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# Dual Identity, Minority Group Pressure, and the Endorsement of Minority Rights: A Study among Sunni and Alevi Muslim in Western Europe

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*Research has found that migrants with strong dual identities (e.g., Muslim German) are more likely to endorse the rights of their minority group. This article aims to contribute to the literature by examining whether dual identity predicts stronger endorsement of minority rights when migrants perceive pressure to conform from their minority community. This is examined in two subgroups that tend to exert different pressures: Alevi and Sunni Muslims. Muslim migrants ($n_{Sunni} = 464$; $n_{Alevi} = 235$) in Germany and the Netherlands answered questions about dual identity, endorsement of Muslim rights, and perceived minority pressure. For Alevi Muslims, dual identity predicted greater minority rights as minority pressure increased. For Sunni Muslims, the opposite pattern was found, with dual identity predicting less minority rights as minority pressure increased. These findings highlight the importance of studying different minority communities, and their pressures, to understand the societal ramifications of dual identities.*

> I hear "thud, thud, thud" outside. Me and Dad run outside and all the windows on the Camry are smashed in. [ . . . ] I'm like, "Why aren't you saying something? I'm asking you, say something!" [My dad] looks at me and goes, "Hasan . . . " [ . . . ] "These things happen, and these things will continue to happen. That's the price we pay for being here." [ . . . ] My dad's from that generation where he feels like if you come to this country, you pay the American dream tax. You endure racism, and if it doesn't cost you your life, pay it. There you go, Uncle Sam. But for me, [ . . . ] I actually have the audacity of equality. I'm like, "I'm in Honors Gov, I have it right here. Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness. All men created equal." It says it right here, I'm equal. I'm equal. I don't deserve this.
>
> Hasan Minhaj, 2017

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In his comedy show, Hasan Minhaj narrates to his audience the time when his family of Muslim Americans from Pakistani descent was called on the phone by someone accusing them of terrorism, after which they see their car's windows being smashed. The experience is not unique to Hasan's family or to Muslim Americans, as similar events occur in West European countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, in which the current study was conducted (e.g., Brüß, 2008). Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Muslim migrants in Western countries have regularly been subject to prejudice, discrimination, and civil rights violations (Allen & Nielson, 2002).

One way in which Muslim minorities can respond to these predicaments is to accept the situation as it is, in a similar way to Hasan's father. Another approach is to endorse and claim one's rights as a citizen. In Hasan's case, his dual identity allows him to care for the rights of Muslim minorities such as himself, while feeling entitled to demand and assert the rights that come with being American (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Research in political and social psychology demonstrates that minorities with strong dual identities are more likely to affirm the rights of their minority group (e.g., Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). However, dual identity is also associated with a reduced tendency to endorse minority group rights when the identity is burdened with feelings of identity incompatibility (Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013), when it leads to a blurring of group boundaries (Wright & Baray, 2012), and when it goes together with experiences of rejection rather than acceptance by the majority group (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014). These studies have focused on how lack of recognition from majority members can compromise minority members' ability to engage and support minority rights (e.g., Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011; Verkuyten, 2017; Wiley, Figueroa, & Laucirella, 2014), calling attention to the need for policies promoting majority group's acceptance of minority members.

The aim of the current research is to go beyond the much-researched processes of societal rejection, exclusion, and discrimination originating from majority members, and instead to focus on the dynamics within minority communities (Verkuyten, 2018). Research among ethnic and religious minority groups has shown that there is a preference for comparisons with minority members over comparisons with members of the majority (e.g., Abbey, 2002; Lay & Nguyen, 1998; Leach & Smith, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). Differences and similarities within one's own cultural or religious minority community get a lot of attention in daily life, and one's conformity (or lack thereof) to minority group norms is much discussed. Migrants make comparisons within their minority community (e.g., Franzini & Fernandez-Esquer, 2006), facing normative pressures to conform to and maintain minority group beliefs and traditions (Lay & Nguyen, 1998). This normative pressure depends on the community to which individuals belong, as some groups have stricter norms and enforce them more strongly than others (Gelfand et al., 2011).

In the current study, we examine whether the relation between dual identity and the endorsement of Muslim minority rights depends on perceived minority pressure and the specific Muslim minority community to which migrants belong. To be more precise, it is examined whether this association is stronger when there is greater perceived minority pressure, and whether the association is stronger for Sunni compared to Alevi Muslim minorities from the same origin country (Turkey) living in Germany and the Netherlands. By examining the dynamics occurring within minority groups, stakeholders and policy makers can become aware of such pressures and be better positioned to design policies addressing pressures from both majority and the minority groups.

