DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
&
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Views from the Global South

EDITORS
Ian Liebenberg
Dirk Kruijt
Shrikant Paranjpe

Introduction

International relations have since the earliest of times reflected many dimensions. At some point, mostly due to Western academic influence, the term "international politics" dominated the scene and became the framework of analysis with the term "nation" as a core assumption. The term international politics brings to mind power to influence or coerce either through soft measures such as policy and dialogue (diplomacy) or hard measures such as the projection of military power. The notion of nation as broadly understood today is seen as having some classic roots. The notion of the Greek city states is frequently mentioned whether in terms of cooperation or war. The Greek city states Sparta and Athens went to war as an example of a power struggle, but also cooperated with other Greek city states when necessary to defend themselves against contending powers such as the Persian Empire.

In Europe, the feudal state and an era of monarchs and rule by the royalty were gradually replaced by the formation of the nation-state. The transition to the nation-state frequently took place through the mobilisation for and enactment of internal wars in Europe. Consider the rise of Prussia (later Germany), France and the torturous unification of Italy in the 19th century. Though conflict played an important role, attempts at some minimal consensus and mutual accommodation to minimise war and its negative consequences were also seen. In this regard, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as an early attempt to restrict war in Europe is notable. The treaty set about a process with long-term consequences. The notion of national sovereignty was born and this idea and practice were to spread far. The notion of nation-building and the use of military as instrument of the state is a close and traditional one, ever since the beginnings of the Greek city state. In different forms, even if they were ancient kingdoms, i.e. in Africa, the same applies. The holders of power, for example the King or Chieftains in order to maintain security for their own collective, and dominance over others if deemed necessary, are closely linked to military capacity either as a threat or direct tool. Ancient Egypt is one example.

Early attempts at nation-building were to spread the concept and its material outcomes outside Europe through (violent) colonisation and later empire-building by Western powers of large areas and communities outside Europe were to experience the results. To a large extent, the European outlook imposed on the former colonies an artificial nationhood, as previously colonised communities were grouped together mostly along the lines of the geographical territories as dominated by colonial powers such as The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Germany, (then) Great Britain, France and Italy. The winds of change in Asia and Africa during the late 1950s and 1960s saw the Asian and African countries becoming independent. In the case of Africa, the newly independent

I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.

2   DEFENCE DIPLOMACY AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

states followed the previous borders as defined and decided on in Europe during the Berlin Conference (1884/1885) in which Bismarck played a leading role to formalise the colonisation of Africa by Western powers. In the case of Asia, the Dutch, French and the British withdrew in the face of independence movements and their own financial limitations of being able to hold on to the empires. In South Asia, the process began in the late 1940s with the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent followed by the Dutch and the French from Southeast Asia in the 1950s.

In the East, areas ruled by the Dutch were clustered together during colonial rule. India became independent in 1947 after years of struggle against British colonialism. Britain, as an alleged "Empire on which the sun never sets" dominated India from 1757 to 1947. Ever since the Indian Mutiny during 1857/1858 the Indian people fought for their independence; a struggle that succeeded in 1947 with the declaration of independence. India's struggle set a historic example. It was a struggle marked by the important role that mass passive resistance (under Mahatma Gandhi's influence) could play in achieving national liberation and establishing a democracy that still lasts. The former British India was to split into India and Pakistan, the latter a Muslim majority state which later was to see a military coup d'état. Since 1947, a long-lasting conflict over the Kashmir began which still lasts today and recently heated up again.

China after a period of relative disruptive Western colonial intervention returned to what perhaps can be called the geographical space of a perceived "greater" China as many ages before. While China became a republic in 1912 under Sun Yat-sen it was to experience a wide-ranging and destructive Japanese invasion before World War II and a civil war between communists and nationalists that was to end with the defeated nationalists establishing a nationalist government in exile in 1949 on the island of Taiwan (the latter seen by the Chinese government as an errant province). In a sense then, the European model of nationalism (or in cases a paradigm widely accepted in current discourse) had long-term consequences, some of which we still see today. Actions by major global actors involve elements of national interests and touches foreign policy conceptualisation, making and executing. In tandem, defence diplomacy as interconnected to foreign policy plays an important role. A broader look at this stands as one rationale of this edited work. In the case here, the cases under discussion were all earlier seen as the "Third World", with perhaps China more befitting the term "Second World".

