



BRILL

JOURNAL OF CHINESE OVERSEAS 15 (2019) 171–201



brill.com/jco

Overseas Chinese Educational Strategies and Its Policy Implications

中国移民关于后代教育的家庭策略及其政策启示

Lijie Zheng (郑丽洁)

Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, the Netherlands
zhenglijie2331@gmail.com

Mariëtte de Haan

Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, the Netherlands
M.deHaan@uu.nl

Willem Koops

Department of Developmental Psychology, Utrecht University,
Utrecht, the Netherlands
w.koops@uu.nl

Abstract

This paper assesses whether China's policies for providing educational support to overseas Chinese match the educational needs of current Chinese immigrants around the world. Firstly, the paper presents the different migration backgrounds of four waves of Chinese global migration in contemporary history: labor immigrants to the Global North, international students in the Global North, businessmen in the Global South and the new rich investors in the Global North. Using the concept of intergenerational contract, we found the four waves have distinct parental investment strategies in relation to their migration background, which comes along with their different educational needs. After carefully reviewing China's policies in overseas education in terms of the assumptions, purpose and background of their implementation, we argue that these policies are outdated and serve the needs of only a limited number of Chinese immigrants due to their ignoring the variety of certain intergenerational contracts. Lastly, some specific suggestions for policy makers are given.

Keywords

education policy – overseas Chinese – intergenerational contract – policy implication – Chinese immigrant parenting

摘要

本文主要考察中国对海外华人华侨教育支持政策是否匹配当前全球华人的教育需求。首先，本文呈现了当代四个主要移民浪潮中海外华人的不同身份背景：流向发达国家的劳工移民；国际学生；进军发展中国家的商人以及新富投资移民。借助代际契约这一概念，通过分析我们发现，这四类移民具有彼此不同的亲代投资策略，而这些不同又和他们身份背景相关。在综述了中国对于海外华人华侨教育政策的前提、目的和实施背景之后，我们提出，这些教育政策有很多已落后于时代要求或者仅能满足数量有限的华人移民的需求，因为它们忽略了海外移民在代际契约方面的多样性。最后，本文提供了一些具体建议。

关键词

教育政策 – 海外华人 – 代际契约 – 政策启示 – 华人移民的儿童养育

1 Introduction

China's overseas policy has always had the purpose of strengthening its influence by providing educational support to the Chinese diaspora all over the world. In this paper, we point to the fact that the assumptions of these policies serve the needs of only a limited number of Chinese overseas immigrants. We argue that these policies are the product of specific historical migration contexts and specific diplomatic goals which served the educational needs of especially the first international migrant population in Asia, but not the subsequent waves of emigrants to other parts of the world. Although it is acknowledged that Chinese migrants are globally widespread and have multiple backgrounds, educational policies do not take this variety sufficiently into account.

In this paper, we take up the challenge not only to describe these different waves but also to analyze their specific educational needs depending on their specific migratory contexts. Finally, our aim is, from the analysis of the

pedagogical assumptions underpinning China's current policies supporting overseas Chinese education, to see whether they adequately match and cover the needs of current Chinese transnational families and what should be done in order to cover the needs of a larger variety of immigrant groups.

We do so from our particular expertise regarding the nexus between parenting and the motives different migrant groups have not only for migration itself but also for keeping the best balance between serving the economic welfare of the family and investing in the education of the future generation. In our earlier work, we have argued that we should understand the variety of parental ethno-theories of Chinese immigrant parents within the context of their specific migration history, paying attention to two different migration "waves," the so-called labor immigrants and the international student immigrants, called first and second wave in the section below (Zheng, de Haan and Koops 2019). In line with this work, in this paper we adopt a pedagogical lens to investigate the nexus between Chinese parents' migration backgrounds and their various parenting strategies across different migration situations, but now with a much broader scope: to map the different global waves of international Chinese migration. Extending this earlier work, we describe the educational strategies of four different waves of Chinese migration and show how educational motives are not only an inherent part of migration but also how each wave copes with different educational and pedagogical issues, which require different kinds of solutions.

In the following sections, we (1) draw an updated picture of global Chinese migration discussing four different waves of migration, paying attention to their motives, destinations, socioeconomic status, and the specific historical, legal, economic and cultural context which stimulated each particular wave of migration; (2) turn the lens to direct a pedagogical focus onto these immigrants while paying attention to the so-called intergenerational contract of each wave, that is, how resources are divided between the different generations and how investment in education is weighted against other factors, such as economic factors; (3) review China's current overseas policy that supports education and pedagogy and analyze its assumptions; and (4) provide policy implications and suggestions to improve current overseas Chinese policy in order to better support Chinese immigrant families while taking the existing global variety into account.

In this article, we focus on the Chinese originally from mainland China, i.e. the P.R.C., and who then migrated (either settling down or changing nationality, or doing both) abroad, excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. According to a comprehensive estimation of the number of China immigrants by Zhuang

and Zhang, there are currently around 5.5 million first-generation Chinese immigrants living all over the world. If the Chinese descendants are included, the number would be more than 45 million (Zhuang and Zhang 2012).

Although China has a long history of emigration, here we focus on the migration waves in contemporary history. During the World Wars and the Cultural Revolution from the 1960s to the late 1970s in China, emigrants rarely left Mainland China. Since China's economic reform, i.e., China's Reform and Opening-up in 1978, global emigration has started up again (Wei 2014). In this paper, we therefore will take the late 1970s as the starting point of Chinese migration. According to Chinese academics and official statistics, there have been three chronological waves of Chinese emigration since the late 1970s. We add another type of migrants, investment migrants, on top of these and thus distinguish in total four types or waves of Chinese migrants, which we will describe as not only distinct in terms of when they migrated but also in terms of what motivated them to migrate, the conditions under which they migrated, their socio-economic status before migration and what their economic activities have been since migration. We illustrate these four waves in detail in section 3. We would like to stress that all four waves are ongoing. There is no strict time distinction between one wave and another: the previous wave continues while the next emerges. Before we do so, we will review the literature on China's overseas policies as related to the educational needs of Chinese, while also explaining the relevance of the concept of intergenerational contract to our study.

2 Literature Review

In order to tackle the (mis)match between China's policies that provide educational support to overseas Chinese and their educational needs "themselves," here we draw attention to China's overseas policies, current Chinese global migration and Chinese family ideology. Although these themes have been studied from multiple disciplinary perspectives including history, economics, politics and international relations, they rarely do so from the point of view of the educational needs of Chinese overseas.

2.1 *Chinese Overseas Policies: Global Qiaowu and the Ignorance of the Educational Needs of Families*

Conventional studies on China's policies for overseas Chinese take China's perspective and aim to benefit China politically and economically. According

to the political scientist To (2014), *qiaowu*, or the extra-territorial policies and practices of China, has harnessed the power of overseas Chinese communities by means of cultural and economic activities so that overseas Chinese can provide the financial resources and skills to deliver the “soft power” necessary to advance China’s outreach to the world (To 2014). Zhao has concluded that the evolution of China’s *qiaowu* in the course of the past 40 years has been closely linked to the development strategy of China over time (Zhao 2018). In line with this idea, many other Chinese researchers and think tanks have performed studies and developed advocacies concerning how to strengthen the connection between China and overseas Chinese in different geopolitical environments around the world and across time. For instance, in their recent work, Zhang and Huang proposed several means to improve China’s current *qiaowu* to fit China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including enhancing the trust in China of overseas Chinese communities, ensuring mutual benefits and lowering risks for those communities (Zhang and Huang 2017).

Most studies of China’s policies for overseas Chinese on strengthening the connection between China and overseas Chinese have been done from a macro level perspective and have not provided specific policy suggestions about how to strengthen the connection. However, studies from a micro level perspective could provide a more effective means to strengthen this connection, addressing their day-to-day life and activities. Tao (2011), for instance, in her study on how to ensure the personal safety of overseas Chinese, states that immigrants are often more concerned about their daily personal safety and property safety than about issues involving large-scale violence. She states that when a government takes its responsibility for protecting its people from violence, war and riots when they are abroad, their loyalty toward and trust in the home country increases.