### *Dual Identity and Endorsement of Minority Rights*

In the transcript of comedian Hasan Minhaj, it was his recognition that he was both Muslim Pakistani and American, that is, his dual identity, that allows him to call out the injustice of the situation while also legitimizing his claim for equal rights. Dual identity implies a commitment to one's minority group together with a sense of entitlement as a member of the receiving society (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Whereas the minority identity provides the motivation to assert and support minority rights, one's national identity provides the legitimization to do so. Research in the context of Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States has shown that minority members with a dual identity are more likely to endorse minority rights and support lawful forms of collective action (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & Van Stekelenburg, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008).

In some contexts, however, the lack of dual identity recognition from majority members might compromise minority members' support for minority rights. Hopkins and Blackwood (2011), for example, found that the perceived ability of British Muslims to advocate for the rights of their group in public life was undermined by the perception that their national belonging was not recognized (see also, Wiley, Figueroa, & Laucirella, 2014). In another series of studies, it was found that migrants with dual identities in the Netherlands were less likely to protest against discrimination when policies that do not recognize dual identities (i.e., assimilation policies) were made salient (Verkuyten, 2017).

However, the predominant concern in research with perceived discrimination and recognition from majority members can lead to the (implicit) presupposition that, for minorities, the relationship with the majority group is all that matters. This is a restricted view that at best underestimates (and at worst ignores) the relevance of the minority community as a main group of reference (Verkuyten, 2018). Minority groups offer their members critical information concerning how

to behave and how well they are behaving (i.e., social norms). They also regulate their members' behaviors by putting pressure on them so that they follow the appropriate norm. In the current study, it is examined how, among those with strong dual identities, perceived minority pressure and the particular Muslim community (or branch of Islam) to which individuals belong are associated with the endorsement of minority rights.

### *Perceived Minority Pressure*

Minority groups typically try to maintain their cultural norms and values, and often engage in efforts to preserve their community life in the receiving country (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). Furthermore, group norms influence the behavior of individual group members through processes of group identification, social control, and normative pressure (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group members are sensitive to the pressures exerted by their groups and adjust their behaviors accordingly. By conforming to the pressures and demands of their ingroup, individuals secure acceptance as ingroup members (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007).

When facing rejection and not receiving full recognition of one's group membership by ingroup members, people become uncertain about themselves and their position within their group (Branscombe, Smith, & Harvey, 1999). According to uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000), people will be motivated to reduce this self-uncertainty and try to do so by more strongly expressing support for the continuation and social position of their group. Thus, people will try to present themselves as committed group members when facing uncertainty about acceptance into an important ingroup (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995; Walton & Cohen, 2007), as ingroup support communicates one's alignment and commitment to the group. In the case of migrants, perceiving demands for conformity from minority members, such as strong pressure to maintain one's ethno-religious culture, can motivate those with strong dual identities, that is, those whose loyalty might be questioned, to prove their closeness to the minority group by enacting group behaviors (e.g., Wiley & Deaux, 2010), or in this case, by endorsing minority rights.

### *Muslim Subgroups*

Migrants from Turkish origin living in the Netherlands and Germany are often simply described as "Muslims" in public discourse and governmental policies. Similarly, psychological research on Muslim minority members tends to homogenize Muslim groups, ignoring important religious subgroup distinctions

such as those existing between Sunni and Alevi Muslims (Van Bruinessen, 1996). It has been estimated that around 75% of Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands are Sunni Muslims, and approximately 20% are Alevi Muslims (Buijs & Rath, 2002). The two groups of Muslims are comparable in terms of their relatively low socioeconomic position in the two societies (Kaya, 2006). However, Sunni and Alevi Muslims have a very different understanding of what it means to be a Muslim (e.g., Erman, 1997), and follow different religious practices (e.g., Kingsley, 2017).

One important difference between these groups is in terms of orthopraxy, or the performance of the correct religious practices. Orthopraxy is central to the Sunni faith (not to say that every Sunni follows this) and enacting the five pillars of Islam is critical to being a "good Muslim." The emphasis on orthopraxy is argued to restrict a personal interpretation of Islam (Bruce, 2011), creating higher levels of social conformity to religious dogmas and to the religious community than in other religions. The place of the community, and of doing right (or wrong) by one's community, is central to the Sunni branch of Islam (Barzegar, 2016), facilitating its relevance in guiding members' thoughts and actions.

