

## CHAPTER 8

### THE UNFULFILLED PREFERENCE FOR WORKING FEWER HOURS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Christine Baaijens and Joop Schippers<sup>1</sup>

#### **Abstract**

Even though the Dutch working week has become shorter and more diverse over the last decades, not all employees weekly working hours preferences are fulfilled. Time and again, cross-sectional studies among employees reveal dissatisfaction with working hours. However, only part of the employees that are dissatisfied with their working hours manage to adjust their hours to their preferences. A wide gap apparently exists between preferring to adjust working hours and actually adjusting them. The gap is widest for employees who would like to reduce their working hours.

In this article three questions are addressed. What is the pattern of transition from wanting to adjust working hours to actually doing so? Which categories of employees can be expected to reduce working hours? Which categories of employees can be expected to realise their preference for working fewer hours? We will answer these questions using panel data for the period 1986-1998.

We find that for many employees, in spite of the broad acceptance in the Netherlands of part-time employment and the excellent arrangements entailed around it, it is still difficult for employees to realise their preferences. This leaves little optimism for the opportunities of employees in other European countries. In these countries part-time employment is often marginal employment and the labour market is less equipped for it. It will ask a major effort from many European policy makers to offer other European employees at least the same possibilities as are already available to Dutch employees.

#### **Acknowledgements**

The OSA is gratefully acknowledged for providing the data. We wish to thank Jan Dirk Vlasblom for useful comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual conference of the European Society of Population Economics in New York, June 2003. We also wish to thank the participants of the session in which we presented the paper for their helpful comments. The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) has subsidized this research, grant no. 510-02-0302.

#### **1. Introduction**

In the Netherlands, annual average working hours per job have decreased sharply over the last decades. Even though the full-time working week has become shorter and even though there has been tremendous growth in part-time jobs, still not all employees' working week duration preferences seem to be fulfilled. Cross-sectional studies among employees reveal time and again that a fair share of men and women would like to adjust their working hours. In addition, using panel data, we will show in this chapter that the dissatisfaction among employees regarding working hours hardly shows a downward

tendency over the course of the past ten years. Since the gap is largest for people who would like to *reduce* working hours, we will mainly focus on this group in our analyses. Theoretical insights will help us to derive hypotheses with respect to which categories of employees can be expected to be more or less successful in realising their preferences for adjusting working hours.

Adjustment of working hours is an interesting phenomenon from the perspective of transitional labour markets. As far as adjustments of working hours are the result of employers' initiatives it can be seen as an answer to cyclical movements in the economy and the demand for the company's goods or services. In that case it is an alternative to lay offs. As far as adjustments of working hours are the result of workers' initiatives – as we will study in this chapter – it can be seen as an instrument to prevent a complete transition (to another job or out of the labour market) and serve as an instrument to allow for the combination of work and, for instance, care tasks. So, the answers to the question addressed in this chapter will tell us to what extent working hour adjustments help in preventing labour market transitions and allow for a smooth combination of paid labour with activities in other domains of life (Schippers, 2004).

In this article three questions are addressed:

1. How have preferences regarding the adjustment of working hours developed over time and how many employees have actually adjusted working hours?
2. Which employees can be expected to want to reduce working hours?
3. Which categories of employees can be expected to realise their preferences for working fewer hours?

We will answer these questions using panel data for the period 1986-1998.

## **2. The shortening of the average working week**

### *Full-time jobs have become shorter*

Between 1950 and 2001, average working hours per full-time job decreased from 2,280 hours per year to 1,719 hours per year, a decline of 25%. This downward tendency can primarily be explained by subsequent collective reductions of the working week and by the growth in the number of holidays (CBS, 1996). Shortly after World War II, the government introduced a mandatory 48-hour working week, because the economy had to be rebuilt. Between 1959 and 1964, employees, organised in trades unions, preferred to receive part of the post-war growth in prosperity in the form of extra free time instead of higher income (SCP, 1994: 97). Employers, faced with severe shortages on the labour market, started offering contracts for a five-day working week and the Saturday off as a means to recruit and retain employees. So, for many full-timers Saturdays became part of the weekend, thereby changing the working week from six days per week to five days per week.

In the early 1980s, the Netherlands faced a severe economic recession causing unemployment figures to rise to record levels. In 1982, employers, unions and the Dutch cabinet signed the now famous Wassenaar Agreement, in which all parties agreed to achieve structural improvement of the labour market. The aim was to solve the unemployment problem by redistributing existing employment. Collective working time reduction was one of the instruments used; in most cases, this meant a reduction from 40 hours to 38 hours per week. The distinctive feature of working time reduction as it was introduced between 1983 and 1986 was that it was not introduced as reduction per day or per week, but rather as reduction per year, the so-called roster-free days (*roostervrije dagen*). Consequently the number of holidays and off days held by full-timers had increased to 36 days per year in 1986 (CBS, 1996).

Between 1994 and 1997 a second round of working time reduction took place. During this round, a 36-hour working week was negotiated by employers and unions in many sectors of the economy. This time working time reduction was often introduced as reduction per week or per fortnight. In the private sector, the 36-hour working week was traded off against flexibility and reduced premiums for working non-standard hours or working overtime. In the public sector working time reduction was traded off against the preservation of employment and modest wage increases (Hemerijck & Visser, 1997).

In recent years the regulation of individual working times within collective agreements is increasingly decentralised to the level of the work floor (Van den Toren, 1998).

The above shows that average contractual working hours of full-time jobs have strongly decreased over the last 50 years. However, due to increasing overtime *actual* working hours have decreased somewhat less. Moreover, the decline of the working week has not been universal. In some jobs or sectors a 40-hour full-time working week still applies. In other jobs or sectors a 36-hour full-time working week applies and the full-time working week of employees working in shifts is often even shorter.

#### *The rise of part-time employment*

In the Netherlands, the growth in part-time employment is of recent date. In 1973, the proportion of part-time employment in total employment was only 4% (OECD, 1983). Women held most of the part-time jobs. Since the 1970s, the relative share of part-time employment in total employment has grown gradually, with significant increases occurring in the 1980s and 1990s. Similar trends in the growth of part-time employment can be found in most European countries. However, as illustrated in Table 8.1, part-time employment is nowhere as common as it is in the Netherlands.