In line with this argument, namely that China’s *qiaowu* could be more effective and better serve its goal if it met the daily needs of overseas Chinese, we propose another element that should be taken into account as well as safety: overseas Chinese’ familial needs. As family and education have always been valued as key elements by Chinese, it can be assumed to be relevant to address the wellbeing of Chinese overseas. To our knowledge there is no research that addresses policies for Chinese overseas regarding their educational needs from the perspective of their daily lives. In her MA, Dai has analyzed how China’s Confucius Institutes project adds educational and cultural elements to diplomacy by way of promoting Chinese language worldwide (Dai 2008). However, when analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of this type of government-led project, Dai took China’s perspective and not that of the overseas Chinese

communities. Therefore, to our knowledge, our study is perhaps unique in its analysis of overseas Chinese familial needs as well as in its analyses of how current *qiaowu* have addressed these needs.

2.2 *Reconciling Migration and Education: Intergenerational Contract and (Overseas) Chinese*

Overseas Chinese have a long and complex migration history and have spread over the world, and there is a large body of research that documents the development of Chinese communities in different migration regions across different time periods. However, when these studies talk about the needs of families and their need for education, they tend to emphasize the importance of the Confucian influence rooted in Chinese history (e.g., Meng, 2008) without taking into account the influence of migration on overseas Chinese. This oversimplifies their family situation and overlooks its diversification due to the influence of migration (Zheng, de Haan and Koops 2019). For this reason, the current study sets out as its goal to analyze the current four main Chinese immigrant waves in terms of their family situation and educational needs in a comparative framework making use of the concept of “intergenerational contract.”

Given our stated goal, our next step is to dig deeper into the economic and social situation of each wave in relation to the position of education, seeing education as a form of investment which constitutes part of the intergenerational dynamics that shapes migration. As we announced, we will do so while making use of the concept of intergenerational contract. This concept is positioned precisely at the nexus of the socio-economic and educational motives that we consider relevant for understanding the variation between these migration waves.

The concept of intergenerational contract is defined as the mutual responsibilities and agreement between parents and children. The core of this contract is to decide who provides and gets which resource and according to which resource distribution strategy, at present as well as in the future (Croll 2006). Cultural change (Croll 2006) or economical change (Li and Nie 2012) affects intergenerational contracts. This concept has been applied in studies that operate at the nexus of economy and family studies, often involving a comparative framework (see, e.g., Ehrlich and Lui 1991) or in the context of migration (e.g., van der Meij and Darby 2017). It has also been used to a limited degree to explain changes in family relationships and economic resource distribution in China.

Traditionally, in China, the intergenerational contract is dominated by Confucianism, which stressed hierarchy between the generations and the obligation of grown-up children to support their elderly parents and grandparents

in terms of money and care, in return for their early care during childhood (Slote and DeVos 1998). However, it is acknowledged that migration certainly breaks, or at least affects, this traditional contract. Cong and Silverstein (2011), in a study on intergenerational exchange in rural China, show that the circulation and distribution of resources between generations and within the family are changing due to migration. Specifically, established migrant sons who work in cities tend to provide more financial support but less time and care to their aging parents, while in return elderly parents take care of their left-behind children in the village. Meanwhile, the daughters, as well as non-migrant sons, increasingly share the responsibilities of investing time in and caring for the elders (Cong and Silverstein 2011). As this example shows, in the context of migration within China, families try to maximize their wellbeing at the level of the family as a whole. In doing so, traditional patterns of who gets what are broken, and new patterns of intergenerational agreements are invented. Therefore, and in line with how this concept is used in the literature, the concept of intergenerational contract is a useful tool for understanding the changing familial strategy in relation to migration.

As far as Chinese international migration is concerned, there is little research that addresses these changing patterns between the generations. However, there are good reasons to study this topic. Along with the increasing educational costs associated with the rise of a child-centered ideology, a reversal in intergenerational resource flow is observed in Asian societies: the family resources which tended to flow to elder generations affirming the Confucian ethic are now redirected toward the younger generation (Caldwell 1976, as cited in Croll 2006). The education of the young, especially school education, has become parents' central concern. These changes affect Chinese immigrants in a particular way. In their decision to migrate, they will now also consider the benefits in terms of the quality of education that can be provided both in China and abroad. Based on their assessment, these parents decide where to raise their children to enlarge their opportunity to be successful as a family in future. Simultaneously, as migration brings challenges to the traditional intergenerational contract, it may bring certain pedagogical problems as the original balance is broken.

Therefore, in our analyses of the four migration waves we will answer the following questions:

What is the intergenerational contract that underlies each migration wave? Who is providing what support to whom? Are care arrangements limited to the nuclear family or are grandparents or other family members also involved and why? How are economic means and resources balanced with care and education? Are economic investments sometimes prioritized or postponed with

respect to educational ones or vice versa and why and when does this happen? How do the local settings (social, cultural, legal, educational) define the choices that are made? And since we are dealing with immigrants who consider their options across multiple locations: how are the limitations and opportunities both in China and abroad weighted for the different waves? We will pay specific attention to parents' so-called investment strategies. How do they invest in the future and education of their children, and how do they balance these investments within the intergenerational contract as a whole? We will pay specific attention to the role of formal schooling. How do parents choose where their children will attend school? What are their motives? In each case we take the migrating generation as the starting point, considering them as parents, while at the same time considering other generations when they become relevant for care.

3 Four Waves of Chinese Migration in Contemporary History and Their Pedagogical Needs

3.1 *The First Wave: the Rise of Labor Migration since the "Opening-up" in the Late 1970s*

After China's Reform and "Opening-up" in the late 1970s, Chinese, especially those who are from *qiaoxiang*, the home towns and villages of overseas Chinese, in Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, resumed the tradition of migration to Hong Kong, Japan, Southeast Asia and the U.S. Gradually, people from other areas, e.g. Liaoning province, where migration was not a tradition, also started to go abroad to North America, West Europe, Australia and New Zealand in the 1990s. Economically developed countries in the Middle East, such as Israel, also became popular destinations (Zhou 2006).

The main purpose of the migrants in this wave was to pursue a better-paid job abroad to improve their economic condition at home. The huge wage differential between the receiving countries and China has been very attractive to these low-income and low-educated working class people or peasants from the aforementioned areas. In addition, the need for such workers in highly industrialized societies has accelerated this type of labor-intensive migration to the West (Zhou 2006). This group of emigrants and their offspring make up the majority of overseas Chinese in the current world.

According to Li, in this wave of labor migration four different stimuli for migration can be distinguished, all relating to different regional policies (or legal/social settings). First, the "Touch Base Policy" implemented by the Hong Kong government from 1974 to 1980, which was the earliest opportunity for migrants

from Mainland China to join their relatives in Hong Kong. This policy allowed any Chinese who successfully crossed the Frontier Closed Area and reached the urban areas to register for a Hong Kong Identity Card, even if most of the attempts failed and those who made them were repatriated back to Mainland China immediately. Second, when the Cultural Revolution ended, the strong connection between existing Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, along with the economic cooperation between China and Southeast Asia, finally made it easier for their families in Fujian and Guangdong to join them. Third, people from particular *qiaoxiang* were able to utilize the family reunion policy in Japan in the 1980s. Fourth, in the historical context of the Cold War, Western countries, especially the U.S., implemented certain policies to protect refugees from the Communist Bloc, including China. In 1987 and 1993, two legal acts legalized over half a million Chinese migrants in the U.S. (Li 2011)

The actual numbers of these “Chinese new migrants,” as they were called, have always been a research focus in Chinese diaspora studies. However, due to various ways of estimation, the result varies from 4.5 million to 6.32 million.

After migration, most of this group of Chinese migrants have engaged in labor-intensive industries where local people are not willing to work, including the catering business, construction, the clothing industry, the decoration business, etc. Beside remittance, some of the parents must pay the middlemen who sneaked them into the U.S., which leads to huge economic pressure in the first few years after migration. As many of them have joined already established overseas Chinese communities containing their relatives and fellow townspeople or villagers, they were able to profit from the inherited image of the hardworking Chinese, e.g., as cook or restaurant owner (Zhou 2006).

