – 12 (*SVF* 3.328), with which the theme is introduced, the Cynic undertones are even clearer: "Each inferior person is an exile, in as much as he is deprived of law and of a community in accordance with nature" (φυγάδα πάντα φαῦλον εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον στέρεται νόμου καὶ πολιτείας κατὰ φύσιν ἐπιβαλλούσης).

The extant sources on Cynicism thus provide substance to the characterisation of Cynicism as "the short cut to virtue" (σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν), as the expression goes in Diogenes Laertius 6.104 and 7.121, with the Stoics by implication following the longer road. Just as the early Stoics would do later on, the Cynics argued against law as convention. But as we have seen, they may also have contributed to a more positive conception of law as ordering reason. On the basis of their constructive doctrines on, first, the simple life, second, the world as a city, third, nature and, finally, law as civilized, the Cynics could thus have offered to the Stoics the starting point for more substantive theories about the nature of reality and the special place of human beings in it. If this is correct, the Stoics would thus have substantiated Cynic doctrine, developing it into the more theoretical interpretation of law as the rational force of nature, in which sages due to their perfect reason participate. Cynic practical simplicity in the world at large would thus have developed into Stoic rational immanentism and thus have formed the basis for the Stoics' doctrine of natural law.

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[31] φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἄγροικον εἶναι πάντα φαῦλον· τὴν γὰρ ἀγροικίαν ἀπειρίαν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων· ᾗ πάντα φαῦλον ἔνοχον ὑπάρχειν. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄγριον, ἐναντιωτικὸν ὄντα τῇ κατὰ νόμον διεξαγωγῇ καὶ θηριώδη καὶ βλαπτικὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸν δ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ ἀνήμερον ὑπάρχειν καὶ τυραννικόν, οὕτως διακείμενον ὥστε δεσποτικὰ ποιεῖν, ἔτι δὲ ὠμὰ καὶ βίαια καὶ παράνομα καιρῶν ἐπιλαβόμενον.

Abbreviations

G. = Giannantoni 1990.
LS = Long and Sedley 1987.
SVF = von Arnim 1903–1905.

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