

Olympic Legacies

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Abstract

Expectations of urban upgrading projects in light of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro oscillated between hopeful prospects and pessimistic anticipation. The different opinions were clearly interwoven with stark socioeconomic inequalities and urban segregation. While authorities spread a celebratory narrative of improvements for the whole city, critics depicted a dystopian vision of spatial interventions that would violate the poor's right to the city. We side with those critics who foresaw the uneven consequences of these sports mega-events. Nevertheless, we also think that the experiences and narratives of poor residents themselves often get lost in such struggles. This photo essay provides insights into the displacement that took place against the backdrop of these mega-events. In both text and images, it zooms in on the consequences of an urban development program that was carried out in the run-up to the Olympics in two favelas bordering Rio's affluent South Zone. It shows residents' diverse ways of dealing with the intervention and its aftermath. It demonstrates how their displacement entailed decreased notions of collectivity, neighborliness, and security, and how it gave rise to new expectations, grievances, and claims on authorities.

[Urban Renewal; Brazil; Olympics; Favelas; Urban Governance; Rio de Janeiro; Photo Essay]

Introduction

All those who traveled from Botafogo to Copacabana during the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro could see from afar the huge Olympic Summer Games banner hanging above a tunnel that connects the city center to the beaches. On a blue and green background the text “*Um mundo novo*” (A new world) had been written. While much could be said about this official slogan—its neocolonial undertone and its Christian connotation—we read it as promising a brighter urban future in light of the transformative energies of sports mega-events. Implicitly, the slogan underscored Rio's urban reality, marked by stark differences between rich and poor, and between *asfalto* (asphalt; the middle-class neighborhoods) and *morro* (hill; the low-income neighborhoods on the hillsides). The tunnel, opened in 1906 and popularly known as the Túnel



Photo 1. Cable car in Complexo de Alemão, an example of the many urban renewal projects that were implemented in the run-up to the World Cup and the Olympics. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

Novo, not only connects the center to the shore but also hides what is located above: the *favelas* (low-income neighborhoods) on the hilltops that once separated the city from the beaches. These favelas were born at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the first urban development along the waterfront, and grew exponentially during the construction boom of the 1960s. From the outset, these areas housed the construction workers that built the tunnels and, later on, new coastal neighborhoods. Two of these favelas, Babilônia and the adjacent Chapéu Mangueira, form the site where we conducted our research and took the photos for this essay.¹

The 2016 Olympic Summer Games and earlier sports mega-events, including the 2014 World Cup, had a significant impact on the city and its residents. Debates about the consequences of these events on Rio's inhabitants center on a number of contrasts and oppositions (Steinbrink 2014; Gaffney 2010). Narratives range from celebratory to dystopian, depicting triumph or failure. During the process, public and private representatives imagined beautiful futures for the city, while activists and journalists argued that the urban poor would be denied any right to this city-to-be. While the authorities claimed, in the run-up to these mega-events, that they were improving the city for the whole population, critics claimed that such events would only benefit foreign companies and the richer portions of Brazilian society. Analyzing the impact of urban interventions for Rio's mega-events, Castro and Novaes (2015) show that the public investments in Olympic areas mostly benefited proprietors, with land becoming more valuable and rent being increased.



Photo 2. João Carlos on the roof of his house in Chapéu Mangueira. He was offered USD 50.00 for his house by an American but refused to sell. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

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Valuable as these and other analyses are, accounts of the impact of mega-events do not often include the experiences and reflections of the residents of poorer areas. In this essay, we add to the knowledge of the practices and perceptions of some of the people affected by the “urban renewal” programs in Rio de Janeiro. We feature favela residents who were evicted from their houses due to policies that were carried out in relation to the sports mega-events. By showing their perspectives and practices, we demonstrate how the ramifications of such events are grim but diverse, even within the same favela, and how inhabitants struggle to make the best of the opportunities presented. Our encounters with residents in Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira elucidate how people deal with the aftermath of displacement and relocation. Our essay shows how displaced people react to their new physical and social environments, and the decreased senses of community and collectivity that accompany such displacement. Also, it demonstrates how new grievances and claims emerge when residents develop expectations toward the authorities and are disappointed with their rehousing.

