

An Imperial Affair: The Allied Council of Ambassadors and the Occupation of France, 1815–18¹

Beatrice de Graaf

Introduction

In July 1815, after the second defeat of Napoleon, Paris was a hub for allied activities – and a site of discontent and anxiety for its French inhabitants. The allied ministers sought to defuse the French spirit of revolution – not solely through treaties, but through a military occupation of France. This novel type of collective action was managed by the Allied Council of Ambassadors, consisting of representatives of the four main allied powers; Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain. This chapter investigates the innovative, far-ranging activities of the Council, by analysing it as a project of inter-imperial collective security – indicating that it operated in a hierarchical and progressively expansive fashion regarding the identification of threats and interests, and that it became a testing ground for a series of inter-imperial security arrangements. The workings of this Allied Council, and its repertoire of measures and activities, have never been studied extensively.² Its minutes have been pieced together,³ so as to offer an overview of how it attempted to organize a secure, imperial peace, for France, for Europe and for the rest of the world – and how that played out.

A legitimate occupation and imperial affair

‘The war of 1815 is not a war of conquest’, as the Austrian chancellor, Metternich, urged his German counterpart Hardenberg. For the allies ‘the double aim’ of the war was ‘bringing down the usurpation of Napoléon Bonaparte’ and to install a government that would guarantee order for both France and the remainder of Europe.⁴ To ensure this, something new was asked for, something unheard of in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century international relations⁵: a military occupation as a joint collective action, because the danger was, as the British foreign secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, put it, ‘that when the Allied Armies are removed from the Country, the System itself may fall to pieces, before it has by time been consolidated’. Hence, ‘no time ought to be lost’, in

effecting an occupation that was to be executed by ‘regularity and method’,⁶ and that had more in common with the occupation regime of later epochs (for example the Allied Council after 1945⁷) than with earlier efforts to restore peace.

Politically, the allied occupation did not attempt to include all of the allied coalition partners, let alone the states of Europe. It was a highly hierarchical, limited group of ministers who took their strategic aims from existing documents for the reorganization of Europe, predominantly from the so-called ‘Pitt-plan’ (1805)⁸ and Friedrich Gentz’s 1806 study on the balance of power in Europe,⁹ and from the Final Act of Vienna (February/June 1815). These plans envisioned a reorganization of the European map and a hierarchy of powers: ranging from the first-rank allied powers (the four key empires), the second-rank (Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, for example) and the third-ranked (smaller German and Italian states, including Piedmont). Other partners of the military campaign who requested membership of the Allied Council were refused and only granted indirect access to information, although they were occasionally invited to sit on subcommittees. Only four were considered ‘les premières Puissances de l’Europe’.¹⁰ Since they were the main victors, paymasters and providers of troops, protests against this directorate (from the French, but also from Spain and Portugal) fell flat. The occupation, and its managing body, the Allied Council, indeed seemed to have been perceived as legitimate by the other European powers, but it was definitely an imperial affair – as becomes clear by zooming in on the expanding scope of its activities.¹¹

Igniting the allied machine

The Allied Council drew upon the management experience gained through the Central Administration in 1814: the body that dealt with allied communication, logistics and the government of the reconquered German and French lands, and which was headed by the Prussian minister Stein.¹² This Administration was a logical outcome of the *Territorialrevolution*, the geopolitical shifts and the judicial professionalization (*Verrechtlichung*) that reshaped the European continent between 1794 and 1815.¹³ It combined expert knowledge of many lawyers, scholars and notables with that of allied planners and commanders, and expressed the ongoing trend of ‘internal colonizing projects’ not just of the eastern lands in Prussia, Poland and Russia, but also those reconquered by France. These lands that had to be *verwaltet*, managed and brought under control of new rulers and commanders. Stein’s administration’s first task was to serve the Sixth Coalition, to manage a supply to the troops, and to prevent retribution against civilians. Its no less important secondary task was the overhaul of administration in these lands by subjecting them to ‘modern’ centralized rule, as a form of *Herrschaft durch Verwaltung* (‘ruling by management’).¹⁴

While the occupation of France in 1814 was short lived, in 1815, the allies decided that a longer period was preferable. The aim was to bring back ‘the people of France . . . to moral and peaceful habits’, as Castlereagh stated in the Allied Council.¹⁵ This time, the ministers of the four powers decided to act as a consortium without Stein. The management apparatus was more complex than in 1814. The Allied Council was the

overarching political body, but subordinated to it was an executive, administrative organ, the Allied Administration – initially referred to by the Germans as the *General-Armee-Kommission*, and later as the *Vereinigtes Ministerium der alliierten Armeen*.¹⁶ Representatives of the four major powers oversaw requests of allied governors and military commanders regarding care for troops, and settled these with the French Requisition Committee.¹⁷ Its task was to prevent looting and mitigate chaos in the occupied French provinces, and to ensure an equal division of material support to each allied force.¹⁸

