Menacing Tides

Security, Piracy and Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean

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Security, Piracy and Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean

Gevaarlijk getij. Veiligheid, piraterij en imperialisme in de negentiende-eeuwse Middellandse Zee

(met een samenvatting in het Nederlands)

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. H.R.B.M. Kummeling, ingevolge het besluit van het college voor promoties in het openbaar te verdedigen op

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Promotoren:

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'All in the immediate vicinity of the ship is the blackness of eternal night, and a chaos of foamless water'

- Edgar Allan Poe, 'MS. Found in a Bottle' (1831)

'Enchantment on the high seas'

- Sleaford Mods, 'Face to Faces', Key Markets (2015)

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The historical fact that this work exists with the health and mind of its author still more or less intact can only be attributed to the great number of people who provided personal support and intellectual council, as well as a fair share of much-needed distraction during the making of this dissertation. My four-year venture into the history of Mediterranean piracy began with a daunting statement that I encountered in one of the nineteenth-century sources. It was a job description of sorts, but not a particularly inviting one. 'If the archives of European diplomacy could be ransacked by some person of patience more than human', the piece read, 'and of a perverted taste for the study of elaborate trifling mingled with infatuation and misconduct in great concerns, high among the monuments of incredible folly and wickedness, we will venture to say, would stand the despatches touching Algerine affairs'.¹ Four years later, I can say that these European archives were indeed filled with follies and misconduct, but studying them never required a superhuman effort. The many people who have come to my aid during my PhD ensured that this project always stayed manageable and enjoyable, so it is to them that I wish to express my sincerest gratitude.

Naturally, my two supervisors Beatrice de Graaf and Jan Hoffenaar are the scholars to whom my work is most indebted. I am incredibly grateful that the two of them dared to take a chance on me when I first applied for a PhD position concerning a topic that I was very inexperienced in, and allowed me to share in the generous funding of the European Research Council.² Their advice and guidance have, each in their own way, made this dissertation into what it is now: a lengthy tract that hopefully reflects their respective expertise in international relations and military history. They supported me when I needed it, and criticized me when history demanded it. Without their sharp comments, inspiring tracked changes and nononsense attitude to overly generic phrasings, this work would have suffered tremendously. Together, they not only drew me into the early nineteenth century, but they also shaped me as a writer. While Beatrice was kind on most of the literary flourishes in my writing and introduced me to the art of signposting, Jan always made sure that my claims were sensible and often acted as a very crafty devil's advocate. Working under their guidance was truly enriching.

¹ The Edinburgh Review, XXVI:LII (June 1816), p. 451.

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In addition, I consider it a real privilege that I have been able to carry out my doctoral work within the ERC research project 'Securing Europe, Fighting its Enemies. The Making of a Security Culture in Europe and Beyond, 1815-1914'. The project group soon became a veritable intellectual collective, which meant that historical research in this case hardly ever was a lonesome endeavor. Alongside Beatrice, each member of the team aided my work and I grateful to them all: Ozan Ozavci (for his unwavering attention to the Ottoman side of the story, and his help with the sources in Istanbul), Joep Schenk (for stressing the importance of commerce, and the pirate mascot that he gave me), Constantin Ardeleanu (for his unparalleled awareness of publications in all corners of historiography, and the profound cinematographic discussions), Melle Lyklema (for his stern wisdom and aid with all things Arabic, and for saving me from some faceplants in the transliteration department – of course, any remaining errors are entirely my own) and Susanne Keesman (for her unique abilities in time-sheeting and budget-keeping). My thanks also go out to the other members and student assistants of the project: Annelotte Janse, Jossie van Til-Duijsters, Yannick Balk, Paul Kardoulakis, Martijn Kool, Hannah Joosse, Nicolette Moors, Celine Mureau and Eva van de Kimmenade. Special mention, however, must go out to my fellow PhD Wouter Klem, who read everything I put to paper and never ceased to be brutally honest. In the hardest of times he echoed my woes, in the best of times he only added to the joys of doctoral life. Our companionship as mutual sidekicks made these four years all the more memorable and worthwhile.

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Summary

The fight against piracy as a perceived threat to security, this dissertation argues, engendered large-scale and highly impactful changes in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean. It not only brought different European and non-European states together in a shared effort to create order and tranquillity on the waters, but it also effectuated imperial expansionism and colonial dominion in the wider region. After 1815, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, a repressive turn against the alleged 'Barbary pirates' of the Ottoman Regencies in North Africa (Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli) commenced that by the 1850s had resulted in the demise or conquest of these privateering polities. The fight against piracy hence links the history of post-Napoleonic peace and security to that of colonialism in the Mediterranean. In order to bring this generally overlooked link to light, this dissertation poses the question: How did discourses and practices of security against piracy relate to the creation of a new imperial order in the Mediterranean between 1815 and 1856?

In answering that question, this work of international history delves deep into the diplomatic impact and contemporary uses of the intertwined concepts of 'security' and 'piracy'. Together, these concepts gave shape to new divisions of power and helped create a novel political order in the Mediterranean that was not dominated by a single hegemon, but by the era's concerting Great Powers of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, France and, towards the middle of the century, the Ottoman Empire. To make this clear, this study unpacks the historical meanings of 'security' and 'piracy', and analyses how contemporary statesmen, diplomats, military officials and non-state actors utilized these words to carry out practices of repression. The appearance of the Mediterranean Sea and its shorelines changed profoundly as a result of this historical involvement with security, which reshaped regional politics, altered local economies and destroyed a sea-spanning tradition of licensed maritime raiding. Yet none of these disruptive changes sparked the sort of massive, drawn-out conflicts between empires that had proven so disruptive during the decades of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that preceded the general European peace of 1815. This dissertation hence argues that the new political, economic and legal order of security that was constructed in the Mediterranean had an inter-imperial character.

As such, this study provides three significant and innovative historiographical insights. First of these is its novel attempt to historicize security. In its inquiry into the nineteenthcentury past, this dissertation uses the analytical tool of the security culture, which is defined as an open-ended, contested process of community formation on the basis of shared discourses of security, mutual interests, common threat perceptions and a collective understanding on the applicable practices to fight these threats. Security as a core concept in international relations has rarely been studied in a genuinely historical fashion, with attention to context and fluctuations over time. By endeavouring to historicize security, this work therefore brings a new perspective to the history of international relations in the nineteenth century, studying it from an angle of collective security and cooperation rather than of bellicose antagonism and retrograde conservatism.

Secondly, this dissertation sets forth a more detailed analysis of the ideas and international dynamics that fostered the repression of 'Barbary piracy' than has hitherto been published. The historical literature generally contends that the post-1815 European peace was crucial to the increasing repression of maritime raiding by the Regencies of North Africa, which engaged in the legalized plunder of privateering (or, corsairing). Yet the how and why of this development both tend to remain obscure. This thesis explains how the changing perception of corsairing as a piratical threat, together with the creation of a security culture in the post-Napoleonic period, effectuated increasing international repression. The fact that North African privateering came to be seen as a threat not only to security at sea, but to the new, peaceful international order that the Great Powers upheld and oversaw was of paramount importance.

Thirdly, this study points to a new way of understanding the international order that emerged in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean by stressing its inter-imperial character. Over the first half of the nineteenth century, the suppression of piracy became conflated with imperial interventions and wars of conquest in North Africa. Still, there was no single power that could completely direct or dominate this transition, contrary to what is implied in historical notions of a regional 'Pax Britannica' or of the Mediterranean as a 'British lake'. As this dissertation shows, it was international concertation that facilitated the process of change, rather than unilateral sea power or naval hegemony.

In fostering these three historiographical innovations, this work has drawn from a diverse, multinational and largely underused array of source material. The dissertation utilizes and juxtaposes diplomatic correspondences, naval journals, travel accounts, songs, poems and the many publications of civic activists. It brings to light and critically analyses a range of documents from archives in London, Paris, Nantes, Aix-en-Provence, Marseille, Vienna, The Hague and Berlin. Notably, the dissertation also includes a small sample of findings from the

Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul to nuance and alternate the narrative's predominantly European perspective.

On the basis of these historical sources and with help of the security culture methodology, this work presents a novel take on the fight against 'Barbary piracy' and shows how that repressive effort depended on international cooperation and worked to reshape the Mediterranean region. The dissertation's narrative traces this fight from its beginnings at the Congress of Vienna of 1814-1815, when non-state activists first raised North African corsairing as a threat to collective security, and continues with the first efforts at its repression during the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816. The dissertation furthermore brings to light several overlooked multilateral attempts to foster security, including a continental defensive alliance, and highlights the non-European opposition to these plans during the 1810s and 1820s. It also shows the obscured connections between the fight against piracy and the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, before concluding with an analysis of that invasion's aftermath in matters of regional security. By 1856, when another international congress convened in Paris, the struggle for security against Mediterranean piracy appeared to be all over. Its main underlying arguments were turned into international law, but even the matterof-fact phrasing of new treaties could not eradicate the four decades of repression, violence and imperial expansion that this dissertation discusses.


Samenvatting

De strijd tegen piraterij heeft het aangezicht van de Middellandse Zee ingrijpend veranderd. Aan het begin van de negentiende eeuw, toen in 1815 de Napoleontische oorlogen net voorbij waren, werd zeeroof op mediterrane wateren voor het eerst beschouwd en besteden als een internationale veiligheidsdreiging die door gezamenlijk optreden onderdrukt moest worden. Europeanen van allerlei beroepsgroepen, naties en politieke overtuigingen begonnen daarmee te werken aan een grootscheepse omvorming van de Middellandse Zee. Dat grote, golvende wateroppervlak moest verworden tot een ruimte van veiligheid, waar transport, commercie en reizen vredig plaats konden vinden, ongehinderd door enig zeeroversgevaar. Het bereiken van dit doel moest, op zijn beurt, een hele reeks repressieve maatregelen rechtvaardigen, van bombardementen en diplomatieke intimidatie tot imperiale oorlogsvoering en koloniale overheersing. Dit proefschrift toont hoe deze samenhang tussen veiligheidsdenken en wapengekletter vorm kreeg, en maakt daarom voor het eerst inzichtelijk hoe de bestrijding van piraterij heeft kunnen leiden tot ingrijpende historische gebeurtenissen die de politieke kaart van de Middellandse Zee compleet hebben omgevormd.

Tot aan de negentiende eeuw was zeeroof alomtegenwoordig op de Middellandse Zee en kende het fenomeen een veelvoud aan verschijningsvormen. Een aanzienlijke, georganiseerde vorm van zeeroof was die van de kapers. Dit waren zeelui die een licentie of kaperbrief bezaten van een soevereine macht, een lokale heerser of verre vorst. Met zulke mandaten aan boord jaagden zij in oorlogstijd op vijandelijke schepen. De zogenaamde 'Barbarijse kapers' die uit de Noord-Afrikaanse staten Algiers, Tunis en Tripoli kwamen waren hier een prominent voorbeeld van. In Europa werden deze zeerovers uit Noord-Afrika traditioneel gezien en erkend als legitieme krijgsonderdelen van de 'Barbarijse staten'. Lange tijd waren ze daarom even berucht als alomtegenwoordig, totdat de kapers in de vroege negentiende eeuw ineens verwerden tot piraten die de veiligheid bedreigden en bestreden moesten worden. Dit werk verklaart hoe deze omslag plaats kon vinden, en laat zien hoe Europees veiligheidsdenken de teloorgang van de 'Barbarijse kapers' teweeg zou brengen.

In de bestaande historiografie over de Noord-Afrikaanse zeerovers en de bestrijding van piraterij op de Middellandse Zee is het belang van contemporain veiligheidsdenken echter bijna geheel over het hoofd gezien. *Gevaarlijk getij* vult de literatuur aan en bouwt erop voort door te onderzoeken wat veiligheid betekende aan de randen van Europa, op de Middellandse Zee. De centrale vraagstelling van het werk is daarom: hoe droegen veiligheidsdenken en de internationale bestrijding van piraterij bij aan de politieke veranderingen in de Middellandse Zee, tussen 1815 en 1856? Op basis van grotendeels ongebruikt archiefmateriaal uit Londen, Washington, Den Haag, Parijs, Nantes, Marseille, Wenen en Istanbul beantwoordt dit proefschrift deze vraag en doet het de kleine verhalen en grote gevolgen van de strijd tegen de piraterij uit de doeken.

Gevaarlijk getij laat zien hoe de strijd tegen piraterij de Middellandse Zee tot een ruimte van veiligheid maakte: een ruimte die gekenmerkt door nieuwe vormen van internationaal recht, veranderende handelsstromen en uitbreidend imperialisme. Het werk volgt deze omvorming vanaf de eerste pogingen om de 'Barbarijse kapers' als een internationale veiligheidsdreiging te presenteren, ondernomen door een groep activisten op het Congres van Wenen in 1814-1815. Vervolgens gaat het boek verder met de initiële pogingen om tegen deze dreiging op te treden, waarvan een Nederlands-Engels bombardement van Algiers in 1816 het voornaamste voorbeeld is. Daarna bespreekt het werk andere, nagenoeg vergeten veiligheidsmaatregelen (zoals een Nederlands-Spaans militair verbond) en het toenemende Noord-Afrikaanse verzet daartegen. Het proefschrift beargumenteert tevens dat de Franse bezetting en kolonisatie van Algerije in deze brede geschiedenis van piraterijbestrijding gezien moet worden, en analyseert wat de gevolgen hiervan voor de veiligheid in de Middellandse Zee waren. Het boek eindigt ten slotte met het Congres van Parijs dat in 1856 een einde maakte aan de Krimoorlog, maar tevens een nieuw stuk internationaal recht voortbracht. In die nieuwe regelgeving werd kaapvaart koeltjes gelijkgesteld aan piraterij en daarmee uit het scala van geaccepteerde krijgshandelingen geschreven, terwijl Gevaarlijk getij laat zien hoeveel onderdrukking, geweld en imperiale interventies er achter die frase schuilgingen.








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Introduction

The fight against piracy brought them to the desert. The French sailors had been dragged from a desolate beach, along muddy paths to hilltop villages, before they reached the open plains south of Algiers. The landscape, one of the men later recounted, appeared to him 'burned' and 'deserted' as his eyes skimmed the horizon for 'something that could indicate the end of our tribulations'.¹ When he neared the city, the man could distinguish a multitude of white sails and French flags in the far distance out at sea. Those ships on the horizon were part of the sizeable squadron that blockaded Algiers during a war that lasted from 1827 to July 1830. The group of Frenchmen that looked out on this fleet from the enemy shore consisted of two crews that had fallen into the adversary's hands. They had been tasked to reinforce the squadron and provide it with communications, but their ships were caught in a storm and crashed ashore. Finding themselves on a beach at night, without much clothing, arms or provisions, the sailors were captured by a local militia, who took them on a long and tiring march to the capital. Upon reaching the gates of Algiers and seeing the French fleet in the distance, the prisoners initially calmed somewhat, but found their illusions to be 'of short duration'.²

Like so many other captives in previous decades and centuries, the Frenchmen were detained in the main prison, or *bagno*, of Algiers. Still, their imprisonment was unlike any other. One of the 86 prisoners, the then 25-year-old Louis Adolphe Bonard, would later tell the story to a journalist over cigars and *digestifs* in French Cochinchina (presently southern Vietnam), where he acted as a colonial governor. The published product of this after-dinner conversation that lasted late into the night came with a preface which noted that Bonard's captivity 'had something providential'. His time in the *bagno*, the text noted, 'marked the last instance of barbarity'.³ Though the peoples of Algeria would see many more acts of barbaric violence under the imperial rule of France through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Bonard was indeed amongst the last group of European sailors to be held captive there. The

¹ A. Lomon, *Souvenirs de l'Algérie. Captivité de l'Amiral Bonard et de l'Amiral Bruat* (Paris 1863), pp. 135-136. It is important to note that accounts of the supposed infertility of Algerian lands were, in themselves, part of an imperial narrative that posited French colonisation as an improvement to alleged indigenous misuses of agricultural land. Nonetheless, the political turmoil of the early nineteenth century is said to have had a disastrous effect on normally intensely cultivated hinterlands of the city of Algers J. Sessions, *By sword and plow. France and the conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, NY and London 2011), p. 214; J. McDougall, *A History of Algeria* (Cambridge 2017), pp. 22-23.

² Lomon, Souvenirs, pp. 31-32 and 135-136. Also, G. Weiss, Captives and corsairs. France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean (Stanford, CA 2011), p. 166.

³ Lomon, *Souvenirs*, p. viii.

naval forces that he had seen on the horizon moved in for an attack several weeks later, landing thousands of troops that managed to take the city by 5 July 1830. This was to be the start of a long, troubled history of imperial expansion and colonial rule, marked by warfare and oppression. To many European contemporaries, however, the French victory rather represented something else: the end of piracy on the Mediterranean Sea.

Bonard's captivity was 'providential' because it marked an ending. In all its finality, his imprisonment was seen as an indication of a significant change in the Mediterranean. That was not only a rationalization in hindsight, inspired by imperial hubris in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was also what the troops of the French expeditionary army were told in the spring of 1830, before they even departed for Algiers. A hefty book that the Ministry of War distributed among the mobilizing forces noted that the impending attack would 'deliver France and Europe from the triple plague (...) of piracy, of the enslavement of prisoners, and of the tributes imposed by a Barbary state on Christian powers'.⁴ Ending piracy and its relating malice featured prominently in the coming of the invasion. Likewise, when the white flag of surrender appeared on the battered remnants of Algiers' fortifications and news of the victory reached Paris, French officials noted that the 'security of the Mediterranean' was restored and Europe had been 'avenged of a long humiliation'.⁵ Contemporaries thus considered the events of 1830 to have been part of a longer conflict, a struggle in which France finally managed to deliver 'Europe' from an old 'plague' that had tormented Christians for centuries: piracy. The payoff in this fight, the same line of reasoning held, would not solely be glory or gain (though those things certainly mattered), but most of all a tranquillity that had perhaps once existed on Mediterranean waters, but which would now return: security.

This dissertation delves into the entwined history of security and piracy. It discusses how changing notions of security and piracy became related to each other and thereby deeply impacted the nineteenth-century history of the Mediterranean region. Together, they gave form to new divisions of power and helped create a novel political order dominated not by a single hegemon, but by the era's concerting Great Powers. To make this clear, I will unpack the historical meanings of 'security' and 'piracy', and analyse how contemporaries utilized these words to carry out various practices of repression, deterrence and accommodation. What did 'piracy' mean at the time when Bonard fell into captivity? How did 'security' inspire his

⁴ Aperçu historique, statistique et topographique sur l'état d'Alger, a l'usage de l'armée expéditionnaire d'Afrique (Paris 1830), p. 76.

⁵ Centre des archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve (CADLC), 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 133-134.

compatriots to mobilize against Algiers? What was the historical significance of French claims to deliver 'Europe' of an old 'plague'? And how did the French invasion relate to a broader, European effort to fight pirates and bring security to the Mediterranean Sea? In these pages, I will answer all those questions by linking them to this dissertation's larger research problem: How did discourses and practices of security against piracy relate to the creation of a new imperial order in the Mediterranean between 1815 and 1856? In taking on that problem, it will not only become clear how the fight against piracy brought Louis Bonard to the plains outside the city of Algiers and set countless other individuals onto missions to other destinations, but we will also gain new historical insight into the related topics of security, piracy and the nineteenth-century Mediterranean.

Security in history

With its focus on notions of security and their relation to the fight against piracy, this dissertation is not a work of military history. Naval warfare, imperial interventions and the outlooks of armed forces all feature at different points in the subsequent chapters, but they are not the prime subject matter. Nor is this dissertation a maritime history in line with the field's current emphasis on seafaring experiences and life at sea.⁶ Instead, this is a work of international relations and particularly of the way in which ideas and discourses have shaped the conduct of international relations in the past. The central concept here is 'security'. How historical actors conceived of this idea, used it in their writings and discussions, pondered its implementations and turned such conceptions into actual practice are the essential concerns of this work. Security efforts, I will argue, shaped international relations at a crucial moment in history, during the first half of the nineteenth century, when international involvement with Mediterranean piracy enveloped all these changes. Yet, in order to really grasp the impact of security considerations, it will be necessary to look at the ways in which concept.

⁶ G. Harlaftis, 'Maritime history or the history of thalassa' in: Idem et al (eds.), *The new ways of history* (London and New York 2010), pp. 158-176. Also, M. Fusaro, 'After Braudel. A reassessment of Mediterranean history between the Northern Invasion and the caravane maritime' in: Idem, C. Heywoord and M. Omri (eds.), *Trade and cultural exchange in the early modern Mediterranean. Braudel's maritime legacy* (London and New York 2010), pp. 1-22.

Therefore, this dissertation follows upon a relatively new venture in security studies: the historization of security.⁷

Plenty has been published about security in history, but rarely has the underlying research been genuinely historical. There is a strong focus on the present and recent past in most works of international history that treat security. These works generally stress that security emerged as an important principle only after 1945 or perhaps during the interwar years. Hence, security's links to the changes of the nineteenth century have remained obscure.⁸ A few authors have treated security in earlier eras, but they tended to do so by taking a modern definition of security – for instance the UN definition of 'human security' – and extrapolating it to the past.⁹ There are also conceptual histories of '*securitas*', 'security' and 'safety', which have tracked the changing meanings and uses of the terms over long periods of time, showing how security obtained a more secular meaning linked to intra- and inter-state politics by the eighteenth century.¹⁰ Though drawing inspiration from such works of conceptual history, this dissertation forgoes their extended timeframe and zooms in on the first few decades of the nineteenth century.

This zooming in entails trying to understand how historical actors themselves conceptualized and carried out security, rather than attempting to cram their outlooks into present-day understandings of the term. When looking at past engagements with security in detail, it becomes clear that its meanings and uses could vary amongst people and be subject to changes. Context is therefore of great importance in making historical sense of security. Or, as a recent publication has it, to historicize security is to study the term as a historical concept with its own historical trajectory 'of imbued meaning and political application'.¹¹

The fight against piracy in the Mediterranean is one case in which these imbued meanings and political applications can be traced and grasped. In the case of piracy, the meanings and applications of security can be distinguished in three related guises. Firstly, security provided a legitimizing discourse, justifying repressive actions while simultaneously opening up the

p. 18.

⁷ For an early, programmatic article, B. de Graaf and C. Zwierlein, 'Historicizing security. Entering the conspiracy dispositive', *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013), pp. 46-64.

⁸ For an extensive discussion, O. Waever, *Security. A conceptual history for international relations* (unpublished manuscript; Copenhagen 2012). On IR as a 'presentist discipline' in general, B. Buzan and G. Lawson, *The global transformation. History, modernity and the making of international relations* (Cambridge 2015), p. 62.
⁹ J. Östlund, 'Swedes in Barbary captivity. The political culture of human security, circa 1660-1760', *Historical Social Research* 35 (2010), pp. 148-163.

 ¹⁰ W. Conze, 'Sicherheit, Schutz' in: Idem, O. Brunner and R. Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. *Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* Vol. 5 (Stuttgart 1984), pp. 831-862.
 ¹¹ B. de Graaf, I. de Haan and B. Vick, 'Vienna 1815. Introducing a European security culture' in: Idem (eds.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon. 1815 and the new European security culture* (Cambridge 2019), pp. 1-18, there

possibility of contestation. Secondly, security functioned as a perpetuating logic, setting off courses of action that developed into unintended directions as they could not entirely be controlled. Thirdly, security worked as an ordering principle, which was forcefully imposed. There were, of course, many alterations and alternatives in the ways that historical actors talked about and practiced security. Nevertheless, these three aspects can help explain how security and the fight against piracy created a new imperial order in the Mediterranean.

This, however, still leaves the question of why historical actors would invoke security to justify their efforts at this particular point in time. Why is the early nineteenth century such a crucial period for studying this topic? The answer lies with the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and the transitory years that followed upon the defeat of the French Emperor. In 1815, as the negotiations and agreements of the Congress of Vienna brought an end to over two decades of global warfare and initiated a time of transition and change, security truly arose as a crucial concept in international politics. Seeking to take away the passions that had aroused intermittent struggle and dampen states' propensity for war, the attendees of the congress turned to security. They developed plans to foster collective security by creating a continental order of peace, tranquillity and moderation that was to be the counterpoint to the 'terrors' of the French Revolution and its subsequent wars. Fearing the toppling of social order, the outbreak of conflict and the rise of hegemonic despotism on the continent, the signees of the Congress of Vienna's Final Acts entered into alliances, set up international organizations and agreed to further multilateral meetings – all for the professed sake of security.¹² This basis had to give the concept its legitimizing (if contestable) ring. Actors in subsequent decades would keep referencing the Congress of Vienna as a precedent for their actions, also in fighting against piracy in the Mediterranean.

The year 1815 thus marks an important point in the modern history of security in Europe and its Mediterranean environs, but this importance has long been overlooked. Historians have tended to see the arrangements of Vienna as deeply conservative and retrograde, as a foolhardy attempt to return to a pre-Revolutionary past of restored monarchical rule and illiberal oppression. This has, for a time, diverted historical attention away from the novel, innovative aspects of the post-Napoleonic international order, particularly in matters of security.¹³

¹² B. de Graaf, *Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd na Napoleon* (Amsterdam 2018), p. 26.

¹³ For a discussion, Ibid., p. 23. Also, J. Kwan, 'Review article: The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815.

Diplomacy, political culture, and sociability', The Historical Journal 60:4 (2017), pp. 1125-1146.

Amongst the first to radically alter this dominant perception of the period is the historian of international relations Matthias Schulz. In his landmark work *Normen und Praxis*, he has shown how continental peace in 1815, for the first time in history, continued to be the subject of follow-up meetings, negotiations and cooperative practices that were aimed at preventing potential crises.¹⁴ Following the Congress of Vienna, he argues, peace became an international project that was managed through specific forms of mediation and cooperation.¹⁵ The string of successive multilateral meetings that came after 1815, exemplified by the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Verona (1822) and Paris (1856), ensured that the newfound order of peace lasted well into the nineteenth century.¹⁶ This international order created at Vienna in 1815 has also been termed the 'Congress System' or, when the assembling of international congresses became somewhat less regular in the decades after 1820, the 'Concert of Europe', but its demise is generally dated around the middle of the century – supposedly due to the rise of bellicose nationalism.¹⁷ Schulz, backed by subsequent work of Maartje Abbenhuis, has shown that the 'Congress System' and 'Concert of Europe' were not only innovative, but also made for a quite durable order of continental security.¹⁸

What these recent publications pay less attention to, however, is how perceptions of threat have inspired practices of cooperation for the sake of continental security. The Dutch historian Beatrice de Graaf has therefore pointed out that sentiments of fear and conceptions of threats were crucial to the creation and functioning of this nineteenth-century international order. She contends that fear was one of the great unifiers that brought European statesmen together in 1815. Fear, that is, of regicide, Napoleonic despotism, military invasion, looting, destruction and occupation.¹⁹ De Graaf has accordingly proposed to think of the post-1815 order as a 'security culture', shaped by the shared engagement with specific threats.

In addressing the historical involvement with the fearful figure of the pirate, I will use this security culture approach. The nineteenth-century security culture, as De Graaf defines it, looks into contemporary conceptions and allows for grasping changes. It thereby furthers the historization of security. She explains the meaning of the security culture as an open-ended,

¹⁴ M. Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Groβmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860 (München 2009), pp. 40-48.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 2-19 and 547.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 551.

¹⁷ For instance, M. Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its legacy. War and Great Power diplomacy after Napoleon* (London and New York 2013), pp. 347-352; P. Schroeder, *The transformation of European politics*, *1763-1848* (Oxford 1994), pp. 801-804.

¹⁸ M. Abbenhuis, *An age of neutrals. Great power politics, 1815-1914* (Cambridge 2014), p. 42; Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, p. 551.

¹⁹ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, p. 26.

contested process of community formation on the basis of shared interests and threat perceptions. De Graaf notes that actors in this culture developed a shared idiom of security out of which they undertook political actions and created a common set of practices for enacting security.²⁰ The security culture is hence a way of bringing threats, practices and actors together in a single analytical framework. As such, it is both less expansive and less rigid than alternative analytical concepts like Michel Foucault's 'security apparatus' or the notion of a 'security regime'.²¹ In the case of the fight against piracy, the former would involve drawing connections between matters as dispersed as port construction, quarantine regulations and import tariffs, while the latter implies a stability and coherence that the international engagement with Mediterranean piracy often lacked.

Through the lens of the security culture the dynamics and regional impact of the fight against piracy can be made apparent most easily. With its emphasis on the three factors of threats, practices and actors, this analytical framework will help to show how the perceived threat of piracy came to be a matter of international security and how discussions over this threat eventually materialized into action. Historical actors of diverse functions and backgrounds were pivotal in this process by which threat perceptions were translated into security practices. This dissertation will focus on these actors. It will clarify how they mediated and prioritised piracy as a threat to security.²² It will uncover which interests they deemed to be at stake in fighting off the threat of piracy. It will also gauge how contextual factors such as technologies of shipping, means of communication or diplomatic rituals impacted their actions, as realities on the ground and seaboard often turned out to be very different from what had originally been envisioned.

Who, then, were these 'historical actors' that played such a pivotal role in the developing security culture of the nineteenth century? They were senior statesmen and low-ranking officials, naval commanders and merchant sailors, poetesses and captain's wives. As my analysis of threat perceptions and implemented practices will show, the relevant actors of

²⁰ Ibid., p. 24; B. de Graaf, 'Bringing sense and sensibility to the continent. Vienna 1815 revisited', *Journal of Modern European History* 13:4 (2015), pp. 447-457.

²¹ M. Foucault, 'The confession of the flesh' in: C. Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977* (Brighton 1980) pp. 194-228, there p. 194. Also, M. Foucault, *Security, territory, population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978* (New York 2007), pp. 6 and 108-109. For 'security regime', K. Härter, 'Security and cross-border political crime. The formation of transnational security regimes in 18th and 19th century Europe', *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013), pp. 96-106.

²² Drawing from 'securitization' theory, T. Balzacq, 'A theory of securitization. Origins, core assumptions, and variants' in: Idem (ed.), *Securitization theory. How security problems emerge and dissolve* (London and New York 2011), pp. 1-30.

security were not only the foreign policy elites and wider diplomatic corps. Entrepreneurs, insurance underwriters, scholars, journalists, artists, and activists all had parts to play.²³ Security agendas could be set from the 'bottom-up' as civilians or lower-tier officials on the ground prioritized threats and altered practices.²⁴ Hence, I do not seek the main thinkers and shapers of security amongst philosophers like Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant or Adam Smith, but amidst the many practitioners who acted out security.²⁵ These practitioners even included the allegedly 'threatening' or 'piratical' actors themselves, as they spoke back or collaborated and worked to influence, tweak or escape particular security practices. Though many discourses and methods of security referenced a 'European' interest or precedent, non-European actors at times had prominent roles and decisive impact. Their involvement with the security culture was thus much more than merely that of a threatening nuisance, they managed to co-opt, collaborated within or railed against it, providing the historical record with a multitude of different perspectives on the nineteenth-century engagement with security at sea.²⁶

Still, it is of crucial importance to note that the security culture and the fight against piracy did not represent a level playing field. This nineteenth-century way of managing international issues was deeply hierarchical and could often be exclusionary. European officials operated within a hierarchy that distinguished between Great Powers (Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and, later, France), second-rank powers (Spain, the Netherlands) and third-rank powers (Hanseatic cities, small principalities). Beyond this ranking lay the allegedly 'uncivilized' political entities, the non-European 'barbaric' states and 'savage' societies, whose invocations of security or perceptions of threat were generally brushed aside or wilfully ignored.²⁷

²⁵ D. Armitage, Foundations of modern international thought (Cambridge and New York 2013), p. 8.

²³ E. Conze, 'Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der internationalen Politik' in: U. Lappenküper and G. Müller (eds.), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2004), pp. 14-43, there p. 33; U. Lemkuhl,

[•]Diplomatiegeschichte als internationale Kulturgeschichte. Theoretische Ansätze und empirische Forschung zwischen Historischer Kulturwissenschaft und Soziologischem Institutionalismus', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27:3 (2001), pp. 394-423, there p. 411.

²⁴ B. de Graaf, 'The Black International conspiracy as security dispositive in the Netherlands, 1880-1900', *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013), pp. 142-165, there p. 160.

²⁶ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 28-30; O. Ozavci, *Dangerous gifts. Imperialism, security, and civil wars in the Levant, 1798-1864* (forthcoming, Oxford University Press). Also, in relation to security studies more broadly, P. Bilgin, 'The "Western-centrism" of security studies. "Blind spot" or constitutive practice?', *Security Dialogue* 41:6 (2010) pp. 615-622, there p. 617.

²⁷ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 28-30. On hierarchies and Great Power spheres of influence within Europe, N. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831* (Groningen 1985), p. 8. Also, E. Keene, 'A case study of the construction of international hierarchy. British treaty-making against the slave trade in the early nineteenth century', *International Organization* 61:2 (2007), pp. 311-339.

At the edges of the security culture there existed a realm of intimidation, violence and conquest. The lasting peace of the Vienna order was often hard to find beyond the inner circle of the concerting European powers. Concerns of continental security could, as we shall see, play a very important role in propelling imperial warfare and expansion outside Europe. Attention to the fight against piracy and its impact on the wider Mediterranean shows how the post-Napoleonic peace in Europe and imperial expansion were linked.²⁸ The international system, as the British historian Edward Ingram argues, diverted European bellicism elsewhere, to China, India and North Africa.²⁹ In relation to the latter region, I will show that this diverted bellicism was not simply warmongering for warmongering's sake, but an aspect of the attempts to ward off one particular threat to security: that of Mediterranean piracy.

Piracy and its repression

The measures that this dissertation delves into were not geared towards just any kind of piratical activity on the Mediterranean Sea. They concerned specific types of maritime raiding, which only in the first half of the nineteenth century really started to get treated as a piratical threat to security. Mediterranean waters had long been home to a large variety of marauders. There were the modest scavengers, the bands that set out on a single ship with a few arms to prowl the sea for easy prey. In the unparalleled description of Ferdinand Braudel, these were 'minor carnivores', 'humble men with humble ambitions: to capture a fisherman perhaps or rob a granary, kidnap a few harvesters, steal some salt'.³⁰ Braudel wrote of them almost as if they were another layer of the Mediterranean's great continuities, atop the winds, streams and flows of trade. And indeed, by the early nineteenth century merchant captains and local prefects still reported sightings of black flags on the Adriatic, wrote down rumours of fishing boats being taken near Ravenna or recounted run-ins with seaborne thieves near the island of Elba.³¹ These were the clearest cases of piracy, involving blatant theft by outlaw gangs. Still, these men were not the pirates that became the target of concerted action for the sake of security.

²⁸ Heeding the call to study these links made in J. Osterhammel, *The transformation of the world. A global history of the nineteenth century* (Princeton and Oxford 2014), p. 396. Also, C. Bayly, *The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914* (Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell 2004), p. 230.

²⁹ E. Ingram, 'Bellicism as boomerang. The Eastern Question during the Vienna System' in: P. Krüger and P. Schroeder (eds.), *"The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848". Episode or model in modern history?* (Münster 2002), pp. 205-225, there pp. 205, 211 and 224-225.

³⁰ F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world in the age of Philip II*, vol. 2 (London and New York 1973), p. 871.

³¹ Reports in Archives de Chambre de Commerce Marseille (CCM), MR.4.4.3.5.3, 'Commandant Marine to CCM', Toulon 19-08-1816; 'Intendants to CCM', Marseille 05-01-1818; '[??] to CCM', Marseille 15-07-1815.

The maritime robbers that did make it onto the congress tables and into the outlines of plans for multilateral repression often were not pirates in the legal sense at all. The one type of maritime raiding that featured most prominently in the nineteenth-century security culture was the sort that European contemporaries called 'Barbary piracy'. Hailing from the 'Barbary Coast' of North Africa, these 'pirates' were a distinct, organized kind of robbers. They formed sizeable fleets, capable of crossing great distances and carrying away large numbers of captures. They also had the backing of a sovereign. The 'Barbary pirates' (a name that was allegedly adapted from the word 'Berber', though the exact etymology is uncertain) actually held licenses to attack enemy shipping in times of war, granted to them by the rulers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli – the Ottoman vassal states, or Regencies, of North Africa.³² In essence, these sailors were not outlaw pirates, but state-sanctioned privateers, since the possession of an official license is what ultimately distinguishes legal from illegal captures at sea.

In their Mediterranean context such sanctioned raiders were known primarily as 'corsairs' and they proliferated on all the sea's coasts. Corsairs not only set sail from North Africa, but also from Southern France and the ports along the Adriatic littoral. The maritime crusades carried out by the Maltese Order of St. John and the Tuscan Order of St. Stephen depended on privateering too. This was an institutionalized business in all its incarnations. Whether they carried licenses of the French King or the Pasha of Tripoli, corsair captains would drag their captures into port cities, have them adjudicated by special courts and then sell them as legitimate prizes.³³

Recently, scholars have begun to stress that the distinctions between privateering and piracy were not always clear or held little practical significance. Piracy and privateering could sometimes be hard to differentiate: pirates and privateers used the same kind of fast-sailing vessels, chased the same type of easy targets, and deployed highly similar tactics during their takings.³⁴ Moreover, pirates would often go down the road of 'legal posturing', providing forged privateering commissions or stressing ties to distant sovereigns that made it seem as if

 ³² For a discussion of the 'Barbary' etymology, A. Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment. European attitudes towards the Maghreb in the 18th century* (Leiden and New York 1987), pp. 13-15.
 ³³ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, vol. 2, pp. 867-870. S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï,

³⁵ Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, vol. 2, pp. 867-870. S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï, Paris 1998), p. 17.

³⁴ J. Thomson, *Mercenaries, pirates, and sovereigns. State-building and extraterritorial violence in early modern Europe* (Princeton 1994), p. 140; G. Chet, *The ocean is a wilderness. Atlantic piracy and the limits of state authority, 1688-1856* (Amherst 2014), pp. 2-3 and 92. For a contrary view, D. Starkey, 'Introduction' in: Idem, E. van Eyk, and J. de Moor (eds.), *Pirates and privateers. New perspectives on the war on trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries* (Exeter 1997), pp. 1-9, there pp. 3-4.

they had official backing.³⁵ It was not uncommon, on the other hand, that licensed privateers would go beyond the limits of their commissions to illegally increase their revenues.³⁶

The legal distinctions could get even murkier in settings where the pirate-privateer terminology held less meaning. Historians of Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf stress that the vocabulary of legal versus illegal raiding derived from a particular European historical experience. They note that definitions of piracy and privateering were often forcefully imposed on non-European societies, in tandem with imperial expansion.³⁷ This, however, applies less to the states of North Africa, which had for centuries been part of a Mediterranean legal tradition that regulated maritime raiding through treaties, commissions, ransoms and prize courts.³⁸ During the second half of the eighteenth century this tradition was still very much alive, as nearly all powers on the Mediterranean participated in the practice of corsairing.³⁹

Regardless of this tradition, things were to change profoundly from 1815 onwards. As the European states ended their military conflicts and stopped their privateering wars under the general peace of Vienna, the privateers of the Barbary Regencies suddenly came to be treated as a piratical threat to security. In this capacity they featured in multilateral discussions at the Congresses of Vienna (1814-1815), Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) and Paris (1856). They were the topic of a series of ambassadorial conferences in London (1816-1823) and inspired violent action like the Anglo-Dutch bombardment (1816) and French invasion (1830) of Algiers. Within these frameworks, other types of raiding were also treated as 'piratical' threats to collective security, such as the privateering of the Latin American insurgencies against Spain (1816-1821) or of the maritime side to the Greek Uprising (1821-1830).⁴⁰ Though it is important to note that these other perceived 'piratical' threats also had many of the trappings of privateering, the international treatment of 'Barbary piracy' still stands apart – if only because it was a much more drawn-out affair. This dissertation will therefore solely focus on

³⁵ L. Benton, 'Legal spaces of Empire. Piracy and the origins of ocean regionalism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 47:4 (2005), pp. 700-724, there pp. 719-720.

³⁶ L. Benton, *A search for sovereignty. Law and geography in European empires, 1400-1900* (New York 2010), pp. 112 and 130-131.

³⁷ R. Antony and S. Prange, 'Piracy in Asian waters, part 1. The social and economic dynamics of piracy in early modern Asia – an introduction', *Journal of Early Modern History* 16 (2012), pp. 455-462, there p. 459; P. Risso, 'Cross-cultural perceptions of piracy. Maritime violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region during a long eighteenth century', *Journal of World History* 12:2 (2001), pp. 293-319, there pp. 300-302.

³⁸ M. Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere. Piraterie, Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen, 1500-1900* (Frankfurt a.M. 2010), pp. 262-263.

³⁹ Bono, *Les corsaires*, pp. 76-77, 81 and 92-93.

⁴⁰ G. Brown, *Latin American rebels and the United States*, *1806-1822* (Jefferson, NC 2015), pp 78-88; For the Greek Uprising, see the various contributions on the nineteenth century in G. Harlaftis, D. Dimitropoulos and D. Starkey (eds.), *Corsairs and pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean*, *15th-19th centuries* (forthcoming).

why and how the corsairs of North Africa came to be fought as 'Barbary pirates' that threatened security, thereby showing how this fight contributed to a realignment of power relations in the Mediterranean.

The treatment of the corsairs from Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli as 'Barbary pirates' was more than just a legal matter. It was a profoundly political affair with a far-reaching impact. To call into question these sailors' status as privateers was to call into question the very authority that had licensed them. If the commissions issued by the rulers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli did not suffice to make raiding legitimate, then the sovereignty of these North African states became doubtful and disputable. International diplomatic recognition and the question of legitimate raiding were intertwined. 'Distinguishing between piracy and privateering', one author clarifies, 'ultimately required a political act of choosing to recognize or to question the legitimacy of the polity sponsoring maritime violence'.⁴¹ When the corsairs started to be confronted as a pirate threat after 1815, the statehood of the 'Barbary Regencies' as largely autonomous Ottoman vassals was thus also cast in a different light.

Claims of fighting piracy and providing security hence worked to legitimize *and* delegitimize. On the one hand, such claims had to justify repressive measures. On the other hand, they delegitimized the conduct of the North African sovereigns – opening up avenues for punitive actions, the reversal of treaties and even conquest. As the fight against Mediterranean piracy picked up speed, the first three decades of the nineteenth century hence saw a gradual hollowing out of 'Barbary' statehood. The impact of this process was blatantly clear by the middle of century. In 1815, the three Regencies were still commonly treated as sovereign entities. By the 1850s, Algiers had been conquered by France, Tripoli had been brought under direct Ottoman control and Tunis found itself increasingly hemmed in between French colonial expansion and Ottoman dominion.⁴²

Generally, the literature contends that the repressive turn against corsairing had a profound influence on nineteenth-century political changes in North Africa, but the how and why of this development both tend to remain obscure. Though the vast majority of the works on the North African Regencies primarily treat the early modern heydays of corsairing, the publications that do focus on the nineteenth century all stress the importance of the post-1815

⁴¹ Benton, A search for sovereignty, pp. 130-131.

⁴² K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 354-355; M. Minawi, *The Ottoman Scramble for Africa. Empire and diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* (Stanford 2016), p. 27.

changes in the international order.⁴³ The late expert Daniel Panzac notes: 'It was the return to a peace generally in Europe that meant the failure for the North Africans'.⁴⁴ He also argues that there was 'a profound change in the balance of power and in relations between Europe and the Maghreb'.⁴⁵ Prominent historians of Algeria and Tunisia, such as Lemnouar Merouche and Khelifa Chater, stress the importance of 'enlightened' civilizing notions and the accompanying European attempts to 'pacify the Mediterranean'.⁴⁶ Other authors simply conclude that European 'attitudes' and 'outlooks' towards Barbary corsairing and the North African states changed completely in the early nineteenth century.⁴⁷

What drove those changes? Why did peace amongst the European powers lead to the violent repression of corsairing? This thesis provides, as the first in the literature, a detailed answer to these questions. In its pages, I will explain how the changing perception of corsairing as a piratical threat, together with the creation of a security culture in the post-Napoleonic period, effectuated a repressive turn against the Regencies of North Africa. The fact that North African privateering came to be seen as a threat not only to security at sea, but to the new, peaceful international order that the collective of the four (and later five) Great Powers upheld and oversaw was of paramount importance. It was in this sense that 'attitudes' and 'outlooks' towards corsairing changed. By analysing and tracking the role of security in great detail, this dissertation will thus help clarify why the continental peace of 1815 was ultimately linked to the demise of the North African Regencies.

The disappearance of Barbary corsairing is, however, not solely a local history. It simultaneously features in bigger, global debates of piracy repression. An historical analysis of security is thus also relevant to the broader literature on piracy. Like in the works on the North African corsairs, the historical discussion around piracy's increasing suppression often emphasizes structural changes. Seeking to clarify why the nineteenth century saw a crackdown on piracy across the globe, authors tend to conjure up large-scale and long-term transitions. Though such structural clarifications have their merits in allowing for a bigger

⁴³ Some examples are S. Dearden, A nest of corsairs. The fighting Karamanlis of Tripoli (London 1976); W. Spencer, Algiers in the age of the corsairs (Norman 1976); J. Wolf, The Barbary Coast. Algiers under the Turks, 1500-1830 (New York 1979); G. Fisher, Barbary legend. War, trade and piracy in North Africa, 1415-1830 (Oxford 1957); A. Jamieson, Lords of the sea. A history of the Barbary corsairs (London 2013); M. Fontenay, 'L'Empire ottoman et le risqué corsair au XVIIe siècle', Actes du IIe colloque international d'Histoire (Athens 1985) pp. 429-459; F. Carim, Cezayir'de Türk'ler (Sanat Basimevi 1962).

⁴⁴ D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), pp. 4-5.

⁴⁵ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 291-292.

⁴⁶ L. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. II, *La course. Mythes et réalité* (Saint-Denis 2007), p. 12; Chater, *Dépendance*, pp. 213-214 and 226-227. Also, McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, p. 48.
⁴⁷ C. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death. European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth century', *Journal for Maritime Research* 18:2 (2016), pp. 139-154, there p. 139; Jamieson, *Lords of the sea*, p. 20; Fisher, *Barbary legend*, p. 4.

historical overview of the subject, attention to the contemporary discourses of security, implemented practices and perceptions of threat could add crucial insight and analytical finesse.

Essentially, most works on piracy repression draw from different aspects of what is now termed the nineteenth century's 'global transformation'. Though part of a bigger, interdisciplinary discussion, the international relations scholars Barry Buzan and George Lawson have defined this transformation as the nineteenth-century shift towards a global international order dominated by 'the West' and its 'mode of power'. They single out four defining characteristics of the transformation: industrialization and 'the extension of the market to a global scale'; 'rational state-formation'; the rise of ideologies 'bound up with notions of progress', and; the increasing volatility of 'great power relations'.⁴⁸ Long before Buzan and Lawson made their contribution in 2015, each of these factors had already been posited as a driver of piracy's increasing eradication.

Global networks of trade, the formation of nation states, ideologies of liberalism and geopolitical rivalries have all been offered as explanations of why piracy came to be repressed over the course of the nineteenth century. Some authors have suggested that the Industrial Revolution brought an increase in oceanic trade, which, thanks to steamships and the telegraph, also began to run on an increasingly tight schedule. Defending free trade thus became an incentive for repressing piracy.⁴⁹ Others, especially the political scientist Janice Thomson, argue that the fight against piracy should be seen as part of the historical development in which states came to claim to a monopoly on violence.⁵⁰ Another, particularly salient line of reasoning, maintains that pirates were the most apparent 'losers' or victims of attempts to reshape the world's seas as an ordered realm governed by international law.⁵¹

What many of these explanations miss, however, is a sense of historical contingency and context. A sense, that is, of lived experience, of the contemporary ideas and sentiments, of the power relations in encounters at sea, or of the negotiations and contradictions that made up the fight against piracy for the participants who enacted it.⁵² The legal historians Lauren

⁴⁸ Buzan and Lawson, *The global transformation*, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁹ J. Anderson, 'Piracy and world history. An economic perspective on maritime predation', Journal of World History 6:2 (1995), pp. 175-199, there pp. 176 and 188; A. Howe, 'Free trade and global order. The rise and fall of a Victorian vision' in: D. Bell (ed.), Victorian visions of global order. Empire and international relations in nineteenth-century political thought (Cambridge 2007), pp. 26-46, there p. 31.

⁵⁰ Thomson, *Mercenaries, pirates*, p. 105; Chet, *The ocean is a wilderness*, pp. 96-97; W. Brenner, *Confounding* powers. Anarchy and international society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda (Cambridge 2015), p. 177. ⁵¹ Kempe, Fluch der Weltmeere, pp. 23-25 and 31.

⁵² An exception is J. Angster, Erdbeeren und Piraten. Die Royal Navy und die Ordnung der Welt, 1770-1860 (Göttingen 2012). Also, in stressing questions of power, A. Pérotin-Dumon, 'The pirate and the emperor. Power

Benton and Lisa Ford have recently made a similar point when they emphasized the 'ragged edges' and chaotic consequences of the British navy's 'projects of oceanic ordering'.⁵³ World-spanning visions of global free trade, legitimate statehood, human progress and international law certainly gripped historical actors who endeavoured towards the repression of piracy on the Mediterranean, but such aspirations do not tell the full story.

The concept that is conspicuously absent from most structural explanations of piracy repression is security. At times it appears in the literature, but it is rarely analyzed in greater depth – particularly in a historicized form.⁵⁴ Still, an analysis of security can give us a clearer understanding of what historical actors felt to be at stake in their changing engagement with maritime raiding. What did security encompass in relation to piracy? Was it a matter of protecting ships and coastlines, as modern works on maritime security would lead us to believe?⁵⁵ Historical research, with attention to changes over time, should indicate that it could mean different things in different situations. As will become clear, security, in our Mediterranean case, could signify matters as diverse as the honour of the national flag, uninterrupted trade, a revived crusade, the abolition of slavery and territorial conquest.

As a threat to security, piracy was thus perceived and understood within a particular regional and temporal context. Nineteenth-century attempts to eradicate piracy, Benton and Ford contend, 'were regionally focused and patchy in character'.⁵⁶ This dissertation follows upon their assertion. It will show that the fight against 'Barbary piracy' possessed a particular dynamic – closely linked to the security culture that emerged in post-Napoleonic Europe – and had a significant regional impact, as it worked to reshape the Mediterranean.

The nineteenth-century Mediterranean: colonially safe?

When French officials spoke of re-establishing Mediterranean security in 1830, they imagined a specific kind of regional order. The new, secure Mediterranean would be a sea of undisturbed trade, its waters would be devoid of warfare, its shores lined by peaceable polities

violence in Europe and Asia in the period of transition (Leiden 2018), pp. 43-65, there pp. 60-62; L. Benton, 'Toward a new legal history of piracy. Maritime legalities and the myth of universal jurisdiction', *International Journal of Maritime History* 13:1 (2011), pp. 225-240, there p. 236.

and the law on the seas, 1450-1850' in: J. Tracy (ed.), *The political economy of merchant empires* (Cambridge 1991), pp. 196-227, there p. 198.

 ⁵³ L. Benton and L. Ford, *Rage for order. The British Empire and the origins of international law, 1800-1850* (London and Cambridge 2016), pp. 4-7 and 119-121.
 ⁵⁴ S. Shinsuke, 'Plunder and free trade. British privateering and its abolition in 1856 in global perspective', in: O.

³⁴ S. Shinsuke, 'Plunder and free trade. British privateering and its abolition in 1856 in global perspective', in: O. Atsushi (ed.), *In the name of the battle against piracy. Ideas and practices in state monopoly of maritime*

⁵⁵ For instance, N. Klein, *Maritime security and the law of the sea* (Oxford and New York 2011), pp. 1-2 and 11.

⁵⁶ Benton and Ford, *Rage for order*, p. 119.

and its African hinterlands opened to the spread of 'civilization'. This aspiration was not an invention of the summer of 1830, nor was it a figment of the French government's imagination per se. Notions of a new Mediterranean order marked by the prosperity, tranquillity and legal regularity, which would supposedly accompany European domination, infused the changing international engagement with maritime raiding throughout the post-1815 decades. Sometimes such ideas were referenced vaguely, almost as a self-evident byword, in other cases they were put to paper in great detail, but they always hovered around discussions on 'Barbary piracy'. They were also the product of a decidedly transnational debate involving actors from all over and beyond the European continent. The envisioning of a new, secure order in the Mediterranean was thus as much a product of international concertation as the repression of piracy itself. This dissertation's third main historiographical contribution, alongside historicizing security and detailing the fight against 'Barbary piracy', is to show that the new order that was constructed on the Mediterranean had an explicitly inter-imperial character.

The idea that the nineteenth century saw the creation of a novel regional order in the Mediterranean is not new. The era has been described in the literature as a period in which Mediterranean waters became less dangerous than they had hardly ever been before. In his landmark 'human history' of the sea, David Abulafia states that during the second half of the nineteenth century, 'there was a greater degree of peace and safety than at any time since the hevday of the Roman Empire'.⁵⁷ The distinction between 'safety' and 'security', it should be noted, is generally posited in present-day political sciences as a difference between the status of being free from harm, whereas security is the process of preventing and protecting.⁵⁸ Both definitions, as we shall see, were used rather interchangeably in the early nineteenth century, though historical usage would sometimes resemble the current distinction.

Out on its waters, the mid-1800s 'safe' Mediterranean was a sea transected by the regulated shipping routes of steamship companies, with the times of arrival and departure neatly charted in standardized schedules. Trade and communications ran more smoothly, seeming less fraught with uncertainties than they had before. The Mediterranean, moreover, no longer appeared to be a prime stage of warfare. Grand naval battles, Abulafia writes, were few and far between following the Battle of Navarino in 1827 and the end of the Greek Uprising against the Ottoman Sultan.⁵⁹ Instead, this 'safe' Mediterranean was a sea where

⁵⁷ D. Abulafia, *The great sea. A human history of the Mediterranean* (London 2011) p. 561.
⁵⁸ On the distinction, De Graaf and Zwierlein, 'Historicizing security', p. 47.

⁵⁹ Abulafia, *The great sea*, p. 577.

travellers, with *Murray*'s guidebooks in hand, could find leisure as they journeyed from port to port and sight to sight.⁶⁰

Yet, the Mediterranean was not 'safe' for everyone to the same degree. The historical realities of unequal power relations permeated maritime tranquillity, ensuring that security at sea was not unequivocally beneficial to all. The nineteenth century in the Mediterranean region was characterized as much by imperial expansion and colonialism as by security and tranquillity. Other authors have therefore argued that the Mediterranean became a 'colonial sea' over the course of the century.⁶¹ Manuel Borutta and Sakis Gekas have provided a particularly clear elaboration of this argument.⁶² According to them, Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition (1798-1801) marked the first instance of a century-long history of imperialist encroachment in the region. In its wake came the establishment of direct and indirect British rule over Malta (1802), the Ionian Islands (1815) and Cyprus (1878). The French conquest of Algiers (1830), Spain's war with Morocco (1859-1860), the European interventions in Syria (1840s-1860s), the establishment of a French protectorate over Tunis (1881) and the British invasion of Egypt (1882) further mark the colonial timeline.⁶³ As Borutta and Gekas argue, the string of imperial conquests rendered the nineteenth-century Mediterranean a space of 'colonial interactions and entanglements', marked by international asymmetries of power.⁶⁴ In practice, this meant that the maritime commercial interests, the deployment of naval force, and the potential for unhampered seaborne movement of powerful groups often predominated over, and came at the expense of, the less powerful. In some cases, it even designated the near complete eradication of unwanted presences, such as the allegedly piratical corsairs of North Africa.

Bringing the conceptualizations of a 'safe' and 'colonial' sea together, this thesis argues that the nineteenth century saw the creation of an inter-imperial order of security in the Mediterranean. The fight against 'Barbary piracy' was an important component in this reshaping. As the subsequent chapters will show, the suppression of piracy became conflated with imperial interventions and wars of conquest in North Africa. These violent efforts, in

 ⁶⁰ For example, J. Murray, A hand-book for travellers in the Ionian Islands, Greece, Turkey, Asia Minor and Constantinople (London 1845). Also, on the coming into being of the 'modern beach' around the 1840s, A. Corbin, The lure of the sea. The discovery of the seaside in the Western world, 1750-1840 (Cambridge 1994), p. 281.

⁶¹ J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich 2009), p. 158; M. Borutta and S. Gekas, 'A colonial sea. The Mediterranean, 1798-1956', *European Review of History* 19:1 (2012), pp. 1-13; M. Greene, 'The Mediterranean Sea' in: D. Armitage, A. Bashford and S. Sivasundaram (eds.), *Oceanic Histories* (Cambridge 2017), pp. 134-155, there pp. 138-140.

⁶² Borutta and Gekas, 'A colonial sea'.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 2-3. Also, Ozavci, *Dangerous gifts*.

⁶⁴ Borutta and Gekas, 'A colonial sea', p. 2.

turn, significantly altered the political layout of the region. Yet there was no single power that could completely direct or dominate this transition, contrary to what is implied in historical notions of a regional 'Pax Britannica' or of the Mediterranean as a 'British lake'. It was international concertation that facilitated the process of change, rather than unilateral sea power or naval hegemony.⁶⁵

The inter-imperial aspects of nineteenth-century Mediterranean history can be made apparent by looking through the analytical lens of the security culture. The management of shared threats and the development of common security practices actually helped to contain competing imperial agendas. Following the Napoleonic Wars, various powers were embroiled in efforts of retaining, consolidating or extending empire, also in the Mediterranean. Whereas British statesmen sought to maintain the post-war status quo and the French monarchy endeavoured to restore France's pre-Revolutionary regional preponderance, Russian officials tried to solidify their country's influence in the Black Sea and Balkans while a reformist Ottoman centre gradually turned towards exercising greater control over its North African vassals.⁶⁶ Amidst these clashing agendas, there were also smaller powers that sought to assert their own positions and commercial interests on Mediterranean waters.⁶⁷ This would have created ample opportunity for violent conflict – as it still had between 1789 and 1814.68 Yet warfare over imperial matters amongst these powers became increasingly rare during the first decades after 1815, both in the Mediterranean and the wider world. Collective security was of crucial importance in averting large-scale conflict, as it pushed actors to manage shared issues and competing interests diplomatically. This capacity to collaborate, the historian David Todd argues, can help 'explain the acceleration of European formal and informal expansion after 1815'.69

⁶⁵ P. Kennedy, *The rise and fall of British naval mastery* (London 1976), pp. 158-163; J. Kraska, *Maritime power and the law of the seas. Expeditionary operations in world politics* (New York 2011), pp. 50-57; R. Holland, *Blue-water empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London 2012), p. 66. For the Mediterranean as a 'European lake', J. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and saint. Muslim notables, populist protest, colonial encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)* (Berkeley 1997), pp. 65-67.

⁶⁶ Holland, Blue-water empire, pp. 22-23; V. Puryear, France and the Levant. From the Bourbon Restauration to the Peace of Kutiah (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1941), p. 214; J. Swain, The struggle for the control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848. A study in Anglo-French relations (Dissertation University of Philadelphia 1933), p. 44; L. Sondhaus, The Habsburg Empire and the sea. Austrian naval policy, 1797-1866 (West Lafayette, IN 1989), p. 44; B. Anderson, A history of the modern Middle East. Rulers, rebels and rogues (Stanford, CA 2016), p. 78; A. Hourani, A history of the Arab peoples (Cambridge, MA 2002), p. 272.

⁶⁷ S. Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel. Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiendeeeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme* (Dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam 1998), pp. 139 and 303.

⁶⁸ J. Meeks, *France, Britain and the struggle for the Western Mediterranean* (Cham 2017), p. 18.

⁶⁹ D. Todd, 'A French imperial meridian, 1814-1870', *Past & Present* 210 (2011), pp. 155-186, there pp. 185-186.

In practice, such collaboration meant that piracy repression in the Mediterranean started to take on a much more multilateral (and fatally effective) shape than it had in previous centuries. Bombardments, diplomatic expeditions, naval demonstrations and treaty arrangements that were geared towards the suppression of the 'Barbary pirates' tended to be undertaken in direct cooperation or through more indirect forms of concertation, like ambassadorial correspondences. The nineteenth-century fight against piracy thus functioned on a basis of shifting combinations of powers participating in a common security effort. Accordingly, the novel maritime order that this fight helped create was one of inter-imperial domination, marked by hierarchy as much as by collaboration. Contemporaries thereby came to reshape the Mediterranean as an imperial 'contact zone', which was ultimately subjected to concerted interventions and negotiated expansion.⁷⁰

With its attention to the shifting international involvement in the region, this dissertation thus provides a history that is not only set in the Mediterranean but also problematizes that geographical term. In a series of almost paradigmatic publications, Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have stressed the need to distinguish between histories *in* and *of* the Mediterranean. The latter concerns studies that inquire into the history *of* the Mediterranean as a geographical whole, both in the sense of an 'indispensable frameworks' of clarification and as a historically constructed idea.⁷¹ Various historians now assert that the idea of the Mediterranean as a broader 'region' only emerged in the nineteenth century, as European powers were establishing their commercial and military dominance.⁷² Security and the suppression of piracy were, I will argue, integral to this developing idea and therefore provide a history *of* the Mediterranean. As they discussed the threat of 'Barbary piracy', statesmen at congresses and civic activists helped foster the notion of the Mediterranean as a region that could be made secure through concerted practices. They thus shaped conceptions of a regional whole, even if they were located far from the Mediterranean's shores and had never ventured on its waters.

Still, at the same time, the subsequent chapters also contain a fair share of history *in* the Mediterranean. This other variety, according to Horden and Purcell, signifies histories that simply (or accidentally) take place *in* the Mediterranean, without that conceptualization

⁷⁰ V. Barth and R. Cvetkovsky, 'Introduction. Encounters of empires: methodological approaches' in: Idem (eds.), *Imperial cooperation and transfer, 1870-1930. Empires and encounters* (London and New York 2015), pp. 3-34, there pp. 9-10 and 16; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in world history. Power and the politics of difference* (Princeton and Oxford 2010), pp. 11-17.

⁷¹ P. Horden and N. Purcell, 'Four years of corruption. A response to the critics' in: W. Harris (ed.), *Rethinking the Mediterranean* (Oxford 2005), pp. 348-375, there p. 357.

⁷² P. Horden and N. Purcell, 'The Mediterranean and "the New Thalassology", *American Historical Review* (June 2006), pp. 722-740, there p. 728; Greene, 'The Mediterranean Sea', pp. 143-145.

necessarily influencing the subject matter under study.⁷³ Throughout these pages, the many stories of individuals who set out to sea to enforce, contest or escape measures of security represent such a history. This work thus finds many people in transit *in* the Mediterranean, as they carried out their maritime labours or were commissioned for special missions. Amongst many other historical actors, we will encounter awkwardly cooperating French and British admirals, captured Dutch sailors, quarantined Ottoman envoys, a sojourning Princess of Wales and an ingenious crew of Tripolitan corsairs, who together allow us to trace the twists, turns and trajectories of security at sea.

Sources, tides and the structure of the thesis

In order to grasp the nineteenth-century dynamics of security and follow the itineraries of the different actors that shaped these dynamics, this work draws from a range of dispersed and often unused sources. The research problem's emphasis on the relations between threat perceptions, notions of security and implemented practices has necessitated the study of many sorts of materials. Diplomatic correspondences of congress attendees, ambassadors at Great Power courts and European consuls around the Mediterranean feature prominently in this work. The state archives in London, Paris, Nantes, Vienna, The Hague and, to a lesser extent, Berlin have been primary sources for official information. The dissertation also includes a small sample of findings from the Ottoman imperial archives in Istanbul to nuance and alternate the narrative's predominantly European perspective.⁷⁴

As this thesis is about figuring out how security measures were implemented and reshaped in practice, other, non-diplomatic texts complete the selected basis of source material. To contrast and complement official diplomatic writings, I will turn to the naval journals and travel accounts penned down on decks, the songs and poems sung at tavern tables or recited at solemn memorials, and the multitude of sometimes vicious pamphlets that circulated at the time. What this work nevertheless misses are materials from the archives of the purportedly piratical entities of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, due to practical and linguistic reasons. Still, a thorough reading of the materials in other places does allow me to integrate North African perspectives on security, piracy and the imputed legitimacy of concerted action.

The subsequent chapters highlight differences in perspectives and show that there was also plenty of contemporary opposition to the enforcement of security and suppression of piracy.

⁷³ Horden and Purcell, 'Four years of corruption', p. 357.

⁷⁴ Thanks to the research assistance of Filiz Yazicioglu in the Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivi (BOA) in Istanbul.

Security and piracy both were contested concepts, which opened up possibilities for debate and disagreement.⁷⁵ This also gave the creation of a new order on the Mediterranean a great degree of contingency. Many plans and proposals came to nothing, while other implemented practices developed in ways that their instigators had never foreseen. There was thus no steady stream that tugged on the first calls for concerted action against the 'Barbary pirates' in 1815 and pulled the French armies into Algiers exactly fifteen years later. The dynamics of security and the fight against piracy where hence more like the flowing of tides: prone to reversals and sudden dashes.

Though this dissertation is set up chronologically it by no means follows a strictly linear development. Its first three chapters concern the stops and starts with which the post-Napoleonic suppression of 'Barbary piracy' began. Opening with the Congress of Vienna, Chapter 1 discusses the manner in which Mediterranean piracy was first raised as a threat to collective security, linked to the new diplomatic structures and budding security culture that were being shaped in 1814-1815. It analyses how 'Barbary piracy' was prioritized as a security threat by various non-state activists, much to the dismay of several Great Power statesmen, and clarifies why that perception of threat was a significant break from the early modern past.

Subsequently, Chapter 2 takes to the seaboard, laying out how corsairing and its mounting repression functioned. It treats the first and grandest confrontation in the post-1815 suppression of the Barbary pirate threat: the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816. How was the emerging threat perception turned into violent practice? Which powers and actors were involved in this process of translation? This chapter shows how historical actors grappled to find ways in which to operationalize and legitimize concerted, violent action. It also indicates that the bombardment of 1816 marked a significant change in the diplomatic relations between the European and North African powers.

Though asymmetries of power were taking shape, Chapter 3 makes clear that the fight against 'Barbary piracy' was not without fierce opposition. It discusses how corsairing did not end with the bombardment of Algiers and therefore foregrounds North African ways of coping with the new politics of security. The focus lies on the years 1816-1824, which saw a continuation of European efforts at concertation through ambassadorial conferences in London and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The diplomatic and punitive measures that the various European statesmen decided upon at these meetings, however, met very different

⁷⁵ For security as a contested concept, E. Conze, 'Securitization. Gegenwartsdiagnose oder historischer Analyseansatz', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 38 (2012), pp. 453-467, there p. 456.

realities on the ground. This chapter therefore envelops not only a high point of cooperative ventures, but also of local resistance to these security practices.

In the latter part of the dissertation I scrutinize the varying consequences of the security politics that were carried out against piracy. Chapter 4 hence looks at the French invasion of Algiers from the perspective of collective security. It shows how the threat perception of 'Barbary piracy' played a pivotal, if nearly completely overlooked, role in the coming of the invasion. Notions of threat and security permeated international discussions on the legitimacy of this endeavour. At this point it also started to become apparent that the fight against piracy had gone hand-in-hand with a gradual hollowing out of North African statehood. The French invasion illustrated what the effects of this development could be.

Finally, Chapter 5 turns to the aftermath of the 1830 invasion, scrutinizing its short-, medium- and long-term consequences over two decades, both in Europe and North Africa. What did talk of a 'secure' Mediterranean really signify after 1830? How did lasting occupation and colonization fit within this history of international security? In answering these questions, it will become clear that colonization and imperial expansion had a deep impact on the international engagement with maritime raiding. Piracy did not disappear from the Mediterranean, but the old practice of North African corsairing was effectively destroyed in the decades following 1830. To conclude, the chapter looks at the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law issued by the Congress of Paris in 1856 as a cap on this destruction. The treaty, which has been described as the 'Magna Carta' of the laws of naval warfare, maintained that privateering 'is, and remains, abolished'. It thus put an end to the wilful blurring of legal categories that had fostered the fight against the threat of 'Barbary piracy'.⁷⁶ The Congress of Paris of 1856 therefore serves as the end point of my analysis. The Declaration may have been an innovation of international law, but, as the following chapters will clarify, four decades of repression, violence and imperial expansion lay submerged beneath its matter-offact phrasing.

⁷⁶ Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere*, p. 349.

Chapter 1: Of knights and pirates. Barbary corsairing before and during the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815

For European contemporaries, the Congress of Vienna held a hopeful promise before it even convened in November 1814. Activists, pamphleteers and state officials across the continent expected that this exalted meeting of monarchs and statesmen in the Austrian capital was going to bring lasting changes, delivering a devastated Europe from its conflict-ridden past. After over two decades of incessant and destructive warfare, these contemporaries hoped, and sometimes prayed, for the beginning of a new era of betterment, a time in which peace and progress would alleviate the sufferings of the revolutionary era. However, some actors argued that one final war would have to be fought before any lasting period of peace could truly begin: a decisive war against Mediterranean piracy. Franz Tidemann, the mayor of the Hanseatic town of Bremen, was one of those people for whom peace and piracy were incompatible.

In 1814 Tidemann had big plans for the whole of Europe. He anonymously published an essay laying down a vision for the continent's future: *Wass könnte für Europa in Wien geschehen? Beantwortet durch einen Deutschen*.¹ Tidemann envisioned a Europe of cooperation, where mistrust would disappear as states worked together for the general wellbeing of the continent. The mayor described this need for cooperation in line with his religious convictions, posing the provision of general welfare on the continent as a Christian duty. Tidemann saw a crucial role for religion in the betterment of society, both in Bremen and the wider world. He had previously curated an anthology of prayers and hymns for prison inmates, but scaled up his aims in preparation for the Congress.

Dignified as Tidemann's plans for Europe were, they had a bloodthirsty component too. Creating peace could not succeeded, according to the Bremen mayor, without the violent eradication of Christianity's common enemies. Tidemann saw one great hindrance to his project of continental betterment: the presence of the menacing 'infidel' in Europe's immediate environs. He claimed that the destruction of the 'North African robber states' and the termination of their 'piracies' had to be central to any agenda of European peace.² Tidemann therefore proposed the creation of a European 'protective alliance' at the Congress

¹ [F. Tidemann], *Wass könnte für Europa in Wien geschehen? Beantwortet durch einen Deutschen* (n.p. 1814). The text is listed among Tidemann's other works in H.W. Rotermund, *Lexikon aller Gelerhten, die seit der Reformation in Bremen gelebt haben* (Bremen 1818), vol. I, p. 206.

² [Tidemann], *Was könnte für Europa*, pp. 35-36.

of Vienna. He argued that this alliance should start a winter offensive, directed against the Regents of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli as well as their Ottoman overlords. In unison, the allied Europeans could 'chase the Turks out of Europe' and exclude them from the Mediterranean forever. Afterwards, the victors would be rewarded with the territorial spoils: Britain would obtain Egypt; France, Portugal and Spain could colonize the fertile lands of North Africa; the other conquests would be distributed at a later congress.³

The assembled delegates in Vienna, however, did not take much notice of Tidemann's plans. His schemes would probably have fallen on deaf ears, had anyone even read them. Military commanders and statesmen had just come out of two decades of large-scale conflict and might not have been up for this sort of venture.⁴ Yet Tidemann's publication, in a way, transcends concerns of readership and direct influence. His text is an interesting source not because it was read widely, but because it spoke the language of its day. The Bremen mayor used the frames of general amelioration and Christian obligation that also permeated that other great international project of the post-Napoleonic period: the reconstruction of Europe in a lastingly peaceful manner.⁵ Tidemann tried to link his plans for destroying the Islamic states in Europe's vicinity and ending Mediterranean piracy to the broader remaking of the European international order. He directed his pleas to the Congress of Vienna because this was the place where that new order was to be made. His writing indicates that historical actors saw 1814 as a moment of great importance and as a potential new beginning, especially in relation to the fight against piracy.

Precisely because of such contemporary aspirations the events of 1814-1815 ultimately did initiate the fight against the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy', even if that purported security issue never made it to the official deliberations. In order to bring that importance to light, this chapter clarifies why and how the Congress of Vienna marks a starting point, not only of the concerted repression of 'Barbary piracy', but also of the remaking of the Mediterranean's political order. Here, I therefore analyse how historical actors tried to use the Congress of Vienna to push their security agenda of repressing the 'Barbary pirate' threat. This chapter thus discloses which historical actors were involved in these attempts, and clarifies why their efforts helped about bring a new repressive turn against North African corsairing. The Congress of Vienna was so important because it laid down a diplomatic basis

³ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

⁴ M. Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860 (München 2009), p. 54.

⁵ On the Holy Alliance and other Christian aspirations behind the new international order, B. de Graaf, *Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd na Napoleon* (Amsterdam 2018), pp. 82-116.

of concerted diplomacy, international agreement and recorded agreements that helped legitimize later efforts of piracy repression. The discussions in Vienna also hinted at the gradual delegitimation of the Barbary Regencies as internationally recognized states. This development would reach full force as the fight against piracy intensified in the decades that followed. It is therefore most telling that the initial efforts to discuss North African corsairing at the Congress of Vienna faltered precisely because Great Power statesmen still wanted to treat the Regencies and their raiders as accepted international partners and legitimate belligerents.

As important as the Congress of Vienna was to the creation of the nineteenth-century security culture, it was not immediately clear that 'Barbary piracy' was going to be a prominent concern within its new frameworks of diplomatic cooperation.⁶ The negotiations in the Austrian capital delineated territorial settlements, coronated several newly independent monarchs, and resulted in an official declaration on the abolition of the slave trade, but they did not touch upon questions of piracy. This duality is the key concern of this chapter. Fruitless as Tidemann's calls for action were, they did utilize notions of security. He presented his 'protective alliance' against the Ottomans as a 'necessary and obvious means of providing security'.⁷ His pamphlet thus employed the exact same terminology that Great Power statesmen had used in their coalition wars against Napoleonic France and in their convocation of a congress after their adversary's defeat. The idea that security in Europe depended on lasting cooperation and binding agreements was already present in the plans of the British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger (r. 1804-1806). In 1805, he proposed to bring Europe's principal powers together under a system of public law, mutually obliging them to protect and support each other. This so-called 'Pitt plan' was a touchstone for the Congress of Vienna, which took that creation of a new system to heart during a slew of negotiations that lasted from September 1814 to November 1815.⁸ Vienna's Final Acts were the end product of these talks, and though they did not mention 'Barbary piracy', their conclusion would nevertheless have a great impact on the international treatment of this newly perceived threat to security.

To show why 1814-1815 marked an important turning point and initiated a period of transition, this chapter argues that the Congress created an international context in which North African corsairing was understood anew. To make this clear, we will first turn to the

⁶ B. Graaf, I. de Haan and B. Vick, 'Vienna 1815. Introducing a European security culture' in: *Securing Europe after Napoleon*, pp. 1-18.

⁷ [Tidemann], Was könnte für Europa, p. 47.

