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# Religion and integration: does immigrant generation matter? The case of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands

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## ABSTRACT

Public debates on Muslim migration to Europe often describe religiosity as a barrier to immigrant integration. Among the first generation, negative correlations between Muslims' religiosity and integration were indeed found, but among the second generation, religion and integration are more often decoupled. To examine whether the relation between religion and integration differs across immigrant generations, this study compares foreign-born with local-born Turkish and Moroccan minorities in the Netherlands based on the NELS data ( $N = 1,776$ ). We analyse how religiosity (religious identification and practices) relates to eight indicators of immigrant integration and find it to be unrelated to socio-economic participation, Dutch contacts, national identification and gender egalitarianism, but negatively related to Dutch friendships, language skills and sexual liberalism in both generations. Only the association between religiosity and educational attainment in the Netherlands differs across generations, and changes from negative in the first to non-significant in the second generation.

## KEYWORDS

Integration; religiosity; immigrants; Muslims; Netherlands

## Introduction

In European public debates, Islam is often presented as incompatible with full participation in West-European societies (e.g. Foner and Alba 2008). For instance, Muslims' traditional Islamic beliefs and values are considered to be in conflict with the liberal sexual and gender equality norms of Western societies (Koopmans 2016; see also Kogan and Weißmann 2020). Previous research confirms a negative link between religiosity and integration amongst first-generation Muslim immigrants (e.g. Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010; Van Tubergen 2007; Kogan, Fong, and Reitz 2020). Yet, studies also show that compared to the foreign-born first generation, second-generation Muslim immigrants can maintain or strengthen their religiosity (e.g. Diehl and Koenig 2009; Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012), while at the same time having higher levels of integration compared to their parents (e.g. Statistics Netherlands 2014). Unfortunately, there is a lack of research

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that directly assesses the role of immigrant generation in the relationship between religiosity and integration (but see Maliepaard and Phalet 2012, on interethnic contacts). This study aims to fill this gap and asks whether the association between religiosity and a broad range of integration outcomes differs between first- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.

How religiosity relates to immigrant integration depends on the integration outcome that is being studied (see e.g. Van Tubergen 2007). Therefore, to fully gauge the importance and role of religiosity in immigrants' integration into the host society, studying multiple indicators of integration is necessary to provide a comprehensive overview of how religiosity relates to integration. Previous studies typically focused on a single or few selected integration outcomes, for instance egalitarian gender ideology (e.g. Scheible and Fleischmann 2013), educational attainment and employment status (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012), political participation (Fleischmann, Martinovic, and Böhm 2016) or social integration (Maliepaard and Phalet 2012). The current study offers a more comprehensive test of the role of immigrant generation in the association between religiosity and the integration of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands by including eight different indicators of immigrant integration, covering its structural, social, cultural, and psychological dimensions.

### ***Religiosity and immigrant integration: predictions from assimilation theory***

Most empirical studies start from the assumption that integration into secular West-European societies would lower immigrants' religiosity (e.g. Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012; Van Tubergen 2007). Assimilation theory posits that as immigrants adapt to the values, beliefs, and ways of life of the host society over time, they lose their own distinctive culture (Alba and Nee 2003). West-European societies are generally characterised by a dominant secular ideology and low levels of religious participation (Schuh, Burchardt, and Wohlrab-Sahr 2012). Immigrants who engage in institutions of the host society are thereby exposed to secular norms, and come in contact with the majority and its secularism. This, in turn, should lead Muslim immigrants to become less religious themselves (Dobbelaere 1981; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). We can therefore derive the general expectation that *religiosity is negatively associated with integration amongst Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands (H1)*.

We should immediately add that, since most studies on this topic, including the current, are cross-sectional, the causality of the relationship between immigrants' religiosity and integration cannot be firmly established. Thus, the relationship may also operate in the reverse direction, such that higher levels of religiosity hinder Muslims' integration in the host society. This is often the assumption in public debates on Muslim migration to Western Europe (Foner and Alba 2008) and also the approach of the current study. Immigrants' distinctive ethnic and cultural traits, including their religion, may form sources of disadvantage that negatively affect the process of assimilation to the host society (Koopmans 2016).

### ***Dimensions and indicators of immigrant integration***

The literature on immigrant integration distinguishes various dimensions of integration, the most important being structural, social, cultural, and psychological integration (e.g.

Alba and Nee 2003). Structural integration is regarded as a key indication of immigrants' successful and active participation in the host society and driving force behind other integration outcomes (Alba and Nee 2003). This dimension of integration is primarily concerned with immigrants' position in education and on the labour market. Most previous research on Muslim immigrants' integration into West-European societies therefore includes education and employment as aspects of structural integration (e.g. Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012; Roth 2020; Van Tubergen 2007).

Socio-cultural integration, on the other hand, is more concerned with the question whether immigrants' social, cultural, and psychological distance to the mainstream diminishes over time (Alba and Nee 2003; Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). This is relevant in research on Muslim immigrants in Europe since their values and ways of life are regularly perceived as colliding with those of the host society (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Previous studies examined for example whether more religious immigrants maintain less social contacts with natives in their daily life (e.g. Maliepaard and Phalet 2012), identify less with the host society (e.g. Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007), and acquire less skills in the host language (e.g. Güveli and Platt 2011).