But the main political forum for decision-making was the Allied Council, installed once the military capitulation treaty was signed on 3 July 1815. It was designed that none of the four main allied powers would operate in isolation and that all decisions would be based on ‘common and uniform principles’.¹⁹ The Allied Council, in the minutes referred to as the *Conférence des Ministres Alliés*, convened from 12 July 1815 until 1818, initially meeting every day, and later two or three times a week.²⁰ The Council originally consisted of Vienna’s main players: Metternich for Austria; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh for Britain; Ambassador Friedrich Wilhelm von Humboldt, Chancellor Prince Karl August von Hardenberg and General Neidhardt von Gneisenau for Prussia; and Counts Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo and Karl von Nesselrode for Russia. Prince Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, and his successor after 20 September, Armand Emmanuel du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu (the former Governor of Odessa for the Tsar who had proved himself a master of ‘internal colonization’ and management),²¹ were summoned to join the Council (and to receive orders from them). The members knew each other well, having worked so closely together over the Vienna settlement.²² The ‘Allied Machine’²³ could now translate its imperial security ambitions into practice – starting with France.

Its four ‘principles of salutary precaution’ were formulated by Castlereagh, confirmed by the Allied Council, and then cemented in the Paris Peace Treaty of November 1815: first, to demilitarize the country; second, to ‘de-bonapartise’; third, to de-revolutionize the political situation; and fourth, to guarantee the payment of reparations.²⁴ To ensure their effectiveness a series of subcommittees was created. First, the Council appointed a Military Committee, consisting of the allied commanders of the Sixth Coalition under the leadership of the Duke of Wellington. It oversaw the handling of conflicts between allied commanders, between troops, and also between French citizens (by appointing mixed judicial courts). It established a temporary military government of Paris (until the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty in late November). Financial matters were dealt with by an audit board. Police and intelligence issues were the province of an allied secret police force, the *Verbündetenpolizei*, chaired by the Prussian Justus von Gruner. This complex structure of committees also ensured that the autonomy of the French king, Louis XVIII and his government, remained limited.²⁵

To keep allied infighting and the ongoing conflicts with the French in check, in October, Wellington was appointed as overall manager. He acted as the main conduit between the allies and the French king and government and the chair of the Military Committee and main adviser to the Allied Council. Owing to his support in 1814 and in 1815 for the return of the Bourbons to the throne, Wellington enjoyed the support of Louis XVIII.²⁶ He required members to send him a report at least once a week

recounting their discussions.²⁷ In short, imperial allied rule took precedence over the rule of Louis XVIII.

Demilitarizing France: occupation as the bond of peace

To guarantee the fulfilment of the treaty conditions, the allies occupied two-thirds of France, as an 'occupation of guarantee' and as a 'bond of peace'.²⁸ The first task was to demilitarize the country. The Napoleonic army had to be reduced and reorganized. The Council ordered a withdrawal of all French troops to south of the river Loire and kept a check on the issue of passports.²⁹ Second, Wellington was to oversee an allied force of occupation in France. Altogether 1.2 million soldiers were deployed on French soil, of which 320,000 were Austrians, 310,000 Prussians, 250,000 Russians, 128,000 British as well as troops from smaller German states, Denmark, Spain and Switzerland.³⁰ In the autumn of 1815, the Prussians were still advocating a dismembering of France, and the separation of large parts on the eastern borders, to be absorbed into Prussia, Austria and other German states. Only after a series of notes and discussions with Wellington (the Austrians and Russians broadly agreed with the British view) did the Prussians acquiesce in the prolongation of the occupation. Eventually, the allies reduced the force of occupation to 150,000 – consisting of five cohorts: four for the main allied powers, and one for the smaller German states. This force would remain in place and occupy the territory until France had paid the yet to be determined reparations and standing arrears, including the costs of maintaining the troops.³¹ Two-thirds of France was to be occupied; the British in the west, the Prussians and Russians in the north and north-east, and the Austrians in the south-east. Paris was to be liberated and left under the jurisdiction of the king.³² Furthermore, a more long-term precautionary measure was adopted to deter new French military aggression: the creation of a physical defence line. From July 1815 onwards, Wellington oversaw the construction and expansion of a system of twenty-one forts and garrisons along three parallel lines of fortifications, ranging from the fortresses along the North Sea coast (Nieuwpoort, Ostende) via Dendermonde, Ath, Doornik, Oudenaarde, Gent and Dinant, up to the German lines of defence at Mainz.³³ This defence line, the 'Wellington-Barrier', was financed predominantly through the French reparations payments.

