

Conclusion

Shedding a new light on Cold War Europe

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This volume has shown that smaller powers' position vis-à-vis the super powers often provided them with an *opportunity* rather than merely representing a *constraint*. It thus defies the Realist assumption that small states are *not* driven by a search for power and national interest but argues instead that smaller states successfully searched for ways to stretch their margins for manoeuvre in pursuit of their own interests. Examining the strategies of fourteen different European countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, as well as neutrals, the volume has also provided a wealth of new empirical evidence to reinterpret the Cold War as well as an unusually wide spectrum of themes, ranging from energy politics to technology and the economy, which deserve further consideration in New Cold War History. In this conclusion we will therefore address not only how this contributes to the literature on smaller powers but also to what extent it sheds a new light on Cold War Europe, as well as setting the agenda for further research.

Discussing the parts in turn and comparing the individual chapters within each part, we seek to transcend the particular questions per chapter by offering a more general approach towards Cold War Europe at the end of our conclusion. Starting with the part on 'Manoeuvring through Multilateralism', it is safe to conclude that the hypothesis that Crump and Romano posed in their chapter equally applies to all other contributions, namely that 'multilateralism offers small groups or even single countries the opportunity to either organise efforts at coordinating a position on international issues or even asserting their *individual* interests through using the multilateral mechanism as leverage over the superpower' Chapter 1 (Crump and Romano), P. 13. Having analysed seven multilateral fora in total, the WP, NATO, the EEC/EPC, the Benelux, the NNA-group, the CSCE and the UN, all authors conclude that without any of these multilateral mechanisms the smaller allies would have been far less powerful in the face of the superpowers. It is therefore no coincidence that the smaller powers on both sides of the Iron Curtain and beyond increasingly acquired a taste for multilateralism.

Crump and Romano convincingly show that the opportunities of multilateralism thus seemed to transcend the constraints of individual political systems, since both the Warsaw Pact countries and the countries within the EC used their respective fora – the WP and the EPC – in order to increase their scope for manoeuvre and pre-empt superpower unilateralism. Despite the differences imposed by two

radically dissimilar political contexts, it is striking that smaller powers perceived and used multilateral frameworks as an instrument to widen their margins for manoeuvre within two antagonistic blocs. The same also applies to the Neutral and Non-Aligned (N+N) countries. Makko shows in his chapter on the strategies of Sweden and Norway in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that ‘membership in an alliance – or an affirmative attitude towards a group like the N+N – did not reduce but rather increased those margins’ Chapter 3 (Makko), page 61. Palm, too, concludes in her chapter on the Benelux and the European defence community that the smaller countries – in her case the Benelux – did not have ‘a strategy of embracing “smallness” but rather of projecting a bigger shadow by working together with other smaller powers’ Chapter 2 (Palm), page 33. In that sense the Benelux cooperation within the EDC negotiations starkly resembled the European Political Cooperation within the CSCE, which Crump and Romano explore within their chapter.

In all of these cases, there are different multilateral levels at play. The Benelux worked as a smaller multilateral grouping to assert its interests within the bigger EDC-group *and vis-à-vis* NATO. The EPC functioned as a coherent unit to circumvent American pressure within NATO and achieved its aims within the multilateral CSCE context at large. The Norwegian NATO membership gave that country greater leverage within the Pan-European framework of the CSCE, while Sweden reluctantly had to rely on strategies within the N+N group to maximise specific goals. Whereas the Benelux was too small a grouping ‘to set or change the margins set by the superpowers’, but ‘maximise[d] their room for manoeuvre instead’ Chapter 2 (Palm), 43, as Palm argues, the EPC framework offered its participants a means to withstand American pressure altogether and sometimes even act against American interests, as in supporting the CSCE process, which the Americans did not even endorse.

The case for the smaller Warsaw Pact countries was a little different, since they had to manoeuvre within the framework of their alliance leader, rather than having an alternative *without* the superpower, such as the E(P)C on the Western side. The alliance did, however, also provide the smaller Warsaw Pact members with a platform to make their voices heard and even influence the agenda, as was already strikingly the case with the Polish proposal to convene a European security conference in the first place. The same applies to the Norwegian role within NATO, which Makko discusses: the Norwegian leadership did not have an alternative multilateral platform to the one led by their superpower either, but its ‘cooperation with the delegations of other NATO member states, in particular that of the United States, helped the little Nordic country to exert influence on the negotiations that exceeded its usual role in international affairs’ Chapter 3 (Makko), 61. Like the other countries discussed in this part, the Norwegians, too, ‘viewed multilateralism as a means to stretch their margins’ Chapter 3 (Makko), 50, as Makko argues.