Next to these aspects of socio-cultural integration, sexual and gender norms are often described as a source of conflict between Muslims and the European mainstream (Norris and Inglehart 2012). Several studies consider Muslims' attitudes towards the position of women within the household and sexual liberties, including the acceptance of homosexuality, as indicators of their adaptation to the host society's cultural values (e.g. Kogan and Weißmann 2020; Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Scheible and Fleischmann 2013). Islam holds allegedly traditional views regarding these matters (e.g. Abukhalil 1997), especially compared to the views of the majority population in West-European societies (e.g. Röder 2015). This leads to the expectation that immigrants' religiosity may be more intertwined with cultural adaptation on sexual and gender norms and values compared to, for instance, host language adoption, employment, or education. By including all above aspects of integration, the current study can explore whether the role of religiosity varies across multiple domains of Muslim immigrants' integration in the Netherlands.<sup>1</sup>

### *The role of immigrant generation*

Several studies found that the level of religiosity amongst first-generation Muslim immigrants is negatively associated with their integration in West-European societies. For example, Van Tubergen's (2007) research on Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands revealed negative relations between religiosity and social contacts with natives, interethnic marriage, Dutch language skills, employment, and Dutch education. Other studies found negative associations between first generation immigrants' religiosity and their egalitarian gender role attitudes (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009), host language proficiency (Güveli and Platt 2011), educational attainment (Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010; Phalet, Gijsberts, and Hagendoorn 2008; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011), majority social contacts (Maliepaard and Phalet 2012), employment (Lesthaeghe and Neels 2000; Phalet, Gijsberts, and Hagendoorn 2008; Smits, Ruiters, and Van Tubergen 2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011), and national identification (Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).

Yet, research on second-generation Muslim immigrants finds fewer negative and sometimes even positive associations between religiosity and integration outcomes such as

education, employment, interethnic marriage, civic engagement, and gender egalitarianism (Carol and Schulz 2018; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Fleischmann, Martinovic and Böhm 2016; Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010; Maliepaard, Gijsberts, and Lubbers 2012; Ohlendorf, Koenig and Diehl 2017; Scheible and Fleischmann 2013). For example, Fleischmann and Phalet (2012) investigated second-generation Turkish immigrants in four European cities and found neither educational attainment, employment status nor interethnic marriage to be associated with immigrants' religiosity in Amsterdam, Brussels and Stockholm. Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts (2010) found that, contrary to the first generation, higher education is associated with more, rather than less, frequent mosque attendance amongst second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. The results of these studies imply that, while closely associated for the first generation, religiosity might have become decoupled from integration in the second generation (Voas and Fleischmann 2012).

### *Decoupling as segmented assimilation*

The observation of a possible decoupling of immigrants' religiosity and integration fits with the expectations of segmented assimilation theory, which posits that second-generation immigrants can combine socio-economic integration without losing distinctive aspects of their heritage culture, including religion (Zhou 1997). From the perspective of religious studies, this might reflect what Dobbelaere (1981) described as the privatisation of religion, which is characterised by a diminished impact of individuals' religious beliefs, values, and practices in everyday life in modern societies, for instance, in the educational, economic, and social domain. This privatisation may be seen as a form of secularisation distinct from declining religious involvement (Dobbelaere 1981). To explain generational variation in how religiosity relates to immigrant integration, it is important to distinguish the integration context of the first and the second generation of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.

First-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants arrived from the 1960s onwards primarily as guest workers and later through family-based migration (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Recruited as temporary migrants for low-skilled work, these immigrants originated from the least developed and most religious parts of their country of origin (Peach and Glebe 1995). In the Netherlands, most Moroccan and Turkish immigrants found themselves in a disadvantaged position on the labour market, had little Dutch language skills, and resided in neighbourhoods with high co-ethnic concentrations (Musterd 2005). These co-ethnic communities were often structured around Islam (Cesari 2004), and were in time accommodated with their own religious associations and mosques (Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012). Religious involvement in the co-ethnic community provided immigrants with social contacts and a sense of belonging in the host society (Vertovec and Rogers 1998), but also limited their opportunities for contact with natives, exposure to the host society language and values, and engagement in mainstream institutions and jobs (Foner and Alba 2008; Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007). This dynamic may have contributed to first-generation immigrants' high religiosity becoming associated with a poor integration in West-European societies (Cesari 2004).

The situation of the second generation is different. On the one hand, the local-born children of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are socialised with their parent's culture

of origin, and religious values and beliefs are transmitted to them (e.g. Jacob and Kalter 2013). In fact, this transmission is so successful that many studies do not find a significant decline in Islamic religiosity between the first and second generation (see Voas and Fleischmann 2012, for a review). At the same time, second-generation immigrants grow up in the host society and participate from early childhood in mainstream social settings. For example, they attend school in the Netherlands, obtain jobs, interact with native peers and colleagues, and acquire the Dutch language which makes them more familiar with the Dutch culture (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Although second-generation immigrants, on average, still hold a disadvantaged socio-economic position relative to natives (Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2008), their way of life and opportunities are in various ways more similar to the majority population than those of the first generation. The culturally, linguistically, and economically isolated and vulnerable position that many of their parents experienced does not apply (to the same extent) to the second generation. Instead, second-generation immigrants may successfully combine their religiosity with the adoption of the lifestyles, identities, and cultural norms and values of the host society (Vertovec and Rogers 1998; Zhou 1997). We therefore expect that *the negative association between religion and integration is weaker for second- compared to first-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands (H2)*.

### **Religious expressions and practices across immigrant generations**

To understand the role of Islam in immigrants' integration process, it is important to recognise the complexity of the religiosity construct and the considerable variations in the ways of being Muslim between and within immigrant generations (Maliépaard and Gijsberts 2012; Phalet, Fleischmann, and Stojcic 2012; Vertovec and Rogers 1998).

First-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants generally combine strong religious attachment with high levels of Islamic practices such as praying, mosque attendance, fasting, and abstinence from alcohol (Maliépaard and Gijsberts 2012). This more 'strict' form of religiosity amongst first-generation immigrants is bound up with the status of Islam in their country of origin and their feelings of identification with this country (Vertovec and Rogers 1998). This may apply to different Muslim immigrant groups to a greater or lesser extent since Turkey is historically known to be a more secular state compared to Morocco (Smits, Ruiters, and Van Tubergen 2010). For second-generation immigrants, involvement in religious practices may be less evident since they do not share their parents' memories about the role of Islam in the origin country, and grow up in the secular context of the host society (Vertovec and Rogers 1998).