⁸ Schulz, Normen und Praxis, pp. 45-46.

long history of diplomatic and commercial contact between the states of Europe and North Africa that preceded the Congress of Vienna, and look into older European attitudes towards corsairing. As we will see, calls for concerted action against the 'Barbary pirates' drew from older works by Enlightenment scholars. The repressive turn against the corsairing Regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli thus had some clear precursors, if only in the realm of learned literature rather than diplomatic practice.

After discussing these earlier periods, this chapter will treat the Congress itself. The historiography generally does note the importance of Vienna for the repression of piracy, but rarely discusses the activities, ideas and disagreements that made 1814 and 1815 such pivotal years.⁹ Brian Vick's recent, culturalist work on 'influence politics' at Vienna is the most notable exception.¹⁰ As his detailed reading of the Congress shows, non-state actors and smaller power delegates played a crucial role in prioritizing the threat of 'Barbary piracy'. In fact, this agenda-setting effort took on a momentum all of its own as it linked up with the pressing issue of abolishing the slave trade and managed to obtain the support of one Great Power monarch. The activist and small power efforts thus lent a significance to the negotiations that its organizers did not initially have in mind. The Congress of Vienna, in this case, provided a stage on which a range of actors could voice their opinions.

After a discussion of the agenda-setting efforts and negotiations in Vienna, we conclude with the immediate aftermath of the Congress. New ideas on the nature of peace, European cooperation, international legality and divisions of power were the most important parts of Vienna's legacy. The Final Acts – especially Article 15, which contained the 'Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade' – helped reinforce claims that the North African corsairs were pirates and thus 'enemies of all'.¹¹ An American punitive effort against Algiers that took place near the ending of the Congress further impressed contemporaries of the possibilities to turn anti-pirate plans into action, convincing European onlookers that repression should not merely be a subject of diplomatic talk. The framing of North African corsairing as a piratical threat to security hence not only signified an intensification of older discourses on 'Barbary

⁹ D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), pp. 4-5; L. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. II, *La course. Mythes et réalité* (Saint-Denis 2007), p. 12; K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 213-214; C. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death. European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth

century', Journal for Maritime Research 18:2 (2016), pp. 139-154, there p. 139.

¹⁰ B. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and politics after Napoleon* (Harvard, MA 2014). For a discussion of the culturalist approach to the Congress of Vienna, J. Kwan, 'Review article: The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815. Diplomacy, political culture, and sociability', *The Historical Journal* 60:4 (2017), pp. 1125-1146, there p. 1128.

¹¹ W. Brenner, *Confounding powers. Anarchy and international society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda* (Cambridge 2015) p. 182.

piracy', it also spelled violence from the outset. As the writings of Tidemann reveal, confrontation and conquest were not necessarily seen as antithetical to peace and security.

Caution and consistency. Why 'Barbary piracy' was kept from the Vienna talks

Concerns of war and peace ensured that 'Barbary piracy' was not discussed at the Congress of Vienna. Vocal proponents of violent action against the 'Barbary pirates' generally came from states that were openly at war or in mounting conflict with one of the Regencies. Tidemann did not mention it, but Bremen was in uncertain diplomatic relationships when he wrote his pamphlet. The status of the peace treaties between all Hanseatic cities and the Barbary Regencies were unclear in 1814, which made Hanse ships run the risk of corsair captures.¹² The newly independent Netherlands were another nation in a similar position. The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs hence wrote that he hoped 'the unspeakable depredations of the Barbary Regencies' would be 'an important subject of the deliberations of the Congress of Vienna'.¹³ However, the Great Power participants who could set the topics of deliberation tended to hold very different views on the uses and dangers of acting against North African corsairing.

The Habsburg host of the assembly in Vienna, Foreign Minister Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) played a pivotal role in keeping 'Barbary piracy' from the official agenda. He feared that forceful action against the North African Regencies would come with grave consequences. Metternich dreaded the impact that piracy repression could have on Austria's diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Sultan. Fearing Russian expansion in the East, the Austrian Minister considered the stability of the Ottoman Empire more important to continental security than repressive action against the Barbary Regencies. Should corsairing have been put on the agenda and the Congress delegates have decided on violent action, then Metternich feared it might upset the status quo in the Near East to the advantage of Russia.¹⁴ Notably enough, his reasoning even ran counter to the wishes of his highest superior. Habsburg Emperor Franz I (1768-1835) actually ordered that the Barbary Regencies should be discussed at the Congress, following attacks on Austrian ships by corsairs from Tripoli.¹⁵

¹² E. Baasch, *Die Hansestädte und die Barbaresken* (Kassel 1897), pp. 130-131.

¹³ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA), 2.05.01, inv. 96, no. 1036, 'Van Nagell to King William I', 16-11-1814.

¹⁴ Vick, *The Congress*, p. 222.

¹⁵ Ibidem; Panzac, *Barbary*, p. 268.

defeat of the Regencies and wanted to make this a subject of international discussion. Still, as Brian Vick has minutely shown, Metternich managed to keep Barbary corsairing from the agenda, acting in direct defiance of Franz I and his inner circle of advisors.¹⁶

Existing treaties, Metternich argued, provided ample protection for Austrian shipping. He pointed to old agreements between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, which had been renewed as recently as 1792. The agreements provided for guarantees from the Ottoman Sultan, ensuring the safety of Austrian vessels from Barbary corsairs. The Austrian flag, the agreement held, sailed under the commandment of the Sultan, which meant that if a ship would be taken, the Sultan would arrange for reclamations from his North African vassals.¹⁷ As one Habsburg diplomat noted later in the nineteenth century, this *sened*, or treaty, was 'one of the most beautiful documents in the history of Austrian diplomacy'.¹⁸ With this old agreement in place, there was little use for actions of repression that could weaken and displease the one authority that already guaranteed safe Mediterranean navigation under the flag of Austria.

Like Metternich, the delegates that represented Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna were reluctant to discuss violent action against North African corsairing. They also pointed to older treaties.¹⁹ England had been among the first European states to enter into direct diplomatic relations with the Barbary Regencies. In 1622, Algiers and England initiated what would be a string of treaties between North African and European powers. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, friendly relations, and even a sense of alliance, were still very much in place between Great Britain and the Regencies. As the head of the British delegation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh (1769-1822) readily mentioned those long-lasting diplomatic relations whenever the question of piracy repression came up. He too wished to see the region's territorial status quo remain intact, and feared that repressive action could easily hurt the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The most senior statesmen in attendance at the Congress of Vienna thus stuck to the old means of engaging with Barbary corsairing, through treaties and guarantees.²⁰ Pamphleteers like

 ¹⁶ Vick, *The Congress*, pp. 221-223. Also, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (HHStA), StK, Kongressakten, 1, Folder 10, 'Matériaux pour le Congrès et des négotiations séparées', n.d..
 ¹⁷ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 7, Subfolder, 'Nachtrag ad Polit. Berichte', 1816, 'Translated statement of Reis

 ¹⁸ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 7, Subfolder, 'Nachtrag ad Polit. Berichte', 1816, 'Translated statement of Reis
 Rachid Mehmed Efendi', 24-12-1792.
 ¹⁸ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, Subfolder, 'Turcica VI, Berichte, 1819, in französischer Sprache', 'Lützow to

¹⁸ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, Subfolder, 'Turcica VI, Berichte, 1819, in französischer Sprache', 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fol. 111-117.

¹⁹ Russian delegate Count Nesselrode later recalled that whenever the subject of Barbary corsairing was raised, Castlereagh simply brought up the peace treaties that existed between the Regencies and Britain. NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 90, no. 4338, 'Verstolk van Soelen to Van Nagell', St. Petersburg 25/18-10-1816.

 ²⁰ I. Ortayli, 'Ottoman-Habsburg relations, 1740-1770, and structural changes in the international affairs of the Ottoman state' in: J. Bacqué-Grammont et al. (eds.), *Türkische miszellen. Robert Anhegger. Festschrift*,

Tidemann easily leapt from pleas for security to calls for conquest, but it was precisely that leap which unsettled Great Power delegates most. Still, at the Congress of Vienna, a challenge to that old way of doing things and providing safety for ships arose with a force that was impossible to ignore. What therefore needs explaining is perhaps not why Metternich and Castlereagh kept to these tested means, but why calls for action against 'Barbary piracy' would have appeared so unwarranted and even menacing to them.

'Now at peace, now at war'. European-North African diplomacy before 1814

The history of North African maritime raiding was part of a Mediterranean-wide phenomenon, bound up with questions of diplomatic relations between sovereigns. From its earliest conceptions in the sixteenth century, this raiding was tied to broader regional politics. The beginnings of Barbary corsairing, one author notes, coincided with a 'vast geopolitical crisis' in the Maghreb.²¹ In the sixteenth century, Spanish 'crusading' forces encroached upon the North African coastline, taking or subduing important towns like Oran, Bougie (Béjaïa) and Tripoli between 1508 and 1510. Citizens of Algiers then called on outside aid from the Ottoman Sultan, who sent Aruj Bey, a soldier and seaman from the Aegean island of Mytilene who later become known as 'Barbarossa'. He and his brothers succeeded in defeating and repelling the Spaniards, which led the Barbarossa clique to establish a new state under the Sultan's tutelage in 1533: the Ottoman Regency of Algiers. Similar states were founded after Ottoman take-overs of power in Tripoli (1551) and Tunis (1574).²² Corsairing subsequently grew in prominence because privateering wars came to replace the massive galley battles that had pitted Christian and Muslim powers against each other, such as at Lepanto in 1571.²³ On the Christian side of the denominational struggle, the Maltese Order of the Knights of Saint John and the Tuscan-based Order of Saint Stephen countered North African corsairing. They carried out the same kind of privateering wars as the Regencies, starting in the second half of the sixteenth century.²⁴ Privateering thus became the main mode of warfare in the bigger (though abating) antagonism over the Mediterranean Sea. Because it generated handsome incomes through prize-taking and the ransoming of captives, North African corsairing had by

armağani, mélanges (Istanbul 1987), pp. 287-298, there pp. 290-291; D. Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922* (2nd ed., Cambridge 2005), p. 88.

²¹ J. McDougall, A history of Algeria (Cambridge 2017), p. 9.

 ²² Ibid., pp. 9-11 and 37-38; K. Folayan, *Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press 1979), p. 3; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 9-13.

²³ D. Hershenzon, 'The political economy of ransom in the early modern Mediterranean', *Past and Present* 231 (May 2016), pp. 61-95, there pp. 67-68.

²⁴ S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï, Paris 1998), pp. 68-73.

the seventeenth century developed into a veritable industry – drawing in military men, adventure seekers and renegade Christians from all over the Mediterranean and its furthest hinterlands.²⁵

The conduct of corsairing, even if it was part of a bigger Christian-Muslim rivalry, nevertheless created opportunities for exchange, negotiations and agreements. By the early nineteenth century, there was a long tradition of standing diplomatic contact and treaty relations between the states of Europe and the Regencies. After the first Anglo-Algerine treaty of 1622, Dutch and French agreements with Algiers soon followed in 1626 and 1628. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the network of treaties expanded almost by the year. Austria (1725-1726), Sweden (1729-1741), Tuscany (1748-1749) and Denmark (1751-1752) added to the network as they made peace with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Only Spain, Naples and Venice remained as the Regencies' European enemies until they too began to seek peace in the second half of the eighteenth century.²⁶

The ever-tightening knot of treaties indicates that the Regencies were far from outlaw piratical entities. Activists and diplomats at the Congress of Vienna would try to claim otherwise, but their historical arguments hardly matched the record of preceding centuries. Still, the legal status of the Regencies and the legitimacy of their privateering captures were never entirely undisputed amongst European writers.²⁷ Throughout the early modern period there were discussions over whether the Barbary corsairs were pirates, but the increasingly common practice of treaty-making did significantly influence the debate.²⁸ Cornelius van Bynkershoek, a Dutch jurist working on the laws of the sea, maintained that the Barbary Regencies could not be piratical, precisely because of the international treaties that they had concluded. In 1737, he wrote that the Regencies were not pirate lairs, 'but rather organized states, which have fixed territory in which there is an established government, and with which, as with other nations, we are now at peace, now at war'.²⁹ Whether a political entity could legitimately issue privateering licenses depended, in Bynkershoek's outlook, on how that authority was treated by other international actors.³⁰

 $^{^{25}}$ Hershenzon, 'The political economy of ransom'; M. van Gelder, 'Tussen Noord-Afrika en de Republiek. Nederlandse bekeerlingen tot de islam in de zeventiende eeuw', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 126:1 (2013), pp. 16-33.

²⁶ The Regencies also sent ambassadors to the countries of Europe for negotiations and as acts of courtesy. Tripolitan representatives, for instance, went to Paris in 1719-1720, 1774 and 1785, to the Netherlands in 1735, to Stockholm in 1756, to Venice in 1764, and to London in 1765 and 1773. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 25, 28-29, 38 and 40-41.

²⁷ Brenner, Confounding powers, p. 176.

²⁸ A. Rubin, *The law of piracy* (Newport 1988), pp. 20-29 and 68.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 68-69.

Treaties and international recognition did not mean the total absence of struggle and warfare. As Bynkershoek wrote, the European and North African states were indeed 'now at peace, now at war'. Occasional conflicts upset peaceful relations and many treaties of peace were formed and perpetuated through the use and threat of force.³¹ Cannonades, blockades and intimidating tactics were not uncommon to the diplomatic repertoire employed by the European admirals who enacted diplomacy.³² The authorities and officials of the Regencies, for their part, sometimes took recourse to flagellation, imprisonment and execution in their engagement with international representatives.³³ Diplomacy could be violent. One Dutch commander in the mid-seventeenth century, for instance, tried to enforce an earlier treaty by hanging several captives from the topmast, in full view of the port of Algiers.³⁴

While peace agreements protected European shipping against corsairing, they brought other advantages for the Regencies. Treaty stipulations often generated income and provisions. Over the course of the centuries, various North African rulers managed to obtain monetary and material tributes from the smaller maritime powers that were eager to conclude peace. Annual supplies of money, arms and shipbuilding materials flooded the ports of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli under multiple treaty stipulations.³⁵ Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, North African rulers had largely turned corsair captures from an uncertain source of income, dependent on chance takings at sea, into a latent threat that generated regular payments.³⁶ This was no superfluous benefit, as steady deforestation in the Maghreb and ever-increasing ship sizes made the maintenance of a sizeable fleet progressively difficult.³⁷ Both parties in this treaty-making business thus, to an extent, came to depend on the agreements.

The increasing number of treaties, moreover, enabled the rulers in North Africa to wrest some independence from the central Ottoman authorities. By the early nineteenth century, elites in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli had to a large extent taken control over the Regency's foreign relations.³⁸ Support from the Ottoman Sultan had been vital when the Regencies were

³¹ F.R. Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East. The opening of the Maghreb, 1660-1814', *The Journal of North African Studies* 4:4 (1999), pp. 1-26, there p. 13.

³² Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 28-29.

³³ W. Spencer, Algiers in the age of the corsairs (Norman, OK 1976) p. 15; E. Plantet, Correspondence des Deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579-1833, vol. I, 1579-1700 (Paris 1889), p. xliii.

³⁴ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 29; J. Schokkenbroek, 'Lambert Hendricksz en zijn jihad tegen de Barbarijse zeerovers', *Leidschrift* 26:3 (2011), pp. 117-129.

³⁵ Bono, *Les corsaires*, pp. 114-115; Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', p. 9.

³⁶ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 40-41.

³⁷ D. Abulafia, The great sea. A human history of the Mediterranean (London 2011), p. 532; M. Belhamissi,

Histoire de la marine algerienne (1516-1830) (Algiers 1983), pp. 67-68.

³⁸ Spencer, *Algiers*, p. 28; Brenner, *Confounding powers*, pp. 162-165.

founded, but later on, over the course of the seventeenth century, the North African states obtained the status of *pashalik* (or, provinces) and they gradually became more and more autonomous.³⁹ In Algiers, the centrally appointed *Pasha* was replaced from 1671 by an elected member of the local garrison who held the title of *Dey* (a honorific title derived from the Turkish 'deyi', meaning uncle).⁴⁰ Tunis and Tripoli each saw the establishment of local ruling dynasties, but their heads nevertheless kept calling themselves *Beys* or *Pashas* (both being Ottoman designations for appointed provincial rulers).⁴¹ Symbols of rulership and the legitimation of power in each of the Sultan, even if the Deys and Beys were internationally recognised as diplomatic powers in their own right.⁴² In a recent work, historian Betty Anderson describes this acquiring of autonomy as part of a broader adjustment in Ottoman methods of rule from centralism to cooperation with increasingly prominent local ruling groups.⁴³

There were similarities in how the rulers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli at times sought to benefit from central sponsorship, and at other moments flouted the Sultan's orders.⁴⁴ Further similarities in the execution of authority also outweighed the local differences in the nature of rule and accession to the throne. In all Regencies, the ruler was also a military leader. The gains of privateering and the degree of control over the local troops were each of great importance in legitimating and solidifying authority. Corsairing had, by the late eighteenth century, largely become a state-managed affair, with the Regencies possessing or holding shares in most of the vessels.⁴⁵ The changing fortunes of the corsair trade would thus conflate with the personal standing of the Deys and Beys. Many of them therefore faltered and perished in military revolts over naval defeats and diplomatic setbacks.⁴⁶ Some authors have gone to great lengths to stress that the basis of authority in Tripoli and Tunis started to differ greatly from Algiers when Ottoman troops started to marry into local society in eighteenth century, creating a social stratum of mixed descent. This intermingling is thought to have

³⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 9-12; Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 26-27; J. Abun-Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* (Cambridge 1987), p. 181.

⁴⁰ McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, pp. 37-38.

⁴¹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 9-13.

⁴² McDougall, A history of Algeria, pp. 37-38.

⁴³ B. Anderson, *A history of the modern Middle East. Rulers, rebels and rogues* (Stanford, CA 2016), pp. 43-44 and 46. Also, A. Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples* (Cambridge 1991), pp. 250-251.

⁴⁴ Brenner, *Confounding powers*, pp. 162-165.

⁴⁵ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 149; Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 172-173; Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁶ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 17-20; C. Windler, 'Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis. Muslim-Christian relations in Tunis, 1700-1840', *The Historical Journal* 44:1 (2001), pp. 79-106, there pp. 81-82.

happened less in Algiers, ensuring that the Dey's rule there largely remained 'foreign' to the local Arab population.⁴⁷ Recently, however, such distinctions have begun to be nuanced as the lines between the ruling class and indigenous population in Algiers appear to have been much less absolute.48

Authority in the North African Regencies nevertheless depended to a significant degree upon the presence of the Janissaries, an Ottoman elite corps. Like in the central Ottoman cities, they were instrumental in shaping the political and urban life of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. The Janissaries acted as power brokers in local politics and functioned as a guild of sorts in their operation of various urban businesses.⁴⁹ The functioning of rule was hence linked to the Regents' ability to ensure the loyalty of this military group.⁵⁰ Paying its soldiers sufficiently and on time was crucial. As would later become clear, when the international pressure to abolish corsairing mounted, the Janissary garrisons could act as a formidable obstacle, hampering any attempt to end the practice of privateering. The political structures of the Regencies, which had been bolstered as much by Ottoman support as by treaty relations with the Christian powers, thus did not easily allow for the kinds of sudden diplomatic shifts that followed after 1815, when the fight against Mediterranean piracy began.

A coast of commerce. International trade in North Africa

Matters of diplomacy were not the sole reason behind the Great Power hesitancy to act against 'Barbary piracy', nor did they make up the entirety of European-North African relations. The Regencies were solidly embedded in regional and trans-Atlantic networks of maritime trade.⁵¹ Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli exchanged goods in all directions, particularly to and from the other Ottoman markets in the Eastern Mediterranean, but European ports were an important partner as well.⁵² European merchants sought the agricultural produce of the Maghreb and offered manufactured goods in return. The peace treaties allowed these commercial exchanges to expand.⁵³ In his historical study of Tripoli, Kola Folayan has

⁴⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 20; R. Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary. A diplomatic history* (Gainesville, FL 2004) pp. 14-16.

⁴⁸ McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 39.

⁴⁹ C. Kafadar, 'Janissaries and other riffraff of Ottoman Istanbul. Rebels without a cause?'. *International Journal*

Panzac, Barbary corsairs, pp. 293-304.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 9-12. For the trans-Atlantic trade, S. Marzagalli, 'Tunis et la navigation américaine dans les années 1800' in: H. Amadou and M. Jerad (eds.), Échanger en Méditerranée. Recueil d'études en hommage à Sadok Boubaker (Tunis 2016), pp. 187-201.

⁵² Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, p. 261.

⁵³ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 37.

described what sorts of cargoes European ships would take and bring. Barley, wheat, dates, medicinal senna leaves, olives, cattle, camels and hides left the ports of the Maghreb, while arms, ammunition, silks, linen, muslins and writing paper were brought in.⁵⁴ Rather than being completely dependent on the revenues of privateering, the Regencies actually drew most of their incomes from trade and agricultural produce.⁵⁵

Commercial concerns were a great incentive for the negotiated settlements between the European and North African powers. Along with diplomatic relations, commercial ties intensified and brought increased competition between the Christian nations. British and French treaties - entered into and maintained by force - ensured that nationals could import and export in the Regencies at reduced duty rates and without paying the anchorage fees demanded from other nations.⁵⁶ Commercial institutions supporting commerce were created on North African soil in the wake of peace and trade agreements. Consular offices were established and extended, commercial houses became more firmly rooted, and foreign concessions were set up.⁵⁷ These foreign concessions were designated territories granted to foreign companies as 'reserved markets'. They soon took the appearance of enclaves, filled with warehouses where export crops could be received, processed and shipped out.

The largest of their kind were the French, British, Genoese and Spanish-operated concessions of Tabarka and Cap Negro, located in the grain-producing regions of today's eastern Algeria and north-western Tunisia.⁵⁸ The French concessions of La Calle – which France acquired in 1478 to obtain an exclusive right on coral fishing – developed particularly quickly and extensively. In the late sixteenth century, work began on the construction of the so-called 'Bastion de France', which, contrary to the old treaties, turned the concession into a fortified post, holding some four hundred soldiers, merchants and fishers. The concessions of La Calle were ravaged by Algerine forces and subsequently returned to French authority twice, in 1640 and 1682.⁵⁹ The French monarchy also founded the Compagnie Royale d'Afrique to manage the exports from the concessions - which it did without much commercial success from 1741 to 1793.⁶⁰ During the upheaval of the Napoleonic Wars, which strained relations between Algiers and France, the Regency handed the concessions over to

⁵⁴ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 60-61.

⁵⁵ McDougall. A history of Algeria, p. 13.

 ⁵⁶ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', pp. 5-6.
 ⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁸ Ibidem.

⁵⁹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 112-115; Plantet, *Correspondence des Deys*, vol. I, pp. xxxxxxii and lxix.

⁶⁰ L. Merouche, Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane, vol. II, La course. Mythes et réalité (Saint-Denis 2007), pp. 261-264.

the British government in 1807, which leased them at 60,000 piastres a year.⁶¹ Such interventions suggest that there was some degree of local control over these designated zones. Still, the American historian Frederick Hunter notes that the commercial concessions and their creeping military presences foreshadowed the economic expansion and imperial interventions of the nineteenth century.⁶²

The histories of trade and diplomacy during the early modern period indicate that the Barbary Regencies were not exclusively dependent on corsairing for income, unlike what the pamphleteers and activists would later argue at the Congress of Vienna. Agricultural produce, international commercial exchange and, in case of Tripoli, the trans-Saharan transit trade, all brought in revenue. Captures at sea could augment losses if harvests failed or trade receded. Prize-takings were thus only one of the potential sources of income. Nor were corsairing and commerce mutually excluding.⁶³ The sale of goods was essential to the corsair practice; it made corsairing profitable and worth pursuing. Many captured ships and cargoes were exported back to Europe. Expat carriers looking for a bargain often bought prizes the moment they were brought in and adjudicated. Alternatively, these merchants could also wait to buy the confiscated goods at the local markets and re-export them back across the Mediterranean.⁶⁴

Despite the productive relationship that long existed between privateering and trade, the practice of corsairing did diminish over the course of the eighteenth century. The increase of commercial traffic and the proliferation of treaties of trade meant that raiding dwindled significantly. Peace agreements simply offered fewer potential corsairs targets. The privateering fleets of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli gradually shrank as a consequence. They were generally of a modest size by the end of the eighteenth century.⁶⁵ On the Christian side of the Mediterranean struggle between denominations, the knighthoods that carried out religious privateering underwent similar changes. The corsair fleets of the Maltese Order and the Tuscan Order of Saint Stephen steadily declined in size, almost in tandem with the North African corsairs.⁶⁶ The Maltese knights retained their old assertiveness a bit longer, as they still took ships and enslaved Muslims by the dozens in the latter decades of the eighteenth

⁶¹ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, p. 259.

⁶² Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', p. 20; Plantet, *Correspondence des Deys*, vol. I, p. xxxii-xxxiii. ⁶³ M. Fontenay, 'La place de la course dans l'économie portuaire. L'exemple de Malte et des ports barbaresques', Annales ESC 43 (1988), pp. 1321-1347.

⁶⁴ Bono, Les corsaires, pp. 202-207.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 163-164.

⁶⁶ Bono, *Les corsaires*, p. 59.

century.⁶⁷ Still, the order's maritime earnings and scope of action declined considerably.⁶⁸ The corsairing of the Barbary Regencies and the Christian orders, long a common feature of Mediterranean life, thus seemed to be moving towards a steady demise by the 1780s as relations 'normalised' and commercial exchanges only grew in significance.⁶⁹ Then, the age of revolutions shook up the region.

Revolutionary opportunities. The fluctuations of privateering

The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars upended the trend of corsairing's decline, redirecting maritime activity to unforeseen shores. War between France and the opposing coalitions of European powers saw a large-scale return of privateering to the Mediterranean Sea in the 1790s. The main protagonists of this new chapter in privateering history were not only the North African corsairs, but also the licensees of the European belligerents.⁷⁰ In January 1793, the French Republic issued a decree calling for the outfitting of privateers. Soon, *le Sans-Culotte* and other hunters with apt names roamed the waters.⁷¹ This newfound French privateering was a particular nuisance to flags that lacked the backing of a sizeable navy. Austrian, Ragusan, American and Genoese merchants regularly complained about French consuls who condemned prizes under the slightest pretext and courts that hardly ever accepted appeals.⁷² Corsican raiders, on the other hand, abused their British protection under the short-lived Anglo-Corsican Kingdom (1794-1796) to harass shipping, even that of Britain's Spanish allies.⁷³ Privateering thus rebounded as a tested mode of warfare amongst European powers, even if it became abundantly clear that licensed raiders could not be controlled easily.

The first years following the French Revolution also brought a sudden upsurge in North African corsairing. The outbreak of war severely impacted trade with the ports of Marseille,

⁶⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 74.

⁶⁸ Bono, *Les corsaires*, p. 59.

⁶⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 43; McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, p. 45. For the 'normalised' argument, Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, pp. 255-256.

⁷⁰ Bono, *Les corsaires*, pp. 168-169; R. Holland, *Blue-water empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London 2013), pp. 14-15.

⁷¹ Bono, *Les corsaires*, pp. 90-91.

⁷² L. Sondhaus, *The Habsburg Empire and the sea. Austrian naval policy, 1797-1866* (West Lafayette, IN 1989), pp. 7-8 and 14; S. Marzagalli, "However illegal, extraordinary or almost incredible such conduct might be". Americans and neutrality issues in the Mediterranean during the French Wars', *The International Journal of Maritime History* 28:1 (2016), pp. 118-132, there pp. 122-123.

⁷³ J. Meeks, *France, Britain and the struggle for the Western Mediterranean* (Cham 2017), pp. 132-133 and 137-139.

Genoa and Livorno, which were some of the Regencies' most prominent trading partners.⁷⁴ The North African Regents sought to compensate for dwindling incomes by turning to corsairing. Yusuf Karamanli, *pasha* of Tripoli, extended the fleet from three 'rickety vessels' to eleven ships of war between 1795 to 1798.⁷⁵ In Algiers, the estimated number of corsair vessels rose from eight to thirty during the first phases of the war. By 1798, Mustafa Bey of Tunis allegedly commanded a fleet totalling 97 vessels.⁷⁶ All these new North African ships were put to good use when Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in July 1798 – and Sultan Selim III's (r. 1789-1807) declaration of war against France – ensured that French prizes became 'new prey'.⁷⁷

The era of conflicts provided a context in which the North African Regents could reassert themselves internationally, with myriad possibilities to further their own agendas.⁷⁸ The rulers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli began by outfitting more corsairs and enlarging their navies, but this naval build-up proved short-lived. There were more lucrative opportunities to be had than naval captures. The provisioning of troops and markets in Europe soon proved a lot more profitable. As a result, North African corsairing decreased significantly again during the wars of the Napoleonic Empire (1804-1814).⁷⁹ This was also the time of British ascendancy in the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy had become the most dominant force in its waters, and British troops amassed on Malta and the Iberian Peninsula. The provisioning of this military complex depended largely on the Regencies of North Africa.⁸⁰

The British and French acceptance of the Regencies' neutrality was crucial to this provisioning. It strengthened the commercial position of the Regencies accordingly. Neutrality, in fact, had been part of a long-standing regional tradition. Algiers' port, for instance, remained open to all flag states with treaties, even in times of war. The established practices of corsairing, in addition, generally followed the principle that a friendly flag could protect enemy cargo.⁸¹ Maritime neutrality was thus strongly embedded in the decidedly Mediterranean body of international law that existed between the Christian and Muslim states.⁸²

⁷⁴ Only 28 ships per year arrived in Marseilles from the Maghreb ports between 1793 and 1799, the average had been as high as 151 per annum for the 1789-1792 period. French ventures into Italy after 1796 further disturbed trans-Mediterranean commercial relations with Genoa and Livorno. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 73-74. ⁷⁵ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 26-27.

⁷⁶ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', p. 16.

⁷⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 74-75.

⁷⁸ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', p. 16.

⁷⁹ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, p. 20; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 331.

⁸⁰ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, p. 33; Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 140-142.

⁸¹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 94-95; Marzagalli, 'However illegal', p. 130.

⁸² Windler, 'Diplomatic history', p. 81.

During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Regency of Tripoli greatly profited from its neutrality. The Regency became the prime exporter of livestock to Malta. At the same time, this lucrative commercial connection also brought the *pasha* Yusuf Karamanli intimidations from British admirals who tried to obtain more favourable deals, at reduced rates.⁸³ On the other side of the conflict, Napoleon's brother Jerôme concluded a peace treaty with Dey Mustafa Pasha of Algiers in July 1805, which further lubricated trade, allowing Algerine ships to supply Marseille with grain again.⁸⁴ Throughout the wars, the Regencies developed their own merchant fleets to meet the international demands for provisions. Over the course of the years 1806-1813, Maghrebi captains and carriers thereby were able to dismantle the so-called 'maritime caravan': the near exclusive control that European merchants had attained over North African transports in earlier centuries.⁸⁵

This was the tableau of European-Maghrebi relations as it lay at the height of the Napoleonic Wars: the British and French governments clashed over access to North African supplies and sought to maintain peaceful relations with the Regents, while the authorities of the Regencies, for their part, benefitted from the conflict by transforming their corsair navies into merchant fleets.⁸⁶ If anything, the spikes and drops of corsair activity in 1793-1813 indicate that the Barbary Regencies were not embroiled in permanent confrontation with Europe or Christianity. The international policies that the Regents of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli oversaw were not single-mindedly concerned with a fanatical struggle against all Christians, though hot-headed pamphleteers and officials in Europe would later argue otherwise. The Regents turned to privateering wars when the international context appeared favourable or when financial concerns seemed to dictate so.⁸⁷ Subsequent turns to corsairing were thus not, as the authors and activists of the post-Napoleonic era would propagate, purely a matter of irredeemable fanaticism.⁸⁸

Following these fluctuations, corsairing appeared as a viable solution for mounting troubles in the Regencies again when the Napoleonic Wars came to an end. The 1806-1813 period had truly been exceptional, but due to internal and external pressures it came to an end as suddenly as it began. Local administrators and official interdictions gradually worked to ban Maghrebi merchants from ports in France and Italy, restoring the 'maritime caravan' in

⁸³ Folayan, Tripoli, pp. 61-65; Abun-Nasr, A history of the Maghrib, p. 198.

⁸⁴ Bono, Les corsaires, pp. 40-41.

⁸⁵ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 9-12 and 331.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 1 and 31; Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', p. 16.

⁸⁸ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 107-108.

its old form.⁸⁹ The Regencies' international room for manoeuvre was thus increasingly curtailed. At the same time, internal difficulties that had been mounting in the Regencies for about a decade reached a critical stage. Algiers and Tripoli faced uprisings in the interior over rising taxes and efforts to centralize rule. These revolts of Berber tribes and local clans were put down with costly expeditions, aided by expensive imports of European arms.⁹⁰ Central rule was challenged in all the Regencies to varying degrees. The *pasha* of Tripoli faced local uprisings, the Beys of Tunis were caught up in a string palace coups, and the Deys of Algiers were confronted with both. The Janissaries of Algiers murdered five Deys between 1805 and 1815.⁹¹ In Tunis, Hammuda Bey's sudden death after a long reign in 1814 led to a family vendetta that lasted into the next year.⁹² Successive natural disasters only intensified the troubles. Algiers, for instance, was hit by earthquakes, droughts and locusts between 1813 and 1815.⁹³

The turn to corsairing was one means of abating these challenges. The idea was that captures would generate the incomes that could satisfy the financial demands of the Janissary troops. The end of the European wars provided new opportunities for prize-takings, also because conflicts in Europe had kept many powers from paying their tributes to the Regencies. The arrears in payments informed renewed corsair warfare when ships of old tributaries appeared on Mediterranean waters again.⁹⁴ Algerine corsairs took Dutch, Danish, Swedish and Hanseatic vessels, as well as Italian ships traveling under British protection. Tripolitans brought in French and Austrian prizes. Tunisian sailors carried out twelve raids on Calabrian and Sardinian seaside towns between May and November 1815.⁹⁵ Barbary corsairing was back after its absence during the Napoleonic Wars.

The first signals of renewed corsair action came to the attention of European onlookers right before the Congress of Vienna. The news of recent captures inspired the Bremen mayor and the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to express their hopes for violent action. Yet, this upsurge of corsairing did not fit the long-term pattern. The height of the Napoleonic Wars had seen the near disappearance of Barbary corsairing as a North African merchant fleet took shape. A steady decrease in corsair activity, moreover, had already marked the second half of

⁸⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 4.

⁹⁰ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', pp. 10-11.

⁹¹ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 47-50; Abun-Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib*, pp. 166-167 and 183-184; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 299-300.

⁹² Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 295-296.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 293-294 and 303-304.

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 73-74.

⁹⁵ Bono, Les corsaires, pp. 168-169.

the eighteenth century. Captures had dropped whenever diplomatic and commercial ties between the Regencies and the European powers intensified.

The statesmen who worked to keep Barbary corsairing from the congress agenda hence clung to these older bonds. Castlereagh and Metternich did not think it was in their states' interest to include maritime raiding in the Congress negotiations. Debates and agreements on violent action or conquest could bring the risk of a profound reversal in the regional status quo. Not even these two senior figures, however, could entirely control what transpired at the margins of the Congress, outside of official negotiations, where others sought to use this grand conjugation as a stage on which to present their own agendas of piracy repression.

The Congress as a stage. Pamphlets and picnic parties

Even if senior statesmen had liked to see otherwise, the Congress of Vienna did create an international context in which corsairing was understood anew. After 1815, it became increasingly easy and, within European circles, acceptable to think of the North African corsairs as a piratical threat that was a shared concern. Official and public attitudes began to grow more and more dismissive of the maritime conduct of the Barbary Regencies in the wake of the Congress of Vienna. The historical transformation from being an accepted ally or belligerent during the recent wars to being an outlawed pirate in the new time of peace was sudden and swift. The change was so conspicuous that some authors have argued that the Congress, in fact, 'condemned' Barbary corsairing.⁹⁶ From an international legal point of view, that was hardly the case, as the purported 'piracies' of the Regencies were not included in the Final Acts. What, then, made the Congress of Vienna such an impactful occasion? How did it mark the start of the fight against Mediterranean piracy?

The Congress of Vienna was not solely what the four victors over France wished to make of it. It was an event that generated its own dynamic, bringing together a diverse cast of people with a multitude of agendas. To understand why the Congress reshaped conceptions of piracy and security on the Mediterranean Sea it is necessary to look beyond the machinations of Castlereagh or Metternich, and focus on the many other attendees that were present in Vienna. The example of the Bremen mayor Tidemann illustrates how contemporaries could direct hopes and pleas to the Congress in writing, but other actors travelled to the Habsburg capital to assert their claims – even if they were not officially invited. For them, the Congress

⁹⁶ Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 141-142; Brenner, *Confounding powers*, pp. 180-181; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 272-273.

of Vienna provided a stage on which to make their reclamations. All sorts of people came to the Austrian capital, and with a variety of aims to match.

One thing that these different actors and diverse agendas shared was the wish to utilize the coming of peace to make specific changes and improvements. Their lofty aims were about righting wrongs and bringing order to a world that was just coming out of two decades of warfare. For Karl Fidel Sartory, a legislator and fortress inspector from the Swiss canton of St. Gallen, this creation of order was a numerical matter. He wrote Metternich to propose the introduction of a shared, European metric system at the Congress.⁹⁷ For others, the provision of peace meant suppressing the 'piracies' of the Barbary corsairs in an efficient, concerted manner. This chapter now turns to their efforts and sources of inspiration. As will become clear, the meetings of 1814-1815 provided the proponents of piracy repression with an international platform, unprecedented in scope, which was watched attentively by onlookers from all over the continent. Up on the stage of Vienna, they were the first to present North African privateering as a matter of international security.

The invited and the uninvited. Activism at the Congress

An ever growing and increasingly diverse group of people came to Vienna from late September 1814, when the opening of the Congress was drawing nearer and nearer. Large masses came trailing after the monarchs and delegates that flocked to the Habsburg capital. Thousands of spectators came to watch the crowned heads of Europe ride into the city. Many soon scattered out again after having feasted their eyes, but some, as one contemporary magazine stated, remained to 'attend business'.⁹⁸ The British gentleman Sir William Sidney Smith (1764-1840) was one of those lingering non-official attendees. A retired Vice-Admiral of the Royal Navy, Smith had come to Vienna as the self-proclaimed head of a new knightly order: the 'Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa'.⁹⁹ It had one great cause: alleviating the plight of Christians who had fallen captive to Barbary corsairs. The main issue that this

⁹⁷ HHStA, StK, Kongressakten, 13, 13-2-2-2, Großbritannien, 'Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels', 'De Sartory to Metternich', Turin 22-11-1814. Also, P. Müller, 'Sartory, Karl Fidel' in: *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (version of 11-01-2012), www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D21776.php, accessed 02-04-2019.

⁹⁸ 'Ueber öffentliche Vergnügen und Feste während des Congresses zu Wien (Fragment aus einem Briefen)', Journal für Literatür, Kunst, Luxus und Mode (December 1814), p. 771.

⁹⁹ Smith's term of active service had largely ended by 1814, but he was knighted as a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in 1815 and promoted to the rank of Admiral in 1821. 'Smith, Sir William Sidney', *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1911) vol. 25,

en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclopædia_Britannica/Smith,_Sir_William_Sidney, accessed 10-05-2017.

activist Vice-Admiral invoked to bring the threat of 'Barbary piracy' to the attention of the Congress was that of European sailors being captured and detained by North African privateers. Such captures of persons were an integral part of the Mediterranean corsairing economy, generating additional incomes as captives were ultimately sold for ransom through largely formalized channels of exchange, involving Christian redemptive orders and fiscal instruments like the so-called 'Sklavenkasse'.¹⁰⁰ Until that moment of ransom came, the captives were generally, depending on their social status and monetary means, put to forced labour, which, in contemporaries' eyes, rendered this captivity 'Christian slavery'.¹⁰¹

Smith employed all kinds of means to publicize his cause and put the 'Knights Liberators' in the limelight at the Congress. The former serviceman travelled from England to Vienna around 20 September and took up lodgings at the Gundelhof, just behind the Peterskirche in the city centre. He arranged a private audience with the Russian Tsar and initiated correspondences with, among others, Metternich and the French Foreign Minister Charles-Maurice, Prince of Talleyrand (1754-1838).¹⁰² All this networking was mere preparation for the big fund-raising event that Smith was planning to organize. On 29 December 1814, the 'Knights Liberators' held a charitable 'picnic' at the Augarten, a setting that Smith was proud to describe as 'a house appertaining to his imperial and royal majesty the Emperor of Austria'.¹⁰³

Smith had planned the banquet right in the middle of the festive season. Judging by the agenda of Lord Castlereagh, late December was a time full of parties: on 26 December Metternich hosted a ball, followed on the 28th by a dance at the Habsburg court. Nonetheless, Emperor Franz I of Austria, Tsar Alexander of Russia, King Frederik VI of Denmark, King Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia and Prince Leopold of Sicily all accepted Smith's invitation and showed up.¹⁰⁴ Allegedly, most of the high-positioned guests did not stay long after dinner, which Smith opened by making a quadruple toast to the sovereigns, the ladies of Europe 'and all other women on God's Creation', the Christian knights of his order, and the slaves 'in the hands of the infidel'.¹⁰⁵ One lady in attendance, Countess Elise von Bernstorff,

¹⁰⁰ Hershenzon, 'The political economy of ransom'; M. Ressel, *Zwischen Sklavenkassen und Türkenpässen*. *Nordeuropa und die Barbaresken in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin 2012).

¹⁰¹ R. Davis, *Christian slaves, Muslim masters. White slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke 2003).

¹⁰² National Maritime Museum, Greenwich (NMM), SMT/13; 'Narischkin to Sidney Smith', Vienna 30-10-1814. Other correspondences are printed in E. Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith* 2 vols. (London 1839), vol. II, pp. 316-317 and 319-320.

¹⁰³ Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith*, vol. II, pp. 321-325.

¹⁰⁴ The invitation and 'List of illustrious chevaliers gathered at Augarten' are both in NMM, SMT/13.

¹⁰⁵ HHStA, StK, Kongressakten, 1, 'Fête des Chevaliers a l'Augarten', 29-12-1814.

the wife of a Danish delegate, later recalled that many hours of the polonaise ensued as the dancing crowd went down the stairs and around the galleries.¹⁰⁶ She also reminisced that Smith, fifty years old at the time, was an elderly, small and somewhat 'hunched' man, but that his powerful speeches and eccentric mannerisms (involving constant changes of the regalia he wore) put everyone in a good mood.¹⁰⁷

According to the Countess, who wrote her account some two decades later, the cause behind the event had had something to do with aiding 'black slaves'.¹⁰⁸ This was a common mix-up, even during the days of the Congress. Smith complained to Metternich about the faulty press coverage, repeating that his aim had been to raise money 'to nourish the Christian slaves in chains and remove them from the dark and unhealthy dungeons'.¹⁰⁹ He found the reports in the *Correspondences d'Allemagne* particularly hurtful and urged Metternich to obtain redress for the 'the knights and charitable ladies' who needed to be defended against ridicule.¹¹⁰ The 'Knights Liberators', Smith once more explained in another letter, would send the money generated at the picnic to the European consuls in North Africa, so that they may set up hospitals and provide subsistence to the captured subjects while they awaited an 'ulterior measure for their deliverance'.¹¹¹

Smith set out what such an 'ulterior measure' might be in a pamphlet that he published in preparation for the Congress. His *Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens de faire cesser les pirateries des états barbaresques* opened by stating how 'remarkable' it was that no one paid attention to the enslavement of Christians in North Africa, while the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade had become such a popular cause.¹¹² The definitive redemption of the Christian captives, Smith argued, would never be attained by paying ransoms and tributes, but could only ensue through intimidation and force. Smith denounced the payments that had long been such a common feature of European-North African diplomacy, calling it

¹⁰⁶ E. von Bernstorff, *Ein Bild aus der Zeit von 1789 bis 1835. Aus ihren Aufzeichnungen* (Berlin 1896) p. 158;

K. Schneider and E. Werner, *Europa in Wien. Who is who beim Wiener Kongress 1814/15* (Vienna 2015), p. 56. ¹⁰⁷ Von Bernstorff, *Ein Bild*, pp. 156-158.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 156.

¹⁰⁹ Vick, *The Congress*, p. 216.

¹¹⁰ HHStA, StK, Kongressakten, 13, 13-2-2-2, Großbritannien, 'Abschaffung des Sklavenhandels', 'Sidney Smith to Metternich', Vienna 14-01-1815.

¹¹¹ From a letter by Sidney Smith to the First Minister of Sardinia in Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith*, vol. II, pp. 321-325.

¹¹² W. Smith, *Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens de faire cesser les pirateries des états barbaresques* (London 1814) p. 1. A German copy is in Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NL-HaNA), 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816, Annex I, 'Schriftlicher Aufsatz. Über die Nothwendigkeit und Mittel die Seeraeubereyen der Barbaresken einzustellen'. An English translation appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, no. 14436, 10-08-1815.

'repugnant' that 'civilized peoples' would turn themselves into tributaries of 'robber chiefs'. It was an absurd and monstrous state of affairs, he claimed, 'outrageous' to religion, humanity and honour.¹¹³

As a less 'dishonourable' alternative, Smith proposed the creation of a multinational fleet commanded by the 'Knights', which could monitor, arrest and persecute the 'pirates' on land and sea. All interested governments were invited to provide naval contingents that could guard Mediterranean waters as a truly supranational force, unaffected by wars or political crises between the European states themselves. According to the Vice-Admiral, who clearly did not lose sight of his own professional interests here, this combined fleet under his command would not only bring 'perfect security' to European maritime commerce, it would also help 'civilize' the coasts of Africa by directing local initiative away from piracy and towards other industries.¹¹⁴ First, the 'Knights' would attempt negotiations with the Ottoman Sultan. Smith proposed to urge the Sultan to stop the provision of Janissary troops to North Africa, as they were also used against the European allies of the Ottoman Empire. If the Sultan, however, did not comply, then, Smith assured, 'the barbarians in Africa' would be brought to reason with 'remonstrances, threats or reprisals'.¹¹⁵

The self-styled 'philanthropic' agenda of the 'Knights Liberators' thus had an inherently imperialist inclination. Smith did not argue for outright conquest and colonization, but he did propose that the Barbary Regencies should be kept in check with the constant threat of force. He, moreover, called into question the very status of the Regencies as sovereign political entities. By questioning the use of treaties and tributes for providing security, Smith delegitimized the position of the Regents of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli as sovereigns. The retired Vice-Admiral posited diplomacy with Barbary as an outdated absurdity. In his view, the 'progress of Enlightenment and civilization' would leave no place for 'Barbary piracies' or 'Christian slavery'.¹¹⁶

In this line of reasoning, security at sea was made dependent on whether the North African polities could fit a 'civilized' model of state. Smith invoked the dichotomy of civilized versus barbaric and mentioned historical trajectories of progress to argue that intimidation and force were justified. The absence of a piratical threat to European shipping would be ensured only when governments that were 'useful to commerce', ruled over North Africa, living in

¹¹³ Smith, Mémoire, pp. 3-4.

¹¹⁴ Smith, Mémoire, pp. 5-6.

¹¹⁵ From a letter by Sidney Smith to the First Minister of Sardinia in Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith*, pp. 325-328.

¹¹⁶ Smith, Mémoire, p. 4.

'harmony with all civilized nations'.¹¹⁷ Smith asserted that concerted measures of the European powers, both on the diplomatic and military level, were necessary to bring these changes about. His writings therefore provide an early conception of the inter-imperial order of security that was to emerge in the Mediterranean, shaped by cooperative action and with a pretence of 'universal' benefit.¹¹⁸

These were unprecedented and potentially far-reaching plans. To argue for their reasonability, Smith claimed that his personal expertise guaranteed their usefulness and relevance. All his schemes, he argued, were the result of 'thirty years of study and profound examination'.¹¹⁹ With this statement, Smith referred to his days of active service on the Mediterranean, when he visited Ottoman territories and cruised around North Africa and the Levant. He had negotiated with the Reis Effendi in 1799 and been involved in a failed attempt to sail through the Dardanelles in 1807. Both operations had been aimed at creating an alliance with the Ottoman Empire against France.¹²⁰ Smith became famous, however, for his contribution to the Siege of Acre (1799) that thwarted Napoleon's Near Eastern campaigns – a battle that he recounted so often and in such detail that it brough thim the nickname 'Long Acre', in a play on a London street name.¹²¹ At the Congress of Vienna, Smith referenced these experiences and encounters to posit himself as a knowledgeable individual whose agenda ought to be taken seriously. He called on expertise to propose what some of the most senior attendants, and particularly his British superiors, were unwilling to do: concert against the Barbary Regencies.¹²²

Smith, moreover, did not only bolster his arguments by showcasing his expertise and exploiting his personal fame, he also tacitly linked his programme to more general activist sensibilities. From the opening line of the pamphlet, the agenda of the 'Knights Liberators' was presented as a logical extension to the abolition of the slave trade. Smith had close ties to leading figures of the British abolitionist movement and carried out a steady correspondence

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 5.

¹¹⁸ On the innovation of posing Barbary corsairing as a 'universal interest', G. Weiss, *Captives and corsairs*. *France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean* (Stanford 2011), p. 148.

¹¹⁹ Smith, *Mémoire*, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁰ Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith* vol. I, pp. 41-42 and 150. The mission of 1807 brought out the poet in the Admiral, who captured some of his later attitudes to Ottoman statehood: 'His empire's fate a thread alone doth bear, / Suspended hangs the blow of death in air; / (...) 'tis not time to take / Revenge on Europe's scourge, Mahommed's race'. J. Barrow, *The life and correspondence of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith* 2 vols. (London 1848), vol. II, pp. 243-244.

¹²¹ T. Pocock, *A thirst for glory. The life of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith* (London 1998) p. 221.

¹²² On the importance of expertise in the security efforts of low-ranking officials, K. Härter, 'Security and crossborder political crime. The formation of transnational security regimes in 18th and 19th century Europe', *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013) pp. 96-106, there pp. 101-102.

with William Wilberforce.¹²³ The Vice-Admiral had encountered Barbary corsairing and Christian captivity during his stints on the Mediterranean Sea, but, as one of his biographers noted, it had been Parliamentary debates on international abolition that had provided the final push to pick up a cause and go to Vienna.¹²⁴

In his writings, Smith utilized the same sort of religiously inspired justifications to argue for worldly changes that also characterized much abolitionist petitioning. As one study of English abolitionism holds, much early nineteenth-century activism was marked by 'a fundamental concern for proper order in the world' – and this order could be defined in terms of Christian Providence or the progress of civilization.¹²⁵ The 'Knights Liberators' were thus not a singular or stand-alone phenomenon. They fitted seamlessly into that part of the post-Napoleonic public sphere which was characterized both by a distaste of 'Godless', unchecked revolution and a strong conviction that societal changes were necessary, as long as they proceeded in an orderly manner. Smith, in effect, mixed Christian notions of obligation with Enlightenment visions of progress (and an Old Regime reverie of chivalric duty). The 'Knights Liberators' were thus an offshoot of the much broader upsurge in civic and Christian activism that was behind abolitionism as well as plans like the Holy Alliance.¹²⁶

Some authors, however, suggest that there was more to Smith's activism than professional experience and personal conviction. The Vice-Admiral had been a secret agent during the wars, involved in the spying, smuggling and clandestine warfare of the British fight against Revolutionary France. Smith was a cousin of Prime Minister Pitt and had been brought up at court, where his father was a gentleman usher to Queen Charlotte, the wife of King George III. Lines of communication where therefore short and informal, landing Smith a covert appointment to set up a military base on the uninhabited Îles Saint-Marcouf off the coast of Normandy in 1795. From there, he operated a spy network and carried out secret missions on the French mainland.¹²⁷ The historian of Tunisia, Khalifa Chater hence puts forth the theory that Smith was secretly instructed to test the waters for a British crackdown on the Barbary Regencies, which was allegedly informed by the capture of Malta and the need to take over

¹²³ Barrow, *The life and correspondence*, II, pp. 371-373.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 366.

¹²⁵ D. Turley, *The culture of English antislavery, 1780-1860* (London and New York 1991), p. 44.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 17-21; S. Ghervas, 'Antidotes to empire. From the Congress System to the European Union' in: J. Boyer and B. Molden (eds.), *Eutropes. The paradox of European empire* (Chicago 2014), pp. 49-81, there pp. 56-59 and 63-7.

¹²⁷ These missions did not always succeed in staying covert. Smith was caught and held at the Abbaye prison in Paris in 1796, T. Clayton, *This dark business. The secret war against Napoleon* (London 2018), pp. 43-44 and 49.

the Maltese Order's anti-corsair mission.¹²⁸ Smith's knightly endeavours would then have been a mere façade, but the internal embarrassment that his efforts caused in British official circles does seem to support a different conclusion.

The European press immediately noted that Smith's efforts put British statesmen in an uneasy position. Smith's personal fame, and the elaborate events that he staged during the Congress of Vienna, certainly drew attention to the order's cause. One periodical, however, displayed scepticism about the feasibility of Smith's plans, stating: 'We wish that the noble organizer may not encounter his primary obstacle in the political maxims of his own country'.¹²⁹ It was clear that British treaty alliances and maritime commercial interests did not go well with Smith's confrontational proposals. Moreover, the diplomatic views of Britain's prime Congress delegates opposed great ruptures in the international status quo. In a memorandum of 7 May 1814, Lord Castlereagh had warned against the dangers of all too sudden and extreme political changes.¹³⁰ He penned this warning in relation to constitutional alterations in Europe, but it is not hard to see how these ideas would support moderate policies towards the Barbary Regencies as well. Forceful action could upset the regional status quo and antagonize the central authorities of the Ottoman Empire.

Smith even tried to obtain support from the British government, but failed. In one of his personal writings, the Vice-Admiral noted that official backing would be necessary to realize his plans of creating a combined fleet and conducting a concerted diplomacy towards the Ottomans. Without it, he wrote, 'I must confine myself to friendly invitations addressed to my fellow *knights*'.¹³¹ Support from the Foreign Office or the Admiralty never came, and Smith would even receive several official letters that slapped him on the wrist for his rogue conduct in the years that followed.¹³² Still, the retired commander and his knightly order were not entirely without allies or official supporters in Vienna.

A small power cause. Allies and their sources of inspiration

While British statesmen preferred to stay far from Smith's endeavours, the 'Knights Liberators' did find official allies amongst the delegates of several smaller European powers. Their efforts were hence at least as important to the beginnings of the fight against

¹²⁸ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 218 and 238-239.

¹²⁹ Vick, *The Congress*, p. 218.

¹³⁰ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 56-57.

¹³¹ Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith*, vol. II, pp. 325-328. Emphasis in the original.

¹³² The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO 8/11, 'Bathurst to Melville', London 27-09-1816, fp. 26-27.

Mediterranean piracy as those of the most senior Congress attendees. Independently from Smith, these small power delegates, who represented Italian principalities and German city states, made their own attempts to push the threat of 'Barbary piracy' onto the Congress agenda. They also contacted and pressured the British delegation. One example is the Florentine Prince Corsini, who represented Tuscany and sent a long letter to Castlereagh. He urged Great Britain to reprimand the North African Regencies. The Italian states were unable to protect their navigation themselves, the Prince argued, and without British help, their trade would be seriously jeopardized.¹³³

The representatives of the German Hanseatic cities argued along similar lines. The Lübeck delegate, Senator Johann Hach, carried to Vienna what was certainly the longest memorandum on Barbary corsairing. The volume, sub-titled Ein Völkerwunsch, totalled 438 pages. The largest part of the text provided historical illustrations of the Barbary Regents' 'unfaithfulness' concerning international treaties.¹³⁴ The author, a local gymnasium professor with poetic sensibilities named Friedrich Hermann, adopted a petitioning style in which he addressed the Congress directly.¹³⁵ 'Towards your meeting, you exalted', he pleaded, 'all cast their hopeful eyes. Do not hesitate: the extermination of pirates on the Mediterranean is the unitary wish of all peoples harmed by them. Never was a wish expressed in more general fashion, never was an affair of humanity less hindered by private interests and national particularism'.¹³⁶ Hermann called for an outright war, in the same vein as Franz Tidemann, the pamphleteering mayor of Bremen. He proposed a new 'crusade' that would 'cleanse' the Mediterranean of corsairs, whom he framed as 'childlike', 'mentally ill', and as an 'obstacle' to maritime trade.¹³⁷ As beneficial consequences of a crusade against North Africa, Hermann enumerated a full list: Christian and national honour, security on the Mediterranean shores and sea, commercial and scientific progress, and the dealing of a 'deathly blow to Islam'.¹³⁸

Hermann's book came with a thirty-page list of literature references, which allows us to trace his sources of inspiration and get a sense of the genealogy of his arguments.¹³⁹ In stark comparison to Smith and Tidemann, the Lübeck professor styled his call for action as a

¹³³ TNA, FO 139/21, 'Prince Corsini of Tuscany to Castlereagh', Vienna 15-10-1814, fp. 79-84.

¹³⁴ F. Hermann, Ueber die Seeräuber im Mittelmeer und ihre Vertilgung. Ein Völkerwunsch an den erlauchten Kongre β in Wien (Lübeck 1815), pp. 12-206.

¹³⁵ Some of Friedrich Hermann's other works included *Der erste Morgen an Schillers Grabe. Eine Dichtung* (Lübben 1805), *Urania. Eine Sammlung romantischer Dichtungen* (Lübben 1806) and *Argwohn und Unschuld. Drama in 3 Akten* (Lübeck 1824).

¹³⁶ Hermann, Ueber die Seeräuber, p. 342.

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 343 and 376.

¹³⁸ Ibid., pp. 398-405.

¹³⁹ Hermann, Ueber die Seeräuber, pp. 417-437.

scholarly work, with historical reflections and geographical descriptions. One of the publications that he cited most frequently was the *Histoire des deux Indes*, which contained only a small section on North Africa but was nonetheless hugely influential in shaping attitudes towards the Barbary Regencies.¹⁴⁰ This 'multi-authored bestseller of pre-Revolutionary Europe', as one historian describes it, was edited by the French writer and priest Guillaume Thomas Raynal and first appeared in 1770.¹⁴¹ It set out a broad judgment of European colonial expansion, while singling out the Barbary Coast as one area that could benefit from the spread of 'civilization'. Later editions of the work contained a passage that suggested a 'universal league' could end tyranny in North Africa, stop piracy, and open up the Regencies for useful commercial exchange.¹⁴²

This eighteenth-century line of thinking is not hard to distinguish in the various publications that aimed to set piracy on the Congress agenda. The reference to Raynal in Hermann's work hints at the historical lineage that these texts were a part of. Calls for decisive and sometimes multinational action against 'Barbary piracy' were not entirely new, neither was the idea that North Africa could be forcefully made to benefit from the 'civilizing' effects of commerce. Smith's argument that the money spent on ransoming captives could better be employed in fitting out a fleet of war was also much older. It already appeared in the memoires of the French diplomat Laurent d'Arvieux, which were published posthumously in 1735.¹⁴³ As Ann Thomson clarifies in her Barbary and Enlightenment, European writers in the eighteenth century gradually began to think of the Barbary Regencies as polities that were still in an earlier stage of historical development. These authors, she notes, also came to see the Barbary Regencies as a part of the African continent and as a gateway to its unbounded natural riches. The commercial potential of North African could be opened up, but the constant, tyrannical warfare of privateering was thought to stand in the way. The endurance of this warfare was thought to be a result of the narrowly self-interested policies of most European governments, who were happy to conclude treaties and let the corsairs target their rivals. Pleas and proposals for European action hence became increasingly common in these quarters of the Enlightenment.¹⁴⁴ The Congress of Vienna

¹⁴⁰ A. Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment. European attitudes towards the Maghreb in the 18th century* (Leiden and New York 1987), pp. 4 and 130-132; D. Todd, 'Retour sur l'expédition d'Alger. Les faux-semblants d'un tournant colonialiste français', *Monde(s)* 10:2 (2016), pp. 205-222, there pp. 216-217.

¹⁴¹ D. Todd, 'Transnational projects of empire in France, c.1815-c.1870', *Modern Intellectual History* 12:2 (2015), pp. 265-293, there p. 268.

¹⁴² Thomson, Barbary and Enlightenment, pp. 130-135.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 125.

¹⁴⁴ Thomson, Barbary and Enlightenment, pp. 130-132 and 137.

provided an opportunity to turn those plans into action, which is what Tidemann, Smith and Hermann sought to do.

Still, this was not an easy feat. Metternich's unwillingness to allow 'Barbary piracy' into the official negotiations was only one of the difficulties at hand. The size and German language of Hermann's tome, for instance, also did not help its popular reception at the Congress.¹⁴⁵ To push its agenda nonetheless, Senator Hach arranged many personal meetings in which he discussed concerted measures against Barbary corsairing. A severe toothache kept Hach up at nights in Vienna, but his Congress days were filled with talks, for instance with Dutch and Spanish delegates. Though one of his Hanseatic colleagues characterized Hach as a 'rather boring' man, a Dutch representative recounted that he became remarkably agitated whenever he discussed Barbary corsairing.¹⁴⁶ Part of this agitation consisted of Hach's ceaseless comparisons between 'black' and 'Christian' slavery. Like Smith, he questioned the partiality of acting against the 'African slave trade' while letting the 'enslavement' of Christian captives in North Africa continue.¹⁴⁷ That linkage ultimately allowed 'Barbary piracy' to land on the negotiating tables, as abolition became the subject of one of the most drawn-out debates of the Congress.

Linking abolitions

Negotiations on abolition became linked to the perceived threats of North African corsairing because many contemporaries did not see any problems in equating 'black' to 'Christian' (or 'white') slavery.¹⁴⁸ Actors with agenda-setting aspirations like Smith or Hach consciously utilized that sense of overlap to pose 'Barbary piracy' with its link to captivity as a threat of European importance. The press also made the association between these two types of slavery. Abolition and Barbary corsairing were both popular topics in the European periodicals, which increasingly put the two together.¹⁴⁹

The forced labour that Christian captives had to carry out in North Africa until they were ransomed was, in practice, totally different from the trans-Atlantic chattel trade in humans or the enslaved status that Africans were born into under the plantation system in the West

¹⁴⁵ Vick, *The Congress*, p. 218. Despite its size, one of Hach's colleagues from Bremen still managed to lose a copy of the book among his other papers. M. Hundt, 'Widerstreitende Interessen und gemeinsame Bedrohungen. Lübeck und Bremen in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts', *Bremisches Jahrbuch* 87 (2008), pp. 92-116, there pp. 102-103.

¹⁴⁶ Hundt, 'Widerstreitende Interessen', pp. 101-102 and 104.

¹⁴⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.10.10, inv. 18, no. 15, 'Van Spaen van Voorstonden to Van Nagell', Vienna 04-10-1814.

¹⁴⁸ Weiss, *Captives and corsairs*, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Vick, *The Congress*, p. 217.

Indies.¹⁵⁰ Capturing people and ransoming them was, moreover, hardly unique to the Regencies. Like corsairing itself, the enslavement of captives had been common practice well into the eighteenth century on all sides of the Mediterranean. Captive Muslims were put to work on the construction of the Vatican's fortifications, the digging of Livorno's canals and the erection of the Caserta Palace that belonged to the Bourbon kings of Naples.¹⁵¹ In 1789, the Moroccan Sultan Mohammed ben Abdallah (r. 1757-1790) ransomed six hundred slaves from Malta. When France conquered the island nine years later, Napoleon chose to liberate the two thousand Muslims that were still held in its prisons.¹⁵²

The linking of 'black' and 'white' slavery nevertheless became particularly important in Vienna. This was a direct result of the primary position that abolition occupied in the official instructions of the British delegation. Domestic campaigns headed by Wilberforce and other activists had made abolition a highly popular cause in Britain.¹⁵³ An immediate international ban on the slave trade was therefore one of the prime British Congress goals. In May 1814, the House of Lords adopted a decision on this subject after months of public pressuring.¹⁵⁴

The abolitionist negotiations in Vienna, however, quickly slid into outright barter. French, Spanish and Portuguese delegates asked for colonies or financial concessions in return for prospective dates of abolition.¹⁵⁵ Castlereagh was convinced that foreigners mistrusted Britain. He thought that others viewed British abolition as some cunning attempt to gain competitive advantages in colonial commerce. According to Castlereagh, this mistrust made it 'impossible to persuade foreign nations that this sentiment is unmixed with the views of colonial policy'.¹⁵⁶ The changing international context did make abolition costly. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, several European powers regained their colonies from Britain, the sugar trade was going up again and the Royal Navy could no longer enforce anti-slave trading policies as it pleased: this made the ban on the slave trade appear much more detrimental to British commerce than it had upon its declaration in 1807.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ A. Zamoyski, Rites of peace. The fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna (London 2007), p. 346.

¹⁵⁷ H. Berding, 'Die Ächtung des Sklavenhandels auf dem Wiener Kongress 1814/15', *Historische Zeitschrift* 219:2 (1974), pp. 265-289, there pp. 276-277.

¹⁵⁰ McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 32.

¹⁵¹ Bono, Les corsaires, p. 218.

¹⁵² Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁵³ P. Kielstra, *The politics of slave trade suppression in Britain and France, 1814-48. Diplomacy, morality and economics* (London 2000), pp. 22-55.

¹⁵⁴ B. Fladeland, 'Abolitionist pressures on the Concert of Europe, 1814-1822', *The Journal of Modern History* 38:4 (1966), pp. 355-373, there pp. 358-359.

¹⁵⁵ J. Reich, 'The slave trade at the Congress of Vienna. A study in English public opinion', *The Journal of Negro History* 53:2 (1968), pp. 129-143, there p. 137.

The international sceptics referred to the Christian slaves in the Barbary Regencies to prove their point of British self-interest. If Great Britain really was so poised to end the slave trade out of philanthropic considerations, then why did it do so little to end this other kind of slavery? Spain's representative, Pedro Gómez, Marquis of Labrador (1755-1852), called the British position inconsistent while he negotiated the termination of the Spanish slave trade with Castlereagh.¹⁵⁸ When British delegates suggested to equate slave traders to pirates, it became even easier to mirror the abolition of the slave trade to the repression of 'Barbary piracy'.¹⁵⁹ The proposal to outlaw the slave trade met with stiff opposition from the representatives of Spain and Portugal, like most of Castlereagh's other plans for immediate abolition.

On 20 January 1815, the plenipotentiaries of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Prussia and Austria did agree to draft a joint declaration. It stated that each power would end the slave trade as soon as possible, but only at a date that each government could decide for itself.¹⁶⁰ A few weeks later, on 8 February, the different delegates settled on a final version: the 'Declaration of the Powers, on the Abolition of the Slave Trade'.¹⁶¹ It would take several more months before this agreement made it into article fifteen of Vienna's Final Acts. There were negotiations on a range of other questions that dragged on - until the proceedings of the Congress were suddenly shaken up by the return of the one man that the assembled statesmen saw as the single greatest threat to peace in Europe.

Towards the Final Acts

Napoleon Bonaparte, the Congress attendees found out, had escaped from his exile and landed on the coasts of southern France on the first day of March. The former Emperor of France represented exactly the kind of hegemony that the multilateral negotiations, moderate proposals and concerted efforts of the Congress of Vienna sought to make a thing of the past. It therefore did not take the Great Power statesmen long to take a firm stance against Bonaparte's return. On 23 March 1815, the four allies issued a plan to foster 'mutual security' in a lasting manner, until France's total defeat – and after. This plan went further than the

¹⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.10.10, inv. 18, no. 15, 'Van Spaen van Voorstonden to Van Nagell', Vienna 04-10-1814.

¹⁵⁹ Berding, 'Die Ächtung des Sklavenhandels', p. 280.

¹⁶⁰ Reich, 'The slave trade', p. 137; J. Klüber, *Acte des Wiener Congresses in den Jahren 1814 und 1815* 8 vols. (Erlangen 1818), vol. VIII, pp. 9-28.

¹⁶¹ Klüber, *Acte*, vol. VIII, pp. 9-28. The declaration, however, was a mere statement of intent - the courts of Portugal and Spain would not sign treaties of abolition until the bilateral agreements with Great Britain of 1817, which took another hefty portion of bargaining by the Duke of Wellington and other British agents.

common war aims and peace agreements of the Treaty of Chaumont and the Treaty of Paris (1814), as the allies laid the foundations for a collaborative regime of occupation that had to avert any future threat posed by France to continental security. The reappearance of their old nemesis had brought the Great Powers even closer together, making them adopt shared security measures that were to be extended into peacetime and binding them to repeated multilateral discussions in which they treated matters of collective security.¹⁶²

The impact of the March 1815 agreement for 'mutual security' endured after Napoleon's final defeat. The spirit of 'mutual' assurances was retained after the Battle of Waterloo, it was echoed in the Final Acts of the Congress of Vienna, and it was integrated into the Second Treaty of Paris of November 1815, which definitively settled the occupation of France and led to the creation of the Quadruple Alliance between Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain. Great Power statesmen extended their guarantee of 'mutual security' into peacetime, donning themselves with the authority to decide on continental issues. For France, this meant the stationing of an allied army of occupation. For the rest of the continent, it meant that preserving peace and retaining the 'balance of power' would be based on mediation. The guarantee of 'mutual security' entailed the international managing of security issues and the concerted employment of Great Power force even after wartime.¹⁶³ None of this had an immediate impact on the discussions over 'Barbary piracy' that had been taking place at the Congress of Vienna, but such collective management of the fledging security culture did create the diplomatic frameworks for further negotiations and, eventually, repressive efforts concerning the purported threat of North African corsairing.

The reappearance of Napoleon set these new policies in motion, but it also drew attendees away from Vienna. Several of the main Congress participants therefore were no longer in the Habsburg capital when the ten-month meeting ended. Sidney Smith had left Austria for Brussels, hoping to join the fight against Bonaparte. He even travelled to Waterloo, where he organised the transportation of the wounded after the battle. He chartered wagons to carry the abandoned casualties to hospitals and largely paid the bills himself.¹⁶⁴ When the Final Acts of the Congress were read out to the remaining attendees in Vienna on 9 June 1815 – a week before the Battle of Waterloo took place – Smith was not among the crowd. Its many stipulations did not include the cause that he and others such as Hach, Prince Corsini and the

¹⁶² De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 64-67.

¹⁶³ Ibid., pp. 156-159.

¹⁶⁴ R. Liverpool, *Knight of the sword. The life and letters of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith* (London 1964), pp. 198-200.

Marquis of Labrador had raised at the Congress, but it would soon become clear that the Final Acts made Barbary corsairing appear in a whole new light.

The spoils of peace. The Congress' impact

The Congress of Vienna impacted the European engagement with the Barbary Regencies indirectly, not by settling any open questions or imposing any decisions, but rather by bringing to the fore new ideas on international relations and legitimate conduct. A new international culture of 'mutual security' was put into practice in the wake of 1814-1815. The Final Acts altered the frameworks in which European contemporaries understood corsairing, allowing them to frame 'Barbary piracy' as an issue of shared concern. The conclusion of a general peace between the European powers, moreover, created opportunities for these new attitudes to transpire into unprecedented cooperative policies. Contemporary European attitudes to Barbary corsairing were influenced by the idea that peace was a common project and that self-interested politics of security could be overcome. These takes on peace and security would eventually effectuate a turn towards violent intervention in North Africa. Yet policies did not change immediately, as the conduct of Metternich and Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna abundantly made clear.

What then was the overall impact of the Congress on the repression of Mediterranean piracy? What were the spoils of peace for those who sought to eradicate Barbary corsairing as a 'piratical' threat? In Vienna, Great Power representatives, after all, had continued to emphasise their governments' treaty relations with the Regencies, even when faced with criticisms from other attendees. Nonetheless, the negotiations and many public campaigns of 1814-1815 would eventually alter conceptions of Barbary statehood and corsairing. This became clear through the various expeditions, bombardments and interventions that marked subsequent years and decades. An early indication that 'Barbary piracy' would only gain in prominence as a matter of international negotiation came in an additional article of the Second Treaty of Paris. The article noted that Great Powers ambassadors would convene in London sometime in 1816 to talk further on pressing matters, particularly the abolition of the slave trade. Tsar Alexander (1777-1825) then suggested to include the 'piracies' of the Barbary Regencies too. The Russian monarch had been approached by Spanish and Portuguese diplomats to ask for his mediation, and now took the opportunity to follow up on their request. In addition to humouring the Iberian governments, Alexander wished to bring an immediate end to the string of hostilities that corsairs of all three Regencies had carried out

against Russian ships.¹⁶⁵ Yet his proposal also clearly echoed Smith's plans in its calls to 'liberate the Mediterranean of the Barbary piracies' by creating a 'defensive system'.¹⁶⁶

The Congress of Vienna signified a point of change because various important developments coalesced for the first time during its meetings and side-events. The Final Acts and the abolitionist declaration signalled a moralizing turn in international politics. The efforts of Smith and other activists pointed to the internationalization of common issues, framed as shared security threats. The creation of a general European peace, in addition, worked to solidify asymmetries of naval power on the Mediterranean Sea. The new ideas on righteous politics, the rising notions of mutual security and the strengthening assuredness of European military might profoundly impacted global international relations. Together, these three factors also informed a new, more hostile attitude to North African corsairing.

In a more general sense, the normative ring of the Final Acts helped further the delegitimation of the Barbary Regents as internationally accepted sovereigns. The treaties' tone of moral righteousness and rhetoric of international legality helped to bolster claims that Barbary corsairing was a piratical threat against which repressive measures should be taken. The 'Declaration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade' proved particularly instrumental in this sense. The statement was vague about setting an end date for the slave trade (which was why abolitionist activists considered it a failure), but its moral tone was clear. The agreement held that the slave trade was 'repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality'. Therefore, the signees agreed on 'putting an end to a scourge, which has so long desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity', stating that the 'public voice, in all civilized countries, calls aloud for its prompt suppression'.¹⁶⁷

From a legal perspective, the declaration's phrasing did little to outlaw the trade. It only bound the signatories to further negotiations. However, these follow-up talks would have to touch upon the 'slavery' of Barbary captives too, thanks to the diplomatic intervention of Tsar Alexander in Paris, as well as the philanthropic efforts of William Sidney Smith and the counter-abolitionist arguments of the Marquis of Labrador. At the Congress, it had become clear that Christian 'slavery' in North Africa could be posited as a test to the limits of British

¹⁶⁵ Vnešnjaja politika Rossii XIX i načala XX veka. Dokumenty rossijskogo ministerstva inostrannych del (Moscow 1960-1974), series 1, vol. 8, pp. 278-279, 'Nesselrode to A. d'Italinskiy', Vienna 12(24)-04-1815.

 ¹⁶⁶ HHStA, StK, Kongressakten, 16, Folder 16-2, 'Diverse mémoires', 16-2-11, 'Abolition de traité des nègres et des piraties des Barbaresques', n.d..