Rio de Janeiro, the Olympics, and Urban Planning

In recent years, Rio has hosted several major sporting events: the Pan American Games in 2007, the 2011 Military World Games, the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the Olympic



Photo 3. View from the hill in Babilônia, positioned attractively close to the beach and showing Copacabana in the background. The two identical small flats in the foreground depict the housing blocks constructed under the banner of Morar Carioca. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

and Paralympic Games in 2016. Through these years, Rio experienced a wide range of urban changes. We focus on those changes in the city's South Zone that were directly related to the last and biggest event, the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Since the Olympic City was built west of the city, far from the hotels at the famous beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema, special bus lanes and new metro stations were constructed to transport all visitors to and from the sports stadiums (Silvestre and de Oliveira 2012). However, the event also propelled other urban renewal projects in other parts of the city not directly related to the Olympics' infrastructure. Cable cars were built in the favelas of Complexo do Alemão and Morro da Providência, allowing residents and tourists to move to and from the highest favela points (until they were both shut down not long after the Olympics).

In addition to these infrastructural developments, the state of Rio de Janeiro installed a repressive security apparatus in the city aimed, amongst other things, at the securitization of a selection of favelas dominated by criminal factions. This securitization was carried out through the inauguration of Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs), or "pacification" police units that were installed in favelas near World Cup and Olympic sites and tourist areas (Livingstone 2014). Concretely, the installation of UPPs entailed the placement of police posts within favela territories to end the dominance of criminal factions by means of "community policing" (Menezes 2015). The first UPP units were installed in 2008. Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira each received an UPP in 2009. At the high point of the securitization efforts, thirty-eight UPPs were installed, most of them at sites where sports competitions would take



Photo 4. “Pacification Police” (UPP) in Babilônia. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

place, and around other wealthy areas such as the beaches on the south side of the city.

While initially many favela residents were happy with the installation of an UPP in their community, reports of UPP misconduct in several favelas tempered general expectations that it would bring about improved relations between the police and favela residents. Moreover, the promised government-sponsored social projects that were supposed to follow “pacification” did not take place, and many residents suspected and feared that UPPs would disappear as soon as the Olympics were over (Musumeci 2017). Sadly, at present, this is exactly what has happened. The state of Rio de Janeiro fell into a severe financial crisis after the Olympics, and on February 1, 2018, the commander of the military police forces announced that they were investigating the possibility of reducing the amount of UPPs to twenty.² In Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira, members of the criminal factions that had been laying low during the initial UPP years started flaunting their presence as they had before the existence of UPP programs, and, to make matters worse, on February 16, 2018, President Temer signed a decree that allowed the federal military to take command of Rio’s public security, paving the way for military interventions in the city. In the midst of these interventions, the Terceiro Comando Puro and the Comando Vermelho, two of the city’s largest drug gangs, started a turf war in Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira, giving rise to frequent violent outbursts. In February 2019, the Legislative Chamber of the city of Rio de Janeiro formally voted in favor of ending the UPP project.

Back in 2010, the state had launched a program dedicated to improving the living conditions of all 1.5 million residents living in Rio’s favelas: Morar Carioca. The program promised, among other things, to improve

sewer systems in the favelas, construct access roads to these neighborhoods, and build social housing flats where people living in “high-risk areas” endangered by land erosion due to heavy rainfall could be relocated. However, as the Olympics opening ceremony approached, less and less was heard about the Morar Carioca program. Even though some projects under its banner were carried out, of the promised R\$8 billion (USD 4 billion) in investments, very little was spent (Steiker-Ginzberg 2014). The failure of Morar Carioca to deliver what was promised added to ardent debates between different camps that dominated discussions about the urban renewal plans from the outset (Richmond 2016; Faulhaber and Azevedo 2015). State representatives pointed to the positive legacy of the Olympics and argued that the event would advance the city as a whole in many different ways. Critics (journalists, activists, academics), however, rightfully argued that foreign companies, tourists, and the richer echelons of Brazilian society benefitted the most from the event (Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013).