In contrast, almost none of the Alevi Muslims who self-identify as Muslims base their faith on the five pillars of Islam or visit the mosque. Rather, they have other congregational or assembly meetings in Cem houses (*Cemevis*) led by a "dede." Alevi Muslims tend to interpret Islam in a spiritual and mystical way, and not in terms of strict rules and regulations. For most of them, how an individual treats other people, by acting in a responsible and caring ways, is a key issue. Some even argue that "Alevis share with Germans and Europeans a democratic, laïcist and egalitarian outlook" (Kosnick, 2004, p. 985). Research in Western Europe has shown that Turkish Alevis display lower levels of religious fundamental beliefs than Turkish Sunnis (Koopmans, 2015).

These religious subgroup differences can be expected to have implications for how Sunni versus Alevi Muslims react to minority pressure. Specifically, Sunni, compared to Alevi, Muslims can be expected to perceive stronger minority pressure and to more strongly endorse Muslim minority rights. Furthermore, it will be explored whether both Sunni and Alevi Muslims with high dual identities endorse more strongly Muslim minority rights when perceiving minority pressure. Because of its emphasis on orthopraxy and community life, and thus greater group conformity, Sunni Muslims might be particularly sensitive to minority pressures. Thus, for Sunni Muslims who perceive minority pressure, dual identity may be a stronger predictor of minority rights support. A similar but weaker pattern is expected among Alevi Muslims, as conformity (and thus pressure to follow group norms) is less important. A three-way interaction of dual identity, minority pressure, and Islam branch (Sunni vs. Alevi) when predicting endorsement of minority rights is thus hypothesized.

## Method

### *Participants*

A total of 787 first- and second-generation Muslim Turkish migrants were recruited in Germany ($n$ = 365) and in the Netherlands ($n$ = 427). Of these, the majority were Sunni Muslims ($n$ = 464), followed by Alevi Muslims ($n$ = 235; other groups $n$ = 88). Since the current study focused on dual identity and Muslim rights, only participants who reported membership to these two Muslim subgroups were kept in the analysis (final $N$ = 699).[1] Participants were recruited via snowball sampling starting from four initial chains, and responded to the questions in Dutch or German, depending on the country. This study was conducted in 2008.

The majority of the sample was born in Turkey ($n$ = 468), with an average stay in the Netherlands or Germany of $M$ = 21.42 years ($SD$ = 10.65). The average age was 36.33 years ($SD$ = 14.34), and over 90% of participants earned 3,000 Euros or less a month (less than 1,000€ = 29.3%; between 1,000€ and 2,000€ = 41.6%; between 2,000€ and 3,000€ = 17.7%). In terms of education, participants had a wide variety of education levels, ranging from no education to tertiary education, according to the broad ICSED levels (no education = 11.7%; primary education = 12.7%; secondary education = 40%; tertiary education = 35.4%). Men ($n$ = 382) and women ($n$ = 312) were similarly represented in the sample. The great majority self-identified as ethnically Turkish ($n_{Turkish} = 528$; $n_{Kurdish} = 146$; $n_{other} = 22$).

### *Measures*

*Endorsement of Muslim minority rights.* Believing that one's Muslim community should have cultural and political rights in the host country was measured with five items (see also, Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009). These are: "The right to establish our own Islamic schools should always exist in the Netherlands [Germany];" "Dutch [German] TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslims;" "Some Islamic holidays must become Dutch [German] official holiday;" "It is important for Muslims that an Islamic political party is established in the Netherlands [Germany];" "Muslims have to start to work together in order to gain political influence in the Netherlands [Germany]" ($\alpha$ = .88; for Sunni, $\alpha$ = .83; for Alevi, $\alpha$ = .82). These statements were evaluated using a scale ranging from –3 (*Totally disagree*) to 3 (*Totally agree*).

[1]These data and some of the variables used in this article have been previously used in other articles, namely minority pressure (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012) and endorsement of minority rights (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009). However, the current analysis is novel.

*Dual identity.* Dual identity was measured with one item used in previous studies on dual identity and minority rights among Turkish Muslims in Germany (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). The questions asked participants to what extend they agreed with the statement "I see myself as a Dutch [German] Muslim" (using a scale ranging from –3 [*Totally disagree*] to 3 [*Totally agree*]). The use of this rather simple, straightforward, and subjectively meaningful question reduces the problem of meaning and interpretation inherent in more complex measures of dual identity. Furthermore, a one-item measure has been shown to have adequate validity and reliability in assessing group identification (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013).

*Minority pressure.* Minority pressure was measured by asking participants four questions (see Lay & Nguyen, 1998; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012) which were: "It is considered wrong if you become too Dutch [German];" "You must always take into consideration what can be said about you;" "There is often pressure to keep your own cultural habits and rules;" and "There is gossip about you if you do something wrong" ($\alpha = .75$; for Sunni, $\alpha = .71$; for Alevi, $\alpha = .81$). These questions were answered using a scale ranging from –3 (*Totally disagree*) to 3 (*Totally agree*).

