25

Planning Reconfigurations in a Mega-Event Context
The Case of Rio de Janeiro

Abigail Friendly

Introduction

In 2007, Brazil was selected by FIFA as the host country for the 2014 World Cup. Rio de Janeiro was among the 12 host cities across the country. Two years later, in October 2009, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced Rio de Janeiro as the host city of the 2016 Olympic Games.[1] As a result, over a period of two years, Rio de Janeiro would feature as a mega-event city, making its mark on the spatial fabric of the city. At the national level, Brazil faced an economic crisis, combined with a political crisis that included the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. In 2013, this crisis was manifested by protests that reverberated across the country, starting in São Paulo as the Free Pass Movement (*Movimento Paste Livre*, MPL), which demanded a reversal of a bus fare increase. Although the protests began specifically around transportation, they evolved through a broad focus on a range of issues including public spending on the World Cup and corruption, "calling attention to a gap between promises and results and urban issues in Brazil" (Friendly 2013, 113). Ultimately, at the center of these issues was a critique around public spending on mega-events in contrast to the reality of Brazilian cities marked by inequalities, and a condemnation of Brazil's pattern of urban development (Fernandes 2014).

In the name of mega-events, Rio de Janeiro has invested massive funding on sporting, transportation, tourist and security infrastructure in preparation for these events, focusing these investments on three key policies: transportation, housing and security (Ribeiro and Santos Junior 2017). First, transportation investments included bus rapid transit (BRT) corridors and light rail vehicle (VLT) routes, as well as the expansion of Rio de Janeiro's subway system. Second, regarding housing policies, investment included intense real estate investment in three areas (Barra da Tijuca in the west of the city, the port area of Porto Maravilha in the city center, and the south zone), in addition to the removal of favelas and squatter settlements. Third, the state government promoted public safety through the implementation of Police Pacification Units (*Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora*, UPP) in specific favelas "justified by a need to develop an image of 'order and progress' alluring investors and tourists" (Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015, 120).

One perspective on Rio de Janeiro's transformations – which Richmond and Garmany (2016) identify as a "post-third-world narrative" – views such changes as beneficial to move beyond systemic problems of weak integration, poor service provision and endemic violence. Yet despite the supposed benefits that have come for Rio de Janeiro as a result of this unique position, another perspective shows how mega-events have cast a shadow over the way planning has unfolded in the city, establishing the conditions for the remaking of the city through new forms of private governance (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013). This process has been likened to a neo-liberal "shock doctrine," or urban reengineering in the name of mega-events through extra-legal governance permanently transforming the socio-spatial fabric of Rio de Janeiro (Gaffney 2010; La Barre 2016). As Mociaro and Pereira (2019, 7) show, "the interests of private actors become increasingly dominant vis-à-vis city governments and inclusionary urban policies." While the literature on mega-events has shown similar developments in other cities (Haila 2008), the case of Rio de Janeiro is noteworthy for two reasons, according to Richmond and Garmany (2016). First, the political coalition in power strategically emphasized the attraction of capital by way of hosting mega-events. Second, the exceptional measures taken in Rio de Janeiro have often had extreme impacts on both the city in general, and on specific communities.

This chapter explores how these reconfigurations came about, a result of a group of local and political economic elites who used this unique climate to re-craft parts of the city. Within this context, this chapter focuses on two main reconfigurations that have occurred: first, the rise of large-scale redevelopment projects, focusing on the Porto Maravilha revitalization project, and second, gentrification in informal communities, which augmented real estate speculation and the occupation of favela communities. These changes have in many ways worsened socio-spatial segregation within an already fragmented mega-city, but have also raised possibilities for renewed action by local citizens seeking to play a role in the city's future. This chapter sheds light on a range of dilemmas created by the unique context of successive mega-events in Rio de Janeiro, as well as the future possibilities for planning in the post mega-event context.

Rio de Janeiro: The City of Exception

Rio de Janeiro's entry point into the world of mega-events began in the early 1990s as a strategy to attract global capital. Indeed, the adoption of strategic planning can be seen as creating the conditions to host the mega-events. This neoliberal managerial approach was considered key in order to confront the conditions imposed by globalization and to engage in competition for mobile global finance (Vainer 2009). Thus, strategic planning was justified based on a view that the well-being of a city's inhabitants would depend on the city's success as a global competitor. Key to this model was an approach based on institutional flexibility, allowing local authorities to reinvent planning regulations, by altering zoning and land use plans, permitting tax exemptions and legal exception to service private interests (Novais 2010). As Sanchez and Broudehoux (2013, 136) note, "according to such views, neo-liberal leaders have learned to exploit a crisis discourse of fear, violence, and economic decline to generate a popular consensus about major urban interventions."