International political frameworks or theories built around the nation as a central construct brought in theoretical approaches (or paradigms, if you wish) such as realism (later revised and refined to include neorealism), the liberal institutional approach, dependency theory and developmental theories (call it a critical sociological approach to world or global politics) and in later years, gender and environment orientated frameworks. In terms of international politics, a shift occurred from international relations or politics to what can

best be described today as *global politics*. Numerous actors other than the state became part of the global socio-political and economic setting; a process partly facilitated by what some describe as globalisation. Much of this historical evolution – in cases even an evolution-revolution – to borrow a term from Thomas Hanna, made the study of global politics much more interesting, but also more complex (especially if one assumes that we live in a world that some observers choose to call a post-truth society). No single approach dominates any longer and many more actors than the state (or nation-state) have entered real developments and theoretical discourse. In the case of this work, the notion of the state or nation as entity remains part of our analysis.

Contemporary political and military developments are much more convoluted, consistently interactive and multilayered – in short – more complex. Due to globalisation and the spread of liberal capitalism, many more actors became involved such as civil-society groups, multinational companies, trans-national business interests, international organisations and non-governmental groups, global interactive networks united on an issue-related consensus (i.e. ecology, deep ecology, nature conservation, human rights, gender rights, climate change). Today, it makes more sense to talk about *global politics*, whatever one may wish to understand under the term in the context of both nation-state and non-state actors as participants in the world order – or perhaps more cynical, increasing global disorder.

Simultaneously, the idea of larger, medium and smaller national actors, including nation-states, has remained. We still see "national clashes" of interest. The cold war era debates still revolve around issues of national interests, but are also closely coupled with different ideological angular optics and a social practice – i.e. capitalism versus communism or socialism (the latter broken up into many socialisms such as democratic socialism, socialist and communist parties that participated in national democratic politics, i.e. Euro-socialism). Or consider African socialism and other models of socialism, i.e. Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong or Giap's interpretation of communism in Vietnam that played a role, in many cases the ruling ideologies still vexed around national or geographical interests. In various countries communist parties still exist but now abide by the parliamentary rules of law. Think about India, South Africa, Russia, Italy, and Portugal in this regard. In others such as North Korea, the old approach still holds while China is evolving along the lines of what perhaps can be called socialism of a special type.

In Latin America, the Republic of Cuba stands between the choices of losing past gains in socialist terms in favour of (vulgar) capitalism or finding a pathway in between. In the case of Cuba – a country still faced by an aggressive neighbour that, since 1959, keeps its grudges against a smaller country that chose its own historical trajectory; and in doing so kicked far above its political weight in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 1970/1980s and on the continent of Africa. Cuba's foreign policy and astute use of politico-

military projection played an important role to bring about Namibian independence in 1990 and indirectly contributed to end apartheid, despite covert support from various Western states for the regime in Pretoria.

The Cold War (a term that originated in the West and is mostly used in the West and should perhaps be called the "Cold War syndrome") saw what was viewed as a bipolar world. Whether it was bipolar in the real sense of the word is a different question. At the time, China under Mao followed its own pathway to communism and the country having had numerous internal development challenges enacted through various plans and from time-to-time radically revised or streamlined plans, was somewhat less involved in international conflicts (there were exceptions such as brief support for liberation movements and the building of the railway line between Tanzania and Zambia during the late 1970s). Chinese involvement at the time did bother apartheid Pretoria's leaders as it was viewed as an additional "Red Threat" apart from Moscow's Marxism-Leninism (USSR).