*Control variables.* Six control variables were used: Participants' age, their income (ranging from less than 1,000 euros a month to more than 4,000 euros a month), their education level (according to the broad ICSED levels: no education, primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education), the number of years in the host country, their country of residence (the Netherlands or Germany), and their cultural group (Turkish, Kurdish, or Other).

## Results

### *Measurement Model*

First, it was examined whether Alevi and Sunni Muslims interpreted the items measuring endorsement of minority rights in a similar way, thus allowing for a meaningful comparison between the two Muslim groups. To do so, we tested whether a scalar measurement model (in which we can assume equivalent factor structure, factor loading, and intercepts across groups) had an acceptable model fit (in MPlus). It was found that the scalar model had an acceptable fit ($\chi^2$ (58) = 240.65, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .095, CFI = .91, SRMR = .082), indicating that we

can assume a similar interpretation of the minority rights and minority pressure items for Sunni and Alevi Muslims.[2,3]

*Descriptive Statistics*

Descriptive statistics for the overall sample and for Sunni and Alevi Muslims separately (Table 1) showed that there were no extremely high or low means, indicating that there was neither strong agreement nor strong disagreement on dual identity, support of rights, and perception of minority pressure in either group. Nevertheless, there were some differences between the Alevi and Sunni sample. First, Sunni Muslims had stronger dual identity, $t(693) = 7.43$, $p < .001$. As expected, they also perceived stronger minority pressure, $t(696) = 2.89$, $p = .004$, and more strongly endorsed Muslim minority rights than Alevi Muslims, $t(695) = 16.24$, $p < .001$ (while the assumption of scalar invariance allows for the means of the Sunni and Alevi Muslims to be compared the exact interpretation of this mean difference should be done with care; see footnote 2). Second, perceived minority pressure was more strongly related to endorsement of Muslim minority rights among Sunni Muslims than Alevi Muslims, $Z_{r\ difference} = 3.09$, $p = .001$. In contrast, the correlation between dual identity and rights was much stronger among Alevi Muslims than Sunni Muslims, $Z_{r\ difference} = 1.93$, $p = .027$. In both

[2]Measurement invariance can also be examined by comparing the scalar model to the configural (testing factorial invariance) and metric (testing covariance invariance) models. The fit indices of the configural and metric models were very similar to those of the scalar model, configural model: $\chi^2$ $(46) = 172.49$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .089, CFI = .94, SRMR = .054; metric model: $\chi^2$ $(53) = 240.65$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .094, CFI = .92, SRMR = .074. The chi-square difference tests indicate that the scalar model did not fit the data as well as the metric model, metric versus scalar = $\chi^2$ $(5) = 24.86$, $p < .001$; also configural versus metric = $\chi^2$ $(7) = 43.3$, $p < .001$. However, the chi-square tests are usually significant when large sample sizes are involved, and thus should be interpreted with caution (e.g., Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). Considering the similar fit indices found in the configural, metric, and scalar models, the current analyses assume scalar invariance between Sunni and Alevi, but, given the significant difference in chi-square tests, special care is taken when interpreting the mean differences between Sunni and Alevi in endorsement of minority rights and minority pressure between the groups.

[3]A country comparison was also performed to test whether the endorsement of minority rights and minority pressure are interpreted similarly in Germany and in the Netherlands. The results of the measurement model show that a partial scalar model had a satisfactory fit, $\chi^2$ $(60) = 193.62$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = .080, CFI = .95, SRMR = .063. This partial scalar model involves freeing the intercepts of two items in minority rights ("The right to establish our own Islamic schools should always exist in the Netherlands [Germany]" and "Dutch [German] TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslim"). Overall, these results indicate that factor and covariance invariance may be assumed between the two countries, but that we should be hesitant to compare the means of cultural rights across countries, especially for these two items. However, since cross-country mean comparisons are not the goal of the study, assumptions of partial scalar invariance (i.e., of equal factor loading, equal covariance, and equal intercepts for three out of five items) are sufficient for the aims of the current study.