The same applies accordingly to the Netherlands, which we have already seen to maximise its margins for manoeuvre through Benelux cooperation, as Palm has shown. Like Sweden in the case of N+N collaboration, as Makko proves, the Netherlands did so reluctantly, after it had experienced that going it alone

did not provide an opportunity to exert any influence whatsoever. In Massink's chapter, the Netherlands plays a central role too, namely in its strategy to prevent the Americans from admitting dictatorial Spain to NATO. This chapter shows multi-layered dynamics of a different kind from the other three chapters; Massink concentrates on the way in which, initially, the Dutch Labour Party and eventually the den Uyl Cabinet (led by a Labour prime minister), influenced the Dutch stance vis-à-vis Spain within NATO. Instead of problematising the concept of multilateralism by introducing different layers, she problematises foreign policy itself by showing the different interests at stake within one particular country. She interestingly concludes that '[t]he social democrats thus played a role in limiting the margins of manoeuvre of the Dutch government, while indirectly also contributing to restricting the options of the United States and Spain', since 'the attitude of the Dutch social democrats and the den Uyl cabinet contributed to preventing dictatorial Spain from joining NATO' Chapter 4 (Massink), page 81. They even "squarely opposed" Chapter 4 (Massink), 76 this from happening in meetings of the Atlantic alliance, and as such stretched the margins of the Netherlands as a NATO member in a very concrete manner, by determining on which grounds another country could or could *not* join the alliance whose framework it had used to increase its own room for manoeuvre. Twenty years after its reluctant collaboration within the Benelux to influence the negotiations on an EDC treaty, the Netherlands had learnt how to withstand American pressure within NATO itself.

The success in transcending the bipolar superpower paradigm thus became increasingly concrete in the course of the Cold War: in the 1950s the Netherlands succeeded in maximising its scope for manoeuvre through Benelux cooperation and at least 'guarantee[d] for itself a seat at the table of the Board of Commissioners', Chapter 2 (Palm), 43 as Palm shows. The Netherlands had thus ensured a certain degree of influence if the EDC Treaty had ever materialised. In the 1960s several smaller Warsaw Pact members were successful in increasingly influencing the agendas of Warsaw Pact meetings by first tabling the proposal for a European security conference and then influencing the proposal to meet the interests of individual countries. In these two decades, the scope for manoeuvre of the superpowers themselves became increasingly contested. In the 1970s the results of smaller powers' attempts to stretch *their* margins for manoeuvre were still more remarkable: within the CSCE both the EPC countries and Norway succeeded in shaping the 1975 Helsinki Final Act by both promoting human rights and, in the Norwegian case, also the issue of confidence-building, as well as endorsing the Pan-European conference altogether in the face of a reluctant US.

The fact that the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu succeeded in signing the 1969 WP Communiqué in the name of "the participating states" Chapter 1 (Crump and Romano), page 18 and the Italian prime minister Aldo Moro similarly managed to sign the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on behalf of the EPC is an interesting echo of the same principle: the smaller European powers increasingly began to distance themselves from the superpower and their status as individual countries or as participants in an alternative multilateral framework, such as the EPC,

became recognised as such. At the same time, the success of the Dutch strategy to exclude dictatorial Spain from NATO up to the late 1970s shows that smaller powers even got a stake in defining the parameters of the multilateral forum in which they participated.