India, the world's largest democracy established early during the decolonisation period is notable in the Global South. In many respects, India set an example of choosing its own international pathway while interacting with the Western economies, even cooperating with the former coloniser, Britain, within the framework of the Commonwealth of Nations; yet acted independently along with the other newly independent states. During the Cold War, India also chose to work closely with the Soviet Union in terms of economic deals, especially where the acquisition of arms was concerned and so maintained a balanced course between dependency on only one power block or another. As independent state, India's leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the 1970s and 1980s is another example.

In China, the efforts put into the four modernisations project since the 1980s detracted from a unified international foreign policy and a unique defence diplomacy with the exception of some minimal military support for African countries' liberation movements during the 1970s, yet also entertaining exchanges with the USA during Mao's era of "ping-pong" diplomacy.

The Cold War had a wider influence. The Soviet Union and its allies supported liberation movements in their anti-colonial struggles. Africa is one example and so are various other so-called "Third World" countries. Africa was liberating itself and throwing off the shackles of colonialism. Given Africa's experience of colonialism and the effects of what Africans and others saw as neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism, namely a Western/USA-driven post-World War II world order of the "free market", the IMF and World Bank and GATT which kept the core states of the world (the USA and Western Europe) commanding the heights of the global economy, African states faced various choices, none of these easy. After World War II, the USSR, Eastern Europe and China followed a different model,

I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.

Introduction   5

namely various experiments with socialism. Within this complex international scene, African countries had to choose between economic pathways for the future and where they stood in the "East-West conflict".

Various experiments and approaches followed. These were based on the socio-political, developmental conditions, economic strengths or weaknesses, leadership styles and pragmatic ideological choices. This phase saw the growth of regionalism in Asia and Africa. India had hosted the first Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947 to promote a sense of regionalism. The Asian Relations Conference brought together many leaders of the independence movements in Asia. This conference is looked at as the beginning of the attempt to create a sense of regionalism in Asia. This was followed by the Bandung conference of 1955 in Indonesia. This was the first Afro-Asian conference that sought to provide a broader base for the concept of regionalism to include the countries of Africa. The Bandung Conference was a historic event. It tried to spread the concept of regionalism to Asia and Africa. Unfortunately, Bandung was the first and the last Afro-Asian conference to take place.

The end of the Korean War saw the beginning of cold war alliances in Asia. The fundamentals of regionalism – independent understanding of world affairs and peace approaches came under stress due to the alliance system. Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, New Zealand and Australia became part of the American system of alliances, while China, Mongolia, the Indo-Chinese states and North Korea became pro-Soviet. Further, the countries of Asia were not able to overcome their intra-state conflicts despite the umbrella of regionalism. The period from Bandung of 1955 to Belgrade of 1961 was a period that saw a movement away from regionalism towards nonalignment.

The spirit of regionalism did, however, continue to grow in the Southeast Asian region. It saw the formulation of Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (*MAPHILINDO*) and the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) that went on to merge in a successful regional organisation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Middle East saw the continuing rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union play its part in the Arab-Israel dispute. African states, for example, had to choose whether to support the liberation struggles of the long-oppressed Palestinian people. In such conditions a choice for Palestinian liberation was bound to stir tensions – then and now. The majority of African states tried to steer clear (at least in policy-speak) from the Western-dominated capitalist pathway. One saw a focus in Africa on African socialism, mixed economies as elsewhere; a choice to steer between the West-East conflicts. These "Third World" countries, as they were pejoratively called in Western political and economic (as well as academic) circles, stood together as countries mostly from the

southern hemisphere (today more accurately perhaps referred to as the Global South). They had to find a way in the middle. But most of them had fought or were fighting Western colonialism and its aftermath. The imposition of the Washington consensus and with it liberal capitalism brought deep divisions and kick-started a rich-poor gap that was to increase during the decades thereafter and up till today ensconced in the glib mantra of globalisation. Coupled with this, the much spoken about development theory and modernisation theory benefitted only some.