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics for Pooled Sample, Sunni, and Alevi

| Variable | $N$ | Pooled $M$ ($SD$) | Sunni $M$ ($SD$) | Alevi $M$ ($SD$) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Dual identity | 695 | −0.63 (1.90) | −0.26 (1.87) | −1.35 (1.77) | – | −.02 | .10$^{*}$ |
| 2. Minority pressure | 696 | 0.42 (1.26) | 0.52 (1.17) | 0.23 (1.40) | −.06 | – | .44$^{***}$ |
| 3. Endorsement of Muslim minority rights | 697 | 0.14 (1.52) | 0.72 (1.62) | −0.97 (1.18) | .25$^{***}$ | .22$^{**}$ | – |

*Note*. All scales range from –3 (*Totally disagree*) to 3 (*Totally agree*). Correlations for Sunni Muslim are above the diagonal and for Alevi Muslims below the diagonal.
$^{*}p < .05$. $^{**}p < .01$. $^{***}p < .001$.

Sunni and Alevi samples, the main independent variables were not related to each other, while they were related to the endorsement of Muslim minority rights.

### *Main Analyses*

To test the hypothesis that dual identity and perceived minority pressure interact to predict support of minority rights, and that this would be different in Alevi and Sunni Muslims, a three-way interaction was tested. Specifically, a regression analysis was performed with endorsement of Muslim minority rights as dependent variable; dual identity, minority pressure, Muslim subgroup, and their interactions were the independent variables (with centered variables). Age, income, education level, time in host country, country of residence (the Netherlands and Germany; a dummy variable with the Netherlands as the reference group) and cultural group (Turks, Kurds, or Other; two dummy variables with "Other" as reference group) were used as control variables. Table 2 shows that higher dual identity and stronger perceived minority pressure were associated with stronger endorsement of Muslim minority rights. Additionally, Sunni Muslims endorsed minority rights more strongly than Alevi Muslims. Further, two simple (or two-way) interactions were significant; minority pressure interacted with both dual identification and with minority group. The interaction between minority group and minority pressure (which was significant before and after the addition of the three-way interaction) indicates that the Muslim subgroups react differently to minority pressure, with Alevi Muslims being less influenced by such pressure. The interaction between dual identity and minority pressure showed that dual identification predicted greater support for minority when low pressure by minority groups was experienced. Importantly, this two-way interaction was significant only after the addition of the three-way interaction, suggesting that Muslim subgroups may be experiencing differently the interaction between dual

**Table 2.** Moderation Models Predicting Endorsement of Minority Rights

| | Endorsement of Muslim Minority Rights | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Step 1 | | Step 2 | | Step 3 | |
| Independent variables | b (SE) | $\beta$ | b (SE) | $\beta$ | b (SE) | $\beta$ |
| Constant | 0.66 (0.23)* | | 0.81 (0.23)** | | 0.68 (0.23)** | |
| Age | −0.00 (0.00) | −.03 | −0.00 (0.00) | −.03 | −0.00 (0.00) | −.04 |
| Income | −0.04 (0.05) | −.03 | −0.05 (0.05) | −.03 | −0.05 (0.05) | −.04 |
| Education | 0.01 (0.01) | .05 | 0.01 (0.01) | .04 | 0.01 (0.01) | .04 |
| Years in host country | −0.01 (0.02) | −.02 | −0.01 (0.02) | −.02 | −0.01 (0.02) | −.02 |
| Cultural group (Ref. group = Other) | | | | | | |
| Turks | −0.07 (0.28) | −.02 | −0.12 (0.28) | −.03 | −0.12 (0.27) | −.03 |
| Kurds | −0.19 (0.29) | −.05 | −0.24 (0.29) | −.06 | −0.22 (0.28) | −.06 |
| Country of residence (Netherlands = 0; Germany 1) | 0.38 (0.10) | .12*** | 0.28 (0.10) | .09** | 0.30 (0.10) | .10** |
| Dual identity (X) | 0.13 (0.03) | .16*** | 0.11 (0.03) | .14** | 0.14 (0.03) | .17*** |
| Minority pressure (W) | 0.36 (0.04) | .30*** | 0.46 (0.05) | .38*** | 0.46 (0.05) | .38*** |
| Religious group (Sunni = 0; Alevi = 1; Z) | −1.43 (0.12) | −.44*** | −1.41 (0.12) | −.44*** | −1.39 (0.11) | −.43*** |
| Dual identity * Minority pressure (X*W) | – | – | −0.01 (0.02) | −.02 | −0.09 (0.03) | −.13** |
| Dual identity * Religious group (W*Z) | – | – | 0.06 (0.06) | .05 | 0.04 (0.06) | .03 |
| Minority pressure * Religious group (X*W) | – | – | −0.24 (0.08) | −.13** | −0.19 (0.08) | −.10* |
| Dual identity * Minority pressure* Religious group (X*W*Z) | – | – | – | – | 0.17 (0.04) | .17*** |
| $R^2$ | .408*** | | .418* | | .434*** | |
| $\Delta R^2$ | | | .010 | | .016 | |

*Note.* Main variables are centered.
*$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

identification and identity pressure. This is confirmed by the expected significant three-way interaction effect between dual identity, minority pressure, and Muslim subgroup.