Religious expressions may therefore be more diverse amongst second-generation Muslims in Europe. Generally, either a more secular and individualised or a more fundamentalist approach to Islam is adopted (Vertovec and Rogers 1998). In the first approach, Islam can be seen as immigrants' cultural heritage and gives important symbolic meaning to their life. However, they keep their religious sentiments and practices more to the private sphere and engage less in collective religious activities such as mosque services (Peek 2005; Vertovec and Rogers 1998). This is also described as a kind of 'consumer approach' to religion in research on second-generation Muslims' religiosity, who maintain high levels of religious affiliation and identification but are more selective in their religious practices compared to the first generation (Maliépaard and Gijsberts 2012; Phalet,

Fleischmann, and Stojic 2012). A more strict approach to Islam can be adopted by second-generation Muslim immigrants that are eager to study Islamic scriptures and beliefs themselves. This may result in a revitalisation of religion, and at times a rejection of their parents' form of Islam (Vertovec and Rogers 1998), more radical Islamic ideas (Buijs 2009), or in more traditional beliefs and higher levels of mosque attendance compared to their parents (Maliepaard and Alba 2016).

The variations in religious expressions and practices may be relevant when comparing the association between religiosity and integration across immigrant generations. We therefore first examine whether religiosity can be operationalised in the same way in both migrant generations.

## Data and method

This study uses data from the first wave of the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS) conducted between 2008 and 2010 amongst Dutch inhabitants by De Graaf, Kalmijn, Kraaykamp, and Monden (2010). For this nation-wide survey, 35 municipalities in the Netherlands were randomly selected, stratified by region and urbanisation. The four biggest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) were included by design to obtain a representative sample of Moroccans and Turks. Subsequently, participants between 15 and 45 years were randomly selected from the population registry of selected municipalities. People of Moroccan and Turkish origin were oversampled and are the focus of this study. The response rate amongst the 4,891 Moroccan and Turkish inhabitants who were approached was 50% for Turks and 46% for Moroccans. The survey consisted of a face-to-face interview in which respondents were asked about their socio-economic and demographic background, and a self-completion questionnaire that assessed respondents' attitudes, values, norms, and contacts.

Respondents that did not complete the self-administered questionnaire were excluded (12.6%) since we have no observations about our core variables of interest for these participants. Furthermore, non-religious respondents (9.3%) and non-Muslim respondents (Christians, Jews, or other non-Muslims, 2.1%) were also excluded. Of the final sample of 1,776 respondents, 1,152 respondents belong to the first generation (609 Moroccans, 543 Turks) and 624 to the second (325 Moroccans, 299 Turks). As determined by the population register, first-generation immigrants are persons who were born in Morocco or Turkey. Second-generation immigrants are persons born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born in Morocco or Turkey. Females are somewhat overrepresented with 51.6% and 56.4% amongst first- and second-generation respondents, respectively. The average age of first-generation respondents ( $M = 35$ ,  $SD = 7.2$ ) is considerably higher compared to the average age of second-generation respondents ( $M = 23$ ,  $SD = 6.5$ ). The majority of respondents self-categorizes as Sunni Muslim (52.6%), followed by a large proportion that indicates to belong to an 'other Islamic' category (44.9%). Only a small proportion self-categorizes as Shi'i (2.4%).

## Measurements

### Integration

This study examines eight measures of immigrant integration: Dutch education (1), socio-economic participation (2), Dutch language proficiency (3), superficial contact (4) and



friendship with natives (5), endorsement of gender egalitarianism (6) and sexual liberalism (7), and (8) national identification.

*Dutch education* was indicated by respondents' highest level of education ever or currently followed in the Netherlands. Following the Dutch educational system, a distinction was made between 0 'no education (in the Netherlands)', 1 'primary education', 2 'lower vocational secondary education' (LBO, VMBO), 3 'lower secondary education' (MAVO, VMBO TL), 4 'lower vocational tertiary education' (MBO), 5 'higher secondary education' (HAVO, VWO), 6 'higher tertiary education' (HBO), and 7 'university'. We treat Dutch education as a continuous variable. The 28.5% respondents who only followed education abroad received a value of 0. These respondents were mostly first-generation immigrants.<sup>2</sup>

*Socio-economic participation* indicated whether respondents' are active on the labour market or participating in the educational system of the Netherlands. Respondents could indicate their status to be employed, unemployed (but searching for a job), inactive (not searching for a job), and in education. Respondents that were employed and/or in education received a value of 1 and respondents that were unemployed or inactive received a value of 0. We decided to group the unemployed and inactive together in order to model immigrant participation that relates to exposure to Dutch institutions, the host society language (Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2008), and opportunities for contacts with natives (Martinovic 2013).

Two variables on contact with Dutch natives were included: *superficial contact* and *native friends*. The first was constructed from a set of three items that asked how frequently respondents have contact with someone of Dutch origin in the neighbourhood, in school or at work, and in clubs or organisations. The answer categories ranged from 1 'never' to 7 '(almost) every day'. On the latter two items, respectively 18.9% and 50.7% respondents indicated 'not applicable'. These responses were recoded as 1 'never' since respondents that are not in a school, work, or organisational context do not have contact with Dutch natives in these contexts. As this study is interested in immigrants' actual amount of social contact with Dutch natives rather than their underlying attitude towards people of Dutch origin, the variable superficial contact was treated as a formative measure and an average was computed across the three items. The second variable measured whether respondents have one or more good friends of native Dutch background (1 = yes, 0 = no).

*Dutch language proficiency* was measured by four self-report items on which respondents indicated how well they can understand, speak, read, and write Dutch, with answer categories ranging from 1 'not at all' to 5 'very well'. Like the remaining measures, it will be treated as a latent variable in the analyses.

*Gender egalitarianism* was measured by four items: 'Men are equally capable of caring for a baby as women', 'It is unnatural for men to do work in the household', 'Men and women should contribute equally to raising children', and 'It is good for a young child if the father contributes to his/her care'. The answer categories ranged from 1 'totally agree' to 5 'totally disagree'. Item one, three, and four were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated more egalitarian views.

*Sexual liberalism* was measured by six items asking 'Do you think the following cases are wrong or not?', 'homosexuality', 'divorce', 'abortion', 'chosen childlessness', 'premarital sex', and 'sex with someone other than partner'. The answer categories ranged from 1 'always wrong' to 4 'never wrong'.