	EU-15	B	DK	D	EL	E	F	IRL	I	L	NL	A	P	FIN	S	UK
<b>Men + women</b>	18	21	22	19	5	8	17	17	9	11	41	17	11	12	23	25
<b>Men</b>	6	6	10	5	3	3	5	7	4	2	19	4	6	8	11	9
<b>Women</b>	34	40	35	38	8	17	31	31	17	26	71	33	16	17	36	45

Source: Eurostat (2001: Table 34)  
 Distinction between full-time and part-time is based upon spontaneous response by the respondent  
 EU-15 = All 15 member states of the EU, B = Belgium (employees only), DK = Denmark, D = Germany, EL = Greece, E = Spain, F = France, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, A = Austria, P = Portugal, FIN = Finland, S = Sweden and UK = United Kingdom

The growth in part-time employment in the Netherlands has been caused by a combination of supply and demand factors. Furthermore, since the 1980s, government intervention has been geared towards improving the quality of part-time employment, both by reinforcing the legal position of part-timers and by expanding the number of part-timers (Baaijens, 1999a).

On the supply side the growing labour participation of (married) women has contributed greatly (Plantenga, 1996). The desire or need to supplement (family) income, changing attitudes towards the division of paid labour and care between men and women, changes in the educational level and a decrease in the number of children per family all supported this trend (Baaijens, 1999a).

On the demand side a second development should be mentioned, apart from the above-mentioned Wassenaar Agreement: the growing importance of the service sector. Contrary to manufacturing industry, many services cannot be delivered from stock. Part-time employment can be used as a means to fine-tune the supply of services on demand, especially if demand is relatively predictable (Remery et al., 2002).

Between 1987 and 2001, the proportion of part-timers in total employment increased from 23% to 33%. Statistics Netherlands defines part-time employment as working 34 hours or less per week.<sup>2</sup> People holding a contract of 35 hours or more are considered full-timers. Women overwhelmingly hold part-time jobs. In 1987 the proportion of women in total employment amounted to 33%, in 2001 this proportion has increased to 40%. However, the share of female part-timers in total part-timers increased from 70% in 1987 to 78% in 2001.

During that same period, the proportion of male part-timers has barely changed (10% in 1987 compared to 12% in 2001). The majority of male part-timers hold a substantial part-time job (20 to 34 hours per week).

When looking at the female workforce, a different picture emerges. In 1987, slightly less than half of the employed female labour force worked part-time (48%). Over the past 15 years this proportion has increased to 63%. Especially the share of women in substantial part-time jobs has increased strongly. 1995 marked the first year in which the number of women working substantial part-time jobs exceeded the number of women working full-time. The growing importance of substantial part-time jobs can be explained by the significant increase in labour force participation of mothers over the last decade (Plantenga et al., 1999). Early 1980s one-third of working women continued to participate on the labour market after the birth of their first child. Late 1990s, this proportion has increased to three-quarters of women.<sup>3</sup> Most mothers that remain in the labour force do so in a part-time position (Groot en Maassen van den Brink, 1997:64; Kragt, 1997: 38).

Thus, we can conclude that the absolute number of full-time jobs for women has barely increased between 1987 and 2001. The increased participation of women in the period under investigation has almost entirely been realised by means of part-time employment.

### 3. Data

To answer our research questions, we will use data from the OSA Labour Supply Panel. The Institute for Labour Studies (*Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek* - OSA) started this panel in 1985. It is a face-to-face biennial panel survey among a representative sample of some 2,000 households (about 4,500 individuals) in the Netherlands. The panel contains both questions about the number of contractual working hours per week as well as questions about the preferred size of the contractual working week (Fouarge et al., 1998).<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, the attrition between waves is a quarter to one-third of the respondents. Each new wave of the sample is therefore supplemented with new households. By doing so, the total number of respondents per wave remains about the same and, more importantly, the dataset remains large enough to be representative for the labour force. Yet, attrition from the panel reduces the possibility of following employees over a long period. Therefore we have limited the analyses in this paper to transitions between two waves.


Data are collected in 1985 and from 1986 onwards every two years up to 2002. The year 1985 is not used because we wanted to use waves of equal length for the analyses. The years 2000 and 2002 are not used because that year the phrasing regarding contractual and preferred working hours was completely changed. We will only use the years 1986 up to and including 1998, or seven waves.


Since respondents appear to face great difficulty in reporting working time reduction or roster-free days, a 4-hour cut-off is used. This means that a desire to work more or less hours is only used in the analyses and taken as a deviation from 'content' if the employee states a preference to work at least half a day more or less than currently negotiated. This way, inaccuracies that might arise from wrongly completing the questions are avoided as much as possible. Reference point for preferred contractual working hours is current contractual working hours; both refer to weekly working hours. The question about contractual working hours has been slightly altered in the years under investigation in order to capture working time reduction.<sup>5</sup> In order to determine whether employees have changed their contractual working hours between two consecutive waves, we also used a 4-hour cut-off. An important limitation of the OSA Labour Supply Panel is that the panel does not contain information on whether employees have put forward a request for adjusting working hours. Nor does the panel contain information on what employees prevents from adjusting their working hours, with the exception of 1994.

#### 4. Preferences for working more or fewer hours: 1986 – 1998

Figures 8.1a and 8.1b show how working hour preferences of male and female employees have developed between 1986 and 1998. Figure 8.1a reveals that throughout the period, three-quarters of male employees is satisfied with the length of their working week. Only a small proportion of men express a preference to increase their working hours. Recently this proportion has even decreased (in 1998 it concerned 7% of male employees). In light of the fact that most men work full-time in the Netherlands, it is not surprising that only a small proportion of men would like to extend their working hours. On the other hand, from 1988 onwards, there has been a small rise in the proportion of men that would like to reduce their working hours (in 1998 it concerned one out of five - 19% - of male employees).

Looking at the preferred working hours of women, a different picture emerges. Here we find a larger share of employees that is not satisfied with their contractual working hours. A growing number of women would like to extend their working week, although their share seems to be decreasing from 1996 onwards. One explanation could be that part of this group has already adjusted their working hours and now belong to the group of 'satisfied' respondents. The proportion of women that would like to reduce their working hours has slightly decreased in recent years.





In order to examine to what extent employees are successful in adjusting working hours in the preferred direction, two-yearly transitions have been calculated. We calculated how many of the employees that in one year state that they are *not* satisfied with their working hours, have adjusted their working hours according to their preferences two years later. Table 8.2 shows the results. The rows refer to the situation in year  $t$  and the columns refer to the situation in year  $t + 2$ .

Table 8.2 (next page) reveals that the majority of employees did not adjust their working hours according to their preferences from one period to the next. Of the employees with a desire to reduce working hours, 15% to 20% have actually done so two years later. Here as well we find that employees seem to be more willing to petition for more hours or, alternatively, that requests for more hours are more easily honoured. Between 23% and 32% of employees with a desire to work more hours have adjusted their working hours accordingly two years later. This percentage seems to have increased after 1994.