Within this model of strategic planning, the focus was on improving Rio de Janeiro's image, and marketing its competitive advantages to attract foreign investment, tax-paying residents, wealthy tourists, and professionals from the "creative class." This entrepreneurial mode of governance was modelled after the strategic planning approach pioneered in Barcelona, whose highly celebrated Olympic revitalization project was widely mimicked

around the world, especially in Latin America. As Vainer (2015, 97) notes, in the early 1990s, "a new concept of the city set in." Following the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, consultants from Barcelona were hired to assist Rio prepare its first strategic plan. The Catalan consultants – also responsible for the Barcelona strategic plan – were key in the diffusion of the "Barcelona model" to Rio de Janeiro (Acioly 2001; Novais 2010).

A fundamental shift occurred in the early 1990s with the municipal leadership's strategy. Indeed, César Maia of the conservative Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (*Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, PMDB), elected mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1993, was drawn to the idea of strategic planning.[2] The Barcelona model became a successful demonstration of a strategy to foster mega-events, demonstrated both by Rio de Janeiro's strategic plan and the recommendation of the city as a candidate for the Olympics. In 1995, the Strategic Plan of the City of Rio de Janeiro (*Plano Estratégico da Cidade to Rio de Janeiro*) promised to bring tourism back to the city and to insert Rio de Janeiro in the circuit of sporting mega-events, and to attract investment and attention to the city. The goal was to establish a competitive city internationally, including a range of macro-economic, social, urban, cultural, and environmental infrastructure projects, defining the city for the future (Silvestre 2017). The document presented a scenario in which competition between cities and countries was of fundamental importance, defending the Olympics as a way to reach Rio de Janeiro's objectives, guarantee public investments, and project a new image of the city (PCRJ 1996).

Rio de Janeiro's adoption of mega-events as a development strategy also resulted from a political alignment between the municipal, provincial, and federal governmental levels. Indeed, strong political alliances between President Lula's Worker's Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT), Rio de Janeiro's state governor, Sergio Cabral, and Rio's Mayor, Eduardo Paes, both of PMDB, were also key to the strategy of mega-events. As Oliveira (2012) notes, the promotion of mega-events at this time was a priority for the Brazilian State, given the inclusion of practically all political parties, including those of the opposition. This unified political front was behind Rio de Janeiro's successful Olympic bid, after two failed Olympic attempts in 2004 and 2012, and the successful hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games. As Vainer (2015, 98) notes,

> what Rio residents are experiencing today is the result of a slow, complex, but continuous process of formation of a new hegemonic coalition able to propose, and impose on the 'city in crisis' a new project and a new destiny.

In addition, the extreme growth of Brazil's economy, alongside the growth of the oil and gas industry, and the security policy implemented by the state of Rio, also likely boosted Rio de Janeiro's chances to host the games (Silvestre 2017).

Framed by Agamben's (2005) work on the state of exception, the story of Rio de Janeiro's Olympic city-making has been shown to operate as a city of exception, functioning outside the law. For Vainer (2009, 2015), the market-friendly state operates without firm rules in order to take advantage of opportunities to meet the demands of urban capital. In this reading, mega-events are embedded in a reconfiguration of power structures – both at the local and national levels – thus imposing a neoliberal order based on authoritarianism and exceptionalism. In this reading, such processes are not inevitable, but "intended outcomes of the new urban policies" (Richmond and Garmany 2016, 622). As Vainer (2015, 102) notes,

> A new rule imposes itself in answer to the regulatory standards: the case-by-case ad hoc, flexible negotiation in the pursuit of flexible accumulation. Instead of the master plan,

the master project; instead of the comprehensive plan, we increasingly experience pin-pointed acupuncture-like urbanism. The exception becomes the rule.

Thus, the state of exception transforms the exception into a rule. As Agamben (2005, 1) notes, "a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law." By creating a sense of urgency, mega-events create exceptional conditions that both facilitate and accelerate the fruition of large-scale urban projects. The next section introduces Rio de Janeiro's experiences with mega-events, starting in the mid-2000s.

Recent Experiences of Mega-Events in Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro's first experience in the realm of mega-events was in 2007, when the city hosted the Pan American Games, setting the tone for what would follow in subsequent years in Rio de Janeiro's mega-events saga. As Curi et al. (2011) show, the Pan American Games constructed a "big wall" dividing daily life in Rio de Janeiro, with the reality of poverty and violence outside the wall, and the games inside fortified enclaves. As the authors note, it created "some islands of excellence which could be shown on television for the national and international public" (Curi et al. 2011, 152). Other than the short-term construction and low-paid service sector employment that resulted from the Games, the Pan American Games left behind few social programs or usable urban spaces for the city. Indeed, the literature has shown that such projects leave communities with huge debts, reduced public space, and public financing for real estate development projects (Di Vita 2018). In the case of Rio, as Gaffney (2010, 18) notes,

> The production of Olympic constellations in Rio did not deliver the promised transportation infrastructure, did not improve the housing situation for Rio's poor, did not open new sporting venues in order to develop the a generation of Olympic athletes, and neglected promises of environmental remediation while contributing to the generalized opacity of mega-events.