¹⁶⁷ Berding, 'Die Ächtung des Sklavenhandels', pp. 282-283 and 285.

abolitionist policy.¹⁶⁸ The issue of Barbary corsairing thus became a central concern in subsequent negotiations, particularly during the ambassadorial conferences that were going to convene in London in 1816.¹⁶⁹ As long as Great Britain did little to confront the Regencies, critical publics and sceptical officials of small power states would keep referring to the enduring enslavement of Christians in North Africa.¹⁷⁰

The linking of Barbary captivity and international abolition did not just inspire diplomatic barter, it also had consequences on a normative level. The wording of the declaration on the slave trade, by extension, came to touch upon the conduct of the Barbary Regents as well. Christian captivity, and the corsairing wars in which that captivity was embedded, were situated in the same disputable light as the trans-Atlantic trade in humans. Brian Vick has described the abolitionist declaration as 'the first truly humanitarian measure cast in universalist terms to emerge from a diplomatic gathering'.¹⁷¹ The post-Congress engagement with the Barbary Regencies evinced that such 'humanitarianism' did not apply to all peoples and creeds in the same manner. This was not a humanitarianism of universal human rights. Rather, humanitarian measures meant international condemnation and violent intervention for the 'piratical' and 'infidel' polities of North Africa, which seemingly opposed the 'civilized' and 'popular' abolitionist agenda.

The consecration of peace through the Final Acts further effectuated a closing of the ranks among the European powers. As Matthias Schulz has argued, the Final Acts were the 'first general peace concluded as a multilateral treaty' and therefore they were considered 'a kind of "constitutional" order of Europe".¹⁷² This order was also made out to be exclusively Christian, European and 'civilized'. Muslim powers were not part of this order but would soon notice its workings. Respect for old arrangements with the North African Regencies did not disappear instantly. Still, the development of public international law in Europe, based on the new web of multilateral treaties and fledging practices of enduring concertation, did raise uncertainties about the legal standing of the North African sovereigns.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ O. Löwenheim, "Do ourselves credit and render a lasting service to mankind". British moral prestige, humanitarian intervention, and the Barbary pirates', International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003), pp. 23-48, there p. 31. ¹⁶⁹ Kielstra, *The politics of slave trade suppression*, pp. 120-123.

¹⁷⁰ Vick, The Congress, p. 199.

¹⁷¹ Vick, The Congress, p. 204.

¹⁷² M. Schulz, 'The construction of a culture of peace in post-Napoleonic Europe. Peace through equilibrium, law and new forms of communicative interaction', Journal of Modern European History 13:4 (2015), pp. 464-474. there p. 465.

¹⁷³ Windler, 'Diplomatic history', pp. 79-80. On its later impact, J. Pitts, 'Boundaries of Victorian international law' in: D. Bell (ed.), Victorian visions of global order. Empire and international relations in nineteenth-century political thought (Cambridge 2007), pp. 67-88, there pp. 67-68.

The inclusion of the Ottoman Empire within the developing Congress System was another particularly complicated question, pointing to the difficulties and inconsistencies of delineating the extents of this system. Ottoman representatives had been invited to come to Vienna, but under the condition that they would be accorded 'the rank of the fourth class' – the same rank as that of Europe's smallest sovereign entities. As the British ambassador in Constantinople explained, this meant that the Ottoman plenipotentiary would come 'not to sit in the congress (...) but to be within reach of the assembly'.¹⁷⁴ Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) maintained a four-month long silence before rejecting the offer, signalling his offence and displaying a lack of trust in the political designs of his Christian neighbours.¹⁷⁵ Castlereagh did give Yanko Mavroyeni, the Ottoman resident in Vienna, an oral pledge that the interests and 'intact conservation' of the Ottoman Empire were necessary to the 'established system' and general order.¹⁷⁶ Soon after the Congress, however, it became clear that this new international system would allow for violent interventions on Ottoman territory, especially against the Empire's North African subsidiaries.¹⁷⁷

Another aspect of the European closing of the ranks was that the old Enlightenment hopes of a universal league against 'Barbary piracy' now, for the first time, became a real possibility. The peace of 1815 made the ideas for cooperative action and the prospects of a new inter-imperial order on the Mediterranean more than figments of the imagination, penned down in learned tracts and scholarly volumes. 'Barbary piracy' could now be more resoundingly posed as a threat to European security, to be eradicated definitively in a concerted manner. The terms in which historical actors described such concertation at the Congress of Vienna differed, ranging from the all-out crusading rhetoric of Tidemann, Hach and Hermann to Smith's proposals of diplomacy and maritime policing. Yet the underlying conceptions of the threats posed, and interests at stake, were highly similar. The Barbary Regencies menaced commerce and navigation through their perpetuated wars, thereby destabilizing order at sea and subjecting Christians to slavery. These notions of threat supported the idea that corsairing was a shared international concern. This is why the Congress of Vienna marked a significant break from the past. It hinted at altered European-

¹⁷⁴ O. Ozavci, *Dangerous gifts. Imperialism, security, and civil wars in the Levant, 1798-1864* (forthcoming, Oxford University Press).

¹⁷⁵ Ozavci, Dangerous gifts.

¹⁷⁶ TNA, FO 139/26; 'Copy of a note by the Ottoman Charge d'Affaires', Vienna 16-02-1815, fp. 36-39.

¹⁷⁷ E. Ingram, 'Bellicism as boomerang. The Eastern Question during the Vienna System' in: P. Krüger and P. Schroeder (eds.), *"The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848". Episode or model in modern history?* (Münster 2002), pp. 205-225, there pp. 210-211.

North African relations and signalled the coming of a new era in which old proposals of 'enlightened opinion' could be turned into action.¹⁷⁸

A sense of timeliness

Contemporaries accordingly liked to depict the Congress of Vienna as a moment of historical change. When these actors took the stage and called Barbary corsairing a piratical threat to all of Europe, they also criticized the older, 'self-interested' means of protection. The most aggressive pamphleteers completely disregarded the old diplomatic relations and commercial ties between the European powers and the Barbary states. They claimed that the Regencies were inherently illegitimate entities with whom no official relations could be maintained. The notion that these states posed a threat to security was central to this newfound process of delegitimation. Accordingly, contemporary arguments brimmed over with the rhetoric of a looming new era, an era in which 'progress' (of Enlightenment, of civilization) would leave no place for polities that allegedly depended on robberies, warfare and enslavement.¹⁷⁹ Peace imbued historical actors with the idea that they were living in historic times, that they had to take action and reshape the future. This 'era-consciousness' inspired the idea that the Barbary Regencies and their corsairs were an anomaly, out of place in a world reconfigured with a new international order.¹⁸⁰

Simultaneously, European actors started to notice that power relations within the Mediterranean had altered significantly. There had been a considerable build-up of naval force during the Napoleonic Wars. The Royal Navy's presence in particular increased as the British Empire obtained various regional footholds and created sizeable military complexes on these holdings.¹⁸¹ European forces also had become much more powerful than their North African counterparts. Ships of eighty, ninety or a hundred cannon had come to fill the ranks of many European navies, following technological innovations in the preceding centuries that were enabled by economies of scale and the growing apparatuses of the fiscal-military state.¹⁸² Squadrons made up of such warships totally outclassed the North African fleets.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁸ For 'enlightened opinion', Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment*, pp. 130-132.

¹⁷⁹ Turley, *The culture of English antislavery*, pp. 228-229.

¹⁸⁰ W. Pyta, 'Kulturgeschichtliche Annäherungen an das europäische Mächtekonzert' in: Idem (ed.), *Das europäische Mächtekonzert. Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Wiener Kongreβ 1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853* (Cologne 2009), pp. 1-24, there pp. 22-23.

¹⁸¹ There were still many debates in Westminster about whether these conquests had to be maintained after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Holland, *Blue-water empire*, pp. 12-13 and 22-24.

¹⁸² C. Bayly, *The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914* (Malden, MA and Oxford 2004), pp. 62-64.

¹⁸³ Hourani, A history of the Arab peoples, pp. 259-260; Panzac, Barbary corsairs, pp. 27-28 and 32.

The ensuing differences in power impacted naval battle as much as overarching ideas of righteous order and proper diplomatic conduct. The appeal of certain 'civilized' or 'Enlightened' principles became all the greater now that the option of forcibly implementing them presented itself. In return, such moral principles became the pillars that had to sustain and justify naval predominance, as would become clear during the bombardments and violent interventions against 'Barbary piracy' that followed over the next two decades.¹⁸⁴

Alongside the growing military might stood an increasing awareness of North Africa's economic potential. Sidney Smith, following precursors like Abbé Raynal, made much of the commercial benefits that 'civilized' government in the Regencies could bring. Commercial exchanges had come with their own forms of encroachment in earlier centuries, as demonstrated by the foreign concessions, but the post-1815 calls for the colonization of the Regencies were to become much more menacing.¹⁸⁵ The American historian Frederick Robert Hunter has described how the rulers of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli generally used three means of counteracting economic penetration in the early modern period. The Deys and Beys, he explains, established commercial monopolies, took advantage of inter-European rivalries to create international division, and pursued the practice of privateering.¹⁸⁶ In the post-Vienna context, the latter two lines of action were increasingly obstructed.

Asymmetries of power, however, did not immediately materialise into action. Governments of smaller and larger powers still tried to conclude treaties with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in the years right after the Congress of Vienna. Smith, Hermann and Tidemann could call for forceful action all they wanted, but diplomatic negotiations did, for the time being, remain the first option in the face of acute crises and repeated captures at sea.¹⁸⁷ It was, furthermore, as of yet unclear how such concerted action was going to transpire. Who could instigate multinational means of repression? On the basis of which diplomatic agreements? And how were European naval contingents going to be brought together? The promise of a follow-up conference in London suggested some possible answers to these questions. Still, this promise was only a first, preliminary step. Activist pamphleteers and smaller powers

¹⁸⁴ What David Turley has written about British abolitionism could apply for European anti-piracy policies as well: 'as the British recognised their predominant position in the world, antislavery laid claim to putting moral fibre into the exercise of international power and in doing so promised to help sustain the predominance by prescribing as fundamental features of other societies forms of commerce and labour in accord with British values'. Turley, *The culture of English antislavery*, p. 46.

¹⁸⁵ Todd, 'Transnational', p. 271-272.

¹⁸⁶ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', pp. 14-15.

¹⁸⁷ S. Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel. Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiendeeeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme* (Dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam 1998), p. 139.

officials at the Congress of Vienna had pushed the idea of 'Barbary piracy' as a threat to security, but how that idea was going to be turned into practice remained obscure.

Conclusion. A warlike postscript to Vienna

An intervention of a non-European power against the Regency of Algiers, which took place just weeks after the Final Acts were read out, provided European contemporaries with one possible line of action. This episode serves as the conclusion to this chapter because it further strengthened the calls for violent repression that had been brought to international attention at the Congress of Vienna. The diplomatic meeting in the Austrian capital may not have resulted in the immediate execution of such plans to repress the threat of 'Barbary piracy', but it did create an international context in which such actions could took place. As we have seen, the agenda-setting efforts of activists and smaller power diplomats were not entirely new, as they harkened back to older Enlightenment proposals of general leagues that could unite Christianity. They did prove to be effective, due to the linkage with British policies of abolition and the sympathy they obtained from Tsar Alexander. Yet it was only after the Congress of Vienna, when the fledging security culture's frameworks of standing multilateral negotiation took further shape, that such proposals were first turned into implemented practice. However, another factor that helped bring about this transition from plan to practice was a very successful operation by the supposed upstarts of the U.S. navy.

While the delegates of Europe's powers went about their negotiations, dances and picnics, something else was happening on the other side of the Atlantic. There, the U.S. government sought to reap its own benefits from the conclusion of a new peace. The Treaty of Ghent of December 1814 had brought an end to the Anglo-American War of 1812, in which British troops had ransacked Washington and destroyed the White House. In the midst of this conflict, the Regent of Algiers Dey Hadj Ali (r. 1809 – March 1815) had also declared war on the United States. He did so because of overdue and insufficient payments of tribute, and was allegedly backed in his resolve by a statement of alliance from the British Prince Regent George IV (1762-1830).¹⁸⁸ The Treaty of Ghent allowed the U.S. government to redirect its attention to this conflict. Congress authorized the use of the navy against Algiers on 3 March 1815, two weeks after the Senate unanimously ratified the peace treaty with Britain. Few

¹⁸⁸ The Algerines wanted tributes in the guise of naval stores like masts and lumber, made from American timber. This would make the Regency less reliable on Dutch and Scandinavian supplies. Sending heavy items such as masts across the Atlantic was an expensive and complicated exercise, and the Americans often sought to avoid it. Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary*, pp. 128 and 132.

American merchants had appeared on Mediterranean waters during the War of 1812, but in 1815 this seemed set to change. The protection of Mediterranean trade was deemed vital to the recovery of the U.S. economy, but ideas of honour and international prestige also featured heavily in the rationale for naval deployment.¹⁸⁹

A squadron of ten ships left New York in May. Its commander, Commodore Stephen Decatur, was a veteran of the United States' war with Tripoli of 1801-1805, which was also fought over issues of treaty ratification and the payment of tribute.¹⁹⁰ En route to Algiers, off the volcanic rocks of Cabo de Gata in the southeast of Spain, the American fleet encountered the frigate *Mashouda*: the 46-cannon flagship of the Algerine navy. The Americans quickly managed to encircle the ship as its captain Raïs Hamidou had been caught by surprise. In the exchange of fire that ensued, the Algerine commander fell, ending a distinguished career of thirty-five years. His crew was subsequently captured and his frigate confiscated.

The Italian historian Salvatore Bono has called Raïs Hamidou the last of the famous Barbary naval commanders.¹⁹¹ He may also be seen as one of the first victims of the changing international engagement with North African corsairing. Hamidou was an illustrious figure: historian Abun-Nasr describes him as 'the idolized hero of the Algerine community'.¹⁹² Born a tailor's son in 1773, Hamidou made a rapid career in the navy and became especially renowned for the capture of a Portuguese brig of 44 cannons in 1802. The captain made such a name for himself that the mistrusting Dey Ali ben Mahmud (r. 1808-1809) exiled him to Beirut upon taking office.¹⁹³ After his return to Algerine service in 1809, Hamidou was made the head of his own squadron and reeled in Sicilian, Neapolitan, Spanish, Dutch, Swedish and American prizes before meeting his end on 17 June 1815.¹⁹⁴

Following the battle, the victorious Americans dragged Hamidou's frigate to Cartagena in Spain and kept the 406 Algerine crewmembers imprisoned. The fleet then sailed on to Algiers, where the newly acceded Dey Omar Agha (r. 1815-1817) was delivered the first defeat of his two-year reign and agreed to a treaty without tributes.¹⁹⁵ The peace agreement further stipulated that American captives, in the event of future wars, should be treated as

¹⁸⁹ Brenner, *Confounding powers*, p. 190; Marzagalli, 'However illegal', p. 119.

¹⁹⁰ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 33-36; Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', p. 141.

¹⁹¹ Bono, Les corsaires, p. 153.

¹⁹² Abun-Nasr, A history of the Maghrib, p. 166.

 ¹⁹³ A. Devoulx, Le Raïs Hamidou. Notice biographique sur le plus célèbre corsair algérien du xiii^e siècle de l'hégire. D'apres des documents authentiques et pour la plupart inédites (Algiers 1859), pp. 114-115.
 ¹⁹⁴ Bono, Les corsaires, p. 153.

¹⁹⁵ According to the chancellor of the French consulate in Algiers, the peace treaty created great consternation among inhabitants of the city. Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 22PO/1/31, no. 20, 'Journal d'Alger, 01-12-1814 – 30-07-1815', entry for 30-06-1815.

prisoners of war and not as slaves – a stipulation that European governments soon came to demand for their subjects as well. The ravaged *Mashouda* was given back to Algiers in return.¹⁹⁶ Decatur was well aware of the international impression this affair would leave. The 'successful results of our small expedition', would, he hoped, 'induce other nations to follow the example; in which case the Barbary states will be compelled to end their piratical system'.¹⁹⁷

The American display of force did not miss its mark. An English pamphleteer took the campaign as proof that 'half a dozen ships of war' could 'reduce' Algiers 'into complete humiliation'.¹⁹⁸ And indeed, little over a year after Decatur's expedition, another set of warships sailed to Algiers. This fleet would carry out a mission on behalf of all the powers of Europe, who, Dey Omar Agha was to learn from the commanding Admiral, had been brought together by the Congress of Vienna.

¹⁹⁶ Decatur also went on to Tunis and Tripoli. The authorities there had allowed British forces to retake prizes that an American privateer brought in during the War of 1812, which the U.S. government wished to see (and managed to get) compensated, Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary*, pp. 128-129.

¹⁹⁷ Cited in F. Leiner, *The end of Barbary terror. America's 1815 war against the pirates of North Africa* (Oxford 2006), p. 173.

¹⁹⁸ W. Hone, *The cruelties of the Algerine pirates. Shewing the present dreadful state of the English slaves and other Europeans at Algiers and Tunis* (London 1816), p. 7.

Chapter 2: Opening fire. The Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers, 1815-1816

During the night of 27 August 1816, William Shaler stood bent over a windowsill overlooking the bay of Algiers. Unlike most of his consular colleagues, the American diplomat had stayed in the city that day. Locked in in his residency with only the Danish consul for company, Shaler holed up at home to witness and document what all other foreign representatives had fled to avoid. At midnight, when the near constant grumbling of fire and explosions had finally died down, Shaler dared open the shutters and take a look outside. 'The spectacle at this moment', he recounted in his memoirs, 'is particularly grand and sublime. A black thunderstorm is rising, probably an effect of the long cannonade; its vivid lightning discovers the hostile fleets retiring with the land breeze, and paints them in strong relief on the deep obscurity of the horizon'.¹

The ships that Shaler saw retire from the bay through flashes of lightning and the zooming of the last few cannon shots were somehow different from those that had appeared before Algiers on any earlier occasion. Flying Dutch and British flags, these vessels formed a multinational force that had sailed across the Mediterranean to pose demands to Dey Omar Agha of Algiers in the name of 'Europe'. The fleet was commanded by Royal Navy Admiral Edward Pellew, Viscount Exmouth (1757-1833), with the aid of the Dutch Vice-Admiral Theodorus Frederik van Capellen (1761-1824). Their joint mission resulted in a bombardment so intense that by the time it ended the combined fleet was largely out of munitions. The assembled ships of war had fired almost 50,000 projectiles and lit up over a hundred tons of gunpowder.² Omar Agha wrote of a 'veritable hail of projectiles' in a report to his Ottoman suzerain. 'Many of your servants, courageous heroes', the Dey continued, 'fell as martyrs of this war, defending their religion and their Sultan'.³

¹ W. Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers, political, historical, and civil. Containing an account of the geography, population, government, revenues, commerce, agriculture, arts, civil institutions, tribes, manners, languages, and recent political history of that country* (Boston 1826), p. 281.

² R. Perkins and K. Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary. Admiral Lord Exmouth's battle with the corsairs of Algiers in 1816* (Havant 1982), p. 147; O. Löwenheim, "Do ourselves credit and render a lasting service to mankind". British moral prestige, humanitarian intervention, and the Barbary pirates', *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003), pp. 23-48, there p. 31.

³ Cited in D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), p. 287.

The sights in the harbour bore testament to the onslaught. During the darkest hours of the morning, a British officer walked about the deck of one of the ships moored off Algiers. He reported:

'The horror of the spectacle is difficult to describe. (...) Legs, blood, brains and mangled bodies were strewn about in all directions. You could scarcely keep your feet from the slipperiness of the decks, wet with blood. But still a more shocking scene was seeing the men and boys who had been burnt by an unfortunate explosion on the main deck, crawling about the deck in the most excruciating agony, stark naked, a single feature of whose faces could not be discovered, perfectly blind, uttering the most heart-rending shrieks and cries, and calling out to everyone they met to put them out of their misery and put them over-board'.⁴

Further demonstrations of the bloodshed and destruction could be seen around the vessel. The water inside the harbour, one observant noted, 'was all black, covered with charcoal and halfburnt pieces of wood'.⁵ These were the smouldering remains of the Regency's corsair fleet, which had been nearly completely destroyed. 'But the most shocking and dreadful sight', the account concluded, 'was the number of dead bodies which were floating in the water'.⁶ In the bombardment of 27 August an estimated 300 to 2,000 Algerines lost their lives, while counts of the British and Dutch casualties amounted to 131 dead and 742 wounded.⁷

The next day it was clear that the coastal fortifications of Algiers lay in tatters and most of the corsair fleet had been reduced to fleeting rubble. Dey Omar Agha saw himself forced to sign a treaty following the demands of the European commanders. The cooperating admirals were to return home as national heroes. Both received honorary titles from each other's governments. Even the celebration of their victory was a border-crossing affair. This is what made the Anglo-Dutch bombardment historically unique. The attack of 27 August was not the first bombardment of Algiers, nor was it the first time that Dutch and British navies had united against the Regency. A combined Anglo-Dutch fleet had appeared before the fortified port in 1670, after having destroyed several Algerine vessels out at sea.⁸ In 1816, however, the two admirals claimed that they were not acting on behalf of their respective crowns and nations, but for the sake of 'universal' interests and 'humanity'. They referenced a new

⁴ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, pp. 131-132.

⁵ Cited in Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 286-287.

⁶ Ibidem.

⁷ The extremities of different estimates are represented by Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 287 (who stresses the highly approximate nature of any calculation incorporating Algerine casualties) and Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 151.

⁸ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 32-33. On another example, the Anglo-Spanish expedition against Algiers of 1620, W. Brenner, *Confounding powers. Anarchy and international society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda* (Cambridge 2015), p. 174.

arrangement between the powers of Europe, a new political situation on the continent to bolster that claim. The incentive for the bombardment, they argued without any historical precedent, lay with the 'General Peace' that now existed.⁹

This reference to peacetime order and universal interests made the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers unique in its sort. The city had seen its fair share of barrages through the ages, its port had been home to the sanguine scenes of wounded sailors and burning ships many times before, but it had not yet been inflicted an assault in the name of humanity and European peace. The attack of August 1816 hence stands out, as it points us to the first beginnings of the concerted European fight against piracy and the new inter-imperial order of security that were starting to reshape the Mediterranean. The bombardment may have been carried out bilaterally by the governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands, but it was undertaken for allegedly multilateral interests that concerned all the powers of Europe. In its wake, the attack received a European reaction to match. A multitude of official congratulations, impromptu festivities, presents and poetic outbursts of jubilation greeted the victory, emanating from all corners of the continent.¹⁰

Such links between the bilateral action of the British and Dutch navies, and the broader European security culture that emerged after 1815 will be the main focus of this chapter. The bombardment of Algiers, we may say, was a violent way of communicating the results of the Congress of Vienna. Tellingly, one of Admiral Exmouth's notes to the Dey declared that new arrangements regarding corsairing had 'become necessary under the present change of the political situation in Europe'.¹¹ As the attack of 1816 indicates, the Congress impacted relations between the powers of Europe and North Africa almost immediately. It impacted these relations by marking the start of the concerted fight against the perceived threat of Mediterranean piracy. This chapter shows how that fight began in practice, clarifying how it was turned from an idea ventilated at the Congress of Vienna into implemented, destructive action at sea.

That process of translation was burdensome and marked by inconsistencies. Still, it did set out the contours of the new inter-imperial order of security that would become discernible in the Mediterranean over the course of later decades. Many historians of Algeria and the Maghreb have stressed that 1816 was a major turning point. Jocelyne Dakhlia, for instance,

⁹ The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO 8/2, Letter from Exmouth to Croker, Algiers 06-04-1816, attached

^{&#}x27;Exmouth to Dey of Algiers', 24-03-1816; Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA), 2.05.01, inv. 80, no. 2281, 'Fraissinet to Van Nagell', Marseille 05-06-1816.

¹⁰ Many examples are assembled in NL-HaNA, 2.21.008.01, inv. 149.

¹¹ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816, attached 'Exmouth to Dey of Algiers', 24-03-1816.

writes that the new asymmetries of power between Europe and North Africa became apparent with the bombardment, as it enforced a one-sided change of the old rules of maritime raiding and diplomatic contact.¹² Comparably, Khelifa Chater argues that the event initiated an era of European hegemony.¹³ Following their line of reasoning, I suggest that 1816 was an important moment in the creation of a new Mediterranean order. Defining features of that order – such as modes of cooperation, the linkage to the Congress System, the use of security as a legitimizing discourse and the important roles of smaller and non-European powers – were all at play in the coming of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment. In focussing on this Anglo-Dutch cooperation it furthermore becomes clear how different states could take the lead in the fight against piracy at different times. This was never a matter of singular naval hegemony. At this early stage, smaller powers initially drove the repression of 'Barbary piracy', later to be followed by Great Britain, Russia and France.

The sizeable literature that exists on 1816 has, thus far, mainly grappled with the simple, but nonetheless challenging question of *why* the Anglo-Dutch attack took place. Some of the most senior actors in British foreign policy had, after all, been very reluctant to even discuss action against the North African Regencies at the Congress of Vienna. In order to explain why they nonetheless subscribed to a bombardment, scholars have referenced the rise of humanitarianism, drawn from IR theories of moral prestige and turned to considerations of geopolitical power play.¹⁴ That a Dutch squadron participated in the effort is either ignored in such explanations or disregarded as a mere 'coincidence', being the result of 'incident, rather than pre-coordination'.¹⁵ In contrast to such readings, this chapter contends that the involvement of the Dutch naval contingent is an important explanatory factor in its own right. The fact that the Royal Navy cooperated in this venture discloses that the action against Algiers was deeply intertwined with the formulation of 'Barbary piracy' as a perceived threat to European security, and with British wishes to assert control over how that threat was going to be fought in the Mediterranean Sea. The Anglo-Dutch bombardment was hence born from the contemporary realisation that security at sea was going to be enacted *multilaterally*. The

¹² J. Dakhlia, '1830, une rencontre?' in: A. Bouchène, J. Peyroulou, O. Tengour and S. Thénault (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962)* (Paris and Algiers 2012), pp. 142-148, there pp. 145-146.
¹³ K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 259-260.

¹⁴ F. Klose, 'Enforcing abolition. The entanglement of civil society action, humanitarian norm-setting, and military intervention' in: Idem (ed.), *The emergence of humanitarian intervention. Ideas and practice from the nineteenth century to the present* (Cambridge 2016), pp. 91-120; Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves credit', p. 23; R. Holland, *Blue-water empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London 2013), p. 31.

¹⁵ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 129; Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves credit', p. 31.

new order that emerged in the Mediterranean was to be one of collectively enforced and multilaterally managed security.

Cooperation was a crucial trait of the 1816 attack. It set the endeavour apart as a founding moment of the fight against Mediterranean piracy and helps explain why the bombardment took place. Regardless of its importance, cooperation between the British and Dutch navies did not come easily. It was the result of cumbersome debates, difficult trade-offs and repeated disappointments. Multiple complications and obstructions marked the journey towards the meet-up of the British and Dutch fleets. Not the least of these complicating factors had to do with the political choices and diplomatic skills of Dey Omar Agha and the other rulers of the North African Regencies. An enduring respect for these authorities' status as sovereigns did continue to shape European conduct towards to them, as it had in earlier centuries. Nevertheless, things were set to change rapidly and violently. To get a sense of how rapid these changes were, this chapter begins out at sea in the summer of 1814, when North African corsairing was still an everyday, if menacing aspect of Mediterranean life.

Marauders in the mist. The workings of 'Barbary piracy'

It was a foggy day when Gerrit Metzon, a captain from the Dutch fisher's town of Vlaardingen, encountered a first sign of his impending fate. On Friday 24 June 1814, while struggling to navigate his herring boat *De Twee Gebroeders* ('The Two Brothers') around Cape St. Vincent in thick fog, Metzon heard some cannon shots in the obscured distance. That roar in the mist proved foreboding. In the clarity of the next morning, when the fog had dispelled, the Dutch captain quickly found out who had fired these shots. A row vessel with turbaned men was fast approaching his boat. These were Algerine corsairs, dispatched from the larger fleet of several small warships that could be seen in the distance. After boarding Metzon's vessel, the two officers of the privateering crew demanded that the Dutch captain hand over his goods while their subordinates opened the coffers on deck and razed through the cabin. The Dutchman was ordered to leave his crew behind and taken to the frigates that made up the core of the squadron. There, he found out that the shots he had heard in the mist were fired in the taking of another Dutch ship, the koff *De Vigilantie*. One of the Algerine officers could speak a little English and inquired what other ships under what flags were laying in the harbour of Cadiz, from which Metzon had departed six days prior. After the

interrogation, he was brought back on board his own boat as the corsairs and their prizes slowly set sail for Algiers.¹⁶

It would take over two years before Gerrit Metzon and the seven other men who had been on *De Twee Gebroeders* would leave the Regency again.¹⁷ Their captivity only ended after the Anglo-Dutch fleet completed its bombardment and Dey Omar, as part of his part of his reparations, had to free all 'Christian slaves'. Metzon later published a narrative of his time in Algiers, recounting the events from his capture off the coast of Portugal to his return to Den Helder on an autumn afternoon in October 1816. As a 'diary' of his experiences, Metzon's texts fits neatly within the corpus of Barbary captivity narratives, which had become wellestablished by the early nineteenth century. His writing is filled with genre-defining details of 'Turkish' brutality, 'Moorish' ignorance and Christian perseverance. 18 Keeping the stereotypical tropes of his published recollections in mind, the case of Metzon can still tell us much about why corsairing was deemed to be a threat and how that threat was experienced by seafaring men rather than high-ranking diplomats at congresses. Before turning to the negotiations between Dutch and British ambassadors, we will therefore first look into the practice and frameworks of North African corsairing. If only because the workings of maritime raiding further illustrate that there was, in fact, little about 'Barbary piracy' that was intrinsically piratical.

Raiding tactics

There was nothing irregular about Metzon's capture. His herring boat and its cargo were legitimate prizes under the conventions of privateering. The Regency of Algiers and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which was newly independent from French imperial domination, were at that time in a state of war because of disagreements over tributes and diplomatic recognition. The way in which the small Dutch vessel was chased, boarded and taken on that June afternoon neatly fitted the tried and tested practices of North African maritime raiding. Corsairs used small, light vessels without many cannon to chase their prey. Speed was therefore the primary quality valued in a ship, which explains why the craft of choice were often of the smaller types that had both sails and oars, such as galiots or xebecs.¹⁹

¹⁶ G. Metzon, *Dagverhaal van mijne lotgevallen gedurende eene gevangenis en slavernij van twee jaren en zeven maanden te Algiers* (Rotterdam and Vlaardingen 1817), pp. 5-8.

¹⁷ The crewmembers of *De Twee Gebroeders* are listed among the liberated slaves in NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 88, no. 4063, 'Report from the Secretary of State to Van Nagell', Brussels 23-10-1816.

¹⁸ W. Gallois, A history of violence in the early Algerian colony (New York 2013), p. 31.

¹⁹ M. Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne (1516-1830)* (Algiers 1983), pp. 49, 59-61 and 102.

Against a group of frigates or a large ship of the line, with its multiple decks of batteries, these vessels would not stand a chance, but against weak enemies they could be highly effective. Corsair captains often took a cautious approach, targeting poorly protected coastal areas or solitary merchants ships out on the open sea, far from any potential interference.²⁰ Metzon's herring boat was taken in precisely such a setting, out of sight of Portuguese shores. Probably unwittingly, the Dutch vessel had sailed into one of the primary zones of corsair activity. The 'geography of danger' that one French historian sought to compile singles out the waters of the Atlantic, especially the route from the Straits of Gibraltar to Lisbon, as an area of particular risk, alongside Sicily, the Azores and the Canary archipelago.²¹ Dutch sailors were accordingly forewarned after Metzon's run-in with the Algerines. In May 1815, the consul in Lisbon urged all ships flying the flag of the Netherlands to stay anchored in Portuguese harbours, regardless of their cargoes, as venturing out to sea was simply deemed too dangerous.²²

Surprise was the greatest corsair asset in the deserted regions of operation. In order to avoid long and possibly unsuccessful chases, it was imperative to get near to a target without raising suspicion. North African raiders would therefore fly false flags during their approach and hoist the Regencies' ensigns only at the last instance.²³ They did not sail under the black flags that some solitary pirate ships on the Mediterranean Sea reportedly flew.²⁴ One Dutch captain who managed to escape two Algerine corsairs after a pursuit that lasted from 8 in the morning to 3 in the afternoon, noted that the ships had first neared in under an English flag.²⁵ If a corsair vessel did manage to get close enough to a prize in this manner, its crew would subsequently jump on board, shout, wave swords, dash out a few smacks and knock over what objects were standing on deck. Should this not scare the targets into submission and the enemy attempt to resists, the assailants would kill one or two individuals on the ship.²⁶ Many European accounts – Metzon's included – described such attacks as wanton brutalities fanned on by blind fanaticism, but they could also be seen as a conscious hijacking tactic of shock and awe, however terrifying these maritime encounters may have been to contemporaries.²⁷

²⁰ Ibid., p. 101; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 21.

²¹ Bartolomé Bennassar, mentioned in S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï, Paris 1998), pp. 135-136.

²² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 60, No. 1172, 'Pilaert to Van Nagell', Lisbon 26-05-1815.

²³ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 101.

²⁴ As reported in, Archives Chambre de Commerce, Marseille (CCM), MR.4.4.3.5.3, 'Vice-Consul Civitavecchia to Consul Naples', Civitavecchia 20-05-1816.

²⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 60, No. 1172, 'Pilaert to Van Nagell', Lisbon 26-05-1815.

²⁶ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 102; Bono, *Les corsaires*, pp. 136 and 140.

²⁷ Bono, *Les corsaires*, p. 138.

Far from being the unmoored place of outlaw anarchism that some present-day authors wish to make of it, the North African corsair ship was a rather orderly enterprise.²⁸ On board there were differences of rank, hierarchies of command and clear divisions of tasks. Leadership was in the hands of the *raïs*, or captain. People with many different backgrounds held the rank of *raïs* through the centuries of corsairing, ranging from Turkish recruits and local talents of Berber origin to Christian renegades.²⁹ In Algiers, the *raïs* were personally appointed by the Dey and assigned a specific ship that carried a specific, personal ensign besides one of the flags of the Regency.³⁰ A variety of officers operated under these captains. The second-in-command was the *bach raïs*, who put crews to work and kept an eye on discipline. Other functionaries on board included scribes handling administrative matters (*khodja*), lower-ranking captains who could pilot captures back to port (*raïs etterik*), surgeons and Imams, who led the crews in the daily prayers and recited Quran verses during chases.³¹

Privateering campaigns entailed that these groups of men would spend several weeks roaming the seas together, whether on solitary ships or in small corsair fleets. Their prize-hunting journeys generally lasted between fifteen and fifty days, and usually took place only in the warmer months. Prevalently northerly winds and the possibility of storms made sailing the coasts of North Africa a dangerous venture during winter, which meant that there was also less commercial traffic to target out at sea.³² The small size of the corsair vessels, many of which did not have a deck or hold, further ensured that campaigns were largely centred on the months between March and September.³³ Metzon's capture thus took place almost exactly in the middle of what seafarers called the 'good season'.

Ceremonies and celebrations formalized the occasions when corsairs ventured from the harbours to carry out their hunts. Elaborately ornamented flags laced the rigging of the ships, salutes were fired in honour of the authorities, lighted candles were placed on board and crowds filled the docks to admire the corsairs.³⁴ Privateering's religious dimensions would come to the fore at these events. In Algiers, the ships departed from a specific port, the *Bâb al-jihâd*, named after the holy war. On their way out to sea, the ships saluted a nearby mosque

²⁸ H. Bey, T.A.Z.. The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Seattle, WA 2011).

²⁹ K. Folayan, *Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli* (Ile-Ife: University of Ife Press 1979), pp. 27-29; Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 71.

³⁰ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 72-73.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 77, 98 and 101.

³² D. Abulafia, *The great sea. A human history of the Mediterranean* (London 2011), pp. xxviii-xxix; Bono, *Les corsaires*, p. 101.

³³ With some regional variety. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 79-80.

³⁴ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 21-22; Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 93-94.

and the crews threw parts of a sacrificed lamb overboard at designated points.³⁵ Corsair captains visited tombs of holy persons in preparation for their journeys, such as that of the Tunisian female patron saint who was said to have worked miracles in bringing back imprisoned sailors.³⁶ As to the worldly aims of their cruises, the departing corsairs flew the flags of the targeted enemies beneath the bowsprits of their ships.³⁷

North African maritime raiding was simultaneously embedded in both a notion of enduring holy struggle and in the fluctuations of war, peace and diplomacy. The corsairs were hence belligerents fighting delineated conflicts rather than piratical robbers. Formalities shaped the changes of international relations and the Regencies' declarations of war. If a treaty had previously been in effect, grace periods were usually instated before attacks on enemy shipping began. The Deys and Beys informed the consuls that they were going to declare war and sent them away. In Tripoli and Tunis, declarations of war involved the customary cutting down of the flagpole of an enemy consulate.³⁸ Corsairing thus took place within set bounds of a formalized state of war. The issuing of passports to treaty partners, which corsair captains could check to be sure of a particular vessel's friendly status, further illustrated this formality of warfare.³⁹

Still, privateering activity out at sea did not always abide by the rules and conventions. Corsairs who boarded ships to inspect passports would sometimes harass crews and steal objects, regardless of the treaty relations.⁴⁰ Another sketchy tactic involved chasing a friendly crew away and claiming that a ship had been found abandoned on some deserted beach.⁴¹ Privateering could also take on an erratic form, especially when treaty relations were unclear. This is exactly what happened in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, when certain newly independent states emerged in Europe while other polities changed between different imperial overlords. Corsairs from Tripoli took three Venetian ships in 1815, which now sailed under the flag Austria.⁴² The same went for a crew of Ionian sailors that were brought into Algiers

³⁵ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 93-94.

³⁶ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 24-25.

³⁷ R. Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary. A diplomatic history (Gainesville, FL 2004), p. 7.

³⁸ Parker, *Uncle Sam in Barbary*, p. 7.

³⁹ J. Mössner, *Die Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit und die Völkerrechtspraxis der Barbareskenstaaten (Algier, Tripolis, Tunis 1518-1830)* (Berlin 1968), pp. 132-134; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 31.

⁴⁰ Reports in CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/01, 'Famin to CCM', Marseille 15-05-1815 and 'Vidal to CCM' Marseille 15-06-1816.

⁴¹ CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/01, 'Commissaire de Marine Service to CCM', Marseille 23-09-1816; Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 712PO/1/52, No. 38, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 20-08-1816.

⁴² L. Sondhaus, *The Habsburg Empire and the sea. Austrian naval policy, 1797-1866* (West Lafayette, IN 1989), p. 48.

as captives in July 1814, even though they enjoyed British protection.⁴³ Russian officials, for their part, complained of harassments that ships flying the imperial flag received from Tunisian and Tripolitan corsairs in the springtime of 1815.⁴⁴ At this diplomatically complex moment, North African corsairing appeared to turn indiscriminate. All traffic within reach seemed to make for fair game, as corsairs even began to disturb Ottoman shipping.⁴⁵ North African raiding was seen as all the more disconcerting for its alleged omnipresence. The upsurge of privateering around 1814-1815, which brought dozens of prizes into the ports of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, thus came close to resembling pure and simple piracy.⁴⁶ Activists and diplomats at the Congress of Vienna tapped into that sense of threat to argue for forceful action.

A Tunisian raid on the Italian island of Sant'Antioco in October 1815 further heightened notions of increasing danger and caused mounting outrage in Europe. The raiders carried off a total of 160 Sardinian subjects into captivity, sparking many newspaper pieces that further critiqued 'Christian slavery' and called for the abolishment of such barbarity.47 A French consular report of early 1816, however, points out that there had been different incentives behind this action than bloodthirst or fanaticism. The report describes how the raid was carried out by an old captain named Mustafa Raïs, who had been on an unsuccessful cruise of over two months along the coasts of Italy and steered to the Sardinian island in a last hope for success.⁴⁸ Corsair captains who had little to show or somehow angered the authorities risked punishment or execution upon their return.⁴⁹ Cruises that did not result in captures could turn into testing journeys. Another French source mentions a Tunisian corsair floating around near St. Tropez, deprived of rations and water, stopping every ship it encounters to try and get some food.⁵⁰ Harassments, attacks and thefts were not always a sign of insolence or aggression. Corsairing, these cases show, could be hard and dangerous. In contrast, the captain who brought Gerrit Metzon and his herring boat into Algiers had little to worry about when he returned.

⁴³ CADN, 22PO/1/31, 'Journal d'Alger, Jan. 1812 – June 1815', entry for 04-07-1814.

⁴⁴ 'Note by d'Italinsky', Constantinople 27-11/(09-12)-1815 in: *Vnešnjaja politika Rossii XIX i načala XX veka*. *Dokumenty rossijskogo ministerstva inostrannych del* (Moscow 1960-1974), series 2, vol. 1, pp. 23-26.

⁴⁵ L. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. II, *La course. Mythes et réalité* (Saint-Denis 2007), p. 319.

⁴⁶ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 268.

⁴⁷ Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA 2014), p. 214.

⁴⁸ CADN, 712PO/1/51, No. 21, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 22-03-1816.

⁴⁹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 76; Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, p. 284.

⁵⁰ CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/01, '[??] to CCM', Marseille 04-05-1816.

Privateering institutions

The captive Dutchmen, who were kept aboard their captured ship, entered the military port of Algiers on 19 July 1814, almost a month after they had fallen into corsair hands. They were immediately approached by a rowboat carrying the captain of the port, who came to ask if any of the prisoners could speak Italian. He shrugged his shoulders when he heard the men were Dutch and let them pass to shore.⁵¹ Within the first minutes of his time in Algiers, Gerrit Metzon thus encountered the official institutions that supported North African privateering. Their exchange had been short, but the man who shrugged his shoulders at the Dutch was an important functionary. As the captain of the port (or, *qâ'id al-marsâ*), this officer was charged with overseeing the arrivals and departures of vessels. He also held a political function in aiding the Dey during official audiences.⁵² 'Barbary piracy', however threatening and illegitimate it may have started to seem, had by 1815 become a matter of state. Maritime raiding by the North African Regencies took place within a frameworks of officialdom and statehood, with authorities that were strong enough to create rules and control their application.⁵³ Despite some political differences between the Regencies, this control depended on the institutions of the prize courts, prisons and corsair councils. These institutions, in turn, long allowed Europeans to make legal objections, demand restitutions and arrange ransoms until the legitimacy of Barbary statehood itself began to be questioned.

First in the string of institutions that reeled in captures from the sea and capitalized on them stood the prize courts. Their existence that rendered privateering legally distinct from piracy, not only in the North African Regencies, but in all states that licensed maritime raiders. At the courts it was decided whether a capture did, in fact, make for a legal prize and could be adjudicated. Subsequently, officials would decide whether the Regency wanted to keep the vessels and their cargoes or sell them off to European traders immediately. In Algiers, it was also the place where a captured ship and its values (in cargo and crew) would be noted down in the register of prizes. The entry for Metzon's herring boat indicated that it was brought in together with seven other prizes, including four Swedish vessels and a Danish ship. Carrying cargoes of cochineal (a red dye made from the insect of the same name), salt, coffee, sugar, cod and timber, the total value of the captures amounted to about 255,000

⁵¹ Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, pp. 19-20.
⁵² Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 93.

⁵³ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 9.

francs.⁵⁴ The register also noted the name of the *raïs* who was in charge of the six corsairs that had carried out this profitable cruise: Hamidou. These were the last few captures that this venerated captain made before his death at American hands in June 1815.⁵⁵

The highest echelons of power in the Regencies had most to gain financially from the prize-taking ventures. Due to the gradual historical decline of North African privateering, ownership of the corsair vessels had by the beginning of the nineteenth century largely become exclusive to the state and its most senior officers. As the *raïs* were no longer the outfitters of their own vessels, their pay changed from prize shares into a regular salary. In July 1814, the profits from the captured ships and cargoes thus went to the Dey and his most senior aides. The Intendant of the Marine and overseer of the port of war (the *wakil harj Bâb al-jihâd*) especially gained from the corsair fleet.⁵⁶ This functionary had also become a sort of Minister of Foreign Affairs over the course of the eighteenth century, as he generally became involved in matters of external relations and was often consulted in diplomatic negotiations.⁵⁷

Though the head of the marine fulfilled an important political role in the North African Regencies, the political influence of the captains themselves had diminished greatly by 1815. The cooperative bodies of the *raïs* had once been a major power faction in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Even Christian renegades could arise to positions of great importance as part of this faction, becoming the highest naval commanders or special envoys.⁵⁸ In the post-Napoleonic decades, however, authority generally rested with the Regents and their inner circles of officials.⁵⁹ In Algiers, the execution of power largely lay with a small council (or, *divan*) consisting of the Dey, the treasurer, a senior clerk in charge of provincial tributes, the Intendant of the Marine and the *agha*, who commanded the Regency's land forces.⁶⁰

Upon his arrival in Algiers, Gerrit Metzon and the other captives had no opportunity to look into these institutional frameworks. Nor did Metzon note the existence of the prize court. He writes that he was immediately brought to prison and shackled with 'a light bracelet around the leg'.⁶¹ Like corsairing itself, the imprisonment, enforced labour and ransom of

⁵⁷ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, pp. 275-277; Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 91.

⁵⁴ According to Salvatore Bono, a single Danish ship worth 165,000 francs made for a particularly valuable prize. Bono, *Les corsaires*, p. 206. A. Devoulx, *Le Raïs Hamidou. Notice biographique sur le plus célèbre corsair algérien du xiii^e siècle de l'hégire: d'apres des documents authentiques et pour la plupart inédites (Algiers 1859)*, p. 128.

⁵⁵ Devoulx, *Le Raïs Hamidou*, p. 131.

⁵⁶ Merouche, Recherches sur l'Algérie, vol. II, pp. 273-274 and 308-310; McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 31

⁵⁸ J. Abun-Nasr, A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period (Cambridge 1987), p. 197; Merouche,

Recherches sur l'Algérie, vol. II, pp. 277-278; Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 91 and 167. ⁵⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 15.

⁶⁰ Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, pp. 18-19.

⁶¹ Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, p. 22.

captives had largely become a state monopoly.⁶² Algiers' three prisons, often referred to in captive accounts as the *bagno*, were located in the lower parts of the city, near the harbours. The lower city was a military and administrative centre of sorts, its narrow streets housed the Janissary barracks, admiralty and Dey's palace.⁶³ Prisoners could easily be put to work in the ports and dockyards because of this location. Metzon's account describes how artisans, bricklayers, carpenters and sailmakers were utilized in their respective sectors, whereas the captives without 'some steady trade' had to engage in the heavy labour of emptying ships and dragging stones in the harbour.⁶⁴ The first job Metzon was assigned was carrying the cargo of salt out of the other Dutch prize, into the private storages of the Dey.⁶⁵ This type of forced labour was the 'Christian slavery' that loomed so large in perceptions of Barbary threat.

Ransom could bring an immediate end to this enslavement, but there were also other institutionalized modes of providing temporary relief. The foreign consulates played a key role in this regard. Consuls could buy prisoners out of their labour duties or arrange for an increase of their daily rations. As Metzon recounted, the Swedish representative gave additional food and clothing to the Dutchmen and took a nine-year old cabin boy into his home.⁶⁶ These diplomatic agents would also make appeals and arrange for reclamations in matters of corsairing. French sources, for instance, show how the consul in Tunis worked for over four years to obtain an indemnity for an outfitter from Toulon.⁶⁷ A more immediately successful case took place in Tripoli, where the French representative legally arranged the return of a ship that had been found 'abandoned' by corsairs.⁶⁸ European consulates were thus part of the institutional web that regulated North African privateering, rendering this raiding much less 'piratical' than its threat perception maintained.

Another diplomatic avenue that European governments could pursue went by the Regency's overlords in Constantinople. As the suzerain over Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, the governmental body of the Ottoman Porte could issue official orders to make the Regencies stop or reduce their corsairing. At the Congress of Vienna British and Austrian statesmen had favoured this option, as they liked to emphasize their robust treaties of peace with the Ottomans. They maintained that the existing arrangements with the Porte allowed for the safety of Mediterranean shipping, at least under the flags of Great Britain and Austria. When

⁶² McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 36.

⁶³ Parker, Uncle Sam in Barbary, pp. 11-12.

⁶⁴ Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, p. 29.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 34.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 51 and 76.

⁶⁷ CADN, 22PO/1/52, 'Direction de la caisse des invalides to Deval', Paris 28-11-1814.

⁶⁸ CADN, 712PO/1/52, No. 38, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 20-08-1816.

their flags did undergo attacks and harassments from corsairs, ambassadors in Constantinople could demand redress from the Sultan.⁶⁹ This was, in a sense, the highest institutionalized channel of complaint and redress that existed in relation to North African raiding.

Following a series of such complaints during the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, the Porte began to issue orders to the Regencies in late 1815. Called *firmans*, these official communications called on the Regencies' vassal status and stressed that the Ottoman Sultan held protective obligations to its allies. One *firman* directed towards Dey Omar Agha of Algiers read:

'The corsairs of the regency of Algiers are capturing commercial ships belonging either to the subjects of the Sublime Porte, or to nations that are at peace with it; they reduce to slavery their captains and sailors and seize their cargoes. The Sublime Porte is responsible for these ships; they are in possession of safe passes, and the Sublime Porte is at peace with them. The European governments never cease to lodge complaints against you and to make it known that you are capturing their ships. I am giving you this warning in order to cause you to cease these aggressive acts and abandon this sanctionable course of action'.⁷⁰

The sanctions that came with the official order of the *firman* included stops on the transfer of Janissary recruits or on the delivery of ammunitions and naval materials.⁷¹ Together with the consular presence, the existing treaties and the formalized practices of ransom, the *firmans* made up a long-standing framework through which North African privateering could be appealed and stopped. Whether these pressurizing tools also managed to influence the authorities of the Regencies was not always certain, as the run-up to the Anglo-Dutch bombardment shows. And whether these institutionalized options of redress could, by 1814-1815, stem the rising tide of calls for violent action against the 'Barbary pirates' was equally questionable.

Powerless to act? Dutch efforts against corsairing

The capture of Metzon's herring boat and the other Dutch ship in the summer of 1814 immediately put the new independent government of the Netherlands on high alert. Both ships were taken shortly after they left the harbour of Cadiz in June. By the end of August, the

⁶⁹ I. Ortayli, 'Ottoman-Habsburg relations, 1740-1770, and structural changes in the international affairs of the Ottoman state' in: J. Bacqué-Grammont et al. (eds.), *Türkische miszellen. Robert Anhegger. Festschrift*,

armağani, mélanges (Istanbul 1987), pp. 287-298, there pp. 291-292. The same went for Russia, G. Yakschitch, 'La Russie et la Porte Ottomane de 1812 à 1826', *Revue Historique* 91:2 (1906), pp. 281-306, there pp. 285-288. ⁷⁰ Cited in Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 268-269.

⁷¹ BOA, C.BH 89/4272 (29 N 1230), 04-09-1815.

Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Anne Willem Carel, baron Van Nagell (1756-1851) convened an emergency meeting with a member of Amsterdam's Board of Levantine Trade.⁷² The merchants of Amsterdam had held very different expectations of what the end of the Napoleonic Wars would bring. Early in 1814, before Napoleon had even been exiled to Elba, they dared to be cautiously optimistic again for the first time in years. The Continental System, which severely impacted Amsterdam's position as a node of international trade, had come to an end when French occupying troops retreated.⁷³ One pamphleteer exalted the occasion: 'The sea is free! Trade revived!' Accordingly, the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce declared that Dutch trade in the Mediterranean ought to recommence as quickly as possible.⁷⁴ Under this veneer of optimism, however, there were deeper anxieties about the possible dangers of navigating the Mediterranean Sea again. In February 1814, the directorate of the Board of Levantine Trade requested information about the status of diplomatic relations with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. 'The security of shipping', the Minister replied, 'dictates that our relationships with the Barbary Regencies be renewed'.⁷⁵ The captures of Dutch vessels by Algerine corsairs underscored that necessity.

The Board of Levantine Trade therefore urged Van Nagell to find a solution before more ships and crews would follow.⁷⁶ Its members argued that the new government should opt for the quickest solution to make the prize-takings come to an end. They did not care much about talk of national honour and the need to avenge the flag. Nor did they feel that meeting the Algerine demands for renewed tribute payments would somehow be an insult to the Christian religion or an affront to humanity, as contemporary activists claimed. Balthasar Ortt, one of the Board's directors, maintained that paying Algiers would be the most effective way to protect Dutch shipping, no matter how degrading or costly it would be. 'Every state has its weak side', Ortt wrote. The weak side of the Netherlands, according to him, was that it could only thrive during peace, dependent as the country was on revenues from commerce. Therefore the sole option was to pay, and if this meant spending over 200,000 guilders on tributes, Ortt concluded, then 'so be it'.⁷⁷

In effect, the merchants of Amsterdam thus proposed a return to the established modes of protection of the pre-Revolutionary age. Paying tributes and reinstating treaty relations was

⁷² NL-HaNA, inv. 95, no. 675, 'Van Nagell to B. Ortt', 20-08-1814.

⁷³ J. Joor, 'Significance and consequences of the Continental System for Napoleonic Holland, especially for Amsterdam' in: Idem and K. Aaslestad (eds.), *Revisiting Napoleon's Continental System* (New York 2015), pp. 259-275, there p. 263.

⁷⁴ F. van Oosten, 'Algiers', Marineblad 76 (1966), pp. 699-723, there p. 709-710.

⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, no. 88a, 'Memoir on relations with the Barbary states', 04-02-1814.

⁷⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 48, 'Ortt to Van Nagell', 03-07-1814.

⁷⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 48, no. 770, 'Ortt to Van Nagell', 03-07-1814.

no problem to them. A sense of Dutch vulnerability, weakness and probably also lack of military might permeated their argumentation. The Netherlands, in their opinion, was in no position to forcefully impose demands or successfully pick a fight. The government should rather pay to restore peace, as Europe's small powers – the predecessors of the new Dutch kingdom included – were accustomed to do. These commercial stakeholders thus did not share in the calls to end all diplomatic recognition of the Regencies that surfaced around the Congress of Vienna, as became clear in Chapter 1. Dutch officials, however, chose another, more assertive line of action, regardless of the speedy solution that the Board of Levantine Trade desired. They interpreted the smaller power status of the Netherlands differently and deployed a range of unilateral measures, before turning to multilateral means and taking the lead in developing concerted security practices within the new international context created by the Congress of Vienna. Theirs was not a 'so be it' attitude, but rather one of stubborn assertiveness, marked by the will to foster security in new and allegedly 'civilised' ways. The many complications and conflicts that this line of action caused would, ultimately, help bring forth the joint Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816.

Negotiations and tributes

The beginning of the post-Napoleonic period presented Dutch diplomats with a host of problems. Brought under a new monarchy and territorially extended to include the Austrian lowlands (present-day Belgium), the Kingdom of the Netherlands as it was cemented in 1815 was a novel entity on the European map. Diplomatic relations that had existed between previous incarnations of the Dutch (particularly the republic of the United Provinces, 1581-1795) and foreign powers therefore had to be renegotiated. Some sovereigns, including the Ottoman Sultan, took their time to diplomatically recognize the new state in north-western Europe.⁷⁸ This pending recognition took on particularly pressing aspects in case of the North African Regencies, where the question of recognition became intertwined with privateering warfare. Another source of conflict related to the tributes that were allegedly due from the new government Netherlands. Together, these unresolved issues made for causes of war and brought on corsairing against Dutch shipping.

The revolutionary wars, the French occupation, and the total standstill of Dutch Mediterranean trade put a stop to the tributes and thus upended the basis of peace. All Dutch

⁷⁸ L. Giebels, 'De erkenning van de koningstitel van Willem I door de Hoge Porte 1814-1819' in: A. de Groot (ed.), *Het Midden Oosten en Nederland in historisch perspectief* (Muiderberg 1989), pp. 101-122.

consuls had left their posts in the Regencies after the Netherlands was annexed by the French Empire in 1810.⁷⁹ With the newfound independence, much was therefore uncertain about the status of the relations in North Africa. New diplomatic representatives tried to take up the old consular positions in 1814, but they soon found out that some rulers would not follow the official reasoning that a new Dutch state had come into being, warranting the conclusion of new treaties. Hammuda Pasha, the Bey of Tunis (r. 1782-Sep. 1814), swiftly re-instated peace, but his counterparts in Tripoli and Algiers claimed that, regardless of its new form, the Kingdom of the Netherlands was seriously behind on its tributes. Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli (r. 1795-1832) and Dey Hadj Ali of Algiers (r. 1809-March 1815) argued that they had not received payments for over six years. Peace with the Netherlands would only be restored if these arrears were paid. Karamanli almost immediately accepted a lower counter-offer, but Ali Hodja remained firm and stuck to his demand that the deficit had to be paid in full.⁸⁰ Because the Dutch tribute had been suspended from 1809 and Algiers had received about 50,000 guilders per year, the total sum in question was some 250,000 guilders.⁸¹

Facing a dire treasury situation after years of warfare, foreign occupation and largely discontinued trade, the new government of the Netherlands was unwilling to meet the demands.⁸² Additionally, officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entertained the idea that all of the North African Regents were simply gripped by a boundless greed. A ministerial memorandum of February 1814 warned that 'knowing the money-grubbing nature of these Kings one should hold no doubts, but that the renewal of relations will have to be bought expensively'.⁸³ The demands of the North African authorities were thus not seen as just causes of war, pertaining to the established agreements of treaty relations, but as a matter of greed and even private enrichment. Minister Van Nagell wrote to King William I (r. 1815-1840) that the Algerine claims for the compensation of arrears were as a sign of the Dey's 'inborn disposition'.⁸⁴

Whereas negotiations in Tunis and Tripoli had quickly settled the pending issues of tributes and peace, Dey Hadj Ali of Algiers refused to open talks. He barred the newly

relations with the Barbary states', 04-02-1814.

⁷⁹ G. van Krieken, *Kapers en kooplieden. De betrekkingen tussen Algiers en Nederland 1604-1830* (Amsterdam 1999), pp. 90-92; H. Boom, *Onze man in Constantinopel. Frederik Gijsbert baron van Dedem, 1743-1820* (Zutphen 2012), pp. 238-244.

⁸⁰ S. Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel. Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiendeeeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme* (Dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1998), p. 139. ⁸¹ On the demands of the *dey* of Algiers, TNA, FO 37/73, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 24-06-1814. For a very insightful overview of the status of Dutch-Barbary relations, NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, no. 88a, 'Memoir on

⁸² Van Oosten, 'Algiers', pp. 709-710.

⁸³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, No. 88a, 'Memoir on relations with the Barbary states', [?] 04-02-1814.

⁸⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, No. 445, 'Van Nagell to King William I', The Hague 22-06-1814.

appointed Dutch consul, Antoine Joseph Fraissinet (1785-1864), from entering the Regency. Being the oldest son of the previous, pre-Revolutionary Dutch representative in Algiers, he had long been on location. Due to the French annexation of the Netherlands, however, Antoine and the rest of his family had left North Africa for Marseille, the birthplace of his father. Upon his nomination to become consul, Fraissinet thus found himself stuck in that French port city. From Marseille, he tried to carry out his diplomatic duties as best he could and wrote incessantly to the British consul Hugh McDonell (1760-1833), who took care of Dutch affairs while the conflict with Algiers dragged on.⁸⁵ As the captures of ships became more frequent, the negotiations remained in a deadlock and the new consul could not get to the Regency, the Dutch government decided to turn to Great Power allies for help.

At this point, a comparison to other negotiations that went on between European states and the Regencies may further indicate the predicament that the new Kingdom of the Netherlands was in. Lacking a sizeable, war-ready navy and diplomatic guarantees from the Ottoman Porte, the Dutch government had little means of pressuring Dey Hadj Ali of Algiers. States that found themselves in a similar situation were Sweden, Denmark, Spain and the Hanseatic cities. All of their shipping continued to be subjected to the risks of Algerine privateering.⁸⁶ It only takes a look at France to see how different the situation was for a power of greater international repute.

Besides its internal complications of lingering Bonapartists, overly aggressive ultraroyalists and the presence of an allied army of occupation, the Restoration monarchy of the re-instated Bourbon King Louis XVIII (r. 1814-1824, exempting the Hundred Days of Napoleon's return) faced many potential problems in North Africa.⁸⁷ French ships were being harassed and taken by corsairs because the changes of government had rendered treaty relations with Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli uncertain. Furthermore, the government found itself with either Napoleonic appointees or empty consulates for diplomatic representation in the Regencies.⁸⁸ The reconstruction of the old, pre-Revolutionary relations, when France held a place of great primacy within the Regencies, was a primary concern of the Restoration monarchy, as it wished to see the lucrative Levantine trade of yore revived and hoped for the

 ⁸⁵ Van Krieken, *Kapers en kooplieden*, p. 92; TNA, FO 37/73, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 27-12-1814.
 ⁸⁶ Devoulx, *Le Raïs Hamidou*, pp. 128-131.

⁸⁷ On the post-1814 situation in France, B. de Graaf, *Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd na Napoleon* (Amsterdam 2018), pp. 179-209.

⁸⁸ E. Plantet, *Correspondence des Deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579-1833* vol. II, 1700-1833 (Paris 1889), pp. 530-531 and 540, fn. 1.

re-instatement of the traditional commercial privileges in North Africa.⁸⁹ In the spring of 1814, the French government was therefore sending out new consuls with decidedly royalist credentials, such as Pierre Deval who took up the post in Algiers.⁹⁰ These men and their families were brought to the Regencies aboard impressive battleships, while Foreign Affairs Minister Talleyrand instructed them to always remind the local authorities that the naval bases of southern France were very near.⁹¹ A less martial aspect of this diplomatic offensive consisted of handing over the customary consular presents, which reached a value of almost 113,000 francs in Algiers.⁹² By early 1816, all the North African postings could report that 'amicable relations' were in place.⁹³ The combination of naval intimidation and a compliant attitude towards the traditional conduct of diplomacy quickly managed to bring France on a friendly footing with the Regencies, abating the corsair nuisance to shipping under its flag. Though France was not formally a continental Great Power within the Quadruple Alliance of Austria, Russia, Prussia and Great Britain, it is still clear that it could exert a lot more leverage with the Regencies than Europe's smaller powers, due to its diplomatic and commercial networks as well as expertise in knowledge of North Africa.

Unwilling to pay and as of yet unable to use the diplomacy of force, the government of the Netherlands did not follow the French example and turned to Great Britain for assistance. The British consul in Algiers was asked for advice on how to deal with Dey Hadj Ali's demands as early as June 1814.⁹⁴ In addition, the Dutch ambassador in London, Hendrik Fagel (1765-1838), approached Cabinet members on the Algerine issue, calling for British help to protect Dutch commerce from the activities of 'these pirates'.⁹⁵ During discussions with Lord Castlereagh, he arranged that the British consul in Algiers would help to release the captured Dutch sailors. Little came of these promises, as McDonell in Algiers was not given the necessary funds to liberate the prisoners. In reply to complaints by the Dutch ambassador in London, McDonell wrote: 'I cannot suppose that Mr. Fagel understands that I should without authority have spontaneously granted pecuniary aid to the nineteen Dutch captives here'.⁹⁶ Assurances of aid thus carried little practical value and did nothing to alter the diplomatic

⁸⁹ V. Puryear, *France and the Levant. From the Bourbon Restauration to the Peace of Kutiah* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1941), pp. 2-3 and 10.

⁹⁰ H. Contamine, *Diplomatie et diplomates sous la restauration 1814-1830* (Paris 1970), p. 154.

⁹¹ CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Bénévent to Consul Tunis', Paris 20-06-1814 and 'Talleyrand to Consul Tunis', Paris 02-08-1815.

⁹² Plantet, *Correspondence des Deys*, vol. II, p. 540, fn. 1.

⁹³ CADN, 706PO/1/140, 'Royal letter to the Bey of Tripoli', received 20-09-1814; 712PO/1/46, 'Talleyrand to Consul Tunis', Paris 13-02-1815; 22PO/1/66, 'Deval to Marquis de Riviére', Marseille 29-01-1816.

 ⁹⁴ TNA, FO 37/73, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 24-06-1814.
 ⁹⁵ TNA, FO 37/73, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 25-06-1814.

⁹⁶ TNA, FO 3/16, 'McDonell to Bunbury', Algiers 30-03-1815 and 'McDonell to Bunbury', Algiers 21-04-1815.

conflict between the Netherlands and Algiers. McDonell did give an additional piece of advice, stating that only naval force would impress the local authorities, who, according to him, were 'never reasonable but from necessity'.⁹⁷ This was the option that the Dutch government tried next, but without much success, which further convinced it of the need to act multilaterally.

Costly convoys and a counterproductive demonstration

King William I and his Minister of Foreign Affairs had a dilemma on their hands. They found that meeting the demands of Dey Hadj Ali for the payments of arrears would be too expensive. Yet the protracted dispute proved to be costly itself. Dutch Mediterranean shipping was forced to stay in port to avoid the danger of encountering Algerine corsairs out at sea, which brought commercial losses. Liberation of the captured subjects would carry a hefty price, while readying and arming a fleet of war was not cheap either. Minister Van Nagell maintained that delivering the arrears to the Regency of Algiers was beneath the dignity of the nation and the honour of the King. He also noted that ransoming the 'slaves' would only inspire further captures of Dutch subjects.⁹⁸ This was not a popular policy with the merchant classes in the capital, who, as we have seen, saw little use in asserting 'honour' and simply wanted the privateering to stop. The threat of 'Barbary piracy' therefore also had a domestic dimension, as the new royal regime appeared increasingly incapable of protecting its subjects and fostering peacetime prosperity.⁹⁹

The government decided to turn to naval means in order to provide some security for Dutch Mediterranean shipping. Setting up a convoy service was the first of these measures, though internal memoranda still deplored that convoying 'came with heavy burdens'.¹⁰⁰ A royal decree of 8 August 1814 ordained that no vessel flying the Dutch flag was allowed to sail south of the Gulf of Biscay without naval protection.¹⁰¹ In the text, King William I claimed to act at the behest of the State Secretary for the Marine and 'several freight carriers from Amsterdam'.¹⁰² The measure was thus posed as an alleviation of the commercial losses incurred in the conflict, even if convoying was hardly the preferred solution of merchants. In practice, the functioning of convoys often brought further delays as ships had to wait in

 ⁹⁷ TNA, FO 3/16, 'McDonell to Bunbury', Algiers 30-03-1815 and 'McDonell to Bunbury', Algiers 21-04-1815.
 ⁹⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 96, no. 1036, 'Van Nagell to King William I', 16-11-1814.

⁹⁹ Legêne, *De baggage van Blomhoff*, p. 326.

¹⁰⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 94, no. 88a, 'Memoir on relations with the Barbary states', 04-02-1814.

¹⁰¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 49, no. 942, 'Royal Decree by King William I', 08-08-1814.

¹⁰² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 49, no. 942, 'Royal Decree by King William I', 08-08-1814.

harbour for the naval contingents to arrive and could proceed across the seas only at a much reduced speed.¹⁰³ The assigned convoy squadron, however, never managed to make it to the Mediterranean. It got into heavy weather on the North Sea and was battered into the harbours of southwest England, where most of the crewmembers jumped ship and deserted.¹⁰⁴ A mere three months after having been issued, Royal Decree no. 50 was reversed in December 1814.¹⁰⁵

Faced with the failure of the convoy measure, the Dutch government decided to take the offensive and began to plan a naval expedition. While awaiting the repairs and armaments of further ships of war, Van Nagell proposed that the King opt for a show of force. Merely taking a few Algerine ships, he argued, would push the Dey to adopt 'feelings of greater moderation'. Negotiations could then be reopened with the immediate liberation of the Dutch captives as a prerequisite for any further talks.¹⁰⁶ The King agreed and ordered that a fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Jan van Hoogenhouck Tulleken (1762-1851) should proceed to North Africa.¹⁰⁷ It took until the spring of the next year before this force was ready to leave, but official hopes only grew as the wait continued. By early July 1815, as the fleet had entered the Mediterranean, news of the successful showing of the U.S navy against Algiers began to spread. In The Hague, it inspired aspirations that the 'glorious example of the Americans' and the resulting treaty without tributes could be replicated.¹⁰⁸

Tulleken's expedition, however, proved much less effective than that of his U.S. counterparts – owing both to his conduct as a commander and the actions of the local authorities. The six frigates and single brig that made up the Dutch fleet appeared before Algiers on 24 July. In the preceding months, several successions of leadership had taken place in Algiers. Dey Hadj Ali was murdered in March because of his failure to suppress the frequent rebellions in the interior of the country, which he allegedly had intended to fund through the spoils of privateering.¹⁰⁹ His successor Mohamed Khaznadji only managed to stay in place for sixteen days, before being assassinated by members of the Janissary corps to be replaced for Omar Agha (r. April 1815-Semptember 1817). The international political situation in the Regency was thus volatile when Tulleken arrived, especially because the new Dey had just suffered a defeat at American hands in June. Unwilling to board this foreign

¹⁰³ For the problems of convoying, see G. Chet, *The ocean is a wilderness. Atlantic piracy and the limits of state authority, 1688-1856* (Amherst 2014), p. 55.

¹⁰⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 56, no. 516, 'May to Fagel', London 17-03-1815.

¹⁰⁵ Van Oosten, 'Algiers', p. 710.

¹⁰⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 96, no. 1052, 'Instructions to Tulleken', 19-11-1814.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 99, no. 1408, 'Memoir to the King', The Hague 05-09-1815.

¹⁰⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 112-113.

fleet, Omar Agha sent the captain of the port to talk with the Dutch on his behalf. The consul Fraissinet, who had joined the squadron from Marseille, took this as an initial affront and the subsequent talks continued in a similar vein. Fraissinet declared that the Dutch King was willing to pay 50,000 guilders to Algiers per year at most, but only in currency rather than the traditional military supplies. The captain of the port replied that the Dey still wished to receive these supplies in accordance with the old treaties and left.¹¹⁰ Later that day, he confided in an interpreter of the French consulate and told him that 'the Dutch had come with yet more pretentions'.¹¹¹

Because the negotiations remained stuck, Tulleken's instructions allowed the commander to press the demands by force. His orders had noted that the capture or sinking of corsair ships would help assert the Dutch position, as it had for the Americans when they killed *raïs* Hamidou and took his flagship. In the wake of that incident, however, all of the Regency's corsairs were safely docked in the harbour. Tulleken therefore attempted to commence a blockade in the night of 25 July. One of the ships under his command carried out a half-hearted chase of an Algerine corvette that managed to escape, but which did reportedly result in deaths of two corsair sailors. The harbour fortresses then retaliated with some shots.¹¹² Over the next two days, Omar Agha, who was seemingly unshaken, made a public tour to inspect the fortifications and commissioned the armament of eight corsairs in the dockyards. He also instructed the British consul to go and tell Tulleken that he no longer wished to negotiate peace.¹¹³ The Dutch squadron left soon after. Gerrit Metzon later recounted how he and the other captives were subsequently ridiculed by their 'fellow slaves as well as the Turks'.¹¹⁴

When they received the news, the Ministers in The Hague quickly concluded that Tulleken personally was to blame for the failure and had him resign. Van Nagell wrote to his colleague of the Marine to complain about the great costs of the Vice-Admiral's 'inconsistent behaviour'. The failed negotiations, he argued, bound the government to 'the continuous and costly maintenance of a substantial force in the Mediterranean Sea'. He also noted that the 'honour' as well as the 'reputation' of the Dutch navy had been greatly damaged by this showing at Algiers. If the nation's standing had to be defended by rejecting tributes, then this inconsequential action did little to raise it. Again, the Dutch government encountered the

¹¹⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 63, No. 1688, 'Fraissinet to Van Nagell', aboard brick *Havik* to Livorno, 12-08-1815.

¹¹¹ CADN, PO/1/32, no. 21: Journal d'Alger, 01-07-1815 to 30-11-1815, entry for 25-07-1815.

¹¹² Ibid., entry for 26-07-1815.

¹¹³ CADN, PO/1/32, no. 21: Journal d'Alger, 01-07-1815 to 30-11-1815, entry for 27-07-1815.

¹¹⁴ Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, pp. 83-88.

limitations of unilateral efforts against corsairing. As a result, it would become even keener on pursuing multilateral alternatives. The security threats posed by the Algerine corsairs would, after all, persist unabatedly – with further prize-takings and more Dutchmen falling into captivity. Or, as Van Nagell concluded in a letter to the King: 'the outlooks for national shipping remain as worrying as ever'.¹¹⁵

Moving the alliances. The creation of a 'European' concern

Sheer necessity propelled the search for multilateral solutions. Over the course of 1815 it became exceedingly apparent that the government of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands could not have its way in the conflict with Algiers by acting alone. Nor were its diplomats and naval commanders able to provide effective protection for Dutch subjects out on the Mediterranean Sea. Unilateral efforts at convoying and naval demonstrations had made little difference, and thus Dutch officials became all the more pressed to obtain aid from more formidable partners. Gradually, they began to frame such requests for assistance not as a matter of protecting national commerce but as a concern of European importance. To do this, they started to invoke the threat of 'Christian slavery' and utilized the existence of the new continental peace to stake their claims. At this point, the calls for forceful action against 'Barbary piracy' that had been put forth at the margins of the Congress of Vienna entered into the ambassadorial and consular correspondence of great and small powers alike. That such calls for action for the sake of 'European' interests and shared security eventually managed to materialize into a joint bombardment, in turn, was a result of the new security culture that was taking shape after 1815. Still, this joint action did not come about swiftly or easily. It was preceded by debates about the threat posed by North African corsairing and disagreement about the appropriate ways to act against it. This chapter now turns to these discussions and moments of contention, showing that the concerted practices and shared threat perceptions of the security culture were still in the process of being constructed. Alliances to fight common threats were no given features of the new inter-imperial order of security, they had to be created and put into motion first.

Great Britain, the one partner that the Dutch government immediately singled out for collaboration, proved to be particularly difficult to move into action. The ambassador in London had first asked for British consular assistance in Algiers without much success in August 1814. When he proposed that the Royal Navy could assist in convoying ships he

¹¹⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 26, 'Van Nagell to King William I', The Hague 01-02-1816.

received the reply that Britain wished to stay neutral in the Dutch conflict with Algiers.¹¹⁶ This reluctance to act is hardly surprising in light of Lord Castlereagh's unwillingness to even discuss 'Barbary piracy' at the Congress of Vienna. Old treaty relations between Great Britain and all the North African Regencies were still in place. The realization that the food supplies of British troops on Malta had depended on provisions from the Regencies was also far from forgotten in London's ruling circles.¹¹⁷

It is equally unsurprising that Dutch actors sought aid from Great Britain, regardless of its established relations with Algiers. The Royal Navy, as contemporaries were well aware, was not only the largest armed presence on Mediterranean waters, but the very existence of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was to a great extent dependent on British diplomatic backing. A strong Dutch state featured prominently in British plans to check future French expansion. As such, the Great Power attendees of the Congress of Vienna agreed to recognize the United Kingdom of the Netherlands at British behest.¹¹⁸ To add to the strength of this bulwark, the British government arranged the return of the Dutch colonies in 1814 (including territories in Indonesia, Surinam and the Antilles) that Britain had conquered in the late wars.¹¹⁹ The flipside of this support was that British statesmen like Castlereagh expected (and pressured) the Dutch to follow its lead in nearly all matters of international politics. The activities of Dutch officials, both in Europe and in the colonies, were starkly delineated by the room that Great Britain allowed for them.¹²⁰ In his work on the subject, Dutch historian Niek van Sas has shown how contemporaries conceived of this alliance, for all its duality, as a 'special relationship'. He has also highlighted the importance of this most unequal relationship in the negotiations preceding the Anglo-Dutch cooperation at Algiers.¹²¹ When the government of the Netherlands at the start of 1816 sought to go its own way, together with other partners, in acting against threat of 'Barbary piracy', British actors intervened.