This part has accordingly shown that the smaller powers successfully manoeuvred within and outside the constraints of the bipolar Cold War order, increasingly challenging the superpower paradigm and offering alternative visions of shaping the international arena instead. Stretching their margins for manoeuvre was not simply a strategy to survive in the superpower shadow, but it increasingly yielded concrete results, which in turn influenced the course of the Cold War. All of the multilateral fora under consideration were increasingly shaped by the smaller powers – or in some cases, such as the Benelux and the EPC exclusively so. The findings of this section do not only straddle the East–West divide – since they show similar tendencies regardless of the position vis-à-vis the Iron Curtain – but also show how the conventional bipolar Cold War order slowly began to crumble in the face of the interests of smaller powers. By the end of the 1970s the superpowers did not determine the international arena on their own. With European détente increasingly overshadowing superpower détente, the smaller European powers got a larger stake in defining the Cold War theatre. This volume adds an important analytical layer to the rise of European, multilateral détente by showing how the smaller powers on either side of the Iron Curtain and beyond increasingly began to use multilateralism to assert their own interests and as such inadvertently also provided an alternative to the bipolar Cold War order. In fact, one could see the Helsinki Final Act not merely as a triumph of human rights, as is so often the case but also as the fruit of the smaller European countries' push for multilateralism as an alternative to Cold War bipolarity. This tendency in itself would also provide a challenge to the Cold War as such. It is therefore safe to conclude that multilateralism did not only provide the smaller European powers with more room for manoeuvre but also that the smaller European powers' quest for stretching their margins for manoeuvre resulted in an altogether new means of conducting the Cold War, namely multilaterally. European détente could as such be seen as a direct consequence of the smaller powers' quest for a greater stake in the international dynamics which affected them all.

The East–West dichotomy is further challenged in the second part of the volume, called 'The Margins of Superpower Rule'. Kansikas, Oiva and Matala question the conventional divide between market and planned economy by comparing Finnish and Polish trade with the Soviet Union, while Stanoeva concentrates on trade between a socialist country (Bulgaria) and two capitalist countries (Denmark and the FRG). Meanwhile Gerits and Beers move beyond the Cold War divide altogether by showing how Belgium used its colonial past as an asset vis-à-vis the United States and examining to what extent the Dutch capitalised on their status as an energy provider respectively. As in the first part, so the second part starts with a chapter in which the two systems – socialist and capitalist – are being compared, showing strikingly similar strategies of the Polish and Finnish traders

in the chapter by Kansikas, Oiva and Matala. The chapter is also innovative in that it ‘combines economic, social, political and cultural history’ Chapter 5 (Kansikas et al.), page 92 in a way that is illustrative for this part as a whole: ranging from Finnish, Polish and Bulgarian trade to Dutch energy and the Belgian colonial ideology, this part also stretches the margins of the conventional themes within Cold War history and adds an extra thematic dimension which further responds to the call of New Cold War history.

Central to all the chapters is the asymmetrical situation between the countries under consideration and their respective superpower and the way in which the ‘power of the weak’ is explored to make a virtue out of necessity. The chapter on Finnish and Polish trade with the Soviet Union convincingly shows that ‘[t]he competitive advantage the two small neighbours had over Soviet domestic producers was their ability to prioritise the Soviet market and their perceived westernness’ Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102. In part, their finding is in line with what small state researchers emphasising small states’ ‘passive power’ have said since the 1950s: they had an intrinsic advantage *because* of their smallness, namely the fact that they could afford to ‘focus [their] attention and resources on one objective’ rather than dividing it ‘between multiple issues’ Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 103. In addition, however, the authors point to the fact that both countries had an asset that the superpower did not have, as ‘both countries had far tighter contacts with the Western high-tech world than the Soviet Union’ Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102. This demonstrates that the ‘power of the weak’ was not only about being able to stand up to a greater power in spite of its greater resources but also about actively exploiting resources that the superpower lacked because of the Cold War antagonism. Ironically, Gorbachev’s perestroika in the second half of the 1980s limited the Finnish room for manoeuvre, since ‘economic responsibility replaced the hierarchical planning’ Chapter 5 (Kansikas), 102 and along with it the Soviet officials who had supported Finnish–Soviet trade. This also proves how the Finns had turned a potential Cold War constraint – the rigid Soviet hierarchy – into an opportunity to increase their margins for manoeuvre. Moreover, it shows how the ostensibly *apolitical* nature of trade had contributed to transcending the Cold War divide, which Gorbachev attempted to overcome. It created as it were a safe space in which the different systems did not matter so much anymore.