Despite what was promised for the city, the actual legacy of the Pan American games became a marketing act, which required the city to serve as a competitor in the international sphere (Curi et al. 2011).

The largest project built for the Pan American Games was the stadium formerly known as Estádio Olímpico João Havelange, in the lower middle-class neighborhood of Engenho de Dentro, located in the north zone of Rio. Renamed the Estádio Olímpico Nilton Santos − and known popularly as Engenhão − the episode was highly criticized given its high cost (R$380 million), financed by public funds. The lack of access to the facility following the games was also criticized, which was rented by the (private) Botafogo Football Club for R$30,000 per month following the games (Gaffney 2010). Although official rhetoric pledged that the stadium would help to regenerate the surrounding neighborhood, in fact its construction generated ambiguous consequences for the neighborhood, which experienced "no relevant infrastructural investment in the stadium's surroundings" (Curi 2013; Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013, 137). Built in a relatively low-rise neighborhood, the realization of the stadium resulted in the relaxation of local zoning regulations and the possibility of constructing higher buildings (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013). In 2013,

experts found Engenhão to be unsafe for public use after major structural problems were found in its roof.

Ultimately, the episode reopened public discussions around the misuse of public funds for sports infrastructure, while allegations of over-spending during the stadium's construction re-emerged. This entrepreneurial logic – rather than a more socially oriented agenda – has been present, overall, within Rio de Janeiro's mega-event discourse and events. In the next section, I explore the making of large-scale redevelopment through the case of Porto Maravilha.

Large-Scale Redevelopment: The Case of Porto Maravilha

In preparation for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, several urban projects were planned based on a market-friendly vision, promoting "an exclusive vision of urban regeneration that can open the way for the state-assisted privatization and commodification of the urban realm, thus serving the needs of capital while exacerbating socio-spatial segregation, inequality, and social conflicts" (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013, 133). Porto Maravilha is Brazil's largest public-private partnership (PPP), and the first experience of an administrative concession to a private consortium for the provision of basic urban services (Sarue 2018). The project has been depicted by key actors as a strategic project for the city given the area's unique economic and symbolic attributes (Mosciaro and Pereira 2019). Rio de Janeiro's port region – which sits just north of the city's central business district – has experienced disinvestment and depopulation since the 1960s. The area's abandonment, in combination with its low-income, transient population and the perception of the region's hollowness, attracted the attention of real estate development interests and Brazil's largest civil construction firms (Gaffney 2016). The history of projects to revitalize Rio de Janeiro's port since the 1980s show that despite interest in the area's revitalization, institutional arrangements were still necessary for it to be realized (Sarue 2018).

As Silvestre (2017) notes, the circumstances that led to the emergence of Porto Maravilha can be attributed to several factors. First, political alliances facilitated the release of land held by the three levels of government. Second, the Brazilian economy's exponential growth, which was especially pronounced in Rio de Janeiro, fostered a demand for office space. Third, new planning tools were institutionalized by the 2001 Statute of the City (*Estatuto da Cidade*), permitting the implementation of revitalization financed by the private sector (Friendly 2013). Specifically, urban partnership operations (*operação urbana consorciada*, OUC), introduced formally by the Statute, allows for the public capture of planning gain by selling additional building rights in exchange for funds reinvested in the regeneration of the area (Friendly 2017).[3] Fourth, the lobbying efforts of several of Brazil's largest construction companies, which produced the feasibility plan for the revitalization program and eventually won the bid for engineering works and the supply of services. Finally, the momentum that resulted from hosting the mega-events further strengthened Rio de Janeiro's visibility, but also accelerated the approval of by-laws and planning permissions. Indeed, an enduring legacy of this event-led redevelopment was a powerful consensual rhetoric portraying mega-events as a panacea for Rio de Janeiro's ongoing urban crisis, and an easy solution for urban regeneration (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013).

Created by a mayoral decree in 2009 to transform docklands, rail yards, and warehouses into a mixed-use neighborhood, Porto Maravilha comprises 5 million square meters in Rio de Janeiro's port neighborhoods of Saúde, Gamboa, and Santo Cristo. This also includes

several favelas – Morro do Providência, considered one of Rio's oldest favelas – as well as Pedra Lisa, Moreira Pinto, and São Diogo, and parts of São Cristovão, Centro, Caju, and Cidade Nova (see Figure 25.1).[4] As Mosciaro and Pereira (2019) note, OUCs are often depicted as a "magic formula" that both provides a means to implement large-scale urban projects while freeing local governments from paying for them (Fix 2000). Indeed, the global discourse of waterfront redevelopment – that of the London Docklands and Barcelona's Port Vell – exerted considerable influence on the Porto Maravilha project (Mascarenhas 2013; Oliveira 2012).