Table 8.2 also shows that some of the employees stating that they are satisfied with their working hours are nonetheless working different hours two years later. We have no information whether the change in working hours was initiated by the employee or the employer. A voluntary change could for example be the result of changes in personal life, such as the birth of a child.

Table 8.2. Transition from preferring a different number of working hours to actual changing working hours, two-yearly calculated for employees only, 1986-1998

<b>Situation in 1988: employees with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1986</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	17%	70%	2%	2%	7%	2%	N=241
Content with # of hours	7%	79%	5%	2%	7%	1%	N=1,091
Wants to work more hours	4%	61%	23%	2%	7%	2%	N=161
<b>Situation in 1990: workers with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1988</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	16%	72%	1%	1%	9%	1%	N=275
Content with # of hours	6%	78%	6%	2%	7%	1%	N=1,220
Wants to work more hours	4%	62%	25%	3%	5%	1%	N=189
<b>Situation in 1992: workers with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1990</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	15%	73%	4%	1%	6%	1%	N=352
Content with # of hours	5%	82%	6%	2%	4%	1%	N=1,309
Wants to work more hours	4%	59%	28%	2%	6%	1%	N=172
<b>Situation in 1994: workers with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1992</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	16%	72%	2%	3%	5%	2%	N=374
Content with # of hours	6%	79%	4%	3%	7%	1%	N=1,337
Wants to work more hours	8%	61%	24%	4%	4%	0%	N=206
<b>Situation in 1996: workers with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1994</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	19%	69%	2%	5%	4%	1%	N=350
Content with # of hours	6%	82%	4%	2%	4%	1%	N=1,301

Wants to work more hours	6%	62%	24%	4%	3%	2%	N=181
<b>Situation in 1998: workers with ...</b>							
<i>Situation in 1996</i>	Reduced # of hours	Same # of hours	Extended # of hours	Unemployed	Not participating	Other	Total
Wants to work less hours	20%	71%	2%	2%	4%	1%	N=296
Content with # of hours	11%	76%	6%	2%	4%	1%	N=1,124
Wants to work more hours	2%	56%	32%	4%	3%	3%	N=170
Other refers to people who have become self-employed or work in a family business or people in full-time education 2 years later							
Source: Calculations based upon OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986 – 1998							

From this section we can conclude that a fair share of employees is not satisfied with the number of contractual hours they are currently working and, more importantly, that the relative share of dissatisfied employees has barely changed throughout the last 10 years. Secondly, we can conclude that a large share of the employees that in one year state that they would like to adjust their working hours, have not done so two years later. Employees seem especially hesitant or unsuccessful in adjusting their working hours downward. Also, as can be seen in Figure 8.1a and Figure 8.1b, the share of employees who would like to reduce their working hours is larger than the share of employees who would prefer an increase in working hours.

The above result leads to the question which categories of employees can be expected to be more or less successful in adjusting working hours. This question will be discussed in the next section.

### 5. Which employees can be expected to be successful in adjusting working hours?

Barriers regarding the reduction of working hours can exist both at the level of the individual and at the level of the organisation.

#### *The individual level*

A possible important barrier at the individual level are the income consequences of reducing working hours. Working fewer hours means a lower income and that might hinder employees from working their preferred number of hours. This might especially be the case for (young) parents. Parents may be the category of employees with the highest needs and preferences for reducing their working hours (Esveldt et al., 2001), but who can least afford to do so, because of the costs of raising children. A similar line of arguing can for instance be applied to people who have negotiated a mortgage on their house that is only redeemable when working full-time. In such cases there exists a clear path dependency of prior decisions that could very well preclude people from working their preferred number of hours. However, the consequences in terms of income are already captured in the question posed in the survey:<sup>6</sup>

“Imagine that you could determine the number of hours you work per week yourself. It concerns the number of hours you would like to negotiate with your employer. How many hours would you like to work in your current position, if you would on average

earn the same per hour as you are earning now? If you decide to work fewer hours this means lower after-tax earnings; extending your hours implies higher earnings. Also, you have to make the assumption that any other member of your family will not work more or fewer hours.”

To what extent individuals will or can take income consequences really fully into consideration is difficult to determine. However, it seems fair to assume respondents will at least think about the consequences regarding income when filling in the questionnaire.

#### *The level of the organisation*

Once an employee has put forward a request for working fewer hours, the employer has to decide how to respond. The results from section 4 have shown that not every request is honoured. In developing possible determinants of employer responses to employees' request for working fewer hours we will draw heavily on the existence of institutions. For our theoretical framework we draw on two different but complementary theories: dependency theory, originating from social psychology, and, emanating from sociology, institutional theory.

The 'dependency perspective' (Bartol & Martin, 1988) explains how managerial behaviour is influenced by the degree of dependence on subordinates and by threats to that dependence. Fundamental in this perspective is the assumption that managers, to varying degrees, depend upon their subordinates and that managers use financial rewards as a means to manage this dependency. Economists have also elaborated on the issue of management of uncertainty in the relationship between employer and employee, in studying hold-up (for an overview, Malcomson, 1997).

Bartol and Martin identify several sources of managerial dependence on subordinates. They argue, among other things, that managers are more dependent on subordinates when subordinates are difficult to replace. Subordinates are difficult to replace when they possess skills which are difficult to acquire in the short run, either because the skills are firm specific and/or because the skills are relatively short in supply on the labour market. Another source of dependency is organisational connections. The idea is that subordinates who have connections with 'powerful others' in the organisation (who look out for their interests) expose the manager to potential vulnerabilities. This argument could easily be extended to network members outside the organisation; in such cases one could for example think of the clients of someone working for an advertising agency. Finally, Bartol and Martin argue that managers are more dependent on subordinates that perform well, especially when managers cannot affect output directly and/or performance is difficult to monitor.

Bartol and Martin further argue that dependency threat operates as a moderator between dependency sources and pay allocation. Thus, an employee who would be difficult to replace and who threatens to leave the organisation is more likely to receive a pay raise than an employee who is equally difficult to replace but who does not impose this threat. In addition, employees who are less difficult to replace but impose a high risk of leaving the organisation may also be more likely to receive a pay raise. The idea is that managers sometimes rather avoid the inconvenience and expense of replacing subordinates.

Dependency theory can be adapted to explain predicted employer responses to employee requests for adjusting working hours downward. Building on work by Klein et al. (2000), it can be argued that the more dependent a manager is on a subordinate, the more likely that manager is to allow his or her subordinate to adjust working hours downward. Managers are expected to honour requests under these circumstances, because they may

rather want to keep their subordinates for fewer hours than not employ them at all. Thus it can be hypothesised (Klein et al., 2000) that employers are more likely to honour requests for downward adjustment if it concerns employees that are high performing and/or well-connected and/or difficult to replace. Therefore, high performing and/or well-connected and/or difficult to replace employees are expected to be more successful in realising their preference for working fewer hours.