The same applies to Stanoeva’s chapter, in which she shows through a very unorthodox comparison – Bulgarian trade with Denmark and the FRG – how Bulgaria, usually considered the most servile Soviet ally, could stretch its margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union by ‘infusing [its diplomacy] with the pragmatic objectives of economic cooperation’, which allowed state institutions ‘to diminish its ideological dogmatism’ Chapter 6 (Stanoeva), 111. Thus problematising the ‘ambiguous match of ideology and pragmatism’ as well as the ‘party-state paradigm’ Chapter 6 (Stanoeva), 112, Stanoeva’s chapter also offers us a new lens to interpret the Cold War. This chapter thus also proves ‘the power of the weak’, since ‘the limitations for Bulgaria’s small-state diplomacy also presented an opportunity [. . .] for state officials with a technocratic rather than an ideological outlook to take the lead and subordinate the strategy of this opening

to the pragmatic interests of economic cooperation' Stanoeva (chapter 6), 122. The comparison between trade with little Denmark and the FRG, so pivotal in the Cold War order, is therefore also a very fruitful one, since it highlights how much more the margins for manoeuvre could be stretched in the Danish case than in the West German case, where the Soviet Union attempted to keep a close watch. Either way, the economic rapprochement to the FRG also led to ground-breaking treaties on political normalisation with the FRG, even in the wake of the WP five invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The safe space of economics had thus provided Bulgarian politicians an instrument to open up to the West in a more enduring way and thus also paved the way to the European détente of the 1970s.

The chapter by Beers on the extent to which the Dutch used their status as energy provider to increase their margins for manoeuvre provides an interesting comparison with the previous chapters. Strikingly, unlike the Eastern European countries we have just discussed, the small Western European country did not seize the opportunity to use its economic capital as energy provider to stretch its political margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the United States. Within the Dutch infrastructure, the economic and political realms seemed two parallel universes, and the Dutch did not capitalise on their economic resources for political gain. This is particularly remarkable, since we have seen in the previous part in the chapters by Palm and Massink that the Dutch did attempt to increase their leverage over the American superpower on other occasions. In fact, the Dutch attempt to prevent Spain from entering NATO only preceded the Urengoy Pipeline crisis by a few years. The Dutch failure 'to translate its strong economic potential into geopolitical instruments Chapter 8 (Beers), page 147' can also be attributed to the fact that it was simply not a Dutch priority. Where it concerned human rights, as in Massink's chapter, the Dutch could afford to act as a bigger player thanks to the veto right; on the issue of European defence, as in Palm's chapter, it did so reluctantly, because it had to give up some sovereignty in order to act as a unit with the Benelux; and where it concerned energy, it ultimately only did so on a European level and not vis-à-vis the American superpower. In this case, pragmatism played a role, too, since the Dutch wanted to retain energy reserves in Groningen for their own use. Moreover, the domestic structure of the ministries also influenced the margins for manoeuvre of the Netherlands, as well as the way priorities were made and how those margins were perceived.

The chapter by Gerits shows that the opposite could also be the case: where the Dutch did not seize the fairly obvious opportunity of its enormous energy supply, their Belgian neighbours succeeded in using public diplomacy regarding the Belgian so-called civilising mission in the Congo as leverage over the Americans. This is again an interesting instance of the 'power of the weak', since the Belgians explored the American concerns over colonial rule to their advantage. Innovatively employing the perspective of the Belgian Information Center in New York, Gerits shows how the Belgians 'sought to sidestep the Cold War conflict and played on Truman's developmental concerns to increase the manoeuvrability of Brussels towards the US' Chapter 7 (Gerits), page 140. Reframing colonial rule as part of a modernisation project, the Belgians turned a 'diplomatic

embarrassment' into a shared value with the US administration, which greatly coveted 'to remake the Third World' Chapter 7 (Gerits), 140. Raising the stakes of modernisation, the Belgians thus attempted to move beyond the bipolar Cold War paradigm altogether in order to escape from superpower rule.