To further disentangle the three-way interaction, simple slope analyses were performed (with PROCESS, Model 3; Hayes, 2017). These analyses showed three




**Fig. 1.** Variations in the endorsement of minority rights as a function of dual identity and minority pressure in Sunni and Alevi Muslims.

notable findings (Figure 1). First, Sunni Muslims showed generally higher endorsement of Muslim minority rights compared to Alevi Muslims. Second, higher dual identity was generally associated with stronger endorsement of minority rights. Third, this relation differed for Sunni and Alevi Muslims, but not as expected.

Specifically, the test for conditional interaction effects showed that dual identity and minority pressure significantly interacted among Sunni participants, effect = –0.09; $F(1, 635) = 11.13, p = .001$. Dual identity predicted greater support for Muslim rights when there were below average or average levels of perceived minority pressure, –1 *SD* simple slope = 0.24; $t(635) = 4.73$, $p < .001$; mean simple slope = 0.13, $t(635) = 4.13$, $p < .001$, but not when there were strong perceptions of minority pressure, +1 *SD* simple slope = 0.02, $t(653) = 0.46$, $p = .648$.

For the Alevi Muslims, the conditional interaction effect between dual identity and minority pressure was also significant, effect = 0.09; $F$ (1, 635) = 7.72, $p = .006$. However, in contrast to Sunni Muslims, the conditional effects showed that dual identity did not predict greater endorsement of Muslim minority rights at low levels of perceived minority pressure, –1 *SD* simple slope = 0.08, $t(635) =$ 1.34, $p = .178$, but it did predict greater rights endorsement at average and above

average levels of minority pressure, mean simple slope = 0.18, $t(635) = 4.08$, $p < .001$; +1 *SD* simple slope = 0.29; $t(635) = 4.69$, $p < .001$.[4]

## Discussion

Dual identities imply a commitment to the minority group along with a sense of entitlement to rights that comes with being a member of the receiving society. This combination of commitment and entitlement allows those with dual identities to claim the rights of their minority community (Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). However, several studies have shown that making these claims depends on the pressure felt from the majority community, which acts as a limiting condition on the endorsement of minority rights. For example, dual identity no longer predicted endorsement of minority rights under conditions of anti-minority (Wiley et al., 2014) and assimilation policies (Verkuyten, 2017). While the impact of the majority community has been studied, the role of the minority community has received very little attention, despite findings that, for migrants, minority communities are an important source of information (e.g., Zhou & Nordquist, 1994), normative behaviors (Stark & Taylor, 1991), and social comparisons (Segura, 1989).

The results from the current study illustrate that it is important to consider the minority community and the pressure it exerts on its members. It was hypothesized that dual identity would be a stronger predictor of endorsement of minority rights under conditions of high perceived minority pressure. Having a strong dual identity may raise doubts about one's commitment to the minority group especially when perceiving strong minority pressure, motivating individuals to prove that they are good minority members by endorsing minority rights. Alevi Muslims show this hypothesized pattern of results: Dual identity predicted greater endorsement of minority rights when there were medium and high levels of perceived minority

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[4]Considering how Alevism can be interpreted in multiple ways, by some as a philosophy, a culture, or a religion, and that some Alevi Muslims do not self-identify as Muslims (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009), the measure of dual identity might not reflect identification with Muslims. To test this, a measure of Muslim identification (e.g., "My Muslim identity is an important part of myself;" "I identity strongly with Muslims") was correlated with dual identity in the Alevi and Sunni Muslim samples. Results show that in both groups, dual identity and Muslim group identification are related to each other, $r_{Sunni} = .10, p = .035; r_{Alevi} = .23, p = .001$. Thus, greater dual identity does imply greater identification with Muslims, particularly in Alevi. To ensure that the results for the Alevi sample hold regardless of their interpretation of Alevism, we conducted the main analyses but only for the Alevi sample, while also controlling for the interpretation of Alevism (philosophy, a cultural group, a religion, or other; dummy coded so that religion was always the comparison). The results are similar to those found in the main analyses; the interaction between dual identity and minority pressure was significant, $\beta_{\text{dual identity X minority pressure}} = 0.08$, $SE = 0.03$; $\beta = .16$; $R^2 = .38$, $F\ (1, 183) = 5.99$, $p = .015$, and the simple slopes became more positive as minority pressure increases, –1 *SD* simple slope = 0.17; $t(185) = 2.83$, $p = .005$; 1 *SD* simple slope = 0.38; $t(185) = 6.45$, $p < .001$. Thus, the interpretation of our results does not change after controlling for interpretation of Alevism.