3.2 *The Second Wave: the Increase in the Number of Chinese Students in the 1990s*

The second wave of Chinese migration consists of an increasing number of international students and is significantly different from the first wave, in terms of educational background, migration motives, and professions followed after migration. These international students migrate to pursue a better quality of high education which is helpful in their career development, although their migration “motives” have varied over time.

In the beginning, these students had little freedom to choose as they were appointed by the Chinese government and all decisions regarding who would go abroad, which university to attend, what to study, etc. were made by the state. The majority of the students were sent to Communist Bloc countries (Netease 2014). Since 1978, because of the Opening-up Policy, the number of government-sponsored students has increased, especially since the new

TABLE 1 The number of Chinese government-sponsored students studying abroad, 2000–2017

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Number	2,808	3,495	3,500	3,002	3,524	3,979	5,580	8,853	11,400
Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number	12,000	13,000	12,800	13,500	16,300	21,350	25,900	30,000	32,500

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

millennium, as table 1 shows. Their educational level is quite high: half of them pursue PhDs and half are visiting scholars. Meanwhile, a system of mutual selection was gradually introduced (Ministry of Education 2007).

The main category of students going abroad rapidly switched from state-sponsored to self-supporting. Studying abroad has flourished since the 1990s and the main destination rapidly switched from communist countries to the U.S. and other developed countries where world-class universities are located. Since the millennium, self-sponsored students have formed the mainstream: in 2000, 32,000 self-sponsored students went abroad, and in 2013 the number was 384,300, which was more than 20 times bigger than the number of government-sponsored students in the same year.

The majority of the Chinese students abroad were previously master's students, but recently students have also started to undertake bachelor's degrees. Until 2015, 80.7 per cent of returnees received a Master's degree abroad; while in 2016, among those who went abroad to study, 30.56 per cent pursued a Bachelor's degree while those who pursued a Master's degree or a PhD comprised 35.51 per cent, the rest doing degrees lower than Bachelor (Ministry of Education of China 2016). This trend of sending students abroad at a younger age is, according to some, associated with the increasing number of wealthy families from the economically developed areas of China. We will come back to this trend of going abroad at a lower age in 1.4.

As we can see in figure 1, the number of Chinese studying abroad generally increased over two decades, with a small decline since 2002. This decline has been mainly due to heightened visa controls and the screening of international students by the U.S. after 9/11 on grounds of national security, the U.S. being the most popular destination for Chinese students (Chishti and Bergeron 2011). Despite the stricter immigration laws in the U.S., the growth rate in the number of Chinese students going abroad is increasing.




FIGURE 1 The growing numbers of Chinese students studying abroad and returning home
SOURCE: NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA

In 2012, the top three popular destinations for this wave were the U.S. (25 per cent), the U.K. (13 per cent) and Australia (7 per cent), followed by Canada, Japan, Korea, Singapore, France, New Zealand and Russia (New Oriental, 2013). Among the total 1.91 million Chinese students who studied abroad between 2000 and 2011, 91.3 per cent were self-supporting.

Compared to government-sponsored students, self-sponsoring students are more likely to stay in the countries where they study and thus come to form a second wave of Chinese global immigration. They tend to see studying abroad (with a relatively high tuition fee) as an investment and expect to receive the returns sooner by earning a higher salary after graduation. Therefore finding a job in the receiving countries where average income is higher than in China becomes a rational choice. On average, in the new millennium, around 20 per cent of former international students settled down in receiving countries after graduation (Sciencenet 2017).

Popular majors of Chinese students abroad include management, economics, science and engineering (Ministry of Education of China 2016), which offer them opportunities in the local labor market. The Chinese students who settle down after graduation mostly work as white-collar professionals in the country in which they have studied. Leo found that the new Chinese migrants in developed countries who are businessmen, professionals and technicians don't stick to the Chinese traditional idea of "*luoye guigen*: one has to return back to one's roots (in China) at the end (落叶归根)," as was the case with immigrants in former generations (mostly labor immigrants). Instead, they tend to build a new life together with their spouse and children in places with better opportunities. Together with differences in motives, destination and socio-economic status, this yet again makes them significantly different from the first wave.

3.3 *The Third Wave: Businessmen in the Global South in the New Millennium*

While most Chinese migrants of the previous two waves tend to move to the Global North, a new emigration to “new markets” in the Global South has emerged in the new millennium, adding to the increasing variation of Chinese overseas migration. First so-called developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America, for instance, Nigeria, Congo, Mongolia and Brazil, have become popular among international companies in heavy industry in search of new markets.

A huge number of workers has been collectively sent to industrial projects operated by Chinese state-owned companies because of China’s increasing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Africa is a typical example of this type of temporary migration. In an early stage, back in 1950, it concerned only a few workers, mostly technicians and engineers working on big public construction projects, and it rarely resulted in settlement (Kuang 2008). In the new millennium, with the FDI growing, the number of state-supervised international workers has increased (Bräutigam 2003). Kuang names this category of Chinese in Africa “Temporary labor migration in connection with big public construction projects” (Kuang 2008). The Chinese migrant workers being sent are generally young males. They live collectively in settlements affiliated to the projects, which are relatively isolated from local people. Most of them live in Africa simply because their job requires them to. They live and work there for a few years until the job is done; then they return to China (Gaye 2006).

A second variant of migration to the Global South is so-called “entrepreneurial migration”: small-scale companies or individuals who travel to newly emerging areas with the purpose of finding new markets for China’s rising production of consumer goods. For instance, Johannesburg has several hundred merchants and wholesalers in the biggest Chinese commercial center “China City” market distributing goods to everywhere in the country as well as to neighboring countries (Mulaudzi 2013). In contrast to the situation of the first wave of Chinese immigrants in the Global North, where these businessmen can hardly become part of the upper class, in the Global South they can join the elite. With skills, resources and capital gained in China, they can more easily become wealthy in Africa. In contrast to the Chinese catering businessmen in Chinatown in New York, who were more likely to have been proletarians before migrating, the entrepreneurs in Africa were loaded with cheap Chinese consumer goods on arrival; and they received relatively high returns in these new markets in the Global South (Fang 2013).

In Africa, while there were only around 136 thousand Chinese in 1996, in 2011 there were approximately 750 thousand officially registered Chinese workers and businessmen (Li 2013). French has estimated that Africa has received a million or so of these Chinese newcomers in the space of a mere decade (French 2014). According to Li, the newcomers are widely distributed across South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, Madagascar, Mauritius, Congo (Kinshasa), Ghana, Tanzania and Réunion (Li 2013).

Apart from the described groups, which have clearly economic reasons for migrating, Chinese immigrants to the Global South also include enthusiastic NGO volunteers, doctors and other professionals who are aiming to contribute to the development of the Global South or have been called upon to deliver aid (CNTV 2016).

3.4 *New Investment Migration*

Since the early 2010s, a new trend of migration has emerged, namely investment migration, which is encouraged by some traditional immigrant countries in the Global North. Compared to the previous three waves, the number of migrants in this wave is very small, as only those with considerable wealth meet the receiving countries' requirements in terms of investment migration. However, they have drawn much attention in both China and the receiving countries. According to the Report of Personal Wealth in China (2015), 44 per cent of China's so called "high net-worth" population, the part of the population able to invest large amounts of money, have considered conducting or have already engaged in investment migration; 17 per cent of them decided not to migrate themselves but instead to send their children abroad to live or study. The main reasons for doing so are that they want a better education for their children in the receiving countries, as well as to make their wealth secure (China Merchants Bank 2015). The impressive economic achievement of the Chinese immigrants in this wave indicates that they are very likely to be middle-aged and to have children of school age. Therefore when considering migration, the total well-being of the family, including the children's education, is more likely to be considered.

The precise number of investment emigrants from China is unclear. However, we can see the demand from the statistics of popular receiving countries. According to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), of the total of 10,000 EB-5 visa (immigrant investor visa) holders in 2013, 6,895 were Chinese. In Canada, until June 2013, of the total of more than 60 thousand visa applicants for the Immigrant Investor Venture Capital (IIVC)

Pilot Program, more than 50 thousand were from Mainland China; however, the total IIVC visa quota in the same year was only 8,600 (Nandu Weekly 2014). In the cases of both the U.S. and Canada, the minimum investment amount in 2013 was 0.5 million USD and 2 million CDN respectively, an amount that has been growing every year.