*National identification* was measured by four items: 'I feel at home in the Netherlands', 'I identify strongly with the Netherlands', 'I feel really connected to the Netherlands', and 'Dutch identity is an important aspect of myself'. The answer categories ranged from 1 'totally disagree' to 5 'totally agree'.

### *Religiosity measure*

*Religiosity* was a latent variable measured by four items: religious identification, mosque attendance, worship practices, and dietary practices.

Religious identification was measured by the question 'How important is religion to you personally?', with answer categories ranging from 1 'very important' to 5 'not important at all'. The item was reverse coded. Mosque attendance measured how often respondents attend religious services, with answer categories ranging from 1 'never' to 7 'multiple times a week'. Worship practices were measured by two items that asked whether, in the past three months, respondents read the Bible or Quran and prayed (1 = yes, 0 = no). A variable was subsequently constructed counting the number of worship practices respondents participated in, with values ranging from 0 'none' to 2 'both practices'. Dietary practices were measured by three items that asked whether respondents fast, drink alcohol, and eat pork (1 = yes, 0 = no). The latter two items were reverse coded. The 0.8%, 8.8%, and 8.9% respondents that indicated 'not applicable' on these three items were assigned a value of 0. Again, a count variable was constructed for dietary practices, with values ranging from 0 'none' to 3 'all practices'.

### *Controls*

Since the association between religiosity and, for example, endorsement of gender egalitarianism has been found to differ for males and females (Scheible and Fleischmann 2013), *gender* was included (1 = male, 0 = female). *Ethnicity* was included (1 = Moroccan, 0 = Turkish), since Moroccans and Turks may differ in their integration in Dutch society as well as religious involvement (Smits, Ruiter, and Van Tubergen 2010). Since religiosity can be subject to life cycle effects and has been found to increase with age (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999), *age in years* was included to control for the age differences between immigrant generations. Lastly, for all outcome variables except for Dutch education, *education* was included as a control variable since this is a known predictor for various other integration outcomes, such as inter-ethnic contacts (Martinovic 2013), and host language acquisition (Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2008). The same scale was used as for the integration variable Dutch education (ranging from '0 'no education at all' to 7 'university') but now additionally including information on education that was followed abroad. Respondents who followed education abroad indicated, in consultation with the interviewer, an educational level of the Dutch system that was most comparable.<sup>3</sup>

### *Measurement model*

Using Mplus version 7.3 (Múthen and Múthen 2012) multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis was applied to assess the measurements and test for measurement invariance of the latent constructs across immigrant generations. The results are presented in Table 1.

The five-factor measurement model including the latent constructs religiosity, Dutch language proficiency, gender egalitarianism, sexual liberalism, and national identification

as four correlated latent dimensions of socio-cultural integration fit the data well. Two items were removed sequentially due to low communalities ( $R^2 < .2$ ), one for gender egalitarianism ('It is unnatural for men to do work in the household') and one for sexual liberalism ('sex with someone other than partner'). The two-dimensionality of Dutch language proficiency was specified by allowing the factors of the verbal skills 'understanding' and 'speaking' and the non-verbal skills 'writing' and 'reading' to correlate. Lastly, the factors of the items 'abortion' and 'chosen childlessness' for the factor sexual liberalism were correlated. The model with these modifications yielded a good fit (see Table 1).

To test for measurement invariance, a model was fitted in which factor loadings were constrained to equality across the first and second generation (i.e. metric or weak invariance) and tested against the model with freely estimated factor loadings (i.e. configural invariance). Based on the modification indices, it was concluded that the loading of the item 'mosque attendance' cannot be constrained to be equal for first- and second-generation immigrants. The equality constraint of this loading was therefore relaxed. Including this modification, another model was fitted in which intercepts were restricted to be equal across the first and second generation (i.e. scalar or strong invariance) and tested against the previous model with freely estimated intercepts. Based on the modification indices, it was concluded that the intercepts of the items 'writing' for Dutch language proficiency, 'homosexuality' for sexual liberalism and 'Dutch identity is an important aspect of myself' for national identification cannot be constrained to be equal for first- and second-generations immigrants. The equality constraints of these three intercepts were therefore relaxed. A model assuming partial scalar invariance and including these modifications had a good fit and the chi-square difference test against the configural invariance model yielded a significance level of  $p = .0499$  which was regarded as acceptable (see Table 1). This model was selected as the final measurement model and partial scalar measurement invariance was assumed for the five latent factors across first- and second-generation immigrants.<sup>4</sup>

The composite scale reliabilities (Kline 2011, 242) were low for religiosity (first generation  $\rho = .413$ , second generation  $\rho = .564$ ), but reasonable high to high for Dutch language proficiency (first generation  $\rho = .941$ , second generation  $\rho = .925$ ), gender egalitarianism

**Table 1.** Five-factor measurement model and measurement invariance tests across first- and second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.

	Model fit indices							Model comparison		
	Chi <sup>2</sup>	df	Sig.	RSMEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR	Δ Chi <sup>2</sup>	df	Sig.
Measurement model <sup>a</sup>	1550.071	398	.0001	.057	.931	.920	.052			
Measurement model excluding items with $R^2 < .2$	1218.343	320	.0001	.056	.945	.934	.045			
<i>Measurement invariance test across immigrant generations</i>										
(1) Configural model + three error covariances	837.101	314	.0001	.043	.968	.961	.043			
(2a) Metric model incl. modifications	873.849	329	.0001	.043	.966	.961	.047	36.748	15	.0014
(2b) Metric model + one free loading	858.155	328	.0001	.043	.967	.962	.046	21.054	14	.1003
(3a) Scalar model incl. modifications	951.897	343	.0001	.045	.963	.958	.048	93.742	15	.0001
(3b) Scalar model + three free intercepts (final model)	875.996	340	.0001	.042	.967	.963	.046	38.895	26	.0499 <sup>b</sup>

Notes: first generation  $N = 1152$  and second generation  $N = 624$ . RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. The Weighted Least Squares Mean and Variance adjusted estimation method is used.

<sup>a</sup>Factors: religiosity (4 items), Dutch language proficiency (4 items), gender egalitarianism (4 items), sexual liberalism (6 items), and national identification (4 items).