In contrast to Brazil’s main TV channel Globo, which portrayed the Olympics as a glorious sportive happening, websites and blogs such as Rio Olympics Neighborhood Watch (www.RioOnWatch.org) incessantly showed the negative impact of the event on the urban poor by, for example, stating that 77,000 people had been evicted from their homes. Critical academic studies argued that mega-events such as the Olympic Games provided local administrations with a governmental framework to summon a state of emergency, enabling them to rapidly yet permanently transform the urban landscape according to a neoliberal logic (Saborio 2013; Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013). The events were, in such a view, an excuse for enacting processes of accumulation by dispossession and severely violating the urban poor’s right to the city (Harvey 2003; Rekow 2016; Gaffney 2016).



Photo 5. Gentrification has taken place, especially in the attractively located southern favelas. The urban poor are pushed back and even out of the favela. This sign in Santa Marta, another favela facing gentrification, gives expression to the protest against this development. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

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We agree with critical analyses that turn to political economy to argue that the sports mega-events do not and will not improve the lives of the urban poor. The urban renewal that took place under the banner of the mega-events, culminating in the Olympics, mainly gave rise to gentrification and beautification projects to make the city more attractive to tourists and the higher-income brackets of the city's population (Castro and Novaes 2015). However, we also feel that macrolevel analyses of the impact of sports mega-events do not grasp the experiences of residents who were targeted by said urban interventions. Such analyses do not include the different individual experiences of people who suffered from these urban renewal programs. In this essay, we portray several people who were confronted with the urban interventions and their aftermath. We set out to understand the changes from the point of view of these residents of Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira, who have been confronted with forced eviction, and we attempt to elucidate what this displacement entails. More than merely adjusting to a new house, displacement often means moving from a place with a sense of community, or at least collectivity, where neighbors know each other, to a place where residents need to start constructing new social ties from scratch. Without romanticizing the situation, many displaced residents leave behind a place with certain notions of neighborliness and support in times of hardship. Also, their move often implies saying farewell to a relatively stable environment of calculable risks and moving into a new place where they need to restore a sense of security. Even within one single favela, residents experience stark differences between streets or areas. Thus, moving from one place to another entails dealing with these differences. We also show how moving into a new house may generate new expectations, complaints, and claims vis-à-vis the authorities. As such, we contribute to understanding how urban interventions and their aftermath may give rise to changes in residents' relationships with and imaginings of the state.

Before continuing, we would like to make clear that we are very much aware of the specificities of the favelas at the center of this essay. Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira are both located on the slopes of hills that face the ocean; one only needs to descend the hills to reach the beaches on the south side of the city, where international tourism provides increased economic opportunities. This generally makes daily life different from that of the favelas in the northern zones of the city (see also Rekow 2016; Oosterbaan 2017). Still, we disagree with those who tend to downplay the voices of favela residents of the south side of Rio, claiming that these cannot be compared to those of the urban poor elsewhere in the city. Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira had and still have their share of armed violence, which has even increased in the last year, related to the presence of drug-trading criminal factions. Also, despite having better economic opportunities than residents of peripheral favelas, the income differences per household between



Photo 6. After pacification, Babilônia, with its fabulous views, became attractive to investors wanting to establish new restaurants and hostels. View from a bar run by a Belgian-Colombian couple. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira and the adjacent neighborhoods of Leme and Copacabana substantially outweigh the differences between favelas in the south and those in the north.³

Forced Eviction and its Aftermath

In recent years, and especially after the installation of the UPPs in 2009, the built environment and the demography of Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira have changed. For almost a decade, violence in the neighboring favelas decreased and this attracted new residents. Some newcomers came from other favelas, but others came from middle-class neighborhoods or even from other countries. People built restaurants, hostels, and a film studio in the area. On Sunday afternoons, we witnessed the unprecedented phenomenon of middle-class Brazilian families parking their cars downhill and walking up the *morro* to one of the new restaurants with beautiful views of Copacabana and the rest of the city. Tourists, both Brazilian and foreign, visit the neighborhoods to take pictures of the houses and their inhabitants. Processes of gentrification took place. Due to decreased violence and the infrastructural upgrades occurring in the area, real estate prices increased. Throughout the whole area, houses became more expensive, and newly built houses and lots were sold for prices that were, until recently, unheard of. Some of the original residents were pushed out due to increased rents and the formalization of electricity and water infrastructures that made it more difficult to illegally tap from the system.