Additionally, it can be hypothesised that the higher the probability of an employee leaving the organisation when downward adjustment is not an option, the greater the likelihood of honouring a request. Female employees, in general, more often than male employees combine paid work with unpaid child caring responsibilities, as will be elaborated on below. Women may therefore be more likely than men to leave their job if they desire a less time-consuming job, but are unable to secure this arrangement with their employer. The threat of an unwanted outflow of female employees who are settled into their job may cause employers to be more flexible in dealing with requests for reducing hours coming from women. However, there might also be a turning point: if the share of part-timers becomes larger than a certain threshold, employers may become more reluctant when it comes to honouring requests for working part-time.

For a large part with the same ingredients, but using an adapted reasoning, we can also derive a competing hypothesis. New ingredient is the limited mobility of mothers as emphasised by Madden (1973) and Gordon and Morton (1974) among others. Since many mothers bear main childcare responsibilities, their radius of action is generally more limited than the radius of action of men and women without children. This implies that mothers have three options in case an employer turns down their request for reducing working hours: a. accept the decision, or b. withdraw themselves from the labour market. The third alternative, finding a new job with another employer, is often not available, within their limited radius of action. The choice mothers make under these conditions will depend on the financial necessity for them to participate in the labour market. Men, who are less bound by childcare responsibilities, can more often make use of the third alternative; try and find employment elsewhere. Within the Dutch institutional context, the problem for many mothers is further complicated owing to the fact that an important part of the work-family facilities are not supplied for by the government, but come at the expense of employers. Given the shortage of day care facilities, day care places supplied for by the employer may act as a 'golden chain' for mothers with young children.

As indicated above, when a request for adjusting working hours has been turned down, employees can decide to try and find jobs elsewhere where the hours-wage package are more suitable to their needs. Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992) find that some individuals indeed need to change jobs in order to attain their desired level of labour supply. Euwals (2000) finds similar results for the Netherlands, concluding that Dutch employees that have changed employer are more successful in adjusting working hours than so-called 'job keepers'. We therefore expect that employees who have recently changed employers are more successful in realising their preference for adjusting working hours. However, one must bear in mind that employees may switch jobs or employers for many reasons, the number of working hours being just one of them.

Another line of research that can contribute to explaining employers' responses to requests for adjustment of working hours is 'institutional theory', as derived from sociology. Central to this theory is the importance of institutions to organisational structures and actions (for a review, Goodstein, 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Social

norms and values are examples of institutions, as well as laws and rules. Organisational scholars have extended the theory by conceptualising organisational responsiveness to institutional pressures as a strategic *choice* (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1991, among others).

Applied to the present research, institutional theory implies employers' responses to request for downward adjustment of working hours may also be influenced by institutional pressure (see also Klein et al., 2000). Employers face substantial institutional pressure to adopt programs to facilitate the combination of work and family (for instance Goodstein (1994) for the US and Den Dulk (2001) for the Netherlands), among these programs the possibility of adjusting working hours.

Institutional pressure to provide more opportunities for women to work fewer hours stems from several factors. First, the acceptance of women working part-time is larger than the acceptance of men working part-time (Baaijens, 1999a). Further, in spite of the significant rise in female participation over the last decades and in spite of the decay of the traditional 'breadwinner' model, even in today's society, men are still often seen as primary income earners. Women on the other hand are often still seen as secondary income earners with primary responsibility for the household and the care of children (Van den Broek et al., 1999: 55-73). It can be expected that requests for fewer working hours for childcare reasons will carry more institutional support than requests for working fewer hours for other personal reasons. Thus, from a different theoretical insight, this also leads to the expectation that women are more successful in realising their preference for working fewer hours.

Not all organisations are equally subject to institutional pressure. It is to be expected that organisations in the public sector want to portray themselves as examples of good behaviour more often than organisations in the private sector. It can therefore be expected that organisations in the public sector will more easily be inclined to honour requests for working reduced hours.

This line of reasoning can also be applied to large organisations. Large organisations are more visible and subject to more attention from politics, media and professional groups than smaller organisations. This renders large organisations more vulnerable to public pressure. Additionally, it can also be expected that the consequences of reducing hours are easier set off in large organisations than in small organisations (Baaijens, 2000).

#### *Individual and employer level*

Besides formal rules, employees may also be hindered in realising their preferences for working fewer hours by the existence of the informal rules or norms that prevail in an organisation. Informal rules and norms relate to company culture. For the purpose of illustration, Table 8.3 reveals how employees working in the public and private sector assess, on a five-point scale, the company culture regarding working part-time within their own organisation.<sup>7</sup> The higher the average score, the more positive employees are about the company culture regarding working part-time within their own organisation. As is clear from Table 8.3, employees working in the public sector are, on average, more positive than employees working in the private sector.

Table 8.3: *Company culture regarding working part-time, by sector: the higher the average score, the more positive employees are*

Sector	Average score
All employees	2,65
Employees in the public sector	3,02
Employees in the service sector	2,34
Employees in the industry	2,05
Source: data collected in 2000 and 2001 as part of the project <i>New Organisational Structures and Workers of the Future</i> N = 1,307 spread over 28 organisations	

Some organisations may use willingness to work long hours as an indicator of commitment (Landers et al., 1996). Additionally, sometimes part-time employment is conceptualised as a secondary form of employment and consequently part-timers are seen as less committed to an organisation than full-timers (for instance Fagan and O'Reilly, 1998: 7-11). Employees working in such organisations may fear that putting forward a request for reducing their working hours may be understood as signalling low commitment to their job, with detrimental consequences for their career.

The complicated interaction between individual weighing of pros and cons combined with the decision making process within the organisation may lead to a kind of self-censorship that makes employees reluctant to even start a procedure to adjust working hours downward. Since requests have to be put forward before they can be honoured or rejected, it can be expected that employees who fear diminished career perspectives as a consequence of requesting reduced working hours are less successful in realising their preferences.

This self-censorship might also be gender biased, due to different societal norms and expectations for men and women. For instance it may be thought of as acceptable, and maybe even desirable, for women with young children to reduce working hours in order to spend more time with their children. At the same time the societal norm for men with young children may expect them to extend their working hours to provide enough income to support the family. Similarly, since many women work part-time and still pursue a career, this combination might be thought of as conceivable, while at the same time 'male jobs' might still be constructed as full-time jobs with hardly any room for a part-time career. Main problem here is that being in part-time employment seems to be easier for women because it is more common. But at the same time, it is more common for women to have a part-time job *because* it is easier to get one.