The members of this wave are mainly from China's new middle-up class, who are attracted to the quality of education, financial security and high living standard of countries of the Global North, where the tolerance of immigrants is high—countries like Canada, the U.S. and Australia. In these countries, many overseas Chinese communities have been established in the course of more than two centuries, which makes settlement for new immigrants easier. Some European countries affected badly by recent debt crises, for example, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus, are also attractive to some new rich as the openness of investment migration policy in those countries increases (Netease 2014). One consequence of this new type of migration is that many very young Chinese students, mostly the children of investment migrants, are going abroad to study at the level of pre-college, middle school or even primary school, as we mentioned in 1.2.

These so called “very young international students” are thus partly a spin-off of this new investment migration. We use the term *xiao liuxuesheng*, “very young international students” (小留学生), to refer to those Chinese students who are sent to foreign middle and high schools and even sometimes primary schools without their parents to accompany them. According to Wang, the number of very young Chinese international students in American high schools in 2004 was 433, rising to 26,919 in 2014 (Ministry of Education of China 2016). While some of them are the children of investment migrants, others can also be considered as part of the second wave of emigration: students in search of higher education abroad. The turning point of returning students in 2013 in figure 1 can probably be partly explained by the increasing number of such very young international students, who will stay longer than most BA and MA students in the receiving countries. Being different from the mainstream of international students in the second wave who made their own decision to go abroad, these very young overseas students tend simply to follow their parents' decision regarding migration.

Given that such investment immigrants are capable of expanding their businesses in the receiving countries, we can assume that their living standards will not be greatly affected by migration.

3.5 *Different Intergenerational Contracts of the Four Waves of Chinese Immigrants*

3.5.1 Labor Migrants in Industries in the Global North with High Concentrations of Chinese

While investing firstly in economic growth with the aim of achieving an affluent future, the first wave of labor migrants initially leave their children behind in order to minimize child-raising costs, both in terms of money (the cost of living is cheaper in China) and of time (so they can work extra hours). As many of them migrate abroad in early adulthood, they might be single or have quite young children at migration. If they give birth to children in the receiving countries, many of them choose to send them back to China. These immigrant parents provide financial support to the entire family by sending remittances to China. In return, their aging parents provide care for and spend time on their very young children. These children have been called “*yang liushou ertong* (left-behind foreign kids)” (洋留守儿童) (PBS 2015) by Chinese media. This intergenerational contract is marked by a trade-off between money and care, which makes use of the possibility these families have to exchange cheap care abroad from family members (grandparents) for money.

A typical example of this parent-child separation as part of a transnational family pattern can be found among the Fuzhou immigrant community in New York City. In 2011, the Fuzhou area had at least 10 thousand pre-schoolers whose parents were working in the three China towns in New York, mainly in the catering business. Shortly after being born in New York City and acquiring U.S. passports, these children were sent or “posted” back to their grandparents in the Fuzhou area. Before reaching school age (around 5), they were picked up and taken to New York by their parents to attend U.S. primary school (CCTV 2013).

According to Law, these left-behind foreign children’s parents, who are mostly illegal immigrants and working in low-paid jobs in New York, cannot afford local day-care (Law 2014). Moreover, economic pressures push them to work extremely hard and they are therefore unable to live up to their own pedagogical ideologies or meet the strict guidelines for guardians in most Western receiving countries, including the prohibition on children being left alone at home.

These specific decisions regarding the intergenerational contract are made, we would argue, on the basis of the parents’ careful assessment of the benefits on both sites, and depend also on the local legal and child-care setting.

These labor-immigrant parents in the U.S. generally want a good education for their children (Louie 2001) and they regard the schooling in the U.S. as better for their children's future development than in China, which explains why they take their children back at the point at which they reach school age. Another reason for this reunion at the age of five has to do with U.S. immigration law: because of the existence of birth-right citizenship in the U.S., (illegal) immigrant parents tend to have children in the U.S. in order to acquire a U.S. passport. However, the passports issued for children are valid for only 5 years, so the parents need to re-new them before they expire. In some other Global North countries decisions in this respect are different, depending on the local circumstances.

However, this transnational parenting setting also raises a few pedagogical problems at an institutional, social, family and individual level. Law finds that in China these children cannot attend local public kindergartens or primary schools, and have access only to village-run or private schools, which are not up to the standards of government schools. This is because of the children's foreign nationality (Law 2014). For the same reason, they are also ineligible for Chinese public medical insurance (Guancha 2014). Moreover, these children have to deal with the fact of their separation from their overseas parents as they rarely meet each other in person and have to keep in touch by telephone or the Internet (ChinaNews 2013). This separation affects the parent-child emotional bonding and the pedagogical arrangement more broadly. There are reports that the left-behind children are more likely to have behavioral and emotional problems (Suárez-Orozco, Bang and Kim 2011). One possible reason, according to Liu, is that the grandparents often spoil their left-behind grandchildren and cooperate less with educational institutes. It is also reported that after reunion with parents in the U.S. many children cannot adapt to the new environment, which may lead to further problems (Liu 2010).

3.5.2 International Students in Developed Countries

In contrast to labor migrants, international students, who migrate to obtain a higher-education degree in a western developed country, are generally allowed to pursue an affluent and western middle-class lifestyle after finding a local professional job. They mostly raise children by themselves in the same way as their western peers, because their regular work schedule and better economic conditions allow them to do so. Their parents, who mostly still live in China, can also provide some practical help, but only when they irregularly visit their children in the receiving countries.

As international students, their first concern when graduating from a foreign university is to start a career. At that moment, family-related issues will

not yet have been greatly considered. The place in which to build a family and raise children a few years later on would mostly depend on where such people find a job. We therefore infer that the investment strategy of these career-oriented highly skilled immigrant parents is characterized by a focus on their own career development. In terms of their children's schooling, they are mostly satisfied with the opportunities offered in the location of settlement after migration. They generally regard the local educational opportunities and their quality to be better than those in China. Like their labor immigrant counterparts, the former international student parents also value education and believe that schooling provides access to upward social mobility for the next generation. So good local education facilities are, as it were, a sort of extra bonus that come with migration.

According to many studies regarding Asian (Chinese) immigrant families, the main pedagogical problem they face is the huge gap in language and culture between them and their children. Although the children are generally quite successful at school (Kaufman 2004), as their parents would have expected, they mostly suffer from issues regarding their ethnic identity. Being labeled as Asian, they experience ambivalent pressures both to cultivate their Asian identity and simultaneously to downplay or minimize it (Kibria 2000).

3.5.3 New Businessmen in the Global South

As mentioned in 1.3, the temporary Chinese workers sent to the Global South are generally young men and mostly without children. Therefore family is in no way a concern for them. Even in the case of those who have children, work doesn't often allow them to keep the children with them (Kuang 2008). However, some Chinese workers or businessmen who migrate to the Global South don't return to China a few years on, as they originally planned to do, and instead settle down. One reason is that they find a local spouse and start a family in the host country (Ifeng 2017). As this type of newly emerging transnational family is scarce, little academic research has been done on it. It is known, however, that these small-scale companies or individual businessmen, like the labor immigrants, migrate for economic reasons, and send their children to China or leave them there. Like the NYC labor immigrants, they also provide economic support for the children and the main caregivers, the grandparents. Through the money they earn in the host countries, they can better financially support the whole family in China (Ifeng 2017).