In fact, we have seen that the smaller powers explored the margins of superpower rule in all chapters by 'sidestepping' the Cold War. The Poles, Finns and Bulgarians turned economic leverage into political gain, using trade as a means to perforate the Iron Curtain and presenting economic issues as separate from politics. In all cases personal relations played an important role in doing so. The chapter by Kansikas, Oiva and Matala adds a particularly thought-provoking dimension by analysing the interplay between social, political, economic and cultural margins. The absence of this interplay marks the Dutch case, where economic strength was not translated into political leverage. It seems as though the officials responsible for the Dutch energy policy had sidestepped the Cold War to such an extent that they failed to appreciate that economic strength could be used to influence the superpower politically. In the Belgian case, there is however a clear interplay between these margins, since public diplomacy was also used for geopolitical gain – i.e. increased Belgian scope for manoeuvre in its colonial project. Just as the shared economic interests in the first two chapters created scope for manoeuvre for the smaller powers, so did the Belgian reframing of their colonial rule as a modernisation project, which they shared with the Americans, stretch their margins for manoeuvre. This part accordingly shows how the smaller powers could redress the asymmetrical relations with the superpower by concentrating on aspects that were not central to the political Cold War, such as trade, modernisation and energy – although the Dutch case is an exception in that it only ultimately stretched the country's margins on a European level. In all their varieties, the contributions of this part all demonstrate how attention for what smaller powers pursued (and how and why) gives us a much richer and more nuanced picture than focusing on their ability to resist greater powers, as much small state research traditionally has.

The third part on 'Identity as an Instrument' shows how various nations used their identity in order to stretch their margins for manoeuvre within the Cold War framework. In the first chapter in this part, which deals with neutrality, Rainio-Niemi argues that neutrality began to boom exactly because it provided smaller powers with an instrument to escape from the bipolar yoke, providing an alternative to choosing sides. In the second chapter Mavrodin shows how Romania widened its margin for manoeuvre by launching a plan on regional denuclearisation, which served Soviet interests as well as raising the Romanian profile by claiming to offer a bloc-transcending peaceful alternative to between-bloc antagonism. In the third chapter Sío López shows how post-authoritarian Spain attempted to increase its scope for manoeuvre by its simultaneous strategy of democratisation and European integration. While its identity remained tied to the Cold War order, Spain served to align itself more strongly to the Western camp by emphasising a Western, democratic identity, which in fact weakened its bipolar ties to the American superpower. Last but not least, Karamouzi shows in the fourth chapter how

six smaller powers, most notably Greece, explored public concerns about nuclear proliferation to widen their own margins for manoeuvre through the so-called Six Nation Initiative.

Rainio-Niemi sheds new light on the history of neutrality as an element of international history of the post-1945 period and the Cold War, pointing to the intertwining of domestic and international elements. After World War II, much of the scholarship dismissed neutrality as a fundamentally unsustainable and therefore transient phenomenon of the small, weak and otherwise marginal powers, and neutrality was often described in negative terms connoting failure, death and immorality. However, Rainio-Niemi shows that a serious interest of the superpowers in neutrality as an element of domestic stability and predictability in fact restored the uses of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring in the bipolar Cold War. As a global phenomenon, neutrality opened unprecedented options for the small “traditional” neutrals in Europe, allowing them to use their type of neutrality as an instrument of manoeuvring internationally and nationally. By the early 1950s, Swedish and Swiss neutrality – exhibiting a strong national unity and a commitment to an armed independent defence – had become ‘*the type of neutrality that the US led bloc was ready to respect*’ Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 171. The two post-war European neutrals, Austria and Finland, sought to model their policy on the two traditional neutrals. Rainio-Niemi shows how expressing in almost identical terms democracy and neutrality as their two ‘core values’, or ‘way of life’ Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 180, emphasising long traditions of defending neutrality and democracy against authoritarian currents, allowed for ‘virtuous images of the small European neutrals concerning their inner strength, capacity and skills as states’ Chapter 9 (Rainio-Niemi), page 182.