## 6. Model

The number of employees in the dataset that realises their preference for working fewer hours is not very large. To be certain of our results, we also analysed what factors determine whether employees adjust their working hours downward between two waves. For this model the N is larger. We therefore estimate two models in the next section.

Firstly, we analyse the probability of employees reducing their working hours. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic analysis is the most appropriate technique. Employees are divided into two groups: a group with employees who reduced their working hours between two waves versus all other employees.<sup>8</sup>

The second model, the model that we will use to test our hypotheses, analyses the probability that employees realise their preference for working fewer hours. Here, we also used logistic regression analysis. First, we only selected employees indicating a desire to

work fewer hours. Subsequently, we divided these employees into two groups: a group of employees that reduced working hours between two waves versus the rest.<sup>9</sup>

Based on the theory and the availability of data, the following independent variables are used in both analyses: dummy variable indicating woman, dummy variable indicating mother of young children living at home, dummy variable indicating recent newborns, dummy variable indicating job mobility, dummy variable indicating civil servant and dummy variable indicating training period of the job. Furthermore we used as control variables: dummy variable indicating living with partner, age, income and dummy variable indicating education. All variables refer to the situation in year  $t$ , with the exception of dummy variable indicating job mobility and dummy variable indicating recent newborns. Job mobility refers to the period between two waves and measures whether employees have changed employers. In order to determine whether there are recent newborns, we used the birth data of the two years following year  $t$ .

Young children refer to children aged four years or younger during year  $t$ . We used training period of the job as an approximation of the degree to which employees are difficult to replace. We assumed that employees are difficult to replace when the training period exceeds three months. Further, we did not observe work experience in the dataset and therefore used age as an approximation. We used monthly after-tax income and corrected for the number of contractual working hours per week.<sup>10</sup> Education refers to highest educational level and can have three values: lower educated, secondary educated (reference category) and higher educated.

When estimating the logistic regression analysis explaining the probability that employees reduce their working hours, we used one supplementary variable: dummy variable indicating preference for working fewer hours (situation in year  $t$ ).

Unfortunately there are no empirical data available with regard to all variables considered theoretically relevant. At the level of the individual there was no variable available measuring whether employees are high performing<sup>11</sup> and/or well-connected. Furthermore there was no variable available measuring whether mothers work out of financial necessity. Neither was a variable available measuring to what extent individuals fear diminished career perspectives as a consequence of working part-time. Respondents were asked about the size of their place of work. Unfortunately this variable suffers from a large number of missing values for the first few waves. Since we wanted to estimate the same model for all years, we decided not to use this variable.

## **7. Who succeeds in reducing their working hours?**

### *Who reduces working hours?*

Table 8.4 contains the results of the logistic regression analysis explaining the probability that employees reduce their working hours between 1986 and 1998. Table 8.4 shows that three variables are significant and positive for all years under investigation: a preference for working fewer hours, changing employers and being female (with the exception of '96-'98). This means that preferring to work fewer hours, being female and job mobility all increase the probability of reducing working hours between two waves. These effects are all as could be expected.

Furthermore, from 1990 onwards the birth of a child in the household has a positive effect on the probability of reducing working hours between two waves. We can explain the insignificance of this variable in the years before 1990 by taking the spirit of the times into consideration. During the 1980s most women withdrew from the labour market after childbirth. From the 1990s onwards it became more common for mothers to stay in the labour market, albeit often part-time.

Table 8.4: Results logistic regression analysis to explain the probability of reducing working hours between two waves, all employees, 1986 – 1998

	1986 – 1988		1988 – 1990		1990 – 1992		1992 – 1994		1994 – 1996		1996 – 1998	
Explanatory variables	Coef.	[t-value]										
Preference for working fewer hours	1,07	[4.57] ***	1,17	[5.15] ***	1,13	[5.52] ***	1,08	[5.55] ***	1,20	[6.18] ***	0,84	[4.51] ***
Woman <sup>a</sup>	0,89	[3.62] ***	1,09	[4.84] ***	1,01	[4.70] ***	0,99	[4.82] ***	1,13	[5.29] ***	0,26	[1.41]
Living with partner <sup>a</sup>	0,51	[1.67]	0,58	[1.88]	-0,01	[0.04]	0,19	[0.78]	0,07	[0.26]	0,04	[0.19]
Mother young children living at home <sup>a</sup>	0,35	[0.81]	0,06	[0.12]	0,50	[1.31]	-0,10	[0.26]	0,41	[1.21]	-0,39	[1.03]
Recent newborn	0,51	[0.60]	0,50	[1.51]	0,90	[2.98] ***	0,82	[2.83] ***	0,87	[2.84] ***	0,95	[3.34] ***
Age	0,04	[3.10] ***	0,03	[2.43] **	0,00	[0.18]	0,01	[0.65]	0,01	[1.02]	0,02	[1.72]
Job mobility <sup>a</sup>	1,09	[4.65] ***	1,44	[6.53] ***	1,09	[5.28] ***	1,39	[6.22] ***	1,31	[5.41] ***	0,77	[3.64] ***
Civil servant <sup>a</sup>	0,16	[0.72]	0,37	[1.74]	0,40	[1.91]	0,16	[0.77]	0,04	[0.18]	0,31	[1.43]
Training period of job more than 3 months <sup>a</sup>	0,06	[0.27]	0,11	[0.48]	0,10	[0.50]	-0,11	[0.58]	0,11	[0.54]	0,06	[0.35]
After-tax income (adjusted)	-0,02	[2.06] **	0,00	[0.73]	-0,00	[0.38]	-0,01	[1.85]	-0,00	[0.72]	-0,01	[2.80] ***
Lower educated (ref.: secondary educated)	-0,65	[2.44] **	-0,08	[0.34]	0,59	[2.54] **	-0,17	[0.79]	0,12	[0.51]	-0,57	[2.86] ***
Higher educated	0,32	[1.08]	0,07	[0.25]	0,37	[1.29]	0,52	[2.01] **	0,51	[1.86]	0,02	[0.10]
Constant	-4,35	[6.80] ***	-5,53	[9.17] ***	-4,42	[9.12] ***	-3,30	[6.64] ***	-4,07	[7.70] ***	-2,17	[4.89] ***
Log Likelihood	-327.57611		-360.8585		-400.06618		-441.13808		-424.30813		-497.30087	
N	1366		1600		1760		1745		1661		1465	
Mean of the dependent variable	0.076 9		0.072 5		0.072 2		0.084 8		0.086 1		0.118 8	

\*\* significant at p < 0.05 \*\*\* significant at p < 0.01. <sup>a</sup> dummy-variable (1 if characteristic applies)

Source: Calculations based upon OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986 – 1998

Income shows a significant negative effect for the first and the last wave. However, the effect of income on the probability that employees do or do not reduce their working hours is very small. The marginal effect is less than 0% for both waves (not in the table).