<sup>b</sup>Chi-square difference test against configural invariance model, see model (1).

(first generation  $\rho = .637$ , second generation  $\rho = .646$ ), sexual liberalism (first generation  $\rho = .767$ , second generation  $\rho = .689$ ), and national identification (first generation  $\rho = .871$ , second generation  $\rho = .865$ ).

## Analysis

Multiple Group Structural Equation Modeling (MGSEM) was applied to compare the association between religiosity and our eight integration measures across first- and second-generation immigrants. Structural equation modelling offers the advantage of estimating latent factors and conducting multiple-group tests of associations.

In the main analysis, religiosity was regarded as a multidimensional factor using the measurement established above. A two-group model was specified to compare first-generation immigrants with second-generation immigrants. For each of the eight integration outcomes, a separate model was fitted.

The controls were included in all models as predictors of the outcome variable. For the benefit of the multi-group comparison of the associations, the effects of the control variables were set to equality across groups. Because the observations on some of the variables are non-normally distributed, all models were fitted with the Robust Maximum Likelihood (MLR) estimation.

## Results

### Descriptive findings

Table 2 provides summary statistics for all measures for first- and second-generation immigrants. As can be seen, the second generation is less religious compared to the first. When the dimensions of religiosity are considered separately, we observe that second-generation immigrants have similar levels of religious identification, mosque attendance, and dietary practices, but they are less active in worship practices. Regarding integration, we find that second-generation immigrants score higher on all outcomes except national identification for which levels do not differ across generations.

Table 3 presents the correlations between the main variables separately for the first and second generation. Amongst the first generation, religiosity correlates negatively with Dutch education, having Dutch friends, Dutch language proficiency, and endorsement of sexual liberalism. Religiosity does not correlate with socio-economic participation, superficial contact with natives, endorsement of gender egalitarianism, and national identification. Almost all integration outcomes correlate positively with each other.

Among the second generation, religiosity also correlates negatively with having Dutch friends and endorsement of sexual liberalism. However, religiosity correlates negatively with endorsement of gender egalitarianism, but not with Dutch education and Dutch language proficiency. Furthermore, not all integration variables correlate with each other amongst second-generation immigrants.

### Structural model

The results of the path models are presented in Table 4. For the eight integration outcomes, the intercept and main effect of religiosity are shown separately for first- and

**Table 2.** Descriptive statistics for first- and second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.

	Range	First generation			Second generation			Mean difference
		<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	Mean	<i>SD</i>	
Religiosity <sup>a</sup>		1152	2.92	.52	624	2.85	.52	-.07*
Religious identification	1–5	1139	4.65	.64	615	4.61	.63	-.04
Mosque attendance	1–7	1152	3.16	2.15	624	3.15	1.93	-.02
Worship practices	0–2	1152	1.43	.74	624	1.34	.76	-.09*
Dietary practices	0–3	1152	2.46	.85	624	2.42	.88	-.04
Dutch education	0–7	1152	2.12	2.23	624	4.14	1.50	2.03***
Socio-economic participation	0/1	1152	.62		624	.83		.21***
Native Dutch contact	0–7	1148	4.49	1.58	623	5.27	1.37	.78***
Native Dutch friends	0/1	1136	.70		622	.85		.15***
Dutch language proficiency	1–5	1134	3.90	1.00	608	4.72	.51	.82***
Gender egalitarianism	1–5	1141	3.92	.54	618	3.99	.55	.07*
Sexual liberalism	1–4	1135	2.40	.69	617	2.56	.60	.16***
National identification	1–5	1138	3.71	.70	616	3.75	.66	.05
Male	0/1	1152	.48		624	.44		-.05 <sup>†</sup>
Age	14–49	1152	34.89	7.23	624	23.06	6.54	-11.8***
Moroccan	0/1	1152	.53		624	.52		.01
Education Dutch/abroad (control)	0/7	1102	3.43	1.88	623	4.28	1.31	.85***

Note: first generation *N* = 1152 and second generation *N* = 624.

Two-tailed significance <sup>†</sup>*p* < .07; \**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01; \*\*\**p* < .001.

<sup>a</sup>Summary statistics are provided for the four items of religiosity with varying scales.

second-generation immigrants. To test our second hypothesis, Wald tests were conducted to assess whether these parameters could be constrained to equality across generations. First, the equality of the intercepts was tested to assess the effect of immigrant generation on the integration outcomes. Second, it was tested whether the main effect of religiosity is the same for first- and second-generation immigrants. When parameters could be constrained to equality across generations, the same parameters are presented in Table 4 for both generations. The path models also include the controls gender, age, ethnicity, and education (for all models but Dutch education) .<sup>5</sup>

### Hypothesis 1

For first-generation immigrants, religiosity is negatively associated with Dutch education, the likelihood of having Dutch friends, Dutch language proficiency, and endorsement of sexual liberalism. Religiosity does not relate to first-generation immigrants' socio-economic participation, superficial contact with Dutch, endorsement of gender egalitarianism, and national identification. Thus, our first hypothesis that religiosity and integration are negatively associated for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants is confirmed for four out of eight aspects of integration.