The occupation and ensuing 'imperial management' transformed northern and eastern France into an 'alien' country. French residents were subject to foreign troops who were there to perform their peacekeeping duties. Prussian forces had a rather bad reputation and were widely resented.³⁴ Christine Haynes has established how in the areas where the occupiers and the indigenous people could understand each other (as in the Alsace region), a sense of fraternity and mutual respect sometimes took root.³⁵ However, the pervasive sentiments were those of great distrust and rancour regarding the 'allied invasion' – a resentment that the allied reports suggested increased over time.³⁶ Wellington struggled with the dilemma of keeping his military forces in order while recognizing that their presence often fuelled unrest. He warned: 'If one shot is fired in Paris, the whole country will rise against us.'³⁷ In other words, demilitarizing the country (the first principle) clashed with the idea of stabilizing France (the second

and third principles, see below). That is why, after some hesitation, the Council agreed to reduce troop levels as partial compensation for the dissolution of the *Chambre Introuvable* in September 1816. In February 1817, Wellington sent 30,000 of his troops home³⁸ – but only upon the condition of a reinforcement of the ‘Wellington-Barrier’. In 1818 an initial series of forts was completed and manned by Dutch troops and the German Federation garrisons to serve as a replacement guarantee for the security of Europe.³⁹

Notwithstanding rumours about allied disunity,⁴⁰ the occupation and the close cooperation on the Council in military matters occasioned a greater degree of understanding and rapprochement between the allied powers. Through joint troop inspections, parades, field exercises, the construction of the fortresses, the exchange of military orders, sitting on joint legal committees, the imperial powers of Europe demonstrated their united management of the French security risk.⁴¹

The main reason for the occupation was of course its function in enforcing the execution of the fourth principle: the payment of war reparations, back payments of individual debts and the price of the deployment of allied armies. The pecuniary indemnity for the allied powers totalled 700 million francs. In addition the expenses for maintaining a 150,000 strong allied army of occupation amounted to 360 million francs per annum.⁴² On top of this came the question of French debt payments to private owners, initially amounting to a claim of over 1 billion francs.⁴³ After lengthy negotiations, the Allied Council decided to contact the private banking houses of Hope and Baring, in London and Amsterdam, to secure France a loan in 1817, with a second in 1818.⁴⁴ Only then could France fulfil her outstanding financial obligations and pay the required 1,893 million francs. That was less than the reparations imposed on Germany after the First World War, but in absolute terms more than any other externally imposed war debt in the nineteenth and twentieth century.⁴⁵ Thus, at the Congress of Aachen/Aix-la-Chapelle, 30 September to 9 October 1818, France was invited to accede to the Quadruple Alliance (under special stipulations) and the allies’ occupying army left France in the same year. The mutual European dependency on loans and subscriptions remained and expanded. A veritable bond was forged between the European great powers’ banking houses and public investors, accelerating the emergence of financial markets for investors and stock buyers, and expanding the scope of financial security/ies.⁴⁶

Defusing the spectre of unrest and rebellion

The activities of the Allied Council did however expand far beyond military affairs and financial arrangements. The Council took a series of steps intended to unnerve resurfacing sympathies for Napoleon and his relatives – the second and third principles of salutary precaution. Since they did not feel the Bourbons could ensure that stability,⁴⁷ the first sessions of the Council’s meetings were devoted primarily to ensuring (and enforcing) that Bourbon rule led to domestic stability and to removing Bonapartist sympathizers from the scene. To do so, the Prussian head of the allied ‘high police’, Justus von Gruner, provided daily intelligence to the Allied Council.⁴⁸ He had reformed

the Berlin police, had set up a spy ring for Tsar Alexander in Prague, and was happy to be the instrument of European 'peace and tranquillity', of public order and security in Paris.⁴⁹ Upon his appointment, he hired agents to assist him. He also asked the French spy masters, Fouché and Descazes, to forward their intelligence regarding allied matters.⁵⁰ In the months that Gruner ran his agency, he had at least 14 spies at his disposal, a bureau, a series of clerks and a substantial budget to persuade others to reveal information. Gruner and his spies described the gossip on Wellington's escapades and Fouché's intrigues, on the alleged divisions between the Austrians and the Prussians, and on the magnanimity of Tsar Alexander. Exclamations such as 'Vive l'empereur!', or 'vive le petit Napoléon' could be heard regularly, as were attempts to ridicule the king and his family. Gruner even found out rumours about allied disunity were orchestrated and manipulated by Talleyrand.⁵¹

Gruner's initial admiration for Fouché gave way to a mounting unrest with regard to alleged Bonapartist conspiracies. The allies increasingly grew wary of rumours that an attack on King Friedrich Wilhelm III or on Louis XVIII was imminent. These reports proved to be a hoax. But the news about massacres in the French south was not. Historians still differ regarding the number of Protestants being killed – estimates vary from 1,000 to 45,000. Public order and safety was severely compromised, as was the king's authority.⁵² At first reluctant, but urged by pleas from British Protestants, the Allied Council intervened and asked Louis to restore order in the south.⁵³ Indeed, Fouché sent a letter to the prefect of the Gard, underlining his demands for greater compliance with allied pressure on the French king and government.⁵⁴ But on 30 August, Gruner wrote to his allied masters, including to King Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia himself, that a second 'St Barthelemy' (referencing the trope of Protestant persecutions) was imminent.⁵⁵ The Council intervened again, this time sending the Austrian general Schwarzenberg with his troops to pacify the hitherto unoccupied Gard (a *département* in southern France).⁵⁶