pressure. Having a strong dual identity—a strong Muslim and majority identity—implies that Alevi Muslims care greatly about their Muslim identity while also making them more susceptive to having it contested (because of their strong majority identity), specially under greater perceived pressure from the community. In contrast, for those with low dual identity, there is neither the importance of the Muslim identity nor the strong majority identity that would make dual identifiers susceptible to accusations of disloyalty, regardless of the strength of the pressure from the minority group. These findings are in line with theories on identity uncertainty (Hogg, 2000) and identity performance (Klein et al., 2007), which postulate that having one's social identities contested motivates individuals to prove with their actions and attitudes that they belong to the group, particularly for individuals who strongly identify with their group (e.g., Albuja, Sanchez, & Gaither, 2018; Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Noel et al., 1995). Thus, minority pressure seems to be an enforcing condition on endorsement of minority rights among Alevi Muslims with strong dual identities.

This is further reflected in the two-way interaction between religious group and minority pressure (significant in the second and third step of the regression), which tells us that Alevi Muslims are less likely to react to minority pressure. However, when including dual identity in the three-way interaction, pressure becomes important to those with strong dual identities, as these are the individuals for whom being Muslim (and member of the host country) is important; they are the ones who want to ensure that their membership in the group remains confirmed.

Sunni Muslims were expected to show the same pattern but stronger, as the emphasis on orthopraxy and community life would make members of this subgroup particularly sensitive to its pressures. Results show that dual identity predicted greater endorsement of minority rights for those with low and medium levels of minority pressure, in line with previous findings showing the positive link between dual identity and minority rights (e.g., Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Klandermans et al., 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). However, for those with high perceived minority pressure, dual identity did not predict endorsement of minority rights. These findings confirm that minority pressure is particularly important for Sunni Muslims, but not necessarily in the way that was expected. Perceived minority pressure was particularly important for those with low, rather than high, dual identity, as reflected in the different intercepts of their slopes (see the top part of Figure 1). For Sunni Muslims with low dual identity, minority pressure seems to be a favorable condition for minority rights endorsement. However, for those perceiving high minority pressure, dual identity did not matter.

This pattern of findings might be explained in at least two ways. First, it is possible that Sunni Muslims interpret their dual identity differently from Alevi Muslims. When participants are asked to what extent they see themselves as a Dutch or German Muslim, it is unknown whether a low score means that they do not identify as Dutch (German), as Muslim, or as neither (Fleischmann & Verkuyten,

2016). This makes it difficult to determine why Sunni with low dual identities are more sensitive to perceived minority pressure. Further, Sunni Muslims often reject the notion of developing a Euro-Islam, along with the dual identity it implies, as they do not want Islam to be qualified by any national identity (Yildiz & Verkuyten, 2013).

Second, Sunni Muslims who perceive strong minority pressure might feel that their full membership in the group can be questioned at any time by any "misbehavior" (or break in orthopraxy). To prove their loyalty under a state of permanent threat to belonging (high minority pressure), they may "over-enact" their Muslim identity to the community (e.g., Klein et al., 2007; Wiley & Deaux, 2010) and strongly endorse minority rights, regardless of how much their dual identity brings into question their membership in the Muslim community. In contrast, for Alevi Muslims, only individuals with a high dual identity score will experience minority pressure as a threat to belonging, with the inclination to prove their group commitment through endorsement of minority rights. Future studies disentangling the differences between Alevi and Sunni Muslims, how much they emphasize actions (e.g., endorsing minority rights might be the "correct" thing to do for Sunni), their histories, and their statuses can help us understand the diversity that exists within these Muslim subgroups.

The differences between the two Islamic groups do reveal the problem with using "Muslims" as an analytical category. Muslim migrants are often lumped together under this single religious category when researchers perform statistical analysis and policy makers think about Muslim minorities. This not only hides the "qualitative" differences between subgroups, it can also lead to wrongful interpretations of findings. In the current case, not differentiating between Sunni and Alevi would have led to the erroneous conclusion that minority pressure does not interact with dual identity in predicting endorsement of minority rights, as the interactions in the Alevi and Sunni samples cancel each other out. A distinction between the different branches of Islam is important to understand when and why such differences matter and when they do not.