The "trickle-down" effect of modernisation and the spread of capitalism was not to benefit all. In Asia the Asian tigers rose and saw benefits. So did Japan during the Cold War. Today some would argue that Japan became a "silent giant". In Africa and Latin America, others struggled and were in fact on the receiving end of global capitalist exploitation which in cases bordered on economic destabilisation. In the case of Cuba, a long-term vendetta by the USA followed that still lasts. Non-core or peripheral economies found themselves bound into economic prisons from which escape seemed remote. Latin-America represents a different trajectory while some similarities to other developments on the globe can be discerned.

Latin American and Caribbean nations had become independent in the early 19th century. Only Cuba remained a Spanish colony until 1898 and was then "liberated" by American marines. European military missions (by Germany, France and Great Britain) had shaped and strongly influenced Latin-American armed forces. After World War II, US hegemony in political, financial and defence matters of Latin America and the Caribbean became clear, sometimes underlined by direct military interventions, the last one in Panama in 1989 (in 1903 the US had created the latter country, previously a part of Colombia). The Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense Latin America structure were instruments of political and military control, reinforced by multiple dictatorships of the "National Security Governments". Following Brazil's coup in 1984, ten similar dictatorships emerged in the region. The only exceptions were the nationalist-progressive military governments in Peru and Panama in the 1970s. The Cuban Revolution (1959) favoured many efforts of establishing "socialist revolutions". With the exception of Nicaragua (1970), all efforts failed. Only between 2000 and 2015, did the major Latin American nations take their distance from their powerful northern neighbour, but at present (2019/2020), neoliberal presidents in the larger nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru) seek stronger political and military ties with the United States.

The phenomenon of security regimes (or rule by reactionary military juntas) during the Cold War had peculiar, though cynical outcomes. During the 1970s and even the 1980s, Latin American authoritarian regimes drifted closer together under the tutelage of the US. The case of Chile under Pinochet and Argentina under various juntas are examples. In following a zealous anti-communist war, these countries extensively oppressed their

own civilian populations with a mass murder of perceived left-wingers – a common phenomenon (in Latin-American political literature, these internal war of state oppression (rather state terrorism) was frequently referred to as a *guerra sucia* or dirty war).

Elsewhere, the state of Israel cooperated with the apartheid regime in terms of offensive nuclear research as well as arms production. For strategic reasons, Israel even briefly cooperated with a brutal dictator on African soil, Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, before relationships soured. The Latin-American military regimes and Israel were not the only ones to cooperate with apartheid South Africa. The nationalist Chinese government on the island of Formosa (Taiwan) in turn also cooperated with South Africa in more than cordial ways. The Pretoria regime developed close relations with military regimes in Argentina and Chile and authoritarian states such as Uruguay and Paraguay, all of them with dismal human rights records. On African soil, South Africa, France and the USA worked with their favourite dictators such as Mobutu of Zaire and even Hastings Banda of Malawi, if needed, including military and arms exchanges. The exchange of arms and arms-related research frequently took place between these states. Uganda under Amin, mentioned above, was an interesting case of falling in and out of favour with the West and some Middle East countries, including Israel.

The end of the cold war brought in new challenges. It saw the rise of ethnic nationalism based right on self-determination. This concept was to give legitimacy to the newly created states of Europe and the newly emergent states such as East Timor, Eritrea, and South Sudan. It also saw the growth of asymmetric warfare in form of the events of 9/11 and its escalating aftermath where states that were seen as non-pliant to the West were toppled at will by the USA and its "coalition of the willing". While there was an apparent switch to a unipolar world order, the eventual emergence of China, resurgent Russia and the post-Maastricht European Union perhaps brought in a sense of multipolarity.

The hegemonic interests, especially of the United States, saw interference in the politics of other countries (as many times earlier on, during the Cold War). The Middle East became especially prone to military intervention by the US under the concept, "coalition of the willing". Compare interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq or take note of the role of the French, the UK and the USA in the intervention in Libya to topple and kill Gadaffi in 2011.