This pattern of escalating allied interference in police and political matters continued in the years thereafter. The Allied Council sent Wellington to bring the king to reason, when the ultra-royalists appeared to frustrate the occupation and the completion of the Paris Treaty provisions. In February 1816, when the *Chambre des Introuvables* threatened to reject the budget (and thus the reparation payments), Wellington, on behalf of the allies, threatened the king with the outbreak of war once again – 'Il est possible que je me trouve dans le cas de mettre toute l'Europe une autre fois sous les armes'.⁵⁷

The dissolution of the *Chambre* in September 1816 did not placate the Council's worries over Jacobin conspiracies and revolutionary plots. From July 1815 onwards, the Allied Council worried about fugitive and émigré Bonapartists and revolutionaries continuing to foment unrest: not only in, but also outside France. In early 1816, the ministers asked Richelieu to draw up lists of 'terroristes dangereux', in order that they may be sent into exile. The Council disseminated these lists to the other courts of Europe, demanding that they identify the French fugitives and to put them under surveillance.⁵⁸ The blacklisted individuals were prohibited to settle anywhere near the border of France and were only granted passports for one of the countries represented in the Allied Council – since it was thought that only these countries were able to

mobilize enough surveillance. (This measure was applied, for example, to Hortense de Beauharnais, former Queen of the Netherlands, and the estranged wife of Louis Napoleon).⁵⁹

The Council's worries were triggered by rumours, plots and real incidents. In June 1816, Wellington's house was set on fire.⁶⁰ On the night of 10/11 February 1818, an aggrieved Jacobin from Brussels, named Cantillon, attempted to assassinate him.⁶¹ The perpetrators were found but acquitted by French judges.⁶² For the Allied Council, especially for Prussia, Russia and Austria, these attacks were linked to émigré Bonapartists from Brussels and Krakow spreading subversive pamphlets, and were perceived as an expanding network of radicals whose aim was not only the overthrow of the French, but of the imperial and monarchical European order.⁶³

At that time, Gruner's secret police had been disbanded with the termination of the military rule over Paris. In his place, Metternich took over questions relating to intelligence and counterrevolutionary measures. Early in 1816, he proposed to the Allied Council the establishment of a 'European police' force. And indeed, the Allied Council, urged by Metternich and Richelieu, conveyed the impression that there was a threat of a joint military action towards the Netherlands if the new king, William I, was unwilling to adopt censorship laws and to limit the freedom of the press and so to undermine the activities of the French exiles in Brussels.⁶⁴ William and his parliament succumbed to the threat by introducing new laws concerning deportation regulations.⁶⁵ At this point, the British ministers called the Council to a halt: 'The Allied Ministers at Paris must be kept within the bounds of their original institution and not be suffered to present themselves as an European Council for the management of the affairs of the world.'⁶⁶

The Council thus displayed a progressively expansive ambition regarding the identification and countering of transnational revolutionary threats. It initiated a number of joint memoranda, complaints, missions and measures (on passports and listing). Shortly before it turned into a 'police state', the process was stopped by the British members, who knew that Parliament would never tolerate a system of automatic military intervention on behalf of repressive regimes.

The Allied Council: expanding the scope of imperial security

From 1816 onwards, the Council stretched its remit beyond the borders of France, the Netherlands and even Europe. The ministers discussed the deployment of troops from Russia, Spain, Britain and the Netherlands to fight the Barbary Corsairs. It settled British rule over the Ionian isles.⁶⁷ And it also enabled a joint mediation intervention on behalf of Spain to repel the Portuguese invasion of the Rio Plata in 1817. This last endeavour took up a substantial number of sessions and sparked heated discussions within the Council as to its scope, institutional identity and imperial interests.

The trigger to this affair (which cannot be rendered in its full complexity here)⁶⁸ was the formal request made by the Court of Madrid to the Allied Council and to the government of France, in March 1817, to act as mediating courts in negotiating the Portuguese restitution of the territory in the Banda Oriental (today's Uruguay) – a

highly strategic swath of land along the Rio de la Plata that Portugal had invaded and occupied in 1816.⁶⁹ According to Spain, the aggression demonstrated by the Court of Brazil would bring disaster not only to South America, but also to Europe. The Council accepted, and succeeded in bringing Portugal to declare Spain's formal right of property over the occupied territory. However, the Portuguese envoy Palmella came to Paris and defended the invasion as a counterrevolutionary measure, and the only means of safeguarding South America's monarchies against the advance of 'Republicks' and artiguist revolutionaries.⁷⁰ After having quelled the 'esprit revolutionnaire' in Europe, it was now high time to combat this 'malheur' not only in Europe, but in 'le monde entire', since the revolutionary uprisings in the Americas were an 'attentat contraire à la moralité des nations et à la sureté des thrones'. It had to be the 'grand but' of the European 'confédération' to fight this 'anarchie' and these 'ennemies des souverains et des peuples'.⁷¹