Beyond furthering the psychology of Muslim minorities, future research could consider the pressures exerted by the minority and majority communities of those with dual identities. These two communities might exert different pressures on those with dual identities, sometimes even having conflicting norms (e.g., pressure to exclusively adopt the culture from the majority group versus pressure to exclusively maintain the cultural heritage from the minority community; Albuja et al., 2018). Conflicting pressures might cancel each other out when it comes to predicting minority rights. Alternatively, closeness with the heritage community is important for migrants living in a new country (Stark & Taylor, 1991), and they often engage in cross-border connections to maintain their family and cultural ties (Waldinger, 2015). This might make pressure to conform from minority communities more important than pressure from the majority community.

*Policy Implications and Applications*

The current findings highlight the role of the minority community in minority members' endorsement of policy-relevant information (in this case minority rights). Policy makers and community leaders would thus benefit from greater awareness of the community's role when creating and implementing policies. Policy makers in particular would do well to work along minority communities and their leaders in order to increase the support for policies. By engaging the community and its leaders in policy decisions and applications, these may become part of the group's norms and hence subject to group pressure, resulting in greater support and compliance in minority members. This might be a particularly useful strategy in groups for whom minority pressure plays an important role, as it seems to be the case in the Sunni Muslim community in the current article.

Disadvantaged minority groups themselves may also want to better harness the pressure exerted by their group to further promote its well-being and position in society. By putting greater pressure on their members, they can ensure that at least some of them (e.g., those with strong dual identities) will be more likely to endorse, and possibly fight for, the rights of their groups. This strategy, however, may also backfire. Perceiving greater pressure to conform to the group can result in feeling that one's freedom is constricted, which in turn can result in a reaction opposite to the pressure placed by the group (psychological reactance; e.g., Jung, Shim, & Mantaro, 2010). Thus, if greater minority pressure is interpreted by individuals as having their freedom reduced, this may result in lower support for minority rights. Another way in which increasing pressure from the minority group may backfire is by generating greater dual identity conflict. Greater minority pressure may lead individuals to believe that they cannot have dual identities, that they cannot be simultaneously members of two groups. Those with strong dual identities who are also experiencing dual identity conflict are more likely to endorse destructive forms of minority rights (Simon, Reichter, & Grabow, 2013), ultimately damaging the reputation and well-being of minority groups.

Finally, the rights studied in the current article are those of Muslim religious expression, teaching, and political parties. These rights are currently contested in Western European countries such the Netherlands and Germany, as many question the extent to which religious minorities, and particularly Muslims, should have these rights (Statham, 2016). Thus, the results of the study highlight those who will show greater support for currently contested rights. The conundrum for those Muslims with strong dual identities is that by supporting the rights of one group, they are immediately at odds with their other important groups. Acknowledging that sometimes dual identifiers have conflicting interests—because their two groups having conflicting interests—can help policy makers understand and rephrase the issue away from conflict. This in turn may allow those with dual

identities, those well-positioned to understand the position of both the minority group and the receiving society, to become mediators when conflict arises.

### *Limitations*

The data are cross-sectional, which means that no causal conclusions can be drawn from this study. Further, the findings were obtained using a snowball sample to recruit an important number of both Sunni and Alevi Muslims. This means that the current sample is nonprobabilistic, limiting the generalizations that can be made about Sunni and Alevi Muslim minorities at large. Nevertheless, with minority populations, it is often difficult to find information to create a probabilistic sampling strategy. Such is the case with Sunni and Alevi Muslims whose denomination is not registered in official records. Furthermore, the sampling strategy used allowed us to obtain a sample of Alevi Muslims large enough to compare them to Sunni Muslims, and this in two countries in Western Europe. While this might affect the specific means obtained in the results, it is less likely to have an impact on the relation between the variables, which was the main aim of the study.

A second limitation is that the underlying mechanisms explaining the pattern of results remain untested. There were no measures of motivation to show commitment to the minority group, nor whether dual identity is perceived as a lack of loyalty to the minority group. Additionally, differentiating between identity enactment versus "over-enactment" could not be done in the current study. Agreement to more contested rights or even endorsement of violent acts could offer further proof that "over-enactment" is taking place. Future studies focusing on these processes can confirm whether they are indeed important for dual identity and minority right endorsement.

### *Conclusion*

The current article represents one of the first to explore the implications of dual identities on minority rights among Alevi and Sunni Muslim migrants in the Netherlands and Germany. It also represents a call for research on dual identities to acknowledge and examine the role played by minority communities in the creation, meaning, and expressions of dual identities, a perspective that is often ignored in the current literature. It is by understanding how the two communities implied in dual identities actively shape the meaning of these identities that researchers will be better positioned to understand their implications for the complex social world minorities navigate.

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