In the case of Libya, regime change was imposed under the guise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Libya apparently was a different case to others in North Africa. In Tunisia, very little Western interference occurred – at least not in military terms. The Arab spring in Tunisia and Egypt brought "regime-change" (in fact only a change of the leader) and no fundamental transition. There was no military interference by a show of Western military force projection in the case of Egypt. In Egypt, regime change took place, but after elections the military returned to power (assuming that the military released the levers of power at all).

The fluidity of global politics can bring about rapid change with (unforeseen) outcomes. Karl Popper's notion of unintended consequences is relevant here. Libya was apparently an exceptional case. There was no inclination from France, the UK and the USA to solve the matter diplomatically or through a negotiated settlement, despite the fact that the African Union (AU), Turkey and Russia proposed a negotiated regime change. These initiatives were briskly sidelined. We will not discuss it for long but an independent Libya, economically stable and growing in stature in Africa and its eccentric leader became an increasing irritant as a pivot of influence. Gadaffi had to be toppled and the demonstrations against the Gadaffi regime provided a perfect pretext for intervention and the killing of Gadaffi. Libya was not a pliant state in terms of US/Western hegemony. It was a stable state and not in debt with the World Bank. Moreover, Libya's international profile and economic influence was on the rise in Africa and southern Europe. All this played a role to enforce regime change. Today Libya is a failed state in all respects with consequences still felt in northern Africa (SAHEL), Europe and the Middle East – a situation unlikely to be resolved or turning for the better in the decade to come. Whether it was intended to create a failed state by those that intervened is a moot point. Anyone with some political-military foresight could have predicted the future of a failed state in Northern Africa. Exactly for this reason the African Union, Turkey and Russia proposed a different approach.

The death of Gadaffi did not bring more peace and stability; not in North or West Africa, not in the Middle East and not more political-economic certainty in Europe. On the contrary, conflict (potential) increased sharply. This all to serve as demonstration that international relations (or in its broader sense, global politics) did not become less complicated. In fact, it may have become cloudier if not outright stormy. The war against terror that is waged by the US (with France and the UK and to an extent The Netherlands as loyal junior followers) is pestered by stereotypes; much like under apartheid, all resistors to the system are labelled terrorists. Violent actions are countered by state action. Some may say terrorist actions are countered by the state-terror of strong (self-perceived) hegemons.

There is little to be seen about defence diplomacy derived from a peace-driven foreign policy approach by the USA and its coalition of the willing. This spells no good for the future. Asymmetric warfare (though different in content from context to context) arises and may increase. Notions of specific communities' aspirations (i.e. the Kurdish question) and their contextual struggles, but also contestation for scarce resources on the globe and wars of greed play an important role. In cases, major powers exploit age old conflicts and grudges as proxy forces, reminding one about old-style divide and rule or divide and gain political leverage for own interest. Again the situation of the Kurds in the Middle East comes to mind. Globalisation has a down-side, another face of Janus. With greater integration, implosion of time and space and international flow of goods and capital comes a greater rich-poor gap, fragmentation, alienation and conflict, the latter frequently transformed into violence on multilayered levels; violence best to be analysed without

falling for glib mantras and stereotypes, not to mention the pragmatic fabrication of "facts" to justify military intervention. In this regard, the recent killing of a senior military leader of Iran by a US drone attack is one example of how conflict can be escalated virtually overnight. There seems to be little of an understanding that all conflicts are not "terrorist" or religiously inspired. Too little analysis is taking place of conflicts that arise because of greed, control over scarce resources, intervention by states outside relevant regions, water security or the maintenance of trade routes (especially in northern Africa) and grudges held by minorities over years, if not centuries. Likewise, the role of increasing poverty within and between states and its violent side effects are massively under-researched and deserve much more attention by theorists and policymakers.

Against the above complex global collage, this edited volume looks at the defence diplomacy of various countries in the Global South on a *capita selecta* basis. The work is compiled in times when global politics are cloudy, if not warped; one sees permanent flux with new crises arising with a context of revolutions in warfare and the countering of resistance by the aggressive projection/export of state terror. State terror or foreign military intervention even in cases not announced or not on the radar of Western media, such as French actions in West Africa and regular drone attacks by the USA in East-Africa spring to mind here.