After lengthy deliberation amongst the allied ministers (and Richelieu), Portugal stepped up its bid and asked the 'court médiatrices' in Paris to come up with a concrete plan for the 'pacification of South America' as a whole. 'The greatest interest of Spain, Portugal and the whole of Europe' dictated a joint effort to put an end to the revolutionary agitation in America, 'conform to the spirit of the age', and 'with respect to the relations between the two worlds'. If the 'esprit de démogagie' was not stifled there, it would 'sooner or later' spread to Europe.⁷² Wellington never saw Pozzo di Borgo and the other ministers that 'disturbed'. Subsequently, the ministers of France and Russia formally requested Wellington to accept a role as mediator between Spain, Portugal and the colonies, and practically expand his efforts in Paris to Madrid and South America.⁷³

At this point, Wellington, in close correspondence and under instructions from Castlereagh, politely declined. After discussing the hazards of sending an allied expedition under the command of a 'third power' (possibly the Netherlands) to Montevideo, he explained to the Allied Council that the conflict between Portugal, Spain and the revolutionaries under Artigas was a 'bye-battle', that Spain was 'too jealous' to seriously accept European interference in her affairs, and that he could not see himself bringing such a challenge to a conclusive end.⁷⁴ Here, British unilateral imperial interests dominated over and thwarted a joint, inter-imperial effort. Since the Allied Council had been disbanded after Aachen, there was no follow-up.

Concluding remarks

The Allied Council functioned as a venue for inter-imperial cooperation and as a testing ground for its corresponding security practices and arrangements. It also gave birth to an increased sense of inter-imperial dependency. This dependency was expressed in the international mobilization of huge financial loans and public investors throughout Europe; in the attempts to function as a joint allied police force and the implementation of concrete security arrangements (black lists, uniform passports) all over Europe. It was a testing ground for Metternich's idea of creating a European police directory, as underpinned by the framework of the Holy Alliance. British opposition prevented

Metternich and the Prussians from transforming the Council into a European police directorate. But the ministers did establish some uniform standards and means of mutual assistance in dealing with unrest and uprisings. Within the societies of Europe, news about such events and incidents was reported and commented upon extensively.⁷⁵ Intelligence reports and letters of solidarity were exchanged regularly.

By means of defined institutional practices and reciprocal treaties of assistance, the Allied Council tested a series of inter-imperial security practices that were quite expansive in their ambitions.⁷⁶ After 1816, the allies' scope widened to include the whole of Europe, and far beyond – stretching to the 'other hemisphere' and South America. At the same time, critics (the radical pundits in Brussels and London for example) argued that the allied interventions contributed to greater polarization in France and elsewhere. Even Wellington felt by 1818 that it was time to leave. But after 1818, the Allied Council had left a substantial legacy; the military occupation of France was just the beginning of the large-scale imperial security projects that came later in the nineteenth century.

Notes

- 1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n.615313. The author is currently working on a monograph about the Allied Council, with CUP.
- 2 Thomas Dwight Veve has studied the *military aspects* of the occupation in *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (Westport, CT, 1992). See also Thomas D. Veve, 'Wellington and the Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818', in *The International History Review* 11 (1989) 1:98–108; Philip Mansel, 'Wellington and the French Restoration', in idem, 76–83; Enno E. Kraeche, 'Wellington and the Reconstruction of the Allied Armies during the Hundred Days', in idem, 84–97. Volker Wacker's book *Die Alliierte Besetzung Frankreichs in den Jahren 1814 bis 1818* (Hamburg, 2001) concentrates primarily on the *Prussian share* in that task. Christine Haynes is the first to systematically address the *feelings and reactions of the French population* during the occupation, Idem, 'Making Peace: The Allied Occupation of France, 1815–1818', in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Michael Rowe (eds), *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (London, 2016), 51–67. See also Emmanuel de Waresquiel, *Le Duc de Richelieu, 1766–1822* (Paris, 2009).
- 3 For the minutes of these meetings see, amongst others: National Archives, Kew (TNA). Foreign Office Files (FO) 92, 139; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (GStA PK), Berlin. III. Hauptabteilung (HA) Ministerium des Auswärtigen (Mda) I, Politische Abteilung, Konferenz der Minister der alliierten Mächte in Paris, among others nrs. 897, 911, 1464, 1465, 1458, 1469.
- 4 Metternich, Memorandum to Hardenberg, 6 August 1815, Paris. GStA III. HA Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten. I. Nr. 1461. p. 75.
- 5 Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (London, 1994), 121; Mathew S. Anderson, 'Eighteenth-Century Theories of Balance of Power', in Ragnhild Hatton, D. B. Horn