How British involvement in the fight against Mediterranean piracy eventually came about cannot, however, solely be explained through the 'special relationship' with the Netherlands. For a long time, Castlereagh and other diplomats maintained that Britain was at peace with

¹¹⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 49, no. 978A, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 12-08-1814.

¹¹⁷ Holland, *Blue-water empire*, p. 31.

¹¹⁸ N. van Sas, 'The Dutch and the British umbrella 1813-1870' in: N. Ashton and D. Hellema (eds.), *Unspoken allies. Anglo-Dutch relations since 1780* (Amsterdam 2001), pp. 33-42.

¹¹⁹ J.A. de Moor, "A very unpleasant relationship". Trade and strategy in the Eastern Seas. Anglo-Dutch relations in the nineteenth century from a colonial perspective" in: G. Raven and N. Rodger (eds.), *Navies and armies. The Anglo-Dutch relationship in war and peace, 1688-1988* (Edinburgh 1990), pp. 49-69. ¹²⁰ Legêne, *De baggage van Blomhoff*, p. 394.

¹²¹ N. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831* (Groningen 1985), pp. 113-123.

the North African Regencies and therefore could do little against the privateering that threatened Dutch shipping. That stance changed at the beginning of 1816, owing to a variety of factors. The popular appeal of abolition was at play in this transformation, due to its linkage with 'Christian slavery'. Considerations of naval and diplomatic pre-eminence in the broader Mediterranean were equally important in effectuating this change. Why British officials eventually decided to act against the threat of 'Barbary piracy' therefore needs to be explained in the light of changing imperial politics and altered international relations in the Mediterranean. There, the newfound peace amongst the European powers, infused with the ideas of security that emerged at the Congress of Vienna, started to bring about concerted security practices. Inspired by notions of ending 'Christian slavery' and destroying 'Barbary piracy', different European powers set out on cooperative ventures that could potentially develop beyond British control. Representing the greatest naval power in the region, British actors acutely became aware that they could not remain indifferent to this changing state of affairs.

Abolitionist obligations

One of the most salient effects of the Congress of Vienna was the linkage of the 'black' and 'white' slave trade that had arisen during the negotiations. British delegates at the Congress attached great importance to the creation of an international ban on the trade in African slaves. This allowed public activists, like the semi-retired Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, and diplomats of states that were less inclined to abolish the trade, such as Spain's Marquis of Labrador, to pose 'Christian slavery' in North Africa as an extension of (and test to) the 'philanthropy' of British abolitionist policies. The conjunction of both slaveries did not disappear after the Congress of Vienna ended. In fact, it only grew more prominent. Castlereagh had proposed to continue discussions on the abolition of the slave trade in London, where he invited representatives of the Great Power allies to sit in a series of ambassadorial conferences. 'Barbary piracy' would, as Tsar Alexander had proposed, feature as a corollary issue during these meetings. The first of the conferences in London did not convene until late August 1816, when the Anglo-Dutch bombardment was already about to happen.¹²² Critiques of British partiality in tolerating 'Christian slavery' thus continued to hold sway, both amongst foreign diplomats and with the domestic public in Britain.

¹²² B. Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism and the global liberal order. Abolition and the Barbary corsairs in the Vienna Congress System', *The International History Review* (2017), pp. 1-22.

As a purported threat to European security, the captivity of Christian sailors in Barbary prisons, with its mobilizing impact on public opinion throughout the continent, also provided a much more effective argument for collective action than the protection of a nation's flag or commerce. Dutch officials had figured out by the end of 1815 that invocations of the 'safety of commerce' were not going to bring about British cooperation. Commercial concerns in the Netherlands or in other states that were subjected to North African privateering did not, in themselves, make 'Barbary piracy' a pressing issue of collective security. Castlereagh expressed this disinterest to the Dutch ambassador in London, clarifying that he was weary the Royal Navy would end up bearing the brunt of the costs while other powers merely reaped the benefits of safely resuming their Mediterranean trade.¹²³

The captivity of European sailors that had fallen into corsair hands, however, carried a much wider, transnational appeal. This aspect of the 'Barbary pirate' threat had received much international attention during the Congress of Vienna, thanks to different actors and publications, but especially due to Sir William Sidney Smith and his 'Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa'. The self-proclaimed head of this knightly order did much to ensure that this continental attention was not lost. He sent at least two collections of assorted writings, including various translations of his pamphlet, to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1816.¹²⁴ In a letter to Van Nagell, Smith expressed his hope that the Dutch government would stick to the 'honourable principle' of not paying tribute and staying out of 'hollow truces' with Algiers. He also proposed that the Dutch Mediterranean squadron could be placed under the command of the Knights Liberators.¹²⁵ This personal agenda aside, Smith's activist proposals clearly matched the government's unwillingness to meet the Algerine demands, which were supported by the same references to 'honour' and the same ideas on the Regency's questionable political status as treaty partner.

Van Nagell received additional, more personal accounts of the threats posed by 'Christian slavery' from family members of sailors. He maintained a steady correspondence with Mrs. Riedijk, a captain's wife from Vlaardingen. Her 64-year-old husband Arij Riedijk had been captured near Lisbon on 21 May 1815 and was taken to Algiers together with his son and grandson, who were also on board. Mrs. Riedijk wrote to Van Nagell to ask for information and lament her husband, son and grandson, devoid as they were 'of religion' under 'these

¹²³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 168, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 08-12-1815.

¹²⁴ One of them is in NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816, the other is mentioned in National Maritime Museum, Greenwhich (NMM), PHB/P/5/2, 'Van Nagell to Sidney Smith', Brussels 19-05-1815.

¹²⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816.

barbarians' who made them fight 'like dogs' for a few odd scraps of bread.¹²⁶ In reply, Van Nagell consoled her and noted: 'let us not lose hope that Heaven will bless the attempts that our good King undertakes, and will continue to, in order to redeem the prisoners from the lands of the Barbarians and ensure the security of our shipping in the Mediterranean Sea'.¹²⁷ If anything, their exchange shows that the threat perception and personal impact of captivity could merge domestic and international concerns of security, mobilize public support for violent action and allow non-state actors to stake their claims in official circles.

A similar, though less immediately personal, dynamic could be discerned in Great Britain. The activities of Smith and his knightly order reverberated within British society, where the issue of 'Christian slavery' soon became intertwined with domestic political tensions. Public opinion split on the proposals of action against the Regencies. Publications that leaned towards the Tory government of Prime Minister Robert Jenkins, second Earl of Liverpool (r. 1812-1827), noted that an attack on North Africa would be 'an act of madness'. The *Quarterly Review*, with its conservative imprint, discussed the fate of Christian prisoners and wondered: 'what has England to do with it, that she must stand foremost as the avenging power, and sacrifice her seamen to evince her humanity towards Sardinians, Neapolitans and Sicilians'?¹²⁸

Periodicals and publishers that sided with the Whig opposition held an entirely different view on the subject. This segment of public opinion emphasised the plight of the captive sailors and directed outrage towards the complacent Cabinet. One typical example is the published version of letter 'to a Member of Parliament', written by Walter Croker, an officer of the Royal Navy who purportedly visited Algiers in July 1815. It was issued in cheap print (at a sixpence price) and discussed in Whiggish journals like the *Edinburgh Review*. The printed letter zooms in on the cases of several 'poor' and 'unoffending' Italians who were held as captives.¹²⁹ It notes that one of them, a Vincenza Avelino from the island of Ponza, had been captured aboard a ship that sailed under the British flag, which was torn to pieces

¹²⁶ The first archived letter is NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 69, no. 101, 'Mrs. Riedijk to Van Nagell', Vlaardingen 05-01-1816, other parts of the correspondence are inv. 73, no. 952, 'Mrs. Riedijk to Van Nagell', Vlaardingen 09-03-1816; inv. 78, no. 1894, 'Mrs. Riedijk to Van Nagell', Vlaardingen 17-05-1816; inv. 87, no. 3885, 'Mrs. Riedijk to Van Nagell', Vlaardingen 10-10-1816. A list of all Dutch captives held in Algiers until the bombardment of 1816 is in inv. 88, no. 4063, 'List of Dutch captives released and shipped from Algiers on 30 and 31 August 1816, compiled by J.M. Polders', Bay of Algiers 31-10-1816.

¹²⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 100, no. 2061, 'Van Nagell to Mrs. Riedijk', The Hague 11-12-1815.

¹²⁸ G. Weiss, *Captives and corsairs. France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean* (Stanford 2011), pp. 149-150.

¹²⁹ Edinburgh Review XXVI:LII (June 1816), pp. 449-457.

and cast into the sea by the Algerine assailants.¹³⁰ If this insult to the Union Jack and national pride did not inspire sufficient outrage in the reader, Croker suggested his public go to Algiers and see the wretched situation for themselves. 'I cannot but wish', he wrote, 'that some of those English gentlemen, who travel in search of pleasure in the Mediterranean, would pay Algiers a visit, even for one week; I am sure they could not fail to feel, like me, the degradation to which the Christian name is exposed'.¹³¹ The text argued that Algiers, 'which was never yet so weak as at this moment', would easily comply if 'England only command them to release the Christian slaves', before concluding: 'it is surely worth trying'.¹³²

Because of their appearance in the oppositional press, these calls for action against 'Christian slavery' carried more than just diplomatic urgency. They merged with domestic political conflicts and government perceptions of internal political threats. It is notable that William Hone, a prolific satirist and London bookseller, published Croker's letter and interspersed the text with his own commentaries. His inexpensive publications, which included accounts of adultery trails as well as political riots, were widely read and went through numerous editions.¹³³ He titled another pamphlet (costing two pennies) A political catechism and dedicated it 'without permission, to His Most Serene Highness Omar, Bashaw Dey (...) of Algiers; The Earl of Liverpool; Lord Castlereagh, and Co.'. The brutality, despotism and illegitimacy of the Dey, any reader would understand, was thus mirrored to that of the British Cabinet. At its opening, the text set out a litany of injustices: 'The state pensioners are wallowing in luxury, and paupers are pining on alms; the Ministers are all confidence, and the people all despair; the military are superbly clothed, and the poor are in rags; the court is feasting, and the cottage is fasting'.¹³⁴ To alleviate the plight of the people, Hone proposed reforms of representation and tax laws.

At a time when British political life was, as one author notes, in the grips of 'a constant sensation of fear – fear of revolution, of the masses, of crime, famine and poverty, of disorder and instability', the suggestions of Hone were most unwelcome.¹³⁵ A copy of the *Political*

¹³⁰ The Italians could fly the Union Jack because the island of Ponza had been captured by British forces during the Napoleonic Wars. NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816, Annex 'A letter to a Member of Parliament on the slavery of the Christians at Algiers by Walter Croker, Esq. of the Royal Navy', p. 8.

¹³¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816, Annex 'A letter to a Member of Parliament², p. 9.

¹³² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 746, 'Sidney Smith to Van Nagell', Paris 07-03-1816, Annex 'A letter to a Member of Parliament', p. 14.

¹³³ D. Worrall, Harlequin Empire. Race, ethnicity and the drama of the popular Enlightenment (London 2007), p. 112.

[[]W. Hone], A political catechism (London 1817), p. 1.

¹³⁵ B. Hilton, A mad, bad and dangerous people? England, 1783-1846 (Oxford 2006), p. 31.

Catechism was duly retained by the Home Office as part of its surveillance of the radical movement.¹³⁶ As oppositional groups picked up on the issues of 'Christian slavery' and 'Barbary piracy', these could thus become domestic concerns of the British Cabinet as well.

From the beginning of 1816, foreign officials began to add to the domestic challenges of the British government by invoking European captivity in North Africa as a rightful incentive for repressive action against Algiers. A letter that Van Nagell sent to London in January dropped the usual Dutch worries over the 'safety of commerce' and instead posed 'Christian slavery' as the primary threat posed by Algiers. The Dutch Minister wrote about the wellbeing of captured Christians in the Regency and expressly linked their circumstances to British abolitionist efforts - much like Smith and other activists had done earlier. Great Britain, Van Nagell stated, had posed a great example to humanity by working so fervently to ban the black slave trade. Thus he was without doubt that Lord Castlereagh would also want to contribute to an international project that aimed to abolish Christian slavery.¹³⁷ This set of arguments seemed to have more effect than the preceding calls to protect commerce. Little later, the Dutch ambassador in London received a confidential communication from Castlereagh. He reported that the British government finally appeared to take the matter seriously, 'and is not completely deaf to the general cry of indignation that the brigandage carried out by these pirates has excited throughout Europe'.¹³⁸ However, it were not solely the idealist concerns and domestic aspects of the 'Christian slavery' issue that brought this change about. Even more pressing for the members of the British Cabinet was a looming rearrangement of diplomatic relations in the Mediterranean, which became dangerously apparent in the closing months of 1815.

Rivals in protection. Old coalitions and a new league

Even if there was a 'special relation' that put Dutch and British officials in particularly close contact, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was hardly the only power that sought aid from London. Multiple European governments came knocking at the doors of the British Cabinet to search for help in their dealings with the Regencies. As the available numbers on corsair captures illustrate, North African privateers targeted and brought in ships under a diverse array of European flags. Algerine privateers took a total of forty prizes in 1815, just three of which were Dutch. Their other captures included ships from Sweden, Denmark and

¹³⁶ Worrall, *Harlequin Empire*, p. 112.

¹³⁷ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 10-01-1816.

¹³⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 19, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 09-02-1816.

Spain as well as various German and Italian states. Only the number of cruises per year can be stated with certainty for the Regencies of Tunis and Tripoli, but in 1815 they respectively carried out 41 and 53 corsairing expeditions, which did not necessarily bring in captures. Different sources note that Austrian and Russian ships were the objects of these Tunisian and Tripolitan ventures, alongside the usual variety of smaller European powers.¹³⁹ Many of the targeted nations directed their pleas for help to the government of Great Britain. After all, the Royal Navy had emerged as the most dominant military presence on Mediterranean waters in the wake of Napoleonic Wars. Additionally, several governments claimed that the safety of their shipping effectively had to be guaranteed by Britain because of wartime coalition agreements. Offering protection against corsairing was thus also a matter of imperial standing, it helped foster alliances with (and assert control over) polities in the region. To understand how that protection functioned and find out why British actors suddenly wanted to reassert national primacy by the beginning of 1816, it is necessary to look into Great Britain's diplomatic entanglements in the Mediterranean.

In terms of diplomatic promises and protective guarantees, the British state had to manage the large, complex and to some degree inconvenient heritage of its wartime efforts against France. From the assembly of the First Coalition in the Mediterranean onwards, British statesmen had pitted local states against Revolutionary France under the vague, but rousing phrase of 'indemnity for the past and security for the future'.¹⁴⁰ Governments ranging from Sardinia to Portugal and Naples to Spain had sided behind this mantra and joined the British effort in various coalitions. During wartime, the benefits of this promised security included protection against the North African corsairs. British officials thus ransomed Sicilian slaves in Tunis and arranged a treaty of peace between the Regency and Portugal in 1812-1813.¹⁴¹ As early as 1798, Admiral Horatio Nelson comparably assured Ionian subjects that the Royal Navy would offer them every protection if they managed to expel the French troops stationed on their islands.¹⁴² The widening circle of Mediterranean countries that were associated with Britain and enjoyed its protection did, by the early 1810s, result in fewer and fewer potential targets for North African privateers.¹⁴³

As the coalition wars against France ended, the endurance of this system became an openended question. The authorities in the North African Regencies added further urgency to this

¹³⁹ Panzac, Barbary corsairs, p. 267.

¹⁴⁰ J. Meeks, *France, Britain and the struggle for the Western Mediterranean* (Cham 2017), pp. 13 and 113.

¹⁴¹ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, p. 37.

¹⁴² Vick, *The Congress*, p. 232.

¹⁴³ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 69-71.

pending issue when they stressed the need for new treaties, demanded tributes and commenced privateering.¹⁴⁴ Many of Great Britain's old allies in the region therefore wished to see the promise of 'security for the future' extend beyond war's end. Some officials even argued that Great Britain was required to act. Acquiring control over Malta, they noted, now obligated Britain to continue the efforts of the island's previous tenants: the Order of St. John. The Governor of Genoa, which became part of the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1815, was one to adopt this reasoning and wrote: 'The squadrons of the order protected the navigation and the coasts of those nations which could not purchase the peace from the Barbaric powers. Is not England charged with this protection? As to her ability to do so there can be no doubt'.¹⁴⁵

The various Italian states fulfilled an important role in debates over what protection and alliance meant in times of peace and in the face of corsair activity. Requests for British help come from old coalition members like the Kingdom of Sardinia or the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, and new creations of the Congress of Vienna like the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The latter entity, a merger of the Kingdoms of Sicily and Naples, was in particularly close political and commercial relations with Britain, to a degree that resembled the Anglo-Dutch partnership, as one French Minister noted.¹⁴⁶ The Tunisian historian Khelifa Chater therefore argues that Italian demands for help as well as public outrage over Tunisian raids on Italian territories, like at the island of San'Antiocho, were pivotal in getting Britain to act against the Regencies.¹⁴⁷

One case in which the protection of Italians was most closely related to the British imperial presence in the Mediterranean was the fisheries of La Calle. This old French concession near the border of Algiers and Tunis had been leased to Great Britain since 1807. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Dey Hadj Ali of Algiers decided to test the extent of Britain's protective arrangements there. He informed consul McDonell that he considered the Regency to be at war with Sicily and would allow the capture of the many Sicilian ships that were employed in the coral fishing at La Calle, even if they operated under a British license. McDonell recounted the incident in a dispatch to London, noting that he felt Britain should hold firmly to the guaranteed protection and intimidate the Regency's authorities, even though he also argued that, commercially, 'there appears to be a manifest loss in holding the contract in the

¹⁴⁴ C. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death. European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth century', *Journal for Maritime Research* 18:2 (2016), pp. 139-154, there p. 141.

¹⁴⁵ E. Howard, *Memoirs of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith* 2 vols. (London 1839), vol. II, pp. 318-319.

¹⁴⁶ CADLC, 9CP/22, 'Instructions to Osmond', Paris 31-12-1815, fp. 110-130.

¹⁴⁷ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 240-242.

time of peace'.¹⁴⁸ He later reported that about two hundred licenses were distributed to the coral fishers, and that they all 'expect to be protected'.¹⁴⁹ In this instance, guarantees of safety against corsairing were directly related to questions of British power in the region.

At other occasions, matters of protection were less clear-cut. Passports, licenses and the guarantees they represented did not always end up in the right hands. Many owners of the British Mediterranean passes that put vessels under the guarantees of Great Britain's diplomatic treaties actually held them unjustly, as they were not subjects of the British Empire or could rightfully lay claim to its protection. One Royal Navy captain reported from Malta in 1813 about 'the extreme facility with which foreigners of every description have been enable to produce Mediterranean passes'.¹⁵⁰ The illegal sale of passports was well-known and widespread. British consuls in various Mediterranean ports managed to make handsome earnings through this business. A representative in Genoa was reported in 1815 to have sold about 500 passes, at a price of, as one Dutch source notes, two Genoese livers for every ton of a ship's hold.¹⁵¹ Greek sailors from the Ottoman Empire would likewise obtain British passes at the Ionian Islands or Malta.¹⁵² The papers that sailors showed at inspections by corsair captains could therefore very well be false, and privateering conventions held that forgeries could be captured as legitimate prizes, which many corsairs did.¹⁵³ Not every claim of protection or purported insult to the British flag therefore warranted assertive action.

The matter of Great Britain's guarantees to the different Mediterranean states really became pressingly urgent when an alternative, possibly rivalling alliance sprang up. Architected by the smaller European powers of Spain and the Netherlands, it tried to turn the activist ideas of a multinational fleet protecting European shipping and Christian sailors from the treat of 'Barbary piracy'. The alliance entailed the conclusion of a defensive pact, allowing its signees to combine their naval forces and offer each other mutual security. As such, this system of cooperation had the potential to render the diplomatic leverage of British protection much less effective. The impending creation of this alliance further impressed British statesmen of the need to act on European calls for action against the pirate threat. Its conception and subsequent diplomatic treatment therefore highlight the pivotal, if oftentimes overlooked, role that small power governments could play in post-1815 matters of security.

¹⁴⁸ TNA, FO 3/16, 'McDonell to Colonel Bunbury', Algiers 01-06-1814.

¹⁴⁹ TNA, FO 3/16, 'McDonell to Bunbury', Algiers 25-09-1814.

¹⁵⁰ G. Fisher, Barbary legend. War, trade and piracy in North Africa (1415-1830) (Oxford 1957), p. 327.

¹⁵¹ Folayan, *Tripoli*, p. 68; NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 50, no. 1102, 'Joseph Dodero to Van Nagell', Genoa 16-08-1814.

¹⁵² A. Cobbing, 'A Victorian embarrassment. Consular jurisdiction and the evils of extraterritoriality', *The International History Review* (2017), pp. 1-19, there p. 4.

¹⁵³ Mössner, Die Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit, pp. 132-134.

Spanish officials took the initiative in proposing a new, multilateral arrangement against 'Barbary piracy', and they immediately found a willing partner in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Prime Minister Pedro Cevallos (1760-1840) made his first proposal in August 1815, right after Tulleken's failed naval demonstration at Algiers. He expressed his empathy over the 'unfortunate negotiations' to the Dutch representative in Madrid and noted that illustrated the need to create an alliance 'as the sole means' of impressing the Barbary authorities.¹⁵⁴ Spain's ambassador in Brussels, Miguel Ricardo de Álava (1770-1843), a veteran of both Trafalgar and Waterloo, added to the diplomatic overture and suggested that both kingdoms could do 'something of reciprocal utility' against the Barbary powers.¹⁵⁵ Come October, King William I had sent his orders to 'act by mutual agreement against Algiers, and make formal commitments to that end'.¹⁵⁶ Negotiations on the projected stipulations and possible inclusion of other parties continued in Madrid over the course of that month.

Both sides in this Spanish-Dutch venture had clear incentives for siding with each other. The two kingdoms were each at war with Algiers, saw their subjects taken by corsairs and had unsuccessfully tried to obtain support from a Great Power partner. The Spanish government in particular found its financial resources outstretched and its military undermanned. Much of its problems had to do with the choices of King Ferdinand VII, who annulled Spain's liberal constitution in 1814 upon his return from exile in France. His determination to re-establish the country's imperial grandeur in Latin America intensified independence movements in the colonies, which he tried to stamp out by sending an army of 10,000 troops aboard sixty warships to the areas of rebellion in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and the Caribbean islands in early 1815.¹⁵⁷ In a conflict with the Regency of Algiers over debts of the Spanish consul, the government in Madrid therefore possessed little means of enforcing its position or protecting merchant shipping.¹⁵⁸

Spain hence was not a particularly strong naval partner for the Dutch government. Still, there were plenty of benefits to an alliance, as Prime Minister Cevallos liked to point out. He admitted that the available section of the Spanish navy was only of very modest size, but argued that Spain's geographical location and the available resources in its ports were ample

¹⁵⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 63, no. 1718, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 21-08-1815.

¹⁵⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 748, 'Don Miguel de Alava to Van Nagell', Brussels 15-10-1815.

¹⁵⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 18, no. 1102, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 23-10-1815.

¹⁵⁷ G. Brown, *Latin American rebels and the United States*, 1806-1822 (Jefferson, NC 2015), pp. 74 and 76-77.

¹⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 55, no. 275, 'Hartinck to Van Nagell', Alicante 21-01-1815.

compensation.¹⁵⁹ Dutch ships of war often stopped at the strategically located port of Mahon on Menorca and an alliance, Spanish officials noted, would allow these vessels to spend the winter there.¹⁶⁰ The Dutch Minister of the Marine agreed, but also saw another advantage. Based on captains' reports, he knew that the Spanish navy possessed the small, heavily armoured bomb vessels that its Dutch counterpart lacked. These ships could fire heavy mortars. Such armaments, the Minister clarified, would not fail to do much damage to a densely built city like Algiers. He therefore approved of an alliance with Spain and suggested that six Spanish bomb vessels should be added to the Dutch fleet in the Mediterranean.¹⁶¹

Negotiations on the details of the alliance thus progressed steadily, until the two parties began to try and extend their plans to include other European powers. Spanish and Dutch diplomats had started to envision their alliance as the precursor to a bigger European league, but in their attempts at enlargement they almost immediately encountered strong British obstruction. The government of Spain had, at an early stage in the talks, decided to invite Portugal as well as the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The invitation met a lukewarm reply at both courts. From Naples, the Spanish representative reported that the government only wanted to join in if Britain had expressed its support for the venture.¹⁶² Likewise, the Portuguese governing council (in which the British ambassador had a seat) did not wish to accept the invitation.¹⁶³ The Spanish government immediately took it as a sign of British intentions to further obstruct Spain's return to its former preponderance as a naval and imperial power, adding to the same chagrin over being excluded from the Great Power ranks that also made the Spanish authorities renege on signing Vienna's Final Acts.¹⁶⁴ Cevallos wondered whether British officialdom would really work against an alliance, and asked his Dutch partners to contact London.¹⁶⁵

In December 1815, ambassador Fagel received a 'copy of the project of alliance' from his superiors in The Hague, together with 'an invitation to communicate confidentially to Castlereagh'.¹⁶⁶ The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that he hoped Great Britain would join the alliance, especially because it would help advance the abolition of the slave trade in its different varieties.¹⁶⁷ Furthering that notion of common interests, the added outline

¹⁵⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 19, no. 1179, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 14-10-1815.

¹⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 748, 'Don Miguel de Alava to Van Nagell', Brussels 15-10-1815,

¹⁶¹ NL-HaNA, 2.12.21, inv. 4, no. 16, Folder dated 25-06-1816, 'Van der Hoop to Van Nagell', 25-06-1816.

 ¹⁶² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 19, no. 1249, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 09-11-1815.
 ¹⁶³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 19, no. 1250, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 09-11-1815.

¹⁶⁴ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 158, 167 and 276; R. Carr, *Spain 1808-1975* (2nd ed., Oxford 1982), p. 38.

¹⁶⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 19, no. 1249, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 09-11-1815.

¹⁶⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 27, no. 658c, 'Van Nagell to Fagel', The Hague 05-12-1815.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem.

of the alliance declared that there was not a single power that did not wish to see the end of Barbary piracy. As nothing seemed to work in bringing that end about, not even interventions from the Ottoman Porte, 'there remain no other remedies but the reunion of the maritime forces of different powers, maintained in permanent Mediterranean cruises, in order to protect commerce'.¹⁶⁸ The text posited the alliance as a long-awaited and effective means of concertation, calling it 'astonishing' that such a measure had not already been instigated now that 'all cabinets' are willing to protect their commerce against the threat of piracy.¹⁶⁹

Castlereagh took note of the project, expressed his doubts about its feasibility, stated that he would give an official reply by February and then, in secret, began to plan a British expedition to North Africa.¹⁷⁰ A general, European league had the potential to hurt British diplomatic preponderance in the Mediterranean, as Spanish officials suspected and Castlereagh appears to have immediately foreseen. Adding injury to insult, the governments of Spain and the Netherlands presented themselves as forerunners in the emerging security culture, undertaking what the Great Power cabinets 'astonishingly' failed to do. As Niek van Sas has argued, the Dutch and Spanish kingdoms sought to assert their intermediate positions in an international constellation that became ever more divided between great and small powers.¹⁷¹ In matters of security, the Great Powers were to assert their primacy. The British obstruction of the general defensive league brought this to light. Still, officials from Spain and the Netherlands, as smaller power actors, managed to shape and steer the fight against piracy. They had taken the proposals of Smith, Tidemann and other activists that we encountered in Chapter 1, and made them into a projected alliance with a drafted treaty. When Fagel reported from London in February 1816 that the British government was 'no longer completely deaf', he was thus not only talking of the continental dismay over 'Christian slavery', but also of the possibilities that existed to turn plans for concertation into diplomatic practice.¹⁷²

Admiral Exmouth's first diplomatic mission to North Africa, March-May 1816

Efforts to pose the threat of North African raiding as a European concern, framed in terms of 'Christian slavery', had convalesced with the potentially worrisome development of cooperative naval ventures outside British control, and thereby prodded the Cabinet into

¹⁶⁸ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Fagel to Castlereagh', London 10-01-1816.

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 26, no. 173, 'Fagel to van Nagell', London 12-12-1815.

¹⁷¹ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste*, p. 117.

¹⁷² NL-HaNA, inv. 2.05.44, no. 19, 'Fagel to van Nagell', London 09-02-1816.

action. The government's stance had changed from a stated unwillingness to defend other nations' commerce to the point where it was plotting a diplomatic intervention with the Regencies, and that change had come about rather swiftly. Within a matter of months, Castlereagh turned from an unconcerned recipient of pleas for assistance into someone who was drafting instructions for a naval deployment. In this transition, we saw the security culture taking further shape, as non-state actors ventilated their perceptions of threat and smaller powers attempted to create their own cooperative practices. By January 1816, Castlereagh therefore felt compelled to act and issued a set of orders for a Royal Navy Admiral who was tasked to negotiate with the authorities of the Regencies.

Writing to the Secretary of War and Colonies, Henry, third earl Bathurst (1762-1834), Castlereagh began the instructions with an eye on continental affairs:

'Your lordship is aware of the very general spirit of indignation that exists throughout Europe at the unrestrained system of piracy and violence, carried on under the pretext of war by the Barbary Powers against the property and subjects of different states; and there is no feature of this system so revolting to the general feeling as the mode in which their captives are thrown into, and retained in slavery'.

The text described how Mediterranean states in close alliance with Britain had 'complained loudly' about this state of affairs.¹⁷³ Castlereagh specifically noted a call for help from the King of Sardinia, and stated that this request was made on the basis of the protection that Sardinia had enjoyed during the Napoleonic period. The goal of the diplomatic venture would hence be to establish by treaty that the 'flag and commerce' of Sardinia were to be treated with the same respect as that of Great Britain.¹⁷⁴

For Castlereagh, the mission was thus primarily about reasserting Britain's position as the guarantor of the maritime security of its Mediterranean allies. That standing of imperial primacy in the region could become imperilled with the development of Spain and the Netherlands' general European league, which is why British officialdom tried to opposite it. Castlereagh's writings to Bathurst fit that line of policy. For all its mentions of general indignation across the continent, the instructions did not entail a solution to all European concerns over the threat of 'Barbary piracy'. Rather, this mission was to be a diplomatic intervention of old variety seen time and again during the coalition wars against France. A British fleet would go to North Africa and try to obtain redress as well as protection for one of

¹⁷³ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', 29-01-1816.

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem.

its Mediterranean partners. When Fagel saw the set of instructions he therefore deplored that it did not correspond to what the Dutch government had had in mind. Britain, he reported, acted more like a mediator than as 'an arbiter of the seas and avenger of the rights of humanity'.¹⁷⁵

Correct as Fagel was about the mission's bilateral character, the instructions were also set up to warn the authorities in North Africa of the changing European attitudes towards them. According to Castlereagh's text, the British commander had to impress the local rulers of 'the spirit of resistance that is rising in Europe against the practices in which their squadrons have lately indulged'. He should therefore inform them 'that it well deserves their serious consideration, whether the prosperity of their dominions cannot by some other means, be better reconciled with the modern system of Europe'.¹⁷⁶ In such phrases, the official complaints and activist mainstays of the Regencies as perpetual warmongers upsetting the newfound order of peace clearly shine through. This wording also echoed the professed benefits of a 'commercial civilization' along the Barbary Coast that had Smith popularized at the Congress of Vienna.

As ever wary to destabilize the regional status quo, Castlereagh thus appropriated the central tenets of the 'Barbary pirate' threat perception and used them to alert the North African authorities of the far-reaching consequences that continuing corsairing could have. The instructions therefore made for a complicated mixture of messages. On the one hand, the rulers of the Regencies were urged to stop exercising their belligerent right of issuing privateers because this not longer matched 'the modern system of Europe'. On the other, the British commander had to ensure the authorities that their 'just right of war as independent states' would be respected.¹⁷⁷ While sharing in some of the basic tropes of activist calls for action, the instructions did not follow the activist suggestion to stop treating the Regencies as sovereign entities. The delegitimation of the North African states and their corsair fleets, this text perfectly illustrates, was thus not at all a linear process of increasing repression, but marked by the endurance of old diplomatic practices and a lingering respect for North African sovereignty.

The naval officer who was sent to the Regencies would have to walk a diplomatic tightrope with this set of orders in hand. To make matters more complex, the instructions also

¹⁷⁵ NL-HaNA, inv. 2.05.44, No. 28, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 05-03-1816.

¹⁷⁶ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', 29-01-1816.

¹⁷⁷ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', 29-01-1816.

authorized the use of force if the need arose.¹⁷⁸ Castlereagh proposed one of the Royal Navy's most senior commanders to carry out this delicate mission: Admiral Edward Pellew, Viscount Exmouth, the acting commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet. The son of a packet-boat captain, Pellew's career was exemplary of the meritocratic opportunities that the Royal Navy offered during the Revolutionary wars.¹⁷⁹ His entry into the peerage as Baron Exmouth in 1814 also made him part of the 'new species' of nobility of the sword that had arisen from this era of conflict.¹⁸⁰ Over his many appointments as a frigate captain and commander, he had seen action in the North Sea, East India and, from 1811, in the Mediterranean. During the latter positing, he had acquainted Sir William Sidney Smith, with whom he often clashed professionally. Exmouth nevertheless joined the ranks of the Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa.¹⁸¹ Shortly after the Congress of Vienna, he wrote Smith on the expediency of acting against the Barbary Regencies: 'I think if a qualified person like yourself, acquainted with their manners, temper etc. could have been sent over to them, all such arrangements might chance to be made as would have ended depredation and Christian slavery'.¹⁸² Smith himself was not getting the appointment he so desired, but his cause appeared to be making progress.

As news of Exmouth's impending expedition spread during first months of 1816, the European appeal of this mission became apparent once again. Many officials sought to get the protection of their national flags and the liberation of their capture subjects into the instructions as well. Soon, the conclusion of a treaty for the Ionian Islands was added to Exmouth's orders. Actors from another newly attained territory under the British Crown, the Kingdom of Hanover, also tried to get on the list. The Hanoverian representative in London, Count Ernst zu Münster, urged on by an East Frisian merchant lobby, eventually managed to persuade Castlereagh and get Hanover included.¹⁸³ Even King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia tried to raise his potential gains by inquiring whether the British Admiral could arrange the release of the islanders of San'Antiocho as well.¹⁸⁴ Still, all of these last-minute additions did not mean that Exmouth was going to carry out a continental task, liberating all captives in the

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁹ E. Wilson, 'Social background and promotion prospects in the Royal Navy, 1775-1815', *English Historical Review* CXXXI:550 (2016), pp. 570-595, there p. 593.

¹⁸⁰ Hilton, A mad, bad, p. 26.

¹⁸¹ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 39; C. Parkinson, *Edward Pellew Viscount Exmouth*. *Admiral of the Red* (London 1934), pp. 398-399.

¹⁸² Lord Russel of Liverpool, *Knight of the Sword. The life and letters of Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith* (London 1964) p. 196.

¹⁸³ Harding, 'North African piracy', pp. 34-35.

¹⁸⁴ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Hamilton to Bunbury', 14-03-1816, fp. 32-35.

Regencies and ending the threat of piracy for good. For this, he would ultimately be harshly criticized upon his return from North Africa.

'Exposed to extreme danger'. Exmouth's diplomacy in Algiers

Although his expedition was intended primarily as a diplomatic effort in which treaties would be concluded and ransoms arranged, Exmouth did prepare for the possibility of military action. Little was known at the time about the exact state and strength of Algiers' fortifications, barring a confidential reconnaissance report drafted by a French colonel in 1808.¹⁸⁵ Exmouth hence sent one of his junior captains ahead on a confidential assignment to the Regency and warned the man: 'Be careful never to have any sort of paper about your person which may lead to suspicion'.¹⁸⁶ This captain not only had to tally the number of cannons pointing seawards, but was also tasked to get some sense of the Dey's popularity and the potential for civil revolt among locals and slaves.¹⁸⁷ He did count the 600 cannon of the coastal fortifications, but on the other forces of the Regencies he could report little more than that many Janissaries 'are very old' and their 'skill as gunners is very deficient'.¹⁸⁸ Somewhat more useful was the intelligence that the Ottoman Porte in Constantinople received from Moldavia, warning it of a possible British attack on Algiers.¹⁸⁹

There appeared to be little use for violent means, however, when Exmouth and his eighteen ships of war managed to near Algiers through contrary winds on 31 March. The authorities allowed the Admiral to an audience after he sent an opening letter, which noted the need for new diplomatic arrangements 'under the present change in the political situation of Europe in consequence of the General Peace'.¹⁹⁰ Exmouth was welcomed at the Dey's palace the next morning, at ten o'clock.¹⁹¹ Located in the lower town in close proximity to the admiralty, the palace was in fact a modestly sized, four-story building around a courtyard with a garden. Inside, its furnishings are said to have been minimal, and there was little pomp or circumstances to the audiences held there.¹⁹² On these premises Exmouth first met Dey Omar Agha, who had ascended to the head of the Regency little over a year before. Thought

¹⁸⁵ Panzac, Barbary corsairs, p. 276.

¹⁸⁶ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 66.

¹⁸⁷ Captain Warde's report is in NMM, PEL/24, 'Warde to Exmouth', aboard H.M.S. Banterer [??]-02-1816, fp. 358-369.

¹⁸⁸ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 66.

¹⁸⁹ BOA, HAT 1282/49722 (23 R 1231), 23-03-1816.

¹⁹⁰ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816 with added copy of the letter to the Dey, dated Algiers, 24-03-1816.

¹⁹¹ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816.

¹⁹² Parker, Uncle Sam, p. 22.

to be of Greek descent, Omar was described by the French consul as calm, reflective man.¹⁹³ He had brought an end to a long-lasting conflict with neighbouring Tunis, but also suffered a defeat at American hands. The day before his meeting with Exmouth, Algerine officials told the British that Omar was 'in great distress of mind', as someone in his inner circle had recently shot himself.¹⁹⁴

Still, the negotiations were off to a very smooth start. Exmouth and Omar Agha quickly reached an agreement on the Ionian Islands, whose treaty rights were to be put on par with Britain's. Peace settlements for the Kingdoms of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies did bring 'long and warm discussion'. The topic of tributes, which Exmouth was instructed not to submit to, proved particularly delicate. In their discussions, Dey Omar explained why the Regency especially needed tributes in kind, which he called an 'ancient custom'. If he could not demand naval and military stores, the Dey argued, 'he was cut off from all his supplies, and exposed to extreme danger'.¹⁹⁵ What was deemed a prerequisite for the security of Sardinian shipping (peace without tribute) would thus, in the eyes of Omar, bring insecurity to the Regency of Algiers.

After breaking off the talks for the day in order to consult his *divan*, Dey Omar announced the next morning that he would agree to all Exmouth's proposals. Neither the Sardinian nor Sicilian court would have to pay tributes for its peace with Algiers. Omar also allowed Exmouth to ransom the Italian captives held in the Regency. The Admiral did report his unease at making the payment, but nevertheless agreed. 'As I did not feel myself authorized to proceed to extremities should the offer I made be refused, I thought it right to regulate the price for the Sicilians', he wrote in a letter to the Admiralty in London.¹⁹⁶ The liberation of the Sardinian and Sicilian captives created a jubilant atmosphere at the British consulate. The consul estimated that after the ransom of these wretched Italians less than four hundred Christian slaves remained in Algiers. 'It is a general opinion here', McDonell claimed exaltedly, 'that the regency could not without the assistance of Christian slaves, put its squadron in a proper state for going to sea'.¹⁹⁷ Corsairing, he thought, would perish together with the enslavement of European sailors. It was an unfounded statement, and one that would soon prove to be untrue. Exmouth left Algiers on 7 April, but it would not be last time that he visited the Regency.

¹⁹³ A. Temimi, 'Documents turcs inédits sur le bombardement d'Alger en 1816', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 5 (1968), pp. 111-133, there p. 114.

¹⁹⁴ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816.

¹⁹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁹⁷ TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Earl Bathurst', Algiers 07-04-1816.

'Serious mischief'. Tunis, Tripoli and back to Algiers

The British fleet then set sail for the next stop on the diplomatic mission: Tunis. There, the negotiations took a few precarious turns. As we shall see, unexpected British guests at the local court and a French consul with obstructionist objectives seriously impacted Exmouth's endeavours. The Admiral later wrote that 'serious mischief' had very nearly resulted from 'improper interference' in his talks.¹⁹⁸ At Tunis, the expedition hence took on a more menacing character. This change of tone and conduct can only be explained with reference to local circumstances, as the Tunisians authorities and other diplomatic actors in the Regency opposed the British efforts at fostering protection. The events in Tunis hence illustrate that the situation on the ground, in the port cities of the Mediterranean, was entirely different from what had been foreseen when instructions were drafted and lines of practice set out. The actual implementation of security, as this case shows, resulted from local encounters and was shaped by the endeavours of the Regency's authorities. What security entailed and who was authorized to enact it became a matter of contestation in Tunis. The impact of that contestation would, in turn, shape Exmouth's subsequent conduct and helped bring about the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 27 August 1816.

On the day he arrived in Tunis, Exmouth found out that he was not the only British dignitary in the Regency. Much to their mutual surprise and dismay, the Admiral crossed paths in Tunis with a somewhat wayward member of the royal family: Charlotte of Brunswick, the Princess of Wales (1768-1821) and estranged wife of Prince Regent and later King George IV (1762-1830).¹⁹⁹ She had been traveling Europe and the Mediterranean with her hired Italian servant (and suspected lover) Bartolomeo Pergami. The pair stopped at Tunis for three weeks in April 1816, after having journeyed to Elba and Sicily. Lodging them at his palace in the city, Mahmud Bey (r. 1814-1824) received the Princess and her companion with every courtesy. The Bey's sons could be seen giving Charlotte an arm as they escorted her through the palace gardens. On 11 April, when the British fleet appeared in port, she and Bartolomeo had just come back from a visit to the ancient Punic port of Utica.²⁰⁰ One author has argued that this could not have been coincidental, and concluded that the Princess of Wales was actually a covert diplomat, directed to Tunis specifically for the mission at

¹⁹⁸ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Admiralty', Tunis 21-04-1816.

¹⁹⁹ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, p. 252.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 247-249; C. Windler, 'Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis. Muslim-Christian relations in Tunis, 1700-1840', *The Historical Journal* 44:1 (2001), pp. 79-106, there p. 100.

hand.²⁰¹ Exmouth's expressed surprise over her presence seems to suggest otherwise, but she would come to participate in the escalating negotiations that ensued.²⁰²

Diplomacy had a somewhat different appearance in Tunis than it did in Algiers, resulting from differences in the local structures of rule. Unlike Algiers, with its changing cast of elected Deys, the Regency of Tunis was headed by a dynasty, that of the Husainids. Audiences at the court therefore possessed much more pomp and circumstance.²⁰³ Exmouth announced his arrival in the same manner as in Algiers, calling for new arrangements in light of the general European peace, but was treated to a different welcome.²⁰⁴ Mahmud Bev received him with an elaborate ceremony on the afternoon of 13 April, before retiring to a more private setting with only the British consul Richard Oglander as an extra attendee.²⁰⁵

At first, Mahmud Bey replied to Exmouth's opening statement by expressing his wish 'to be at peace with Europe, and, in the event of future wars, to exchange his prisoners according to the European practice'.²⁰⁶ The ransoming of Christian captives, it seemed, could become a thing of the past. However, when Exmouth set out the details of mission and put forth the demands of tribute-free treaties for Britain's Mediterranean allies, Mahmud responded less enthusiastically. He told Exmouth that the French consul was already mediating 'on behalf of Naples', and had offered to pay a ransom for all Sicilian slaves. Now Exmouth had come to Tunis and claimed that *he* was mandated to mediate for Sardinia and the Two Sicilies *without* paying tribute. Mahmud wondered: 'how can you now demand the slaves without paying their ransom and to make peace without paying the dues'?²⁰⁷

The Bey's reply brought to light once more that protection and the provision of security could still be turned into a source of inter-European conflict. His call on French mediation and dismissal of the British efforts harkened back to the days, which were not that long ago, when North African rulers utilized divisions between the European powers to strengthen their own positions. Exmouth took the bait. Angered by what he saw as French obstruction, he decided to 'push things to the extremity'. He threatened to take the British consul with him and ready his vessels for and attack.²⁰⁸ Exmouth then departed from the palace and boarded his squadron, leaving the negotiations in a tense deadlock that lasted for two days.

²⁰¹ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 247-249.

²⁰² CADN, 712PO/1/51, 'Devoize to Bouchage', Tunis 17-04-1816.

²⁰³ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, p. 250.

²⁰⁴ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Lord Melville', Tunis Bay 17-04-1816.

²⁰⁵ Chater, Dépendance et mutations, p. 250.

²⁰⁶ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Lord Melville', Tunis Bay 17-04-1816.

 ²⁰⁷ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to the Admiralty', Tunis Bay 21-04-1816.
 ²⁰⁸ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to the Admiralty', Tunis Bay 21-04-1816, which includes the treaties, together with an agreement between Tunis and the Ionian Islands.

All the while, the French consul Jacques Devoize (1745-1832) remained firm to his position. He kept stating that he was the sole mediator of the court of Naples and that only he had the authority to arrange the liberation of the Sardinian subjects who had been taken from San'Antiocho.²⁰⁹ Devoize was an experienced agent, having held the consular post in Tunis in various stints since 1792. He had previously ransomed a large group of Sardinians in 1801, and he was indeed asked to do so again in February 1816.²¹⁰ Devoize did not wish to see that effort suddenly seized by a British Admiral. Exmouth's talk of a new European system seemed suspicious to him, he noted that the mission's real goal was not to ban 'Christian slavery' but to win the affection of the Sardinians, Neapolitans and Genoese for the British government.²¹¹ Protection, as Devoize's resolve shows, was very much a sign of diplomatic standing, a way of asserting international status. The attempted restoration of France's former primacy in North Africa thus clashed with this British expedition. A new, inter-imperial order of security was thus still hard to discern in Tunis, where Mahmud Bey sought to play different claims of protection off against each other.

The rising tensions and suspended talks did not, however, lead to an attack. Princess Charlotte nevertheless feared for escalation, and carried out an impromptu negotiation with Devoize in the presence of the Intendant of the Marine and other senior officials of the Regency. She urged the consul to stop his manoeuvres, which he rebutted by putting the blame solely on Exmouth.²¹² Mahmud Bey meanwhile had all the cannons on the fortifications manned. Still, fearing the consequences of a full-frontal barrage, the Bey yielded in the end. His prime concern, he later told Devoize, had been the loss of his corsair fleet, which was lying in the harbour in its totality.²¹³ Following another lengthy round of negotiations, Exmouth and a large retinue of officers came to sign the desired treaties and ransom agreements on 17 April. They also received a declaration in which Mahmud Bey expressed his willingness to abolish 'Christian slavery'.²¹⁴ The British fleet departed from Tunis on the 21st, a day after the Princess of Wales said goodbye to her Tunisian hosts and continued her Mediterranean sojourn.²¹⁵ Shortly afterwards, Devoize received an official reprimand from Paris, stating that he should have allowed Exmouth to carry out his

 ²⁰⁹ CADN, 712PO/1/51, 'Devoize to Comte de Blacas in Naples', Tunis 18-04-1816.
 ²¹⁰ CADN, 712PO/1/51, No. 18, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 06-02-1816.

²¹¹ CADN, 712PO/1/51, 'Devoize to Comte de Blacas in Naples', Tunis 18-04-1816. ²¹² CADN, 712PO/1/51, No. 26, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 16-04-1816.

²¹³ CADN, 712PO/1/51, No. 27, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 25-04-1816. ²¹⁴ CADN, 712PO/1/51, No. 26, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 16-04-1816.

²¹⁵ CADN, 712PO/1/51, 'Devoize to Blacas', Tunis 22-04-1816.

mediation.²¹⁶ It was a final twist to this peculiar episode, which saw old conceptions of protection as a sign of national prestige collide with new claims of enacting European security.

Tripoli, the final destination of Exmouth's expedition, proved to be the least eventful of the three stops. The Admiral managed to obtain the necessary treaties as well as the abolitionist declaration and also concluded the ransoms without much difficulty. As Exmouth briefly mentioned in his report, the ease of these arrangements can probably be attributed to internal politics within the Regency.²¹⁷ Conflicts over appointments and privileges had been raging between different members of the local ruling dynasty, pitting Pasha Yusuf Karamanli against one of his sons. Further outside hostility would not have aided the Pasha much and thus he submitted to the ransom of almost six hundred captives at a greatly reduced price, leaving only a few dozen Tuscans and Romans imprisoned in the Regency.²¹⁸

Perhaps feeling reassured by the consecutive successes in Tripoli and Tunis, Exmouth subsequently decided to visit Algiers again before sailing back to England. The British fleet reappeared in view of Algiers on 15 May, sparking puzzlement and wonder amongst many onlookers ashore. Sweden's consul found it 'incomprehensible' that Exmouth came back, while his French counterpart Deval wondered what the Admiral's 'real motives' were.²¹⁹ Formally, Exmouth used his return to pose an official complaint against some stipulations on prize-taking in an American treaty of 1815, which had been another last-minute addition to his instructions.²²⁰ Dey Omar granted the British Admiral another audience, but only to tell him that he had annulled this treaty anyway and that there was hence little need for British worries.²²¹

Seizing the opportunity now that he was seated with the Dey, Exmouth put forth the main reason behind his return: the final abolishment of 'Christian slavery'. In a much more menacing tone than before, the Admiral urged Omar to reconsider his take on the matter. He demanded that the Regency release all its European captives and terminate the practice of keeping them as slaves. To bolster his claims, he presented Omar with declarations of intent from the rulers of Tunis and Tripoli and advised the Dey to issue a similar text. If Omar did not comply, Exmouth warned, the decision would 'ultimately be forced upon him', as the Dey

²¹⁶ CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Richelieu to Devoize', Paris 01-06-1816.

²¹⁷ TNA, FO 8/2, Abstract of dispatch from Exmouth, Tripoli 30-04-1816.

²¹⁸ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 53-54 and 72.

²¹⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 80, no. 2281, 'Fraissinet to Van Nagell', Marseille 05-06-1816; CADN, 22PO/1/32, No. 23: Journal d'Alger, 13-04-1816 to 17-08-1816, entry for 15-05-1816.

²²⁰ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', 13-03-1816.

²²¹ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 18-06-1816, fp. 168-178.

'would have all the world up in arms against him'. Interested in the Tunisian and Tripolitan examples, Omar then went on to ask about what the 'European practice' of keeping prisoners entailed. What were the modes of maintaining and these captives, he wondered. He subsequently pardoned Exmouth to leave, saying that he would discuss the matter with the rest of the *divan*.²²²

The negotiations continued to next morning, but in a much less diplomatic manner. The French consul could report that Omar Agha had been 'very astounded' by the new British demands, 'which the Admiral had not made during his first appearance'.²²³ Exmouth presented his requests as a mere continuation of the preceding negotiation, but the Algerine authorities do not seem to have agreed. The *divan* accordingly concluded that the Regency's suzerain, the Ottoman Sultan would have to be consulted first on a subject as important and unprecedented as this. Exmouth did not accept this proposal. He reported that 'much misconception and difference of opinion was excited' in his subsequent debates with Omar. The Dey maintained that approval of the Sultan was necessary, but would not promise that he was indiscriminately going to follow the advice of his suzerain. To add force to his argument, Exmouth turned to the same intimidations that he had used in Tunis. He exclaimed that he would take the British consul back to ship with him – a symbolic declaration of war - and left the Dey's palace.²²⁴ Infuriated, Omar ordered the arrest of all British subjects in the Regency. A group of express messengers on speedy stallions immediately carried his commands to main port cities Bona and Oran, where many coral fishers worked under British protection.²²⁵

Two days of tension ensued. Exmouth and McDonell claimed that the episode 'nearly terminated in actual hostility' and asserted that the Dey had been greatly intimidated, as only contrary winds had kept the fleet from taking the offensive.²²⁶ The U.S. consul believed little of it, however, he argued that Exmouth could have easily attacked the Regency 'as the sea on that morning was as smooth as a mill pond'.²²⁷ Whether a bombardment had been immanent or not, all was settled again when Exmouth and Omar Agha met for a final round of talks. In the end, the Admiral accepted the Dey's proposal of consulting with the Porte in Constantinople. He even assigned a British ship to take the Dey's ambassador Hafiz Khodja

²²² TNA, CO 2/6, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 18-06-1816, fp. 168-178.

²²³ CADN, 22PO/1/32, No. 23: Journal d'Alger, 13-04-1816 to 17-08-1816, entry for 16-05-1816.

²²⁴ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 18-06-1816, fp. 168-178.

²²⁵ Ibidem.

²²⁶ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 18-06-1816, fp. 168-178; NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 9, 'Shaler to Monroe', Algiers 30-05-1816.

²²⁷ NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 9, 'Shaler to Monroe', Algiers 30-05-1816.

to the Ottoman capital.²²⁸ After an exchange of gifts, the British squadron set sail from Algiers again on 19 May. Having spent three months sailing up and down the North African coasts, the eighteen British ships of war were to return to their home ports. In their holds they carried two exotic stowaways: an ostrich and a stallion, signs of the Dey's good faith and friendship towards the King of Great Britain.²²⁹

'I sincerely hope we have finally smoked the horrors of Christian slavery', Exmouth had written when anchored off of Tunis.²³⁰ Besides the treaties for the Ionian Islands, Hanover, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Kingdom of Sardinia, his mission had indeed helped liberate many Christians who had been held captive in the Regencies. From the rulers of Tunis and Tripoli Exmouth had even obtained declarations on the end of 'Christian slavery'. The 'general spirit of indignation' that Castlereagh had mentioned in the Admiral's instructions, however, would hardly diminish. Quite to the contrary, the roar of outrage was only to increase.

'A mere dead letter'. Indignation, delegitimation and the 'Bona massacre'

Before returning to England, Admiral Exmouth expressed that he felt a 'very sensible gratification'. He prided himself on having carried out his instructions to great success, and that 'by fair conviction and pure reasoning from a People who have never supposed to reason or hear reason'.²³¹ How much fair reasoning there had been to his diplomacies of intimidation and threats of violence was certainly open to debate, as the puzzlement of various consuls in North Africa indicated. Questions could just as well be asked about what Exmouth's mission had really obtained. Critiques of the treaties and declarations appeared almost from the moment that the Admiral set foot on English soil again. Such criticism came from the quarters that had denounced government policies for most of the preceding months: that of the domestic opposition as well as European officials. Both groups actually became more vocal and assertive, raising their demands to the point of pure warmongering. The gradual delegitimation of the Regencies as sovereign entities that British opposition figures as well as Dutch and other smaller power diplomats effectuated was of crucial importance in this development. Calls for a decisive, destructive attack on Algiers became increasingly common,

²²⁸ CADN, 22PO/1/32, No. 23: Journal d'Alger, 13-04-1816 to 17-08-1816, entry for 29-05-1816.

²²⁹ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, pp. 71-72.

²³⁰ In a letter to Lord Sidmouth, dated Tunis 05-05-1816. Parkinson, *Edward Pellew*, p. 429.

²³¹ Ibidem.

especially when one particularly tragic event in the Regency further bolstered the notion of a 'Barbary pirate' threat.

Within Great Britain, the Whig and radical opposition continued to lambast the Cabinet for its supposed tolerance of the Barbary powers. The idea that treaties with the Regencies of North Africa were meaningless formed the crux of their critiques. The most vocal criticasters doubted that formal agreements could carry much weight with the ruthless tyrants of Barbary Coast. Exmouth, they claimed, had been siphoned off with hollow promises. A letter from an anonymous correspondent published in *The Independent Whig* was particularly biting:

'You must know in England, long before this time, that our Admiral has been honoured with a mission to the Prince of Ruffians at Algiers, and that he had patched up something, which is called a Treaty with him, as if the ringleader of a banditti of Corsairs would adhere to any treaty longer than necessary (...) It is quite a farce to talk of a treaty with this rascal (...) Then as to those countries, on which it was designed by our wise governors to be conferred as a favour, they are loud in reprobating it. They think the benefit small and temporary, and the expense burthensome and lasting; and they know that the execution of the treaty, after all, will be capricious, that unless every demand be backed by a British fleet, it will be very soon a mere dead letter'.²³²

The whole undertaking, the scathing commenter suggested, was flawed from the beginning. Concluding a treaty with a Barbary power supposedly had no use, as these pirate entities did not know law or were incapable of respecting it. In such statements, the delegitimizing work of the activists at the Congress of Vienna was repeated and intensified, as further doubt was cast on the sovereign status of the North African Regencies.

Critique did not only emanate from anonymous scribblers in the press. The House of Commons was another stage on which to voice dismay. One of the most vocal dissenters in the Parliament was Henry Brougham (1778-1868). Known for his long-winded and dramatic speeches, Brougham was a leading opposition figure in the Commons. He also was one of the founders of the widely read and decidedly Whiggish *Edinburgh Review*. Brougham fiercely supported abolition, including that of 'Christian slaves' in North Africa. With his pleas against Barbary cruelty, he amassed the support of a group of other liberal-minded Members of Parliament, including the well-known naval commander Thomas Cochrane. While the *Edinburgh Review* smirked of the 'pitiful shopkeeper's calculation' that lay behind the British leniency towards 'the Robbers' of the Barbary Coast, Brougham stirred on a general

²³² Parkinson, *Edward Pellew*, p. 435. Further references to the public outrage ventilated in the British press are in Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves credit', p. 36.

indignation in Parliament. He demanded that the public would get to see the official documents relating to Exmouth's negotiations in Algiers and posed a motion to force the Cabinet to do so.²³³

Castlereagh loathed the proposal and told the Dutch ambassador Fagel that he had prayed Brougham would retract or change his motion.²³⁴ The idea of having to explain the delicacies of diplomacy to Parliament filled the Secretary of Foreign Affairs with dismay.²³⁵ Still, Castlereagh could not stop the public debate on the Barbary Regencies from intensifying. The moral outrages of Christian slavery, the appeal of the abolitionist movement and a sense of wounded national pride coalesced to make 'Barbary piracy' a high-profile topic in British society at large.²³⁶ In these early stages of the fight against Mediterranean piracy it was of vital importance that the perception of a 'Barbary pirate' threat became conflated with moral concerns over slavery, meaning that this particular threat perception entered into the increasingly vocal activist circles of abolitionist societies, thereby pushing a Cabinet that was anxious of revolutionary dissent into action against the Regencies.

The moralistic public indignation in Great Britain did not solely deplore the conclusion of treaties with the 'ruffians' of North Africa, it also noted that these treaties hardly matched European expectations. The anonymous author in *The Independent Whig* asserted that Britain's Italian allies were only moderately satisfied. Indeed, various European officials deemed the ransom that Exmouth had paid for the Sardinian and Sicilian captives at Algiers excessively high. A Dutch diplomat in Italy concluded on the basis of local newspapers that the general populace in Naples was not at all satisfied with Exmouth's results.²³⁷ The Swedish consul in Algiers also thought that the diplomatic undertaking had been senseless. If the intention was to abolish Christian slavery in general then why conclude a separate peace for different European states?²³⁸ In retrospect, the rhetoric of shared continental interests of the mission's announcement seemed wholly unwarranted. The governments of various European powers that had not been included in Exmouth's instructions tried to hold the British Cabinet accountable, claiming that it had done nothing to end the shared threat of 'Barbary piracy'.

Such dismay over the supposedly meagre results of Exmouth's mission simultaneously strengthened alternative multilateral ventures of security. Spanish and Dutch officials had

²³⁶ Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves', pp. 32-33.

 ²³³ Edinburgh Review XXVI:LII (June 1816) p. 451. Mention of Brougham in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no.
 87, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 21-06-1816.

²³⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 82, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 14-06-1816.

²³⁵ Castlereagh did not think of international politics as a particularly suitable subject for public debate. Chamberlain, M., *Pax Brittanica? British Foreign policy 1789-1914* (London and New York 1988), p. 43.

²³⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 21, no. 182, 'Reinhold to Van Nagell', Rome 04-05-1816.

²³⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 80, no. 2281, 'Fraissinet to Van Nagell', Marseille 05-06-1816.

continued their efforts to create a defensive league, carrying out further negotiations on its stipulations and extending the invitation to other potential members, including Sweden, Denmark and Russia. At the latter's court, they found a willing listener in Tsar Alexander. The Russian monarch was sympathetic to the proposal of a general league against 'Barbary piracy'. Some vessels under the Russian flag had, after all, been stopped and violated by Tunisian corsairs. Its redemptive ring and Christian character further resonated with Alexander's religiously inspired plans for peace and progress, as reflected in his project of the Holy Alliance.²³⁹ Moreover, anything to the potential detriment of the Ottoman Empire's strength was neatly in line with his worldly, territorial aspirations in South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.²⁴⁰

Tsar Alexander was supportive of the Spanish-Dutch venture, but he did not favour it over the multilateral diplomacy of the Quadruple Alliance. In November 1815, he had arranged that the corsairing of the Barbary Regencies would be discussed at the upcoming ambassadorial conferences in London, and he still preferred to await those negotiations first. The Tsar therefore reasserted the conviction that dealing with the security threat of 'Barbary piracy' was first and foremost a Great Power affair. He appears to have held serious expectations on what the upcoming conferences could do about this shared issue. In preparation for the meetings, Alexander set out a very ambitious proposal to ensure security on the continent and the Mediterranean Sea in a private letter to Castlereagh. He argued for a general process of disarmament, in which the European governments would together demobilize the greater part of their military forces, and noted that the Barbary Regencies should be made to do the same. The piracies of these polities, Alexander wrote, 'trouble the state of peace, destroy commercial relations and insult the dignity of nations'. The Tsar argued that 'hostile, coercive operations' against the Regencies were therefore warranted.²⁴¹

In addition to his own writings, Alexander ordered his ambassador in London, Count Christoph von Lieven (1774-1839), to press the importance of piracy as a shared concern upon the British Cabinet. The Russian representative duly wrote Castlereagh to stress the need for concerted naval efforts towards this 'common goal, of interest to all the European states'.²⁴² Lieven mentioned the creation of a 'grand alliance', bearing close resemblance to

and in no. 77, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 31-05-1816.

²³⁹ A. Palmer, Alexander I. Tsar of war and peace (London 1974), pp. 354-355.

²⁴⁰ G. Yakschitch, 'La Russie et la Porte Ottomane de 1812 à 1826', *Revue Historique* 91:2 (1906), pp. 281-306.
²⁴¹ Vnešnjaja politika Rossii, ser. 2, vol. 1, pp. 108-111, 'Tsar Alexander to Castlereagh', 21-03/(02-04)-1816;

Palmer, *Alexander*, pp. 354-355. ²⁴² A draft letter is in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 60, 'Lieven to Castlereagh', ??-05-1816. An account of Lieven's efforts is provided by Fagel in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 64, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 03-05-1816

the Spanish and Dutch cooperation. Yet the Russian suggestion explicitly stated that this alliance would bring 'a perfect security under a British guarantee'.²⁴³ The oversight and execution of policy would thus remain firmly in British hands. However, the proposal closed with a somewhat cautionary statement. Should the British government be unwilling to act, the memorandum read, then 'the Emperor of Russia is ready to reach an agreement and cooperate with his allies'.²⁴⁴

At once, the possibility of a general league and a multinational fleet outside of British oversight became more realistic and hence more disconcerting. Russian involvement would make the Spanish-Dutch alliance more formidable. It would resultantly pose a greater menace to the continued existence of the North African Regencies, with all the regional consequences that their demise would have. In a letter to the Austrian ambassador in London, Metternich warned that Russia could establish itself territorially in the Mediterranean or obtain a protectorate over the Italian states under the pretext of a 'crusade'. Russian agents are operating all over Italy, he ominously declared.²⁴⁵ Replying that Britain could never remain indifferent towards such expansive attempts in the region, Castlereagh nevertheless argued that he did not believe Tsar Alexander was harbouring these kinds of schemes.²⁴⁶ Still, the exchange did indicate what sort of mutual suspicions and imperial anxieties came with the fight against Mediterranean piracy. To argue, as Castlereagh did, for a series of Great Power ambassadorial conferences over the matter was hence a way of seeking to make the repression of piracy compatible with different imperial agendas, or at least limit the potential for mutual conflict. These conferences had to subject the possibly disruptive issue of 'Barbary piracy' to concerted and allegedly mitigating talks, as happened to so many other collective security issues in the wake of 1815.

However, at the same time, these meetings were also intended as an instrument with which smaller powers could be disciplined. Another reason why Castlereagh disliked a general league and wanted to stick to the ambassadorial conferences was the abolition of the slave trade. In the face of all the resurgent calls for violent action to end piracy and 'Christian slavery', Castlereagh held firm to his position and declared that Great Britain would not act against the Barbary regencies as long as the European powers still carried on the black slave trade. In a letter to the ambassador in Russia he set out his reasoning at length:

²⁴³ *Vnešnjaja politika Rossii*, ser. 2, vol. 1, pp. 126-130, 'Nesselrode to Lieven', 23-03/(04-04)-1816.

²⁴⁴ Ibidem.

 ²⁴⁵ HHStA, StAbt, Großbritannien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 156, Subfolder IV-VIII, 'Metternich to Esterhazy', Vienna 03-07-1816.
 ²⁴⁶ HHStA, StAbt, Großbritannien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 155, Subfolder, V-VIII, 'Esterhazy to

²⁴⁰ HHStA, StAbt, Großbritannien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 155, Subfolder, V-VIII, 'Esterhazy to Metternich', London 05-07-1816.

'When the Powers of Europe have purged, or are prepared to purge themselves of the taint of the Slave Trade, they may then well proclaim, that they will not suffer piracy to exist within the Mediterranean: but, until it is determined to rub out also this blot, they cannot with pure hands make the extirpation of the particular evil which presses upon themselves a moral cause of universal obligation²⁴⁷

Abolishing the slave trade was clearly the more pressing of the two issues for Castlereagh. He was willing to accept that the question of abolition had become intertwined with 'Barbary piracy', but wished to see progress with the former before acting against the latter. The ambassadorial conferences would allow for the continued linkage of abolition and piracy, providing British diplomats with a potential pressuring tool to get the more unwilling states (like Spain and Portugal) to renounce their trade in humans in return for security from 'Barbary piracy'. Should a general league against the Regencies be created, then this possibility would be lost. Castlereagh accordingly wrote with much dismay of the Spanish government's 'unreasonableness' in its search for alternative multilateral means of protection against North African corsairing.²⁴⁸ Domestic and international critiques were mounting, but Castlereagh maintained that further negotiations at the ambassadorial conferences had to precede any action or alliance against the Regencies. However, events in Algiers made it impossible for him to keep that stance.

In these days of public dismay and international impatience, news of a distant tragedy shook up the diplomatic impasse. A grim tale of blood slain on a beach in Algiers spread through Europe's dockyards, streets, taverns and drawing rooms in June 1816. Reporting the event and its aftermath, the British consul McDonell was convinced 'of the horror and disgust with which all Europe will hear the relation of the late melancholy events'.²⁴⁹ What had ensued was a massacre of sorts. It all took place on 23 May on the beaches of Bona, 600 kilometres east of the city of Algiers. The community of Sardinian coral fishers had gathered there to celebrate Ascension Day. Several hundreds of people were present at a festive mass near the shoreline. Their meeting was to take a catastrophic turn because of what had happened several days earlier, when Exmouth's negotiations with Omar Agha had almost boiled over in hostilities. On that occasion, Dey Omar had ordered all British subjects to be arrested and sent his messengers to Bona. By the time the heated debate had tempered and mutual apologies were exchanged, these envoys had already galloped far out of Algiers. The

 ²⁴⁷ TNA, FO 65/102, no. 9, 'Castlereagh to Catheart', London 28-05-1816.
 ²⁴⁸ TNA, FO 65/102, no. 9, 'Castlereagh to Catheart', London 28-05-1816.

²⁴⁹ TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 21-07-1816.

orders of arrest reached Bona on the day of the fisherman's festival. Being taken for British allies, the assembled Sardinians were beaten down. In the tumult, militiamen fired shots and ravished boats. An estimated 200 people were killed or wounded. The British vice-consul in Bona reported of the horror that froze him in his tracks upon seeing dead bodies 'scattered in every direction on the beach'.²⁵⁰

A veritable outburst of public indignation followed from the recounting of these events by the European press. Even the smallest local newspapers in the Netherlands wrote extensively about 'the Bona massacre', as the affair quickly came to be called. Finding its way through many publications and across border, 'Bona' was a prime news event in the summer of 1816.²⁵¹ Foreign eyes swiftly turned to the British Isles to see how the Cabinet would react. Debates in the House of Commons were covered internationally in the general expectation that the government could not but retaliate the incident in Algiers.²⁵² That Omar Agha had tried to reverse his orders and quickly expressed his disapproval of what happened at Bona was lost in the popular tumult. Omar even offered monetary restitutions for the lost lives, which the British consul nevertheless denounced as a sign 'of cold indifference, if perhaps not satisfaction'.²⁵³

The events at Bona fanned on international outrage, solidified the perception of the Dey of Algiers as a ruthless barbarian and ensured that calls for action became increasingly violent. Spain's ambassador in the Netherlands, for instance, wrote of 'this vermin' in Algiers and hoped that they would soon be destroyed.²⁵⁴ The Bona tragedy also made acting against Algiers a matter of British national honour, as the Sardinian victims had stood under Great Britain's protection. This hence was an event that made the British Cabinet take the offensive. Castlereagh had long been unwilling to discuss forceful action against any of the Regencies, owing to the treaties and friendly relations that were in place between Britain and these states. Now even he came to favour an attack.

Bombarding Algiers

Barely four weeks lay between the outraged retellings of the Bona tragedy in the European press and the departure of a new fleet of war to Algiers. A mere two months after having

²⁵⁰ TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 30-06-1816.

²⁵¹ For example, *Rotterdamsche Courant*, 25-06-1816 and *Overijsselsche Courant*, 05-07-1816.

²⁵² Nederlansche Staatscourant, 18-06-1816 and Löwenheim, 'Do ourselves', p. 42.

²⁵³ TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 21-07-1816.

²⁵⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 748, 'Alava to Van Nagell', Paris 22-07-1816.

returned from the North African coast, Admiral Exmouth was once again tasked to set sail for the Mediterranean. Castlereagh explicitly mentioned the 'outrages which had recently been committed' in his instructions to the Admiralty, posing the 'Bona massacre' as a reason for war. The expedition, however, would not solely be about obtaining redress. Meeting domestic and continental demands for the abolition of Christian enslavement in North Africa, Castlereagh made it into the primary subject of his orders. The instructions held that Exmouth was to proceed to Algiers, declare war and settle for peace only when the Dey would sign a declaration renouncing 'Christian slavery' forever. Furthermore, those remaining 'Victims of a system repugnant to the Laws of all Civilized Nations' were to be released from Algiers immediately and without exchange for ransom. Thirdly, the sums paid to liberate Sardinians and Sicilians during the earlier expedition were to be restituted.²⁵⁵ As these orders laid out, the Royal Navy would now undertake what the opposition and continental allies had so vocally demanded. 'Christian slavery' was going to be brought to an end, at once and for the sake of all European sailors on the Mediterranean. To retaliate for what happened and Bona, and fear of leaving the initiative to an uncontrollable collective of other states, the British government would now act out the obligation to ensure security at sea that so many contemporaries argued it possessed.

Castlereagh's new set of instructions also detailed that the Royal Navy was not going to carry out this effort alone. Exmouth was ordered to accept any offer of assistance from the Dutch Mediterranean squadron on his way to Algiers, as Castlereagh was finally ready to meet Dutch demands for assistance and probably saw this collaboration as an effective way to hamper the creation of a general maritime league in the spirit of the Spanish-Dutch plans. The instructions claimed that the Prince Regent wanted to see a cooperation with the Dutch squadron because he was 'desirous that no opportunity should be lost of reviving in the two countries those ancient habits of naval & military cooperation, by which the liberties of Europe have heretofore been so happily upheld'. Additionally, the instructions noted that any peace agreement between the Netherlands and Algiers should be concluded on the exact same terms as those of Great Britain.²⁵⁶ Exmouth's previous mission had been intensively criticized for solely furthering the interest of Britain and its regional allies, but this mission would clearly have to show that the Cabinet was able and willing to act on a broader European behalf. The cooperation with the Dutch navy would be a conspicuous way of making that

²⁵⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Croker to Exmouth', 18-07-1816.
²⁵⁶ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Additional instructions to Lord Exmouth from the Office of the High Admiral', 18-07-1816.

willingness apparent. On a more implicit level, this concentration would also help quench any propensity for alternative alliances and general leagues against the threat of 'Barbary piracy'.

Exmouth now faced a few difficult preparatory tasks. First, he had to amass sailors for the expedition. When his squadron had returned to British waters after a long stint on the Mediterranean, many sailors hoped to hurry home or to their taverns of choice. Hardly anyone signed up when the Admiral tried to rouse the crews for this new mission.²⁵⁷ This was generally a difficult period for the Royal Navy, which entered a 'post-war slump' of budget cuts, officer unemployment, and huge arrears in dockyard works.²⁵⁸ Exmouth received an overwhelming number of applications from officers out of an appointment, but in the lower ranks he had to settle for a ragtag crew amended by some deckhands dragged from nearby jails and workhouses.²⁵⁹

The Admiral's other pending problem was of a tactical nature. The port of Algiers still had the reputation of being one of the most well-defended harbours in the world, despite all activist talk of corsair weakness. A mole that extended 300 metres into the sea provided a perfect protection to the city and the ships in port.²⁶⁰ Heavy fortifications sat atop this mole, which made an enemy's approach of the port and city nearly impossible. In addition, the shorefront of Algiers was lined with further fortresses and batteries. From the sea, the entire town in fact had the appearance of one massive fortification, reaching up from the lower quarters into the elevated Casbah, where another fortress seemed to lay on top of the city. All these defences pointed to the waters, as protection against European naval assault had always been a prime concern of the Regency's authorities.²⁶¹ A Spanish fleet had in 1783 bombarded the city for eight days on end without much success, which only bolstered the reputation of the defences.²⁶² As a tactical puzzle, a major attack on Algiers had therefore long been a favourite subject of dinnertime talk between Royal Navy commanders. At the table Horatio Nelson had once exclaimed that at least ten ships of the line would be necessary to launch a potentially successful attack. Estimating that such a large number would lead to a huddled

²⁵⁷ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 75.