Mavrodin’s chapter analyses how Romania too widened its margins for manoeuvre by emphasising its value to the superpower, making references to its national characteristics and historical role. Mavrodin provides a very interesting nuance to Romania’s image as maverick, by tracing a period in the late 1950s in which Romania was still considered the Soviet Union’s loyal ally when it already began to explore stretching its margins for manoeuvre within and beyond the Soviet bloc. In order to do so, the Romanian leadership exploited its image as loyal ally by aligning its interests with those of the Kremlin through launching a plan to denuclearise the Balkan zone. This was fully in line with Khrushchev’s peace policy but also allowed Romania to establish contacts with the Turkish and Greek NATO members, as well as non-aligned Yugoslavia and the People’s Republic of China. Romania could thus use the fraught relations among the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China in order to position itself as a mediator and raise its international status simultaneously. The plan in itself was less important than the diplomatic opportunities it created for Romania, culminating in its presentation of the plan at the UN General Assembly in 1960. Mavrodin thus shows how Romania’s perceived loyalty to the Soviet Union in fact paved the way for its transformation into the maverick, which it would become in the 1960s.

Sío-López’ chapter on ‘Spain’s Dual Strategy of Democratisation and Europeanisation’ is also an interesting case of entanglement between international and

domestic issues that shows how an apparent adaptation to certain superpower values and interests could in fact yield wider margins for independent manoeuvre. Since authoritarian Spain hardly represented the Western values during the Cold War, post-authoritarian Spain was all the more eager to integrate in the Western camp by joining the European Community as well as democratising. In fact, it needed the integration into the EC to ‘externally reinforce’ Chapter 11 (Sio-Lopez), page 217 its transition to democracy, as Sío-López argues. This in itself meant a shift away from the American superpower, to which it had previously aligned itself, to the European Community. In its strategy to ‘re-join the mainstream Western democratic arena through the European Community’ Chapter 11 (Sio-Lopez), page 216, Spain had thus set a precedent for the Central and Eastern European Countries after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Using the EC as the gateway to democracy, Spain not only redefined its own identity but to a degree would also define post-Cold War Europe. Moreover, by prioritising EC accession over its tight allegiance to the US, Spain had also succeeded in stretching its own margins for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the superpower. Rather than transcending bipolarity, the Spanish case adumbrated what Europe would look like *after* the Cold War.

Karamouzi’s chapter in turn approaches the Euro-missile crisis in the early 1980s from an entirely novel perspective. She shows how Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, along with five other state leaders, launched the Six Nation Initiative in order to influence policy-makers, scientists and the general public during the Euro-missile Crisis. In a show of opposition to the bipolar Cold War order, Papandreou teamed up with leaders from India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden in order to stop the “‘rush towards global suicide’” Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), page 231 and pave the way for a nuclear arms control agreement. They thus already presented an alternative to the Cold War, which did not revolve around ideologies or zones of influence but around the quest for peace. At the same time, the image of global peacemaker and mediator reinforced both the prestige of the Greek prime minister and of his country. His subsequent image as a ‘troublemaker’ Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), 235 in NATO only proves that his quest to delegitimise the Cold War divide was successful, as was his zeal for national independence. The Six Nation Initiative thus presented an alternative to Cold War bipolarity and nuclear competition, which regardless of its success raised the profile of the participating countries. Karamouzi’s observation that ‘it did not matter if it yielded any concrete objective benefits for the country’ Chapter 12 (Karamouzi), 236, could also apply to the Romanian case in Mavrodin’s chapter. What *did* matter in both cases was the increased prestige and room for manoeuvre on the international scene of the countries in question.

All these chapters show how smaller countries found possibilities to pursue wider margins for manoeuvre *in relation* to the Cold War, by profiling themselves as critics of the Cold War or, in the case of Spain, as supporters of Western camp values. The smaller countries under consideration used a particular concept – whether it be neutrality, denuclearisation or European integration – in order to either transcend the bipolar world order or anticipate a post-Cold War order.

Appropriating a project or a stance that suited their purposes, the smaller powers in question also created room to redefine the Cold War in accordance with their own interests. This part accordingly also challenges the image of the Cold War as a bipolar world order dominated by two superpowers. Whereas the previous part already showed that there were many more issues at stake than are usually considered within a Cold War framework, this part proves that those smaller powers, which managed to manoeuvre by offering an alternative to the superpower paradigm, succeeded in shedding the constraints of Cold War bipolarity and explored the opportunities of an increasingly globalising world instead. The Cold War was accordingly no longer determined by the superpowers alone. Instead, the Cold War began to unravel as smaller powers stretched their margins for manoeuvre at the superpowers' expense.