- and Mathew S. Anderson (eds), *Studies in Diplomatic History: Essays in Memory of David Bayne Horn* (London, 1970), 183–198.
- 6 Castlereagh, 'Memorandum', 13 July 1815. GStA III. HA Nr. 1461. See also Henry Houssaye, 1815. *Le cent jours* (Paris, 1920), 425–426.
 - 7 Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (London/Cambridge, 1997); Wolfgang Benz, *Potsdam 1945: Besatzungsherrschaft und Neuaufbau im Vier-Zonen-Deutschland* (München, 2012); Gunther Mai, *Der alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945–1948: Alliierte Einheit – deutsche Teilung?* (Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte. Band 36) (München, 1995).
 - 8 William Pitt, 'Memorandum for security and deliverance of Europe', in a letter to the Russian Ambassador at London, January 19, 1805. Printed in Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830–1902* (Oxford, 1970), 197–8.
 - 9 Friedrich von Gentz, *Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe*. Translation (London, 1806); idem, 'Über de Pradt's Gemälde von Europa nach dem Kongress von Aachen', in *Wiener Jahrbüchern der Literatur* 5 (1819): 279–318, also in Gustav Schlesier (ed.), *Schriften von Friedrich Gentz: Ein Denkmal* (Mannheim, 1838), 88–156.
 - 10 Metternich, Note, as annex to the protocol of 3 November 1815. GStA III. HA Nr. 1469, 50. See also protocol 10 August 1815, GStA III. HA I. Nr. 1461.
 - 11 (Hardenberg), 'Etat des Négociations actuelles entre les Puissances Alliées & la France', 16–28 July 1815. GStA III. HA I. Nr. 1461, 55; Metternich, Memorandum, 6 August 1815. Sent to Hardenberg. GStA III. HA I. Nr. 1461, 75.
 - 12 Memorandum Allied Council to Müffling, protocols 12 July 1815 GStA III. HA Nr. 1464.
 - 13 Lutz Raphael, *Recht und Ordnung: Herrschaft durch Verwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt a.M., 2000), 17, 21–40.
 - 14 Idem; Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780–1830* (Cambridge, 227–8).
 - 15 Note by Castlereagh to the Allied Ministers, 11 September 1815. T. C. Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates from 1803 to the present time* (London, 1816), 298.
 - 16 See Volker Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung Frankreichs in den Jahren 1814 bis 1818* (Hamburg, 2001), 105–7.
 - 17 'Articles arrêtés entre M. l'Intendant Général des armées & les Commissaire de S.M. T.C. sur le mode d'exécution pour l'entretien, l'habillement & l'équipement des troupes', 15 August 1815. GStA III. HA I. Nr. 1461.
 - 18 GStA III. HA Nr. 1464, protocol 14 July 1815; see the memorandum attached from Talleyrand; see also Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 115.
 - 19 GStA III. HA Nr. 1464, protocol 12 July 1815.
 - 20 National Archives, London. FO 146/6, séances 14, 22, 24, 27 August 1815.
 - 21 See De Warequiel, *Le Duc de Richelieu*, chapters 4 and 5.
 - 22 GStA III. HA Nr. 1464, protocol of 12 and 13 July 1815. Cited from Annex 6, protocol 13 July.
 - 23 Castlereagh to Wellington, 13 May 1816, as cited in Niek van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot: Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813–1831* (Groningen, 1985), 122.
 - 24 Castlereagh, Memorandum, 13 July 1815. GStA III. HA Ministerium der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten. I. Nr. 1461. See also Lord Liverpool to Castlereagh, 21 July 1815, in Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*. Vol. 11 (London, 1863), 47.
 - 25 Protocol of 13 July.