### Hypothesis 2

Belonging to the second generation, as compared to the first, is positively related to all aspects of integration except for endorsement of gender egalitarianism. The intercept of endorsement of gender egalitarianism can be set to equality for first- and second-generation immigrants.<sup>6</sup> While religiosity and Dutch education are negatively associated for first-generation immigrants, we find no significant association for second-generation immigrants. For all other aspects of integration, we find no differences across generations as the parameters can be set to equality for both generations.<sup>7</sup> Thus, our second hypothesis that the negative association between religiosity and integration is weaker for second-

**Table 3.** Correlations for first- and second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
(1) Religiosity	—	-.110**	.050	.023	-.154**	-.113**	.032	-.528***	.034
(2) Dutch education	-.021	—	.291***	.248***	.225***	-.629***	.189***	.350***	.146***
(3) Socio-economic participation	.109	.135*	—	.471***	.288***	.328***	.134**	.283***	.100*
(4) Dutch native contacts	.072	.013	.425***	—	.432***	.324***	.171***	.219***	.162***
(5) Dutch native friends	-.155*	.037	.185*	.375***	—	.361***	.165***	.297***	.279***
(6) Dutch language proficiency	-.084	.471***	.328***	.080*	.042	—	.317***	.326***	.240***
(7) Gender egalitarianism	-.113*	.086 <sup>†</sup>	-.055	-.027	.133 <sup>†</sup>	.233***	—	.182***	.174***
(8) Sexual liberalism	-.558***	.209***	.036	.116*	.130	.192***	.174***	—	.123**
(9) National identification	-.017	.001	.076	.004	.100	.190***	.212***	.155**	—

Notes: Correlations for first-generation immigrants ( $N = 1152$ ) are to the right and above the diagonal. Correlations for second-generation immigrants ( $N = 624$ ) are to the left and below the diagonal.

The Weighted Least Squares Mean and Variance adjusted estimation method is used for correlations between latent factors and continuous and categorical observed variables. Tetrachoric and biserial correlations are used for the dichotomous variables 'Participation' and 'Dutch native friends'.

Two-tailed significance <sup>†</sup> $p < .07$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table 4.** Relations between religiosity and integration for first- and second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.

	Dutch education		Socio-economic participation		Dutch native contacts		Dutch native friends		Dutch language proficiency		Gender egalitarianism		Sexual liberalism		National identification	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Intercept																
<i>First generation</i>	3.446	.257	.847	.324	4.555	.205	.059	.335	3.695	.103	3.404 <sup>a</sup>	.074	1.992	.168	3.574	.087
<i>Second generation</i>	4.942	.176	1.408	.269	4.882	.165	.779	.284	4.112	.082	3.404 <sup>a</sup>	.074	2.107	.151	3.657	.072
Religiosity																
<i>First generation</i>	-.848***	.243	-.068 <sup>a</sup>	.220 <sup>a</sup>	.255 <sup>a</sup>	.155 <sup>a</sup>	-.712*** <sup>a</sup>	.246 <sup>a</sup>	-.272*** <sup>a</sup>	.096 <sup>a</sup>	.022 <sup>a</sup>	.049 <sup>a</sup>	-1.180*** <sup>a</sup>	.113 <sup>a</sup>	-.022 <sup>a</sup>	.058 <sup>a</sup>
<i>Second generation</i>	.057	.192	-.068 <sup>a</sup>	.220 <sup>a</sup>	.255 <sup>a</sup>	.155 <sup>a</sup>	-.712*** <sup>a</sup>	.246 <sup>a</sup>	-.272*** <sup>a</sup>	.096 <sup>a</sup>	.022 <sup>a</sup>	.049 <sup>a</sup>	-1.180*** <sup>a</sup>	.113 <sup>a</sup>	-.022 <sup>a</sup>	.058 <sup>a</sup>
Control variables <sup>b</sup>																
Male	-.039	.096	1.130***	.121	.564***	.069	.251*	.117	-.007	.034	-.105***	.027	-.215***	.048	-.025	.028
Age	-.042***	.007	-.042***	.008	-.028***	.005	-.003	.008	-.012*	.002	-.003	.002	.005†	.003	.005*	.002
Moroccan	.362***	.095	-.112	.113	-.059	.069	.287*	.118	.225***	.036	.053*	.025	.066	.045	.156***	.028
Education			.199***	.034	.190***	.021	.207***	.035	.189***	.011	.039***	.008	.111***	.013	.017*	.009
Model fit																
Chi <sup>2</sup>	27975.616		22461.926		26825.438		22361.322		30633.05		32847.334		44130.894		35104.542	
df	25		25		26		26		39		33		41		37	

Notes: *N* = 1776. The robust Maximum Likelihood estimation method is used.

Two-tailed significance †*p* < .07; \**p* < .05; \*\**p* < .01; \*\*\**p* < .001.

<sup>a</sup>The same parameters are presented for first- and second-generation immigrants since these could be constrained to equality based on the conducted Wald tests. The parameters of the first generation results are used and copied for second-generation immigrants.

<sup>b</sup>The effects of the control variables are set to equality for the two specified groups in the model.

compared to first-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants is only confirmed for immigrants' level of Dutch education.

### *Robustness check*

We wanted to test whether our decision to exclude non-religious respondents from the sample may have influenced our findings. We therefore repeated the analyses including the 188 respondents that did not declare a religious denomination. These respondents scored lower on all religiosity items compared to self-identified Muslims. Our robustness check yields similar results as our main analysis. However, we now find a negative association between religiosity and Dutch educational attainment also among the second generation. Nonetheless, compared to the first generation, the negative association between religiosity and Dutch education is still significantly weaker for the second generation (Wald test of equality constraint:  $\text{Chi}^2(1) = 10.409$ ,  $p\text{-}2s = .0013$ ).<sup>8</sup>

## **Discussion**

This study examined whether and how the association between religiosity and integration differs for first- and second-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands. There is much debate on whether Islam hinders the inclusion of Muslim immigrants in West-European societies (Foner and Alba 2008). Although previous studies found a negative relation between religiosity and integration amongst first-generation immigrants (e.g. Güveli and Platt 2011; Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011; Van Tubergen 2007), different results were found for the second generation (e.g. Carol and Schulz 2018; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012; Scheible and Fleischmann 2013). We therefore expected that Islam would be less negatively associated with second-generation immigrants' integration, amongst other reasons because they participate from early childhood in secular mainstream settings while first-generation immigrants often hold a more disadvantaged socio-economical and culturally isolated position.