In 2009, the local government established a corporation known as the Urban Development Company of the Region of the Port of Rio (*Companhia de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Região do Porto do Rio de Janeiro*, CDURP) to coordinate and attract international investors for the project. Structured as a PPP known as an urban partnership operation between CDURP and the Consórcio Porto Novo – consisted of three of Brazil's largest engineering and construction firms (OAS Ltd, Norberto Odebrecht Brasil, and Carioca Christiani-Nielsen Engenharia) to manage the project, upgrade urban infrastructure, and provide basic services.[5] Consórcio Porto Novo is responsible for administering the area for a 15-year period. This revitalization of urban space would be carried out by changing zoning laws and building heights, reorganizing transportation networks, financing cultural attractions, revitalizing public space, and increasing residential and commercial building stocks (Gaffney 2016). While the project contains no prominent Olympic facility, it was "heralded as the main legacy of the Games" (Silvestre 2017, 418).

The project established the conditions to develop an urban partnership operation (OUC), defining urban redevelopment boundaries financed by charging developers for the provision of additional development rights above what is permitted in the master plan. OUCs are financed by selling bonds known as Certificates of Potential Additional Construction


Figure 25.1 Operação Urbana Corsorciada Porto Maravilha, Rio de Janeiro

(*Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construção*, CEPAC), traded on the stock exchange (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários), and subject to speculation. OUCs financed by CEPACs deregulate land use to prioritize higher densities within the OUC's boundaries, ultimately capturing the advantages of increased development. The tool has been highly criticized as a tool enabling the financialization of real estate speculation, especially in the case of São Paulo (Fix 2009).

In Rio de Janeiro, a key goal of CEPACs is to capture, in advance, the increased property value generated by the Olympic revitalization to finance large-scale redevelopment (Sánchez and Broudehoux 2013). OUCs thus represent the anticipation of future revenues, to be reinvested in urban improvements that are likely to stimulate the increase in property prices. Unlike the use of OUCs in other cases such as in São Paulo, in the case of Porto Maravilha, the innovation was to make all of the CEPACs available in a single auction, purchased by the Caixa Econômica Federal, the federal savings bank, through the investment of resources of the Guaranteed Fund for Time of Work (*Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço*, FGTS), the government-run workers' pension fund (Sarue 2018). In 2011, Caixa purchased all the CEPACs on behalf of the FGTS for R$3.5 billion from the city of Rio. The profits that FGTS gains from the sale of CEPACs to individual developers have been used to pay Consórcio Porto Novo to carry out the urban operations in Porto Maravilha. In this case, an historic, formerly public central area of the city "has been re-zoned and re-classified through an experimental form of privatized urban governance that has used the Olympics opportunistically" (Gaffney 2016, 1141). While this section has focused on the redevelopment of Rio de Janeiro, the next section explores the social impacts of these changes.

Gentrification(s) and the Particular Dynamics of Rio de Janeiro

> The Games are, above all, an economic event related to sports. It has its own logic and requirements. Imagine a journal cover photo showing an athlete and in the background a favela with a squalid man. We do not hold on and we do not want to hide our diffi-culties, but we must understand the complexity of the Olympic Games.
>
> —*Ex-mayor of Rio de Janeiro, César Maia (Brasil 2007)*

The literature on mega-events in Rio de Janeiro demonstrates how a shift toward modes of entrepreneurial governance has produced new residential dynamics, including forced removals, rampant speculation, and gentrification (Donaghy 2015; Ribeiro and Santos Junior 2017; Sequeira 2015). Such work shows the involvement Rio de Janeiro's municipal government in promoting gentrification by shedding existing political and economic obstacles, and by relocating low-income communities to areas with lower land prices, often with the use of force. However, as Gaffney (2016) points out, there are multiple types of gentrification(s) occurring in Rio de Janeiro, resulting in different outcomes among varied actors.

Following Ribeiro and Santos Junior (2017), three types of gentrification can be distinguished within Rio de Janeiro's mega-events trajectory. First, a shift in the socio-economic profile of residents in the neighborhoods targeted for intervention, moving from low- to middle- and upper-classes. Second, the rise in price of the future land value has made some areas more attractive for real estate speculation, such as areas adjacent to Barra da Tijuca, Porto Maravilha, and some favelas in the south zone of Rio de Janeiro. Finally, an understanding of gentrification as a strategy for urban renewal and as a strategy of a coalition

between public and private sectors. Associated with the process of urban transformation described in the previous section, rising real estate prices have led to gentrification and perpetuated uneven development, often camouflaged "by proponents of this entrepreneurial approach" (Mosciaro and Pereira 2019, 2162).

Considerable research has shown that the displacement – known as *remoções* – of impoverished populations of Rio de Janeiro's favela is part of the historical dynamics of the city (Fischer 2008). Yet, unlike the mass removals of the 1960s and 1970s involving arbitrary forced removals, favela families have been displaced through a process of thinning, a case of accumulation by dispossession through which the state deploys economic coercion to allow for capital accumulation (Freeman and Burgos 2016; Harvey 1989).