As a whole, this volume has provided new insights into both small state literature and Cold War scholarship. In terms of small state theories, it has shown that most constraints could be turned into opportunities, since 'the power of the weak' often exposed the weakness of the superpowers. Whether it be through multilateralism, through transcending and thus denying the bipolar Cold War order or through using an identity – as a peaceful country, as a neutral country, as a European country – to raise international prestige, we have seen that countries ranging from Bulgaria to Belgium, from Finland to Poland and from Sweden to Spain succeeded in contributing to Cold War dynamics in ways hitherto unobserved. Substituting the term 'margins for manoeuvre' for 'power', with its military connotations, all contributions have shown that these margins were much greater than often considered. Indeed, some smaller powers also succeeded in limiting the margins of the superpower. At the same time, the margins were more varied and allow for a much broader analysis of the Cold War: analysing social, economic, cultural and political margins, the authors have proved that the Cold War did not revolve around high politics and international diplomacy alone. Instead, issues such as public diplomacy, trade, energy and tourism played an important role, too. At the same time, other developments often crossed the Cold War divide, such as decolonisation, European integration and democratisation.

Having read all the chapters, it becomes increasingly difficult to actually define the Cold War. The picture painted in this book is much more messy and complex than the neat bipolar superpower paradigm. Moreover, several other aspects affected important Cold War developments, such as the interplay between domestic and international politics, the many different levels at which foreign policy is shaped and the interaction between different multilateral fora. In fact, this volume shows that this bipolar image has gradually become obsolete, as other developments also took a firm hold on the international world order, such as decolonisation, denuclearisation, democratisation and European integration. Sometimes it is hard to disentangle these developments from the Cold War context, but this volume proves that smaller powers often used such developments in order to escape from the superpower grip or at least widen their own margins for manoeuvre. Their attempts are interesting in themselves, since they pose a deliberate challenge to the Cold War order, but they also often had an effect. Ranging from

preventing Spain's accession to NATO or the influence of smaller powers on the CSCE in the first part, to influencing trade with the Soviet Union or between smaller Eastern European powers and the West, as well as shaping the American modernisation programme in the second part, to striving after a nuclear free world in the third part.

The contribution of this volume in terms of New Cold War history is accordingly threefold. First, it offers a uniquely wide range of empirical evidence, encompassing a total of more than twenty European countries – East, West, neutral and non-aligned – which sheds a light on hitherto understudied topics, such as the Dutch role in the European Defence Community, Bulgarian relations with Western partners and the pacifying Greek role in the Euro-missile crisis. In all cases the chapters are based on multi-archival research, covering or comparing various countries, often in multiple political or multilateral layers. Second, it shows that the international history of the Cold War goes far beyond traditional diplomacy. Public diplomacy, cultural ties, trade, energy, intelligence, transnational networks and other less conventional themes are explored in this book. The margins for manoeuvre perspective accordingly shows not only that smaller powers often sought to expand their scope for manoeuvre in less conventional arenas but also that the Cold War was shaped and overcome by a much wider range of issues than often realised. Third, all chapters argue in some way or other that the relation between smaller powers and the superpowers was much less rigid than has often been assumed. On either side of the Iron Curtain and beyond smaller powers sought ways to turn the Cold War constraints into an opportunity – and often with success. This has been argued by New Cold War historians, but never proved so conclusively in one volume. Moreover, there is no clear-cut difference between East and West in this sense.

And this, in itself, is an important contribution to Cold War scholarship. The East–West dichotomy did not dissolve suddenly with the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, exactly 30 years ago. It eroded over time. The attempts of smaller powers to stretch their margins for manoeuvre and challenge the superpower paradigm is very important in this respect. Considering the wealth of materials in this volume, there is still more scope to research the role of smaller powers in bigger developments on a still wider range of themes. We have seen in this volume that the comparative, multi-archival and often transbloc approach can yield very thought-provoking results, which sheds a new light not only on the influence of the smaller powers in question but also on the image of Cold War Europe. Further research on smaller powers beyond Europe is likely to provide equally interesting insights to further nuance Cold War historiography. We hope that this volume will inspire more studies that focus on margins rather than power, acknowledging that even a hierarchical world order is not static but a dynamic process that only exists in the context of a relationship. A more multifaceted approach towards the Cold War can also help to interpret the post-Cold War order in which we find ourselves today.