A note of caution is perhaps necessary here. This edited work does not explicitly address religious conflict or conflict around scarce resources under the cloak of religious justification. The fog and dust of regionalised war and the stereotyping of enemies under one class, namely that of Political Islamic terrorists is but one complicating factor. Another complicating factor is the salient but persistent role of Political Christianity that is driving the so-called war against terror making for a seemingly self-fulfilling prophecy as end game. The term Political Christianity is seldom discussed or analysed. Is it not recognised due to ignorance, manipulative politics or through strategic silence? The latter questions are important and necessary – if not crucial – debates and strongly advisable for future research. While this point is not addressed by our contributors in this work, we suggest that the link between Political Christianity and the legacy thereof with the aggressive projection of military power by hegemonic states be analysed.

The term Political Christianity certainly deserves to be brought into the political discourse and thoroughly analysed in terms of its ongoing contribution to current global conflict, its effect on foreign policy and projection of power and in turn its effect on defence diplomacy in a global political-military context in permanent flux.

This project started during 2017 as result of an exchange of ideas between the editors that are from different continents but with an interest in the global history of conflict, defence, national security strategies and defence diplomacy or lack of it. In our case Asia, Africa and Latin-America became of particular interest. Contributors were identified and

approached. The contributors are from countries that we here broadly call the "Global South". Theorists, analysts and expert practitioners that contributed are all well versed in their fields of interest. The work recognises a need for a clearer analysis of global politics, specifically through a focused discussion on the defence diplomacy of various countries in the South, from the large to the small. The context differs from country to country and from continent to continent as well as political system to political system against the background of sometimes a shared collective historical experience and memory, in other cases some contrasting experiences. It speaks for itself that not all countries could be included. In some cases, expert potential participants that were approached could not contribute. The nature of the work also does not allow for a wide-ranging case-to-case and inter-case comparative perspectives between the continents of the Global South. Both time and funding were limitations here and such research will have to remain for the future. Hence, the extent to which this specific study represents *broader casing* as known in qualitative research is limited.

The aim here is to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on global politics, especially as they relate to defence diplomacies of countries in the Global South on various continents. While the contributors are not addressing foreign policy per se, the reader will be able to deduct a lot around this from the readings here as foreign policy and defence policies including defence diplomacy have a lot in common. In other cases, some enlightening notes are made around strategic resource management and national security strategies and the evolvement of such strategies.

In terms of the structuring of the work, the reader will see three parts. The first part is dedicated to Latin-America, the second part to cases on the African continent, more particularly southern Africa, and the last part to China and India (the "Far East"). In the case of Africa, originally six potential contributors including two countries from Western Africa were approached. However, only three chapters were finally included. In the case of larger and potentially more influential actors such as India more than one chapter is included. As editors, we decided to include three chapters on India as experts were available to contribute. South Africa, despite numerous internal challenges and economic woes, for the moment is a large and relatively influential state on the African continent, the only African state to form part of BRICS – at least until overtaken by Nigeria or other contenders such as Angola. In the case of South Africa, experts were also available with an interest in related but different areas and two chapters on South Africa are included.

The perspectives brought together in this volume are shared with the reader at a time in history where there is clearly no end of history in sight. The notion of a so-called *clash of civilisations* vested in vast generalisations mostly based on the lack of knowledge and emotional intelligence about intricate global socio-political dynamics, cultural specifics and the effect of deepening poverty and a struggle for scarce resources undermines

current analytical thinking and problem-solving approaches rather than contribute to them. The quasi-ideology of *civilisations in conflict* is followed by many political scientists with a north-bound gaze. On the converse, others argue that there is an urgent need for a critical and constructive dialogue between "civilisations" (historical communities and social identity groups), "nations" and within nations or communities of self-chosen citizens. Instead of a much debated "clash of civilisations" – to such an extent that the term *clash between civilisations* has become a near mantra – what is needed globally, is a dialogue between civilisations and nations. Should such a dialogue not be prioritised, it would be for the worse.