As Magalhães (2013) suggests, the acceleration and intensification of displacement surrounding Rio de Janeiro's mega-events has been facilitated by the use of a new repertoire of removal in which the term "resettlement" was used more frequently. Indeed, "the displacement of these residents started to have the meaning of a 'legacy' of these sporting mega-sport events" (Magalhães 2013, 97). In line with the city of exception thesis (Vainer 2009), residents can be forcibly removed from Olympic venues to make way for urban projects, thus contributing to gentrification. Indeed, research shows the centrality of the Olympic project as an instrument to accelerate the transformation of Rio de Janeiro's urban space to privilege investors (Gaffney 2010; Mascarenhas 2013). A range of research has documented the displacement – and gentrification – resulting from the Rio de Janeiro mega-events occurring in Brazil starting in 2007, resulting in the removal of favelas surrounding the Vila do Pan athletes' housing complex, and attempted removals at the future site of the 2016 Olympic park (Freire 2013). For example, the Comitê Popular (2015) estimated that more than 4,000 families were evicted related to the World Cup and Olympics, while more than 2,000 more families were threatened with eviction.[6]

One example is the case of Morro da Providência (see Figure 25.1), given its strategic location in the middle of Porto Maravilha, which was occupied for a UPP in 2010. This occupation was seen as necessary to improve the safety of the area for outside visitors.[7] A densely populated area, as of 2013, it had a human development index of 0.643, below Rio de Janeiro's average of 0.799 (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano do Brasil n.d.). The showcase for Morar Carioca is an aerial cable car – launched in 2014 but currently unused – connecting Central do Brasil and Gamboa, which lies within Porto Maravilha.

The original plan for Porto Maravilha did not include the provision of social housing to allow previous residents to remain in the neighborhood. Because of the arrangement in Porto Maravilha in which all CEPACs were sold in one auction, the project had no resources to subsidize the production of affordable housing. In 2015, a social housing plan (Plano de Habitação de Interesse Social, PHIS) for the Porto Maravilha OUC was proposed as a social contribution to the public investment from the FGTS funds. Indeed, the inclusion of a PHIS was an obligation for all OUCs drawing on FGTS funds (Santos 2017).

Ironically, FGTS funds represent workers' contributions, and are supposed to be invested in social housing. An obvious interpretation of this scenario is that what was expected was the replacement of the local, predominantly poor, residents, by middle- and upper-income residents within new luxurious towers (Mosciaro and Pereira 2019). Indeed, as Sánchez and Broudehoux (2013, 147) predicted,

> under the combined effect of various interventions, Providência will be symbolically tamed, trimmed, and turned into a tourist attraction. This drastic makeover is key to

understanding the financial potential of the CEPACs and the success of Porto Maravilha as an extraterritorial enclave.

Given that more than 800 houses (almost half the community) were marked for removal in 2011 through the Morar Carioca urbanization program (Santos and Asevedo 2011), this is an obvious conclusion.[8]

The speculative nature of Porto Maravilha is clearly a cause for concern for socio-spatial segregation. Indeed, the success of the project relies on the devalued port area becoming prime real estate lands, which inevitably redefines the area's socio-spatial make-up. Therefore, the high cost of land in Porto Maravilha, and the majority destined for luxury offices and elite housing, leads to the conclusion that the CEPACs could be used as a tool for gentrification. Despite evidence of the intent of Porto Maravilha to gentrify the port region, there has been little evidence of widespread removals of low-income populations (Gaffney 2016).

As Ribeiro and Santos Junior (2017, 916) note, "it is unlikely that the port district will undergo a large-scale gentrification process." A more likely result, in fact, is strong gentrification in some areas, co-existing alongside weak gentrification in others. Indeed, the hills of Providência provide no capital gain to developers or speculators, with the result that development is unlikely to occur there.[9] The key issue then is that "the ambiance of the new project is compromised by the presence of slums" (Mosciaro and Pereira 2019, 2171).

Yet as Gaffney (2016) notes, the enabling conditions for gentrification have been established to facilitate this process, but this process is still in its infancy. Indeed, in the areas where CEPACs can be used – the flat areas of Porto Maravilha, rather than the hills of Providência – squatters and informal settlements were removed to allow for new tower blocks. In addition to the 140 families removed from Morro do Providência, the Comitê Popular (2015) lists over 500 families in eight occupations that were removed in relation to the Porto Maravilha project. On a broader scale, Faulhaber and Azevedo (2015) document more than 20,000 households that were evicted from their homes between January 2009 and February 2014. More worrying, while UPP Social – the add-on program to UPP – was supposed to include resident participation, it effectively became subordinated to the UPP program, leaving out the social component and thus, participation.[10]