²⁵⁸ M. Wilcox, "These peaceable times are the devil". Royal Navy officers in the post-war slump, 1815-1825', *The International Journal of Maritime History* 26:3 (2014), pp. 471-488. For the consequences of these naval cuts, see J. Cookson, *Lord Liverpool's administration. The crucial years* 1815-1822 (Edinburgh and London 1975), pp. 122-123.

²⁵⁹ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 98.

²⁶⁰ Plantet, *Correspondence des Deys*, vol. I, p. xxvi.

²⁶¹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 107-108.

²⁶² Bono, Les corsaires, pp. 38-39.

mess, Exmouth eventually settled for only five grand ships of war. In preparation, it seemed to be a risky gamble to go against the revered words of Trafalgar's fallen hero.²⁶³

Meanwhile, the commander of the Dutch Mediterranean fleet was merely impatient. After replacing the unsuccessful Tulleken at the end of 1815, Vice-Admiral Theodorus van Capellen had seen little action. His career had not been very eventful as a whole. Van Capellen had been excluded from naval service in 1795 on the basis of his unremitting sympathy to the counter-revolutionary cause and loyalty towards the deposed House of Orange. He went back into service in 1798, but surrendered to British and Russian forces a year later. Spending the rest of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in England, he came back to the Dutch navy only when William I instated the monarchy.²⁶⁴ On his post-war Mediterranean appointment he had done little besides occasional displays of the flag along the coasts of North Africa. He hence received the news of Exmouth's new expedition with much enthusiasm. Anchored off Gibraltar, the Dutch commander heard of the upcoming mission on 28 July. He immediately wrote to the envoy in Madrid, expressing the hope that orders to cooperate with Exmouth would soon be sent from The Hague.²⁶⁵

When the British fleet arrived at Gibraltar on 10 August the Dutch commander still had not yet received the express orders that he had called for. This lack of direct instructions, however, did not in the least hamper his fervour to act. Exmouth described the rendezvous that Van Capellen had so eagerly awaited somewhat bemusedly: 'I have also found here, or rather waylaying me, the Dutch Vice Admiral Van Capellan [sic] with six Frigates, most anxious to join us in this chosen work'.²⁶⁶ In the same good-natured manner pleasantries were exchanged between the two commanders and Exmouth, as he had been instructed to do, readily accepted the Dutch offer to help and 'act in the Cause of humanity'.²⁶⁷

The British Admiral jokingly wrote that his Dutch colleague had almost ambushed him, but neither their meeting nor their subsequent cooperation was an unplanned coincidence. Both commanders were present at Gibraltar that day as the result of a lengthy, complicated process of negotiation. The preceding months and years had shown that concerted action against the shared threat of 'Barbary piracy' was by no means a given, not even in the context of a general European peace that emerged with the Congress of Vienna. There had been the British unwillingness to act, vocal critiques of that inaction and smaller power efforts to

²⁶⁶ Parkinson, Edward Pellew, p. 453.

²⁶³ Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 98.

²⁶⁴ G. Köffler, *De Militaire Willemsorde*, 1815-1940 (The Hague 1940), p. 94.

²⁶⁵ NL-HaNA, 2.21.179.01, inv. 5, 'Capellen to Van Zuylen', Gibraltar 29-07-1816.

²⁶⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Correspondence between Van Capellen and Exmouth', Bay of Gibraltar, 10-08-1816.

initiate their own protective measures. When the British government did decide to undertake action with Exmouth's first diplomatic expedition, its results were subsequently slighted as not being universal enough. The collaboration of Exmouth and Van Capellen was hence but another stage in a search for modes in which security could be enacted multilaterally, but without hampering Great Power interests. Resultantly, the cooperative venture of the British and Dutch navies indicated that a new inter-imperial order of security was to take shape in the Mediterranean.

These new cooperative ventures undertaken for the sake of European security could also be seen as profoundly threatening. From early July, the Ottoman Porte received warnings that a British fleet was bound to attack Algiers, this time with the blessing of the Pope.²⁶⁸ Pierre Deval, the French consul in Algiers, got instructions on 2 August to remain 'an absolute stranger to (...) all events that are going to take place'.²⁶⁹ Rumours of further British action had been making the rounds ever since Exmouth's first diplomatic expedition. As early as June, Dey Omar Agha wrote to Constantinople of on 'an allied fleet of the Christian nations' that was allegedly on its way to Algiers with 'evil intentions'.²⁷⁰ By the time that the Anglo-Dutch fleet arrived, the defending forces of Algiers, amounting to an estimated 20,000 men, had been assembled and readied for battle.²⁷¹

On 27 August, Exmouth and Van Capellen reached Algiers, and immediately sent an interpreter ashore to communicate the three demands of the British government. Finding Dey Omar unwilling to meet these requests, hostilities were set to commence.²⁷² Positioning the fleet was of crucial importance to the execution of Exmouth's battle plans, as the bay of Algiers could easily became clutter by the combined squadrons, which consisted of five ships of the line, ten frigates, a corvette and five bomb vessels, totalling 750 cannon and carrying 8,000 servicemen. The Dutch vessels under Van Capellen's command therefore had to flank the British forces as they attacked the fortifications on the mole. Exmouth meanwhile employed a ruse to position his flagship, the 100-cannon *Queen Charlotte* at the entry to the port, where it could destroy the Algerine fleet and hit the fortresses. Deceitfully, he neared in under a flag of truce, which the authorities of Algiers respected by tradition, but only to put himself in place for battle.²⁷³ The trick proved to be fatally effective.

²⁶⁸ BOA, HAT 1285/49837 C (11 § 1231), 07-07-1816.

²⁶⁹ Temimi, 'Documents turcs inédits', p. 115.

²⁷⁰ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 284.

²⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 280-282.

²⁷² Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, p. 108.

²⁷³ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, vol. II, p. 321.

Firing began at 3 in the afternoon and would continue until midnight. The Anglo-Dutch forces lit an unconceivable mass of gunpowder and sent thousands of projectiles crashing into the corsair fleet and the masonry of the shorefront. British forces launched about 500 congreve rockets, a recent martial innovation, which set the totality of the Algerine fleet ablaze. By 10:30 at night, the barrage of shots set a gunpowder storage of one of the fortresses alight, setting off cheers of joy amongst the sailors. Exmouth later reported that he had been most pleased with his Dutch co-operators too. 'In no instance', he wrote in his battle report, 'have I ever seen more energy and zeal; from the youngest Midshipman to the highest rank, all seemed animated by one soul'.²⁷⁴ By midnight the bombardment was over and William Shaler, the American consul, could look out on the 'grand and sublime' spectacle of the fleet retiring in a darkening thunderstorm.

When morning came on 28 August 1816 the rising sun shed light on the harrowing sight of a bay filled with smouldering wrecks and lifeless bodies lapping on the waves. Exmouth once again posed the demands of his government. He sent a message to the Regent of Algiers: 'For your atrocities at Bona, on defenceless Christians, and your unbecoming disregard to the demands I made yesterday (...) the fleet under my orders has given you a single chastisement (...) As England does not war for the destruction of cities, I am unwilling to visit your personal cruelties upon the inoffensive inhabitants of the country'.²⁷⁵ It was a statement of self-proclaimed righteousness, posing the attack as a justified act of punishment, which related rather uneasily to the breach of established conventions that had allowed Exmouth to position himself perfectly for the attack. In a private letter the Admiral adopted rhetoric that was a lot less lofty. The Admiral wrote of how he sniggered at the state of that 'rascally opponent, the Dey'. 'His chastisement', Exmouth went on, 'has humbled him to the Dust and he would receive me if I chose it on the Wharf on his knees'.²⁷⁶

Overseeing the destruction of the port and fleet, Omar Agha immediately acceded to the demands and concluded peace with both Great Britain and the Netherlands. An account of the damage that a Royal Navy interpreter witnessed when he walked around the city clarifies why the Dey saw no option but to meet the terms posed to him. 'This time I was indeed quite surprised to see the horrible state of the batteries and the mole', his account read, 'I could not distinguish how it was erected, nor where the batteries had stood, as well as the many fine

 ²⁷⁴ The London Gazette, 15-09-1816, p. 1791, kept in NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59.
 ²⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 1793.

²⁷⁶ Parkinson. Edward Pellew, p. 466.

houses which I had seen in the city the day previous'.²⁷⁷ In addition, nearly the entire fleet of the Regency had been sunk. A comparison of Algiers' maritime forces compiled by the French consul shows that five frigates and four corvettes – the largest ships in the corsair fleet – had been lost, as well as numerous small sloops of war.²⁷⁸

On 28 August, Dey Omar Agha hence carried out the European wishes and issued a declaration stating that 'the practice of condemning Christian Prisoners of War to Slavery is hereby formally and for ever renounced'. The text noted that European captives were to be treated as prisoners of war in the event of future conflicts. Accordant with 'European practice in like cases', prisoners would be liberated without ransom after the cessation of hostilities.²⁷⁹ All remaining Christian captives were set free immediately and the earlier ransoms were restituted. The following days, all 1,200 remaining 'Christian slaves' were brought to the Regency's palace. For some prisoners, including Gerrit Metzon, it took a while before he got there. Together with his fellow Dutchmen, he had been taken inland upon the arrival of the Anglo-Dutch fleet, where he could still hear the bombardment roar in the distance for hours. After being assembled at the palace of the Dey, as many captives as would fit were brought on-board the British ships of war.²⁸⁰

The bombardment also brought the Dutch government what it had worked towards since 1814: a new treaty of peace, bringing an end to the Algerine privateering. The peace agreement, signed by Van Capellen, Omar Agha and the British consul, contained just two articles. The first stipulated that peace between the governments of the Netherlands and Algiers was to be restored on the basis of earlier treaties up to 1757. The second merely noted that the Dutch consul was allowed to settle in Algiers and take up residence in the city.²⁸¹ The United Kingdom of the Netherlands would thus be recognized as a new political entity and treaty partner. As to the question of the tributes, the Dutch government would no longer have to pay the arrears dating back to 1809. However, it still had to transfer an annual sum of money in 'presents' to maintain this peace. For Antoine Fraissinet the agreement had the personal benefit of finally allowing him to take up his post in Algiers. After a wait of almost two years, he could settle at the Dutch consular mansion. Gerrit Metzon, Arij Riedijk and the 28 other Dutch captives could, on the other hand, finally set sail for home. They arrived in the

²⁷⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 286-287.

²⁷⁸ CADN, 22PO/1/39, 'Tableau des forces navales de la Régence d'Alger réunis dans le Port d'Alger', 30-06-1816 and 'Tableau des forces navales de la régence d'Alger au 30-09-1816'.
²⁷⁹ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Treaty concluded between Admiral Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 28-08-1816, fp.

²⁷⁹ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Treaty concluded between Admiral Exmouth and the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 28-08-1816, fp. 224-225.

²⁸⁰ CADN, 22PO/1/32, no. 24, 'Journal d'Alger, 18-08-1816 to 15-12-1816', entry for 29-08-1816; Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, pp. 136-139.

²⁸¹ TNA, CO 2/6, 'Treaty concluded between Vice-Admiral van Capellen and the Dey of Algiers', fp. 252-253.

port of Den Helder in late October, where Metzon was grateful that he could finally 'after a long and unpleasant absence breathe the Dutch air again'.²⁸²

Conclusion. Praise, dismay and 'a deadly silence'

Official compliments, poetic praise and popular exaltation befell Exmouth and Van Capellen after their victory. This time, both commanders received a hero's welcome upon their return. They each received honorary titles and solemn congratulations from each other's governments.²⁸³ Castlereagh went on to thank Exmouth in a personal letter: 'You have contributed to place the Character of the Country above all suspicion of mercenary policy, the great achievements of the War had not eradicated some lurking suspicion that cherish'd Piracy as a commercial ally; you have dispelled this cloud and I have no doubt the National Character in Europe will be essentially ennobled by your services'.²⁸⁴ All European critiques over British forbearance towards the North African Regencies, Castlereagh felt, would now become groundless and wither away. With his mention of a national character that was 'ennobled', the Secretary of Foreign Affairs hinted at a reassertion of Great Britain's standing as one of the prime guarantors in continental matters of security. Castlereagh's gratitude therefore echoed the incentives that had brought the government to act and bombard Algiers.

And indeed, Europe was in equal parts grateful and impressed. A large religious ceremony of gratitude was held in Rome on 19 September to celebrate the bombardment's success. The King of Spain donned out the nation's highest military decorations for the commanders, while the city of Marseille presented Exmouth with a large, laureled silver piece in an expression of thanks.²⁸⁵ Further outbursts of popular jubilation followed in the commanders' home countries. In Britain and the Netherlands the bombardment became the subject of many poems, plays, and ballads.²⁸⁶ Many of these cultural expressions stressed the dual successes of raising national honour while, at the same time, defending Europe against a shared threat. As such, the poems and songs mixed praises of restored peace and tranquillity with rousing compliments for martial prowess. In the Netherlands, poets wrote of 'The plight that had

²⁸² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 88, no. 4063, 'Report from the Secretary of State to Van Nagell', Brussels 23-10-1816; Metzon, *Dagverhaal*, p. 148.

²⁸³ Van Oosten, 'Algiers', p. 720.

²⁸⁴ Parkinson, *Edward Pellew*, p. 467.

²⁸⁵ S. Bono, 'Deux ecrits italiens sur le bombardement d'Alger de 1816', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine* 7/8 (1977), pp. 49-56, there pp. 52 and 56; Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, pp. 168-169; CADLC, 37CP/697, 'Laval-Montmorency to Richelieu', Madrid 14-10-1816, fp. 258.

²⁸⁶ A sample of those Dutch writings are kept in NL-HaNA, 2.21.008.01, inv. 149. For a discussion of British literary and poetic production, see Perkins and Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary*, pp. 168-170.

tormented the Seas' in the guise of 'The ruffians of Africa's beaches', until, at last, 'The shame was avenged / By which was Europe was defiled'.²⁸⁷ Petronella Moens, a blind and widely read Dutch poetess, took the victory over Algiers as a sign of divine approval for abolition and assertively added that Europeans were now going to break slave chains wherever they could be found.²⁸⁸ Even more dramatic expressions of naval power sprang up in Great Britain, where the three-act opera *The Fall of Algiers* and a traveling panorama of the bombardment would tour the country for years.²⁸⁹

Naturally, these celebratory texts and stagings did not dwell upon the many diplomatic twists and turns that had preceded the Anglo-Dutch bombardment. Matching the spirit of exaltation, they presented the cooperation of the British and Dutch navies as a sign of national pride or universal progress. Still, the concerted action at Algiers came about only after much debate over the nature of the 'Barbary pirate' threat and disagreement over how it should be fought. These discussions show how the post-1815 security culture was, at this point, just beginning to take shape. Different ideas on how to enact security circulated, ranging from plans for a general league with multinational fleet to proposals that stuck to the old ways of treaties and tributes. With the coming of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment, however, the contours of the new inter-imperial order of security on the Mediterranean were beginning to become discernible. It would entail an effort to keep different imperial agendas from bursting into conflict, as the worries of an alliance headed by the Russian Tsar indicated. It was also going to be an order in which officials of the Great Power governments were going to exert a position of prominence, as the obstruction of the Spanish-Dutch defensive league made clear. Over the next few years and decades, this inter-imperial order was going to take further shape, also because the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' would hardly disappear.

Another point that many European officials, poets and playwrights missed in all their jubilation was that North African corsairing had not come to an end. One distant onlooker, seated in exile on the faraway island of St. Helena did immediately note this. At his place of exile, Napoleon Bonaparte had been handed a detailed account of the bombardment and argued that Exmouth had actually obtained a rather meager result. A Royal Navy Sergeant who was stationed on St. Helena transcribed what the defeated Emperor had to say on the attack. The victory over the Dey, Bonaparte told him, had only been won through great and

²⁸⁷ Respectively paraphrased from J.L. Nierstrasz Jr., *De overwinning op Algiers* (Rotterdam 1816) and G.v.R.,
'Bij de beteugeling van Algiers door de vereenigde Britsche en Nederlandsche Eskaders den 27 Augustus 1816'.
Both are in NL-HaNA, 2.21.008.01, inv. 149.

²⁸⁸ P. Moens, 'Iets over den vernietigden slavenhandel', *Euphonia: Een tijdschrift voor den beschaafden stand*3:4 (1816), pp. 677-685 and 695-801, there pp. 699 and 800.

²⁸⁹ Worrall, Harlequin Empire, pp. 113-114.

needless hazards. Furthermore, he allegedly said that once success was certain Exmouth should have pushed for more concessions. 'Lord Exmouth', Napoleon allegedly maintained, 'ought to have made the extinction of piracy, the surrender of their fleet and an obligation to build no more ships of war the sine qua non'.²⁹⁰

What happened after the hostile fleets left may serve to gauge Napoleon's assertions and conclude this chapter. About three weeks after the attack, Omar Agha sent his captain of the port, a man named Ali Raïs, to go to Constantinople and deliver a message to the Ottoman Admiral of the fleet. It appears that the Algerine envoy, when he reached the imperial capital in October, first talked about the Anglo-Dutch attack as if it had actually resulted in a victory of the Regency.²⁹¹ Some European ambassadors reported this news in bewilderment, especially because the Porte otherwise kept a 'deadly silence' on the bombardment.²⁹² Omar Agha's letter to the Admiral, however, lamented the defeat and detailed the degree of destruction, noting that the city, bastions and mosques were ruined. Therefore, the message concludes, 'we had to accept the agreement'.²⁹³ Still, the report was far from defeatist. Omar Agha requested additional Janissary recruits, supplies of arms and new ships from the imperial dockyards. The Ottoman Admiral of the fleet responded that building ships would take a while, but that support for the restoration efforts of the docks and ramparts could be offered immediately.²⁹⁴

The port of Algiers, meanwhile, was filled with the bustle of reconstruction works from the second week of September, when Omar Agha ordered the repair of all fortifications.²⁹⁵ The masons of Algiers took to rebuilding the shorefront while the hands at the dockyards hasted to reconstruct and replace the burnt-down fleet.²⁹⁶ The Regency proved to be resilient and its corsairs would quickly be perceived as a threat to Europe's newfound peace and tranquillity once again. By the end of October, the British consul reported, the fortifications of Algiers had been fully repaired 'to the astonishment of all who have witnessed it'.²⁹⁷ As destructive as it had been, the Anglo-Dutch bombardment thus did not represent the definitive end to 'Barbary piracy' that many European contemporaries saw in it. Still, this sanguine attack was

²⁹⁰ NMM, BGY/G/1, 'Robert Griffin's account of the British expedition against Algiers, 1816', not dated.

²⁹¹ CADN, 22PO/1/32, no. 24, 'Journal d'Alger, 18-08-1816 to 15-12-1816', entry for 13-09-1816.

²⁹² HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 7, 'Stürmer to Metternich', Buyukdéré 25-10-1816, fol. 275-279; CADN, 166PO/B/60, 'Riviere to Comte de Caraman', Thérapia 10-10-1816. For 'deadly silence', NL-HaNA, 2.05.01,

inv. 91, no. 4559, 'Testa to Van Nagell', Constantinople 25-10-1816.

²⁹³ BOA, HAT 455/22486 D (29 L 1231), 22-09-1816.

²⁹⁴ Ibidem.

²⁹⁵ CADN, 22PO/1/32, no. 24, 'Journal d'Alger, 18-08-1816 to 15-12-1816', entry for 12-09-1816.

²⁹⁶ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 289 fn. 34.

²⁹⁷ TNA, FO 3/18, 'McDonell to Bathurst', Algiers 10-11-1816.

highly significant in bringing about the concerted European action for the sake of purported universal interests that had been envisioned since the days of the Enlightenment, but which had never actually transpired. In this sense, the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers opened the way to the execution of further repressive efforts in the decades to come. However, it would also stir further North African and Ottoman contestations of European security efforts, as it had now become clear how menacing and violent such efforts could be.

Chapter 3: 'To give law to the world'. Interventions and their contestations, 1816-1824

The corsair ships kept coming and going. Within months of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers, the supposedly subdued Regency recommenced its privateering ventures. The 1816 attack had certainly been a display of European naval might and its destructive potential, showing that a fortified Mediterranean bastion could be battered by the combined firepower of cooperating squadrons.¹ It had tattered Algiers' ramparts and destroyed most of its corsair fleet, but the bombardment could not bring corsairing to an immediate and definitive stop. Soon after the warships of the Anglo-Dutch fleet raised their anchors and left the scene of their attack, the authorities in Algiers began to work on the reconstruction and replacement of the burnt and sunken ships. They commissioned repairs at the dockyards, bought ships from foreign builders and received vessels by donation. The Regency received an 18-cannon polacca from the pasha of Tripoli in 1817, followed by frigates from Sultan Mulay Suleiman of Morocco and Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II. The authorities also purchased a brig and a schooner in Livorno and ordered a polacca at the dockyards of Naples.² By 1818, the corsair fleet of Algiers counted eleven ships, which was just four short of the total before the bombardment.³ This reinvigorated naval force did not lay idle. With 252 cannons in armaments, these Algerine vessels continued the Regencies' ongoing wars and once again prowled the waters for prizes.⁴ At the end of the 'good season' of 1817, corsairs brought two captures (one Spanish, the other Sardinian) into Algiers.⁵ For all its devastating force, European firepower did not manage to stop the Algerines from continuing their maritime raiding.

Corsair fleets also sailed from Tunis and Tripoli. In September 1817, Tunisian raiders even ventured into the North Sea and brought back a vessel from Hamburg, richly laden with crates

¹ K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 341-342; Robert Holland, *Blue-water empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London 2012), pp. 32-33.

² D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), pp. 52-53.

³ L. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. 2, *La course. Mythes et réalité* (Saint-Denis 2007), p. 272; for 1816, Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 102.

⁴ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, p. 272.

⁵ Both were taken on the grounds of the captains' faulty paperwork. National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO 8/3,

^{&#}x27;McDonell to Geo Don', Algiers 26-11-1817.

of Bordeaux wine.⁶ Tripolitan ships were seen cruising along the coasts of Italy.⁷ At times, corsairs found ships that lay totally abandoned on Tuscan beaches, with their holds still stuffed to the brim. Tunisian sailors brought back two of these beached vessels: the *Confiance en Dieu* and the *Miséricorde*. Their French owners objected, clarifying why these ships had been abandoned so mysteriously. They presented accounts of the crews, who told they had been attacked and chased off by musket fire coming from the exact same Tunisian ships that later 'found' the stranded vessels.⁸ The corsairing of the North African Regencies thus endured, even after 1816, following the bombardments and imposing expeditions that have often been described as a 'definitive end'. This raiding did not have the intensity of old, when prize values went into the millions of france, but it had some intensity nonetheless.⁹

As corsairing continued, so did the international involvement with the issue as a perceived threat to security. 'Barbary piracy' remained a subject of negotiation and concertation during the late 1810s and early 1820s. It was dealt with at ambassadorial conferences in London, during meetings of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), in combined talks with the Ottoman Porte, and through an Anglo-French expedition to the coasts of North Africa. All these deliberations and measures took place in a period that is commonly characterised in historiography as the 'culmination' of the nineteenth-century European Congress System, or as a sort of high-water point preluding that system's 'twilight'. With its ambassadorial conferences, the period witnessed unprecedented multilateral efforts to treat matters of collective interest and ward off perceived threats to the peacetime continental order.¹⁰ In the case of 'Barbary piracy', these years generated ideas for European alliances, multinational fleets, and even a form of shared territorial domination. Such multilateralism in the fight against Mediterranean piracy has received scant historical attention, barring a set of recent articles on the London conferences by Brian Vick.¹¹ The fact that these concerted security

⁶ Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), 712PO/1/53, no. 70, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 20-09-1817.

⁷ CADN, 706PO/1/176, 'Mure to Deval', Tripoli 26-10-1817.

⁸ For the *Confiance en Dieu*, CADN, 712PO/1/52, no. 38, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 18-01-1817; for the *Miséricorde*, no. 55, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 09-03-1817.

⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 291 and M. Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne (1516-1830)* (Algiers 1983), p. 66.

¹⁰ W. Phillips, *The confederation of Europe. A study of the European alliance 1813-1823 as an experiment in the international organisation of peace* (London 1920); M. Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its legacy. War and Great Power diplomacy after Napoleon* (London 2013); M. Schulz, *Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Groβmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860* (München 2009), pp. 143-144.

¹¹ B. Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism and the global liberal order. Abolition and the Barbary corsairs in the Vienna Congress system', *The International History Review* (2017), pp. 1-22; Idem, 'The London ambassadors' conferences and beyond. Abolition, Barbary corsairs and multilateral security in the Congress of Vienna System' in: B. Graaf, I. de Haan and Idem (eds.), *Securing Europe after Napoleon. 1815 and the new European security culture* (Cambridge 2019), pp. 114-129.

efforts also provoked the clear and at times highly effective opposition from the purportedly piratical actors themselves is even more overlooked in the literature.

This chapter will look into further European attempts to extend the security culture to the Mediterranean and set up an inter-imperial order of security there. It will clarify why the eight years following the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816 were marked both by increasingly ambitious efforts to enact maritime security and by an increasingly vocal opposition to such efforts. The perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' had brought different European governments together in their efforts to create a new international order of security in the wake of the Congress of Vienna, and it would continue to do so after 1816. Yet North African corsairing did not disappear when faced with further European attempts at its repression. In fact, the authorities of the Regencies managed to derail and revert several security practices that were geared against them, ranging from concerted communications to defensive alliances. To understand the starts, stops and reversals with which fight against Mediterranean piracy proceeded in the wake of the 1816 bombardment, it is therefore necessary to take such local responses and actions into account. This chapter hence foregrounds the agency of those actors that were deemed to be piratical threats. Their contestations influenced the shape and success of European security practices. Corsair captains, Ottoman officials and the authorities in the Regencies each contested the claims and justifications that came with demands to end 'Barbary piracy'. Encountering such opposition, the European naval commanders and ambassadors who were tasked with implementing the decisions of congresses and conferences saw themselves forced to adapt, alter or abort their efforts.

Security practices thus took definitive shape only through local encounters. Most works on the nineteenth-century repression of North African corsairing have treated such encounters only in passing, noting these instances only because they managed to delay the final demise of privateering somewhat.¹² Here, by contrast, these cases of contestation will be analysed in depth, detailing the arguments and modes of opposition that featured in heated exchanges. Thereby, this chapter not only explains why North African maritime raiding continued after 1816, and why this period's grand plans of multilateral action faltered. It also uncovers a different side to the legitimizing role of security, clarifying that the security culture and especially its repressive practices were also seen as injustices, as illegitimate infringements and unwarranted intimidations by the targeted 'piratical' parties.

¹² S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï, Paris 1998), p. 43; G. Fisher, *Barbary legend. War, trade and piracy in North Africa (1415-1830)* (Oxford 1957), p. 303; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 290.

In bringing these contestations to the fore, this chapter follows several multilateral security practices from the planning stage into their troubled and often unsuccessful implementation. Some of these concerted practices were already initiated in the run-up to the Anglo-Dutch bombardment, such as the defensive league that Spanish and Dutch officials were finalizing in Augustus 1816. We will commence there, finding out how the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' continued to be discussed within the frameworks of the security culture and continued to spark ideas of further multilateral efforts. These included not solely the Spanish-Dutch alliance, but also the endeavours of the ambassadorial conferences in London, which brought draft treaties and, after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, also inspired concerted communications at the Ottoman Porte as well as an Anglo-French expedition to the Regencies. After discussing the opposition that these efforts provoked in both the Ottoman capital and North Africa, this chapter subsequently takes stock of the consequences of such contestations and shows how they seriously hampered attempts to extend the post-1815 security culture to the Mediterranean. How did non-European actors and local encounters impact the fight against piracy? How did purported pirates perceive and engage with the new inter-imperial order of security, shaped by the naval dominance and commercial interests of Europe's Great Powers, that was becoming apparent in the Mediterranean? As will become clear, the supposed pirates' contestations highlighted the limitations to the security culture. Such limitations were also made apparent by a diverse group of European actors, including sceptical judges at Admiralty courts, disgruntled smaller power officials, critical parliamentarians and a new generation of Great Power statesmen that viewed each other with mutual suspicion. Together, all these contestations and complications hindered concerted security practices and, by 1824, even worked to revert some of the multilateral endeavours that many had found so promising only a few years before.

Thinking out alliances. Articles and agreements from Alcalá to Aachen

One bombardment could not change everything. A cannonade was temporary, while concerns over North African corsairing continued to grip European officials. Around the time that it cooperated with Great Britain to attack Algiers, the Dutch government thus also continued its search for other, more enduring, alliances and arrangements. Therefore, the roaring of the cannons in Algiers on 27 August 1816 was almost simultaneous to the signing of a treaty and the conclusion of a pact in a city on the other side of the Mediterranean, in Alcalá de Henares, not far from Madrid. In this town, the birthplace of one-time Barbary captive Miguel de

Cervantes, Dutch and Spanish officials entered into a new arrangement to provide security against 'Barbary piracy'.¹³ The governments of Spain and the Netherlands had been discussing a reciprocal means of protection since the autumn of 1815. From then on, the two powers had talked of clauses and stipulations, taken up the idea of transforming their defensive alliance into a general European league and thereby summoned the dismay of the British Cabinet, which saw itself forced to act against the Regencies.¹⁴ On 10 August 1816, at Alcalá de Henares, Spanish and Dutch signatures concluded these preparatory efforts and initiated an alliance that continued to influence the international discussions on 'Barbary piracy' for years to come. The Spanish-Dutch pact featured prominently in the negotiations, protocols and draft treaties of the ambassadorial conferences in London, which referenced and imitated many of its stipulations. The alliance also continued to hover at the edges of the negotiations in London and at subsequent Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, always posing an alternative means of protection outside of direct Great Power control. In these ways, the Spanish-Dutch alliance impacted the security culture and influenced the concerted practices that followed in 1819 and after. To understand how the fight against 'Barbary piracy' and the reshaping of the international order proceeded after the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers, it is therefore necessary to look into this small power alliance first.

Alcalá. A treaty of honour and embarrassment

The architects of the Spanish-Dutch defensive alliance against the North African Regencies immediately named their creation after the place of its conception, referring to their arrangement as the 'Alcalá treaty', 'Alcalá alliance' or 'league of Alcalá'. One of these architects was the Dutch ambassador Hugo van Zuylen van Nijevelt (1781-1853). He arrived in Alcalá de Henares in early August 1816, for what was the first task of his new diplomatic posting. The final negotiations took place at the home of Secretary of State Pedro Cevallos, the other signee. A toast of a few cups of hot cocoa sealed the conclusion. As their chinaware clung, a new type of security arrangement came into being. The kingdoms of Spain and the Netherlands pledged to act together against any hostilities of the Barbary Regencies. They would consider an attack against one as an attack on both. The Alcala Treaty stipulated how the two powers would help each other to obtain reclamations. It specified how future

¹³ A. Fastrup, 'Cross-cultural movement in the name of honour. Renegades, honour and state in Miguel de Cervantes' Barbary Plays', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* LXXXIX: 3 (2012), pp. 347-367.

¹⁴ Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNA), 2.05.01, inv. 63, no. 1718, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 21-08-1815 and inv. 19, no. 1179, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 14-10-1815.

negotiations with the Regents would take place in concertation.¹⁵ The defensive alliance also contained a promise to keep substantial forces out at sea. For the Dutch, this meant a ship of the line and six frigates. On the Spanish side, the contingent contained four ships of war and sixteen bomb vessels.¹⁶ A secret clause detailed how the Dutch war with Algiers, which was still ongoing at the time, provided an immediate 'casus foederis'. The Dutch and Spanish navies would arrange convoys and cruise together instantly, any captured corsair ships would be burned or destroyed right away.¹⁷

The Alcala Treaty was the first of its kind in instigating a form of standing cooperation, supported by an institutional basis of shared port facilities and regulated provisioning. The arrangement was not that different from the plans presented by Sidney Smith at the Congress of Vienna. The pact also brought to mind the coalition treaties of the wars against France.¹⁸ The treaty let the Dutch and Spanish governments combine their naval forces, which, at that time, were in quite serious disarray.¹⁹ Van Zuylen noted some further benefits for the Netherlands: commanders would obtain experience on the spot, squadrons could stay in Mahon, 'the best harbour of the South', for as long as necessary, and the relations with Spain would remain most friendly.²⁰ Moreover, the contracting parties considered the alliance a source of international prestige. One of the treaty's concluding articles ensured that the rest of Europe would take note accordingly.

Article 23 stipulated that the alliance could be expanded. The Dutch government agreed to invite Sweden, Denmark and Russia, while the Spanish would ask the courts of Portugal, Turin and Naples to join in.²¹ The first invitations went out in October and described membership as a 'service to humanity'. The league would preserve seafarers from the dangers of slavery and halt the payment of tributes to 'powers who consider piracy a means of existence'.²² None of the invitees, however, expressed much enthusiasm about signing up. The Swedish statesman Lars von Engeström scolded the Dutch for openly mentioning

¹⁵ NL-HaNa, 2.05.22, inv. 53, 'Traite d'alliance defensive entre leurs majesties Le Roi des Pays-Bas et Le Roi des Espagnes contre les puissances barbaresques conclu et signé à Alcala de Henares le 10 août 1816 et ratifié de part et d'autre le 19 août et 13 septembre suivant'. An English translation is in TNA, FO 84/1, fp. 147-149. Also, N. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831* (Groningen 1985), pp. 117-123.

¹⁶ NL-HaNa, 2.05.22, inv. 53, 'Traite d'alliance defensive', Article 11.

¹⁷ Ibid., Article 19.

¹⁸ W. Smith, *Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens de faire cesser les pirateries des états barbaresques* (London 1814). References to the Treaty of Chaumont in TNA, FO 84/1, 'Protocol of the 7th Conference', 20-09-1816, fp. 224.

¹⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 18, no. 1102, 'Cambier to Van Nagell', Madrid 23-10-1815.

²⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.21.179.02, inv. 87, 'Autobiography Hugo Baron van Zuylen van Nijevelt', fp. 73.

²¹ NL-HaNa, 2.05.22, inv. 53, 'Traite d'alliance defensive', Article 23.

²² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 105, no. 2520, 'Van Nagell to Verstolk van Soelen', The Hague 03-10-1816; inv. 105, no. 2542, 'Van Nagell to Dedel and Crombruggh', The Hague 05-10-1816.

Stockholm in the articles, fearing that it would hurt Sweden's relations with the Regencies.²³ He also wondered whether the inclusion of smaller Mediterranean powers like Sardinia would not draw the alliance into a state of perpetual warfare.²⁴ His question remained purely hypothetical, as the small Italian states did not join either. Spain's consuls and ambassadors drew nothing but rejections. All the invited governments declined the offer. Though they each expressed different opinions on the league itself, they all made the same objection: Britain appeared to have similar plans concerning 'Barbary piracy'. The Italian polities were effectively client states of Great Britain, protected by the British guarantees that Admiral Exmouth negotiated on his diplomatic mission of 1816. Other European governments preferred to wait and see what would be the results of the ambassadorial conferences that were now beginning to convene in London, under British auspices.²⁵

By late August, the ambassadorial conferences of the Great Powers assembled in London.²⁶ They had first been proposed by Lord Castlereagh to further the discussions on the international abolition of the slave trade, in accordance with the Final Acts of the Congress of Vienna. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, Tsar Alexander of Russia arranged for the inclusion of 'Barbary piracy' and the 'enslavement' of Christian sailors as a twin issue that warranted simultaneous discussion. All the Great Power governments, with France included (even though the country was still being occupied by allied forces), accepted and preferred the invitation to the ambassadorial conferences over the offer of accession to the Alcalá alliance. Castlereagh nonetheless remained steadfast in his dislike of the Spanish-Dutch initiative. He had already called the alliance 'unreasonable' when it was still being drafted and continued to harbour the same attitude after it had been put to paper.²⁷ At a reception to celebrate the bombardment of Algiers, he asked the Dutch ambassador 'with a smile' whether the Netherlands had not become 'a bit embarrassed about its treaty with Spain'?²⁸ The uses of this treaty, Castlereagh's smile and question suggested, would prove to be nil once the ambassadorial conferences brought their own plans for security.

²³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 22, no. 375, 'Dedel to Nagell', Stockholm 30-11-1816.

²⁴ TNA, FO 73/98, 'Thornton to Castlereagh', Stockholm 24-10-1816.

²⁵ For Denmark and Sweden, NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 90, no. 4358, 'Crombruggh to Van Nagell', Copenhagen 09-11-1816; inv. 91, no. 46689, 'Engeström to Nagell', Stockholm 22-11-1816; for the Two Sicilies, TNA, FO 70/80, 'A'Court to Castlereagh', Naples 16-02-1817. For the French, Austrian and Russian opinions, Centre des archives diplomatiques de la Courneuve (CADLC), 37CP/697, 'Richelieu to Laval-Montmorency', [?] 26-10-1816, fp. 271-272; NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 90, no. 4449, 'Van Spaen to Van Nagell', Vienna 09-11-1816 and TNA, FO 65/104, 'Cathcart to Castlereagh', St. Petersburg 30-06/12-07-1816.

²⁶ TNA, FO 65/102, 'Castlereagh to Catheart', 28-05-1816; NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 10, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 24-01-1817, fp. 160-161.

²⁷ TNA, FO 65/102, no. 9, 'Castlereagh to Catheart', London 28-05-1816.

²⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 27, no. 121, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 20-09-1816.

Besides a belief in the superiority and primacy of the Great Powers in managing matters of security, Castlereagh's disparaging remarks also enveloped a degree of mistrust. The Foreign Secretary received a steady stream of reports on Russian intrigues in Madrid, penned down by ambassador Henry Wellesley, the brother of Arthur, Duke of Wellington.²⁹ There was a widespread belief that Russian representatives in Spain were advising King Ferdinand VII not to listen to British calls for moderation in colonial matters. Russia's ambassador Dimitri Tatischev offered several Russian warships to King Ferdinand, which could be used to suppress insurgencies in Latin America. Inspired by a fair share of Russophobia, these ships were reportedly going to be paid for by territories in California or Minorca. The Alcalá treaty was seen in a similar vein, as another attempt to wrest the Kingdom of Spain from British influence.³⁰ In Madrid, on the other hand, Castlereagh's opposition to the league only intensified popular and official anti-British sentiments. As Van Zuylen reported, Spaniards generally blamed London for the post-1815 recession of trade and the on-going insurrections in the colonies, while they also continued to carry old grudges over the British destruction of the Spanish fleet in the Battle of Trafalgar.³¹ Amongst themselves, Dutch and Spanish officials liked to maintain that other governments were 'jealous' of their alliance.³² The Great Powers, the Dutch ambassador in Vienna noted, simply did not want to enter a 'transaction' not initiated by them themselves, even if it was a most honourable endeavour.³³ It seemed that providing security at sea was to be a Great Power prerogative, the execution of which would be settled only in multilateral discussions amongst Great Power diplomats.

The workings of the 'machine'. Commencing the ambassadorial conferences

It was not the content of the Alcalá treaty but the mode in which it was concluded that inspired British misgivings. After all, the plans that soon emerged from the ambassadorial conferences in London were markedly similar to the Spanish-Dutch plans. Castlereagh's idea behind this new diplomatic practice, which was fast becoming a characteristic of the post-Napoleonic security culture, was that representatives of the Great Powers could meet regularly to 'consult upon the most effectual means of counteracting evasion and of

²⁹ Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot*, p. 121; C. Webster, *The foreign policy of Castlereagh 1815-1822*. *Britain and the European Alliance* (London 1925), pp. 39-40 and 167-168.

³⁰ R. Bartley, *Imperial Russia and the struggle for Latin American independence, 1808-1828* (Austin, TX 1978), pp. 121-127.

³¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.46, inv. 18, no. 17, 'Van Zuylen to Van Nagell', Madrid 01-03-1819.

³² NL-HaNA, 2.05.46, inv. 16, no. 45, 'Van Zuylen to Van Nagell', Madrid 25-11-1816.

³³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 90, no. 4449, 'Van Spaen to Vienna', Vienna 09-11-1816.

promoting the common object', which, in this case, was the abolition of the slave trade as well as the repression of 'Barbary piracy'. With their protocolled meetings based on preparatory memoranda, the ambassadorial conferences were equivalent in form to the sessions of commissions or committees at international congresses. Accordingly, their main tasks were to draft treaties or binding international resolutions, which would still require ratification by the respective governments. As such, Brian Vick asserts, the ambassadorial conferences 'proved to be a flexible and practical institution in the new diplomatic system and security culture'.³⁴ However, as we shall see, their uses and legitimacy were not unquestioningly accepted by all nineteenth-century contemporaries, both in and outside Europe.

The London ambassadorial conferences on the slave trade and corsairing were nevertheless off to a rousing start. At the opening meeting of 29 August, Castlereagh opened proceedings by presenting an ambitious proposal. He suggested forming a naval league that would suppress the slave trade and stop 'Barbary piracy'.³⁵ His plan detailed the creation of a multinational maritime police force, which would be able to persecute 'pirates' and slavetraders alike. It was to be mandated with a right of search and seizure, organized through an international commission and backed institutionally by mixed admiralty courts.³⁶ Discussions proceeded quickly at first, and thus the plenipotentiaries had an outline of an alliance ready to send back home by the time of the seventh meeting, on 20 September.³⁷ The draft memorandum disclosed that the proposed alliance would not 'attempt at African colonization or conquest' and 'should purely be maritime'. Its stated aim, which echoed all the pamphleteering on new eras of tranquillity and progress that had appeared around the Congress of Vienna, was to give 'reasonable security for an unmolested enjoyment of the Blessings of Peace'.³⁸

Spain and Portugal were invited to share in those benefits too and could even join the Great Powers in their discussions, as was customary when the topics of negotiation directly touched upon the state affairs of smaller powers. However, the Spanish and Portuguese governments would first have to make some advances with the abolition of the slave trade. In return for abolitionist progress, Spain and Portugal would be allowed into an alliance against the North African Regencies. Castlereagh tried to subscribe the Spanish minister to the

³⁴ Vick, 'The London ambassadors' conferences', pp. 118-119.

³⁵ P. Kielstra, *The politics of slave trade suppression in Britain and France, 1814-48. Diplomacy, morality and* economics (London 2000), pp. 64-65.

³⁶ Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism', pp. 9-10.

 ³⁷ TNA, FO 84/1, 'Protocol of the 7th Conference', 20-09-1816, fp. 203-206.
 ³⁸ Ibid., 'Protocol of the 7th Conference', Annexed memorandum, fp. 222-223.

conferences by arguing that this projected league would far outweigh the Acalá alliance.³⁹ He mirrored the fleet to the allied army of occupation in France, to try and make a case for its greater efficiency. Like the Duke of Wellington in France, the commander of the fleet would receive what he called 'comprehensive powers' from an allied committee. The multinational squadron would thus be under a mandated commander, who could perhaps also instruct the different consuls in North Africa. '[T]here seems to be no reason', Castlereagh wrote on another occasion, 'why the machine should not work as well as the army of occupation has done in France'.⁴⁰ With this single phrase, the British Foreign Secretary described the core of the post-1815 European security culture and applied it to the Mediterranean issue of 'Barbary piracy', as his words disclose the contemporary ambition to instigate international order through the intricate workings of a collective, Great Power machinery.

The ambassadorial conferences thus were a continuation of and resembled the regular allied meetings that were being held in Paris to arrange matters of the occupation.⁴¹ Yet, as Castlereagh's references to the occupying forces indicate, the London conferences also generated similar plans for action.⁴² The ideas of the London meetings explicitly referred back to allied efforts in occupied France. Hence, they illustrate how tested practices of security could travel between places and be transferred from threat to threat. The same approach that had (supposedly) pacified French revolutionary fervour, would be adopted to secure Mediterranean shipping from 'Barbary piracy', and bring a halt to the African slave trade. This was only the planning stage, but the references to the allied army in France certainly did hint at a transfer of security practices from continental Europe to the Mediterranean seaboard.

It was one thing for a group of diplomats to draft some memoranda, but it was quite another to get them implemented. The conference proposals had to be reviewed and passed by the various home offices. The French Prime Minister, Armand-Emmanuel du Plessis, the Duke of Richelieu (1766-1822), who also headed the Foreign Ministry, did not really warm to the London plans. He was actually working to get the allied occupation over with and did not want to see French vessels or officers fall under foreign command again.⁴³ The French ambassador in London, René-Eustace, Marquis of Osmond (1751-1838), received instructions to avoid all arrangements that would bring the French navy under British command or that

³⁹ Invitation attached to TNA, FO 72/187, 'Vaughan to Castlereagh', Madrid 04-11-1816, fp. 284-288.

⁴⁰ CADLC, 8CP/609, 'Castlereagh to Cathcart', 07-05-1817, fp. 136-145.

⁴¹ Even though the London meetings were planned first in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna. B. de Graaf, *Tegen de terreur. Hoe Europa veilig werd na Napoleon* (Amsterdam 2018), pp. 138-143.

⁴² Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism', p. 8.

⁴³ CADLC, 8CP/607, 'Richelieu to Osmond', Paris 28-10-1816, fp. 441-444 and 'Osmond to Richelieu', London 19-11-1816, fp. 451-453. Also, CADN, 166PO/B/61, 'Richelieu to Riviere', Paris 17-10-1816.

would allow for a right of search of French slave traders. Instead of a general maritime league, he had to propose the strengthening of Ottoman suzerainty over the Regencies as a way to end Barbary corsairing.⁴⁴ Similar proposals came from Austria and Prussia. Metternich wrote from Vienna that it was best to approach the Ottoman Porte first, while Prussian chargé d'affaires in London noted that it would be necessary to stress that the measures were in no way an attack on Islam by a Christian coalition.⁴⁵ The Russian representative, Count Lieven, on the other hand, began to ask whether the league could not adopt an offensive rationale.⁴⁶ Communications with the ministries thus only brought new caveats and uncertainties to the negotiated plans.

No 'moral crusades'. Complicating the ambassadorial conferences

The projected league against slavery and piracy also had to relate to oftentimes very incompatible standing practices, both in legal courts and aboard ships out at sea. The squadron's intended mandate against slave traders, which had to allowing for stopping, searching and attacking vessels, proved to be a bone of much legal contention. As at the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh repeatedly tried to equate the slave trade to piracy. His argument centred on the idea that a ban on slave trading existed in all 'civilized' states and thus amounted to natural law. Repression could thus function regardless of state boundaries and did not require new legal arrangements. Slave traders, like pirates, could find no protection under national laws and so became enemies of humanity. They could therefore automatically be persecuted by any state, or, in case of this proposal, by a multinational squadron incorporating all European powers.⁴⁷

International abolition, at this time, was a highly popular cause in Great Britain. The French ambassador in London, the Marquis of Osmond, saw the large theatre crowds that drew to Covent Garden for renditions of Thomas Morton's play The Slave. He drew the conclusion that a dual measure against black and white slavery would surely make a big impression. Castlereagh, he thought, could seriously bolster his influence in a hostile Parliament with such a diplomatic feat.⁴⁸ The conferences, however, had already made clear

⁴⁴ TNA, FO 84/1, 'Protocol of the 7th Conference', 20-09-1816, fp. 203-206. CADLC, 8CP/607, No. 82, 'Osmond to Richelieu', London 26-11-1816, fp. 456-457.

⁴⁵ Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism', pp. 9-10.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁸ CADLC, 8CP/607, No. 82, 'Osmond to Richelieu', London 26-11-1816, fp. 456-457.

that the French, Spanish and Portuguese governments opposed all sorts of a naval mandate.⁴⁹ Still, the most serious blow against Castlereagh's equation of the slave trade and piracy came not from foreign diplomats, but from the judges of Britain's own High Admiralty Court.

According to the presiding judge, William Scott, it was a most 'melancholy transaction' that came before him in December 1817. The case was on appeal from an earlier sentence, made by a court in Sierra Leone.⁵⁰ It concerned a French slave trading vessel, *Le Louis*, whose name would mark the historiography of international law.⁵¹ *Le Louis* had sailed from Martinique in January 1816, heading for Mesurada (present-day Monrovia) to go and buy slaves. Instead, it was stopped by a Royal Navy ship of war that had also served during the bombardment of Algiers: *Queen Charlotte*, Admiral Exmouth's flagship. The French crew of *Le Louis* resisted the arrest, killed eight British seamen and wounded twelve others.⁵² The Vice-Admiralty court in Sierra Leone condemned the ship, reasoning that international treaties denied slavers protection under the French flag and stating that the sailors had 'piratically killed' the British servicemen.⁵³ In London, two years later, the appellate lawyers Lushington and Dodson contested that ruling - in part by questioning whether the slave trade was piracy. To get their point across, they contrasted the 'lawless' British seizure to the Royal Navy's treatment of the Algerines, who also took slaves, but had never been stopped or visited as long as they did not attack British subjects.⁵⁴

Judge Scott ruled in their favour. *Le Louis* could not have been a pirate because it was under French flag and carried all the proper documents. The slave trade, furthermore, was a 'traffic', a form of commercial intercourse. It was 'not the act of freebooters, enemies of the human race, (...) ravaging every country in its coasts and vessels indiscriminately, and thereby creating universal terror and alarm'.⁵⁵ Scott went on to argue that the declarations of the Congress of Vienna were only a promise of future measures, but not law. He did not think 'a solemn declaration of very eminent persons assembled in congress' could, just like that, 'have the force of overruling the established course of the general Law of Nations'.⁵⁶ None of this gave the Royal Navy the right of 'setting out upon a moral crusade of converting other

⁴⁹ Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism', p. 8.

⁵⁰ J. Dodson (ed.), *Reports of cases argued and determined in the High Court of Admiralty. Commencing with the judgments of the Right Hon. Sir William Scott* vol. 2, *1815-1822* (London 1828), p. 236.

⁵¹ L. Benton and L. Ford, *Rage for order. The British Empire and the origins of international law, 1800-1850* (London and Cambridge, MA 2016), pp. 122-123 and 127; H. Chisholm (ed.), 'Stowell, William Scott, Baron' in: *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed., Cambridge 1911).

⁵² Dodson, *Reports of cases*, pp. 210-211.

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 219-220.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 246-247.

⁵⁶ Dodson, *Reports of cases*, pp. 252-253.

nations by acts of unlawful force'. Scott thereby repealed the previous ruling and reversed the confiscation.⁵⁷ His ruling pointed out the difficulties of turning international decisions into new norms, accepted by domestic courts. As the case of Le Louis indicates, the Final Acts of congresses and protocols of conferences were still highly novel diplomatic instruments, and much remained unclear about their actual legal status. Judge Scott, in fact, had no problem in effectively questioning the very legality of a declaration issued by the Congress of Vienna – even if the congress delegates themselves liked to consider the protocols of their meetings as sources of binding international law.

The Admiralty Court's ruling on Le Louis complicated the ongoing negotiations in London, highlighting the fraught legal bases and possible consequences of solemn-sounding, but ill-defined international agreements. The trial had furthermore brought to light that bloodshed and murder could result from a forceful insistence on the right of search. The imposition of that right in peacetime, according to the verdict, amounted to unlawful violence, rendering its inclusion within a general league for security at sea somewhat problematic. The conference meetings, which Castlereagh liked to describe as a 'machinery', undeniably began to run out of steam. Around the time of Scott's ruling, the British Foreign Secretary proposed to separate the issues of piracy and the slave trade again.⁵⁸ Two days after the Le Louis hearing, Castlereagh invited Osmond for a private discussion at his home. The talks were long and animated, but the Frenchman only repeated his objections to British naval supremacy and French subordination within a maritime league.⁵⁹ The ambassadorial conferences had reached their tenth sitting by this point, bringing little else than repetitive reviews of reconsidered plans.⁶⁰ The talks were deadlocked. The mass of correspondence and the many objections from the respective home offices had brought them to a standstill.⁶¹

Nonetheless, the ambassadors managed to keep themselves busy. A draft treaty for a 'system of security' emerged from the conferences in the spring of 1818. It was based on the initial memorandum read out by Castlereagh but had been the fruit of much diplomatic work by Prussian ambassador Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), Austrian ambassador Prince Paul Esterhazy (1786-1866) and Russian ambassador Count Lieven. The latter in particular was eager to expand the conference's concerns from 'Christian slavery' to threats against

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 255, 257 and 260-261.

 ⁵⁸ CADLC, 8CP/609, No. 169, 'Caraman to Richelieu', London 05-12-1817, fp. 464-470.
 ⁵⁹ CADLC, 8CP/609, No. 172, 'Osmond to Richelieu', London 19-12-1817, fp. 493-496.

⁶⁰ At the tenth meeting of 4 February 1818, Castlereagh called for a convention against the slave trade and read out a lot of information on abolition. On 11th meeting of 7 February 1818, Castlereagh discussed the convention between Britain and Spain of 23-09-1817. TNA, FO 84/2, fp. 112-113 and fp. 212.

⁶¹ Webster, *The foreign policy of Castlereagh*, p. 68.

merchant shipping, owing to the attempted capture of a Russian ship by Algerine corsairs in November 1817.⁶² Russian officials, both in St. Petersburg and London, also continued to entertain (and threaten with) the option of acceding to the Spanish-Dutch alliance, should the negotiations remain without results.⁶³ It is therefore unsurprising that the treaty text, which featured at the fourteenth meeting of the conference on 24 May 1818, greatly resembled the Spanish-Dutch alliance and even referred back to equivalent sections of the Alcalá treaty.⁶⁴ It was almost double in length, containing 45 articles with much more detailed descriptions of modes of action and means of decision-making. The draft proposed to contact the Ottoman Porte in order to ask for assistance first. Only afterwards would the North African Regents be informed of the projected league. Should these efforts fail to end 'piracy', then the creation of a multinational fleet would follow.⁶⁵ These piratical offences were defined in particularly broad terms. Article 14 held that the league would not just come into action against territorial 'invasions' (raids like at San'Antioco in 1815) or 'piracies', but also against any obstructions of commercial rights or insults of consuls.⁶⁶ In addition, the treaty's 'system of security' would create the possibility for the North African authorities to bring any grievances before the league's directing council.⁶⁷ Again, the solidifying threat perception of 'Barbary piracy' did not yet come with an all-out rejection of North African statehood, as a degree of diplomatic reciprocity was still upheld in these drafted security measures.

Out at sea, the conference proceedings still hardly mattered in fostering European sailors' sense of security and abating perceptions of threat. Smaller power governments did direct their hopes to the Great Power discussions, but rarely to the desired effect. Ships of the Hanseatic cities and the Papal States continued to be taken by North African raiders. These European powers completely lacked or had only very small navies at best, hence they could do little to protect shipping under their flags besides entering bilateral treaties with tributes. At one point, Tunisian corsairs even ventured up the North Sea in search for Hanseatic

⁶³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 154, no. 73, 'Verstolk van Soelen to Van Nagell', Moscow 10-12/28-11-1817.
 ⁶⁴ FO 84/2, 'Protocole de la quatorzième conference', 24-05-1818, fp. 219-220 and 'Traité principal rélatif aux.

Mésures à prendre contre les pirateries des Barbaresques', Annex 2 to Protocol of the 14th conference, 24-05-1818, fp. 231. Stipulations of Alcala Treaty were consequently listed in the margins, at least of the copy currently held in the British national archives. For instance, Article 11 on the divisions of the multinational squadron and their tasks referred to Alcalá treaty Articles 15-18.

⁶² The captain of the ship in question, *Industrie*, managed to retake the ship as it was being brought to Algiers. NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 154, no. 74, 'Verstolk van Soelen to Van Nagell', Moscow 10-12/28-11-1817; Vick, 'The London ambassadors' conferences', pp. 125-126.

 ⁶⁵ FO 84/2, 'Traité principal', Article 9, fp. 228-229 plus detailed descriptions of Articles 1 and 2 on fp. 251-266.
 ⁶⁶ FO 84/2, 'Traité principal', Article 14, fp. 231.

⁶⁷ Vick, 'The London ambassadors' conferences', pp. 125-126.

prizes.⁶⁸ Past incidents of North African raids on Iceland's settlements or Irish villages in the early 1600s had become almost immemorial, and so the appearance of corsairs in northern waters in May 1817 instantly made for big news.⁶⁹ A Tunisian squadron, consisting of three ships, managed to take two merchants from Hamburg and one from Lübeck in the vicinity of Margate, on the English North Sea coast.⁷⁰

The captures were seen as a dramatic act, taking place in view of British shores. They also inspired further unease and disquiet since they took place at a great distance from what European sailors considered the usual zones of risk, around Gibraltar, the Balearic Islands and the coasts of Italy. Still, the Tunisians did not manage to get very far with most of their prizes. As they made their way through the Channel, the corsairs encountered a Royal Navy brig, the Alerte. The British ship of war retook the prizes and incarcerated two of the corsairs, while the third Tunisian ship managed to escape, taking along six Hamburg sailors. Afterwards, the Alerte brought the two apprehended Tunisian corvettes to the Downs roadstead, next to the port of Deal.⁷¹ When the corsairs were brought ashore, it turned out that one of their captains was a 'young Norwegian renegade', a 25-year-old native of Bergen, named Nicholas Erickson. He was not the only foreigner aboard the Tunisian ship, as the pilot was a Maltese shipman who received a pay of forty dollars a month. Together, these men illustrated the fact that North African corsairing still possessed some of its old cosmopolitan characteristics, but they were amongst the last of their kind. However, Erickson liked to stress that he had not become a corsair by his own free will. He claimed to have fallen into Tunisian hands eight years prior, being forced to 'turn Turk', or convert to Islam, after a drunken night at a brothel in Smyrna. Maintaining that he was a victim, the Norwegian called on the protection of his national representative and was handed over to a nearby Swedish consul. After a few days of detention, a British navy vessel escorted the Tunisian corvettes back to the Mediterranean.⁷² The confiscated captures, meanwhile, were handed back to their German owners.⁷³

For the Senates of the Hanseatic towns the affair nevertheless was a final straw. Ships had been lost to the corsairs on the Atlantic or near the ports of Spain and Portugal as well, but

⁶⁸ M. Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 66; TNA, FO 8/3, 'Circular dispatch by the Foreign Office', London 04-06-1817, fp. 15-16.

⁶⁹ L. Bernard, 'Corsairs in Iceland', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 15-16 (1973), pp. 139-144. Examples of newspaper reporting are *Opregte Haarlemsche Courant*, 29-05-1817 and *The Times*, 05-07-1817.

⁷⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 139, no. 2240, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 20-05-1817.

⁷¹ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Admiralty to William Hamilton', 29-05-1817, fp. 9-11; CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Richelieu to Devoize', Paris 13-07-1817.

⁷² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 139, no. 2342, 'Fagel to Van Nagell', London 30-05-1817.

⁷³ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Admiralty to William Hamilton', 29-05-1817, fp. 9-11; CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Richelieu to Devoize', Paris 13-07-1817.

this instance on the North Sea, so close to the homeports, made matters seem all the more pressing.⁷⁴ Representatives of the Hanseatic cities brought the captures to the attention of the Frankfurt-based Diet (or Bundestag) of the German Confederation in June 1817. The envoys pressed their assembled colleagues to take action. German maritime trade, they warned, would be over and done with if the corsairs were allowed 'to cruise in the Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic⁷⁵ They urged the Confederation to take measures to stop 'these piracies, which threaten the honour of the German flag and the welfare of the German nation⁷⁶ The envoys went on to argue that the threat was not solely commercial or maritime. They presented the corsairs as a health hazard, in an attempt to gather support from the landlocked confederates and raise the perceived threat from ship captures to a danger for society. At this time, news of a plague in Algiers had begun to be disseminated, the representatives used that issue to warn for corsairs introducing the disease in Germany and the rest of Europe.⁷⁷

Threat perceptions of piracy gained new urgency as the hunting grounds of the corsairs expanded and seemed to pose an added sanitary risk. Soon, European actors began to call for further security measures, including mobility bans. The Hanse elites in the Senate and at the Diet in Frankfurt worked together with activist civilians to bring such measures about. A merchant duo from Hamburg founded the 'Antipiratische Verein' ('Anti-pirate association') and actively lobbied for the creation of a Hanseatic fleet of war.⁷⁸ The Hanseatic representatives in Frankfurt upped that agenda as they suggested constructing a navy for the German Confederation. The only thing the Diet agreed to construct, however, was an advisory commission. That body, which included members from Oldenburg, the Hanseatic cities, Denmark and the Netherlands, suggested banning the North African corsairs from appearing near European coasts.⁷⁹ The British Admiralty had already charted a similar, though unilateral course after the Tunisian encounter on the North Sea. It instructed an officer to sail to Tunis and arrange that its warships would no longer cruise in view of British coasts.⁸⁰ The effort, as we shall see below, was not appreciated by Mahmoud Bey, who only accepted with great apprehension.

⁷⁴ E. Baasch, *Die Hansestädte und die Barbaresken* (Kassel 1897), pp. 131-135.

⁷⁵ Translated memoir to the Diet, printed in *The Times*, 16-07-1817.

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

⁷⁷ G. Weiss, Captives and corsairs. France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean (Stanford, CA 2011), p. 152. ⁷⁸ Baasch, *Die Hansestädte*, pp. 149-152.

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 138-140; *The Times*, 18-07-1817. Hans von Gagern represented the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the advisory committee, he suggested that a Dutch commander could head the German fleet. NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 141, no. 2700, 'Von Gagern to Van Nagell', Frankfurt a.M. 17-06-1817.

⁸⁰ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Bathurst to Maitland', London 26-05-1817, fp. 12

The situation of the Hanseatic Senators and the merchants they represented exemplified how difficult it could be to arrange for concerted, international security measures. Following the meeting of the Diet, the Hanse officials directed their efforts abroad. They contacted various European courts for help and mediation, directed an agent to lobby at the ambassadorial conferences in London and pondered a membership in the Spanish-Dutch Alcalá league, but all to no avail.⁸¹ The British resident in the Hanseatic cities informed the Senates in October 1818 that Pasha Yusuf Karamanli of Tripoli wanted to make peace with them, but the senators were unsure whether to enter into individual treaties. The alternative was to await the results of another international meeting that was then just about to start. It was a real European congress, a follow-up to Vienna, and it convened quite nearby, in the western Prussian city of Aachen.⁸²

Of 'inevitable complexity'. Convening for the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle

The idea of organising another congress had been entertained by several Great Power statesmen since at least 1817. They wanted to review the questions that Vienna had left openended and tackle the new issues that were apparently of continental importance. Metternich, for instance, was eager to meet and discuss the status of France, especially its financial obligations to the allies. Castlereagh liked the idea and Tsar Alexander soon warmed to it.⁸³ By April 1818, it was clear that Aachen (or Aix-la-Chapelle, in the French fashion of the day) would be the site of diplomatic action during the upcoming fall. The newly Prussian city, once the imperial seat of Charlemagne, had become an internationally renowned spa during the eighteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars killed most of the local business, but 1816 showed a first restoration of the old tourist numbers, as 1600 foreign visitors found their way to Aachen again. The city, despite its attractions, was small and provincial, surrounded by hilly countryside. It offered little of Vienna's grandeur and splendour. There were some large feasts to welcome the arriving monarchs and to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig on 18 October (which the French delegate Richelieu stealthily avoided) but overall the Congress was dedicated to the more formal side of diplomatic business.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Baasch, Die Hansestädte, pp. 131-138.

⁸² Ibid., pp. 147-148. On accession to the Alcalá alliance, NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 142, no. 3060, 'Huygens to Van Nagell', Hamburg 08-07-1817.

⁸³ M. van Taack, 'Die affären gehen gut'. Metternichs kleiner Europa-Kongreβ 1818 (Düsseldorf 1988), pp. 8-9; M. Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 180-181.

⁸⁴ Van Taack, *Die affären gehen gut*, pp. 77-78 and 83.

That business had everything to do with France. The allied army of occupation was bound to withdraw from the country soon. Payments of the post-war indemnities were nearing their conclusion. A new problem then presented itself: what place France could take within the European system, in relation to the four Great Powers? This was a big question as it touched upon the very basis of the alliance that had defeated the Napoleonic Empire and facilitated the subsequent creation of a new continental order. It was a question big enough to attract attention from Constantinople, where the highest Ottoman authorities inquired what the upcoming meeting in Aachen would be about. The Austrian ambassador explained that the entire congress would be centred on the status of France. The Porte appeared not too sure, throughout July the Reis Effendi (or reis ül-küttab, the senior dignitary for foreign affairs) kept asking when new information on this assembly would appear. According to the Austrian resident, it was an 'idée fixe' of the Porte that the Congress of Vienna had isolated the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen in Chapter 1, this noted isolation was only partially apparent. On the one hand, Sultan Mahmud II had decided not to send a representative to the Congress of Vienna. On the other hand, the Congress did feature in European diplomatic endeavours that directly infringed on the territorial integrity and interests of the Ottoman Empire, such as the bombardment of Algiers or the creation of a British protectorate over the Ionian Islands. Furthermore, the Congress had made clear that European officials had no intention of granting the Sultan the same prerogatives and respect that the Great Powers granted each other, which Mahmud II was very much aware of. In preparation for the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Porte therefore wanted assurances that a new congress would not bring new infractions and insults.⁸⁵

However, like in Vienna, the talks and agreements soon extended far beyond just one set of questions. Castlereagh had already expected and feared this. His preparatory memorandum for the Cabinet was long and detailed. He warned that the ongoing discussions on the maritime league would bring 'considerable inconveniences' and be of 'inevitable complexity'. At the same time, Britain 'could not refuse (...) to a league of this description formed upon fair principles, if the general voice of Europe should call for it'.⁸⁶ As his statement shows, such contemporary notions of European security interests convinced

⁸⁵ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (HHStA), StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, Subfolder, 'Türkei, Berichte, 1818, in französischer Sprache', 'Stürmer to Metternich', Péra 10-07-1818; 25-07-1818, and; 10-10-1818.

⁸⁶ TNA, FO 139/46, 'Second memorandum on the upcoming conference at Aix-la-Chapelle', fp. 32-61; Webster, *The foreign policy of Castlereagh*, p. 139.

Castlereagh that Great Britain could not stem or control multilateral efforts if it did not join them.

Discussions on the abolition of the slave trade and North African corsairing were still unresolved after the conferences in London. At Aix-la-Chapelle, proceedings would hence continue where the ambassadorial talks had left off. A large red box that Castlereagh shipped to the Congress served as a token of that continuity. It was full of potentially relevant documents, including all the protocols of the ambassadorial conferences.⁸⁷ The meetings in Aachen could perhaps provide a solution to their deadlocks, considering that the Ministers and crowned heads would be together in the same place. At the Congress, Castlereagh would get the chance to listen to Richelieu's concerns. He could ask Nesselrode or Kapodistrias about the Russian court's preference for taking the offensive. There would be no need for corresponding back and forth, for keeping decisions subject to changes and reservations.

The talks began on 30 September and tackled the biggest questions first. A convention on the withdrawal of the allied troops and the remaining monetary questions was ready by 9 October.⁸⁸ The rapidity supposedly boosted the delegates' morale, leading to much optimism about all that could be arranged through their discussions. The sessions generally lasted from 10 or 11 in the morning to 3 at night. In Metternich's opinion, it was the 'prettiest little congress' he had ever seen.⁸⁹ Richelieu would have been pleased as well, having obtained his primary objectives: France got rid of its foreign occupiers and joined the ranks of the four Great Powers, though the Quadruple Alliance stayed intact (with secret military clauses geared against France).⁹⁰ The monarchs of Prussia, Russia and Austria left the city not long afterwards, at the end of October, to visit Louis XVIII in Paris. The many foreign journalists who had come to Aachen as reporters found it hard to fathom what the Ministers were still discussing. *The Observer* wrote that the Congress 'still continues to be occupied in its session', but considered it 'difficult to discover what it is that protracts it deliberations'.⁹¹

The delegates produced a mass of 47 protocols that, in their vast variety, show what occupied their minds: the management of all kinds of continental and wider imperial affairs. Eight of these protocols treated piracy or the slave trade. The others concerned issues as diverse as the territory of Baden, the hereditary rule over Monaco, the rights of Jewish

 ⁸⁷ The 'red box' is mentioned in TNA, FO 139/46, 'List of archives to be taken to Aix-la-Chapelle', fp. 126-129.
 ⁸⁸ For a detailed and insightful discussion of the monetary issues and their relation to collective security, De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 294-309, 340-348 and 354-358.

⁸⁹ This may have had as much to with the high-stakes games of whist and a budding romance with Countess Dorothea von Lieven as with diplomatic negotiations. Van Taack, *Die affären gehen gut*, pp. 49 and 83.
⁹⁰ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 194.

⁹¹ The Observer, 02-11-1818.

subjects in German lands, and the mediation of Spanish-Portuguese conflicts in insurgent Latin America.⁹² These subjects were raised and discussed lest they became a source of conflict that could destabilise European tranquillity and security. Aix-la-Chapelle thereby further solidified the practice of holding meetings whenever an issue could uproot European peace and diplomatic order. It also solidified the hierarchies between great and small powers. At Aix-la-Chapelle, Great Power delegates talked things over and only invited their smaller power colleagues when their governments' interests were deemed to be at stake.⁹³ The legacy would prove long-lasting, while its impact was felt right away, especially in the case of the piracy debates.

Corsairing at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle

The Great Power delegates kept the discussions on 'Barbary piracy' amongst themselves. Their talks completely centred on reviewing, critiquing and questioning the contents of the draft treaty that had emerged from the ambassadorial conferences in London. The Russian delegates Count Ioannis Kapodistrias (1776-1831) and Count Karl von Nesselrode (1780-1862) took the lead by presenting Russia's ambitious memorandum at the 25th meeting on 7 November. A territorial base on the African coast was what they proposed. From there, a central institution could oversee the fleets and courts of law that prosecuted both pirates and the slave traders. Steeped in Holy Alliance rhetoric, the proposal described a 'fraternal, Christian alliance' that would last as long as it took to develop 'African civilization'. An explicit denial of Barbary statehood matched these civilizing perspectives. The Russian delegates admitted that the treaty would create a strange relationship with the Barbary States from an international legal point of view. Relations would come to exist in a state somewhere in-between war and peace. Security would be sought through violent repression, but not within the normal confines of warfare. The memorandum referenced Hugo Grotius for theoretical, legal backing, claiming that the Barbary Regencies lost all right to the 'blessings of peace'. Due to their piracies, there was nothing that could justify the existence of the Barbary Regencies as established states. After all, 'the natural state of pirate society is none other than the state of war'.⁹⁴

The Russian proposal was situated at the extreme end of the repressive spectrum. The other attendees did not go as far in questioning the status of the North African polities or in calling

 ⁹² The various protocols are in TNA, FO 139/41, FO 139/42 and FO 139/43.
 ⁹³ Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, p. 68.

⁹⁴ TNA, FO 139/41, 'Protocol no. 25', Aix-la-Chapelle 07-11-1818, with annexes attached, fp. 209-246.

for territorial control. At another meeting, a week later, they got the opportunity to present their views. Metternich explained that Austria also ignored the independent political existence of the 'African cantons', but approached them as provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Only a restoration of real Ottoman control in these environs could end piracy, as destroying cities or burning ships were just temporary remedies.⁹⁵ Richelieu preferred a similar line of action and fully agreed. Together with Metternich, he noted that a big maritime league would bring a multitude of complications. The French Minister argued that a defensive alliance would always turn offensive at some point or another. This, he stated, posed an inherent contradiction. He was sceptical about whether the league could remain neutral and endure in case of a European war. As an alternative he proposed the creation of a small police force engaged in surveillance, with a mandate to capture ships and blockade ports.⁹⁶ Metternich thought that such limited institution-building would already be overly difficult. Why not use tried and tested means, he wondered, and proposed to restore the Order of Malta to its pre-Revolutionary standing. He had probably picked up the idea in one of the many pamphlets that the uprooted Order issued, ceaselessly calling for the return of its old island base.⁹⁷ By the time delegate Karl August von Hardenberg (1750-1822) and his aide Christian von Bernstorff (1769-1835) got the chance to present the Prussian position, they simply argued that a solution to this complex issue would never be found in Aachen, and merely suggested to continue the conferences in London.⁹⁸

The talks at the Congress thus followed the lines that had been set out before. Bringing all the Ministers together in direct contact had hardly altered their perspectives. Tsar Alexander, as he returned to Aachen, told Castlereagh about his growing impatience with these postponed discussions.⁹⁹ At his behest, and under the unremittent possibility of Russian joining the Alcalá alliance, negotiations suddenly picked up speed. A proposed line of action against 'Barbary piracy' followed in the last few days of the Congress, at the 39th meeting, of 20 November. The assembled statesmen decided to leave the draft treaty with its naval league, and stuck to the more practicable parts of their project. Rather than creating an alliance, the Porte in Constantinople and the Regents in North Africa would first be informed that an

⁹⁵ TNA, FO 139/42, 'Protocol no. 31', Aix-la-Chapelle 13-11-1818, the Austrian statement is in 'Annex B', fp. 111-124.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 'Annex C1', fp. 125-127.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 'Annex B', fp. 111-124. The pamphlet is in HHStA, StK, Kongressakten, 18, fol. 95-106. It called for a general revival of the Order, stating that the Congress of Aachen 'doit faire concevoir l'idée d'une sorte de regeneration politique et de Restauration universelle'. The principal advantage of a 'renaissance' of the Order, the text concluded, would be the repression of the Barbary pirates.

⁹⁸ TNA, FO 139/42, 'Annex C2', fp. 158-159.

⁹⁹ TNA, FO 139/48, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', Aix-la-Chapelle 24-11-1818, fp. 310-311.

alliance was possibly in the making. The Great Power ambassadors in Constantinople would make a 'friendly' communication to the Ottoman Porte together, stating that the Barbary Regencies would 'provoke decisive measures by the European Powers' if their corsairing continued.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, France and Britain would cooperate on a diplomatic expedition to the Regencies, 'with the view of persuading upon them entirely to relinquish that System of Piracy & Plunder which they have so long pursued to the extreme detriment and annovance of the civilized states of Europe'.¹⁰¹ Castlereagh agreed to stop by Paris after the Congress finished, to settle the particulars of the mission.¹⁰²

Such militant diplomacy, utilizing intimidations and backed by the threat of force, genuinely became one of the standard solutions of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. It was applied to several other issues as well. The talks on the abolition of the slave trade ran a similar course as those on corsairing. They too kept to the positions already taken at the conferences in London. Castlereagh once again suggested a general right of search and met the same opposition from the allies. He privately urged Richelieu to adopt 'a more favourable view' and publicly denounced the 'moral incompetency in the French nation'.¹⁰³ Castlereagh described the discussions on abolition as 'extremely discouraging to our hopes'.¹⁰⁴ The only result to show for them was a shared statement to the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, stressing the need for abolition.¹⁰⁵

Negotiations on the insurgencies in the Spanish colonies in South America took the same turn, especially when it came to the issue of rebel privateering. Portugal's representative, Pedro de Sousa Holstein, Duke of Palmela (1781-1850), at one point compelled the delegates to take measures against the South American privateers. The restored Spanish monarchy's attempts to turn back a liberal constitution that granted the colonies a voice in government had led to revolts in Venezuela, Columbia and Argentina. Patriot forces in the Rio de la Plata area (near present-day Uruguay) managed to hold out against the 10,000 troops that had come from Spain to restore imperial dominion. To back their ground troops, José Artigas and other rebel leaders issued privateering commissions, which were mainly held by American citizens

¹⁰⁰ TNA, FO 139/43, 'Protocol no. 39', Aix-la-Chapelle 20-11-1818, fp. 219-220.