### *Intergenerational religious stability and increasing integration*

Based on nation-wide samples of Turkish- and Moroccan-Dutch in the NELLS data, this study finds that second-generation immigrants are in general more integrated compared to the first generation, which is in line with previous research (e.g. Statistics Netherlands 2014). At the same time, the current study finds considerable intergenerational stability in the religiosity of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. Although the second generation is less active in praying and reading the Quran compared to the first, they attach as much importance to their religion, comply with dietary rules to the same extent, and attend religious services practically as frequently as the first generation. This is interpreted as support for the view of Islam as part of both a symbolic as well as (collective) behavioural dimension in the life of second-generation immigrants (Peek 2005; Vertovec and Rogers 1998), which is largely in line with previous research (e.g. Diehl and Koenig 2009; Maliepaard, Lubbers, and Gijsberts 2010; Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012). Moreover, we may interpret second-generation immigrants' religious practices in terms of the 'consumer approach', as they are less active in worship practices compared to the first generation but as active in religious dietary practices and mosque attendance (Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012; Phalet,



Fleischmann, and Stojcic 2012). The intergenerational stability of religious identification and practices and increasing integration amongst the second generation could therefore point towards a decoupling of immigrant religiosity and integration (Voas and Fleischmann 2012).

### ***Generational similarity in associations between religiosity and integration***

Based on the NELLS data, we found that religiosity does not hinder Moroccan and Turkish immigrants' integration in the host society in terms of socio-economic participation, superficial contact with Dutch natives, gender equality norms, and identification with the Netherlands. However, we also found several negative associations between religiosity and integration amongst first-generation and, to a lesser extent, second-generation immigrants.

First, as expected and in line with previous research (e.g. Norris and Inglehart 2012) we found that more religious immigrants hold more traditional ideas about sexual and marital norms. This association is equally strong for both immigrant generations, which illustrates the intertwining of religiosity with conservative norms and values regarding these matters (Abukhalil 1997; also see Kogan and Weißmann 2020).

Second, similar to research by Maliepaard and Alba (2016), we found that more religious Moroccan and Turkish immigrants are less likely to have native Dutch friends. This negative association is equally strong amongst first- and second-generation immigrants. The finding can be interpreted by means of the homophily principle which states that people prefer contact with others that are culturally similar to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). However, we also found that religiosity does not hinder immigrants' casual social contact with Dutch natives. Perhaps, mutual understanding of religious beliefs, values, and practices are important for in-depth contact, such as friendships, but not for superficial contact.

Third, we found a negative association between religiosity and Dutch language proficiency amongst Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, in line with research by Van Tubergen (2007). Interestingly, this association is equally strong for both generations. Thus, although second-generation immigrants learn the Dutch language in school, religious involvement can still be influential for their language development. An opportunity mechanism might operate here, since the more immigrants are exposed to the heritage language via religious texts and services, the less opportunities they have to be exposed to the host language (Chiswick and Miller 2001).

### ***Generational differences in associations between religiosity and educational attainment***

Lastly, the current study finds a negative association between religiosity and education in the Netherlands for first- but *not* for second-generation Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. Thus, high levels of religiosity, as transmitted from parents to children, do not stand in the way of educational attainment among the second generation of self-identified Muslims. The finding that second-generation immigrants can maintain religious beliefs and practices and attain high levels of education is in line with segmented assimilation theory and secularisation theory which posit that religious aspects such as praying and

identification no longer have to pose an obstacle to immigrants' socio-economic integration and participation in secular public institutions (Dobbelaere 1981; Zhou 1997). While most second-generation immigrants follow education in the Netherlands, first-generation immigrants may also invest in host country education depending on their age at migration and pre-immigration education and occupational skills (Chiswick and Miller 1994). It has been suggested that first-generation immigrants might find it difficult to combine Western secular worldviews in Dutch education with their own more religious and traditional beliefs (Berger 1967). Alternatively, first-generation immigrants might spend more time in the religious educational institutions of their country of origin, which made them more religious but also less likely to follow additional education in the Netherlands. Lastly, first-generation immigrants that were selected from the most rural and religious areas in their origin country might also have low pre-migration occupational skills, and therefore little motivation to follow education in the Netherlands (Chiswick and Miller 1994). Future research that examines why more religious first-generation immigrants are less likely to invest in (further) education in the Netherlands would be valuable.

### *Limitations of this study*

The findings of this study should be interpreted with some cautionary remarks in mind. Most importantly, this study is limited by its cross-sectional nature and the causality of the relation between religiosity and integration cannot be firmly established. It could therefore also be that immigrants that are less proficient in the Dutch language tend to spend more time in co-ethnic religious associations where they can use their heritage language in social contacts. It could also be that immigrants with higher levels of Dutch education are less religious because they have a more scientific and rational worldview or adapt more easily to the secular environment of the host society. Future longitudinal research is needed to test the direction of this relationship.

Furthermore, one should be cautious to generalise the findings of this study across immigrant groups and to non-religious people. This study jointly analysed Moroccans and Turks after examining relevant between-group differences, and we limited our sample to participants who were self-identified Muslims. Even though we did not find them in our data, there are of course differences between the role of Islam in their countries of origin (Smits, Ruiters, and Van Tubergen 2010), the background characteristics of the migrant groups and their ways of life and integration in the Netherlands (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007), which could influence the role of religiosity for their integration into Dutch society. Moreover, this study did not include smaller Muslim immigrant groups in the Netherlands, such as Muslims from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, or more recent refugee groups such as Syrians. The characteristics of these Muslim groups differ from Moroccans and Turks since they often came to the Netherlands as refugees and also include less religious and higher educated immigrants (Maliepaard and Gijsberts 2012). Ethnic differences were not the focus of this study, but future research could examine how the association between religiosity and integration differs across ethnic groups. Moreover, our robustness check reveals that the most secularised members of these immigrant groups, who no longer declare a religious affiliation (though many report some level of religious identification and practices, particularly dietary) tend to

be more highly educated, leading to a negative association between religiosity and educational attainment also in the second generation when non-religious participants are included in the analysis. However, the number of non-affiliated participants was rather low, which prevents us from drawing strong conclusions regarding the potential role of non-affiliation or atheism for the relation between religiosity and integration in Dutch society. More research including larger numbers of non-affiliates and non-religious respondents is required to investigate this issue further.