The work appears at a time where some argue that we see the decline of a hegemonic power (the US) which will for the most part lead to less predictable and likely more aggressive responses by the declining power. With reference to the US, such a decline is taking place on a historical continuum that slides on a scale from a global policeman mentality to a dangerous international rogue as Gwynne Dyer argues. Others suggest that we are about to enter the change from one hegemony to be replaced by another, in this case China taking the place of the US.

Simultaneously, other large powers are rising. In the case of India, a strong international actor is rising and holds international sway and significant military power. India seems to be an apologetic hegemon, or at least has no pronounced wish to project military power aggressively outside its immediate interests, though relations with Pakistan remain a thorny issue, perhaps likely to become thornier. Japan is a silent giant. Brazil prepares to sway significant political-military power by deploying soft power. What will happen in the future? Russia, after having been pushed back by an encroaching European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the 1990s, is returning to the international arena. For Russia, feeling more and more beleaguered since 1993, such a "return" is both logic and necessary – understandably so. Some theorists foresee a return to multipolarity and perhaps with good outcomes for a relatively more peaceful globe. Others see new hegemonies arising. There are more such as the academician Vladimir Shubin, who asks: Hegemony? Which hegemony? Which hegemon? Whose hegemony? Hegemony so perceived by whom for what purposes?

The work cannot provide all answers. And it raises many questions. It can contribute however, we trust as editors, to a better understanding of the current state of defence diplomacies (and within a broader collage perhaps foreign policy and the national security strategies – the latter coupled to "national" interests). In this sense, the work aims to assist in clarifying some issues and we trust will encourage a more open and deeper dialogue about the multilayered complexities of international politics, defence, "national security" and defence diplomacy within an ever changing – and perhaps less predictable – framework of global politics.

In cases, more questions are raised than answered by this edited volume. This is a good thing because such questions call for more RE-search, RE-flection and new searches for clarity and solutions and serious dialogue based on solving or preventing localised and global conflict. Are we into hegemonic struggles? Is so-called "terrorism" the only danger to the global community? Can one define terrorism at all without keeping numerous other variables in mind? What are the consequences of a hegemonic state or state-centred terrorism and the export or maintenance of state terror? Think about (apartheid) Israel or the USA. And, if so, of what nature are these terrorisms and can they be solved or countered? What role for defence diplomacy, if any? What are the links between national security strategy and defence policy? What do the management of strategic resources and the writing of national security strategies have in common in the South? Can national security strategies in tandem with well thought-through defence diplomacies break the increasing rich-poor gap, state abuse and the common development problems of smaller and marginalised communities within states that hold conflict potential? Are defence policies supplementary or contrary to national foreign policy? Against which background is defence diplomacy changing? Is it changing against a background of national interests or the flexibilities and complexities of global politics, rather than just international relations between states but also influenced by other major non-state actors, movements and organisations? Are we going to experience another era of one-sided hegemony and the decline of it? If we are, where are we going? Are the power infused clandestine and military interventions by the US and European states that play along as the coalition of the willing, giving rise to new alienation, fragmentation, struggles in the Middle East and Africa? What can the Global South do about it? Can all terrorists be glibly classified as one and the same? In fact, what is terrorism and what not? What exactly constitutes resistance – on various levels and within geospatial territories – to the negative effects of globalisation? Can all such resistance be discredited by using the term terrorist as bogeyman?

It is the view of the editors that this volume may become one building block for fruitful future discussion. As editors, we trust that such dialogue on defence diplomacy will facilitate more peace and less violence on a globe desperately in need of human security, development, growth and the closing of the rich-poor gap and racial tensions on multiple layers of society.

<div style="text-align: right">

IAN LIEBENBERG
DIRK KRUIJT
SHRIKANT PARANJPE

</div>