¹⁰¹ A note by Castlereagh of 22-01-1819, attached to CADLC, 8CP/612, no. 204, 'Osmond to Dessolles', London 26-01-1819, fp. 25-26.

¹⁰² TNA, FO 139/48, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', Aix-la-Chapelle 24-11-1818, fp. 310-311 and FO 139/45, Letter from Castlereagh to Bathurst, Paris 10-12-1818, fp. 188-191.

¹⁰³ TNA, FO 139/48, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', Aix-la-Chapelle 02-11-1818, fp. 142-147; FO 139/43, 'Protocol no. 38', 'Annex A', 19-11-1818, fp. 202-203.

 ¹⁰⁴ TNA, FO 92/39, 'Castlereagh to Bathurst', Aix-la-Chapelle 23-11-1818, fp. 223-226.
 ¹⁰⁵ TNA FO 139/41, 'Protocol no. 23', Aix-la-Chapelle 04-11-1818, fp. 165-169.

based in ports like Baltimore.¹⁰⁶ Privateers under these insurgent licenses would sail as far as the coasts of Spain, incurring many losses for Spanish and Portuguese shipping.¹⁰⁷ Though he was invited to join the talks on abolition and Barbary corsairing, Palmela wished to see a multilateral expeditionary force crack down of the insurgents and took the opportunity to warn the other powers about South American privateering.¹⁰⁸ Soon, he argued, 'there would not be any safety at sea anymore for whatever flag'.¹⁰⁹ Rather than reviewing the role of the Iberian powers in the upsurge of this maritime raiding, Palmela suggested to take concerted measures against the U.S. government.¹¹⁰ Washington had to be pressed to follow its neutrality laws and prohibit the sale of arms to 'pirate ports' in Latin America. Richelieu backed the plans and convinced the other delegates to follow the Portuguese suggestion of a shared communication.¹¹¹ North African and South American privateering would hence come to be targeted by highly similar security practices.

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle was over by 22 November. In its wake, the process of implementing these new agreements could begin. It was to be a process fraught with difficulties and obstructions. Realities on the ground often hardly corresponded to official perceptions, and complicating factors lay waiting at almost every stage of action. There would be headstrong ambassadors following their own plans, officers with unclear instructions and, most of all, unconsulted authorities who hardly wished to comply with Great Power demands. The delegates in Aachen did try to make things as uncomplicated as possible, as ambitious projects had proven to be unfeasible. Tellingly enough, the talks at Aix-la-Chapelle actually put the creation of a general naval league, that potential maritime counterpart to the allied army of occupation, on the back burner. The multinational fleet against pirates and slave traders had been discussed in great detail for over two years, but at Aix-la-Chapelle that prospected 'system of security' was essentially suspended. Instead, one-off measures gained traction. This is exemplified by the plans for a diplomatic expedition and concerted ambassadorial communications concerning 'Barbary piracy'.

With the decisions of Aix-la-Chapelle, a European maritime alliance became an increasingly unlikely future possibility rather than an implemented measure. Diplomats and ministers talked of European interests and international security, but they each had different

¹⁰⁶ D. Head, 'A different kind of maritime predation. South American privateering from Baltimore, 1816-1820', *International Journal of Naval History* 7:2 (2008), pp. 1-38; G. Brown, *Latin American rebels and the United States*, *1806-1822* (Jefferson, NC 2015), pp. 76-78.

¹⁰⁷ Brown, *Latin American rebels*, pp. 82-83.

¹⁰⁸ De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 374-383.

¹⁰⁹ TNA, FO 139/42, 'Protocol no. 30', 'Annex A', Aix-la-Chapelle 11-11-1818, fp. 82-92.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹¹ TNA, FO 139/42, 'Protocol no. 31', 'Annex A', Aix-la-Chapelle 13-11-1818, fp. 99-110.

understandings of fitting measures. The French government did not want to take a secondary position under foreign command, especially now that it was getting rid of the allied army of occupation. The British Cabinet considered any league that it did not directly command as a liability. Statesmen representing Russia, Prussia and Austria each considered the plans either too slight or too imposing.

So, what did the arrangements of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle signify when it comes to security at sea? The agreements of Aachen pointed out which sorts of multilateral plans were workable, and which ones were not. An institutionalised integration of navies clearly went too far for the statesmen involved. Official plans, like the equating of the slave trade to piracy or the extended right of search, also met opposition at sea, or even in courts of law. At the same time, the Congress of Aachen helped create a clearer and more rigid distinction of which governments could take the lead in matters of international security. This is not to say that the discussions in Aachen were devoid of result or consequence. If we look beyond the particular issue of 'Barbary piracy', we can see that the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle actually brought on important security measures through multilateral deliberation, such as the withdrawal of the allied army of occupation from France and the simultaneous conclusion of a secret military protocol that could summon a multinational intervention force in case French politics would appear to threaten continental tranquillity once again. Still, these measures were all masterminded and put to paper by Great Power representatives, which further highlights how the security culture was turning more and more hierarchical.¹¹²

The fate of the projected league against the North Regencies especially clarifies that providing security was steadily being remade into an exclusive prerogative of the Great Powers. A multinational maritime alliance had been proposed at the Congress of Vienna by non-state actors and smaller power diplomats. That prospect found its first incarnation in the stipulations of the Alcalá treaty, whose signees were not Great Powers either. British officials, precisely for this reason, obstructed the Spanish-Dutch alliance. The convocation of ambassadorial conferences in London inspired states as diverse as Denmark, Sardinia and Portugal to refuse to accede. Their governments thought it wiser to wait and follow a Great Power conclave presided over by Britain. In London and Aachen, Great Power statesmen tried to ensure that *if* a European league would be created, it would be done on their terms, in a way that would allow them to control not only the actions of Mediterranean 'pirates', but also the naval policies of other European powers. That attempt to exert control eventually

¹¹² De Graaf, *Tegen de terreur*, pp. 383-387.

brought the concerted communications and the Anglo-French expedition, which were limited in scope, but still undertaken on behalf of all the European powers.

'With no idea of menace'? Opposing security in 1819

The Aachen plans travelled out into the world on paper. All the officials who were involved in their implementation received copies of the protocols as part of their instructions. Protocol 39 of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, the one that set out the measures in Constantinople and North Africa, was duplicated and given to ministers, sent to ambassadors and dispatched to departing navy commanders.¹¹³ Their physical inclusion in instructions granted a real materiality to the congress decisions. As Matthias Schulz observed in his analysis of the Congress System, the contracting parties considered the protocols to be binding agreements that legitimized a particular, concerted course of action.¹¹⁴ The distribution of copies underscored this legitimizing role. Copies of the protocols helped turn plans into action, while maintaining a material link to the original decision. In carrying out security policies, actors always had a reference to the international justification at hand. Still, just as the paper on which the protocols were copied could stain, rip or wrinkle, so too could the decisions that implementation, showing how local encounters reshaped security practices and uncovering the many ways in which non-European actors contested these measures.

Plagued times. Circumstances in North Africa

Contextual factors can help explain why the multilateral, European security efforts that followed the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle came to encounter such forceful opposition from non-European authorities. As we will see, the years following the Anglo-Dutch bombardment were marked by societal upheaval and political changes within the North African Regencies. These circumstances reinforced an official unwillingness to meet European demands to end corsairing. The events of 1816 made clear that complying with the demands of the European powers could pose very real dangers. Rebellious Janissaries killed Dey Omar Agha within a

¹¹³ This had become standard practice since the convocation of the Allied Council in 1815, which also drafted and issued its protocols for executive parties.

¹¹⁴ Schulz, Normen und Praxis, pp. 143-144 and 547.

year after the Anglo-Dutch bombardment. His defeat at the hands of the foreign fleet coincided with a string of other calamities, including a devastating outbreak of the plague. The idea took hold that Omar Agha brought misfortune to the Regency, doomed Algiers, and thus had to be done away with.¹¹⁵ Mahmud Bey of Tunis also faced an uprising. About two hundred Turkish militiamen and a gang of civilians took to the city squares in the week after Lord Exmouth's mission in March 1816. The revolt failed and the culprits fled to Constantinople, pillaging the port arsenal on their way out. Complying with foreign demands could thus bring internal risks, as demands to end corsairing threatened to upset local dynamics of rule and social hierarchies.¹¹⁶ When new European commanders arrived with new claims and threats in the years after 1816, the authorities of Algiers and Tunis thus knew that caution and perseverance could be wiser than giving in. Without looking into local circumstances, we thus cannot fully understand why and how the opposition to security practices came about, which is why we now turn to the internal situation of the North African Regencies.

One regional calamity that had a particularly devastating impact was a severe outbreak of the plague in 1817. Pilgrims brought the disease to the Maghreb as they travelled back to Bona and Oran on boats from Alexandria. The sickness spread swiftly. It raged throughout Algiers and found its way into the Moroccan interior. Tunis and Tripoli were also infected through traffic from Egypt. Within the first four months of the outbreak, an estimated 13,000 people fell to the disease in the city of Algiers alone. The death toll amounted to about a third of the total urban population. Tunis, the most densely populated of the Regencies, was hit almost just as hard.¹¹⁷ European threat perceptions of 'Barbary piracy' diversified to include sanitary anxieties when the outbreak became known on the continent. The German outrage over the Tunisian corsairs in the North Sea was a case in point. In addition, the spread of the disease also affected local practices of privateering.

The plague's harms were not just demographic. Agricultural produce dwindled with the decrease of hands that could work the lands. Food prices rose. Unrest was brewing.¹¹⁸ In

¹¹⁵ W. Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers, political, historical, and civil. Containing and account of the geography, population, government, revenues, commerce, agriculture, arts, civil institutions, tribes, manners, languages and recent political history of that country (Boston 1826), p. 153; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA II), 59, M23, vol. 9, 'Buell to Shaler', Algiers 20-09-1817. Also, Panzac, Barbary corsairs, p. 309.*

¹¹⁶ K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 267-272.

¹¹⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 306-307.

¹¹⁸ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 307-309. Reports on unrest by Mr. Buell, a junior agent of the U.S. consulate and the sole foreign diplomat remaining in the city of Algiers during the outbreak in NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 9, 'Buell to Shaler', Algiers 20-09-1817.

Algiers, the plague laid besieged politics as it led to growing disaffection over the Regency's leadership. The Janissary troops revolted soon after the disease arrived, bringing an end to the two-year reign of Dey Omar Agha. The combination of the epidemic and the recent defeats at foreign hands made the Dey's position untenable. He was strangled on 8 September 1817 and succeeded by Ali Khodja (r. September 1817 - February 1818). The new Dey had conspired in Omar's murder, but soon started to fear Janissary intrigue himself. With Algiers in a state of famine, pestilence and popular insurrection, Ali Khodja decided to relocate the Dey's palace from the old location near the harbour to the fortress of the Casbah on the higher grounds of the upper town.¹¹⁹ Following an attempted coup, he ordered the execution of the conspirators and assembled a new personal guard, largely made up of indigenous Berber recruits rather than the Janissaries who were generally brought in from Smyrna (Izmir) and other ports of the Levant.¹²⁰ Under Dey Ali Khodja, the bases of power within the Regency thus appeared to be shifting as lingering mutineers amongst the Janissaries were executed and alliances with other local groups, such as the urban elites seemed to become more central. He also continued the Regency's privateering ventures, possibly to show that he would not budge to Christian pressures like his predecessor had.¹²¹

In foreign affairs, the new Dey thus carried out a complicated balancing act. Dey Ali Khodja tried to assert the Regency's position as a privateering entity, but he also had to guard Algiers against further threats posed by concerting European powers. He thus endeavoured to stabilise the relations between the Regency and its neighbours and ended a lingering conflict with Tunis over tributes of olive oil. Ali Khodja sent his Minister of the Marine to the neighbouring Regency to stop the dispute and terminate the Tunisian tribute. As some authors note, the envoy explicitly urged Mahmud Bey of Tunis to unite against the common threat of European hostility. The warning appeared to have had an immediate effect, as the two Regencies concluded peace in October 1817. Internal problems and foreign infringements of concerting powers thus brought Algiers and Tunis closer together, for the time being.¹²²

The threat of foreign infringement in this time of hardship also inspired the reconstruction of ports, fleets and fortifications. While he was still alive, Dey Omar Agha, as we have seen, had begun to assemble a new fleet and oversaw the swift repair of Algiers' fortified

¹¹⁹ G. Camps et. al., 'Alger', in: *Encyclopédie berbère* vol. 4, *Alger – Amzwar*, accessed online at http://encyclopedieberbere.revues.org/2434 on 28 November 2017. Also mentioned in NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 9, 'Buell to Shaler', Algiers 06-11-1817. ¹²⁰ Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, p. 262; **P.** Boyer, 'Agha', in *Encyclopédie berbère, vol. 2, Ad – Ağuh-n-*

Tahlé, accessed online at http://encyclopedieberbere.revues.org/915 on 28 November 2017.

¹²¹ J. McDougall, A history of Algeria (Cambridge 2017), p. 47.

¹²² Panzac, Barbary corsairs, p. 302; Chater, Dépendance et mutation, p. 276.

shorefront. The seaboards of Tunis and Tripoli were home to similar works of masonry and shipbuilding. Yusuf Karamanli, the pasha of Tripoli, ordered a large improvement of the maritime batteries in 1817-1818.¹²³ In Tunis, Mahmud Bey commissioned an ambitious project to improve the arsenals and dockyards of Porto Farina (Ghar el-Melh), just to the north of the city. He also ordered the construction of a canal at the port's basin. The works would provide a place to shelter the Tunisian fleet, granting extra protection in case of an attack.¹²⁴

A lot of the knowledge that benefitted these improvements was imported from across the Mediterranean. It was a French engineer, Joseph-François Cubisol, who supervised the work on the canal in Tunis.¹²⁵ Mahmud Bey, furthermore, repeatedly asked for French officers who could advise him on his military concerns. When the French consul evaded the request with vague objections, the Bey clarified that Christians had been doing specialized work in the Regency for decades.¹²⁶ Algiers, meanwhile, assembled a new fleet, with ships commissioned at dockyards in Italy. Such orders could be very lucrative. Consular sources mention an Italian shipbuilder from Livorno, named Gio Basthan, who received some 5,600 Spanish piasters for his services.¹²⁷ Private opportunities and monetary gain in these instances surpassed official policies of security and perceptions of threat. While European statesmen made moves to end corsairing, European artisans and experts helped facilitate its endurance.

The Regencies, at this point, continued to be involved in corsairing not solely, or even primarily, for financial profit. The privateering wars of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli had always been informed by pragmatic considerations. These powers took on particular adversaries at specific times, depending on the perceived opportunities and incentives of the moment. Following the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816, the estimated numbers of corsair cruises and captures dropped significantly. Algerian historian Lemnouar Merouche made some calculations on the remaining revenues of corsairs. With an average prize income of 60,000 francs per year between 1816 and 1830, he notes, the Regency of Algiers could barely cover two thirds of the wages that it normally paid to its roughly 3,000 sailors. Despite the

¹²³ N. Lafi, Une ville du Maghreb entre ancient régime et réformes ottomans. Genèse des institutions municipales à Tripoli de Barbarie (1795-1911) (L'Harmattan 2002), pp. 68-70.

¹²⁴ CADN, 712PO/1/54, No. 93, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 02-09-1818.

¹²⁵ J. Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans. North Africa and Europe in an age of migration, c. 1800-1900* (Berkeley, CA and London 2012), p. 51. He is mentioned as 'Cuvisol' in CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 4, 'Malivoire to Dessolles', Tunis 03-12-1819.

¹²⁶ This was not new to the nineteenth century, F.R. Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East. The opening of the Maghreb, 1660-1814', *The Journal of North African Studies* 4:4 (1999) pp. 1-26, there pp. 10 and 21-22.

¹²⁷ CADN, 22PO/1/66, 'Deval to Mariotti', Algiers 30-06-1819.

incidental taking of Hanseatic, Tuscan or Spanish ships, corsairing was thus no longer a profitable business.¹²⁸ The diminishing returns of corsairing matched the Regencies' more general economic downturn, as other sources of income faltered simultaneously. Administrative obstructions to North African merchants in European ports like Marseille did not lessen, trade balances tipped to the disadvantage of the Regencies and as a result they became seriously indebted, mostly to European creditors.¹²⁹

In these dire economic circumstances, corsairing mainly fulfilled a political purpose. Commercially it became steadily less profitable, but politically and symbolically privateering remained of great importance. Maritime raiding legitimized the execution of power and the maintenance of social hierarchies within the Regencies. Only Yusuf Karamanli in Tripoli began to adopt alternative military ventures. He turned his eyes from the sea to the oasis, replacing maritime raiding with inland campaigns to conquer desert trading posts.¹³⁰ In Tunis and Algiers, corsair prize-takings still supported the political authority and social position of the ruling caste, which was drawn from Janissaries, military men and naval commanders. Deys in Algiers and dignitaries at the Bey's court in Tunis continued to be picked from these ranks. The endeavours and successes of the privateers also resonated with the urban populations, who came out to the harbours to cheer on departing and arriving cruisers.¹³¹ Corsairing helped solidify and legitimize the reign of the Deys and Beys, which is why the Regencies' authorities were either unable or unwilling to meet European demands for its termination.¹³² This situation, of course, was at odds with the increasing international delegitimation of corsairing, which framed it as a piratical threat to security at sea. That tension is exemplified by the broad unrest that came after 1816, when revolts and coups ensued in Algiers and Tunis. It would make itself felt again when a new European expedition came sailing to the Regencies in 1819.

Another factor in the opposition of the Regencies was the persistent pressuring of European governments, which may well have seemed to be insensitive to any concessions. Local drivers and incentives for the continuation of corsairing were lost on many Europeans, who continued to subscribe to the established, stereotypical ideas of North African raiding as

¹²⁸ Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, pp. 321-322.

¹²⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 322 and 327-328.

¹³⁰ K. Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli (Ile-Ife 1979), pp. 85-88.

¹³¹ Mohamed El Mansour makes a similar case concerning popular disagreement with Sultan Mawlay Sulayman's decision to terminate Moroccan corsairing due to foreign pressures. M. El Mansour, *Morocco in the reign of Mawlay Sulayman* (Wisbech 1988), p. 111.

¹³² Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, p. 262; Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, pp. 308-310; C. Windler, 'Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis. Muslim-Christian relations in Tunis, 1700-1840', *The Historical Journal* 44:1 (2001) pp. 79-106, there pp. 81-82.

a product of fanaticism, lazy greed, and barbarity. In fact, such attitudes towards 'Barbary piracy' only intensified. European commanders and consuls continued to make new demands, claims and intimidations in the years between 1816 and 1819. The Alcalá alliance, for instance, repeatedly brought Spanish and Dutch fleets to the North African ports. They showed their flags, backed demands for lower tributes and cruised around to demonstrate power, often to the perplexity of other foreign agents and, in case of Tunis, to the dismay of Mahmud Bey.¹³³ Following the Hanseatic captures on the North Sea, a British navy captain also came to Tunis to pose further limitations on corsairs. He requested a written statement, holding that Tunisian corsairs would stay out of the Channel, in accordance with treaties dating back to the seventeenth century. Mahmud Bey tried to insist on reciprocity for British vessels in Tunisian waters. He then suggested to send an ambassador to London, before giving in and declaring that his corsairs would not sail in view of British coasts.¹³⁴

Additional forms of foreign pressuring were directly related to the outbreak of the plague. European newspapers and the Hanseatic representatives at the German Diet had linked robbery and pestilence, complementing the threat perception of piracy with the fear of infection.¹³⁵ The American consul in Algiers turned that perception into policy. Backed by a U.S. squadron anchored near the port, he pressed the Algerine Minister of the Marine to declare that corsair captains would not use their belligerent right to board ships and check papers while the plague still raged.¹³⁶ All these undertakings confined the Regencies' room for manoeuvre, putting bounds on the maritime activities and even the very mobility of North African sailors. These foreign pressures intertwined with the internal difficulties that the Regencies were facing. The hardships of plague, economic recessions, diplomatic intimidations together shaped the circumstances in which the demands of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle were to be received. When an Anglo-French expedition touched at Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in 1819, it may thus have very well appeared as yet another (if better

¹³³ CADN, 712PO/1/52, no. 60, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 14-05-1817, also 712PO/1/53, 'Devoize to Bouchage', Tunis 04-07-1817, and 712PO/1/54, no. 109, 'Devoize to Dessolles', Tunis 05-07-1819. The Alcala stipulations were handed over to Spanish and Dutch naval commanders as instructions, NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 106, no. 3389, 'Van Nagell to Marine Minister', 25-12-1816.

¹³⁴ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Bathurst to Maitland', London 26-05-1817, fp. 12 and FO 8/7, 'Bathurst to Oglander', London 24-10-1817; CADN, 712PO/1/53, no. 73, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 15-10-1817 and no. 76, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 22-10-1817.

¹³⁵ Weiss, *Captives and corsairs*, p. 152.

¹³⁶ The U.S. agents argued that their claims derived 'from so obvious a principle of the law of nature as to need no demonstration', being 'the right of self preservation, which is paramount to all other rights'. NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 10, 'Buell to Algerine Minister of Marine', Algiers 12-04-1818. The declarations are attached to 'Shaler to Adams', USS *Franklin* at sea 15-04-1818.

armed) attempt to impose limitations. As we will find out, this expedition was met with fierce contestations that called the legitimacy of European security practices into question.

The concerted communications in Constantinople

First on the Aix-la-Chapelle plans, however, were the concerted communications to the Regency's suzerains in Constantinople. There, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II faced similar problems of menacing Christian neighbours and internal struggles with the Janissary corps. Diplomatic tensions with Russia over the delayed retreat of troops from the Danubian Principalities and Trans-Caucasus lingered on from the previous era of war.¹³⁷ Questions of military reform and centralisation at the expense of the Janissary troops also smouldered on after the attempted changes that had gotten Sultan Selim III deposed in 1806. Mahmud II declared that these efforts had been cursed and glorified the Janissaries again, but tensions and suspicions remained. ¹³⁸ These circumstances and concerns decisively shaped the execution and reception of the Aix-la-Chapelle plans in Constantinople as well. At the Ottoman capital, the concerted communications hence met fierce opposition from the Porte, which immediately brought to light the contested nature of many European security claims.

Right away, dissention amongst the European ambassadors themselves significantly complicated the concerted communications, which took place in late July 1819. Protocol 39 of the Congress of Aachen stipulated that the ambassadors had to approach the Porte together, in a 'friendly manner'. Yet each of the representatives interpreted their instructions differently. Viscount Viella, the French chargé d'affaires, did not receive any instructions at all.¹³⁹ He was, as a British chaplain described him, of 'kind and affable' manners but with a 'timid and irresolute' disposition.¹⁴⁰ The man seems to have been at a loss when the plans of Aachen came up. He temporized, repeating that he could not do anything because he had not received instructions, and kept writing to Paris to ask for them.¹⁴¹ The ambassadors of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain disagreed amongst themselves in the meantime. Count Rudolph

 ¹³⁷ G. Yakschitch, 'La Russie et la Porte Ottomane de 1812 à 1826', *Revue Historique* 91:2 (1906), pp. 281-306.
 ¹³⁸ A. Yaycioglu, 'Janissaries, engineers and preachers. How did military engineering and Islamic activism change the Ottoman order?', *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 53 (2016), pp. 19-37.

¹³⁹ Viella had only just taken over the embassy. The ambassador Marguis de la Rivière left his posting on 21

July, after the merchants of Marseille complained with the Chamber of Peers over the unfavourable tariffs he had signed into with the Ottoman authorities. 'Rivière (Charles-François Riffardeau, duc de)', in: A. Robert and G. Cougny, *Dictionnaire des parlementaires français*, vol. 5, (Paris 1889-1891), pp. 155-156.

¹⁴⁰ R. Walsh, A residence at Constantinople. During a period including the commencement, progress, and termination of the Greek and Turkish revolutions, vol. 1 (London 1836), p. 326.

¹⁴¹ The instructions were only issued in the last weeks of July, and they indeed arrived in Constantinople only after the communications had been made. CADN, 166PO/B/61, 'Dessolles to Viella', Paris 23-07-1819.

von Lützow (1780-1858), the Austrian Minister, argued against the delivery of a joint note. Trying to delay the measure, as he had been instructed by Metternich, Lützow claimed that a memorandum signed by all the Great Powers was not an 'amicable manner' of communication. Such a text, he stated, 'would carry with it the appearance of a threat'.¹⁴² The Russian and Prussian ambassadors, Baron Grigori Alexandrovitch Stroganov (1770-1857) and Friedrich von Schladen (1772-1845), urged their Austrian colleague to participate in a joint statement, as this had been set down in the Aachen protocol. The two made their objections with little success.¹⁴³ Robert Liston (1742-1836), the British representative, regretted that the appearance of cooperation would be lost. It would seem as if there was 'disagreement among the members of our corps'.¹⁴⁴

Yet Liston urged the others to make some haste. Ramadan would start soon. The fasting, he maintained, would make the Reis Effendi (the chief Ottoman clerk of foreign relations) 'less disposed' and 'less fit' to talk business – especially on a matter that was not 'of an agreeable nature to the Porte'.¹⁴⁵ At the time, Djanib Mehmed Besim was the acting Reis Effendi. He had previously held the position at various intervals, leading an earlier Austrian ambassador to note his regret at Djanib's reappointment in March 1817. Writing to Metternich, the ambassador claimed that Djanib was 'an extremely difficult man'. In 'moments of bad humour' he did not spare the foreign agents from his wrath.¹⁴⁶ Djanib, Lützow later wrote, was easily insulted, irritable, hard-pressed to change his mind, and incredibly defensive when it came to the dignity of the Sultan.¹⁴⁷

The ambassadors decided not to wait for Lützow to change his mind, or for the French instructions to arrive. They thus each separately presented a written note or verbal statement on 27 July 1819, which was contrary to the Aachen plans and hence showed the difficulties of turning congress decisions into implemented, concerted practices. It was much to 'much reluctance and regret' of Stroganov and Von Schladen.¹⁴⁸ Each of the communications (penned down in French and translated into Ottoman Turkish by the embassies' dragomans) informed the Porte of the meetings at Aachen and the plans to end the Barbary 'piracies' or

¹⁴² Lützow considered Austria to be the power least interested in reprimanding the Barbary Regencies. HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fp. 111-117. Also, on Lützow's talks with the British ambassador, TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 26-07-1819, fp. 195-198.
¹⁴³ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fp. 111-117; TNA, FO 78/92,

¹⁴³ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fp. 111-117; TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 26-07-1819, fp. 195-198.

¹⁴⁴ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 27-07-1819, fp. 205-206.

¹⁴⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁶ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 7, 'Stürmer to Metternich', Bujukdéré 24-03-1817.

¹⁴⁷ In the Austrian sources his name is spelled 'Gianib', HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-08-1819, fol. 153-157.

¹⁴⁸ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 26-07-1819, fp. 195-198.

'hostilities'. The tone, however, greatly differed from note to note. The British and Austrian statements invited the Ottoman Porte to cooperate or intervene on the basis of its suzerain rights over the Regencies. The ambassadors of Russia and Prussia were less inviting and put more emphasis on the European league that could form against the Regencies – and perhaps even endanger their existence.¹⁴⁹ Parts of these claims and suggestions would have quite been familiar to Ottoman officials. French diplomacy in Constantinople had focussed from 1816 onwards on getting Sultan Mahmoud II to 'reinstate' his authority over the Regencies.¹⁵⁰ Baron Stroganov, on the other hand, had since the day of his arrival forcefully demanded redress for corsair attacks as part of Russia's many disputes with the Porte. Most of those had to do with the presence of Ottoman troops in the Danubian Principalities and the Ottoman complaints over the Russian military presence in the Trans-Caucasus.¹⁵¹ Liston, moreover, had decided to inform the Ottoman dignitaries of the concerted communications a month in advance.¹⁵² The contents of the allied notes would perhaps have been familiar, but the manner in which they were presented certainly caused dismay. The Porte, after all, had repeatedly been informed that the Congress of Aachen would not treat anything of interest to the Ottoman Sultan.¹⁵³

As he received the communications, Djanib Effendi effectively opposed them with a variety of strategies, ranging from procedural obstruction to informed contestation. The official, as the British ambassador reported, underwent the delivery 'with no small reluctance and the worst grace possible'.¹⁵⁴ The Reis Effendi did everything to hamper the transmission of the letters. When the British dragoman came over, he first tried to send the interpreter back. Djanib called it inappropriate that Britain, as a friend of the Sultan, should send a memorandum – and even be the first to do so, before all the other Christian powers. He urged the dragoman to let Liston give a verbal statement, which would make it seem as if Britain only 'seconded' the others, 'with a degree of reluctance'.¹⁵⁵ The interpreter persisted, stuck to his instructions, and handed Djanib the note. The Reis Effendi then read it but declined to

¹⁴⁹ TNA, FO 78/92, contains the British note (fp. 199-200), which informed of the expedition and asked the Porte to intervene and end the hostilities of the Regencies, which are an obstacle to peace; the Russian note (fp. 201-202), which told of Aachen, referred to Russian reclamations and to the security of Europe; the Prussian note (fp. 203-204), which mentioned the benefits of peace and stated that a league could be formed to endanger the Regencies' existence, and the instructions to Austrian dragoman (fp. 207-208), which called on the Porte's suzerain rights over the Regencies, inviting the Ottomans to cooperate. Also, the instructions attached to HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fp. 111-117.

¹⁵⁰ CADN, 166PO/B/61, 'Richelieu to Riviere', Paris 12-02-1817.

¹⁵¹ Yakschitch, 'La Russie et la Porte', p. 304.

¹⁵² HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-07-1819, fol. 111-117.

¹⁵³ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 10, 'Metternich to Lützow', Vienna 18-12-1818.

¹⁵⁴ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 27-07-1819, fp. 206.

¹⁵⁵ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 06-08-1819, fp. 209-212.

accept it officially. Liston's dragoman remained resolute, refusing to take the note back. Djanib, unwilling to take the memorandum and grant it an official reception, subsequently had the memorandum transferred to the dragoman of the Porte. Liston stressed in his dispatches that this transfer did not imply a failed delivery, but Djanib, for his part, would later maintain that the notes had never been accepted. This British case was not unique. The dragomans of the other embassies, Liston later noted, were received in the same manner that day, perhaps even 'with greater vehemence and ill-humour'.¹⁵⁶

Besides hindering their entry into the recognized channels of correspondence, Djanib also gave fierce critiques of each specific message. He questioned the basis of the concerted measures, pointing out that there already were bilateral treaties between many European powers and the Regencies. Liston's reports, which were drawn from the dragoman's accounts, note what Djanib may have said, barring all the hazards of translation. The Sultan, he argued, could never accept this multilateral venture. Or, as a citation from a British dispatch reads:

'His Highness will be ever ready to attend to the representations of individual states on the subject of their own concerns, but (...) he does not conceive that a number of Powers have a right to combine together in order to regulate the affairs of others, and to give law to the world; (...) the Grand Signor has no knowledge of the Assembly that took place at Aix-la-Chapelle, (...) he had no representative there, had no share in the deliberations of its members, and is no wise bound by their resolves, (...) the Sublime Porte has not been accustomed to let herself be menaced or dictated to by any Power or Powers whatsoever'.¹⁵⁷

Concerted European action, in these Ottoman eyes, appeared as a threat in its own right. A decision at a congress, recorded in a protocol, did not make intimidations legal or benevolent. What the European ambassadors had put forth as a project of security thus appeared to the Reis Effendi as a menacing encroachment of the Sultan's authority as suzerain.

Djanib countered the other messages with particular references to specific treaty stipulations too. Russia and Austria, the Reis Effendi noted, already had agreements that protected their subjects and flags. The Porte had 'religiously observed' these treaties. Whenever Russians and Austrians 'suffered the attacks of the Barbary cruisers', they received fitting compensations.¹⁵⁸ Hence there was no reason for concerted European measures, whether they were presented in aggressive terms or amicable ones. Djanib told the French

¹⁵⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁸ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 06-08-1819, fp. 209-212; Yakschitch, 'La Russie et la Porte Ottomane', p. 293; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 10-08-1819, fol. 153-157.

agents the same thing. Viella had in the end decided to improvise and instructed his dragoman to give a verbal note a day after the rest. France, Djanib stated, had long treated the Regencies as independent states and the status of its current treaties provided no reason for complaints with the Porte.¹⁵⁹ The Reis Effendi dodged the multilateral venture by resorting to bilateral arguments and by addressing each of the notes individually, in light of specific agreements. His references to older treaties set out a different take on what constituted an acceptable, legal basis for reclamations and demands, which was more in line with the diplomatic conventions that had been constructed over previous centuries. To the European ambassadors and their superiors at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, reaching a decision in concert, noted in a protocol, may have appeared to legitimate this kind of diplomacy, but the Reis Effendi did not agree. He clung to the established structures, to the recorded and recognized bilateral treaties that both European powers and the Ottoman Empire had long used to deal with matters of North African corsairing, until European actors began to question these means of providing security after 1815.

Alongside his procedural obstructions and citations of treaties, the Reis Effendi contested the communications by explaining why corsairing was bound to continue. He reportedly told Liston in a private conversation that, to the Sultan, the Regencies were not some unruly, wayward imperial possession. They were semi-autonomous entities with a clear symbolic function. Through their privateering, Liston noted, the vassals in North Africa carried out the task of holy war that the Sultan himself could not always fulfil. The ambassador wrote of Djanib explaining that the Regencies were 'as smoking volcanoes, which did little damage, but kept alive a fire that might be reckoned sacred'. The British representative concluded: 'the faint and smothered warfare of those states served as a *salve* for scrupulous consciences'.¹⁶⁰ From the Ottoman perspective, Liston argued, corsairing could thus go on, as long as it did not infringe upon the Sultan's agreements with his Christian treaty partners.

Such explanations of the Reis Effendi's conduct perfectly reiterated the dominant European categories in which virtually all Ottoman affairs were understood. In matters of imperial politics, foreign relations and military organisation, European contemporaries generally invoked religion as the overarching explanation for all things Ottoman. However, as historian Virginia Aksan has argued in case of the troubled army reforms of the early nineteenth century, 'resistance to social and cultural change might have had causes other than

¹⁵⁹ CADN, 166PO/B/61, 'Rapport sur les communications avec la Porte au sujet des Régences barbaresques', Constantinople 29-07-1819.

¹⁶⁰ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 29-06-1819, fp. 170-171. Emphasis underlined in the original.

religious fanaticism'. She adds: 'Evocations of Islam and the Prophet served as public rhetoric in a debate that became more vociferous as frontiers contracted, and heterodox voices began to challenge the centre'.¹⁶¹ A similar argument can be made in relation to the Reis Effendi's replies to the concerted communications of 1819, which also saw established practices of an old diplomatic order come under challenge at a volatile moment. Djanib's contestations may have invoked religion, but the religious factor can hardly explain the entire dynamic of relations between the Porte and the Regencies.

Appearances and clarifications in this diplomatic setting were not always what they seemed. As Ottoman sources indicate, there was a significant difference between the statements that the Reis Effendi made outwardly, towards the European ambassadors, and the messages that the Porte was sending to its vassal in North Africa. In response to the concerted communications, Djanib forcefully expressed dismay and steadfastness. To the Regencies, on the other hand, the Porte sent orders to halt their raiding immediately. One letter told the North African authorities of the communications, stating that the measure had been directed by Great Britain, and urged them to discontinue their corsairing. 'If you do not stop attacking the ships of these empires', it read, 'they will join forces and attack you'. A combined fleet of that magnitude could not be stopped by the Ottoman navy, the message warned. In conclusion, it posed an order: 'Serve to protect the religious borders and get on well with other states. Otherwise you will incur losses'.¹⁶² Another document from the Ottoman archives can help explain this duality between outward perseverance and internal caution. An earlier report, dating from the immediate aftermath of the 1816 bombardment of Algiers, already noted that further European efforts against the Regencies could follow. Such measures, the text held, could provide a pretext for Russian territorial expansion. Hence, the Porte would do best to steer a middle course, opposing European concertation while trying to take away its basis by urging the Regencies to stop corsairing.¹⁶³ This is exactly the duality of conduct that came to the fore with the communication of 1819.

On the surface of things, the concerting European governments thus did not think they could count on Ottoman assistance in the repression of the 'Barbary pirate' threat. The Reis Effendi had openly contested the requests for help, even if it tacitly ordered the Regencies to stop their corsairing. Officially, the European notes had not even been accepted. The British

¹⁶¹ V. Aksan, 'Breaking the spell of the Baron de Tott. Reframing the question of military reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830', The International History Review XXIV (June 2002), pp. 253-277, there pp. 256-257.

¹⁶² Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivi, İstanbul (BOA), HAT 300/17829 (1234 L 24) 16-08-1819.

¹⁶³ BOA, HAT 457/22537 (29 Z 1231) 20-11-1816.

ambassador pressed Djanib to give a written, 'civil' answer at a later date, when 'the calm of reflection (...) would lead to conciliation and peace'. Seeing that this was unlikely, Liston then backtracked somewhat. He wrote that Djanib 'had mistaken the spirit adopted by the Allies'. There had been 'no intention to dictate, no idea of menace'.¹⁶⁴ In an attempt to control the damage, the French dragoman told Djanib Effendi that the British and French command of the upcoming expedition to the Regencies would actually 'guarantee moderation'.¹⁶⁵ Still, it had become all too clear that the Ottoman authorities did not look kindly upon the multilateral efforts. The ambassadors presented the plans as measures of security, but Djanib's responses show a very different understanding of those measures. In his eyes, they did not bring security, but menaced Ottoman legitimate rule as well as the system of bilateral treaties that was already in place. Britain and France could proceed with their expedition, but if the Regents would oppose them too, then the Great Power statesmen need not look to Constantinople for help.

A complicated departure. The Anglo-French expedition of 1819

The Anglo-French expedition meanwhile made little progress. It still lay anchored on the other side of the Mediterranean, in the port of Mahon, when the ambassadors in Constantinople were submitting their notes. Britain and France led this mission because they, in the words of Richelieu, traditionally carried the greatest influence in the Regencies.¹⁶⁶ In accordance with the removal of the allied army of occupation and its entry into the Quintuple Alliance, France's contribution to this dual venture furthermore also had to signify the country's return to Great Power status. The French Minister and his British counterpart Castlereagh had duly offered to cooperate at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, but getting an expedition out to sea involved much more than a simple pledge. Setting up and starting the mission, however, turned out to be amongst the least of its complications. In this case too, the trajectory from congress plan to implemented security practice proved to be fraught with obstacles, unexpected alterations and the resolute opposition of the purported pirates themselves.

Amongst the mission's initial complications stood the unease with which both powers began to work together. In the spring and summer of 1819, memories of wartime animosity

¹⁶⁴ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 06-08-1819, fp. 209-212.

¹⁶⁵ CADN, 166PO/B/61, 'Rapport sur les communications avec la Porte au sujet des Régences barbaresques', Constantinople 29-07-1819.

¹⁶⁶ CADLC, 8CP/612, no. 24, 'Richelieu to Osmond', 18-01-1819, fp. 22.

would still have been fresh, especially amongst the servicemen of both navies. Old dislikes and lingering mistrust still marked Anglo-French relations in naval matters, as evinced by Richelieu's opposition to the right of search and his restraint towards the general league of the London conferences. Both parties clung to questions of rank and recognition as they prepared the expedition – all in order to avoid the appearance of subservience. French Ministers enumerated a list of questions to their British colleagues on issues of precedence, the language of communication and the order of speaking. Earl Bathurst and the new French ambassador in London, Marquis Victor de Latour-Maubourg (1768-1850) settled matters of formality by stressing the equality between the commanders and noting that all correspondence would be bilingual.¹⁶⁷

The selection of the commanders especially had to reflect the equality between Britain and France. Those chosen officers both had the rank of Rear Admiral – initially. The French navy put forth Contre-amiral Pierre-Roch Jurien de la Gravière, who had spent the preceding years fighting off a British blockade of the Lorient and being held as a prisoner in England. His latest commanding appointment had been with the forces that retook the Île Bourbon in 1815.¹⁶⁸ His British colleague was Thomas Fremantle, a commander with previous experience of negotiating in the North African Regencies. In 1812, he brokered a deal with Hammuda Bey, arranging that captured British vessels could not be sold in Tunis.¹⁶⁹ During the wars, however, Fremantle amassed a great personal fortune by engaging in exactly that kind of business. The sale of French prizes made his posting at the Adriatic Sea a very lucrative one.¹⁷⁰ Fremantle's services in those waters got him the title of Baron of the Austrian Empire. They also supposedly inspired his promotion to Vice-Admiral in August 1819 – just before his departure to join the expedition. The French were furious, they saw their guaranteed equality of rank suddenly imbalanced.¹⁷¹

Military hierarchies were but one of the many complications that the two commanders would face. Like the communications in Constantinople, this second part of the Aachen agreements would encounter stiff opposition from the Barbary authorities. The Regents of Algiers and Tunis rejected the demands, resisted the intimidations and questioned the diplomatic basis of the expedition. To them too, the decisions of an international congress in

¹⁶⁷ TNA. CO 2/10, 'Latour-Maubourg to Castlereagh', London 04-06-1819, fp. 48-53 and FO 8/3, 'Goulburn to Hamilton', 15-06-1819, fp. 156-158.

³ L. Malleret, Jurien de la Gravière. Un amiral gannatois (Plauzat 1984).

¹⁶⁹ HHStA, StAbt, Barbaresken 3, 'Report by Nyssen', Tunis 20-10-1815.

¹⁷⁰ J. Laughton (rev., R. Morris), 'Fremantle, Sir Thomas Francis (1765–1819)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford 2004), accessed online at www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10159 on 27 July 2017. ¹⁷¹ CADLC, 8CP/612, no. 41, 'Latour-Maubourg to Dessolles', London 21-09-1819, fp. 250-253.

which they had not been involved appeared of little value. Just as the ambassadors to the Porte, the two commanders were instructed to present the protocols of Aachen and obtain written replies. Yet local actors would again problematize that multilateral justification, together with the underlying accusations of piracy. The expedition, which set sail in early September with nine ships of war, once again pointed out that claims of security could be heavily contested.¹⁷²

'The united force of Europe'. Intimidations and negotiations in Algiers

Algiers was the expedition's first destination. Jurien and Fremantle arrived there on 3 September, right when several other diplomatic missions went out and came back. One of these came from Constantinople, delivering the Sultan's recognition of the new Dey that had ascended to the position about a year before. Ali Khodja, the reformist Dey who sought to change the local structures of power, had died of the plague in February 1818. His relocation of the palace to the higher town had not sheltered him from the disease. His successor, Dey Hussein (1765-1838), kept the palace where it was but reversed many of Ali Khodja's other reforms. Hussein quickly did away with the changes in the militia, putting the remaining Janissaries on their former footing again.¹⁷³ Accordingly, he endeavoured to strengthen the ties with the central Ottoman authorities. As a former cannoneer of the Sultan's corps at the armoury of Tophane, Hussein was allegedly well-known and respected among the members of the Porte.¹⁷⁴ In July 1819, he sent a request to Constantinople for new Janissary recruits to refill the crews of the fleet and the ranks of the army.¹⁷⁵

Externally, Hussein attempted to solidify diplomatic relations with Great Britain in particular, as he sought to return to the old friendly relations of the Napoleonic Wars. He sent out an ambassador to London in August 1818, who, as it happened, had returned to Algiers just days before the expedition arrived.¹⁷⁶ The British Cabinet tried everything to prevent the man's arrival in London, but eventually had to welcome the ambassador, Ali Capudan. His mission had a single objective: restoring the former close alliances. In a speech he had to

¹⁷² E. Plantet (ed.), *Correspondance des Deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579-1833* vol. 2, 1700-1833 (Paris 1889), p. 543.

¹⁷³ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 67-68; NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 10, 'Shaler to Adams', USS *Franklin* at sea 15-04-1818.

¹⁷⁴ Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys* 2, p. 542; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI 8, 'Stürmer to Metternich', Péra 10-04-1818.

¹⁷⁵ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁷⁶ The Algerine ambassador returned on 28-08-1819 on an English corvette. CADN, 22PO/1/66, 'Deval to Rivière', Algiers 10-05-1820.

submit to Earl Bathurst before it could be presented to the Prince Regent, Ali Capudan recounted how Algiers had stood by Great Britain, even when the King was at war with the Ottoman Empire in 1807. Since then, he lamented, Algiers seemed 'abandoned from your Royal Highness's grace' and 'became an object of disdain & contempt by all the European Nations'.¹⁷⁷ Being barred from an audience with the Prince Regent, the ambassador had to do with an answer by Earl Bathurst. In a short note, he offered friendship of only the most provisional kind. Ali Capudan thus came back to Algiers with a rather cold statement. It pressed Dey Hussein to 'maintain the relations of Peace and Amity with all of Europe, and cultivate such Commercial Intercourse with them as may be for the common interest of all parties'. If not, 'reverting to the system of Warfare', would 'bring down on the Regency the united Force of Europe'.¹⁷⁸ Speaking on behalf of the monarch and the Cabinet, Bathurst thus remained firm to European efforts and alliances, refraining from the close bilateral relations that Ali Capudan had come seeking to restore.

The British reply to the Algerine ambassador was in every sense a prelude to the expedition. Upon their arrival, the two commanders sent a highly similar message to the Dey. The statement, which they also used in Tunis and Tripoli, had the tone of a generalized warning. 'Should the regencies persist in a system as criminal to peaceful commerce, they will inevitably draw upon themselves a general league of all the European Powers'. The Regencies were cautioned, as 'such a combination may endanger their very existence'. In adopting this rhetoric, the expedition had a much more intimidating character than the communications to the Porte. Universalist references to international law supported the ominous warnings. 'The Allied Powers', the note continued, 'insist that the States of Barbary will respect the rights & usages considered as sacred by all civilized Nations'.¹⁷⁹ As with the communications in Constantinople, the act of concertation by the European powers, carried out at some distant congress, had to grant legality to these propositions and make them part of international law. Those who did not abide to such newfound rules were situated outside the circle of civilized nations, and brandished barbarian threats to the international order. This imposition of norms through concerted means, supported by asymmetries of naval force and geared towards the furtherance of 'peaceful' economic interests granted the fight against

¹⁷⁷ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Copy of the intended speech of the Algerian ambassador before the Prince Regent', 18-06-1819, fp. 163-164.

¹⁷⁸ TNA, FO 8/11, 'Bathurst to Ali Captan', London 18-06-1819, fp. 145-146.

¹⁷⁹ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Note to the Dey of Algiers', 05-09-1819, fp. 172-173. Notes to the other North African Regents are in CO 2/10, 'Note to the Bey of Tunis', 27-09-1819, fp. 79-80 and 'Note to the Bashaw of Tripoli', 09-10-1819, fp. 119-120.

piracy its inter-imperial character. As an effort to lay dawn the law, however, these Anglo-French statements were vocally opposed by the purported pirates of North Africa.

A meeting full of contestations followed in Algiers. Dey Hussein invited the two commissioners to the palace on the morning of 5 September, together with the consuls and a retinue of officers and scribes. Hussein, seated on a fauteuil on a platform, listened as Jurien talked of the decisions at Aachen and presented a translated copy of Protocol 39. He then asked the commanders about their health, treated them to coffee, and read the document. After going through the text, Hussein declared that pursuing peace with the European powers was all he wanted. He debased the accusations, saying there had been no infringements of treaties since his ascension to the throne. The commanders admitted that the congress delegates had probably had the previous Dey, Ali Khodja, in mind. They argued, somewhat excessively, that Ali Khodja had posed a great challenge to the tranquillity of Europe with his continued corsairing ventures, even in times of plague. Nonetheless, the duo stated that the European powers were now mainly concerned with assurances for the future. Assurances aside, Hussein replied that he should nonetheless be able to declare war and demand redress. Algiers needed a corsair fleet to defend itself. The two commissioners claimed that their mission was not to call into question Algiers' sovereign and belligerent rights, but to 'secure for ever the entire and perfect tranquillity of European commerce'. Hussein remarked that all was fine by him and told the commissioners to transmit his assurances to London and Paris. When Fremantle and Jurien asked for a written declaration, however, he began questioning the mandate of the two commissioners and told them he would make a decision at a later date.180

This second audience took place four days later, at 1 in the afternoon. Seeing that Hussein would not submit easily, the two commanders attempted to do the work for him. They presented a fully finished declaration, written in Hussein's name. It stated that 'he has never injured any European nation, and from that principle it is his intention so to act towards foreign powers'. Only the Dey's seal needed to be added. Hussein immediately rejected, and critically questioned the implications of this statement. Would it not infringe on Algiers' sovereign right to wage war on its enemies? And why should he relinquish that right in a piece of writing? 'His Highness', the commissioners' report reads, 'then demanded of the

¹⁸⁰ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Detail of the commissioner's first audience with the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 05-09-1819, fp. 174-175; CADN, 22PO/1/42, 'Rapport de l'audience de M.M. les comissaires de France et d'Angleterre aupres de S.A. le Dey d'Alger le 5 Septembre 1819'.

Commissioners to tell him honestly, if he should burn all his vessels, as from the nature of their representations they would become entirely useless'.¹⁸¹

In this exchange, the contested nature of European security claims became readily apparent. Hussein would not compromise the sovereignty of Algiers, not even when the commissioners turned to forceful intimidations. The Dey insisted on the importance of the fleet and on its right to stop and search foreign vessels under belligerent law. That issue of belligerency was precisely where the Dey's outlooks parted with the commanders' demands. Hussein tried to uphold the status of the corsair fleet as a recognised force, with belligerent rights. The Anglo-French expedition, on the other hand, denied those rights by calling the corsairs pirates, which matched the process of delegitimation that had been going on since the Congress of Vienna. Jurien and Fremantle repeatedly stated that they only wanted to ensure security and did not wish to tarnish the sovereignty of Algiers, but Hussein saw a dangerous precedent in the making. He remained firm to his opinions. The two commissioners then threatened the Dey, stating that Hussein 'must expect the Arms of the Allied Powers to fall on him'. 'To this declaration His Highness made no reply', the report of the audience concludes, 'on which the commissioners took their leave, His Highness wishing them with much politeness a good voyage'.¹⁸²

To be 'called a Robber and a Pirate'. Contestations in Tunis and ceremonials in Tripoli

The stopover at Tunis, the second destination, brought the commissioners similar disagreements and contestations. Authorities in the Regency of Tunis also challenged the bases and implications of this European to enforce security. While the Anglo-French expedition was still in the process of preparing, the French consul in Tunis, Jacques Devoize, had received warnings about this mission from the Ministry. In the announcement of the expedition, Marquis Jean-Joseph Dessolles (1767-1828), France's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote that a favourable reply from Mahmud Bey would finally end all calls for a general maritime league. In a telling piece of phrasing, he described this project as 'a great danger to the tranquillity of Europe'.¹⁸³ Apparently, the French government was not too keen

¹⁸¹ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Detail of the commissioner's second audience with the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 09-09-1819, fp. 176-179; CADN, 22PO/1/42, 'Rapport de deuxieme audience de M.M. les comissaires'.

¹¹² TNA, FO 8/3, 'Detail of the commissioner's second audience with the Dey of Algiers', Algiers 09-09-1819, fp. 176-179.

¹⁸³ CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Dessolles to Devoize', Paris 08-07-1819.

on the prospect of further, more intimate concertation against the North African Regencies. Its participation in the expedition indeed set uncomfortably along the Restoration monarchy's broader aims of restoring the old commercial and diplomatic standing in North Africa, which it initially tried to achieve, as we have seen in Chapter 2, by maintaining close bilateral relations. Devoize, for his part, constantly did his best to remain on good footing with the Bey's family, even writing lengthy homages to a prince of the court when he was unfavourably mentioned in the French *Journal des Débats*. There were commercial interests at stake, with lower tariff duties to be had.¹⁸⁴ Devoize nevertheless seems to have considered the expedition as a chance to finally strike that bargain, so he dutifully rendered himself at the service of the commanders when they arrived on 22 September.¹⁸⁵

Vice-admiral Fremantle had been in Tunis before, but he did not find his return to the Regency very uplifting. In his private correspondence, he noted that he 'was sorry to perceive' the changes in the Regency since his last visit in 1812. Back then, he wrote, the country 'was becoming more civilized under the Bey, who was a sensible man'. The current Regent and his family, in contrast, seemed to him to 'pay little attention to Treaties, treat the consuls without respect', and, as Fremantle concluded, 'no faith can be placed in their government'.¹⁸⁶ Notably, the British commander only wrote this negative commentary *after* the negotiations, though he and Jurien spent a week waiting for their audience. Mahmud Bey had kept the men waiting, as he had gone to the countryside for a few days to benefit his health. The commissioners refused to meet with the crown prince instead, as Mahmud proposed, because they considered talking to a junior to be beneath their standing.¹⁸⁷

The audience finally took place on 27 September. Mahmud Bey received the commissioners, their following and their consuls in much the same manner as Dey Hussein had welcomed them in Algiers. He treated the commissioners, who were seated left and right of him, to coffee, listened to their objectives and received the protocol, which he gave to his son Hassan to read it in private. While Hassan Bey looked at the documents, his father asked the commissioners several questions. Finding these 'difficult to understand', the two commanders kept referring to the texts. In the meantime, they also let the British and French consuls try to take advantage of their presence. Fremantle backed the British resident's complaints concerning duties on fisheries and some cases of delinquents protected by the

¹⁸⁴ CADN, 712PO/1/53, no. 82, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 31-12-1817 and no. 83, 'Devoize to Richelieu', Tunis 16-01-1818.

¹⁸⁵ CADN, 712PO/1/54, no. 111, 'Devoize to Dessolles', Tunis 20-10-1819.

¹⁸⁶ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Fremantle to Croker', aboard *Rochfort* Tunis Bay 29-09-1819, fp. 77-78.

¹⁸⁷ CADN, 712PO/1/54, no. 111, 'Devoize to Dessolles', Tunis 20-10-1819.

Bey. Jurien did the same for Devoize's grievances over customs tariffs and commercial stipulations. Mahmud Bey rejected all these appeals, which the commissioners themselves already noted 'were foreign to their mission'.¹⁸⁸ The Prince then returned from his study, spoke briefly to his father, and reportedly declared 'with vehemence' that a written answer would be given.¹⁸⁹

This answer came the next morning and though it was succinct, it did contain a clear critique of the expedition. The translated reply stated that Mahmud Bey had always respected his treaties. It called out the questionable mandate of the commissioners by invoking the legality of the existing diplomatic arrangements and categorically rejected the accusation of piracy. The statement set out a basic definition of what piracy was, and why the term did not apply to the conduct of the Bey:

'He is called a Robber and a Pirate, who captures vessels and goods without a cause and without justice; who breaks through all established customs, and tramples upon treaties; It has neither been proved nor heard of, thank God, that we have ever so disregarded customs and infringed Treaties as to deserve such a letter from you'.¹⁹⁰

The text then went on to clarify that the Regency needed an armed fleet. Tunis had to be protected as 'every government ought to take care of itself, both by sea and by land'. Mahmud, moreover, had obligations to the Ottoman Porte 'by religion'. The Sultan could demand military assistance from his vassals and Tunis should be able to provide it. Mahmud Bey, the statement concluded, would not comply with the demands. If need be, Tunis would face the consequences: 'If you wish to act unjustly and come and molest us, without any cause, there is an almighty God who protects us all'.¹⁹¹ Jurien and Fremantle set sail again two days later, on the first of October. Shortly thereafter, Mahmud Bey sent his navy to dock in the guarded harbour of Porto Farina, awaiting what would come next.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Translated declaration of Mahmud Bey', Tunis 29-09-1819, fp. 81-83.

¹⁹¹ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Translated declaration of Mahmud Bey', Tunis 29-09-1819, fp. 81-83.

¹⁸⁸ Ibidem; TNA, CO 2/10, 'Fremantle to Croker', Tunis Bay 29-09-1819, annex 3, 'Proces verbal', 27-09-1819, fp. 84-85, annexes 4 and 5 contain documents relating to the consuls' complaints and Mahmud Bey's replies, fp. 86-90. Further correspondence on these matters annexed to 'Fremantle to Croker', Tunis Bay 29-09-1819, fp. 91-107.

¹⁸⁹ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Fremantle to Croker', Tunis Bay 29-09-1819, annex 3, 'Proces verbal', 27-09-1819, fp. 84-85.

¹⁹² E. Bey, Du Rôle de la dynastie Husseïnite dans la naissance et le développement de la Tunisie moderne (10 juillet 1705-12 mai 1881) (Paris 1968), vol. 2, pp. 800-809.

After this fierce opposition in Tunis, which turned the very accusation of illegality against the European powers themselves, the authorities in Tripoli reacted very differently to the Anglo-French expedition. The commissioners' visit to Tripoli hence gave the mission a distinctive ending, completely unlike the preceding two stopovers. Pasha Yusuf Karamanli immediately provided the desired declaration. The translation of his statement read: 'our inclinations are, and shall be, to comply with the wishes of their Majesties, in giving up the system of cruising and to live in harmony with the powers of Europe'. The intentions, 'confirmed by our royal seal', could 'be communicated to the Congress'.¹⁹³

In Tripoli, there was thus no questioning of the Aachen decisions or a critique of the claims to security. Nevertheless, the translated declaration does notably avoid the term 'piracy', speaking of 'cruising' instead. Karamanli's statement also tacitly argued against the necessity of the Anglo-French endeavour, noting that Tripoli had 'not for a long time sent out cruizers (...) as the Kings of France and Great Britain ought to know'.¹⁹⁴ The pasha had indeed begun to try and arrange peace treaties with Tripoli's remaining European adversaries around the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Tuscany, the Papal Sates, and the Hanseatic cities each received offers to negotiate.¹⁹⁵ That 'voluntary overture to Peace & Harmony', as the British consul described it, fit a broader shift in the Regency's policies. Following the payment of hefty indemnities on several Austrian captures, strict orders from the Porte, and increasing European hostility, Karamanli, as we have seen, had decided to replace maritime raiding with an inland extension of power. The Pasha wanted to set up a campaign to Bornu (an independent kingdom located to the southwest of Lake Chad) and could very well use British goodwill, especially in monetary form.¹⁹⁶ The arrival of the expedition thus allowed him to once again show his friendship and perhaps further his personal agenda. To Fremantle and Jurien, it granted at least some appearance of success to their mission.¹⁹⁷

The two commanders' departure from Tripoli ended the execution of Protocol 39. Copies of the document had been distributed in Constantinople and the North African Regencies,

¹⁹³ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Fremantle to Croker', Tripoli 09-10-1819, fp. 117-118; 'Declaration by the Bashaw', Tripoli 09-10-1819, fp. 121-122.

¹⁹⁴ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Declaration by the Bashaw', Tripoli 09-10-1819, fp. 121-122.

¹⁹⁵ TNA, FO 8/3, 'Warrington to Bathurst', Tripoli 06-07-1818, fp. 78-80; FO 139/44, 'Castlereagh to Hardenberg', Aix-la-Chapelle 08-10-1818; FO 139/47, 'Castlereagh to Cockturn-Esgo', Aix-la-Chapelle 08-10-1818. The Hanseatic cities nonetheless rejected the offer, the Senates being unwilling to pay tributes for peace. Baasch, *Die Hansestädte*, pp. 147-148.

¹⁹⁶ Folayan, *Tripoli*, pp. 85-88; Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 323-324.

¹⁹⁷ Dessolles described the news from Tripoli as 'completely satisfying'. CADLC, 8CP/612, 'Dessolles to Latour-Maubourg', Paris 11-11-1819, fp. 330. In return for his cooperation (also in welcoming a British geographical expedition), Yusuf Karamanli received a gold medal from the British Crown. TNA, CO 2/10, 'Fremantle to Karamanli', Malta 14-10-1819, fp. 110-111 and 'Karamanli to Fremantle', Tripoli 24-10-1819, fp. 112-113.

which resulted in a range of further reports, statements and dispatches. Overall, the efforts had mainly brought to light the deep-seated opposition to multilateral security politics. Local, non-European actors unequivocally contested the demands to end corsairing, which were posed in the name of a continental congress that had involved only European statesmen. The modes of contestation involved procedural obstruction, competing claims of legality, assertions of sovereignty and fierce critiques of the piracy accusation, based on those sovereign rights. In an international legal sense, this opposition and the ensuing discussions between European and non-European actors disclosed profoundly different understandings of what constituted internal law. Authorities in Tunis, Algiers and Constantinople took recourse to old treaties and notions of the natural law of nations in their legal claims, while the concerting officials of the European Great Powers were actively engaged in upending and remaking those traditional legal bases, aligning them more closely to their interests as dominant parties in the transforming international system.

The multilateral efforts of 1819 thus once again made clear that the European discourses of security and piracy were troubled, problematic, and open to contestation in an international legal sense. The efforts also illustrate that the delegitimation of corsairing as a piratical threat to security was hard to reconcile with local understandings of political legitimacy. Forcefully imposed attempts to end maritime raiding from foreign powers had brought revolts and coups in Tunis and Algiers after 1816. Shipbuilding efforts in the dockyards and the reconstruction of fortifications also indicated that the authorities of these Regencies were not willing to give up their privateering wars. As the contestations of Dey Hussein and Mahmud Bey indicated, corsairing was integral to the Regency's sovereignty and belligerent rights. Internally, corsairing held an important social and cultural function. Hence, security efforts were encroachments that had to be resisted. As Fremantle and Jurien completed their mission and the Anglo-French bows split the Mediterranean waves again, one question rose up: what would follow all this opposition?

The shallows of security. Contestation and its consequences

Fremantle and Julien sailed into the port of Toulon in early November. They filed their reports, had their respective governments take note of it - and that was really all that

happened.¹⁹⁸ There was no creation of general league, no concerted attack, no 'united arms' that fell on the Regencies. The British and French bureaucracies circulated the commissioners' accounts in various European capitals, but there was hardly any follow-up. A few sittings of the London ambassadorial conferences treated the mission's results, but those meetings only took note of the reports. To the French plenipotentiary, Latour-Maubourg, it appeared that Castlereagh was not very willing to talk about the matter. He seemed to find the negotiations on the slave trade much more important and quickly tried to steer the talks back to that issue.¹⁹⁹ The initiative of the 1819 measures then gradually fizzled out, or rather: it was willingly smothered. Dessolles, the French Foreign Minister, discouraged Viscount Viella in Constantinople from taking any further action, instructing him to let the matter rest.²⁰⁰ The two commanders also went their separate ways after the mission ended. Fremantle died in Naples just weeks after the expedition, due to a sudden 'inflammation in the bowels'.²⁰¹ Jurien got a new posting at station of the Antilles, where he had to keep an eye on South American rebel privateers.²⁰² The proposed maritime league quietly disappeared from diplomatic correspondence and public debate.²⁰³

Was this dissolution of multilateral security efforts a direct result of Dey Hussein, Mahmud Bey and Djanib Effendi's opposition to the concerted measures? After tracing the implementation of these measures, we may say that they indeed faltered due to contestations from non-European actors. The ways in which officials in Algiers, Tunis and Constantinople criticized the intimidations and demands of the European powers did clearly indicate the limits to the security culture, calling into question its diplomatic and legal bases. Still, the lack of any subsequent repressive action against the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' cannot solely be attributed to the contestations of Dey Hussein, Mahmud Bey and Djanib Effendi. When the Anglo-French expedition was still being prepared, it had already become apparent

¹⁹⁸ Transfers of the various reports from Paris to London and news of the commissioners' return to Toulon are in CADLC, 8CP/612, 'Dessolles to Latour-Maubourg', Paris 30-09-1819, fp. 266-268, 'Dessolles to Latour-Maubourg', Paris 04-11-1819, fp. 324-326, and 'Dessolles to Latour-Maubourg', Paris 11-11-1819, fp. 330.

¹⁹⁹ CADN, 8CP/612, 'Dessolles to Latour-Maubourg', Paris 30-09-1819, fp. 266-268 and 'Latour-Maubourg to Dessolles', London 12-11-1819, fp. 331-332. The conferences were then postponed until December 1819 because the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia and Prussia had not received new instructions on the issue of the slave trade.

²⁰⁰ CADN, 166BO/1/61, 'Dessolles to Viella', Paris 29-12-1819.

²⁰¹ J. Laughton, 'Fremantle'.

²⁰² Jurien replaced Duperré, the French commander in the Antilles in March 1821, his personal file contains the copied instructions for that posting, Service historique de la Défense, Vincennes (SHD), 35/GG²/6, sub-folder, 'Marine Ministry, Correspondence and instructions, 1819'.

²⁰³ Online databases and the *Hansard Parliamentary Papers* indicate that the expedition was not discussed in the House of Commons; the next debate on piracy was about the protection of British commerce against piracy in the West Indies on 3 July 1822. The few mentions of the 'Dey of Algiers' were mainly for comic effect in debates on other issues, causing noted boisterous laughter in the Houses of Parliament.

that the British and French governments were not very enthusiastic about the prospect of an alliance anyway. Multilateral negotiations on a maritime league had, moreover, become cumbersome and difficult by the time of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The opposition of purportedly piratical actors did bring these complications to the fore, exposing the lack of will amongst the concerting European government to carry their intimidations into effect. After 1819, it was thus as if the multilateral efforts ran aground on a shallow. Opposition in the Regencies and from the Ottoman Porte forced European officials to confront those shallows and replot their course of action.

This chapter now turns to that replotting of security's course, highlighting the consequences of the preceding instances of contestation. We will hence see the most ambitious plans of multilateral measures against 'Barbary piracy' disappear. As perceptions of this threat endured, multilateral actions nevertheless remained unimplemented. Grand proposals for combined fleets and concerted attacks were not going to materialize, as the Anglo-French expedition and concerted communications in Constantinople left Great Power statesmen weary of implementing further multilateral interventions. While concerted, multilateral negotiations over matters of security still endured, the years after 1819 saw a drop in the execution of actual cooperative security practices against the threat of piracy. Contestations by non-European actors had made clear that such actions would involve a military commitment that Great Powers statesmen were unwilling to make in the changing international circumstances of the 1820s. In fact, further contestation from the authorities of Algiers even manged to revert the one form of standing naval cooperation that had been realised: the Alcalá alliance of Spain and the Netherlands. Explaining how these changes and reversals came about will not only allow us to gauge the impact of opposition to security, it will also show that the fight against Mediterranean piracy did not proceed in a linear fashion, with ever greater repression and domination.

Anxieties of old

The opposition of the Ottoman and North African authorities provoked a newly felt sense of menace amongst European diplomats in the Regencies and Constantinople. In October 1819, Liston observed a lot of activity at the Ottoman arsenal. A total number of twenty-five warships were being outfitted, he noted, 'with unusual expedition'. This 'sudden armament'

seemed peculiar and the British ambassador found it difficult to determine the purpose.²⁰⁴ Other things also appeared to be out of the ordinary, imbued with a new sort of menace. On 9 October, Liston reported the arrival of a special envoy from Algiers. The agent and his following carried an abundance of gifts. There were lions, tigers, and ostriches, parrots in jewelled cages, holds stuffed with rich fabrics and ornamented furniture, as well as a shackled group of African slaves. Such a mission was in itself not unusual, especially when a new Dey had come to power. Yet Liston was sure that the Algerine envoy came 'to ask advice and eventual assistance' in matters of corsairing and in defiance of the allied powers.²⁰⁵ When the result of the Anglo-French expedition became known in early November, Liston went on to report that the Algerine envoy had travelled to Smyrna. There, he had raised recruits for Algiers, in 'accompanyment of Drums and musick and with greater *éclat* than usual'.²⁰⁶ Again, the British ambassador appeared anxious, or at least preoccupied, with the idea that things were out of the ordinary due to the Anglo-French expedition.

Djanib Effendi responded to the expedition's news with only a brief remark. The Reis Effendi merely voiced his hope that 'the affair is all over'.²⁰⁷ The reinstated French ambassador in Constantinople Marquis Charles François de Rivière (1763-1828) did not believe the Porte could really be that uninterested in the dealings of his vassals. Surely but secretly, he noted, the Ottoman authorities were quite satisfied that the Empire's outposts 'showed their teeth a little'.²⁰⁸ Of course, the Porte had actually instructed the Regencies to terminate their corsairing right away, warning them of a potential European attack. The European ambassadors, however, saw some hidden convolution between the Sultan and his North African subordinates. They kept stressing that matters in the Ottoman Empire were giving rise for concern and disquiet. Liston, for instance, kept writing London on the activities of the Ottoman navy. '[T]he preparations in the arsenal have been out of all proportion', he reported, 'two thousand Greek seamen (...) hold themselves ready for service'.²⁰⁹ As his concerns prior to the communications and expedition already foreshadowed, Liston feared that the security measures of 1819 could perhaps upset Britain's peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire.

²⁰⁴ TNA, FO, 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 12-10-1819, fp. 256-257.

²⁰⁵ TNA, FO, 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 09-09-1819, fp. 237-238.

²⁰⁶ TNA, FO, 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 09-11-1819, pp. 280-281. Emphasis underlined in the original.

²⁰⁷ Ibidem.

²⁰⁸ CADN, 166PO/B/60, no. 8, 'Riviere to Pasquier', Constantinople 10-02-1820.

²⁰⁹ TNA, FO, 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 09-11-1819, fp. 280-281.

Diplomatic reports from Algiers and Tunis only intensified European anxieties. An Austrian representative noted that the Regency of Algiers was readying twelve corsairs, including a frigate of 42 cannons.²¹⁰ The appearance of these warships on the Mediterranean would be a test to see whether the European powers followed up on their intimidations. That, at least, is how the Austrian ambassador Lützow framed the activity in his dispatches to Metternich. The Porte's approval to recruit some 7,000 Janissaries for Algiers, moreover, appeared to substantiate such suspicions.²¹¹ Activity in the North African shipyards seemed to match that of Constantinople's arsenal. Historical estimates of fleet sizes show that the numbers of corsair vessels increased from 1819 to 1821, rising from eleven to fifteen ships in Algiers and from two to ten vessels in Tunis.²¹² The French registers of passports handed over to Algerine authorities and corsair captains match those estimates, showing an increase from zero listings in 1819 to fifteen in 1821.²¹³ This naval activity in North Africa revived rumours of 'Barbary pirates' who were on the hunt for Hanseatic merchants, or who kidnapped Tuscan fishermen in the waters near La Calle and Tabarka.²¹⁴ The efforts of Fremantle and Jurien had thus hardly fostered a sense of security, as old notions of threat continued to grip European contemporaries.

Many of those anxieties, however, eventually proved unfounded. The activity in the dockyards of Algiers and Tunis, it soon turned out, was not solely directed against the European powers, but rather against each other. In March 1820, an Algerine army crossed the border with Tunis to raze and occupy the city of Kef. Dey Hussein, befitting the general direction of his policies, aimed to reverse his predecessor's agreements with Tunis and tried to bring the Regency back into a tributary relation with Algiers.²¹⁵ The conflict quickly extended to the high seas, where Algerine corsairs took Tunisian vessels. Tunisian squadrons, meanwhile, roamed in view of Algiers, searching for retaliation.²¹⁶ Mahmud Bey announced to the European consuls that he would let Tunisian sailors stop and search foreign ships for

²¹⁰ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Bujukdéré 25-10-1820, fp. 148-151.

²¹¹ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 8, 'Lützow to Metternich', Péra 26-06-1820, fol. 76-79.

²¹² In case of Algiers, from 11 ships with 252 cannons in 1818 to 15 with 368 in 1821. For Tunis, from 2 ships with 112 cannons in 1818 to 10 with 258 in 1820. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie*, p. 272 and Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, p. 275, fn. 40.

²¹³ The microfilmed register in Aix-en-Provence (which notes the number of passports handed to the Algerine authorities and the relevant corsair captains) contains 0 listings for 1819, 5 for 1820 and 15 for 1821. Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (ANOM), GGA1AA42, 'Main courante des expéditions des passeports aux corsaires algériens', 1789-1827.

 ²¹⁴ Archives Chambre de Commerce, Marseille (CCM), MR.4.6.1.4.1/01, '[??] to Chambre de Commerce', Marseille 18-07-1820 and 'Prefet of Bouches-du-Rhône to Chambre de Commerce', Marseille 04-08-1820.
 ²¹⁵ Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, pp. 276-278. Noting the unfounded rumours and his misguided reports, CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 25, 'Malivoire to Pasquier', Tunis 16-07-1820.

²¹⁶ CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 40, 'Malivoire to Rayneval', Tunis 12-12-1820.

Algerine contraband, to which the French and British consuls loudly objected.²¹⁷ The Bey's designs were put to a sudden stop shortly thereafter, as a big storm wrecked almost the entire Tunisian fleet in port. Little later, an Ottoman envoy managed to settle the differences, arranging that Algiers would return the captured Tunisian prizes and Tunis would recommence the annual tribute of olive oil.²¹⁸

European actors were particularly keen on singling out threats to the uninterrupted flow of free trade in the Regencies. Though these threats related to tariffs and anchorage fees rather than captures or killings, Europeans still referred to them as types of piracy. Threat perceptions thus proved to be adaptable to the proceedings of security efforts. In the direct aftermath of the 1819 expeditions, notions of threat changed in the face of local policies. The three Regencies each faced the same dire situations of an economic downturn, internal revolts and a plague epidemic that still flared up sporadically, which at times led to desperate measures. Authorities in Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli turned to arbitrary confiscations, increased taxations, devaluations of currencies, collections of outstanding debts and sales of agricultural produce beforehand, at a fixed price. Providing short-term alleviation at best, all these solutions pushed inflation onwards, increased imbalances of trade and brought further commercial disputes.²¹⁹ A newly appointed French agent in Tunis, Vice-consul Charles-Etienne Malivoire (who manned the consulate in 1819-1824), described such fiscal, commercial and monetary policies of Mahmud Bey as systems of vengeance against Christians. He claimed they were just a kind of corsairing in a different form. Malivoire reported on the Bey's 'oppressions' from the day he was appointed and did not tire to call for forceful measures.²²⁰ However, the ways in which European governments engaged with such perceived threats in North Africa changed significantly after 1819, owing both to local contestations as well as a rapidly changing political context in Europe itself.

'A repugnance'? Collective security amidst European revolutions

While anxieties over North African corsairing endured and threats perceptions diversified, many European security practices that were geared against 'Barbary piracy' returned to older,

²¹⁷ CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 26, 'Malivoire to Pasquier', Tunis 27-07-1820 and no. 32, 'Malivoire to Pasquier', Tunis 20-10-1820.

²¹⁸ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, p. 328. The shipwrecking and the peace agreements are also described in CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 45, 'Malivoire to Rayneval', Tunis 14-02-1821 and 22PO/1/65, 'Malivoire to Deval', Tunis 21-03-1821.

²¹⁹ Panzac, Barbary corsairs, pp. 322 and 327-328; Folayan, Tripoli, pp. 97-98.