*Tourists, both
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borhoods to
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and their
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Opinions about the changes that took place in the run-up to the World Cup and the Olympics varied among the original residents of Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira. While some hailed the arrival of new residents and possibilities to make a living, others complained about the increased costs and the loss of community (Van Langen and Boerland 2015). José, the long-time owner of a local bar on Babilônia's main street, told us he was happy with a new hostel opening across the road, as the guests were "*gente boa*" (good people) who liked to buy a drink at his bar. On the other hand, Rodrigo, the president of the local residents' association, was extremely negative and argued that with the arrival of the newcomers the sense of community had dissolved. He also firmly spoke out against tourists who only came to take pictures. He coordinated a local campaign called "The favela is not a zoo" (*Favela não é zoológico*), with posters that said: "The misery of the favela is not a tourist attraction."

Because of the UPPs and urban upgrades, Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira became more diverse, which gave rise to new opportunities for some, and obstacles and feelings of loss for others. In both neighborhoods, the changes entailed improvements for some, but these also implied an increasing inequality between those who benefited and those who did not. Under the banner of Morar Carioca, in Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira, three apartment buildings had been planned, to provide substitute housing for households that were evicted from high-risk areas and other intervention sites. Two of the buildings were constructed, with sixteen and ten apartments respectively, while the third and largest one was never built. After five years of living there, the contract said, residents would become owners of their apartment. Based on participant observation, informal interviews, and the collection of life histories of evicted persons, we discuss the ramifications of the interventions for the residents.



Photo 7. Blind Naldo with his sister-in-law in his new apartment. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

Blind Naldo: Relocated for No Reason

In the newest building in Babilônia lived sixty-eight-year-old Naldo, locally known as “Blind Naldo” due to his visual impairment. He was born in Babilônia and worked in maintenance in hotels until eleven years ago, when he went blind from an illness. His wife, who passed away nine years ago, had been a domestic worker. Naldo lived nearby in a spacious house with six rooms and a view of Copacabana. He explained:

Some years ago, they started with this urbanization project. The municipality wanted to make a new square, so I had to leave. They never built the square. And now I live here. I had no choice. It was obligatory for me to move out. So, I exchanged that house for this house. My old house has been destroyed, but there is no new square. Well, I could have accepted R\$40,000 [as an indemnity], but you cannot buy a new house for that, so I had no choice. I opted for exchanging the old house for a new house.

After the eviction, Naldo had to live elsewhere for two years, before his new house was completed. He received a monthly R\$400 *aluguel social* (temporary housing fee) from the government. Rents in the city are high, so he moved to a less expensive area in Niterói, across the bay, two hours from Babilônia with public transport. He found a place for R\$600 a month. “It’s very expensive here. So, I had to chip in R\$200 from my own pocket.” After two years, his new house was ready. Because of his visual impairment, some adaptations were made to the design: the kitchen and the bathroom were larger, the entrances wider, and the shower had grab bars.

Naldo’s new house is close to the busy road winding up the hill, which had been extended under Morar Carioca but was not finished according to plan. Naldo’s house has thin aluminum doors and borders the only accessible busy road, which is used by many motorcycles. He complained about the sound, of his neighbors who play loud music and of the traffic. Since becoming blind, he depends greatly on his ears. Now, all day long, traffic passes by, frequently with loud claxons and music blasting from sound systems. In his new place, the sense of community and neighborliness seems to have diminished for Naldo. He told us how he was afraid of complaining about the noise to his new neighbors as he does not know them. In his old neighborhood, it was much more “*sossegado*,” meaning quiet in the sense of there being “no sounds” but also in terms of “calm, without problems.” About his new place, he said: “I don’t like it at all. [There is] so much noise. I thought this house would be nicer, but it isn’t.” Naldo also expressed his grievances with the authorities: “Eventually, the square never arrived. So, they made me move for a square that



Photo 8. Dona Maria in her new Morar Carioca apartment. She does not feel safe, since she knows her walls are not bulletproof. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

was never built.” Moreover, after the move, he found that someone else had built a new house on his old spot, making it even harder to swallow that he had to leave.