Conclusion: From a City of Exception to Resistance

This chapter considers the urban reconfigurations in Rio de Janeiro as a result of the mega-events that have dominated urban policy for the last decade. Focusing on the Porto Maravilha revitalization project based on an entrepreneurial governance approach, the chapter highlights the social impacts of large-scale redevelopment projects through the case of Morro do Providência. The case of Porto Maravilha has often been framed through Vainer's (2009, 2015) thesis of a city of exception which posits that a market-friendly state operates in the absence of firm rules to meet the demands of urban capital. Such extra-legal processes thus result in a situation in which the exception becomes the rule. As Vainer (2015, 104) notes,

> through centralization of decisions, personalization of power, charismatic leadership, ad hoc and flexible regulations, in the name of the crisis and wrapped up in the metaphor of war – to paraphrase Engels – the city of exception plays to the dreams of the urban bourgeoisie.

Yet a corollary of the process and events described in this chapter is the series of protests and resistance movements that have emerged across Rio de Janeiro including in Vila Autódromo, Rocinha, and Aldeia Maracanã, given the questions raised surrounding urban development in the context of the mega-events. One of the most well-known, Vila Autódromo – a low-income neighborhood near the location of the Olympic Village threatened by frequent eviction – is considered a victory given the persistence of residents in establishing their rights and legitimacy to the space (Donaghy 2015; Ivester 2017).

Supported by local academics, professionals, and non-governmental organizations, the case of Vila Autódromo highlights how the mega-event project, in addition to stimulating gentrification, fosters community solidarity and advances social mobilization, illustrating how exclusion also nurtures resistance. Moreover, as Donaghy (2015, 86) notes, "leaders in the community recognize their antagonists as not only the government but also private real estate and construction companies that stand to profit from redevelopment in the city." In Providência, in response to the evictions, residents founded the Community Forum of the Port (Forum Comunitário do Porto). In response to the Forum's actions, the Defensoria Pública ordered the suspension of the Morar Carioca project in Providência. While the city was allowed to finish the cable car, many of the removals marked for Providência were not carried out (Freeman and Burgos 2016).

The protests – and the social costs – in poor communities in Rio de Janeiro ultimately gained the attention of the international media, showing the "radical but negative transformation of the city" (Gordon 2016). Such instances of resistance make visible the spatial injustices occurring in Rio de Janeiro. As Ivester (2017, 973) notes, "the Games can serve to erode citizenship, but they can also activate a tipping point that allows for the imagining of an alternative." For that reason, the resistance, as a result of Rio's mega-events, is also a hopeful story that requires reengaging and reactivating the right to the city debate as a right to participate in decisions that produce urban space (Friendly 2013). This is also necessary to push for a more balanced approach to redevelopment in order to deliver public rather than private benefits. Such challenges to urban redevelopment constitute avenues towards forms of insurgent planning practices that are counter-hegemonic, transgressive, and imaginative, offering material evidence of citizens' insurgencies to both plan and address their livelihoods through situated citizenship practices (Miraftab 2009). Despite the low participation of residents in such processes, such engagement in urban redevelopment could help to move towards a notion of a right to the city to counteract some of the challenges of entrepreneurial modes of governance.

Notes

1 Rio's successful bid in 2009 followed its failure in 2004 to win an Olympic bid.
2 Cesar Maia was affiliated with PMDB between 1993 and 1996, and then with the Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro*, PTB) from 2001 to 2004, and with Liberal Front Party (*Partido da Frente Liberal*, PFL) from 2005 to 2008.
3 This tool emerged in São Paulo in the 1990s, originally known as urban operations (*operações urbanas*). In 2001, the Statute of the City regulated the took, and it became known as urban partnership operations (*operações urbanas corscorciada*, OUC) where "partnership" meant that not only could funds be raised by capturing additional value, but also by selling bonds for the potential additional rights of construction.
4 Porto Maravilha was officially created by Projeto de Lei Complementar 25/2009.
5 Oudebrecht was at the center of the Lava Jato corruption scandal that shook Brazil. It was found to have paid at least R$500,000 in bribes to secure their participation in the metro project.

6 Prior to the Pan American Games, a Social Committee of the Pan (Comitê Social do Pan) was formed in 2005 by representatives of social movements and researchers concerned with the public administration of this mega-event. In 2009, this organization changed its name to the Popular Committee for the World Cup and Olympics (Comitê Popular Copa e Olimpíadas).

7 Launched in Rio in 2008, UPP is a "community policing" policy specifically focused on improving security within Rio's favelas.

8 Following on the Favela–Bairro urban upgrading program of the 1990s–2000s, Morar Carioca was established in 2010 to provide infrastructure upgrades to favelas until 2020. The program is an Olympic legacy project, mean that it is part of the social benefit of the investments in Rio due to the Olympics.

9 Considerable work has documented the social impacts beyond the case of Providência. See, for example, Richmond (2015), Ivester (2017), Freeman (2012), and Gaffney (2016), among others.