- 26 Rory Muir, *Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace 1814–1852* (New Haven/London, 2015), 108–9.
- 27 TNA FO 146/6, séance October 1815, plus annex with instructions and objectives. Note to Wellington, signed by Castlereagh, Metternich, Nesselrode and Humboldt.
- 28 Christine Haynes, 'Making Peace: The Allied Occupation of France, 1815–1818', in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann and Michael Rowe (eds), *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (London, 2016), 62.
- 29 Protocol 17 July 1815, Allied Council. GStA HA Nr. 1464.
- 30 See Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 95–8, 138–43; Andrea von Ilsemann, *Die Politik Frankreichs auf dem Wiener Kongress: Talleyrands aussenpolitische Strategien zwischen Erster und Zweiter Restauration* (Hamburg, 1996), 304–11.
- 31 See the minutes of the Allied Council, 3rd, 10th and 13th meeting, 14 and 21 July 1815, GStA PK III. HA I, 'Konferenzprotokolle der Minister der alliierten Mächte in Paris', Nr. 1464.
- 32 The Prussians were deployed in Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Bretagne; the Russians in the Ile-de-France, the Champagne and the Lorraine. The British, including the Dutch and Belgians, in Thiérache, l'Artois and Flanders. The Wurtemberger and the Bavarians in the Orléanais, Nivernais, Bourbonnais and Auvergne; the Austrians in the Bourgogne, Franche-Comté, Dauphiné, Lyonnais and in parts of Provence and the Languedoc. See 'Memorandum on the temporary occupation of part of France, 31 August 1815', in Wellington, *Despatches*, Vol. 8, 253–5; see also Thomas Dwight Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (London, 1992), 11–31; Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 141–6.
- 33 Cf. Wilfried Uitterhoeve, *Cornelis Kraijenhoff 1758–1840: Een Loopbaan onder Vijf Regeervormen* (Nijmegen, 2009), 289–318; H. D. Jones, *Reports Relating to the Re-Establishment of the Fortresses in the Netherlands from 1814 to 1830* (London, 1861); Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 93–108; Robert Gils, *De Versterkingen van de Wellingtonbarrière in Oost-Vlaanderen* (Ghent, 2005).
- 34 Although these feelings of resentment were exaggerated in later years: Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 262–90.
- 35 Haynes, 'Making Peace', 62–3.
- 36 The Allied Council was made aware of this through Justus von Grüner's daily reports. Letters of Grüner and reports to the Allied Council, July–November 1815. GStA NI Hardenberg 10a. See also ongoing reports in the protocols of the Allied Council, up until 1818. See also De Waresquiel, *Le Duc de Richelieu*, 22–3.
- 37 Cited in Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 67.
- 38 Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 109–23.
- 39 Although Wellington and the allies insisted on an international defensive/garrison force, the Dutch king William I refused to house foreign troops in Dutch forts. So Dutch troops manned the forts, with German troops nearby. Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 223–31. See also 'Memorandum', discussed in the Allied Council to prepare for the Aachen Conference. FO 92/34.
- 40 Gruner, reports to the allied ministers, July–August 1815. NI. Hardenberg 38 Fasz I, GStA.
- 41 Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 37–40. See for such a cooperation: 'Rapport van den Inspecteur-Generaal der Fortificaties betreffende de ontworpen grondslagen tot een algemeen systema van Defensie van het Rijk', 15 March 1816. NA, 'toegangnummer' 2.02.01 ('Algemene Staatssecretarie en Kabinet des Konings'), inventory 5654.

- 42 Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers: 1815–1816*. Vol. 3 (London: Ridgway, 1838), 280–91; see 292–361, for specific conventions regarding how the debt should be paid and borders drawn.
- 43 Richelieu to the Allied Council, 10 September 1817, protocol 13 September 1817. TNA, London, FO 146/22.
- 44 Letter Baring to Richelieu, 7 October 1817, Paris. Protocol of the Allied Council, 8 October 1817. TNA, London, FO 146/22.
- 45 Eugene N. White ‘Making the French Pay: The Costs and Consequences of the Napoleonic Reparations’, *European Review of Economic History* 5 (2001) 337–65, here 341, 361.
- 46 See also Glenda Sluga, ‘The Economic History of a European Security Culture, After the Napoleonic Wars’, in Beatrice de Graaf, Brian Vick (eds), *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture* (Cambridge, 2018); Jerome Greenfield, ‘Financing a New Order. The Payment of Reparations by Restoration France, 1817–1818’, *French History*, 30 (2016) 3: 376–400; Kim Oosterlinc, Loredana Ureche-Rangau and Jacques-Marie Vaslin, ‘Baring, Wellington and the Resurrection of French Public Finances Following Waterloo’, *The Journal of Economic History* 74 (2014) 4: 1072–1102; D. C. M. Platt, *Foreign Finance in Continental Europe and the United States, 1815–1870: Quantities, Origins, Functions and Distribution* (London, Boston, Sydney, 1984); Philip Ziegler, *The Sixth Great Power: Barings, 1762–1929* (London, 1988).
- 47 Wellington to Bathurst, 2 July 1815, in: Idem, Vol. 8, 188–93.
- 48 See reports by Gruner, 22 July–November 1815. In Gruner Nr. 86; Nachlass Hardenberg 10a, GStA Berlin.
- 49 See K. Zeisler, ‘Justus von Gruner. Eine biographische Skizze’, in Werner Breunig and Uwe Schaper (eds), *Berlin in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Berlin, 1994), 81–105.
- 50 Especially letter Gruner to Fouché, 22 July and Descazes, 3 August 1815, Gruner Nr. 86. Gruner to Fouché, 3 August 1815. Nl. Hardenberg 10a. GStA.
- 51 Bericht Gruner, 13 September 1815. Nl. Hardenberg 10a. GStA.
- 52 Daniel P. Resnick, *The White Terror and the Political Reaction After Waterloo* (Cambridge, MA, 1966), 56–62; Charles Pouthas (ed.), *Charles de Rémusat: Mémoires de ma vie, 1797–1820*. Vol. 1 (Paris, 1958), 225–6.
- 53 Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 11 February 1816, TNA FO 27/130; see P. J. Lauze de Péret, *Causes et précis des troubles, crimes et désordres dans le département du Gard et dans d’autres lieux du Midi de La France* (Paris: Poulet, 1819); letter from Wellington to Louis XVIII, February 1816, in Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, Vol. 9, 309–310; Document No. 104. ‘Extraits des rapports du Colonel Ross, Janvier 1816’, in Daniel Robert, *Textes et documents relatifs à l’histoire des Églises Réformées en France: période 1800–1830*. Vol. 37 of *Histoire des idées et critique littéraire* (Geneva/Paris, 1962), 305–11, here 307–8; Correspondance, TNA FO 27/119. See also Alice Wemyss, ‘L’Angleterre et la Terreur blanche de 1815 dans le Midi’, *Annales du Midi* 73 (1963) 55:287–310, here 295–6.
- 54 Letter Fouché to the Préfet of Nimes, 25 August 1815. Nl Hardenberg 10a, GStA.
- 55 Letter Gruner to Friedrich Wilhelm III, copy to Hardenberg and Allied Council, 30 August 1815. Nl. Hardenberg 10a, GStA.
- 56 Note Schwarzenberg. Annex to the protocol of 16 August 1815; Memorandum Schwarzenberg, 27 August, annex no. 97. GStA HA III. Nr. 1465, p. 62 e.v., 109 e.v. Schwarzenberg was dispatched again in September and October.
- 57 Letter to Louis XVIII, composed by Wellington and the Allied Council, 28 February 1816. TNA FO 146/6, séance 28 February 1816.