²²⁰ CADN, 712PO/1/55, no. 2, 'Malivoire to Dessolles', Tunis 20-11-1819, and 712PO/1/177, 'Demis to Malivoire', Tunis 02-09-1821.

less concerted forms. Multilateral deliberations on the 'Barbary pirate' threat would not disappear completely, but European governments nevertheless increasingly sought to resolve their conflicts with the Regencies in a bilateral manner through the tested channels of treaties and tributes. The period after 1819 notably differed from the preceding years in this sense as, for instance, Danish, Swedish, Portuguese, Tuscan and Neapolitan tributes were dutifully delivered to Algiers again.²²¹ The Senators and merchants of the Hanseatic cities, for their part, stopped hoping for Great Power assistance and tried to open direct negotiations with the Regents.²²² The Prussian government attempted the same by sending an agent to the Mediterranean. William Shaler, the U.S. consul-general at Algiers, was vacationing in Marseille when he encountered the man. Identifying himself as 'Henry Pütter', the agent told Shaler he was a knight on a secret mission to Algiers. According to Shaler, this venture illustrated that Prussia had lost all hope of the Aachen agreements against the Regencies. Pütter even expressed, or so the U.S. consul noted, 'a repugnance to treating with them through the mediation of either France or England'.²²³ Shaler was only too happy to offer his own services as a mediator, instructing his twenty-year-old nephew to welcome and assist the Prussian knight when he arrived in Algiers.²²⁴ The lengthy negotiations of Aix-la-Chapelle, the complicated execution of the concerted communications and the lack of a real follow-up to the Anglo-French expedition did not cast a favourable light on multilateral security efforts. Powers that still faced North African privateering hence increasingly opted for solitary solutions.

One of the reasons behind the diminished enthusiasm for multilateral interventions was a noted clash between collective security and national commercial interests. A particularly damning take on the results of concerted security practices was given in 1820 by a British Member of Parliament, Joseph Marryat. Being a noted opponent of the prominent Whig Henry Brougham, who played such a prominent role in the coming of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816, Marryat acted as a parliamentary spokesman for the Lloyd's insurance firm. He scolded the British government's conduct in matters of European security in a sitting of the House of Commons on 5 June 1820, while presenting a petition from the shipbuilders of London that duties on Baltic timbers should not be lowered. Marryat soon spoke of much

²²¹ CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Deval to Governor of Livorno', Algiers 21-08-1820; *The Times*, 12-08-1820.

²²² Baasch, *Die Hansestädte*, pp. 158-161.

²²³ NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 10, 'Shaler to Adams', at sea 18-08-1821. Emphasis underlined in the original. Also on Pütter's mission, Baasch, *Die Hansestädte*, pp. 156-157; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStA), III.HA MdA, II, nr. 5113-5114, 'Pütter to Bülow', Marseille 06-01-1821, fp. 140-146.

²²⁴ NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 10, 'Shaler to Adams', at sea 18-08-1821, attached 'Shaler to William Shaler Jr.' Marseille 25-06-1821.

wider grievances of British merchants, stating that the nation's Mediterranean carrying trade had almost completely disappeared. The British flag had long been the only one that the Barbary powers respected, he noted. Yet since 1815, 'in one of those fits of magnanimity to which we became subject, in consequence of being hailed as the deliverers of Europe', the government had turned against the Regencies and begun to assure the security of other nations' shipping as well. The result of these measures, Marryat exclaimed, 'was that all other European powers could navigate the Mediterranean with the same security as ourselves, and being able to sail at less expense than we can do, they immediately supplanted us in this carrying trade'.²²⁵ The speech was a far cry from the parliamentary demands that Britain should act for the sake of all Christian slaves in Algiers, which could have been heard in the commons only four years before. Multilateral security efforts thus not only seemed to be complicated and contestable, but also expensive.

None of this meant that collective security as a prima concern of Great Power international relations disappeared completely. There were still multilateral discussions at conferences and the shared deliberations over seemingly pressing threats. It was just that the ensuing implemented practices were less multinational than had once been proposed. We may also single out this development in the abolition of the international slave trade, the former twin issue of 'Barbary piracy'. French reluctance to submit to a mutual right of search, as well as the High Admiralty verdict on *Le Louis*, had exposed the limitations of broad, European naval measures. British diplomacy thus began to seek bilateral means to further international abolition. In 1817 and 1818, Britain entered a series of near identical treaties with Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. The agreements specified the mutual right of search that the British Cabinet so eagerly pursued. They also established a collective infrastructure of mixed courts in Rio de Janeiro, Havana, Paramaribo and Sierra Leone.²²⁶ The policing regime that the British government subsequently managed to erect against the slave trade was thereby founded on bilateral bases.²²⁷

Diplomatic actors stopped seeing the abolition of the slave trade and the threat of 'Barbary piracy' as issues that primarily had to be treated in concertation, but this did not mean that the frameworks of the post-1815 security culture were disintegrating or about to disappear. Multilateral deliberations over shared concerns and commonly perceived threats continued between Great Power statesmen. The drop in multilateral efforts against corsairing and the

²²⁵ Hansard, House of Commons, Debates, vol. 1, cols. 847-848, 05-06-1820.

²²⁶ Vick, 'Power, humanitarianism', p. 9; Benton and Ford, *Rage for order*, pp. 118-123.

²²⁷ Benton and Ford, *Rage for order*, pp. 19-20.

slave trade was, in fact, a result of the Congress System's increasing focus on other subjects that warranted a concerted approach. Several international meetings followed upon the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, such as the congresses at Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822). These were veritable successors to the diplomatic congregations of the first post-Napoleonic years in that they concerned the collective management of perceived threats to the international order. It was only that Great Power statesmen now largely distinguished the spread of revolutions throughout the European continent as the threat of primary importance, rather than 'Barbary piracy'.²²⁸

Uprisings and revolutions of disenfranchised and hungering peoples followed each other in quick succession in Great Britain, Spain, Naples, Portugal, Russia and the Ottoman Empire's Danubian Principalities and Greek territories. Bad harvests, economic recession, repressive policies and radical as well as nationalist political ideologies fuelled the popular discontent behind the Peterloo Massacre in Manchester, the Semyonovksy mutiny in St. Petersburg and the proclamation of a liberal constitution in Madrid, which all took place in 1819 and 1820. Questions of whether and how to intervene against revolutions on smaller power territory subsequently dominated the three congresses of 1820-1822.²²⁹ Whatever notion of a 'Barbary pirate' threat still existed among Great Power statesmen, it was totally eclipsed by a revitalised phobia of an international revolutionary conspiracy. Or, as Mark Jarrett notes, the fear of revolution became the Congress System's 'exclusive concern'.²³⁰

Another factor that significantly altered the workings of the Congress System and its security culture was the change of generation amongst the senior statesmen of the Great Powers. In the early 1820s, some of the prominent architects of the post-1815 European order passed away or left active political service. Most important, and most lamented in the literature, was the suicide of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh, who in a state of severe mental distress cut his own throat on the morning of 12 August 1822. With Castlereagh, the Congress System lost one of its staunchest and most pragmatic defenders in the British Isles. His successor, George Canning (1770-1827), openly loathed the conferences and never developed close personal relations with the other Great Power statesmen. Other members of the 'generation of 1815' passed away too. The death of Tsar Alexander on 1 December 1825 was another impactful loss, as he had been one of the most vocal proponents of multilateral security measures. After 1825, only Metternich remained of the original

²²⁸ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 220-258.
²²⁹ Ibidem.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 260.

Congress of Vienna crew, leading some historians to conclude that the Congress System was quickly reaching its own demise.²³¹

In this context, recurrent rumours of 'Barbary piracies' put forth by consuls in North Africa lacked the urgency to make it to congress negotiations again. There certainly were attempts to set the perceived threat of the North African 'pirates' on the international agenda again, but those efforts largely failed. Following the Congress of Verona, the commander of the Order of St. John, for instance, issued yet another plea to regain the former possessions on Malta. His arguments revolved around the old promise of protection against the Islamic 'pirates'. Only this time, the Order's claims referred to the revolutions in Spain and Portugal. The note mentioned 'the revolutionary demon' that disrespected property, just like the 'Barbary pirates' disrespected property. Hence, when the concerting Great Powers sought to save society from the evils of revolution, they should also allow the Order of Malta to do its old job of protecting property against piracy.²³² The endeavour was hardly taken note of and appears to have done little for the knightly order. Yet the effort illustrates the degree to which revolutionary unrest had become the most urgent of threats in the minds of Great Power statesmen. Revolution had become the overarching security issue, it had become the threat that 'Barbary piracy' failed to measure up against.

As the greatest priority of the Congress System and its security culture, revolution did lead to multilateral negotiations and a concertation of practices. Despite significant differences of opinion, Great Power statesmen manage to agree on who could and could not intervene in which revolutionary outbreaks. Tsar Alexander hence refrained from intervening militarily in Greece, whereas the forces of Austria were given allied permission to act unilaterally in Naples.²³³ The one case where this multilateral management of revolutionary unrest on the continent came to relate most directly to the fight against Mediterranean piracy was that of Spain, where domestic political tensions escalated in the early 1820s. The multilateral negotiations on the issue of revolution in Spain and the foreign intervention that had to quell the unrest in 1823 also impacted the single standing form of naval cooperation that had carried over from the ambitious years of 1816-1819: the Spanish-Dutch league of Alcalá.

Revolutionary agitation in Spain had come circling back to the metropole from the Latin American colonies. Various groups in different parts of the Spanish Empire had rallied behind revolutionary proclamations and picked up liberal causes since the earliest days of the

²³¹ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 316-318 and 345-347.

²³² HHStA, StAbt, Malta, 14, 'Memorandum by the Grand Commander', 29-07-1823.

²³³ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 241 and 306-308.

Restoration. By 1820, agitation against conservative monarchical rule reached Iberian territory as well. Junior army officers in Cadiz, having just returned from expeditions in South America, revolted, attempted to take the city and proclaimed the older, more liberal constitution of 1812. King Ferdinand VII accepted the constitution's return and brought liberal factions to power. That same decision, two years later, helped inspire a rapid secession of royalist coups and constitutionalist counter-revolts. Chaos and radicalism appeared to reign in Madrid, or so the Great Power statesmen feared. Hence, they addressed the matter of Spanish unrest during the Congress of Verona.²³⁴

Unrest in Spain could become a pressing international issue because of fears that the revolution could spread northwards across the Pyrenees, reviving the Quadruple Alliance's old nemesis of a revolutionary France. The international treatment of the Spanish uprisings, however, only asserted the position of France as one of the continent's Great Powers, as the Boubron monarchy was to undertake a unilateral intervention against its southern neighbour. At the Congress of Verona, the courts of Prussia, Austria and Russia issued the 'Verona Circular' of 14 December 1822. It professed allied support for King Ferdinand and condemned the revolutionaries. Yet it was the French military that went beyond written declarations and eventually intervened in Spain on its own. On 7 April 1823, the so-called 'Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis' trekked across the border, though the actual size of the army was closer to 60,000 troops. Their command had a notable Bourbon-Bonapartist blend. Louis Antoine, the Duke of Angoulême (the son of later King Charles X) headed the army, aided by several veteran marshals of the Napoleonic Wars. On land, the army obtained quick successes and advanced rapidly to Madrid.²³⁵

Despite its unilateral character and rather unconcerted beginnings, the French monarchy nevertheless presented the intervention as an act of the Great Power alliance. Or, as King Louis XVIII expressed it to the French Chamber of Deputies in January 1823: 'A hundred thousand Frenchmen (...) are ready to march (...) to conserve the throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV, to preserve that Kingdom from ruin, and to reconcile her with Europe'.236 The British Cabinet, with George Canning (1770-1827) as the new Foreign Secretary, questioned the very legality of the French ventures and tried to put limits on them. It sent a contingent of 4,000 troops to Portugal and made clear that the French forces could

²³⁴ Ibid., pp. 225-227, 312-313 and 321-323. ²³⁵ Ibid., p. 341.

²³⁶ Cited in Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, p. 339.

not attempt more than a temporary occupation of Spain.²³⁷ Yet, in the end, the Cabinet accepted the intervention.

Spain's revolutionary situation and the French intervention also tossed the Alcalá alliance with the Netherlands into a listless impasse. It even set the continued existence of that pact on an uncertain, troubled footing. Hugo van Zuylen, the Dutch representative in Madrid, complained about the repeated rotations and replacements of Ministers in these times of unrest. Revolutionary fervour meant that few dignitaries held their posts for long and when they did, the Alcala obligations rarely appeared to be their primary concern. Several appointees such as Juan Jabat, who served under the Alcalá stipulations as a sailor and was Minister of War for a month in 1820, promised Van Zuylen that the Spanish navy would fulfil its duties. The distractions of unrest and mutiny, however, subsequently kept the Spanish fleet from cooperating with the Dutch.²³⁸ Moreover, Spain's ships of war proved to be in such a deplorable condition that they were not fit to sail the Mediterranean, leaving most of the obligatory naval demonstrations to the squadron of the Netherlands.²³⁹

Dissatisfaction over the Alcalá alliance had been present amongst Dutch naval commanders and diplomats for much longer, almost from the moment that the alliance began to be turned into practice. The old commander of the 1816 bombardment of Algiers, Vice-Admiral Van de Capellen, discarded the Spanish bomb vessels that the Dutch navy had once found so appealing as too small and largely unfit for the league's purposes of possibly attacking the Regencies. He also noted that differences in 'prejudice, mores and habits' between Dutchmen and Spaniards were too big to make working together pleasurable.²⁴⁰ The death of a Dutch sailor at the hands of a Spanish guard in the port of Mahon was particularly damning to the cooperative effort. Van Capellen even suggested to direct provisions via Lisbon, so the fleet would no longer have to spend the winter there.²⁴¹

Due to these grievances, Dutch naval commanders in the Mediterranean became increasingly unwilling to act on behalf of its treaty partner. Even when conflicts over consular debts turned into war between Spain and Algiers in 1820, the Dutch did not accept this as a 'casus foederis'. Vice-Admiral Hendrik Alexander Ruysch, who commanded the Dutch

²³⁷ Ibid., pp. 340-341; J. Swain, *The struggle for the control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848. A study in Anglo-French relations* (Dissertation at the University of Philadelphia 1933), pp. 45-46.

 ²³⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.46, inv. 19, no. 28, 'Van Zuylen to Van Nagell', Madrid 27-03-1820; no. 34, 'Van Zuylen to Van Nagell', Madrid 10-04-1820; inv. 20, no. 135, 'Van Zuylen to Van Nagell', Madrid 19-11-1821.

²³⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 237, no. 2515, 'Van Zuylen van Nijevelt to Van Nagell', Madrid 14-06-1821; inv. 248, no. 4647, 'Van Zuylen van Nijevelt to Van Nagell', Madrid 19-11-1821.

²⁴⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 136, no. 1491, 'Van de Capellen to Van Nagell', onboard *Prins van Oranje* in Gibraltar 12-03-1817.

²⁴¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 146, no. 3828, 'Royal Decree of King William I', 03-09-1817.

Mediterranean squadron in 1820-1824, argued that the defensive league could be put on an offensive footing only when Spanish shipping would be 'insulted' by corsairs and the Regency reneged on compensating such harassments.²⁴² The Alcalá alliance, being the one extended form of naval cooperation against 'Barbary piracy', was thus steadily eroded by mutual disappointments and a shared failing to live up to the treaty agreements.

At one point, Spanish officials made a forlorn attempt to link the Alcalá alliance back to broader European security practices. They argued that Spain's conflict with Algiers necessitated the creation of a general league, as the Anglo-Dutch expedition of 1819 had threatened to do. In reply, the British Cabinet explicated that such a league would never be created and stated that Spain and the Netherlands basically found themselves separated from the other European powers with their defensive pact.²⁴³ The Alcalá treaty, once a self-proclaimed token of honour to its signees, thus began to ring hollow. It also started to seem a peculiar anomaly, isolated from the broader security culture that it had once been so centrally embedded in, but which now was largely occupied with revolutions rather than maritime security. Consequently, the Alcalá alliance proved unable to weather a new onslaught of non-European contestations that made itself felt in 1824.

The end of Alcalá

The termination of the Alcalá alliance was decided upon by its two signing parties, but its unmaking directly resulted from a series of newly assertive actions by Dey Hussein of Algiers. From the beginning of 1824, Hussein started to raise new demands towards various European governments, and effectively sought to revert the consequences of the Regency's earlier defeats at European hands. He tried to reinstate the 'enslavement' of corsair captives, arguing that Exmouth's treaties of 1816 were null and void. He put the Regency on a war footing against Great Britain. He also confronted the governments of the Netherlands and Spain, threatening with hostilities if both powers did not immediately terminate their defensive alliance. To conclude this chapter on multilateral security efforts and its many contestations, we will now turn to this instance of opposition and find out how Dey Hussein of Algiers effectively managed to disband some European security arrangements.

A local revolt in Algiers' mountainous Bougie (Béjaïa) region brought on this new set of contestations. Something had been brewing in Bougie for a while. In late October 1823, news

²⁴² NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 214, no. 2678, 'Fraissinet to Van Nagell', Algiers 05-06-1820; inv. 214, no. 2704,

^{&#}x27;Ruysch to Van Nagell', Wassenaar in Gibraltar 21-06-1820.

²⁴³ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 236, no. 2140, 'Fagel to De Clercq', London 25-05-1821.

of unrest in that hilly region to the east of Algiers reached the Dey's palace. Kabyle tribesmen of the mountains turned against the representatives of central power, holding an Ottoman mufti hostage. Dey Hussein, whose policies repeatedly brought conflict with the Kabyle tribes, pursued a double clampdown. He dispatched an army under command of Agha Yahia, which managed to retake Bougie in 1825.²⁴⁴ He also ordered the consuls to hand over all Kabyles working in their service. Some of them, including the Dutch representative, gave their employees the option to flee. The French consul Pierre Deval chose to surrender the Kabyles working for him, whereas his British colleague Hugh McDonell openly refused the Dey's commands, invoking guarantees of Great Britain's protection.²⁴⁵ Hussein then decided to take the servants by force.

Troops broke into the British consular mansion and searched the grounds on 28 October 1823. McDonell, quick-tempered as usual, wrote to London with great indignation over this breach of diplomatic propriety. The Cabinet agreed that this conduct was unacceptable. Soon, the Admiralty dispatched two ships of war to reinstate the consul's rights and demand redress. The requested compensations were mainly of a symbolic nature, concerning signs of respect, but some of them were most uncommon. Particularly unusual was the demand that the British consul should be allowed to hoist the national flag on his residence as a mark of the Dey's goodwill. None of the consulates ever did this. Hussein refused, McDonell left the Regency aboard one of frigates, and things escalated from there, all the way to the point of war.²⁴⁶

During the ensuing conflict, Dey Hussein consistently attempted to overturn the results of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816. Perhaps strengthened by the lack of follow-up to the concerted Anglo-French expedition of 1819, Hussein now sought to outdo the effects of earlier defeats that the Regency had suffered. Seeking this reversal, he declared that Christian captives in Algiers would be held as slaves again. At that time, the prisons of the Regency held various Spaniards, owing to the conflict over Spain's consular debts. The British consul immediately requested a confirmation that these captives were treated as prisoners of war, in accordance with the treaties of 1816. Hussein refused, stating that the treaty of 1816 no longer applied. He suddenly devised the argument that it had been binding for only three years. Stating his claims, Hussein reportedly set out 'that his purpose was to treat all Spanish prisoners taken during the war as slaves according to the former system pursued by the

²⁴⁴ McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 39

²⁴⁵ R. Playfair, *The scourge of Christendom. Annals of the British relations with Algiers prior to the French conquest* (London 1884), pp. 288-290.

²⁴⁶ Ibidem.

Regency of Algiers'.²⁴⁷ Clearly, the Dey was seeking to counter the growing asymmetries of power, which had become all the more apparent through the push of pull of European security practices. Yet these asymmetries of power, as Hussein's actions show, were not deemed insurmountable and were not passively accepted.

Over the following months, a British naval force gradually amassed in view of Algiers. With as many as twenty-three ships of war stationed there, Algiers became the main focus of the British Mediterranean squadron. Its vessels were engaged in a blockade of the port, during which they chased several corsair vessels and captured some 250 Algerine seaborne travellers. Eventually, the fleet commenced an attack on the city.²⁴⁸ The fleet's commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir Harry Burrard Neale (1765-1840), headed the blockading forces and attempted to reopen negotiations with Dey Hussein.²⁴⁹ The last of those talks took place in March 1824, when Hussein denied that the Spanish captives were treated as slaves and said he would agree to all British demands, except for one: McDonell could not return as the British consul.²⁵⁰ Breaking off the negotiations there, Neale maintained the blockade and attempted to bombard the city on 24 July. Having learnt from Exmouth's successful tactic of positioning his ships close to shore, the defenders on the batteries ensured that Neale's forces remained at a distance.²⁵¹

As a result, the bombardment did not have much impact and the battle ended in an undecided manner. British commentators and historians later noted that Neale's attack on Algiers had been a vaguely interesting episode only for technological reasons. The tussle had featured the first steam ship in Royal Navy action. Its showing, however, was not very impressive. The steamer's paddles were quickly destroyed and its funnel shot away.²⁵² Nor did the attack have much diplomatic effect. The ensuing treaty confirmed what had already been stated in March: the Dey would respect the British consulate and abide to the agreements of 1816, but he would not allow McDonell to return to Algiers.²⁵³ The war ended with this compromise. McDonell returned to Britain and would soon be replaced, while Hussein professed his obedience to older agreements on Christian slavery.

²⁴⁷ TNA, FO 8/8, 'Bathurst to McDonell', London 05-01-1824 fp. 230-236.

²⁴⁸ TNA, FO 8/4, 'Spencer to Neale', aboard *Naiad* in the Bay of Algiers 31-01-1824, fp. 9-20.

²⁴⁹ TNA, FO 8/4, 'Spencer to Neale', aboard *Naiad* at sea 01-02-1824, fp. 28-31; 'Neale to Croker', aboard *Revenge* off Algiers 25-02-1824, fp. 45-48; 'Fisher to Canning', Great Yarmouth 17-04-1824, fp. 57 and Playfair, *The scourge*, pp. 294 and 301-302. Also, for French complaints about the British blockade of Algiers, CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Deval to Neale', Algiers 13-05-1824.

 $^{^{250}}$ TNA, FO 8/4, 'Neale to Croker', aboard *Revenge* at sea 29-03-1824, fp. 63-82.

²⁵¹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, p. 128.

²⁵² Playfair, *The scourge*, pp. 301-302.

²⁵³ TNA, FO 8/4, 'Declaration by Dey Hussein of Algiers', Algiers 26-07-1824, fp. 119-121 and 123-124.

Authors of later decades may have found the Anglo-Algerine war of 1824 largely irrelevant, but in light of the dynamics of contestation that marked the years following 1816, the scrimmage was, in fact, quite significant. The war against Great Britain seems to have inspired Dey Hussein to adopt a similar course of action against other European powers. Just months after his agreement with Admiral Neale, Hussein began to try and review the treaties with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. He first demanded new consular presents and then argued that the Netherlands had to start paying its tributes again.²⁵⁴ Dutch officials openly wondered whether the Dey's demands had something to do with the British negotiations. They inquired in London about Neale's agreements, asking if he had done anything to change the 1816 treaties.²⁵⁵ The Dutch consul in Algiers, meanwhile, maintained that tributes would not resume ²⁵⁶

In addition, Dey Hussein demanded that the Dutch government dissolve the Alcalá league. Only by disbanding the alliance with Spain could war be averted, Hussein declared. As the Dutch consul Fraissinet noted, Dey Hussein had long been irritated by the league, which made the Spanish government less susceptible to his wishes. For Fraissinet there hence was 'no doubt that the Algerine government wants to do all it can to make us renounce our treaty of Alcalá²⁵⁷ Hussein acted on this plan on 23 August 1824, when the Dutch Mediterranean squadron touched at Algiers. He brought things to a head by stating that the King of the Netherlands should immediately annul its alliance with Spain and deliver new 'presents', or tributes of naval stores, within three months. Hussein added that 'the position of Algiers had strengthened significantly' and, as a result, 'everything had put back to its old footing again'.²⁵⁸ The Regency, he stressed, was in a position to pose demands to the European powers again, much like it had in the past. Hussein's effort to dislodge the bilateral system of protection between Spain and the Netherlands moreover harkened back to the old strategy of pitting European powers against each other, which had been so effective for the authorities of the Regencies in the decades and centuries preceding 1815.

²⁵⁴ SHD, GR1/H/4, dossier 2, sub-dossier 2, 'Papers found in the cabinet of the Dey, 1816-1829', 'Wolterbuly to Dey Hussein', aboard a ship of the King of the Netherlands, 21-08-1824. Also mentioned in TNA, FO 112/2, 'Danford to Horton', Algiers 23-08-1824, fp. 8-11.

²⁵⁵ TNA, FO 8/12, 'Horton to Howard de Walden', London 16-10-1824, fp. 184-185 and 'Horton to Howard de Walden', London 08-12-1824 fp. 205-210. When looking into this matter, the British consul in Algiers found out that the copies of the 1816 treaties had disappeared from the consulate's archives, FO 112/2, 'Danford to Neale', Algiers 09-08-1824, fp. 3-4.

 ²⁵⁶ TNA, FO 112/2, 'Danford to Neale', Algiers 11-11-1824, fp. 31-32.
 ²⁵⁷ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 396, 24 sep., no. 6, 'Fraissinet to Van Reede', Algiers 06-08-1824.

²⁵⁸ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 396, 24 sep., no. 7, 'Fraissinet to Van Reede', Algiers 23-08-1824.

At this point, the Alcalá alliance was hardly something that the Dutch government desperately wanted to hold on to. It therefore did not take long for King William I to announce his cancellation of the treaty. The considerations behind this annulment almost exclusively revolved around the purported lack of Spanish effort in carrying out the Alcalá stipulations. For further justification, Dutch Ministers noted the 'extraordinary circumstances' which had arisen in Spain, now that the monarchy was effectively under French tutelage following the intervention of 1823.²⁵⁹ It was not hard to bid farewell to the alliance, as Dutch officials had never really obtained what they expected to gain from the Alcalá treaty. Through the eight years of the alliance's existence, it turned out that naval cooperation was challenging and often had disappointing results. Spanish actors did try to talk the Dutch government out of this decision, turning to French diplomats for mediation, but without much result.²⁶⁰ Dev Hussein received a confirmation of Alcalá's dissolution, together with King William's assertion that the Dutch government would rather start a war than reverse the treaty of 1816 and start paying presents of naval stores again. Unwilling to push things to the extreme, Hussein dropped the latter demands in early November.²⁶¹ In return, the Dutch government promised that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands would never enter into a treaty of mutual protection against Algiers again.²⁶²

Conclusion. Combustive prospects

With its dissolution in 1824, the eight-year lifespan of the Spanish-Dutch Alcalá alliance ran parallel to broader changes that affected the fight against Mediterranean piracy. In a sense, its fate was exemplary of the European engagement with North African maritime raiding. Between 1816 and 1824, ambitious plans for multinational security measures against piracy developed to fruition, became contested and faltered in the face of a return to bilateral means of providing security. In these eight years, unilateral actions and bilateral agreements gradually became the chosen outcome of concerted negotiations on the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy'. The demise of the Alcalá alliance thus reflected the general unfolding of the fight against Mediterranean piracy. Cooperation between the Spanish and Dutch navies proved to be more complicated and conflict-ridden than the signees of the Alcalá treaty had

²⁵⁹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 398, 20 okt., no. 15, 'Van der Hoop to Van Reede', The Hague 18-10-1824.

²⁶⁰ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 399, 26 okt., no. 15, 'Dedel to Van Reede', Paris 22-10-1824.

²⁶¹ NL-HaNA, 2.05.01, inv. 403, 2 dec., 12A, 'Fraissinet to Van Reede', Algiers 12-11-1824.

²⁶² Shaler, *Sketches of Algiers*, p. 232; TNA, FO 112/2, 'Danford to Horton', Algiers 12-11-1824, fp. 33-34.

ever expected. The other multilateral interventions against piracy that took place in these eight years were similarly marked by setbacks and mutual disagreement amongst the concerting European powers. Deliberations during the conferences in London and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle may have run relatively smoothly, but the implementation of the protocolled plans was much more difficult. Great Power ambassadors in Constantinople found it hard to harmonize the timing and contents of their messages to the Ottoman Porte, whereas the cooperation between British and French naval commanders was complicated and delayed by disagreements over ranks and other formalities. In practice, collective security was not easy to enact.

Further adding to the difficulties of implementation were the many instances of opposition against European security practices that followed after 1816. The most prominent and impactful of such contestations came from the supposedly 'piratical' authorities of Algiers and Tunis, as this opposition made the inter-imperial and exclusionary nature of the post-1815 security culture all the more apparent. During the Anglo-French diplomatic expedition of 1819, Dey Hussein and Mahmud Bey vocally criticized the piracy accusation and questioned the legal bases of concerted European interventions. Much like the Ottoman Reis Effendi Djanib Mehmed Besim before them, these North African actors argued that the agreements of a diplomatic congregation in Europe had no bearing on them and pointed instead to the existing international legal structures of treaties and tributes. Yet these critiques were not beholden to non-European contemporaries. Similar concerns over questionable accusations and faulty legal bases could be heard in British Admiralty courts, while merchants and smaller power diplomats began to have doubts about the detrimental commercial consequences and inefficiencies of concerted actions against 'Barbary piracy'. What our analysis of these contestations made abundantly clear is that Great Power attempts to create a new international order in the Mediterranean were seen as dangerous in their own right, especially as they clashed severely with older conceptualisations of international legality. At the same time, such contemporary disagreements also indicate the degree to which the Mediterranean was being incorporated in the security culture of the post-1815 era through the concertation of different European imperial powers.

It is significant to note that corsairing never stopped completely throughout these years of opposition and faltering multilateral interventions. Domestic political interests and cultural traditions kept the authorities of Algiers and Tunis from meeting European, and Ottoman, demands to halt their privateering. As the many revolts in the aftermath of the Anglo-Dutch bombardment clarified, it could be dangerous to follow the intimidating orders of concerting

Europeans. Rather than monetary gain, it were these political concerns that informed Dey Hussein's and Mahmud Bey's rejections to renounce corsairing. Out at sea and along the shores of the Mediterranean, this endurance of North African privateering meant that a sense of security was hardly on the rise. Despite the existence of the Alcalá alliance or the concerted efforts of 1819, European sailors, merchants and consuls continued to discern piratical threats to national shipping. Still, by the early 1820s, the felt urgency to act on this perceived piratical threat waned among the most senior actors of the Great Power governments. 'Barbary piracy' momentarily lapsed from its former position as one of the prominent issues within the post-1815 security culture due to revolutionary unrest on the continent, but that would change again by the end of the decade.

As would become clear, the events of the years 1816-1824 quickly provided ample incentive for further conflicts and more violent policies of repression. During these years, Dey Hussein found out that a forceful stance against the European powers could be beneficial. He noticed that multilateral European arrangements against 'Barbary piracy' were not irreversible. He would cling to that lesson in a later conflict with France, which broke out in 1827. French officials, for their part, had noticed that unilateral military action, such as their intervention in Spain, did not immediately provoke a new European war.²⁶³ As this intervention indicated, national agendas of expansionism and the attainment of military glory could be aligned with collective security and invoke universal interests. These lessons of the early 1820s would significantly impact the repression of North African corsairing by the end of the decade. Dey Hussein's realisation that opposition could be useful and the French awareness that unilateral intervention could be possible soon put a new, combustible spin on the fight against piracy. This new dynamic went on to alter the political map of the Mediterranean region, as the Regency of Algiers was going to be destroyed.

²⁶³ On the later significance of the French intervention in Spain, Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 339; Swain, *The struggle*, pp. 45-46.

Chapter 4: 'No security, except in destruction'. The French invasion of Algiers, 1827-1830

The working relationship between Dey Hussein of Algiers and the French consul general Pierre Deval ended just like it once began: with the flapping of a fan. In 1818, when Hussein took the Regency's throne, he gave Deval a horse and a fan in order to renew cordial relations and express his high esteem for France.¹ The opening decades of the nineteenth century were a time of friendship between the French and Algerine governments, as the Restoration monarchy sought to retain France's old, pre-Revolutionary commercial and diplomatic preponderance in North Africa. French officials only participated in measures against the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy', such as the Anglo-French expedition of 1819, with a degree of reluctance and talked of these security practices as international obligations, or even as dangers in their own right.² However, Franco-Algerine relations were in an entirely different state by the end of the 1820s. They had become tense and quarrelsome, dotted with mutual complaints over various affronts. In April 1827, during a discussion on such complaints, Hussein picked up another fan-like object – a fly-whisk – and hit Deval. The consul then left the Regency, Paris declared war, a long blockade of the port of Algiers began, and three years later, in the summer of 1830, a force of 37,000 soldiers landed on North African shores. The victory of that expeditionary army would be the start of a drawn-out conquest that brought French rule over the newly conceived colony of Algeria.

Unlike most of the events that featured in the previous chapters, this part of the historical fight against Mediterranean piracy has received more than ample scholarly attention. The slap of Dey Hussein is perhaps the most oft described in all of historiography. It is certainly considered the most consequential of its kind. The flick of his fly-whisk and the conflict it provoked did not just bring an end to the political existence of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers, they are thought to have had a much broader impact. Many historical works present the French conquest of Algiers, and the subsequent rule over Algeria, as the beginning of a new phase of colonial history in Africa. A phase, that is, of formal rule and territorial dominance rather than the more limited 'free trade', 'commercial' or 'consular' imperialism

¹ E. Plantet (ed.), *Correspondance des Deys d'Alger avec la cour de France, 1579-1833* vol. 2, 1700-1833 (Paris 1889), p. 542.

² For instance, CADN, 712PO/1/46, 'Dessolles to Devoize', Paris 08-07-1819.

of earlier periods.³ What is missing in that extensive literature, however, is the fact that the string of events between 1827 and 1830 was not solely a new beginning, but also a part of, and perhaps even the climax to, a longer timeline and a broader historical process. That timeline, and that process, had everything to do with the international treatment of piracy as a threat to security. This chapter therefore uncovers that overlooked aspect of the invasion of Algiers, delving deep into the military planning and diplomatic efforts of the French government in order to show that its conduct was, in fact, deeply embedded within the security culture that emerged in Europe during the post-1815 period.

On 16 July 1830, a week after he received the news of the victory in Algiers, the French Foreign Minister Jules Auguste, Prince of Polignac (1780-1847), who had played a pivotal role in planning the attack, noted that piracy was over and declared with conviction: 'The security of the Mediterranean is re-established'.⁴ Such rhetoric of piracy and security did not only follow the invasion, it appeared throughout the succeeding events of 1827-1830. Discourses that portrayed Algiers as a pirate lair and Dey Hussein as a robber king permeate the textual and visual sources surrounding the war, the invasion, and the defeat of the Regency. They shaped French policies as well as the international attitudes towards those policies. Still, the French invasion of Algiers has never before been analysed as a part of the nineteenth-century fight against Mediterranean piracy, and has never been studied within the frameworks of the Congress System and its security culture.

In general, the historiography holds a very different, much more nationally focussed perspective on the invasion of 1830. Reconsidering the invasion from the angle of security therefore entails going against some of the mainstays of the literature. The dominant historical narratives present the invasion primarily as a domestic affair of France, Algeria or the Ottoman Empire. Many authors discard the invocations of piracy and security in French official discourse as mere propaganda, as a tool to arouse popular sentiment and rally the population behind the war.⁵ Historians of Algeria have also long tended to discuss the causes of the invasion in terms of French pretexts and manipulations, while perceiving the invasion itself primarily as the beginning of a long-lasting Algerian struggle for national

³ J. Sessions, *By sword and plow. France and the conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca and London 2011), pp. 6-7; F. Quinn, *The French overseas empire* (Westport and London 2000), p. 121; J. Pitts, 'Republicanism, liberalism,

and Empire in postrevolutionary France' in: S. Muthu (ed.), *Empire and modern political thought* (Cambridge 2012), pp. 261-291.

⁴ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 133-134.

⁵ R. Marcowitz, Groβmacht auf Bewährung. Die interdependenz französischer Innen- und Aussenpolitik, 1814/15 – 1851/52 (Stuttgart 2001), pp. 101-102; C. Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, vol. 1, La conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (1827-1871) (2nd ed., Paris 1979), p. 29.

independence.⁶ Meanwhile, scholars of Ottoman history often consider the invasion of Algiers solely in terms of the mounting internal struggles of the Empire, especially in relation to Mehmed Ali: the viceroy in Egypt who would come to play a major role in the diplomatic schemes around the attack.⁷ Overall, the literature on 1830 is thus divided among different fields and there is little sense of the invasion as part of a broader European or Mediterranean story.

Historical works on the invasion often put a strong emphasis on domestic factors within France. The towering work in French is still the *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* – a two-volume study by the late Charles-André Julien. It went through three revised editions since its first publication in 1964. In the work, Julien (a decided socialist and famed anti-colonial publicist) sought to correct chauvinist understandings of imperial glory.⁸ He argued that the invasion had been a chaotic endeavour, undertaken mainly to help a faltering Bourbon monarchy survive in the face of popular discontent. The French colonial presence in Algeria thus had a dubious beginning, which set the tone for the subsequent century of destruction and destitution.⁹ Julien does take into account the international context and many diplomatic negotiations that took place at the time (in Constantinople, Alexandria, Tunis, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and London), but his attention for short-term domestic politics in France has arguably been the most enduring aspect of his historiographical contribution.¹⁰

Julien's legacy lasts to this day and extends well beyond the Francophone field of publishing. A recent and well-received example is the work of American scholar Jennifer Sessions. She contends that 'the roots of French Algeria lay in the contests over political legitimacy' between a royalist government and its vocal opposition.¹¹ She also notes that official actors played on perceptions of Dey Hussein as an illegitimate tyrant, who despotically disrespected the rule of law with his pirate fleet.¹² Still, Sessions does not dedicate much attention to how the French government sought to justify the attack

⁶ L. Merouche, *Recherches sur l'Algérie à l'époque ottomane*, vol. 2, *La course. Mythes et réalité* (Saint-Denis 2007), pp. 15-16; J. McDougall, *A history of Algeria* (Cambridge 2017), pp. 50-51.

⁷ V. Aksan, Ottoman wars, 1700-1870. An empire besieged (Harlow 2007), pp. 363-364; S. Shaw and E. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, vol. 2, Reform, revolution, and republic. The rise of modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge 1977), pp. 32-33.

⁸ A. Raymond, 'Une conscience de notre siècle. Charles-André Julien 1891-1991', *Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée* 59-60 (1991), pp. 259-262.

⁹ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 31 and 59.

¹⁰ D. Todd, *A velvet empire. French imperial power and economic life in the nineteenth century* (Princeton, forthcoming 2020), 'Ch. 2: Algeria: informal empire manqué'.

¹¹ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 2 and 19.

¹² Ibid., pp. 28-29.

internationally, often with use of the exact same rhetoric that denoted the Regency of Algiers as a piratical threat to the security of Europe.

All the while, the conquest of Algiers cannot be properly understood if it is considered solely a French affair. The American historian Frederick Hunter already suggested as much in a seminal article from 1999, as did Julia Clancy-Smith in her work on Algerian resistance against the French.¹³ More recently, David Todd has provided further arguments for considering 1830 from a transnational perspective. He notes that the French invasion was inspired by European and wider Mediterranean circumstances. According to him, the attack was intertwined with the crises and reforms of the Iberian and Ottoman Empires, as well as the French failure to re-establish colonial rule in Saint-Domingue.¹⁴ Todd, furthermore, indicates that detailed plans to create a North African colony were discussed within the French bureaucracy from the middle of the 1820s, and often drew on pamphlets and memoranda of non-French authors.¹⁵ Even more important, however, is his claim that armed conflicts between European powers over colonial affairs were notably absent in the immediate wake of 1815. Cooperation between Europeans in conquering and exploiting the extra-European world became, as Todd argues, a feature of 'interstate politics' after the Congress of Vienna.¹⁶ The invasion of 1830, though fraught with disagreements and contestations, essentially was no exception.

The French attack on Algiers, this chapter contends, needs to be understood within the frameworks of the nineteenth-century Congress System. It was a climax of sorts to the preceding decades, when Great Power statesmen began to manage continental security in concert and learnt how to deal with matters of imperial importance through multilateral diplomacy, conducted at international meetings and recorded in a body of mutually binding protocols. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' temporarily dropped form the agendas of the continental congresses as a vital issue in the Great Power management of collective security. This had as much to do with the upsurge of revolutionary unrest in Europe as with the non-European opposition to security practices against piracy. The

¹³ F.R. Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East. The opening of the Maghreb, 1660-1814', *The Journal of North African Studies* 4:4 (1999) pp. 1-26, there pp. 21-22; J. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and saint. Muslim notables, populist protest, colonial encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)* (Berkeley, CA 1997), p. 70.

¹⁴ D. Todd, 'Retour sur l'expédition d'Alger. Les faux-semblants d'un tournant colonialiste français', *Monde(s)* 10:2 (2016), pp. 205-222, there p. 210; and Idem, 'A French imperial meridian, 1814-1870', *Past & Present* 210 (2011) pp. 155-186, there p. 169.

¹⁵ D. Todd, 'Transnational projects of Empire in France, c.1815-c.1870', *Modern Intellectual History* 12:2 (2015), pp. 265-293, there p. 267.

¹⁶ Todd, 'A French imperial meridian', p. 161.

French invasion not only signalled the return of 'Barbary piracy' as a central issue within the Congress System and its security culture, it was also a direct reaction to the non-European contestations of security efforts. The outbreak of conflict in 1827 in part resulted from Dey Hussein's continued rejection of European demands to end North African corsairing. French actors hence tried to present the invasion of 1830 as part of the concerted fight against piracy, linking it to the creation of a new international order in the Mediterranean.

Though the French attack on Algiers was essentially a unilateral action undertaken under the national flag, it nevertheless took shape through extended multinational deliberation and involved a fair share of diplomatic concertation amongst the different European Great Powers. In this sense, the French government did not go at it alone. It sought to obtain international support and tried to reach agreement with the Great Power allies before commencing the mobilization of troops. The invasion of 1830 hence confirmed rather than toppled the basic tenants of the security culture. Unilateral interventions had, as we have seen in Chapter 3, already become quite an accepted line of action within the European management of shared security issues, as long as such interventions did not infringe upon vital Great Power interests and thereby give cause to war. If the international order of the Congress of Vienna was essentially inter-imperial, and based on a Great Power willingness to avoid war over colonial matters, then the conquest of Algiers stands as a clear result of what impact that order had on the non-European states of the world. This is why the invasion of Algiers ought to be understood within the broader historical frameworks of the Congress System and its security culture.

Such an emphasis on the Congress System may seem untenable in the face of a literature that usually dates its end in the early 1820s.¹⁷ Things certainly had changed in the decades after 1815: French armies had unilaterally crossed into Spain in 1823, bellicose rhetoric started to become *en vogue* again amongst European statesmen, and most of the fated 'generation of 1815' had passed away or otherwise left the diplomatic stage – barring Prince Metternich and the Duke of Wellington. Nevertheless, the main ideas and practices of the Congress System continued to hold international value across the European continent. Appearing to act in concert, gathering international support, building coalitions, and trying to assemble a conference was still important in 1830. The core inter-imperial dynamics of collective security within the Congress System were thus very much at play in the coming of

¹⁷ M. Jarrett, 'No sleepwalkers. The men of 1814/15. Bicentennial reflections on the Congress of Vienna and its legitimacy', *Journal of Modern European History* 13:4 (2015) pp. 427-438, there p. 437.

the French invasion.¹⁸ Therefore, I argue that the French turn to unilateral action in conquering Algiers should not be considered as an upending of the Congress System and its security culture, but rather as a confirmation of their endurance.

As this chapter will show, French imperial aspirations became intertwined with the repression of Mediterranean piracy. In attacking Algiers, members of the French government sought to reassert the country's position as a nation on par with the other Great Powers of the European continent. The fact that French actors chose to turn against Algiers in such a radical way was a direct consequence of their country's position within the hierarchical security culture of the Congress System. From the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, with the withdrawal of the allied army of occupation and the conclusion of the monetary reparations, French officials can be seen to opt for more assertive, interventionist policies, reflecting an aspiration to assert dominance and rank among the peers of the Quadruple Alliance, or Great Power Pentarchy. The conflict with Algiers allowed French officials to link the aim of asserting status to the much more 'disinterested', 'European' goal of ending piracy and bringing security to the Mediterranean Sea.

The repression of 'Barbary piracy' was hence an argument that had to bolster French designs internationally *and* an instrument that helped French actors realize those designs. Piracy featured repeatedly in official justifications of the conquest, but this was not merely argumentative window-dressing. The very invocation of fighting pirates enabled the French government to call on a lineage of internationally sanctioned action, stretching back from the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and the ambassadorial conferences in London to the Congress of Vienna. In this way, the security culture of the Congress System and imperial expansion were linked. References to earlier congresses and attempts to initiate new concerted ventures shaped French policy at every stage of this conflict, from the outbreak of war with Algiers to the planning of the invasion, and right up to the military crossings of the Mediterranean in June 1830. Those references and attempts have never featured prominently in the history of the destruction of the Regency of Algiers. In this chapter they will, as I chart the developments that began with a consul in Algiers and the flapping of a fan, only to end with a proposed congress on a defeated Regency that loomed large amidst a range of new uncertainties.

¹⁸ M. Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Groβmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860 (Munich 2009), p. 121.

Curious beginnings? The conflict between France and Algiers, 1827-1828

In order to reconsider the French invasion of Algiers as part of a broader history, we first have to reconsider the beginnings of the war. The underlying conflict was not that different from many conflicts that immediately preceded it. It was not uncommon for a Dey to fall out with one of the foreign representatives in his Regency. The consular archives are rife with reports on heated debates and complaints over personal affronts. Many of those conflicts had a political function. They precipitated changes in the Regency's foreign relations and were intertwined with internal circumstances, even though the consuls themselves, together with senior officials and broader publics, liked to portray such incidents as indications of Oriental fanaticism or tyranny. Deval's case of 1827 was no different. Nor was the war that ensued any different from the other wars the Regency fought around that time – at first, at least.

Concessions and conspiracies. Dey Hussein and his conflict with Deval

Pierre Deval had been present throughout the fight against Mediterranean piracy. He met Lord Exmouth and witnessed the Anglo-Dutch bombardment in 1816. He struck a commercial deal with Dey Omar Agha in the wake of the attack, returning the concessions of La Calle from British to French oversight. He sat in on Fremantle and Jurien's audience in the autumn of 1819 and heard how Dey Hussein contested their demand to end corsairing. He saw the Royal Navy undertake its failed bombardment of the city of Algiers in 1824. Throughout those years, his relations with the most powerful individuals of the Regency had generally been good. Deval cautiously guarded and cultivated that friendly footing. He participated in concerted efforts to end corsairing, such as those of 1819, only at the behest of his already unwilling superiors. Yet he had no problem with handing over his personal Kabyle servants when Dey Hussein commanded their arrest in 1824, being the only consul to do so.¹⁹ Something, however, had changed profoundly by 1827. Looking back at the incident of the fly-whisk, Dey Hussein would later put all the blame for the quarrel on the French consul. He deplored Deval's aggressive character and treacherous ways, which warrants a closer look at how the consul functioned and why that quarrel in 1827 came about.²⁰

Deval spent a lifetime representing France in Ottoman realms. The vocation was part of his family tree. Born in Constantinople in 1758, Pierre was one of the seven children of

¹⁹ Julien, La conquête, pp. 23-24.

²⁰ CADLC, 2MD/6, 'Dey Hussein to King Charles X', 25-09-1830, fp. 245-246.

dragoman Alexandre-Philibert and Catherine Mille, whose grandparents had worked in France's consular service in Chios and Moldavia. Like so many in the family, Deval studied languages at the prestigious Collège de Clermont and held several postings as dragoman and vice-consul at various stations in the Levant. He was transferred to Algiers in 1791 but abandoned the post within six months. The radicalization of the French Revolution, in conjunction with his well-known counter-revolutionary sympathies, had made his position untenable. He found refuge in Constantinople, yet had little paid work. In 1803 he therefore travelled to Paris, hoping to set up a business importing cotton from the Middle East. Affairs were off to a good start due to the wartime disruption of Atlantic trade, but Deval's business was completely ruined when the protection of the Continental System fell away with Napoleon's first abdication in April 1814. With the change of governments, he almost immediately appealed for a new consular posting and specifically asked to be placed in either Smyrna or Algiers. Talleyrand granted the request and by September 1814 Deval was back on his former post.²¹

At the moment of his return to Algiers, Pierre Deval was in his fifties and many of the man's recurrent concerns were well in place. The years in the Levant and Paris shaped his outlooks and ambitions. Deval's royalist convictions and his belief in cotton as a lucrative staple were still present in later decades, and notably shaped his conduct during the closing years of the 1820s. Foreign Affairs Minister Talleyrand had selected him for a consulship in Algiers precisely because of these traits and fascinations. The choice for Deval was an explicit choice for restoration, for re-establishing what the Revolution had upset, for attempting to regain the Ancien Régime's preponderance in Algiers. In addition, Talleyrand also entertained hopes that North Africa could potentially provide replacements for the tropical produce that France had lost along with its colonies in America.²² Deval personified this mixture of old and new. He was a returning consul from an earlier era with ample experience and an unquestionable command of the Turkish and Arabic languages. Yet he was also ambitious and, at times, audacious in his disregard for established customs and traditions.

Deval initially had to tread a careful line in Algiers. Succeeding French Ministers instructed him to appease the ruling elites. It was a strategy that resulted in the return of the old French concessions and inspired a reluctant stance whenever anti-corsair measures were discussed. Though he managed to remain friendly with the local authorities, Deval did get

²¹ A. Mézin, *Les consuls de France au siècle des lumières (1715-1792)* (Paris 1997), p. 237; Todd, 'Retour', p. 211.

²² Todd, 'Retour', p. 211.

into plenty of arguments with other interest groups. He quarrelled with the Chamber of Commerce in Marseille when he argued against a return of that city's pre-Revolutionary monopoly on carrying commerce into the Levant.²³ He also kept arguing that his salary, which had risen to 24,000 francs per year by 1824, hardly sufficed to meet his duties and expenses.²⁴ Nor was he very popular with the other consuls in Algiers. Not a single colleague turned up when he invited the diplomatic corps to his residence to celebrate the birth and baptism of Henri d'Artois, Duke of Bordeaux and grandchild of later King Charles X in 1820.²⁵ Privately, Deval complained of the 'spleen' that befell his wife, isolated as the family was from the otherwise vibrant social circles of the diplomats.²⁶ The consul's lack of popularity among his peers may certainly have been a result of his increasing unwillingness to act in accordance with concerted decisions reached at faraway congresses and his growing tendency to blatantly put France first, at times at the expense of multilateral security efforts. The same inclinations got him into trouble with the Regency's authorities. By the late 1820s, Deval was seriously at odds with Dey Hussein.

The Regent put his misgivings in writing on 29 October 1826, in a letter personally addressed to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. 'I will no longer suffer this intriguer among me', he stated, and requested the installation of a new consul.²⁷ Monetary matters and political schemes had made Deval an 'intriguer' in the eyes of Hussein. Two affairs were particularly important: the settling of a large debt owed by the French government, and a breach of treaties concerning the French trade posts on the concessions. These issues have since pervaded explanations of the conflict between France and Algiers with only differences of emphasis.

The affair of the French debts was a recurrent issue, coming to the fore once more in the late 1820s. Having simmered on for decades, the topic now became particularly pressing. It was a complex financial matter, dating back to the days of the French Revolution. Julien

²³ V. Puryear, *France and the Levant. From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA 1941), p. 10.

²⁴ Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys*, vol. 1, pp. lx-lxi.

²⁵ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 23-24.

²⁶ CADN, 706PO/1/176, 'Deval to Mure', Algiers 06-04-1816 and 'Deval to Mure', Algiers 25-06-1817. In comparison, the other consuls and their families maintained very close and frequent contacts, forming, as Susan Legêne notes, a sort of 'bubble' amongst themselves in each of the North African Regencies. S. Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel. Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiende-eeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme* (Dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1998), pp. 220 and 257. For a list of the various consuls stationed in Algiers in the middle of the 1820s, see CADLC, 2MD/16, 'Etat nominatif du consuls (...) des Puissances Européennes accrédités et resident dans le Royaume d'Alger (au 05-05-1825)', fp. 162-163.

²⁷ SHD, GR1/H/4, dossier 2, sub-dossier 2, 'Dey Hussein to Damas', Algiers 29-10-1826.

called it a 'shady business deal', probably due to its many intricacies.²⁸ The transaction revolved around an old series of grain purchases that had taken place between 1793 and 1798. Facing shortages in the southern departments and needing to provision armies on the march, the Directoire hungered for cereals from Algiers but often lacked the funds to buy them. The result was an arrangement involving the Regency's authorities and the most important trading firm in the country: the house of the Bacri Brothers and Busnach. The enterprise fulfilled an important hinge function in the Regency's trade, linking internal produce to exterior commerce. Headed by the members of two Jewish families that had come to Algiers from Livorno, the house was exceptionally well connected in networks of trade and communication that stretched far beyond the Mediterranean region. The families maintained a large merchant fleet and had agents stationed in Salonika, New York and many of the cities in-between. Their connections and wealth also brought them great political influence in Algiers, with many of their kin acting as advisors and diplomatic intermediaries.²⁹ The debts incurred for a series of grain supplies could thereby become a matter of the state, for France as well as Algiers. That entanglement was only intensified because the Dey at the time had also loaned money to the Directoire, to help that cash-strapped government pay for parts of the shipments.³⁰

All three parties repeatedly sought to settle the accounts in the decades that followed. A member of the Bacri family went to Paris to inspire Talleyrand (with pecuniary incentives) to take up the issue of the debt, while Deval's first set of instructions for his posting in Algiers ordered him to settle the affair.³¹ Despite these efforts, it took up to 1820 before the sum was settled at 7 million francs.³² Still, the claims of the Regency itself, now taken up by Dey Hussein, were not included in the arrangement.³³ The matter thus remained among the unsettled accounts. Hussein would repeatedly write the French Ministers and Kings in the late 1820s to demand the money.³⁴ The topic also featured in the letter of 29 October 1826 that called for Deval's replacement. Hussein blamed the consul for making false promises and for trying to make some sort of fraudulent, private arrangement with a member of the Bacri family.³⁵ The French Ministry drafted a reply, denouncing Hussein's claims and threatening

²⁸ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 21.

²⁹ M. Rosenstock, 'The House of Bacri and Busnach. A chapter from Algeria's commercial history', *Jewish Social Studies* 14:4 (1952), pp. 343-364, there pp. 343-346.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 351.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 353-354.

³² Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys*, vol. 2, p. 555, fn. 1.

³³ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 18; D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), p. 329.

 ³⁴ For instance, SHD, GR1/H/4, dossier 2, sub-dossier 2, 'Dey Hussein to French FA Min.', Algiers 10-09-1824.
 ³⁵ SHD, GR1/H/4, dossier 2, sub-dossier 2, 'Dey Hussein to Damas', Algiers 29-10-1826; Rosenstock, 'The House', p. 356.

with the opening of hostilities. That letter was never sent, but it showed how much the loans had strained relations between the two governments.³⁶

The other explanation for the outbreak of conflict in 1827 relates to the French concessions in the Regency. As we saw in Chapter 1, the territorial concessions were a prime indicator of the European commercial expansion into North Africa during the early modern period. By the middle of the 1820s, however, one of those small territorial holdings was being reshaped into something entirely different than the 'reserved zone' of privileged commerce that it had once been. The French concession of La Calle (just to the east of Bona, near the border with Tunis) began to change in appearance. The small collection of houses, warehouses, and a church that stood huddled by the seaside had slowly been turned into something resembling a military basis.³⁷ French agents began to install cannons and groups of armed men took posts on the territories of La Calle, which went against all agreements with the Regency. As such, the remodelling of the concessions mirrored the more general tendency to let commercial interests inspire solitary action that had also impacted security measures against piracy in the early 1820s.

At the beginning of his service, Deval had been personally responsible for re-obtaining the French rights over the concessions in 1816. Now, he was personally involved in knowingly breaching the concession treaties. He had his nephew, Alexandre Deval, appointed vice-consul in Bona. From there, Alexandre coordinated and oversaw the armament, which began in 1825.³⁸ The build-up was mandated directly by the Ministers, to whom Pierre Deval had been making proposals as early as 1820.³⁹ A report from the Foreign Ministry of 1824 authorized the consul's plans. The change of policy had a lot to do with commercial disappointments. It had become clear that the return of the concessions did not bring a great impulse to French Mediterranean trade. The posts at La Calle registered considerable losses, while commerce with Algiers dropped below pre-revolutionary levels. To turn the tide, the ministerial report laid down a new kind of system for the concessions. They were to be envisioned as 'a kind of colonial regime', involving more intensive agricultural production (potentially of cotton) protected by the imposition of French 'sovereignty' on the ground.⁴⁰ Dey Hussein saw what that change of policy meant when new cannons were being mounted

³⁶ Plantet, Correspondance des Deys, vol. 2, pp. 558-563.

³⁷ CADN, 22PO/1/70, 'Rapport fait par l'agence provisoire des concessions d'Afrique (...) sur des notes prises par M. Léon, agent provisoire à La Calle', 1817.

³⁸ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 26-27.

³⁹ CADN, 22PO/1/70, 'Projet d'ordonnance relatif à la pêche du corail et au Bastion de France', 1820.

⁴⁰ D. Todd, 'Remembering and restoring the economic Ancien Régime. France and its colonies, 1815-1830' in: A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and M. Rowe (eds.), *War, demobilization and memory. The legacy of war in the era of Atlantic revolutions* (Houndsmills 2016), pp. 203-219, there pp. 213-214.

on the old ramparts of the trading post, and began to look for an opportunity to rid the Regency of them. That opportunity presented itself in the quarrel with Deval.⁴¹

Important as they were, neither the loans nor the concessions entirely clarify how the war of 1827 began. A third source of contention helped bring about the conflict: maritime raiding. Deval and Dey Hussein were also engaged in a vexing succession of negotiations on corsairing. This aspect, however, is rarely noted in the literature, perhaps because it was hardly particular to 1827. Corsairing remained an issue. It continued in spite of earlier, concerted European measures and enduring complaints of individual governments. Though not unique to 1827, the disagreements over maritime raiding were crucial to the outbreak of the conflict. North African corsairing had, since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, come to be perceived by European officials as something of an anomaly, as an outdated mode of warfare that threatened the newfound order of peace and security. Belligerent action by the Regency of Algiers could hence become a source of conflict with France.

The targets of Algerine corsairs in the second half of the 1820s were primarily ships under the flag of the Papacy. Vessels from Spain and Tuscany were also potential prizes. The French flag itself was – barring incidents of sailors mistreated during Algerine checks of paperwork – as secure from North African corsairing at the time as it had ever been since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.⁴² It were other powers' attempts to obtain that same security that brought on new tensions. These governments lacked sufficiently strong fleets, or, in case of the Papal States, possessed no warships at all.⁴³ Hence they turned to Great Power allies for protection. British officials had by then become wary of granting promises of protection, seeing how they came with laborious mediating efforts and, in effect, only hurt British maritime trade.⁴⁴ In contrast, their French counterparts eagerly responded to the call.

Protection of junior partners was, in fact, one of the ways in which France's Great Power status could be reasserted. The French eagerness to offer what British actors would not was therefore indicative of the direction that French foreign policy was taking. It is telling that Deval had tried to position France as a protector of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1816, only to be outclassed by Lord Exmouth and the overpowering British fleet. The matter of the

⁴¹ Todd, 'Retour', pp. 212-213.

⁴² Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys*, vol. 2, pp. 557-558, 'Deval and Captain Fleury to Dey Hussein', Algiers 29-10-1826.

⁴³ R. Playfair, *The scourge of Christendom. Annals of the British relations with Algiers prior to the French conquest* (London 1884), p. 306; CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Rostan to Deval', Livorno 23-09-1826; 'Tableau des navires espagnols captures par les corsairs algériens depuis le 11 juin 1826 jusqu'au 5 janvier 1827'; 706PO/1/99, 'Damas to Rousseau', Paris 19-05-1827.

⁴⁴ TNA, FO 112/2, 'Thomas to Caridnal Guilio Maria della Somaglia', Algiers 12-08-1825, fp. 206-207; FO 112/3, 'St. John to Huskisson', Algiers 29-06-1828, fp. 252-253.

Papal States in 1820s provided a new opportunity to affirm that sought-after status, this time in a new international constellation where France was, at least in name, a Great Power and member of the Quintuple Alliance.

Between 1825 and 1827, Deval therefore negotiated with the Algerine authorities on behalf of the Pope, the King of Spain, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.⁴⁵ These efforts did not always go down well. Part of the grievances that Hussein expressed about Deval related to his mediating efforts. The 'Roman affair', as the Dey called it, loomed large in his demand to have the consul replaced. Hussein contended that Deval did not keep his promises and simply stopped corresponding while Algiers wanted to conclude peace with the Romans. He warned the French Minister in 1826 that the consul may be giving misinformation to the King on these matters.⁴⁶

Corsairing against Roman ships was not only just another source of tension, it was the topic of discussion the day when disagreements escalated into conflict. On 29 April 1827, at Pierre Deval and Dey Hussein's fated meeting, they began by talking about a treaty for the Papal States. Deval had been invited to the Dey's palace as a customary courtesy. It was the beginning of the Ramadan, which normally was an occasion for a ceremonial visit. Hussein, however, asked why he never received any replies to his letters. Suspecting that Deval kept dispatches hidden, he pressed the matter and demanded to see them. He wondered why the French Ministers had never looked into his offer to make peace with the Papal States, nor into his claims concerning the debts of Bacri and Busnach.⁴⁷ Finally, he ordered Deval to answer him. 'My government does not deign to respond to a man like you', the consul is said to have replied. One Algerine contemporary ascribed the blunt remark to Deval's supposed ignorance of the language, but considering his dragoman training and experience the offence seemed intended.⁴⁸ And Dey Hussein took offense at it. He 'lifted himself from his seat', Deval later recounted, 'and waving the handle of his fly-whisk, gave me three forceful blows to my body'.⁴⁹ Hussein remembered that moment differently. He had made 'two or three light strokes with the fly-whisk that happened to rest in my humble hands'.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ H. Contamine, Diplomatie et diplomates sous la restauration 1814-1830 (Paris 1970), p. 98; CADN,

²²PO/1/67, 'Deval to Duc Infantado', Algiers 15-01-1826; CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Moustio to Deval', Madrid 02-12-1826.

⁴⁶ Contamine, *Diplomatie*, p. 98.

⁴⁷ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 27; [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu historique et statistique sur la Régence d'Alger, intitulé en Arabe le Miroir* (Paris 1833), p. 166.

⁴⁸ [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu*, p. 167.

⁴⁹ CADN, 22PO/1/50, 'Deval to Damas', Algiers 30-04-1827.

⁵⁰ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 27.

Many more retellings and reproductions of that flick of the whisk followed in the years, decades, and centuries to come. First it served as the great affront that topped French ultimatums to Hussein. Much later it became a mythical beginning of French imperial glory, the moment whenceforth Christian civilization would prevail over barbaric tyranny.⁵¹ In the countless depictions that the incident spawned, the fly-whisk accordingly took all sorts of Orientalized forms, be it planted with peacock feathers or studded with jewels. In reality it was more likely a short horsetail on a handle made of rope.⁵² Regardless of what it looked like exactly, it did come down on Deval, who took it as an infringement of his consular immunity and an affront to French national honour. After the blows were struck or the strokes were made, the consul was simply told that he could leave.⁵³

The question of France's relation with Algiers turned into an open question. Animosity between the Regency's authorities and French actors had been mounting for some time, but now that this tension had come to a head, it was unclear where things would go. Deval retreated to his residence and shut himself in. 'What may be the result of this affair remains to be seen', his British counterpart noted. 'Hitherto the Consul has made no communication upon it to any of his colleagues, nor would it appear to be his intention to do so, as the most guarded silence is studiously observed to the whole business'.⁵⁴

Contemporary onlookers speculated on the causes of conflict while Deval's silence continued. Like later generations historians, they debated whether it had been the loans or the armaments that pitted the French consul against the Dey, but glossed over the protection of the Papal flag.⁵⁵ Still, the issue of corsair protection needs to be taken into account as one of the instigators of the conflict. It at least provided a trigger for the further escalation of other matters, forming the point of departure for the hostile exchange between Deval and Hussein.

At the same time, the 'Roman affair' was intrinsically tied to the outstanding debts and the fortification of the concessions. All three issues were, in fact, reflections of the French attempt to assert Great Power status. The loans, concessions and protection may be seen as different aspects of a renewed claim to international authority. The Mediterranean was a primary location where Great Power governments sought to assert influence and display assertiveness, especially in the Levant and North Africa. For French actors, this was a matter

⁵¹ J. Dakhlia, '1830, une rencontre?' in: A. Bouchène, J. Peyroulou, O. Tengour and S. Thénault (eds.). *Histoire* de l'Algérie à la période coloniale (1830-1962) (Paris and Algiers 2012), pp. 142-148, there p. 148.

 ⁵² K. Bouchama, 'Comment j'ai rapatrié l'éventail du Dey Hussein', *L'Expression*, 31-12-2011.
 ⁵³ CADN, 22PO/1/50, 'Deval to Damas', Algiers 30-04-1827.

⁵⁴ TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Bathurst', Algiers 14-05-1827, fp. 140-141.

⁵⁵ Ibidem; Todd, 'Retour', pp. 212-213. However, France's Foreign Minister Damas did note that French mediating efforts had brought on the conflict. CADN, 706PO/1/99, 'Damas to Rousseau', Paris 25-06-1827.

of attempting to revive the nation's commercial preponderance, together with its old, pre-Revolutionary diplomatic influence in the region.⁵⁶ Though it had initially been a project of caution, of appeasing the Ottoman Porte and its vassals, this changed as the years progressed, also because that revival of former commercial dominance never really came about.⁵⁷ In Algiers, French actors became less and less inclined to meet the wishes of the Dey – whether it be in relation to debts or concessions. By assuming the role of protector on behalf of smaller powers, the French government, moreover, could present their ambitions in terms of European security. The importance of such pretentions would become clear as the war progressed.

A war like any other. The warfare of 1827-1828

Considering the historical significance of 1830, the early stages of the war seem remarkably unremarkable. Rather than foreshadowing a new form of imperial expansion, the war between France and Algiers resembled many other seaborne conflicts between European and North African powers that had occurred in the preceding decades. The French war effort consisted of passive, but strong-armed blockading tactics, intended to force the enemy into compliance. The Algerine side countered such naval deployment by breaking the blockades, by sending out corsairs, and by strengthening the coastal defences. The dynamics of the war in 1827-1828 were thus highly similar to the military actions of the Anglo-Algerine war of 1824. They also resembled the dynamics of several other conflicts that raged along the North African coast at the exact same time. None of which, however, had a conclusion like the war between France and Algiers. By 1830, this conflict would take on a very different character, involving the landing of French troops on Algerine soil, but the experiences and frustrations of those early stages certainly had a profound impact on the development of French aims and plans.

At first, nothing seemed to happen at all. Silence appeared to reign at the French consular mansion, but only because Deval was biding his time. He was simply waiting for an established scheme to be put in motion. A war plan was already on the table when the news of the fly-whisk incident reached Paris after about a month.⁵⁸ The Foreign Affairs Minister Ange Hyacinthe Maxence, Baron of Damas (1785-1862) and his colleague of the Navy Cristophe de Chabrol de Crouzol (1771-1836) had put a tactical outline to paper at the close of 1825, during the beginnings of the 'Roman affair'. If the negotiations on the protection of the Papal

 ⁵⁶ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, p. 214; Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and saint*, p. 70.
 ⁵⁷ Todd, 'Remembering and restoring', pp. 213-214.

⁵⁸ Contamine, *Diplomatie*, p. 98.

States would be without result, the plan specified, then a small squadron of two to four ships would sail to Algiers, collect the French nationals, and begin a blockade. The plan did not pass at the time, but it was revitalized and approved by the royal council in late May 1827.⁵⁹ Deval was thus waiting for this force to arrive. Being tipped off beforehand, he 'clandestinely' disembarked from the city on 11 June, only to return a day later in the presence of a French navy squadron.⁶⁰

The six warships of that squadron brought along a list of ultimatums that Dey Hussein could never grant. The stipulations were geared specifically at his humiliation. Public apologies would have to be made to Deval if war was to be averted. Hussein was ordered to come on board one of the French ships, where he would apologize himself for his behaviour in the presence of all other consuls and of the Regency's most senior officials. In addition, the French flag had to be flown on top of the palace at the Casbah, accompanied by a salute of a hundred cannons. All this needed to happen within 24 hours, otherwise Algiers would find itself at war.⁶¹ Hussein refused to participate in this two-pronged, symbolic subordination, letting squadron commander Joseph Collet know that he himself could come for an audience at the palace within twenty-four hours.⁶² A blockade of the port began the next day, on 16 June, marking the start of the war.

The first and most significant hostilities took place at quite some distance from the port of Algiers. At La Calle, to the far east of the Regency, Algerine troops moved in on the French concessions. The cavalry breached the limits of this 'sovereign' trade post, while the infantry took to the newly armed forts and razed every armament.⁶³ Hussein had been looking for an opportunity to rid the Regency of this French 'colonial territory' in the making. He took it at the first instance, showing how critical the encroaching breach of treaty was to the authorities of Algiers. Hearing of the act, the British consul wrote it 'would appear to preclude all chance of an amicable arrangement'.⁶⁴

The Algerine war aims did not allow for a quick resolution of the conflict anyway. Still, French statesmen were convinced that Algiers could not endure long and instructed Deval to remain on board with captain Collet. Yet Hussein held out patiently, even as the number of

⁵⁹ Todd, 'Retour', p. 213; CADN, 706PO/1/99, 'Damas to Rousseau', Paris 09-11-1825.

⁶⁰ TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Bathurst', Algiers 15-06-1827, fp. 158-159.

⁶¹ Plantet, *Correspondance des Deys*, vol. 2, pp. 563-564, 'Captain Collet to Dey Hussein', onboard *La Provence* in port of Algiers, 15-06-1827; Julien, *La conquête*, p. 28.

⁶² TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Bathurst', Algiers 15-06-1827, fp. 158-159.

⁶³ M. Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne (1516-1830)* (Algiers 1983), pp. 160-161.

⁶⁴ TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Goderick', Algiers 25-07-1827, fp. 168-169.

blockading ships increased from seven to twelve to eighteen vessels.⁶⁵ Some authors, including Julien, stress that the British consul played an important role in strengthening the Dey's resolve.⁶⁶ However, when we oversee the broader chronology of the 1820s, it appears that Dey Hussein had much more agency and personally shaped the progression of the conflict. As Chapter 3 made clear, Hussein had begun to try and reassert the Regency's position in the face of European intimidations. By 1824, in a war with Great Britain, he had attempted to revert the limitations imposed on Algiers after the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816. That war had remained undecided, but it allowed Hussein to push for the dismemberment of another multilateral European security measure: the Spanish-Dutch defensive alliance of Alcalá. These earlier experiences, which indicated that contestations of European ventures could pay off, can also explain why Hussein remained so firm in his conflict with France, even in the face of mounting dangers. His opposition to Great Power intimidations had born fruit earlier on, so it is not unlikely that he counted on a similar feat in this war.

As important as the ousting of Deval and the razing of the concessions may have been for Dey Hussein, the conflict appeared much less pressing for France's most senior statesmen. In Paris, they had other international issues on their minds. Prime Minister Joseph de Villèle (1773-1854) endeavoured to normalize relations with the Iberian powers in the wake of the French intervention in Spain.⁶⁷ At the same time, events in insurgent Greece still drew most official attention. The London conferences kept Minister Damas and his ambassador in Britain, Jules de Polignac, busy with a steady stream of protocols on Greek politics, territories, and pirates.⁶⁸ With popular Philhellenism on the rise in the Chambers, the King switched sides towards a more pro-Greek policy. The change committed France to an international military coalition and led to the dispatch of expeditionary troops.⁶⁹ Algiers, concurrently, was not a primary concern. Nor were there any plans for an invasion yet. In fact, Deval had strongly argued against a landing of French troops on Algerine territory. 'This would make for an endless war', he wrote as recently as 1824, 'and be, by consequence, without genuinely fortunate results'.⁷⁰ The decision to maintain a blockade was hence a

⁶⁵ Julien, La conquête, p. 29.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.

⁶⁷ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 30.

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ G. Weiss, *Captives and corsairs. France and slavery in the early modern Mediterranean* (Stanford, CA 2011), pp. 161-162.

⁷⁰ Todd, 'Retour', p. 213.

decision to see whether the Regency would succumb or to otherwise figure out how this conflict could be ended in a way that befitted the 'honour' of France.

Out at sea, in view of Algiers, the French blockading ships were successful in postponing all resolution, but did not succeed in much else. Algerian historian Moulay Belhamissi stresses that the blockade was intended to starve the Regency. It had to bring misery and famine, fanning popular unrest, which would make Hussein more prone to negotiate.⁷¹ If so, it was not very effective. Deval did inquire about the state of public sentiment with the Sardinian consul who had taken over his post, asking for intelligence on the impact of the blockade, but, in effect, Algiers was hardly cut off from the world.⁷² The instructions to the blockade commanders held that any neutral goods on neutral ships could pass. The Foreign Ministry received several questions on the matter from merchants in Marseille as well as the government of Sweden, which wanted to deliver its annual tribute to Algiers. In such concerns of neutrality, French actors explicitly cited the British blockade of 1824 as an effective precedent.⁷³ A French captain in front of Bona meanwhile reported on the impossibilities of blockading that port with just a single ship.⁷⁴

Breaks of the blockades proved a particularly daunting challenge. Every Algerine vessel that managed to escape could pose a threat to French shipping, virtually anywhere on the Mediterranean Sea. The sailors of Algiers made repeated efforts to puncture the French line of warships. Some were successful, others were not. A large naval battle took place in October 1827, when eleven Algerine ships tried to evade the French blockade, at their own considerable loss. Two of the Algerine ships were heavily damaged, twenty sailors died in the fight, and another fourteen were seriously wounded. Accounts of the event illustrate the derelict state that corsairing had fallen into. A large part of the Algerine fleet was serving in the Aegean to help suppress the Greek Uprising and would never return due to the catastrophic Battle of Navarino on 20 October 1827, in which British, Russian and French warships destroyed an Ottoman fleet that included Egyptian, Tunisian and Algerine ships. As Moulay Belhamissi indicates, the authorities of Algiers considered the battle one of the greatest disaster that befell the Regency, on par with the American and Anglo-Dutch victories of 1815 and 1816.⁷⁵ After Navarino, Algerine ships had to be manned with inexperienced

⁷¹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 159-160.

⁷² CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Deval to Dattili de la Tour', [no date].