Unlike the labor immigrants, the Chinese businessmen leave their children behind with a different assessment of their local circumstances: they generally regard the place where they work as unsuitable for their children. Firstly, they regard proficiency in Chinese to be more important, and schools in Africa

are unable to provide such education (Lam 2006). Secondly, they sometimes conceive their environment as hostile toward Chinese, for xenophobia, lack of government action on corporate misconduct etc. (IRIN 2012) may bring harm to their children (Sina 2017). Therefore, keeping young children with them is not a good choice. Their investment strategy is to invest first in the family's economic growth and meanwhile keep the children at home where it is considered safer and more suitable, also where schooling is concerned. As to the relatively successful Chinese businessmen in Africa, they can afford an expensive lifestyle including private schooling in exclusive neighborhoods in the big cities. For them, education for children is not a big concern, given their wealth. Instead, they worry more about personal safety (Ifeng 2017).

3.5.4 New Rich Investors in Developed Countries

Among the new rich investors in developed countries, a noticeable pattern of resource distribution is associated with the specific geographic spread of family members. As these parents generally have a high SES and thus can afford high tuition fees in exclusive schools in Western countries, many of them send their children abroad to attend middle school, after the parents have obtained a local residence permit or become nationals of the host country. Sometimes these children are sent on their own to study, but at other times one of the parents, mostly the mother, will migrate together with the children just to accompany them while another parent, mostly the father, migrates only in the official sense, and keeps working in China to provide financial support.

These parents consider migration as a means to realize good parenting as it brings better educational opportunities to their children. At the same time, the decision to send children abroad for schooling is also intertwined with other considerations regarding the welfare of the whole family, for instance, the security of their wealth. As is the case with other waves, the parental investment strategy of this wave of Chinese migrants can be seen as a combination of economic investment strategies with educational ones. According to People.cn, the new middle-upper class favors the education system in Western developed countries for two reasons: firstly, they hope their children will grow up in a safe and comfortable environment; secondly, they don't want their children to suffer under the strict middle and high school education practiced in China (People 2013). Others mention the pollution in Beijing (many investment immigrants are from Beijing), which is a big concern, as is food safety. Unlike the first two waves of Chinese immigrants, who value the education in the West mainly because they are likely subsequently to attend prestigious universities in the West with the hope of upward social mobility, this group of new rich

Chinese immigrants, who are already at the top of the societal ladder, actually value other aspects of the quality educational in the West: the comfortable environment, the student-centered teaching philosophy or the democratic atmosphere and freedom in school.

However, for this group too, separation of children from parents raises serious pedagogical problems. The differences between life in China and in the West in many aspects of life as well as with respect to school bring problems and troubles to these students, problems and troubles highlighted in the mass media. According to an FTChinese report about Chinese high school students studying in Canada published in 2015, many of these students have a tough time. Whereas in China, everything in life was properly arranged by parents and teachers, in Canada the children have to arrange everything for themselves, from lunch to course selection. Moreover, when living with local host families, different habits of life often cause conflicts between the Chinese teens and their Canadian guardians (Yiduo 2015). Another American report in 2014 points out that as teenagers, being emotional and rebellious and developing strong attachments, these young Chinese international students face severe challenges with respect to the formation of their identity, brought about by the separation from their parents and the clash of cultures, which may further lead to mental health crises. Mention has been made of stress and depression on the one hand (Chen and Liu 2014), and serious behavioral problems on the other, such as showing off one's wealth, bullying, ganging up or even engaging in crime (Tan 2018). Even if there has been little scientific reporting on these issues, these media reports reveal serious problems that are matters of concern not only for the newly rich parents but for society as a whole. As we have seen in the case of the second and third wave, in this type of transnational families in which young children are studying abroad alone, pedagogical issues are raised around the physical and psychological well-being of these children rather than around economic matters.

4 Discussion: an Analysis of China's Policies Supporting Overseas Chinese Education

After having portrayed the different Chinese immigrants' family life, we here turn our focus to the policy level. In this section, we evaluate Chinese policies that support these families, with a focus on how China is able to support them as educators. As the review above has shown, access to formal schooling and the availability of good care are important elements in shaping the decisions

these immigrants make to be associated either with foreign countries or with China. Before we do so, we need to make an overview of the current policies that support overseas Chinese education.

4.1 *An Overview of Current Policies in Overseas Education*

The Chinese government has worked hard to facilitate overseas Chinese children's education. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (GQB) is the administrative office that assists the Premier in handling affairs relating to overseas Chinese. This office has formulated most policies, guidelines and regulations concerning overseas Chinese affairs, as well as supervising and checking their implementation (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office 2014). Three terms are often used to address overseas Chinese from China's perspective: *Huaqiao* (Chinese citizens residing in countries other than China), *Huaren* (first-generation Chinese who have changed their nationality) and *Huayi* (Chinese descendants). These three terms indicate different degrees of connection and relatedness to China; however, in the scope of overseas Chinese policies, a more generic term, *Huaren Huaqiao*, is often used to cover the first-generation Chinese immigrants.

In relation to these policies that especially support overseas Chinese children's education, *Huayi* children are the main target group. There are basically two approaches aimed at benefiting them: the first is to ensure overseas Chinese children's right to return to China for (higher) education; the second is to facilitate Chinese language and culture learning alongside local schooling for children of Chinese descent.

4.1.1 Privilege in Access to Schooling in Mainland China

Regarding the education of overseas Chinese children who are prepared to return to China for schooling, especially with respect to higher education, the Chinese government implemented the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Returned Overseas Chinese and the Relatives of Overseas Chinese Who Remain in the Homeland." In this law, the privileges available to overseas Chinese children are specified:

Article 14: For attending higher schools the returned overseas Chinese students, children of returned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese people's children who remain in the homeland shall be given preferential treatment according to relevant State provisions.

This law stipulates that at a practical level, the children of overseas Chinese or Chinese returnees can receive preferential treatment including priority in

attending certain types of schools, and that lower entry requirements or extra scores can be applied when such children seek to enter a Chinese university.

Moreover, the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (MOE) organizes a separate National Higher Education Entrance Examination (NHEE) and university admission every year exclusively for *Huaqiao* students (those who have a long-term or permanent residence permit of a foreign country and Chinese nationality) and students who hold citizenship of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (in Chinese 港澳台侨联招) since 1981. This policy ensures overseas Chinese students' legal right to receive higher education in Mainland China and even makes it easier for them than for local students to enroll at Chinese universities. Additionally, a relatively generous scholarship is provided to overseas Chinese students studying in China. In 2016, there were 297 Chinese universities entitled to receive students from the above-mentioned categories. The number of students attending Chinese universities by way of the separate NHEE has been increasing in recent years. However most students are from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

4.1.2 Chinese Language and Culture Supplementary Learning

The GQB largely supports and organizes activities for overseas Chinese children to improve their Chinese language proficiency and cultural knowledge with the aim of cultivating their cultural identity and strengthening their emotional connection to China. In these policies aimed at facilitating ethnic Chinese children's efforts to learn Chinese language and culture, the distinction between *Huaqiao*, *Huaren* and *Huayi* is no longer strictly applied.

Firstly, Chinese language education is an important part of the work of the GQB. According to its report, the GQB has accessed more than 60 million Chinese children in 198 countries across the world. In 2013, the GQB provided more than 2.5 million Chinese textbooks to pupils in more than 50 countries, trained around 13 thousand overseas Chinese teachers and sent more than 800 professional Chinese teachers to nearly 300 key Chinese schools to support education in the Chinese culture and language. This investment has been increasing as Chinese education is considered as long-term, fundamental and strategic (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of The State Council 2015). The GQB and *Hanban* (Confucius Institutes) also regularly organize the "*Han Yu Qiao* (Chinese Language Bridge)" Chinese Proficiency Competition among overseas Chinese children to encourage and assist them in learning the Chinese language.