Dona Maria: Between Happiness and Discontent

Dona (Mrs.) Maria lived in the first apartment building that was constructed through the Morar Carioca program and inaugurated in 2012. The sixty-seven-year-old woman lives with her eleven cats in one of the building’s sixteen apartments. Her niece lives in the same building with her boyfriend and two children. Four years earlier, Dona Maria shared a big house with her niece and her family. The house was in very bad condition and Dona Maria did not have the resources to refurbish it. When Morar Carioca was carried out, Dona Maria and her niece happily welcomed the news that their house had to be destroyed for the construction of a new road. Both gained the right to a new apartment in the building. After leaving their house, they had to wait for fourteen months before the new houses were ready, during which they rented a small house on the top of the hill. Dona Maria recalled: “We received aluguel social. R\$400 for me and R\$400 for her. We had to leave many things behind, because there was no space in the temporary house. It was much smaller. A year and two months we lived there. And then we could move in here. I had to buy many things anew.” Dona Maria said that she was very content with her house and the program, but she also expressed discontent. One practical frustration was her electricity bill. Although the building had solar panels on the roof—it had been built according to a sustainable

design that received international acclaim—the connection to her house had suffered from a defect, and so she depended on the regular system. In her former house, she had an illegal connection, but now the R\$120 bills weighed heavily on her R\$820 pension. She also missed income as, in the new house, she was not allowed to rent out rooms—in her previous house, she said, she frequently rented out a room to an American. Dona Maria: “The contract says ‘no sale, no rent, and no exchange.’ You have to respect that. Only after five years you become the owner.”

Another grievance was the noise of her neighbors: one of the apartments was inhabited by people who, all neighbors knew, were drug dealers who frequently played extremely loud music at all hours of the day. Having problems with neighbors was a complaint we heard very often. The Morar Carioca program put residents from different parts of the community together in one building with relatively small apartments. Most residents were relocated at random, using a lottery system to decide who would get what apartment. People who did not know each other and lacked a shared history were crammed together, which often resulted in tensions between them. Dona Maria complained about the uncivilized behavior of some of her neighbors who threw their trash down their verandas. To make matters worse, Dona Maria’s house had, one night, been riddled with bullets, some of which even went through two walls. She recalled: “Twenty bullet holes. I’m completely traumatized. It happened a couple of months ago, around one o’clock at night. I woke up from a sound at my window. Then the shooting started. It lasted for twenty minutes. I went to the kitchen and laid down on the floor. When it was quiet for ten minutes, I went to the neighbors. I was very afraid. It took me two weeks



Photo 9. One of the two social housing apartment blocks that were built in Babilônia under Morar Carioca. A third one was promised but never built. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

“It took me two weeks before I dared to sleep in my own house again” before I dared to sleep in my own house again.” She was still afraid that it could happen again. Dona Maria told us that she and some other residents had tried to increase the building’s security by hiring a guard; however, after discussing it, only five residents were willing to pay the monthly fee. She complained that it was difficult, with these new neighbors, to organize something. Nonetheless, she said: “This side of apartment building is much better organized than the other one. In the other building, there’s dog shit everywhere, it is very dirty.” Moreover, even though she missed her old house, higher up the hill, it was also the place where gang members were hanging out: “I would not be able to cope with that. I don’t visit my old neighbors anymore because I am afraid to go there.”