- 58 Minutes of the Allied Council, July–December 1816, and the first months of 1816. HA III, 1464, 1465 and 1469. See also Report by Richelieu to the Council, 19 May 1816, TNA FO 146/6.
- 59 Letter Allied Council to Gruner, 18 October 1815. GStA Nl Hardenberg 10a, FAsz I; Protocol Allied Council, Instructions Metternich, 15 August 1815. GStA III. HA. Nr. 1465. See also Le Prince Napoléon, *Mémoires de la Reine Hortense*. Deel III (Paris: Plon, 1927), 65–103.
- 60 Richard Edgcumbe (ed.), *The Diary of Frances Lady Shelley 1787–1817* (London, 1912), 202–3. Shelley refers to ‘Monsieur de Cage’, a phonetic rendering in English of the French name (Élie) Descazes, the French Foreign Minister and Minister of Police.
- 61 Muir, *Wellington*, 111–13.
- 62 ‘Attentat contre le duc de Wellington’, voluminous file at the Archives de la préfecture de police (APP), Nr. APP.AA.342. Especially police reports 12–13 February. See also police reports 12 February–April 1816. AND.F.7.3839. Paris.
- 63 Cf. Minutes of the Allied Council, February–April 1816. TNA FO 146/6.
- 64 E.g. FO 146/6, séance 25 February 1816.
- 65 Wellington, ‘Memorandum to Ministers on the Libels Published in the Low Countries’, 29 August 1816, in the Duke of Wellington (ed.), *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda* [WSD], vol. 11 (London, 1858), 464–9. Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot*, 125–62; Pierre Rain, *L’Europe et la restauration des Bourbons: 1814–1818* (Paris, 1908); W. P. Sautijn Kluit, ‘Dagbladvervolgingen in België 1815–1830’, *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde* 3 (1892) 6:307–94.
- 66 Castlereagh to Stuart, 22 July 1817, in C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–1822: Britain and the European Alliance* (London, 1924), 71.
- 67 Protocol 28 October 1815; Treaty of 5 November. GStA III. HA. Nr. 1469, 33.
- 68 See Enoch F. Resnick, ‘A Family Imbroglia: Brazil’s Invasion of the Banda Oriental in 1816 and Repercussions on the Iberian Peninsula’, *Revista de História* 51 (1975) 101: 179–205. A monograph by Beatrice de Graaf on the Allied Council and its activities is underway with CUP.
- 69 Note Labrador to Council; deliberations and annex. Protocol 16 March 1817. TNA FO 146/15.
- 70 Allied Council, Protocol 18, 21 June 1817. TNA FO 146/22.
- 71 Protocol 20 July 1817. TNA FO 146/22.
- 72 Memorandum Palmella to the Allied Council, discussion and annexes, 21 March 1818. TNA FO 146/23.
- 73 Letters Wellington to Castlereagh, 23, 26, 30 March 1818. TNA FO 92/33.
- 74 Lengthy letters and memoranda: August 1818; 19 November 1818. TNA FO 92/33.
- 75 A review of the (British) *Examiner*, the (Austrian) *Wiener Zeitung*, (German) *Allgemeine Zeitung* and the (Dutch) *Rotterdamsche Courant* reveals that the ‘news sky’ was already quite transnational. See for a rich analysis of the European press coverage of Vienna and its aftermath: B. E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and Politics after Napoleon* (London/Cambridge, MA, 2014), 99–111.
- 76 In this, it was a system of collective risk management, as provided for in Article VI of the second Treaty of Paris. See: Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes which have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814* (London, 1875), 372–6, here 375.