Secondly, since 1999, the GQB has annually organized "Journey to the Chinese Roots" summer camps for Chinese children from all over the world. Due to the fact that school vacation time differs from one country to the next,

the camps are organized in different seasons although officially they are all called “summer camps.” There are four types of summer camp: regular camps (Chinese language and general culture), camps with a special subject, camps for children adopted by foreign families, and the Chinese culture circuit. The regular camp generally lasts two to three weeks. During the camp, Chinese juveniles from other countries are sent to China as a group to intensively learn the Chinese language and experience (for example) local dance, Kung Fu, and Chinese calligraphy and art. In 2011, the GQB and other local-level Overseas Chinese Affairs Offices have organized more than 300 regular summer camps for more than 13,000 overseas Chinese children. The camps on special subjects, for instance, science and technology, dance and Kung Fu, are organized for overseas Chinese students who have learned these subjects for more than three years. These camps aim to provide participants with intensive and high-quality training and communication with professionals in China. The camp for Chinese children adopted by foreign families started in 2004. It aims at comprehensively introducing China to these families. The Chinese culture circuit has been organized since 2009. Its main target group is overseas Chinese children whose families cannot afford the cost of international travel to China or whose vacation time doesn’t coincide with any other summer camp. This circuit organizes professional Chinese teachers in many culture-related subjects to go abroad, especially to the areas where Chinese immigrant communities lack sufficient opportunities to receive Chinese education, in order to provide lectures and lessons to overseas Chinese children.

4.2 *An Analysis of the Purposes and Assumptions in Policies Relating to Overseas Education*

From the policies summed up above, it is clear that the Chinese government invests quite heavily in overseas Chinese children’s education. However, when delving more deeply into the purpose and historical context of these policies, it becomes clear that the assumptions that underpin them do not address the variety of migration waves, the variation in intergenerational contracts and the corresponding educational needs of these populations.

The policies that support overseas Chinese education were primarily introduced in certain national and international political contexts, in order to cope with unfavorable situations faced by overseas Chinese communities. In late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the GQB was established, many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were treated unfairly due to communist revolutionary influences from China and local state-sponsored discrimination against Chinese in some host countries (Chang 1980). Centuries ago, Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia were successful economically but shunned politically

and culturally, and even isolated by local governments. This experience made them vulnerable in the receiving countries. For example, in Indonesia, the country that has the most Chinese migrants in the world, the government forbade Chinese schools, newspapers, religions and collective activities in order to curb the development of the Chinese community, starting in the 1950s. The conditions under which ethnic Chinese students were allowed to enroll in universities were very strict. In Malaysia, quotas in public university admissions had been particularly resented by ethnic minorities including Chinese since the 1970s—only 30 per cent or less of places are reserved for non-Malay students. However, ethnic Chinese comprise more than 20 per cent of the Malaysian population (Indian and other ethnic minorities comprise around 30 per cent) (Cohen 2001). Overseas Chinese affairs have been a very important issue in China's political agenda ever since the Opening-up in the late 1970s. At that time, the GQB was established to handle related affairs. Given the very hard situation that overseas Chinese were facing in Southeast Asia, the privilege given to overseas Chinese children in the Chinese educational system should be understood as a measure to protect their basic right to receive education.

In recent decades, another aim has joined the prior one. According to recent Chinese foreign policy, strengthening the connection with the receiving countries to which Chinese immigrants migrate is gaining in importance. Jia Qinglin, the chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2007, pointed out that "overseas Chinese, while learning from other countries, can carry forward and promote Chinese culture; and overseas Chinese can help promote people-to-people friendship between China and other countries in the world" (People 2007). Jia's speech clearly expresses Beijing's intention to incorporate the overseas Chinese communities into its foreign policy, which aims to increase China's soft power. However, without knowing any Chinese culture or language, or without a Chinese identity, how could an overseas Chinese promote Chinese culture and friendship with "another country"? Therefore, when connecting this diplomatic goal to the policies supporting overseas Chinese education, it is implied that China is encouraging overseas Chinese children to engage in this ultimate goal by strengthening their Chinese identity and attachment to their motherland. This purpose might be easier to achieve either by supporting university students in higher education or by assisting younger children to learn Chinese language and culture. Although they are handled in a subtle and indirect way, it is essential to consider the policies that facilitate overseas Chinese education in the light of these Chinese diplomatic ambitions.

As the above shows, the policies supporting overseas Chinese education indeed met Chinese parents' demand for a fair chance in terms of education

and were in line with the needs of the early migratory waves described in 3.1. However, although they could indirectly serve the country's diplomatic purposes, these overseas Chinese policies carried out from the Mao era through until the present deserve a re-assessment, bearing in mind the current variation of Chinese global migration. Moreover, it is important to understand the various intergenerational contracts that underpin the different migration waves to address the educational needs of these waves of immigrants. Another reason for re-assessing the overseas Chinese policies is that the local discriminatory policies in Southeast Asia have been continuously changing in the course of the past few decades (Economist 2013) and have transformed the circumstances in which the Chinese immigrants there live.

When China implemented its policies supporting overseas Chinese children's education, its policies assumed that: (1) Chinese immigrant children must leave their migrant parents for (higher) education because local conditions are very hostile; (2) parents regard joining schools in China as the best, or at least the second best, solution; and (3) they have a strong aspiration to preserve Chinese culture and language. As demonstrated, these policies were aimed at certain groups and implemented in a specific historical context. At the time, the absolute majority of overseas Chinese communities was located in Southeast Asia and were facing similar predicaments. However, as this paper has shown, this monolithic image of the Chinese immigrant has already been outpaced by other types of migrants.

By taking into account our analyses of the intergenerational contracts of the four types of current Chinese immigrants, we will reflect on these policies and assess to what extent the policies still match the present situation. Subsequently, we will propose some suggestions to improve the current policies in order to serve overseas Chinese families better, as well as to serve China's national goal.

4.3 *Ignorance of the Variety of Intergenerational Contracts*

Looking at the analyses of the assumptions underlying the educational policies for Overseas Chinese summed above, it is obvious that the variety of intergenerational contracts among the multiple Chinese immigration families is not yet covered by the current policies.

First of all, among the four waves of Chinese immigrants, only the third wave, Chinese immigrants to the new world, partly fits the assumptions in terms of the intergenerational contract on which current policies are based. As stated in 3.5.3, the Chinese parents doing business in places in the Global South such as Africa generally do not favor local schooling and prefer their

children to attend school in China. To them, the current policies that provide privileges for their left-behind children with respect to schooling and university admission would remain welcome, we assume. However, the labor migrants, international students and new rich investors have mostly landed in the Global North where most of them regard the local schooling to be ideal. The new rich parents migrate primarily because they want to help their children escape the stressful Chinese schools and receive a better education abroad. Therefore these three groups of parents don't really need the policies that guarantee their children's right to be educated in China. The extra scores or lower requirements for university admission aren't attractive enough for the young generation in these transnational families to decide to return to China to attend college. The bonus would only be something that is nice to have but not essential, if the children were to return voluntarily.

As to the activities organized to facilitate overseas Chinese children's learning of Chinese language and culture, these may have been more acceptable to the former Chinese international students of the second wave, as they tap into their children's problem regarding identity development. However, they don't fully cover the emerging pedagogical problems, nor may the way in which they are performed be seen as the most favorable and effective way nowadays. This is primarily because these parents face the problem of how to pursue certain elements of Chinese identity and culture while at the same time struggling with making the connection with the culture of the host country.

Furthermore, from our analyses of the diversity in intergenerational contracts among the four waves identified, we can say that many concerns remain neglected in terms of current policies. We think this has to do with the overall perspective the government has on overseas families, which still remains based on a patriarchal attitude. We think it would be better if policy makers could switch to a more service-oriented perspective. On the one hand, by switching perspective, it would be easier to identify the immigrant families' concerns and tap into them. On the other hand, when the immigrant families' problems are taken care of and concerns are covered by the motherland, the bond between China and people of Chinese descent overseas would be stronger, which could also serve China's diplomatic goal of promoting people-to-people friendship and subsequently its soft power.

In sum, we conclude that the policy of supporting overseas Chinese education has reached its limits, so that it is no longer able to cover current issues brought about by the new Chinese emigrants' complex background. Therefore we suggest employing new policies to support the newly emerged Chinese global migrants. This doesn't mean that the existing policies should be

suspended. They are still functional in certain ways and serve some of the educational needs of some transnational Chinese families, e.g. the third wave and, in part, the second wave. What we want to say here is that the gap between the current policies and the present situation should be narrowed. Below we will propose various specific suggestions in order to achieve that goal.