In '86-'88 and in '96-'98 having a lower education has a negative effect on the probability of working fewer hours. During the 1980s part-time employment was not as common as it is today and therefore it can be expected that secondary and higher educated employees take the lead in reducing working hours. When the labour market was very tight during '96-'98, employers became less accommodating regarding requests for working fewer hours. Under these circumstances, it can be assumed that employers are especially reluctant to honour requests from employees that are hard to replace.

The effect of age is significant during the first two waves, indicating that, during those years, older employees, with more work experience, more easily adapted their working hours. However, when the labour market was becoming tighter during the 1990s, employees with less work experience could also demand more and age lost its significant effect.

#### *Who realises their preference for working fewer hours?*

Next, we have analysed which categories of employees are more successful in realising a desire for working fewer hours. To this end we have limited the analyses to employees stating, in year  $t$ , a preference for working fewer hours.

Table 8.5 contains the results of the logistic regression analysis explaining the probability of employees realising their preference for working fewer hours, for the years 1986-1998. For all years we find that changing employers has a significant positive effect on the probability that employees realise their preference for working fewer hours. This confirms our hypothesis. Apparently, many employees have to change employers in order to secure the arrangement they prefer. Alternatively, this indicates less flexibility in adjusting working hours *within* jobs.

We also find that, for all years, being female has a significant positive effect on the probability of realising a preference for working fewer hours. This confirms another of our hypotheses: employers more easily honour requests from women. We must bear in mind however, that we do not know whether or not employees have requested adjustment of working hours. Part of the effect we find could also be caused by the fact that women more often request adjustment, as other research has shown.

For the years '86-'88 and '92-'94 motherhood has a significant positive effect on the probability of realising a preference for working fewer hours. Here as well a change in the spirit of the times may explain what is happening. During the 1980s part-time employment was not yet as common in the Netherlands as it is today. It is quite conceivable that in those years it was easier for mothers than for other employees to adjust working hours downward, especially since institutional pressure on them is considerable. During the 1990's, part-time employment became more common and accepted, thereby reducing the necessity of having a "valid reason", for working part-time. In the early 1990s, the Netherlands faced an economic downturn, allowing women with young children to adjust their working hours downward.

The effect of age is significant in '86-'88 en '88-'90. However, the effect of age on the probability that employees realise their preference for working fewer hours is small. The marginal effect is less than 0% for both waves (not in the table).

We found no effect of working in the public sector versus working in the private sector. Nor did we find an effect of being difficult to replace. These results contradict our hypotheses on these issues.

Finally, we checked whether the gap between preferred and contractual hours has an influence on the probability that employees succeed in working fewer hours (not in the

table). It might be hypothesised that the larger the difference, the more difficult it is to succeed in working fewer hours. However, additional analyses show no effect, with the exception of '88-'90.

Explanatory variables	1986 – 1988		1988 – 1990		1990 – 1992		1992 – 1994		1994 – 1996		1996 – 1998	
	Coef.	[t-value]										
Woman <sup>a</sup>	1,22	[2.48]**	1,43	[3.18]***	1,23	[3.42]***	0,92	[2.52]**	1,13	[3.31]***	1,44	[3.61]***
Living with partner <sup>a</sup>	1,53	[2.18]**	1,47	[2.29]**	0,34	[0.77]	0,49	[1.07]	0,48	[1.04]	0,65	[1.25]
Mother young children living at home <sup>a</sup>	2,14	[2.31]**	-0,43	[0.35]	1,29	[1.56]	1,25	[2.04]**	0,13	[0.23]	-0,53	[0.86]
Recent newborn	1,42	[1.26]	-0,47	[0.64]	0,93	[1.94]	0,20	[0.44]	0,28	[0.58]	1,49	[2.83]***
Age	0,10	[3.16]***	0,06	[2.49]**	0,02	[1.04]	-0,01	[0.45]	0,01	[0.56]	0,01	[0.43]
Job mobility <sup>a</sup>	1,33	[2.68]***	1,91	[4.36]***	0,93	[2.54]**	1,69	[4.18]***	0,94	[2.29]**	1,13	[2.64]***
Civil servant <sup>a</sup>	0,32	[0.73]	0,26	[0.66]	0,64	[1.82]	0,37	[1.02]	0,09	[0.23]	-0,01	[0.02]
Training period of job more than 3 months <sup>a</sup>	0,00	[0.01]	0,06	[0.14]	0,16	[0.47]	-0,41	[1.26]	-0,20	[0.61]	-0,62	[1.83]
After-tax income (adjusted)	-0,05	[2.22]**	0,00	[0.83]	-0,00	[0.28]	-0,01	[1.09]	-0,01	[0.97]	0,00	[0.52]
Lower educated (ref.: secondary educated)	-1,20	[2.22]**	-0,52	[1.19]	0,23	[0.59]	-0,20	[0.53]	-0,12	[0.30]	-0,59	[1.41]
Higher educated	-0,79	[1.14]	-0,80	[1.60]	-0,17	[0.36]	0,39	[0.90]	0,14	[0.33]	-0,28	[0.61]
Constant	-4,62	[3.03]***	-6,05	[4.41]***	-4,15	[4.60]***	-1,66	[1.77]	-2,23	[2.37]**	-3,05	[2.88]**
Log Likelihood	-79.291216		-97.611487		-128.95571		-135.51787		-143.02818		-117.15819	
N	230		262		343		351		330		273	
Mean of the dependent variable	0.1609		0.1603		0.1516		0.1709		0.1848		0.2088	

\*\* significant at  $p < 0.05$  \*\*\* significant at  $p < 0.01$   
<sup>a</sup> dummy-variable (1 if characteristic applies)  
Source: Calculations based upon OSA Labour Supply Panel 1986 – 1998

## 8. Discussion

Since the Adjustment of Working Hours Act (WAA) was passed in 2000, the Netherlands does not have any formal barriers left regarding the reduction of working hours.<sup>12</sup> Article 2 of this act states that an employee can ask his or her employer for an adjustment of contractual working hours. The requests can be both for an upward and for a downward adjustment. The article states that the employer must honour the request, unless precluded by conflicting business interests. The act also includes a non-exhaustive list of examples of conflicting business interests related to the reduction and to the extension of working hours. The act can be seen as an instrument that allows for more labour market transitions *within* the job. If the act is a success it would help to (further) reduce the costly *change of jobs* – or even withdrawals from the labour market – that could be the result of the impossibility for workers to realise their preferred number of working hours.