10 Originally launched by the State of Rio de Janeiro in 2010 but transferred to Rio de Janeiro's city government in 2011, UPP Social aimed to produce information about the needs of favelas, and to integrate and coordinate public policies through the effective participation of residents and local actors (Bentsi-Enchill et al. 2015).

References

Acioly, Claudio. 2001. "Reviewing Urban Revitalisation Strategies in Rio de Janeiro: From Urban Project to Urban Management Approaches." *Geoforum* 32(4): 501–530.

Agamben, Giorgio. 2005. *State of Exception* [Translated by Kevin Attell]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano do Brasil. n.d. Accessed on April 4, 2019. www.atlasbrasil.org.br.

Bentsi-Enchill, Ed, Jessica Goodenough, and Michel Berger. 2015. "The Death of UPP Social: Failing to Make Participation Work." RioOnWatch. Accessed on April 4, 2019. www.rioonwatch.org/?p=17660.

Brasil. 2007. *Relatório Sobre os XV Jogos Pan-Americanos e os III Jogos Parapan-americanos Rio 2007*, Vol. 1 Brasília: Ministério do Esporte. Accessed March 28, 2019. www.esporte.gov.br/arquivos/publicacoes/panVolume1.pdf.

Comitê Popular [Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro]. 2015. *Megaeventos e Violações dos Direitos Humanos no Rio de Janeiro Dossiê*. Rio De Janeiro: Comitê Popular.

Curi, Martin. 2013. "A Diputa Pelo Legal em Megaevento esportivos no Brasil." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 40: 65–88.

Curi, Martin, Jorge Knijnik, and Gilmar Mascarenhas. 2011. "The Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro 2007: Consequences of a Sport Mega-Event on a BRIC Country." *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 46(2): 140–156.

Di Vita, Stefano. 2018. "Mega-Events and Legacies: A Tradition of Studies." In *Mega-Events and Legacies in Post-Metropolitan Spaces: Expos and Urban Agendas*, edited by Stefano Di Vita and Corinna Morandi, 1–13. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Donaghy, Maureen. 2015. "Resisting Removal: The Impact of Community Mobilization in Rio de Janeiro." *Latin American Politics and Society* 57(4): 74–96.

Faulhaber, Lucas, and Lena Azevedo. 2015. *SMH 2016: Remoções no Rio de Janeiro Olímpico*. Rio de Janeiro: Mórula Editorial.

Fernandes, Edésio. 2014. "Brazil's 'Winter of Discontent': What It Says about Urban Planning and Urban Law." Accessed April 1, 2019. https://booksandideas.net/Brazil-s-Winter-of-Discontent.html.

Fischer, Brodwyn. 2008. *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fix, Mariana. 2000. "A 'Fórmula Mágica' da Parceria Público-Privada: Operações Urbanas em São Paulo." *Cadernos de Urbanismo* 3: 1–15.

Fix, Mariana. 2009. "Uma Ponte para a Especulação – ou a Arte da Renda na Montagem de uma 'Cidade Global.'." *Caderno CRH* 22(55): 41–64.

Freeman, James. 2012. "Neoliberal Accumulation Strategies and the Visible Hand of Police Pacification in Rio de Janeiro." *Revista de Estudos Universitários* 38(1): 95–126.

Freeman, James, and Marcos Burgos. 2016. "Accumulation by Forced Removal: The Thinning of Rio de Janeiro's Favelas in Preparation for the Games." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 49(3): 549577.

Freire, Leticia. 2013. "Mobilizações Coletivas em Contexto de Megaeventos Esportivos no Rio de Janeiro." *O Social Em Questão* XVI(29): 101–128.

Friendly, Abigail. 2013. "The Right to the City: Theory and Practice in Brazil." *Planning Theory and Practice* 14(2): 158–179.

Friendly, Abigail. 2017. *Land Value Capture and Social Benefits: Toronto and São Paulo Compared*. IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance 33. Toronto: Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance.

Gaffney, Christopher. 2010. "Mega-Events and Socio-spatial Dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 191911-2016." *Journal of Latin American Geography* 9(1): 7–29.

Gaffney, Christopher. 2016. "Gentrifications in Pre-Olympic Rio de Janeiro." *Urban Geography* 37(8): 1132–1153.

Gordon, Aaron. 2016. "The Rio Games Were An Unjustifiable Human Disaster, And So Are The Olympics." Accessed on April 4, 2019. https://sports.vice.com/en_ca/article/gvayg4/the-rio-games-were-an-unjustifiable-human-disaster-and-so-are-the-olympics.

Haila, Anne. 2008. "From Annankatu to Antinkatu: Contracts, Development Rights and Partnerships in Kamppi, Helsinki." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 32(4): 804–814.

Harvey, David. 1989. "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism." *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 71(1): 3–17.