4.4 *Suggestions for Future Policy Making*

A first suggestion would be to extend the public educational service to more educational stages in order to benefit the left-behind children of overseas immigrants. Especially when the children of immigrant parents encounter institutional difficulties in China due to their foreign nationalities (e.g., finding it difficult to gain access to public kindergarten and medical insurance etc.), it would be very helpful in regard to this group if its members were to receive more support and options regarding public services especially related to education, which has been their main concern.

Another suggestion would be to broaden the scope of current policies in line with the overseas Chinese parents' pedagogical concerns, to prepare their children to manage multiple heritages and identities. Being ambitious parents, some Chinese immigrants expect their children to be successful both in the host country (the North) and in China, or anywhere else in the world. In order to reach this goal, efforts are needed in many respects, especially in terms of finding solutions to the dilemmas of maintaining a Chinese cultural identity while also learning about and surviving in other cultures and communities.

Thirdly, we would suggest delivering new services that enable people to (re-)establish a pedagogical relationship over great distances if parent-child separation is unavoidable. To make use of new technologies might facilitate such a service. For instance, given the fact that new social media have played an increasingly important role in connecting immigrants with both their sending and receiving countries (Zheng de Haan and Koops 2019), policy makers in China could deliver service through social media in order to provide an efficient and timely response to the changing educational needs of Chinese overseas.

Finally, in designing overseas policies, combining the strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of migrant groups might result in the emergence of new ideas. There might be a chance for the different waves of migrant parents to mutually benefit from each other's experience by exchanging their various advantages.

Last but not least, policy makers should understand that the increasingly complex Chinese migration picture is bringing new challenges in its wake. More investigation into the background of their migration, current situation

and life experience, especially in regard to their family's educational needs, is needed to complete our understanding of what overseas policies are needed. This richer understanding would be beneficial and serve as the foundation for a constantly needed updating of overseas educational policies.

References

- Bräutigam, Deborah. 2003. "Close Encounters: Chinese Business Networks as Industrial Catalysts in Sub-Saharan Africa." *African affairs* (102): 447–467.
- CCTV. 2013. "Investigation on 'Left-behind Foreign Children' in Lianjiang County." Accessed March 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QdjoLPLaTsg>.
- Chang, Chak Yan. 1980. "Overseas Chinese in China's policy." *The China Quarterly* (82): 281–303.
- Chen, Justin and Lusha Liu. 2014. "Mental Health: Four Unique Challenges Facing Chinese International Students." *Sampan.org*. Accessed January 2018. <http://sampan.org/2014/09/mental-health-four-unique-challenges-facing-chinese-international-students/>.
- China Merchants Bank. 2015. "Report of Personal Wealth in China. China Merchants Bank." *BAIN and COMPANY*. Accessed January 2018. <http://www.sinotf.com/uploadfile/upload/file/2017/0621/1498008973856463.pdf>.
- ChinaNews. 2013. "Jujiao qiaoxiang yang liushou ertong: fumu queshi de tongnian" 聚焦侨乡洋留守儿童: 父母缺失的童年 (Focus on Left-Behind Foreign Children: Childhood Without Parents). Accessed November 2017. <http://www.chinanews.com/qxcz/2013/06-01/4882065.shtml>.
- Chishti, Muzaffar and Claire Bergeron. 2011. "Post-9/11 Policies Dramatically Alter the U.S. Immigration Landscape." *Migration Policy Institute*. Accessed March 2018. <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/post-911-policies-dramatically-alter-us-immigration-landscape>.
- CNTV. 2016. "Zhongguoren zai Feizhou diyiji: Xin miankong" 《中国人在非洲》第一集: 新面孔 (Chinese in Africa, Episode 1: New Faces). Accessed August 2017. <http://m.news.cntv.cn/2016/02/08/ARTIidGXtoEcuwTpptLe2D8j160208.shtml>.
- Cohen, David. 2001. "Malaysia moves to Suspend University Quotas." *Theguardian.com*. Accessed November 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2001/jul/31/highereducation.uk2>.
- Croll, Elisabeth J. 2006. "The Intergenerational Contract in The Changing Asian Family." *Oxford Development Studies* 34(4): 473–491.
- Dai, Rong. 2008. Kongzi xueyuan yu Zhongguo yuyan wenhua waijiao 孔子学院与中国语言文化外交 (Confucius and China's Language and Culture Diplomacy). Master Thesis, Fudan University, Shanghai.

- Economist. 2013. "A never ending policy." Accessed November 2017. <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21576654-elections-may-could-mark-turning-point-never-ending-policy>.
- Ehrlich, Issac. and Francis T. Lui. 1991. "Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, and Economic Growth." *Journal of Political Economy* 99(5): 1029–1059.
- Fang, Yingzhong. 2013. "Zhongguoren zai Feizhou" 中国人在非洲 (Chinese in Africa). Accessed January 2018. <http://www.nfpeople.com/article/1411>.
- French, Howard W. 2014. *China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa*. New York: Knopf.
- Gaye, Adama. 2006. *China-Africa: The Dragon and the Ostrich*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Guancha. 2014. *Meimei guanzhu Fujian "yang liushou ertong" cheng toudu Meiguo fumu wei shengcun fangqi ziniu jiaoyu* 美媒关注福建 '洋留守儿童' 称偷渡美国父母为生存放弃子女教育 (American Media Report About "Left-Behind Foreign Children" in Fujian). Accessed March 2018. http://www.guancha.cn/society/2014_01_22_201498.shtml.
- Ifeng. 2017. "Zhongguoren zai Feizhou" 中国人在非洲 (Chinese in Africa). Accessed on January 2018. <http://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2017/05/15/6238713.html>.
- IRIN. 2012. "Increasing Hostility towards Chinese Traders." *Irinnews*. Accessed November 2017 <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96266/southern-africa-increasing-hostility-towards-chinese-traders>.
- Kaufman, Julia. 2004. "The Interplay between Social and Cultural Determinants of School Effort and Success: An Investigation of Chinese Immigrant and Second Generation Chinese Students' Perceptions toward School." *Social Science Quarterly* 85(5): 1275–1298.
- Kibria, Nazli. 2000. "Race, Ethnic Options, and Ethnic Bonds: Identity Negotiations of Second-Generation Chinese and Korean Americans." *Sociological perspectives* 43(1): 77–95.
- Kuang, Emmanuel Ma Mung. 2008. "The new Chinese migration flows to Africa." *Social Science Information* 47(4): 643–659.
- Lam, Katy Ngan Ting. 2016. *Chinese State Owned Enterprises in West Africa: Triple-embedded Globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Law, Violet. 2014. "A Test for One Chinese Province: How to Educate An Influx Of US-Born Children." *The Christian Science Monitor*. Accessed November 2017. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0120/A-test-for-one-Chinese-province-How-to-educate-an-influx-of-US-born-children>.
- Li, Anshan. 2013. *Feizhou meng* 非洲梦 (The African Dream). Hangzhou: Jiangsu People Press.
- Li, Jinbo and Huihua Nie. 2012. "Confucian Filial Piety, Economic Growth and Divergence Among Civilizations." *Social Sciences in China* 33(4): 69–88.