Lastly, this study faced some data and measurement limitations. The NELLS dataset does not include respondents over 49 years old, while this might be a relevant group to include since religion becomes more important with age (Argue, Johnson, and White 1999). Furthermore, the NELLS survey includes questions on religiosity that were asked to all Dutch inhabitants, whether Muslim, Christian, or non-religious. For example, it was measured whether respondents prayed in the past three months, but we were unable to differentiate between different frequencies of praying (e.g. five daily prayers vs. less frequent prayer). Other studies have provided more Islam-specific measurements and corresponding answer options (see e.g. Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Also, religious identification was measured by the importance of religion to immigrants personally. Although this study tested for the underlying construct of religiosity, other studies have provided a more direct measurement of religious identification (see e.g. Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). A more direct measurement of religious identification as well as more Islam-specific measurements could have yielded somewhat different or stronger associations with immigrant integration. Finally, the reliability of our religiosity index was low, which limits the statistical power to detect associations with integration. Additional analyses using the underlying dimensions of religiosity as observed variables, for which this power issue does not occur, yield quite similar results. Moreover, the low reliability biases our estimates downwards and thus provides for a more conservative test of our hypotheses, as a study with more power would have been more likely to reveal generational differences.

## Conclusion

The main question of this study was whether the association between religiosity and integration is weaker for second- compared to first-generation immigrants.

With some cautionary remarks in mind, this study finds strong consistencies between immigrant generations, more specifically, on seven out of the eight outcomes of integration. We found, amongst others, that religiosity and traditional attitudes towards sexual and marital liberties are highly intertwined, and that this is the same for first- and second-generation immigrants. We also found that neither the religiosity of first- nor second-generation immigrants hinders their identification with the host society. However, we also found that high levels of religiosity do not hinder the educational attainment of the second generation in the Netherlands – in contrast to the first generation. This can be interpreted in terms of the different migration and integration context of the first and second generation. The finding that religiosity amongst Muslims who grow up in the host society does not relate negatively to their educational attainment is important, since education is a catalyst for other aspects of immigrant integration, such as labour market participation (e.g. Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004), interethnic contacts (e.g.

Martinovic 2013), host language proficiency (e.g. Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2008), and acceptance of homosexuality (e.g. Röder 2015). Thus, the findings of this study contest the assumption that a negative association between religiosity and integration holds across all generations of Muslim immigrants, and for all outcomes of integration.

All in all, this study was one of the first to provide evidence that religiosity is indeed differently associated with different dimensions of integration, and that these associations vary across immigrant generations with regard to structural integration. A first theoretical implication is therefore that religiosity becomes decoupled from its negative effect on educational integration in the transition from the first to the second generation of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, which is in line with the assertions of segmented assimilation theory that socio-economic integration can become dissociated from socio-cultural adaptation among new immigrant groups (Zhou 1997). A second theoretical implication is that different dimensions of integration relate differently to immigrants' religiosity and that it is therefore relevant to differentiate between them. This is an important contribution over previous research that typically addressed a single outcome or dimension of integration in relation to immigrants' religiosity.

## Notes

1. Although not the focus of the current study, integration outcomes of Muslim immigrants may also differ across ethnic groups since Moroccan and Turkish immigrants have been found to differ in, for example, their educational and linguistic integration (Crul and Doornik 2003) as well as their orientation towards the own ethnic in-group (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2007; Maliepaard and Phalet 2012). We therefore take relevant group differences into account in our analyses.
2. We investigated whether the decision to code persons with only foreign credentials as having no Dutch education affects our findings in a robustness test, but found no substantial differences.
3. We do not control for age at migration in our main models, as this measure is only relevant for the first generation and has no variance among the second generation. It would therefore be excluded by default from our multi-group analysis that uses generational status as grouping variable. We did conduct a sensitivity analysis on Dutch education including age at migration as control variable, and assigned second-generation immigrants a score of zero. Results are available upon request.
4. Measurement invariance was also tested for ethnicity and gender; for both comparisons, partial scalar invariance could be established. Results are available upon request.
5. The results of the control variable are as follows: being male rather than female is positively related to socio-economic participation, Dutch friends, endorsement of gender egalitarianism and sexual liberalism. Age is positively associated with all aspects of integration except Dutch friends and endorsement of gender egalitarianism. Compared to Turkish immigrants, Moroccan immigrants score higher on Dutch education, Dutch language proficiency, gender egalitarianism, national identification, and Dutch friends. Education is positively related to all other aspects of integration.
6. The following Wald tests on the equality of the intercepts were conducted: for Dutch education (Wald Chi2 (1)=141.082,  $p-2s<.0001$ ), socio-economic participation (Wald Chi2 (1)=11.326,  $p-2s=.0008$ ), Dutch friends (Wald Chi2 (1)=17.555,  $p-2s<.0001$ ), Dutch contacts (Wald Chi2 (1)=12.501,  $p-2s=.0004$ ), Dutch language proficiency (Wald Chi2 (1)=83.543,  $p-2s<.0001$ ), gender egalitarianism (Wald Chi2 (1)=.123,  $p-2s=.7261$ ), sexual liberalism (Wald Chi2 (1)=3.408,  $p-2s=.0649$ ), and national identification (Wald Chi2 (1)=4.750,  $p-2s=.0293$ ).

7. The following Wald tests on the equality of the effect of religiosity were conducted: for Dutch education (Wald Chi2 (1)=8.683, p-2s=.0032), socio-economic participation (Wald Chi2 (1)=2.666, p-2s=.1025), Dutch friends (Wald Chi2 (1)=.425, p-2s=.5143), Dutch contacts (Wald Chi2 (1)=.728, p-2s=.3936), Dutch language proficiency (Wald Chi2 (1)=2.095, p-2s=.1477), gender egalitarianism (Wald Chi2 (1)=2.852, p-2s=.0913), sexual liberalism (Wald Chi2 (1)=2.370, p-2s=.1237), and national identification (Wald Chi2 (1)=.123, p-2s=.7262).
8. We conducted three additional tests on the robustness of our results, related to (1) the coding of education, (2) the impact of perceived discrimination on relations among variables, and (3) possible differences in the effects of dimensions of religiosity. These tests did not result in any change in our overall interpretation of our findings. Details are available from the authors upon request.

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