This does not mean that from now on every request put forward will be honoured. However, it does imply that rejections must be justified. In this context, Van der Heijden has pointed to a special feature of the new act: “Employees are not required to present arguments for wanting to adjust their working hours. The employer, on the other hand, must justify a rejection. This departs significantly from traditional labour law which is based on hearing arguments from both sides and then weighing them up against each other” (Van der Heijden in Baaijens, 1999b: 14). So, by introducing this act, the legislator has sided with employees by trying to make their attempts at adjusting their working hours easier.

But the existence of legal back up for securing an adjustment of working hours is not the end of the story. Often, an appeal to the law serves as the last resort in solving a dispute between employer and employee. Most employees prefer not to let it come to that because of the detrimental effects to the labour relation. It is telling in this regard that in the period between the introduction of the Adjustment of Working Hours Act and September 2002, the cantonal judge has only ruled fourteen times (Veldman, 2003).

Furthermore, as we have shown above, between desiring to adjust working hours and actually changing them a lot of things can go wrong. Lack of facilities to combine paid work with the unpaid care for children could form an important barrier for employees who would like to work more hours. The potentially negative reaction of co-workers combined with the feared risk of diminished career perspectives when working part-time may act as a barrier for employees to put forward a request for working fewer hours. Next up the employer has to make his move. His reaction to the request put forward will depend on both his own beliefs as well as on the employees’ position within the organisation and on the labour market.

During each phase, costs and benefits, norms and values and institutional pressure are relevant. The extension of the legal framework, not just the introduction of the WAA, but arrangements with regard to increasing day care facilities and the introduction of leave arrangements, that has taken shape during the end of the 1990s, shows that the government wants to supply citizens with more options to combine work and family life. On the one hand the increasing structural tightness of the labour market, caused by demographic factors, renders the negotiating position of some employees stronger, but on the other hand tends to make employers more reluctant to accommodate requests for downward adjustment of working hours. Whether or not employees can realise their preferences regarding working hours in the years to come will depend strongly on the degree to which government, employers and trade unions together will succeed in generating additional labour supply.

Policies introduced in 2002 to favour a more balanced labour supply over the life course may help workers realise their goal of adjusting working hours. A more balanced supply of labour over the life course not only contributes to optimal use of the production factor

labour, but also contributes to an improved work-life balance. Working time adjustments can serve as an alternative to a labour market transition that goes with transaction costs and the loss of human capital.

In spite of the broad acceptance of part-time employment and the excellent arrangements entailed around it, it is still difficult for many employees to realise their preferences for adjustment of working hours. In terms of transitional labour markets this means that the possibilities of adapting to changing economic circumstances and/or changing circumstances in individuals' personal lives are still limited. If individuals cannot realise their preferred number of working hours in a job they may be forced into an unwanted labour market transition. Such an unwanted transition often comes at a high price, as is the case for women who drop out of the labour market and face great difficulties to re-enter it after a number of years –. This rather gloomy conclusion for 'the part-time paradise' that the Netherlands is often considered to be leaves little optimism for the problems that employees working in other European countries face. In these countries part-time employment is often marginal employment and the labour market order is less equipped for it. It will take a major effort from many European policy makers to offer European employees at least the same possibilities as are already available to Dutch employees.

## Notes

---

<sup>1</sup> Christine Baaijens works as a senior consultant at the Dehora Consulting Group, Amsterdam. At the time of the writing of the chapter in this book she worked as a PhD-student at the Department of Economics of Utrecht University.

Joop Schippers is professor of Labour Economics and the Economics of Equal Opportunities at Utrecht University and one of the programme directors of the Institute of Labour Studies, Tilburg.

<sup>2</sup> Workers working less than 12 hours per week have been excluded from the definition of the employed labour force.

<sup>3</sup> A substantial difference exists between higher educated mothers (one out of eight leaves the labour market after the birth of their first child) and lower educated mothers (one out of two leaves the labour market after the birth of their first child). The difference in participation between higher educated women and lower educated women can already be found before children are born (Plantenga et al., 1999).

<sup>4</sup> A few things should be noted on subjective data, such as used in this study. Subjective data, as opposed to objective data, are rarely used in empirical economics as the reliability of subjective data could be questioned. There is no guarantee that answers on survey questions correspond to "true" values. This could be said of all survey data, but objective data can often be compared to information from other sources to check the accuracy. In the case of subjective data, some respondents might give answers that they think are socially acceptable, rather than answers that correspond to what they really think or want. In addition, it is also possible that some employees indicate a desire for adjustment of working hours, even though they do not want to undertake any action in the near future. Euwals et al. (1998), however, conclude that subjective data on working hour preferences contain valuable information and can be helpful in explaining female labour supply. For male employees the evidence is mixed. Other recent Dutch studies that use subjective data include Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990) and Euwals and Van Soest (1999).

<sup>5</sup> In 1986 and 1988 respondents were only asked about contractual weekly hours. In 1990 and 1992 a question was added about the number of roster-free days per year. From 1994 onwards two separate questions were asked, depending on whether respondents were entitled to roster-free days. In the latter case respondents were asked about weekly hours in a week without roster-free days.

<sup>6</sup> Question as posed in 1992, 1994, 1996 and 1998. The wording in 1986, 1988 and 1990 is only slightly different.

<sup>7</sup> Table 3 is based upon 6 propositions: in this organisation part-time employment is unusual; in this organisation it is looked upon as strange if a man wants to work part-time; in this organisation it is looked upon as strange if a woman wants to work part-time; if an employee in this organisation requests to work

---

fewer hours, the request is seriously investigated; in this organisation part-time employment is only accepted at lower job levels; in this organisations working part-time is detrimental to one's career.

<sup>8</sup> The latter group includes employees that in  $t + 2$  have adjusted their working hours upward, are still working the same number of hours, have become unemployed, are no longer participating on the labour market, are working as self-employed persons or as family workers or are in full-time education.

<sup>9</sup> The latter group is made up of employees that in  $t + 2$  have adjusted their working hours upward, are still working the same number of hours, have become unemployed, are no longer participating on the labour market, are working as self-employed persons or as family workers or are in full-time education. The group is further limited to employees with a desire to work fewer hours in  $t$ .

<sup>10</sup> This is not equal to the hourly wage. To get the hourly wage, one should divide by approximately 4,3.

<sup>11</sup> We do have information on whether employees for instance receive a 13<sup>th</sup> month or a cash bonus, but these extras seem to be based upon collective agreements thus apply to all employees rather than being based upon personal individual performance.

<sup>12</sup> Act dated February 19, 2000, Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees (Stb.), 2000, 114. (Wet van 19 februari 2000, houdende regels inzake het recht op aanpassing van de arbeidsduur (Wet Aanpassing Arbeidsduur)).