Flávio and Ana: Critical Acceptance

Flávio and Ana, both in their early sixties, lived in the same apartment building as Dona Maria. He worked as a cleaner for the government sanitation company, and she as a domestic worker for a middle-class family. Before moving in, they lived for a year in temporary housing, also subsidized by a monthly R\$400 payment. Ana said: “I do not know many people here, because I am not from this area. I like the house, but we are all stuffed together with others. Our previous house was much quieter.” They had been forced to move because the authorities planned to build a cultural center for the community on the site of his old house. Flávio stated, “I decided to move, for the sake of the community. I wanted to help the community, so I agreed. My daughter, who lived with her family next to us, refused to leave. I wished I had done so, too.” Pointing out his window to the spot where his house used to be—now an empty place full of waste—he said, “The cultural center was never built. My house was destroyed. I cannot go back, so I am doomed to live in this crap-hole.” Like Dona Maria and Naldo, he and his wife complained about the loud music of their neighbors. Flávio also complained about the low-quality building material: “Did you see Dona Maria’s house, with all the bullets that went straight through the walls? The material is worthless. It cannot even stop a bullet.” Many of the families used to live in freestanding houses, and when they were relocated they took their dogs and other animals to the flat. Flávio grumbled, “It is such a mess. Everywhere the smell of dogs, urine, it is so dirty.” He also complained about how the municipality did not provide any maintenance: “They dumped this apartment block here and they left. There is no control or contact if something breaks. It started out as a white building and look at the disgusting dirty gray color it has now.” Rumors were that the construction company used inferior materials to increase their profits. Residents showed us the defects of their apartments. Floors had already sagged, walls were cracked, and leakages were common. Some residents told us how they had filed complaints with the municipality, but their efforts were in vain. Another explained how filing complaints would not help them further: “If I start

a process, it will take very long. They will slow down the process until I am the official proprietor. Then they will not be responsible anymore for adjustments. Then it's my problem." Although Flávio was very unhappy with his house, he surprisingly did not think of selling it and moving elsewhere. When asked about the future, he explained that next year, after five years of living in the house, he would become its owner and gain rights to renovate it: "Then I will build an extension."

Edson: Taking it to Court

Edson, a fifty-year-old construction worker, lived in the second, smaller apartment building, with his forty-two-year-old wife, Luciana, who is a domestic worker, and their two grandchildren. They had to leave their house higher up on the hill in Babilônia because it was considered a high-risk area. Of the thirty households that participated in the lottery for this building, Edson told us, they were among the ten that received an apartment. The other families, he said, were still in temporary housing: "I did not want to leave. Where I lived, I had a view on the Copacabana. I prefer to live high up. Many people want to live lower, because you do not have to climb so much. But I don't. Peace is the most important. On the top of the hill, it was more peaceful. There is less traffic and less noise."

Like his fellow residents, Edson pointed out the inferior materials used in constructing the building. As a construction worker, he had an eye for it. Although many residents did not believe that the authorities would actually solve such problems, Edson kept on trying. He took it to court and later appealed, all with the help of a pro bono lawyer. "I complain about everything." He claimed an indemnity for the house, as its quality was so low. He was angry with the municipality, the architects,



Photo 10. After losing her house, Fernanda rented a small house with her family, again in a high-risk area. After having waited in vain for a new house, she decided to construct one at her own expense. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

and the construction company. He argued that the policy makers and the company had made a profit with this project, but at the expense of the poor residents who now lived in very bad apartments. “They robbed,” he said. “In Brazil, everything that is related to politics is a robbery.”

Fernanda: Left to Her Own Devices

Fernanda had long lived in a house on top of the hill in Chapéu Mangueira, in a so-called high-risk area, together with her mother and four children. In 2012, heavy rainfall ruined her house. They moved in with a neighboring friend, where they lived for nine months. That same year, Fernanda was included in the Morar Carioca project and was offered a new apartment. She was eligible for the temporary housing supplement, and started to receive the R\$400 aluguel social. With that money, she was able to rent a very small house, the size of a caravan, which she shared with her brother and mother. Ironically, this house was, again, in a high-risk area. After initially being notified that she had been selected for social housing by a municipal officer, nobody ever informed them further about the elaboration of the housing project. After three years of living in the rented house, Fernanda had given up hope that she would ever receive a substitute house, especially since the third apartment building was never built. Disappointed, they bought materials at their own expense and her brother started to build a new house for Fernanda and their mother in the same high-risk area where they had lived before. A neighbor and close friend of the family disclosed to us that Fernanda’s mother had inherited a large sum of money from a middle-class lady for whom she had served as a domestic worker for thirty-five years, and that Fernanda used that money to build their new house.