- Li, Minghuan. 2011. *Guoji yimin zhengce yanjiu* 国际移民政策研究 (*International Migration Policies Research*). Xiamen: Xiamen University Press.
- Liu, Yanfei. 2010. "Dongnan yanhai liushou ertong leixing ji xinli jiankang zhuangkuang bijiao-yi Fujian Lianjiang weili" 东南沿海留守儿童类型及心理健康状况比较—以福州连江为例 (Types of Left-behind Children in the East-south Coastal Area: Lianjiang, Fujian as a Case). *Fuzhou dangxiao xuebao* 福州党校学报 (Journal of Party School of CPC Fuzhou) 6: 53–56.
- Louie, Vivian. 2001. "Parents' Aspirations and Investment: The role of Social Class in the Educational Experiences of 1.5 and Second-generation Chinese Americans." *Harvard Educational Review* 71(3): 438–475.
- Meij, Nienke van der and Paul Darby. 2017. "Getting in the Game and Getting on the Move: Family, the Intergenerational Contract and Internal Migration into Football Academies in Ghana." *Sport in Society* 20(11): 1580–1595.
- Meng Qingzi 孟庆梓. 2008. *Dongnanya huaren shequn de jiangou yu yanhua—yi Xinjiapo jiangdou Wangshi shequn wei zhongxin de lishi yanjiu* 东南亚华人社群的建构与演化—以新加坡江兜王氏社群为中心的历史研究 (The Construction and Evolution of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Historical Study About the Wang family Originated from Jiangdou in Singapore). Doctoral dissertation, Xiamen University.
- Ministry of Education. 2007. "Guojia gongpai chuguo liuxue yanjiusheng guanli guiding" 国家公派出国留学研究生管理规定 (Regulations on National-sponsored Students Studying Abroad). *Chinese Scholarship Council*. Accessed May 2017. <https://www.csc.edu.cn/chuguo/s/586>.
- Ministry of Education. 2016. "Jin bacheng liuxuesheng xuanze huiguo jiuye" 近八成留学生选择回国就业 (Nearly 80 Per Cent of The Students Studying Abroad Chose to Return to China to Work). Accessed December 2017. http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb_xwfb/s5147/201603/t20160328_235475.html.
- Mulaudzi, Shandukani. 2013. "Johannesburg's Chinese Mall Overhaul: Revamping the Retail Model." Accessed December 2017. <http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/2015/01/johannesburgs-chinese-mall-overhaul-revamping-the-retail-model/>.
- Nandu Weekly. 2014. "Zhongguo fuhao yimin Jianada mengsui" 中国富豪移民加拿大梦碎 (Chinese Millionaires Lose Hope of Migrating to Canada). Accessed November 2017. <http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/20140627/110519542103.shtml>.
- Netease. 2014. "Liushiwu nian liuxue licheng" 65 年留学历程: 从留苏到留美, 从公派到自费 (Sixty-Five-Year Experience of Studying Abroad: From Soviet to the U.S., From State-Sponsored To Self-Supported). Accessed June 2017 <http://data.163.com/14/0928/23/A792D5UR00014MTN.html>.
- Netease. 2014. "Yidali zhiye yimin zhengshi kaiqi" 意大利置业移民正式开始 (Property Immigrant Program of Italy Officially Starts). Accessed March 2018. <http://edu.163.com/14/0331/08/9OLCHAI400294III.html>.

- New Oriental. 2013. "2012 liuxue niandu fenxi baogao" 2012 留学年度分析报告 (Annual Report on Studying Abroad). Accessed May 2017. http://liuxue.xdf.cn/special/news/20130110_2012_report/.
- Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council. 2014. Accessed January 2018. http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/10/01/content_281474991090995.htm.
- Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of The State Council. 2015. "'Dute jiyu lun' zai xinshiqi Zhongguo qiaowu fazhan zhanlüe zhong jicheng yu fayang" '独特机遇论' 在新时期中国侨务发展战略中继承与发扬 ("Argument of Unique Opportunity" as Heritage and Development in the New Era of Overseas Chinese Development Strategy). Accessed December 2017. <http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2015/0319/35336.shtml>.
- PBS. 2015. "China's 'left behind' Children Will Once Again Join their Parents in the U.S." Accessed June 2018. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/chinas-left-behind-children-will-join-parents-u-s/>.
- People's Daily. 2007. "Dijiujie shijie huashang dahui juxing" 第九届世界华商大会举行 (The Ninth World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention Opening Ceremony). Accessed December 2017 <http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/6269322.html>.
- People's Daily. 2013. "Zhongguoren touzi yimin redu bujian zinu jiaoyu shi zuida youyin" 中国人投资移民热度不减 子女教育是最大诱因 (Chinese Is Fond of Investment Migration as the First Consideration Is Children's Education). Accessed April 2018. <http://finance.people.com.cn/money/n/2013/0722/c218900-22272421.html>.
- Sciencenet. 2017. "Jiaoyubu fabu 2016nian chuguo liuxue he laihua liuxue shuju" 教育部发布 2016 年出国留学和来华留学数据 (Ministry Of Education Released Data Regarding Chinese Students Studying Abroad And Foreign Students Studying In China In 2016). Accessed March 2018. <http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2017/3/369188.shtml>.
- Sina. 2017. "100 wan Zhongguoren zai Feizhou: shi xinzhimin haishi xindalu" 100 万中国人在非洲:是新殖民还是新大陆 (One Million Chinese in Africa: Is It a New Colony or New Continent?). Accessed June 2018 <http://cj.sina.com.cn/article/detail/1942875804/302974>.
- Slote, Walter H. and George De Vos. 1998. *Confucianism and the Family (SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture)*. State University of New York Press.
- Suárez-Orozco, Carola, Hee Jin Bang and Ha Yeon Kim. 2011. "I Felt like My Heart Was Staying Behind: Psychological Implications of Family Separations and Reunifications for Immigrant Youth." *Journal of Adolescent Research* 26(2): 222–257.
- Suryadinata, Leo and Tan Chee Beng. 1997. "Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia: Overseas Chinese, Chinese Overseas or Southeast Asians?" *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*. Singapore: ISEAS.
- Tan, Kenneth. 2018. "Chinese students in LA Kidnap, Torture Fellow Study-abroad Student." Accessed July 2018. http://shanghaiist.com/2015/06/12/chinese_student_kidnapped_and_tortu.php.

- Tao Shasha 陶莎莎. 2011. *Haiwai Zhongguo gongmin anquan baohu wenti yanjiu* 海外中国公民安全保护问题研究 (A Study About the Security of Overseas Chinese). Doctoral dissertation, 中共中央党校 [Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C.].
- Tian, Xin and Zhen Dong. 2012. "Lun woguo jiaoyu xiaofei de shehui rentong" 论我国教育消费的社会认同 (Discussion of the Social Identification of Educational Consumption in China). *Dongbei daxue xuebao* 东北大学学报 (社会科学版) 6:15.
- To, James Jiann Hua. 2014. *Qiaowu: Extra-territorial policies for the Overseas Chinese*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wang Huiyao 王辉耀. 2012. *Guoji rencai lanpishu: Zhongguo liuxue fazhan baogao* 国际人才蓝皮书: 中国留学发展报告 (International Talents: The Report on The Development of Chinese Studying Abroad). Beijing: Shehui wenxian chubanshe.
- Wei, Wei. 2014. "Zhongguo zhende cunzai yimin chao ma?" 中国真的存在移民潮吗? (Do Migration Waves Really Exist in China). Accessed July 2017. <http://news.ifeng.com/opinion/special/weiyiminchao/>.
- Yiduo. 2015. "Zhongguo xiao liuxuesheng wenti duo" 中国小留学生问题多 (Very Young Chinese Students Have Many Problems). Accessed October 2017. <http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001061421?full=y>.
- Zhao, Jian 赵健. "Gaige kaifang 40nian Zhongguo qiaowu zhengce de huigu" 改革开放40年中国侨务政策的回顾 (Review of China's Policy on Overseas Chinese Affairs in the 40 Years of Reform and Opening-up). *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu* 华侨华人历史研究 [Overseas Chinese Research] (4): 14–22.
- Zhen, Cong. and Merill Silverstein. 2011. "Intergenerational Exchange between Parents and Migrant and Nonmigrant Sons in Rural China." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 73(1): 93–104.
- Zheng, Lijie, Mariëtte de Haan, and Willem Koops. 2019. "Learning to be a Mother: Comparing Two Groups of Chinese Immigrants in the Netherlands." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* (2019): 0117196819844380.
- Zheng, Lijie, Mariëtte De Haan, and Willem Koops. 2019. "Parental Ethnotheories of Two Groups of Chinese Immigrants: A Perspective from Migration." *Migration and Development* 8(2): 207–226.
- Zhou, Min. 2006. "The Chinese Diaspora and International Migration." *Social Transformations in Chinese Societies* 1(1): 16–190.
- Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, and Zhang Jingying 张晶盈. 2012. "Zhongguo xin yimin de leixing he fenbu" 中国新移民的类型和分布 (The Types and Distribution of Chinese New Immigrants). *Shehui kexue* 社会科学 [Journal of Social Sciences] 12: 4–11.