Ivester, Sukari. 2017. "Removal, Resistance and the Right to the Olympic City: The Case of Vila Autodromo in Rio de Janeiro." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 39(7): 970–985.

La Barre, Jorge de. 2016. "Future Shock: Mega-Events in Rio de Janeiro." *Leisure Studies* 35(3): 352–368.

Magalhães, Alexandre. 2013. "O 'Legado' dos Megaeventos Esportivos: A Reatualização da Remoção de Favelas no Rio de Janeiro." *Horizontes Antropológicos* 19(40): 89–118.

Maiello, Antonella, and Cecilia Pasquinelli. 2015. "Destruction or Construction? A (Counter) Branding Analysis of port Mega-Events in Rio de Janeiro." *Cities* 48: 116–124.

Mascarenhas, Gilmar. 2013. "Londres 2012 e Rio de Janeiro 2016: Conceito e Realidade na Produção da Cidade Olímpica." *Revista Continentes* 2(3): 52–72.

Miraftab, Faranak. 2009. "Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South." *Planning Theory* 8(1): 32–51.

Mosciaro, Mayra, and Alvaro Pereira. 2019. "Reinforcing Uneven Development: The Financialisation of Brazilian Urban Redevelopment Projects." *Urban Studies* 56(10): 2160–2178.

Novais, Pedro. 2010. *Uma Estratégia Chamada "Planejamento Estratégico": Deslocamentos Espaciais e a Atribuição de Sentidos da Terapia do Planejamento Urbano*. Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras.

Oliveira, Nelma Gusmão de. 2012. "O Poder dos Jogos e os Jogos do Poder: Os interesses em Campo na Produção de uma Cidade para o Espetáculo Esportivo." PhD dissertation, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro [PCRJ]. 1996. *Plano Estratégico da Cidade de Rio de Janeiro: Rio Sempre Rio*. Rio de Janeiro: PCRJ/ACRJ/FIRJAN.

Ribeiro, Luiz Cesar de Queiroz, and Orlando Alves dos Santos Junior. 2017. "Neoliberalization and Mega-Events: The Transition of Rio de Janeiro's Hybrid Urban Order." *Journal of Urban Affairs* 39(7): 909–923.

Richmond, Matthew. 2015. "The Urban Impacts of Rio's Mega-Events: The View from Two 'Unspectacular' Favelas." In *Mega-Event Cities: Urban Legacies of Global Sports Events*, edited by V. Viehoff and G. Poynter, 249–259. London: Ashgate.

Richmond, Matthew, and Jeff Garmany. 2016. "'Post-Third-World City' or Neoliberal 'City of Exception?' Rio de Janeiro in the Olympic Era." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 40 (3): 621–639.

Sánchez, Fernanda, and Anne-Marie Broudehoux. 2013. "Mega-Events and Urban Regeneration in Rio de Janeiro: Planning in a State of Emergency." *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development* 5 (2): 132–153.

Santos, Maurício Campos de., and Marcos de Faria Asevedo. 2011. "Relatório sobre as visitas técnicas realizadas nas comunidades do Morro da Providência e da Pedra Lisa nos dias 23/8 e 7/9/2011 e Parecer Técnico sobre os motivos alegados pela Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro para a remoção de 832 famílias nessas duas comunidades." Accessed April 3, 2019. https://forumcomunitariodoporto.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/relatc3b3rio-morro-da-providc3aancia_final-1.pdf.

Santos, Rosana Soares dos. 2017. "Plano de Habitação de Interesse Social do Porto: (Maravilha, Para Quem?)." Paper presented at the 4º Fórum Habitar, Belo Horizonte, November 8–10.

Sarue, Betina. 2018. "Quando Grandes Projetos Urbanos Acontecem? Uma Análise a Partir do Porto Maravilha no Rio de Janeiro." *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais* 61(3): 581–616.

Sequeira, Lucimar. 2015. "A Questão da Moradia em Tempos de Copa do Mundo em Porto Alegre." In *Porto Alegre: Impactos da Copa em Porto Alegre*, edited by Paulo Roberto R. Soares, 65–111. Porto Alegre: Ed UFRS.

Silvestre, Gabriel. 2017. "Rio de Janeiro 2016." In *Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning, and the World's Games*, edited by John R. Gold and Margaret M. Gold, 400–423. London: Routledge.

Vainer, Carlos B. 2009. "Pátria, Empresa e Mercadoria: Notas Sobre a Estratégia Discursiva do Planejamento Estratégico Urbano." In *A Cidade do Pensamento Único: Desmanchando Consensos*, edited by Otília Arantes, Carlos Vainer, and Ermínia Maricato, 75–103. Petrópolis: Vozes.

Vainer, Carlos B. 2015. "Mega-events and the City of Exception: Theoretical Explorations of the Brazilian Experience." In *Mega-Events and Globalization: Capital and Spectacle in a Changing World Order*, edited by Richard Gruneau and John Horne, 97–112. London: Routledge.