## References

- Altonji, J.G. & C.H. Paxson (1988). Labor supply preferences, hours constraints and hours-wage trade-offs. In: *Journal of Labor Economics*. Vol. 6, no. 2, 254-276.
- Altonji, J.G. & C.H. Paxson (1992). Labor supply, hours constraints and job mobility. In: *The Journal of Human Resources*. Vol. 27, no. 2, 256-278.
- Baaijens C. (2000). Werkgevers en de wensen rond arbeidstijden bij werknemers in Nederland. *Sociale Wetenschappen*. Vol. 43, 1, 73-96.
- Baaijens, C. (1999a). Deeltijdarbeid in Nederland. *Tijdschrift voor Arbeidsvraagstukken*. Vol. 15, no. 1, 6-18.
- Baaijens, C. (1999b). *Shaping working hours - conference report*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Bartol, K.M. & D.C. Martin (1988). Influences on managerial pay allocations: a dependency perspective. *Personnel Psychology*. Vol. 41, 361-378.
- Broek, van den A., W. Knulst & K. Breedveld (1999). *Naar andere tijden? Tijdsbesteding en tijdsordening in Nederland, 1975-1995*. Den Haag: Sociaal and Cultureel Planbureau.
- CBS (1996). *Tijdreeksen arbeidsrekeningen 1969-1993: 25 jaar banen en arbeidsduur van werknemers*. Voorburg/Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
- CBS Statline, data can be found on <http://statline.cbs.nl>
- DiMaggio, P.J. & W.W. Powell (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 48, no. 2, 147-160.
- Dulk, L. den, (2001). *Work-family arrangements in organisations*. Amsterdam: Thela-Thesis.
- Esveldt, I, G. Beets, K. Henkens, A. Liefbroer & H. Moors (2001). *Meningen en opvattingen van de bevolking over aspecten van het bevolkingsvraagstuk 1983-2000* (NIDI-rapport no. 62). (Opinions on and attitudes towards population issues 1983-2000). Den Haag: NIDI.
- Eurostat (2001). *European Social Statistics - Labour force survey results 2000*. Luxemburg: Office for official publication of the European Communities.
- Euwals, R. (2000). Female labour supply, flexibility of working hours, and job mobility. *The Economic Journal*. Vol. 111, May, c120-c134.
- Euwals, R., B. Melenberg & A. van Soest (1998). Testing the predictive value of subjective labour supply data. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*. Vol. 13, 567-585.

- 
- Euwals, R.W. & A. van Soest (1999). Desired and actual labour supply of unmarried men and women in the Netherlands. *Labour Economics*. Vol. 6, 95-118.
- Fagan, C. & J. O'Reilly (1998). Conceptualising part-time work. The value of an integrated comparative perspective. In: O'Reilly, J. & C. Fagan (eds.) *Part-time prospects. An international comparison of part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim*. London [etc.]: Routledge.
- Fouarge, D., M. Kerkhofs, M. de Voogd, J.P. Vosse & C. de Wolff (1998). *Trendrapport Aanbod van de arbeid 1999* (OSA-publicatie A-169). Den Haag: Sdu.
- Goodstein, J.D. (1994). Institutional pressures and strategic responsiveness: employer involvement in work-family issues. *Academy of Management Journal*. Vol. 37, no. 2, 350-382.
- Gordon, N.M. & T.E. Morton (1974). A low-mobility model of wage discrimination - with special reference to sex differentials. *Journal of Economic Theory*. Vol. 7, 241-253.
- Groot, W. & H. Maassen van den Brink (1997). *Verlate uittreding: oorzaken van uittreding uit het arbeidsproces ruim na de geboorte van het eerste kind*. Den Haag: VUGA.
- Hemerijck, A.C. & J. Visser (1997). *'A Dutch miracle': job growth, welfare reform and corporatism in the Netherlands*. Amsterdam: University Press.
- Klein, K.J., L.M. Berman & M.W. Dickson (2000). May I work part-time? An Exploration of predicted employer responses to employee requests for part-time work. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*. Vol. 57, no. 1, 85 - 101.
- Kragt, C.M. (1997). Arbeidsdeelname van jonge ouders. In: CBS, *Sociaal-economische dynamiek 1997*. Den Haag: Sdu.
- Landers, R.M., J.B. Rebitzer & L.J. Taylor (1996). Rat race redux: Adverse selection in the determinants of work hours in law firms. *The American Economic Review*. Vol. 86, no. 3, 329-348.
- Madden, J.F. (1973). *The economics of sex discrimination*. Lexington, Massachusetts [etc.]: Heath.
- OECD (1983). *Employment Outlook 1983*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional pressures. *Academy of Management Journal*. Vol. 16, no. 1, 145-179.
- Plantenga, J. (1996). For women only? The rise of part-time work in the Netherlands. *Social Politics*. Vol. 3, no. 1, 57-61.
- Plantenga, J., J. Schippers & J. Siegers (1999). Towards an equal division of paid and unpaid work: the case of the Netherlands. *Journal of European Social Policy*. Vol. 9, no. 2, 99-110.
- Ploeger, S.A. (1997). Ruim een half miljoen overwerkers. *Sociaal Economische Maandstatistiek*. No. 7, 21-23.
- Remery, C. , A. van Doorne-Huiskes & J.J. Schippers (2002). Labour market flexibility in the Netherlands: looking for winners and losers. *Work, Employment and Society*. Vol. 16, no. 3, 477-496.
- Schippers, J.J. (2004), The life course approach to the labour market: a new challenge, in: Heuvel, N. van der, P. van der Hallen, T. van der Lippe & J.J. Schippers (Eds.), *Diversity in life courses; consequences for the labour market*, Tilburg: OSA
- Scott, W.R. (1991). Unpacking institutional arguments. In: W.W. Powell & P.J. DiMaggio (eds.) *The new institutionalism in organizational analysis* (164-182). Chicago [etc]: University of Chicago Press.
- SCP (1994). *Sociale en culturele verkenningen 1994* (SCP-cahier no. 112). Rijswijk: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

- 
- Toren, J.P. van den (1998). *De collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst: sleutel tussen belang en beleid*. Amsterdam: Welboom Bladen b.v.
- Malcomson, J.M. (1997). Contracts, Hold-up, and Labor Markets. *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. 35, no. 4, 1916-1957.
- Powell, W.W. and P.J. DiMaggio (eds.) (1991). *The New institutionalism in organizational analysis*. Chicago [etc.]: The university of Chicago Press.
- Scott, W.R. (1995). *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Veldman, A. (2003). De WAA als instrument voor het combineren van arbeid en zorg. Een voortgangsrapportage op grond van jurisprudentieonderzoek. *Nemesis*. No.1, 28-32.