Photo 11. Life goes on: celebrating Fernanda’s son’s birthday with family and neighbors. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

Concluding Reflections

The different stories show how residents of Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira experienced their relocation and its aftermath. First, we see how, in their new house, the senses of community, neighborliness, and security decreased. In his new place, Naldo did not experience the neighborliness he had known previously. He did not dare complain to his new neighbors about their loud music. Dona Maria shared this loss of “community”: although she saw her new house as a blessing, she experienced her new neighbors as a curse; she had to deal with, in her view, anti-social behavior. Also, when she tried to organize a guard, to enhance security in the building, she found most of her neighbors unwilling to join her. In the stories of Flávio and Ana, similarly, we hear how tensions arose between neighbors who were randomly put together in the rehousing program, which significantly affected their quality of life. These stories show how the intervention gave rise to a deterioration of social conditions. Favela space is dense and favela life depends highly on neighborliness (Oosterbaan 2017). Even with people who are happy with their new homes, the relocation confronted them with unwanted noise and new neighbors, some of whom were involved in criminal activities. This, together with the retreat of the UPP after the Olympics, has given rise to a situation in which the relocated residents’ security has decreased. The insecurity became clear when residents were tragically reminded that their new walls did not withstand bullets. Though the walls of their former houses may not have shielded them any better, the fact that Morar Carioca houses are just as flimsy when it comes to gunfire shows, quite nakedly, that the new apartments do not protect them in the way they hoped, and demonstrates that the planners did not take into account the likelihood of armed confrontations.

Second, the intervention and its aftermath gave rise to new expectations and grievances toward the authorities. All residents of the new apartment buildings complained about the low quality of the construction. They were disappointed with the authorities and their unwillingness to help. Flávio, Ana, and Edson complained about the lack of maintenance—something they would never have done in their former self-built house. Naldo was very frustrated with the authorities, as they displaced him for no reason at all. Edson went to court, expressing his anger with the authorities about their “robbery” and claiming the need for compensation. Finally, Fernanda was promised to receive a new house, but eventually had to move out without a new place to live, giving rise to an added sense of having been betrayed by the authorities. All in all, among the residents, the intervention generated feelings of disappointment and grievance toward the public authorities and their private partners.

Taking account of these different stories, we fully agree with the critiques that the urban development carried out in Rio in the period



Photo 12. Bullet hole in one of the windows of the Morar Carioca apartments. ©Sanne Derks 2016 [This figure appears in color in the online issue.]

leading up to the 2016 Olympic Summer Games did not bring the improvements promised by the authorities. The pictures and stories of Naldo, Dona Maria, Flávio, Ana, Edson, Fernanda, and their neighbors demonstrate how the structural socioeconomic inequalities persist in Rio de Janeiro, and have even increased in the wake of these mega-events. In so doing, our essay contributes to understanding how inequalities are intricately interwoven with urban planning in cities across the globe, highlighting the continuous risk of dispossession and the fragility of the poor's right to the city.

Notes

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¹Sanne Derks conducted fieldwork in Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira directly after the Olympics, and has taken all the photographs in this photo essay; Martijn Koster coordinated a research project in Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira in 2015, and conducted long-term anthropological fieldwork on slum upgrading and politics in Recife, Brazil; Martijn Oosterbaan has many years of ethnographic research expertise in Rio's favelas, including Babilônia and Chapéu Mangueira, before, during, and after the Olympics.

²<http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/geral/noticia/2018-02/policia-militar-estuda-reduzir-numero-de-upps-no-rio-de-janeiro>

³Based on the data of the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) census of 2010 and on data of the IETS (Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade). See also: http://www.upprj.com/upload/estudo_publicacao/Diagnostico_Socio_Economico_Comunidades_com_UPP.pdf and <http://www.data.rio/datasets/735c75945e694ef3a645e427b1ba1737>

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