⁷³ CADN, 22PO/1/50, 'Instructions to the commander of the blockade', 25-06-1827; 'Devis to Damas', aboard *Provence* before Algiers, 05-08-1827, with attached dispatch of 27-07-1827 citing the English blockade of 1824 as a precedent; CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, 'Magran de Kothen to CCM', Marseille 03-07-1827.

⁷⁴ CADN, 712PO/1/177, 'D'Oysonville to Guys', Cap Bon, 04-09-1827.

⁷⁵ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 159-160.

volunteers: mostly merchants who had never fought at sea before.⁷⁶ Another unsuccessful Algerine attempt ensued in March 1828, that time involving sixteen ships.⁷⁷ Still, individual corsair vessels managed to find their way out of the harbours. And soon after the beginnings of the war, incidents of captured French vessels proliferated from around the Mediterranean. Algerine corsairs took French merchants near places like Cape Bon, the nearby island of Zembra, and the port of Tunis. They had to sell their prizes in other port cities, owing to the French blockade of Algiers. Angered consular reports attest to their success, even in harbours under European authority such as Palma on Majorca.⁷⁸

French merchants thus became, for the first time in decades, the primary targets of Algerine wartime privateering. They felt the impact of this circumstance in two equally despised ways: through the creation of a mandatory convoy service, and an all-round rise in freight costs. The Chamber of Commerce of Marseille was central in vocalizing merchant grievances and lobbying for remedies, thereby shaping French policies at a time when Paris did not seem that involved. The endeavours of this merchant body hence indicate how nonstate organisations had a significant role to play in the contemporary security culture, as entrepreneurial lobbies themselves initiated new security practices or criticized existing state measures. When a group of ships carrying oil and linen to Marseille got stuck in the harbour of Tunis, for fear of falling prey to privateers, it was the Chamber of Commerce that instigated the push to organize a convoy in September 1827.⁷⁹ The Chamber also became a hub for individual merchants who had lost cargoes to the Algerines. It gathered complaints, filed petitions and forwarded reclamations.⁸⁰ These means, however, were hardly sufficient in meeting merchants' demands for the security of their navigation. The archive of the Marseille Chamber is rife with complaints on the faltering provision of security. Convoy captains and the merchants they had to protect deplored each other's actions. Shippers broke away from the convoys and failed to adhere to signals, which sometimes led to their immediate capture.⁸¹ Merchants, on the other hand, bemoaned the low frequency of the convoys, arguing that their

⁷⁶ Ibidem; TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Hay', Algiers 06-10-1827, fp. 196-198.

⁷⁷ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 160-161.

⁷⁸ CADN, 712PO/1/177, 'Fonque to Guys', aboard *La Marie-Thérese*, 12-08-1827; 712PO/1/181, 'Chamber of Commerce Marseille to Guys', Marseilles 11-09-1827; TNA, FO 112/3, 'Thomas to Goderick', Algiers 25-07-1827, pp. 168-169; CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, '[??] to CCM', Marseille 25-11-1828.

⁷⁹ CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, '[??] to CCM', Marseille 23-07-1827; CADN, 712PO/1/181, 'Chamber of Commerce Marseille to Guys', Marseilles 11-09-1827.

⁸⁰ CADN, 712PO/1/181, 'Guys to Chamber of Commerce Marseille', Marseilles 08-09-1827; CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, '[??] to CCM', Marseille 19-08-1828; 'Mr. Desbief and Lieutard to CCM', Marseille 30-10-1828.

⁸¹ CADN, 712PO/1/177, 'Fonque to Guys', aboard La Marie-Thérese in Tunis, 09-10-1827; CCM,

MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, 'Maritime Prefect Jacob to CCM', Toulon 27-02-1828; 'Jacob to CCM', Toulon 03-10-1828; 'Gantès to CCM', Toulon 08-01-1829.

shipments often had to wait in port for too long.⁸² These were the same old difficulties that appeared throughout the early nineteenth century, whenever the security measure of the convoy was deployed.

The conduct of the war, with its ceaseless blockade, unchecked raiders, and inefficient convoys provoked domestic outcry in France, and mockery in the wider world. Compared to other powers that were or had been at conflict with the Regencies, the French fighting forces did not seem to do all that well. For instance, the Sardinian navy had in the eyes of contemporaries provided a much more impressive showing against Tripoli in 1825, when the burning of two corsair vessels and the threat of a bombardment were enough to make Yusuf Karamanli gave up his claims for additional consular presents.⁸³ At the port of Tangier, only two British warships succeeded in maintaining a blockade in late 1828, bringing Moroccan guarantees for the safety of British shipping in the Atlantic.⁸⁴ The French navy had much less to show for. It did not appear particularly impressive from the vantage point of Algiers' seaside. American consul William Shaler considered the blockade a 'preposterous policy'.⁸⁵ His British counterpart wrote, to his own astonishment, that France 'appears to have been the only sufferer by the war'.⁸⁶ Another U.S. representative remembered the Napoleonic Wars and sardonically concluded: 'The French understand well being blockaded, but not to blockade'.⁸⁷ The proceedings of the French war effort did not do much to raise the nation's international profile as one of the Great Powers.

Criticasters within France also began to raise their voices. Sometimes their tone betrayed a similar astonishment and held a similar sarcastic ring as that of international spectators. Satirists ridiculed the incident of 1827 and wrote that Deval was lucky the kings of Algiers did not carry heavy sceptres like the kings of France.⁸⁸ More often, domestic critique was vengeful and radically violent. A deputy at the Chambers representing Marseille was particularly vocal in denouncing the 'passive war'. This man, Pierre-Honoré de Roux, lambasted the blockade and its detrimental effects on maritime trade. He linked economic problems in the southern departments to France's war with Algiers as well as its support for the Greeks, claiming that it should be 'the slavery of the Francs that must be abolished before

⁸² CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, Maritime Prefect Jacob to CCM', Toulon 21-10-1827; 'Several merchants to CCM', Marseille 22-10-1828; 'Several merchants to CCM', Marseille 03-12-1828.

⁸³ R. Anderson, *Naval wars in the Levant, 1559-1853* (Liverpool 1952), pp. 566-567; S. Bono, *Les corsaires en Méditerranée* (trans. A. Somaï, Paris 1998), p. 43.

 ⁸⁴ TNA, FO 8/4, 'Hay to Backhouse', 08-12-1828, fp. 245-247; 'Hay to Backhouse', 05-02-1829, fp. 256-257.
 ⁸⁵ NARA II, M23, vol. 11, 'Shaler to Clay', Port Mahon 02-09-1827.

⁸⁶ TNA, FO 112/3, 'St. John to Huskisson', Algiers 10-05-1828, fp. 245-246.

⁸⁷ NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 12, 'Biddle to Lee', USS Java at Mahon 23-10-1829.

⁸⁸ Julien, La conquête, 28.

anything else'.⁸⁹ Tapping into the old threat perception of Barbary captivity, he argued for a military expedition that would end North African maritime raiding for good.⁹⁰

De Roux was not alone. Several like-minded speakers could be heard in the Chambers at the end of the 1828 session. On 10 July, the opposition gave several memos and speeches denouncing the official policy and suggesting a military invasion. At an estimated cost of seven million francs per year, the blockade provided an additional point of complaint. The warships constantly had to be provisioned out at sea and there was a big problem with reigning sickness amongst the crews.⁹¹ Charles Dupin, a cartographer, mathematician and member of the Academy of Sciences, considered it 'absurd' that millions were spent to ensure the safety of some small barques carrying cargoes of no more than 20,000 francs.⁹² Deputies from Marseille would have differed and took the lead in pushing more decisive measures to protect their shipping.⁹³ Representatives from the port city felt the war's immediate impact on French maritime trade, which had everything to do with Algerine corsairing. It is no wonder, therefore, that their critical remarks hinged on the threat perceptions of 'Barbary piracy'. Such invocations of a pirate threat became much more commonplace in subsequent years, when the actual deployment of troops became more and more plausible.

The earliest years of the war were therefore a sign of things to come. The idea that France, as a Great Power, would end piracy and ensure security on behalf of other powers became omnipresent in later stages, but it had already become discernible by 1828. Corsairing and security at sea hence were not afterthoughts to the French invasion, they were not just intended to justify conquest at the last moment. Protection of small power shipping had been part of the very beginning of the conflict. However, in this early stage aspirations were very far removed from the reality at sea. French actors may have held visions of Great Power dominance and glory, but for the time being its forces could not even hold the corsair fleets of Algiers at bay. The deployment of corsairs was a central aspect of the Algerine war effort and the French blockade did little to stop it. Algerine successes in upsetting French trade thus inspired critiques of French strategy, which would gradually provoke calls for ever more radical solutions to the conflict. A Great Power should not suffer this kind of nuisance from a barbaric, piratical enemy, such critiques of the war effort often implied. The period of 1827-1828 was thus crucial in setting French policy making on a path of radicalization, leading to a

⁸⁹ Weiss, Captives and corsairs, pp. 165-166.

⁹⁰ Julien, La conquête, p. 29.

⁹¹ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 160-161.

⁹² Julien, La conquête, p. 29.

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 32-33.

point where security against piracy and French imperial expansion were deemed mutually reinforcing.

The lure of conquest, 1828-1829

Anxiety, dissatisfaction, and a sense of wounded pride each played a part in the French decision to seek a definitive victory against Algiers. Misgivings and frustrations were increasingly voiced by 1828, making an invasion of the Regencies seem more appealing than a continuation of the blockade. The historical literature suggests that such displeasures were not only held by critical opposition figures and irritated merchants, but that these existed within broader French official circles.⁹⁴ Authors who situate the invasion amidst the broader dynamics of French imperialism have noted that the loss of sovereign control over the old colony of Saint-Domingue can be linked to the conquest of 1830. Failures of protectionist colonial policies and the setback of having to recognize the Haitian Republic in 1825 provoked a search for new imperial holdings. As David Todd argues: 'The conquest of Algeria, in its initial stage, may thus be construed as an attempt to provide France with a substitute for the riches of Saint-Domingue'.⁹⁵

Yet, besides disappointments, the French plans to conquer Algiers were also marked by hopes for aggrandizement, personal ambitions and universalist ideals of progress. European publicists, French statesmen and foreign officials drafted projects of conquest or subscribed to them with aspirations of furthering their own interests. A diverse cast of contemporaries became involved in plans to invade Algiers in the years before 1830, including individuals as diverse as British naval commander Lord Thomas Cochrane (1775-1860) and Egyptian viceroy Mehmed Ali (1769-1849). Most of these schemes never materialized as the French government eventually opted for a campaign that was waged under the national flag. The years leading up to 1830 were nevertheless of formative importance. Even the discarded ideas warrant attention because they show how outlooks and policies developed in a steadily radicalizing fashion. There was a clear, though not necessarily linear, development in the French planning from blockades and punitive action to actual invasion and conquest. The attack took its ultimate form due to a confluence of different ideas on international security and the role of France within the Congress System. Actions on the ground, particularly the efforts at mediation in Algiers, further shaped the conduct of policy. The process of policy

⁹⁴ Julien, La conquête, p. 29; Sessions, By sword, p. 26.

⁹⁵ Todd, 'A French imperial meridian', p. 169; Quinn, The French overseas empire, p. 107.

formation that preceded the invasion was, as will become clear, interlinked with discourses of pirate threats to maritime security. However, those discourses were also going to be heavily contested, as they had in earlier stages of the post-1815 period and during previous attempts to extend the security culture to the Mediterranean.

French officials and the lineage of invasion

Officialdom came rather late to the idea of invading Algiers. Trailing behind merchant lobbies and speakers in the Chambers, the French government was not particularly enthusiastic about an attack on land. The first line of obstruction concerned questions of a military nature. Senior admirals favoured a bombardment of the city, as they considered it more feasible than an amphibious landing. Moreover, they preferred the added glory it would bestow upon their navy. Several early plans for an invasion thus stranded at the boards of the Admiralty. One of the first examples was the proposal by Abel Aubert Dupetit-Thouars, a frigate captain who succeeded his hydrographical missions along the Algerine coast with a plan to land troops there. His proposal of August 1827 met rejection from most admirals, though the Navy Minister Chabrol allegedly liked the idea.⁹⁶ Members of these high-ranked circles generally still held beliefs that Algiers was too well defended for an attempted attack on land. Those outlooks were not just entertained by the admirals of France. They formed a sort of broader, internationally shared consensus of military knowledge. The commander-in-chief of the British Mediterranean fleet Sir Pulteney Malcolm, for instance, attested to the outlook as well. In October 1829, he told the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople that Exmouth's bombardment of 1816 had ended all English appetite for a landing of troops, as the costs would hardly be proportionate to the gains.⁹⁷ The question of what gains would make those costs worthwhile later became the stuff of political calculation, when domestic elections, commercial imperatives, and international security concerns came into play.

Politicians tended to match the scepticism of military men. The Minister of War, Count Aimé de Clermont-Tonnerre (1779-1865), stood alone when he presented a proposal for an invasion in October 1827. His report to the King was rejected almost unanimously, but it is notable for the ways in which its argumentation is built. The text reads as a lengthy, detailed critique of the French strategy as it stood, larded with details on landing sites and troop numbers. It noted that the navy essentially lay powerless before Algiers, just like the British

⁹⁶ C. Port, *Dictionnaire historique, géographique et biographique de Maine-et-Loire et de l'ancienne province d'Anjou* (rev. ed., Angers 1978), vol. 2, pp. 83-84.

⁹⁷ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 38, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 10-10-1829, fp. 15-18.

navy had ultimately been unsuccessful in 1824.⁹⁸ Therefore, only a territorial invasion could bring the conflict to a 'glorious' conclusion. In making his case, Clermont-Tonnerre argued that there was no honour for France in trying to arrange a treaty with the government of Algiers. History, the Minister stated, had shown that such a treaty would not be respected anyway. He maintained: 'there is no security with the government of Algiers, except in its total destruction, and there is no other means, Sire, to arrive at this goal, but by an expedition on land'.⁹⁹

Assured as he was of the invasion's success, Clermont-Tonnerre stressed that the other European powers would not oppose it. In attacking and occupying Algiers, France would actually be doing a service to Europe, delivering the continent from three centuries of 'humiliating vexations'.¹⁰⁰ These arguments, however, did not do much at the royal council. Most ministers were hostile to the plan and the head of the council, Joseph de Villèle, merely thanked Clermont-Tonnerre for his report, noting that it would surely be useful if such an expedition would ever be carried out. The King himself seemed impressed, but backed down, telling Clermont-Tonnerre: 'you see, we are in the minority'.¹⁰¹

Historians do tend to see the report of Clermont-Tonnerre as a blueprint for the invasion of 1830, in spite of its initial failure to get approved. What they fail to note, however, is that the plan explicitly situated an attack within the framework of European security. Clermont-Tonnerre did list electoral gains and the bolstering of the monarchy as arguments for an expedition, stating that the government could face the ballot box confidently if it had 'the keys of Algiers in hand'.¹⁰² Therefore this report of 1827 is taken to be another sign of the 'true objectives' behind the conquest of Algiers. Still, that emphasis obscures the continental concerns behind the plan. Clermont-Tonnerre noted that military glory could help the government in winning elections, but at the same time he stressed that such military glory could not be attained on the European continent. Europe is at peace, he argued, and it was a sign of Providence that France now had the opportunity to carry out a war elsewhere.¹⁰³ The order of peace and stability on the continent, together with a sense of avenging the military humiliations that France had to suffer as part of that order (a foreign occupation and an

⁹⁸ SHD, GR 1/H/1, 'Rapport au Roi sur Alger', Paris 14-10-1827, fp. 58. The same file also holds a printed version of the report, P. Azan, 'Le rapport du Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre sur une expédition a Alger (1827)', *Extrait de la Revue Africaine* 340-341:3-4 (1929), pp. 1-47.

⁹⁹ SHD, GR 1/H/1, 'Rapport au Roi sur Alger', Paris 14-10-1827, fp. 23.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., fp. 3.

¹⁰¹ Azan, 'Le rapport', p. 5.

¹⁰² Sessions, *By sword*, p. 25.

¹⁰³ SHD, GR 1/H/1, 'Rapport au Roi sur Alger', Paris 14-10-1827, fp. 2-3.

uncertain Great Power status), hence shaped the policies of invasion and conquest from a very early stage.

Clermont Tonnerre was not the first to suggest that the Regency should be invaded. Countless similar plans and projects had already been circulating long before that meeting of the council in October 1827. As previous chapters have made clear, these proposals originated far beyond the inner circles of the French government. The same sorts of claims, solutions and outlooks could be found in the texts of countless pamphlets, poems, and captivity accounts that had emanated from all over nineteenth-century Europe. It is notable just how very similar Clermont-Tonnerre's text is to these many precursors. Surely, the military aspects of his report were heavily indebted to old reconnaissance works that were carried out under Napoleon.¹⁰⁴ But the report especially fits within the steady stream of popular, activist texts that began to appear in great numbers from the Congress of Vienna onwards. One can discern a clear resemblance to the pleas of Sidney Smith in the stated aim of 'delivering' Europe from an old nuisance. Clermont-Tonnerre's 'historical' account of Algiers as a state that could not keep treaties echoed the pamphlets that Hanseatic representatives had dragged to Vienna.

These earlier writings, Clermont-Tonnerre's report, and the various French schemes that were to follow all centred on one basic idea: that the government of Algiers carried no legitimacy due to its piratical conduct. The state of Algiers could supposedly be conquered without repercussions because it was not really a state. It rather was a collective of brigands hampering Europe's peaceable development, complicit as the Regency was in the piratical ways of its corsairs. Such an outlook on Algiers was not beholden to a single French Minister and his odd few supporters. As Chapter 1 made clear, these notions of North African illegitimacy were part of a larger European perception, which had a long lineage dating back to the eighteenth century and which became a justification for concerted repressive action in the wake of 1815. The idea of conquering Algiers and its underpinning arguments were thus by no means 'French'. They were embedded and shared within the post-Napoleonic security culture.¹⁰⁵

Some of these older ideas on the threat of Barbary piracy and the benefits of conquest received a new impulse over the course of the 1820s. Events during the Greek Insurgency

¹⁰⁴ Azan, 'Le rapport', p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Todd, 'Retour', p. 217; L. Ben Rejeb, "'The general belief of the world". Barbary as genre and discourse in Mediterranean history', *European Review of History* 19:1 (2012), pp. 15-31, there pp. 25-26; Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 25-30; M. Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere. Piraterie, Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen, 1500-1900* (Frankfurt a.M. 2010), p. 284.

against Ottoman rule brought notions of North African illegitimacy to the fore once again. Charged news reports of the fighting in the Morea and Aegean sparked a revival of eighteenth-century Enlightenment discourses on Islamic tyranny and Muslim fanaticism. As Jennifer Sessions argues, Oriental despotism came back to the forefront of French political culture 'and set the symbolic stage for the invasion of Algiers'.¹⁰⁶ The Dey who slapped Deval appeared to be as much of a tyrant as the Sultan who chastised the Greeks. One philhellene author of the Revue Encylopédique directly linked events in Greece and Algiers, noting that the 'liberated' Greeks could contribute 'to the philanthropists' wish to one day see the Mediterranean freed from the incursions of these Barbary pirates'.¹⁰⁷ The connection also existed beyond symbolism. In a lengthy memorandum that he wrote while docked at the quarantine of Toulon, Deval claimed that the Algerine involvement in the Ottoman repression of the Greek rebels had brought a 'new offensive' of Barbary corsairing. Once again, this 'system of piracy' had 'subverted public tranquillity'.¹⁰⁸ In addition to such renewed outrage over 'Barbary piracy', French statesmen simultaneously found out that unilateral military action did not necessarily have to result in a Great Power war. The departure of a French expeditionary army to the Morea in 1828 made this clear, as did the intervention in Spain of 1823. Revived threat perceptions of 'Barbary piracy' and the increasing French penchant for martial ventures together bolstered calls for an attack on Algiers.¹⁰⁹

With most of the French ministers still of a sceptical disposition, none of these plans were going anywhere yet. A continuation of the blockade, complemented by renewed negotiations, was the enduring preference of the senior statesmen. Reports like those of Clermont-Tonnerre therefore remained just that: reports. Nor did changes of Ministers impact the conduct of the war. In 1828, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Auguste de La Ferronays opted for a more conciliatory approach, hoping that negotiations with Dey Hussein could end the conflict. Little came of those attempts at reconciliation. Hussein saw no use in acceding to a string of Deval's dictates in return for a 'treaty of perpetual peace'. He did not feel particularly pressed by the enduring blockade either, telling the Sardinian stand-in consul that it had little effect on Algiers.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 30.

 ¹⁰⁷ Weiss, *Corsairs and captives*, pp. 161-162.
 ¹⁰⁸ CADN, 22PO/1/50, 'Deval to Damas', Toulon 29-09-1827.

¹⁰⁹ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 30.

¹¹⁰ Julien, La conquête, p. 32; CADN, 22PO/1/67, 'Dattili to Deval', Algiers 05-01-1829; CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Projet de traité entre le gouvernement de France et celui d'Alger fait par Mr. le Chev. Deval', 23-06-1829, fp. 81-85.

The tides of the war thus continued into 1829 as they had in the years before. Some new warships strengthened the blockade and Algerine corsairs continued to be sighted at irregular intervals.¹¹¹ The decisive shift in French policy only came in August 1829. By that time, the King no longer had to consider himself in the minority when it came to plans of conquest. There were three dispersed, but interconnected men that helped tip the scale: Jules de Polignac, Mehmed Ali, and a Piedmontese trader in Egyptian antiques.

Grand schemes in Paris

The person whose name will probably forever be attached to the French conquest of Algiers is that of Prince Jules de Polignac. Even the historians who sought to write less traditional and less elitist studies of French imperialism each had to note his crucial contribution.¹¹² Jules de Polignac, who became France's Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1829, drafted the policies of conquest, saw the plans through into implementation, and tried to garner international support for them. Still, Polignac did not devise his plans alone or carry out policies single-handedly, nor does he carry sole responsibility for what happened to Algiers under his Ministry. Many people were involved in the plotting of an invasion, which was really starting to loom large from the summer of 1829 onwards. There were North African rulers who attempted to align their own agendas with French plans, Ottoman officials who tried to alter those schemes, diplomatic agents who negotiated for the French service, and Great Power statesmen who professed or withheld their support at pivotal moments.

Jules de Polignac was no stranger to diplomatic negotiation, or to devising secretive plots. He was the French ambassador to Great Britain from 1823 to 1829: six eventful years that enveloped the intense negotiations on the Greek question. Alongside his diplomat's duties, Polignac also pursued other, hidden political projects, which were secret and conspirational and marked by strong royalist convictions. Polignac had fought alongside the rebellious forces of the Vendée and continued the counter-revolutionary struggle as one of the original *émigrés*. His mother had been a personal favourite of Marie Antoinette and he himself continued to stand on the side of the Bourbons, especially of the family's most conservative members. Polignac got very close to Charles, the Count of Artois, who succeeded his elder brother Louis XVIII as King of France in September 1824. Polignac and Charles had shared the experience of exile during the years of the Revolution. They were both

¹¹¹ TNA, FO 112/3, 'St. John to Hay', Algiers 01-07-1829, fp. 303-304; CCM, MR.4.6.1.4.1/02, 'Prefect maritime to CCM', Toulon 05-08-1829; 'Telegraph from Prefet Maritime to CCM', Toulon 28-09-1829.

¹¹² See the contributions in Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*.

connected to underground organizations with a Catholic, clerical and conservative imprint. While Louis XVIII followed his international allies' advice and drafted the liberal charter of 1814, Charles took an opposite course and set up an ultra-royalist shadow government, aimed at obstructing the liberal ministers and tendencies of his brother on the throne. Charles' clique also violently opposed the allied interventions and army of occupation. Polignac was one of the secret group's primary members. Even his return from London to Paris in August 1829, when the crowned Charles X asked Polignac to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, took place under the utmost secrecy.¹¹³

Historians tend to describe Polignac's character as a curious blend. In their writings, he appears not only as a stubbornly consistent conservative, but also as someone who was prone to act on changing and often chimerical rumours or obsessions.¹¹⁴ Like so many ultraroyalists, Polignac tended to see godless Jacobin congregations and violent revolutionary agitation behind every form of opposition to the French monarchy. Yet his preoccupations were also more diverse, and at times could have an almost Bonapartist fringe. Polignac shared the opinion that, since 1815, France was no longer living in its 'natural borders'. The Congress of Vienna received the blame for this, as it had robbed the country of its regions on the Rhine.¹¹⁵ This disgruntlement over the loss of France's hegemonic position on the continent, as seen in the days of the Empire in Europe, was thus directed at the international system that had allegedly dismembered it.

Another of Polignac's lasting fascination were the 'piratical states' of North Africa. He advised Louis XVIII to form commercial establishments on the Barbary Coast in September 1814. That same year, he wrote that a shared European expedition against the North African Regencies could be a useful way of redirecting the continental powers' 'warlike tempers'.¹¹⁶ Polignac is also said to have written a memoir on the conquest of Algiers in the middle of the 1820s, when he was still in London, but a trace of the text is yet to be found.¹¹⁷ This old-style courtier's steadfast belief in the traditional royal order, his subscription to the idea that France had been dismembered by the congress of Vienna and his longing glance at Algiers all found their way into the grandiose international schemes that Polignac began to concoct almost from the moment of his appointment.

¹¹³ V. Beach, Charles X of France. His life and times (Boulder, CO 1971), pp. 287-294.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 295; Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 33-34.

¹¹⁵ A. Pingaud, 'Le projet Polignac (1829)', *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* 14 (1900), pp. 402-410, there pp. 403-404.

¹¹⁶ CADLC, 1MD/6, Comte J. de Polignac, 'Note sur l'expédition projectée contra les Barbaresques', 19-09-1814, fp. 386-387.

¹¹⁷ Todd, 'Retour', p. 214.

An extension of French territory in Europe was foremost on the new minister's mind. Relocating the border to the Rhine would, he believed, grant the King liberal support, while benefitting the country demographically and militarily. Winning an all-out continental war seemed unrealistic, so he pondered which conditions would make France's enlargement towards the banks of Rhine seem acceptable to the other Great Powers. Polignac's answer to that question became the first (and most famous) of his ambitious designs. His basic idea was to side with Russia. At that moment, the Russian army was registering success after success in a war with the Ottoman Empire that lasted from April 1828 to September 1829. Russian forces appeared on the brink of a total victory that could spell the end of the Sultan's rule, though in reality the war aims were far from that, as the Russian authorities sought to obtain smaller territorial gains, keep the Dardanelles open for commercial shipping and reassert the Treaty of London (1827) that established the independence of Greece.¹¹⁸ Still, Polignac proposed to link the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to a total political overhaul in Europe. Should Russian troops take Constantinople and the empire be partitioned, then the territorial order of Europe could also be redacted in one big swoop.

In Polignac's plan, France would get its way and regain the frontiers on the Rhine, while Russia and Austria would be allowed to annex the European parts of the Ottoman Empire. France could then take the southern Netherlands and Alsace, whereas Prussia would be granted control over the northern Netherlands and Great Britain would be appeased with the Dutch colonies. The Dutch King could be compensated by granting him a new throne in Constantinople, reconceived as a Christian city state. The Minister put his plans in a memorandum to the royal council, noting that France could gain 3.8 million additional inhabitants and obtain possession of Wellington's fortresses in the southern Netherlands.¹¹⁹ The memorandum passed the vote and was communicated to St. Petersburg in September 1829. Polignac sent a set of special instructions, directing the ambassador at the Russian court to stress that France 'could not feel secure so long as Belgium offered facilities for an invasion and so long as Prussian armies occupied the Rhineland'.¹²⁰

This memorandum tugged at the very basis of the post-Napoleonic international system. The 'Polignac plan', as it soon became known, would be a total overhaul of the Congress of Vienna's territorial order, the military protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle and of the

¹¹⁸ O. Ozavci, *Dangerous gifts. Imperialism, security, and civil wars in the Levant, 1798-1864* (forthcoming, Oxford University Press).

¹¹⁹ Pingeaud, 'Le projet Polignac', pp. 404-408.

¹²⁰ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, pp. 77-79; CADLC, 112CP/178, 'Mémoire lu et approuvé au Conseil du Roi (Septembre 1829)', fp. 287-290.

Quintuple Alliance that France had been a member of since 1818. Nevertheless, it still spoke in the familiar terminology of security and referenced the old aim of avoiding an inter-European war among the Great Powers. As to the continent's smaller powers and the Ottoman Empire: they could be disposed and dismembered at will. Polignac's plan thus once again made the international hierarchies blatantly clear. For Polignac, France was undisputedly situated at the top of that hierarchy: a position that could only be strengthened by territorial gains in Belgium and the Rhineland. There was, however, a single contingency that would immediately end the progression of the plan. Should the Russian Tsar and the Ottoman Sultan conclude peace, then the scheme would be abandoned. That is exactly what happened on 14 September 1829, when the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople made Polignac's memorandum a theoretical rumination.¹²¹

Though the proposal was never executed, it is nonetheless significant – especially because of the intrinsic relation with the invasion of Algiers. The conclusion of peace between Russia and the Ottoman Empire seemed to close off the option of territorial gains in Europe, which directed attention elsewhere: across the Mediterranean, towards Algiers. The Czech historian Miroslav Šedivý argues that Polignac's plan is noteworthy because it shows how French ambitions of aggrandizement spelled the end of the 1815 order.¹²² Yet the very discarding of the plan and the subsequent turn to conquest in North Africa may just as well point to an opposite conclusion. After a brief moment of agitation, the territorial order of the Congress of Vienna actually appeared settled and solid again with the Peace of Adrianople. A massive war among the Great Powers just for the sake of expanding France to its 'natural frontiers' on the Rhine was no longer a plausible option, if it had ever been. To seek territorial aggrandizement, the French government would have to go beyond the continent.

The Alexandria proposal

The lingering conflict with Algiers hence gained a new importance. Two arrivals in Paris in the summer months of 1829 brought renewed, reinvigorated attention to that unresolved war. The first concerned the arrival of an agitated report from the blockading squadron at Algiers. In early August, a newly appointed admiral sought to negotiate an armistice with Dey Hussein and proposed that he sent an envoy to Paris. Nothing came of it. When his flagship *La Provençe* sailed into the harbour under a flag of truce, it was met by fire from the batteries.

¹²¹ Pingeaud, 'Le projet Polignac', pp. 408-409.

¹²² M. Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question (Pilsen 2013), p. 411.

The admiral then turned around and the affair would come to be framed as a final affront to the dignity of the French nation.¹²³ Noting the graveness of the matter, the British consul quickly concluded: 'Such a flagrant (...) breach of the Laws of Nations will, I suppose, at last stir up the French to make a serious attack'.¹²⁴ Rather than an aggravating breach of convention, the event had actually been an accident, perhaps as costly as that first mistaken gunshot in the bay of Navarino. Hussein instantly offered his apologies, fired the Minister of the Marine and had the culprits punished.¹²⁵ Paris, however, chose to focus only on the offensive part of the story and put it to good use in planning an invasion.

The second arrival that made Algiers an object of ever more radical policies was an infamous diplomat's return to Paris. The 53-year-old Bernardino Drovetti (1776-1852) had an appearance to match his reputation. A notable moustache, long sideburns and big-collared jackets gave him the look of a decided, old-style republican.¹²⁶ Though Piedmontese by birth, Drovetti had flocked to the revolutionary cause, served the French army in Italy, joined Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and had remained in that country to represent France ever since. His years of diplomatic service at Alexandria had brought him in a position of great influence with the Egyptian viceroy Mehmed Ali. Drovetti's fame (and personal wealth) further stemmed from his ceaseless efforts to snatch up antiquities. He sold two of his collections to the Egyptian Museum in Turin and the 'Musée Charles X' (now the Louvre) in 1824 and 1826 respectively.¹²⁷ In late June 1829, he left Alexandria for France, on what the British consul concluded was a leave of absence because of ill health.¹²⁸ Drovetti's first contacts with officials in the capital, however, had a very different inspiration. He had come to present them with a grand proposal: a plan to chastise Algiers and end all affronts of the Barbary States with help of Mehmed Ali.

Drovetti submitted his scheme to Polignac right at the moment when the news of the La Provence had come in, and he found an eager listener. He sent his memoir on the first of September, capitalizing on the incident by stressing that the quarrel with Algiers had to be stopped in a dignified manner. The solution, he argued, would lay with Mehmed Ali. Algiers had to be vanguished militarily, but an expedition of the French army would be costly and difficult. Drovetti, who probably had Napoleon's Egyptian exploits in mind, noted that local

¹²³ Julien, La conquête, pp. 33-34.

¹²⁴ TNA, FO 112/3, 'St. John to Murray', Algiers 03-08-1829, fp. 304-305. ¹²⁵ TNA, FO 112/3, 'St. John to Murray', Algiers 11-08-1829, fp. 305-306.

¹²⁶ HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 37, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 29-08-1829, fp. 133-144.

¹²⁷ D. Reid, Whose Pharaohs? Archaeology, museums, and Egyptian national identity from Napoleon to World War I (Cairo 2002), pp. 37-39 and 46.

¹²⁸ TNA, FO 78/184, 'Barker to Gordon', Alexandria 23-06-1829, fp. 157-160.

resistance and the hazards of provisioning the troops would render French success most uncertain. A Muslim army raised by the Egyptian viceroy would, on the other hand, be welcomed by the populace. The viceroy's forces had already proven their worth in campaigns against the Wahhabis in the Hejaz and during an invasion of Sudan.¹²⁹ An Egyptian presence in Algiers would also bring less hostility from Britain. On the way to Algiers, Mehmed Ali's forces could even take possession of Tripoli and Tunis, bringing an end to all piratical nuisances of the Barbary Regencies. France would only have to supply political, financial and some naval support. In return, the French government would find the entire coast of North Africa in the hand of a strong ally, on whom significant influence could be exerted.¹³⁰

The idea that extending Mehmed Ali's rule could end piracy gave the proposal a disinterested sheen, which Polignac believed would make an attack on Algiers easier to justify internationally. He hence arranged for a discussion of Drovetti's suggestions in the royal council. Several additional reports were on the table at this meeting in late September. The documents weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the project, and included the suppression of piracy in the first group. One outline from the Foreign Ministry stated that Egyptian control over North Africa would replace the Barbary States, 'which recognize no principle of order or justice', with a government that aspires to 'a righteous and durable politics¹³¹ Even more notable, however, was the statement that such a policy in North Africa would have a 'European' appeal. The memorandum argued that the plan would be of interest 'to all maritime states', especially those situated along the Mediterranean, who 'more or less suffer from the piracy of these powers'. European nations, the text continued, would finally be able to maintain stable relations with North Africa, rather than the precarious treaties that were constantly under threat of suspension.¹³² The French government would thereby ensure that smaller powers no longer had to endure the piracies and treaty demands of the Barbary Regencies. Accordingly, its plans with Mehmed Ali could be presented as an extension of preceding European attempts to provide security against the threat of 'Barbary piracy'.

Besides asserting its primary international status in this manner, the memoranda also noted that France would be able to undercut dangerous developments in the British Empire. One of the memorandums raised alarm about British aims to 'complete' its grand colonial system by creating military bases on the Red Sea and setting up a package boat service to India. A

¹²⁹ To support his case, Drovetti shared a table of Egyptian military in the media. TNA, FO 27/396, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 12-10-1829, fp. 204-206.

¹³⁰ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, pp. 113-114.

¹³¹ CADLC, 17MD/19, 'Aperçu de la situation politique de l'Egypte en 1828 et 1829 par Mr. de Coehorn, attaché aux Ministaire des affaires étrangères', fp. 107-120.

¹³² Ibidem.

powerful Egyptian viceroy, established throughout North Africa and indebted to France, would be able to close off the Mediterranean from the Indian Ocean. Mehmed Ali, the report eagerly concluded, could hold the 'keys' to great maritime and commercial routes.¹³³ The prospects of countering the British Empire while appearing to act in Europe's interest seemed promising enough to Charles X and his ministers. They adopted Drovetti's plan and began preparing its execution.

Secret instructions for confidential negotiations went out from Paris shortly after the meeting of the council. Those instructions did not amount to a unilateral departure from the continental order of security. International considerations occupied the French Ministers from the beginning of the plan's implementation. Appearing to act for the sake of broader European interests, and finding ways to get allied support, remained important to French officials – much more so than most of the historiography would allow for. The perceived threat of piracy was a crucial aspect of those attempts to gain international backing for the scheme, but it was also a topic of contention. Reflections on piracy hence marked the many negotiations that soon unfolded in various localities. French ambassadors in Constantinople and St. Petersburg would each test the waters in order to find out how the Ottoman Porte and the Great Power allies would perceive the plan and its professed benefits.

First, however, Mehmed Ali's participation needed to be ensured. A covert diplomatic mission under Drovetti's successor Jean-François Mimaut (1774-1837) began in October 1829, with the aim of getting the viceroy on board.¹³⁴ It immediately turned out that Mehmed Ali had some additional requests to make before he would cooperate. Mimaut opened the negotiations by declaring that the French King wished to make an expedition against Algiers an exclusively Egyptian affair, involving only Egyptian troops, but with monetary support and backing by a French squadron. He described the expedition as a 'project of subjecting the three Barbary Regencies and destroying piracy there'. Participation would therefore grant Mehmed Ali the 'high esteem and gratitude of all of Europe'.¹³⁵ The rationale was clear: chastising pirates would be a most acceptable way for the viceroy to strengthen his power base and extend his domains, simply because no European power could object to such a venture.

Mehmed Ali allegedly listened with profound attention and accepted the invitation, but he also stressed that France would have to provide whatever aid he may need. At a second

¹³³ CADLC, 17MD/19, 'Aperçu de la situation politique de l'Egypte en 1828 et 1829 par Mr. de Coehorn, attaché aux Ministaire des affaires étrangères', fp. 107-120.

¹³⁴ Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 116-117; Julien, La conquête, p. 34.

¹³⁵ CADLC, 6CCC/23, Politique no. 5, 'Mimaut to Polignac', Alexandrie 27-11-1829.

meeting on a subsequent evening, the Egyptian viceroy clarified what kind of aid he had in mind. He demanded four ships of the line, to be entered into Egyptian service. The attack, he noted, would have to be an exclusively Muslim affair, as French cooperation would only arouse resistance. He proclaimed that an army of 40,000 troops could readily take the field under command of his son Ibrahim Pasha (1789-1848), once the ships of war were provided.¹³⁶ Mimaut opened his next dispatch to Paris by clarifying, to his own displeasure, that Mehmed Ali was not making a proposal: his request for ships had already become an ultimatum.¹³⁷

Besides the notable references to piracy, these negotiations are particularly interesting because they indicate what Mehmed Ali may have sought to gain from the expedition. As fellow Ottoman subjects, Egyptian sailors and merchants did not have much to fear from North African corsairs. So, what was it that enthused Mehmed Ali about a project of 'subjecting' the Regencies and 'destroying' piracy? The timing of the proposal was of paramount importance and can clarify why the Egyptian viceroy took it into consideration.

The French proposal came shortly after the deployment of Egyptian troops and warships to Greece at the Sultan's orders, from 1824 to 1827. Mehmed Ali's forces fought in the Morea and sailed the Aegean under command of Ibrahim Pasha to quell the Greek rebellion against Ottoman rule, but their mission was marked by disappointments and ended in disaster. Ibrahim's cooperation with other Ottoman commanders like the Grand Admiral (and his father's old rival) Hüsrev Pasha was troublesome, rife with mutual frustrations. The annoyance of Mehmed Ali over what he saw as the Sultan's obstinate refusal to accept European mediation in the dealings with the Greeks climaxed after the Battle of Navarino, where the entire Ottoman fleet perished, including most Egyptian warships. As a compensation for his losses, Mehmed Ali did not even obtain control over the prosperous, wooded districts in Syria, which he repeatedly demanded from the Sultan, but was granted the rebellious island of Crete.¹³⁸

Increasingly frustrated by the Sultan's conduct, Mehmed Ali also began to worry that attempts to depose him and his family might be undertaken from Constantinople. If founding a local dynasty in Egypt was, as several historians suggest, ultimately what Mehmed Ali aimed for, then that aim may very well have appeared to be under peril from his suzerain. The

¹³⁶ CADLC, 6CCC/23, Politique no. 5, 'Mimaut to Polignac', Alexandrie 27-11-1829. For details of Mehmed Ali's plan, also see, BOA i.DUiT 139/3 29 Saban 1245.

¹³⁷ CADLC, 6CCC/23, Politique no. 6, 'Mimaut to Polignac', Alexandrie 28-11-1829.

¹³⁸ K. Fahmy, All the pasha's men. Mehmed Ali, his army, and the making of modern Egypt (Cairo 2002), pp. 55-60; O. Ozavci, Dangerous gifts.

French proposal offered Mehmed Ali an opportunity to counter that threat, extend his power, and, possibly, obtain further European support for his position.¹³⁹ French imperial agendas and, by extension, the European security culture in which they were embedded, could thus also become an instrument in the hands of this particular Ottoman powerbroker, aiding Mehmed Ali in his own schemes of aggrandizement. Security and the fight against piracy were thus not solely conducive of European Great Power interests, they also gave actors like Mehmed Ali the opportunity to seek benefit from the remaking of the international order in the Mediterranean.

Mehmed Ali's demand for ships of the line is another telling indication of why the viceroy subscribed to the French plan. Most Egyptian ships had been destroyed at Navarino and this would have been a quick way to compensate the loss. There were also deeper, more long-term dynamics at play. Ever since the beginning of the 1820s, significant projects of military reform had taken full speed in Egypt. Mehmed Ali sought to strengthen his position within a beleaguered Empire and felt unprepared to face the forces of the European Great Powers if the occasion would ever arise. He therefore began to create an entirely new kind of army: manned by conscripts, inspired by the latest innovations, and supported by foreign (often French) advisors. He wanted a navy to match. This was why he coveted the Syrian territories, which were rich in the timber used in naval construction. By the end of the decade, Mehmed Ali showed increasing willingness to take those lands himself and accordingly expressed his disdain for Sultan Mahmud II to foreign representatives.¹⁴⁰ The campaign into North Africa would be a detour, but it could be a useful one. With French assistance, Mehmed Ali could obtain new warships and extend his power base on the road to Syria.¹⁴¹ In addition, the destruction of piracy would, as the French presented it, ensure the goodwill of the other European powers. The idea of fighting piracy and fostering security at sea fulfilled the same role for the Egyptian viceroy as it did for the government of France: it would serve as the international legitimation for a project of military glory and geopolitical interest.

French diplomats had initially intended to obtain that allied approval only at the very end of the talks with Mehmed Ali, when the other powers could each, bilaterally be presented with a finished plan. The negotiations therefore had to be kept secret. The French plotting nevertheless was exposed when the other diplomats in Alexandria found out about Mimaut's negotiations. British consul John Barker suddenly realised that Drovetti probably had not

¹³⁹ Fahmy, *All the pasha's*, pp. 51-55; O. Ozavci, *Dangerous gifts* (Oxford, forthcoming), Chap. 1. ¹⁴⁰ Fahmy, *All the pasha's*, pp. 49-50 and 53.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 61.

gone to Paris for the benefit of his health at all.¹⁴² He observed that some sort of secret mission was underway, though everything he could report on the talks were 'mere conjectures'.¹⁴³ Barker at once remembered a topic that Drovetti had talked about for years: a plan to end the war with Algiers by engaging Mehmed Ali in the conflict. He had never taken the subject seriously, 'Gigantic and even chimerical as this project appeared to my British intellect', but now it seemed real, and open to all sorts of objections.¹⁴⁴ Those objections came to the fore in the first few months of 1830, as the French government tried to obtain support from the Ottoman Sultan. Expecting international opposition, the French sought the Sultan's official approval. The legitimizing narrative of ending Mediterranean piracy was to be presented and contested during the subsequent negotiations in Constantinople, Alexandria and the Great Power capitals. Contemporaries would perhaps have been unaware of the moment's importance, but this was the critical phase. The French invasion of Algiers was little over six months away.

A firman from Constantinople...?

Whether the grand scheme of Mehmed Ali bringing an end to 'Barbary piracy' was going to succeed depended on affairs in Constantinople. This was not because of Mehmed Ali, as the Egyptian viceroy hardly seemed to care for the official fiat of the Sultan. Mimaut gleefully reported that Mehmed Ali barely mentioned the Porte during their negotiations.¹⁴⁵ It was rather the opinions of the other European governments that appeared to hinge on the approval of the Ottoman authorities. To let one of the Sultan's nominal subordinates take up arms and subdue three vassal Regencies without any form of official sanctioning would not seem like a very benevolent endeavour, or as beneficial to security in the wider Mediterranean. As Polignac himself admitted in a letter to St. Petersburg, this entire enterprise would have been unthinkable within Europe. Arming a provincial governor to carry out an expedition without his sovereign's consent would be an extraordinary spectacle. But outside Europe things were different. There, borders could be redrawn, and expeditions undertaken. There, Polignac wrote, one would have to 'judge things according to a different order of ideas'.¹⁴⁶ In the

 ¹⁴² TNA, FO 78/184, 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 18-08-1829, fp. 18-08-1829, fp. 204-207.
 ¹⁴³ TNA, FO 78/184, 'Barker to Gordon', Alexandria 29-11-1829, fp. 283-284.

¹⁴⁴ TNA, FO 78/184, 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 18-08-1829, fp. 18-08-1829, fp. 204-207.

¹⁴⁵ CADLC, 6CCC/23, Politique no. 5, 'Mimaut to Polignac', Alexandria 27-11-1829.

¹⁴⁶ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Polignac to Duc de Mortemart', Paris 19-01-1830, fp. 4-9.

context of a supposedly crumbling Ottoman Empire, all of this would be acceptable, or so he thought.

At that time, the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829 had inflated all kinds of anxieties over the potential collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the violent repercussions this could have within Europe. Some governments took a very active role in engineering the decay of that seemingly untenable power, as evinced by Polignac's grandiose plotting. Others, like the British Cabinet and chancelleries of Austria, despaired over the Empire's demise, fearing it could only bring Russian predominance in the East. This was the setting in which Foreign Secretary George Hamilton-Gordon, fourth Earl of Aberdeen (1784-1860) wrote his infamous lines on 'this clumsy fabric of barbarous power' that nonetheless needed to be maintained.¹⁴⁷ The signing of the Treaty of Adrianople in September 1829 momentarily averted the apparent danger. Russian actors had crafted that treaty without involvement of the allies, through direct negotiations with the Ottomans, but the text did (momentarily) abate European fears of the Empire's collapse. Still, even the most relieved observers had to note that insurgent Greece had been lost, Serbian autonomy had been granted, and the Danubian Principalities had fallen under Russian occupation.¹⁴⁸ Now, with the exposure of France's designs, the French government and its Egyptian accomplice seemed bound to hack away at another hem of the Ottoman domains.

Polignac thought that an official sanction at the highest level, in the form of a *firman* (an order or binding decree) by the Sultan, would take away the grounds for international critique on those troublesome, contestable aspects of the scheme against the Regencies. The French ambassador in Constantinople, General Armand Charles Guilleminot (1774-1840), therefore received orders to solicit such a *firman*, installing Mehmed Ali as the new authority over Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. The instructions, sent around the same time as those for Mimaut in Alexandria, claimed that the Regencies would flourish under the Egyptian viceroy and bring additional revenue to the imperial treasury. Polignac tried to make it seem as if France was only acting in the Sultan's best interest. To obscure the role of the French government, Guilleminot had to state that Mehmed Ali had proposed the entire endeavour. The French King supposedly only reacted because the plan naturally interested him, and now wanted to know the Porte's opinion before proceeding. Meanwhile, of course, Mimaut was already discussing details with Mehmed Ali.¹⁴⁹

 ¹⁴⁷ TNA, FO 78/179, 'Aberdeen to Gordon', 10-11-1829, fp. 94-108.
 ¹⁴⁸ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, p. 69.

¹⁴⁹ Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 117-118.

The discourse of the piracy threat featured prominently in the French communications to the Ottoman Porte. A memorandum from Guilleminot to the Reis Effendi featured the same arguments of Algiers and the other Regencies being the seat of untrustworthy, irredeemably piratical governments. Still, the references were tailored somewhat for the Ottoman recipients. The Barbary Regents, the memorandum stated, were actually the 'real rebels to the authority of the Sublime Porte'. These men, engaged in their 'most infamous piracy', were hence 'the shame of Islam'. The note also glanced back at previous international efforts to stop Barbary piracy, in an obvious attempt to justify the drastic scheme by situating it on a longer continuum of grievances and calls for action. According to the French memorandum, 'Europe' had for some time been involved in a 'project' to destroy piracy. Now, with help of Mehmed Ali, that project could be completed. In the process, Ottoman authority over North Africa would be restored, which was really the best guarantee against any future revival of the piracies. The Sultan only had to grant his approval, but he would have to do so quickly. Ending on a menacing note, the memorandum closed by alluding to the French readiness to act – either with or without support from Constantinople.¹⁵⁰

The Sultan's authorization never came. Guilleminot tried hard to discern a tacit form of approval in the Reis Effendi's questions on the state of the expedition's preparations as well as the rather non-committal manner in which he received the memorandum. A week later, at a second audience, the Ottoman official told him that a *firman* would not be issued. In the eyes of the Porte, the war between France and Algiers was born from 'trivial issues' that had been blown out of all proportion. The Porte furthermore rejected any French encroachments in North Africa, even if they were carried out through Mehmed Ali. The Regencies, after all, were still considered as territories under the suzerainty of the Sultan, despite the fact that authorities in North Africa conducted their own foreign policies.¹⁵¹ The Porte therefore countered the French proposal by stating that the Sultan would exert his sovereign power and send an envoy to Algiers, ordering Dey Hussein to settle his differences with France immediately.¹⁵²

It is not hard to see why the Porte would have opted for this course. Considering the degree of mistrust between Constantinople and Alexandria, an expedition by Mehmed Ali would have appeared more as a rebellion against, rather than a reinstatement of, the Sultan's authority. Nor would the Reis Effendi have put much trust in yet another European proposal

¹⁵⁰ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Memorandum remis au Reis Effendi', 01-12-1829.

¹⁵¹ For the origins of the conflict from an Ottoman perspective see, BOA, I.DUIT 138/76, 28-06-1829.

¹⁵² CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Instructions given to the first dragoman', 07-12-1829; Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 36-36; Puryear, *France and the Levant*, pp. 122-123.

at that particular moment, following the recent loss of Greece. The French reference to a longer succession of international attempts to end Barbary probably also had a very different connotation from an Ottoman perspective. That 'project', as the French memorandum called it, would have conjured up imagines of aggression (like the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816) or of unacceptable infringements (like the concerted communications of 1819). Still, the Porte did consider the matter critical enough to get involved directly. The very effort of trying to mediate a settlement was something that it had reneged to do in 1819, when the Great Power ambassadors requested it. In addition, France and Algiers were now actually at war, providing a clearer basis for mediation than the peacetime demands that European actors posed on earlier occasions.

The French legitimizing narrative of ending piracy, providing security and creating a new, harmonious order in North Africa met its first real challenge in the Ottoman insistence on mediation. Here, the Porte argued that it had to be a central party in the making of a settlement. It tried to position itself as one of the key providers of security and one of the crucial players in the maintenance of the established order in the Mediterranean, which ran contrary to every ambition and aspiration that the French nurtured. Therefore, the French claim of acting in the interest of the Sultan could no longer be maintained. In a context of significant international anxiety over the existence of the Ottoman Empire, this was not beneficial to the French designs. Guilleminot and Polignac tried hard to change the Porte's decision. The ambassador claimed that negotiating with Dey Hussein would be unacceptable, as it would be beneath the dignity of the French King. Moreover, the French government was not proposing to merely settle its differences with Algiers, it was trying to conceive an entirely new political order in North Africa.¹⁵³ Polignac all the while kept issuing dispatches that detailed how the Porte could benefit from the French designs.¹⁵⁴ None of these efforts changed the Ottoman preference for mediation. That resolve was a serious complication for the French government. Not because Mehmed Ali seemed to care much for the Sultan's authorization anymore, but rather because it would hamper the acquisition of further Great Power support.

Obtaining consent from the other Great Power governments indeed proved to be a troublesome process. At this stage, the French government opted for a bilateral approach in which it contacted each of the allies separately. Tellingly enough, it had been Polignac's

¹⁵³ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Instructions given to the first dragoman', 07-12-1829.

¹⁵⁴ An undated instruction ordered Guilleminot to keep referring back to the original memorandum from the beginning of December, CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Polignac to Guilleminot', [n.d.]. Another example is CADLC, 133CP/260, 'Polignac to Guilleminot', Paris 09-02-1830, fp. 98-99.

intention to inform them only when the plan with Mehmed Ali would be very close to execution. Russia was the one exception in his plans, as the French Minister counted on the quick approval of Tsar Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855). Polignac's instructions to Constantinople, Alexandria and St. Petersburg therefore stressed the need to maintain the utmost secrecy. The cover, of course, was blown almost immediately. Foreign representatives in Alexandria had been attentive of what was going on and the Porte decided to inform the other Great Power ambassadors of the French proposal. French officials soon had to answer critical questions from the European allies.¹⁵⁵ The legitimization behind the French plans was open to contestation. The idea of a European project against the threat of piracy was not nearly as self-evident or commonsensical as French actors made them out to be.

In fact, the French schemes almost split the European alliance through the middle. The lines of division closely followed those that had arisen at earlier occasions, such as the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which we encountered in Chapter 3. Now, at the close of 1829, Russian and Prussian officials were still more in favour of the total destruction of the Regencies than their British and Austrian counterparts, who continued to support the regional status quo and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was actually the French position that changed dramatically between 1819 and 1829, shifting the majority position within the Quintuple Alliance.¹⁵⁶

From a reluctant participant in measures against the Regencies, the French government had turned into a proponent of radical ventures. French ministers and diplomats now referred to a historical project of ending piracy that their predecessors had never been particularly enthusiastic about. That they employed this argumentative strategy illustrates the importance of situating the invasion of Algiers within the history of the Congress System. The security politics of that system mattered, even if Russian, Prussian, Austrian and British actors held widely differing opinions about the proposed attack on the North African states. In fact, the negotiations amongst Great Power governments highlight the inter-imperial character of the fight against piracy. The six months preceding the French invasion of Algiers illustrate how the repression of piracy revolved around the balancing of different imperial agendas, ensuring that it would not provoke a Great Power war. In essence, this balancing effort revolved

¹⁵⁵ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, pp. 122-123; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 38, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 24-12-1829, fol. 94-95; FO 78/189, 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 02-03-1830, fp. 132-135.

^{135.} ¹⁵⁶ M. Laran, 'La politique russe et l'intervention française à Alger (1829-1830)', *Revue des études slaves* 38 (1961), pp. 119-128, there p. 120.

around one basic diplomatic question: did the recent history of the European concert really allow for the military destruction of the Ottoman Regencies on the coast of North Africa?

Whether one supported the French plans depended on whether one could accept the claim of ending piracy and live with the disregard of the Sultan's suzerainty. Neither the Russian nor the Prussian governments had problems with these aspects. French diplomats addressed the allies in St. Petersburg and Berlin bilaterally, in separation. The French announced their plans by referring back to the assertive positions that Russia and Prussia had taken in relation to Barbary piracy at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, arguing that France and Mehmed Ali were now willing to complete the task.¹⁵⁷ At the Russian court, ambassador Mimaut raised the issue during celebrations of the recent victory over the Ottomans. Tsar Nicholas immediately professed his support, noting that this proposal could finally end Mediterranean piracy.¹⁵⁸ The Tsar, who had just assembled a committee on Russia's Ottoman policy, did not want to see the 'Eastern' Empire disappear, but in light of his own claims to the Caucasus fringes of the Sultan's domains, he did not object to action against the liminal North African Regencies.¹⁵⁹ Repressive action against Algiers and the larger threat of 'Barbary piracy' could, furthermore, benefit Russian merchant shipping in Mediterranean waters. To add, the Russian authorities expected that the support granted to France on this occasion would be returned later, during further (and seemingly more pressing) negotiations on the future state of Greece.¹⁶⁰

In Berlin, Foreign Affairs Minister Günther von Bernstorff offered a similarly supportive reply. He admitted that Prussia, lacking a navy to protect its Mediterranean commerce, would derive 'great advantage' from the destruction of the Regencies. Yet he also warned that the British Cabinet would oppose this plan. Reflecting on his efforts to negotiate treaties with the Regencies for Denmark in 1815, Bernstorff, with alleged 'sourness and bitterness', noted that Britain would still be as reluctant to do anything about the Barbary pirates as it was back then.¹⁶¹ The Russian and Prussian governments both added doubts about the practical feasibility of letting Egyptian forces march through the desert for miles, wondering whether France could not take on Algiers herself.¹⁶² Nevertheless, French actors could now claim that

¹⁵⁷ CADLC, 112CP/178, 'Polignac to Montemart', Paris 14-10-1829, fp. 147-150; 106CP/273, 'Mortier to Polignac', Berlin 30-01-1830, fp. 30-39.

¹⁵⁸ CADLC, 112CP/178, 'Mortemart to Polignac', St. Petersburg 06-10-1829, fp. 144-145.

¹⁵⁹ O. Ozavci, Dangerous gifts.

¹⁶⁰ Laran, 'La politique russe', pp. 121-122; S. Haule, "... us et coutumes adoptees dans nos guerres d'orient". L'expérience coloniale russe et l'expédition d'Alger', Cahiers du monde russe 45:1-2 (2004), pp. 293-320, there pp. 299-300. ¹⁶¹ CADLC, 106CP/273, 'Mortier to Polignac', Berlin 30-01-1830, fp. 30-39.

¹⁶² Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 127-128.

they had some allied backing when they dealt with the more hostile statesmen of Austria and Britain.

For Austrian and British officials, the scheme with Mehmed Ali seemed conniving, dangerous and downright illegal. Their arguments were markedly similar because Aberdeen, Metternich, and their respective diplomats were in constant contact. They shadowed the French bilateral diplomatic efforts and actively streamlined their efforts to hinder the French schemes.¹⁶³ The British and Austrian opposition came down to one fundamental objection: using Mehmed Ali to wage war on other Ottoman vassals was unacceptable because it was illegitimate. France had no right to employ one of the Sultan's local governors in what seemed to be more like an open rebellion against central rule. Aberdeen noted that the proposal went against all principles of legitimacy, while Metternich called it a plan 'without basis'.¹⁶⁴ Polignac thought such daring ventures could be acceptable outside Europe, but Aberdeen and Metternich held a different opinion. They argued that the prerequisites for a legitimate intervention - of recognizing sovereignty, of proceeding with moderation and of acting in concert – applied on Ottoman territory as well. Being aware that the initiative had not come from Mehmed Ali at all, both men condemned the secretive, cunning and misleading ways in which the French government had acted.¹⁶⁵ The members of the British Cabinet in particular liked to maintain that Britain had done things very differently during Exmouth's expeditions to North Africa.¹⁶⁶ French actors, in turn, questioned that precedent, setting off a search in the ministerial archives for a sign of British concertation with the allies in 1816. The reference to the Anglo-Dutch bombardment not only illustrates how the French war with Algiers was seen as part of a longer historical process, it also shows how diplomatic records of earlier concerted actions came to denote something like international legal precedent.

Alongside their outright rejection of the plan's shape and execution, British and Austrian actors also expressed three additional, underlying concerns in their separate negotiations with the French. They considered the venture a mere cover for French regional dominance, found it disproportionate to the existing conflict with the Dey of Algiers, and feared it would endanger European peace. British and Austrian officials accepted the aim of ending piracy as righteous

¹⁶⁵ TNA, FO 27/406, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 15-01-1830, fp. 85-88; FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 19-01-1830, fp. 9-10; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 272, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 24-01-1830, fp. 24-26.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 120; HHStA, StAbt, Großbritannien, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 188, 'Metternich to Esterhazy', Plass 01-09-1829, fp. 49-50; TNA, FO 27/407, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 15-02-1830, fp. 47-49.

¹⁶⁴ CADLC, 8CP/629, 'Laval to Polignac', London 21-01-1830, fp. 80-82; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 05-02-1830, fp. 21-22.

¹⁶⁶ CADLC, 8CP/629, 'Laval to Polignac', London 08-02-1830, fp. 155-162.

in itself, but this was simply not the way to do it. As Prime Minister Wellington told the French ambassador during their bilateral talks in London: 'this would not be deemed a very desirable mode of getting rid of piracy'.¹⁶⁷ Writing on behalf of the British government, Aberdeen noted that 'the country' could not look with 'indifference' upon large political changes in North Africa, 'effected by French means and French influence & probably also to the promotion of French interests'.¹⁶⁸ The French King could naturally obtain redress for the hostilities of Dey Hussein, but not by 'unsettling the existing relations of countries'.¹⁶⁹ Aberdeen suggested to follow Britain's old example instead: 'It would rather appear that something similar to the course adopted by the British government in 1816 might reasonably be expected under the present circumstances'.¹⁷⁰ Each of these critiques and counterproposals in essence harkened back to the questions of what were legitimate, effective, and mutually beneficial ways of practicing security. French conduct seemed so unacceptable because it appeared to endanger European peace itself. With this initial partitioning of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa, Europe could lapse into war and the continent be turned into 'a heap of ruins', as Metternich evocatively warned the French ambassador in Vienna.¹⁷¹

British and Austrian misgivings were directly communicated to Mehmed Ali and the Ottoman Porte as well. Diplomats in Constantinople and Alexandria were instructed to work together to derail the impending French schemes.¹⁷² With the Ottoman Porte, internuncio Ottenfels and ambassador Gordon backed the appointment of an envoy to Algiers - leading Guilleminot to believe that it had actually been their suggestion rather than the Porte's idea.¹⁷³ Mehmed Ali received more threatening messages, alerting him to the 'serious consequences' that an unauthorized attack on the Regencies may have.¹⁷⁴ The Egyptian viceroy was said to have 'laughed heartily' and expressed his 'utter contempt for the Sultan' when the British consul raised this topic. Yet, Mehmed Ali made clear that he did not want to get into conflict with a coalition of European powers. He therefore asked which European government could object to the Barbary Regencies being brought under his rule. 'Have not the European states',

¹⁶⁷ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', 26-01-1830, fp. 11-12.

¹⁶⁸ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Gordon', 25-01-1830, fp. 4-8.

 ¹⁶⁹ TNA, FO 78/192, 'Foreign Office to Barker', 29-01-1830, fp. 1-4.
 ¹⁷⁰ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', 19-02-1830, fp. 27-30.

¹⁷¹ CADLC, 11CP/412, 'Rayneval to Polignac', Vienna 25-01-1830, fp. 33-43, there fp. 35-36.

¹⁷² Šedivý, Metternich, pp. 414-416; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 51, 'Metternich to Ottenfels', Vienna 04-02-1830, fp. 33-40; Türkei VI, 50, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 26-02-1830, fp. 118-119; 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 25-05-1830, fp. 364-369.

¹⁷³ CADLC, 133CP/260, 'Guilleminot to Polignac', Constantinople 26-02-1830, fp. 60-62.

¹⁷⁴ TNA, FO 78/192, 'Foreign Office to Barker', 29-01-1830, fp. 1-4.

he reportedly wondered, 'a sufficient guarantee in my character that Piracy would cease to be practiced?'¹⁷⁵

Mehmed Ali had, before that point, already inquired whether he could expect protection from France against Great Britain. Polignac, however, was unwilling to provide this. His instructions to Alexandria explicitly forbade the signing of any agreements that would oblige France to wage war on Britain. A promise of 'good offices' was as far as the French government would go.¹⁷⁶ Despite his daring ambitions and willingness to upend the status quo, Polignac would not risk a continental war. He had endeavoured to find out the exact strength of the British fleet in the Mediterranean around that time, and perhaps considered the presence of nine first-class warships daunting enough.¹⁷⁷ Shunned from French assistance, Mehmed Ali then took the opportunity to propose an alliance with Britain instead, but the government in London did not seem interested.¹⁷⁸

Clearly, the French scheme with Mehmed Ali was not going to materialize. International hostility to the plan was significant. At home, Polignac stood increasingly isolated in his support for the venture. Other Ministers in the council, especially Navy Minister Charles Lemercier de Longpré, Baron d'Haussez (1778-1854), fundamentally rejected the donation of ships, considering it 'beneath the dignity of France to ask anyone else to avenge her injuries'.¹⁷⁹ Opposition figures ridiculed the plan as 'absurd' and 'impossible'.¹⁸⁰

By late January 1830, the Minister of Foreign Affairs therefore began to think of other ways to attack Algiers, without risking a European war. The professed aim of 'destroying' the Regencies and ending the threat of piracy had not made the policy involving Mehmed Ali any more acceptable. Ottoman, British and Austrian authorities had rebuked the plan, calling it illegal, dishonest, disproportionate and dangerous. Their critiques showed how the norms of international action that marked the era's security culture were still at play. Enacting security against piracy came with normative understandings of whether a single government could legitimately carry out an unconcerted intervention. Ending the threat of piracy, British and Austrian actors liked to maintain, could not come at the aggrandizement of an individual

¹⁷⁵ TNA, FO 78/192, 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 08-03-1830, fp. 97-112.

¹⁷⁶ Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 123-124.

¹⁷⁷ Puryear, *France and the Levant*, pp. 125-126; TNA, FO 27/406, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 04-01-1830, fp. 36-39; 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 11-01-1830, fp. 78-79; FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', 08-01-1830, fp. 5-8; CADLC, 8CP/629, 'Laval to Polignac', London 23-02-1830, fp. 222-227.

^{227. &}lt;sup>178</sup> TNA, FO 78/192, 'Barker to Aberdeen', Cairo 08-03-1830, fp. 97-112; 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 12-03-1830, fp. 113-116; 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 22-06-1830, fp. 211-220; 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 06-07-1830, fp. 250-252.

¹⁷⁹ Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 123-124.

¹⁸⁰ Julien, La conquête, pp. 37-38.

power and at the risk of a continental war. The Congress System, with its inter-imperial management of security in the Mediterranean, was thus still in function, even if its future seemed uncertain. One of Metternich's lamentations further brought such considerations to light. He noted: 'This entire affair is enveloped in a mist that time will soon dispel, and I am afraid that once this veil is raised, there will remain nothing but regrettable and compromising intrigues'.¹⁸¹ That fog would soon dissolve. As it receded, the definitive shape of the invasion of Algiers began to be discernible.

... or a conference in Paris?

When the plans with Mehmed Ali failed, a new strategy was set. French forces were going to cross the Mediterranean, land on North Africa's shores and take the city of Algiers in a glorious victory over Dey Hussein. The speech announcing it on 2 March 1830, however, was not at all a glorious affair. Seated on a throne in front of the Chamber of Deputies, Charles X stumbled his way through a written speech that he read from the page clumsily, in a shrill voice that lacked resonance. It was probably not in a resounding fashion that he stated: 'the shining reputation that I want to obtain, in satisfying the honour of France, will be turned, with the aid of the All-Powerful, to the profit of Christianity'.¹⁸² To complete what is noted to have been a sorry picture, Charles' bejewelled hat, which matched the general's uniform he wore, at some point in the speech slowly slipped from his head and smashed loudly to the floor. Already unpopular and faced with a strong liberal opposition, this opening of the year's parliamentary session did not bide well for the King and his Ministers. Together with the announcement of the invasion, the speech also contained a thinly veiled threat that the constitution (or 'Charter') could be suspended for the sake of maintaining 'public peace' in the face of anti-governmental 'criminal manoeuvres'. The royalists in the room greeted these words with boisterous rounds of applause, while liberal and moderate deputies remained stunned and silent.¹⁸³

The King's speech at the opening of the 1830 session is the moment when historiographical readings of the invasion as primarily a French domestic affair tend to take full swing.¹⁸⁴ This is when the invasion of Algiers clearly became inseparable from political

¹⁸¹ HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 19-03-1830, fp. 53-54.

 ¹⁸² Beach, *Charles X*, pp. 307-309.
 ¹⁸³ Ibid., pp. 307-309; Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 22-25.

¹⁸⁴ For instance, Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 22-25.

conflicts within France, when a victory across the Mediterranean had to be mirrored in a victory of the monarchy at home. The preparation of the troops signalled the certain defeat of Dey Hussein, while the prospected suspension of the constitution signalled the looming defeat of the liberal opposition.¹⁸⁵ French opposition figures began to criticize the King's speech from the moment it was read out, and they turned against the announcement of the invasion as vocally as they turned against the encroachment of national liberties. The suspension of the Charter would suspend both parliamentary chambers and grant the King dictatorial powers in the name of 'state security'. Liberals hence believed that a victory over Algiers would be used specifically against them, to amass popular support for further ultra-royalist policies. One liberal, Alexandre Laborde, noted that the expedition would be a decisive step 'onto the uncertain road of arbitrary rule'.¹⁸⁶ What Charles X and Polignac tried to present as a project of security was, to the liberals, a daunting threat and source of insecurity. Laborde, and others, appeared to be in the right. Charles X suspended the parliamentary session later that month, raising expectations that the Chambers would soon be dissolved and new elections held at an opportune moment.¹⁸⁷

Diplomacy may seem a distant concern in that fierce domestic struggle over constitutional rule. The crossfire between official resolutions and oppositional critiques therefore generally takes centre stage in the historical literature, relegating the tussle over international support to the edges of the narrative. Yet French officials continued to negotiate over the invasion with foreign colleagues, and they continued to reference the perceived threat of piracy in terms of European obligations to fight it. The royal invocation of 'state security' in a sense had its international counterpart in the enduring claim that a French attack on Algiers would end piracy and bring security to the Mediterranean for Europe as a whole. Domestic and international affairs were linked, but without the precedence of the former over the latter, as historians currently like to argue. To understand how the invasion could come about at that moment and in that shape, it is necessary to look at the further attempts to garner allied support, and at the French choice to obstruct the final Ottoman efforts at reaching a diplomatic solution.

The allies were informed of the unilateral expedition first. They received an announcement of the French attack in advance of the parliament and population. Polignac issued circular dispatches to foreign diplomats in Paris, and to French diplomats at foreign courts, almost a

¹⁸⁵ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 37-39; Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 19-22.
¹⁸⁶ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 26.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-25.

month before Charles X held his speech on 2 March. The text still kept the option of Mehmed Ali's involvement against Tripoli and Tunis open, but declared that French forces would take on Algiers themselves, 'to defend the interests of all civilized peoples'.¹⁸⁸ Another circular, sent out after the opening of the sessions, noted that the Egyptian cooperation was discarded, while the French aims in attacking Algiers remained the same. The dispatch disclosed that the King did not merely want to obtain reparations and compensations for the wrongs of the Dev. as that would be beneath the dignity of the country. The goal was rather to depose Hussein and alter the entire political system of Algiers, ensuring that the Regency could no longer continue its piratical ways. That is why France was preparing a massive invasion instead of the punitive bombardment that British actors had suggested. The latter option would, of course, hardly have brought the military glory and genuine Great Power status that the French government so eagerly aspired to. It therefore argued that a large expedition was the only way in which piracy could be 'definitively destroyed', Christian slavery 'absolutely abolished' and the payment of tribute 'suppressed'.¹⁸⁹ The French set of arguments for the invasion thus remained largely what it had been earlier, when the Mehmed Ali plan had to be sold. Only this time, the destruction of piracy had to justify the size and aims of a French army that was beginning to be mobilized to cross the Mediterranean. The circular closed by inviting the European allies to offer their support and concert with the French.¹⁹⁰

As a diplomatic overture, the French communication can be linked directly to earlier instances of concerted action within the Congress System's security culture. Here, we see French diplomacy return to the tried and tested ways of building coalitions through the formalized frameworks of international cooperation. Polignac was, in essence, trying to take on the role that British diplomats had taken on so many times in the preceding decades. He positioned himself and France as forerunners of international concertation, as the main advocates of a venture that would extend the European order of security to the continent's Mediterranean border zones. Thereby, France could assert its rank amidst the other Great Powers. This was a French attempt to do what British actors had done so often in the past few decades of ambassadorial conferences and international congresses: convene, preside and, potentially, dominate. For the time being, however, Polignac remained undecided about the exact forms of concertation. Vague allusions to cooperation and calls for support were all that his letters mentioned.

¹⁸⁸ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Draft circular to French diplomats', Paris 03-02-1830, fp. 12-16, the actual version follows on fp. 17-22. Also, 2MD/4, 'Circular to French ambassadors', Paris 06-02-1830, fp. 217.

¹⁸⁹ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Circular to French diplomats', Paris 12-03-1830, fp. 32-35.

¹⁹⁰ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Circular to French diplomats', Paris 12-03-1830, fp. 32-35.

What is nevertheless notable is that this series of circulars not only went out to the other Great Powers, but to virtually every European government. Polignac decided to contact powers great and small, attempting to widen the basis of international support and further isolate those allies that remained hostile. Because the smaller powers still bore the brunt of corsairing, captivity and the payment of tributes, it was amongst their ranks that the French King's claims of ending piracy could be substantiated. If the expedition was really to the 'profit of Christianity', then the backing of these powers was important – not just in the shape of bilateral, informal support, but through collective, formalized agreement. And indeed, favourable replies came back in droves. Monarchs and ministers of Tuscany, the Two Sicilies, Portugal, Sardinia and the Netherlands expressed their support.¹⁹¹ Pope Pious VII (1742-1823) gave his blessing. He, after all, had asked the French to intervene and protect Roman shipping from corsairing in the first place.¹⁹² The cabinet of Turin even tried to float its own proposal. Its ministers suggested that control over the Regency of Tunis could be given to Piedmont, and prepared a quick naval demonstration to stake their claim.¹⁹³

Support from the more formidable, 'first-rank' partners of the Quintuple Alliance was much more difficult to obtain. Tsar Nicholas once again expressed great enthusiasm for the French venture, offering ambassador Mortemart whatever military intelligence on the Barbary Regencies the archives contained.¹⁹⁴ The Russian court, however, stood alone among the Great Powers in this unequivocal approval, but was therefore crucial in granting the French plans a sheen of international legitimacy.¹⁹⁵ Even the Prussian Minister Bernstorff, once appreciative of the Mehmed Ali plan, began to have doubts and feared the invasion could provoke a war in Europe.¹⁹⁶ Metternich and other Austrian officials (including Emperor Franz) voiced the same concerns.¹⁹⁷ The only navy that could effectively act with force and stop the French army from crossing the sea was that of Great Britain, so these Great Power anxieties were about the potential for a Franco-British war. There certainly were a few tense moments, when rumours about armaments in Gibraltar circulated and Prime Minister

Polignac', Naples 23-02-1830, fp. 259-262; 'Excerpt from Blanchet to Polignac', fp. 265-266.

¹⁹¹ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Extract of Moussaye to Polignac', Brussels 13-02-1830, fp. 231; 'Consini to [??]',

Florence 19-02-1830, fp. 248-249; 'De la None to Polignac', Florence 23-02-1830, fp. 257-258; 'Lapasse to

¹⁹² Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 41-42; CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Cardinal Albani to Bellocq', Vatican Palace, 29-02-1830, fp. 254.
¹⁹³ K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp.

 ¹⁹³ K. Chater, *Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857* (Tunis 1984), pp. 349-350; CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Chasteau to Polignac', Turin 26-02-1830, fp. 270-271.
 ¹⁹⁴ Montemart did not find the material very useful. CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Mortemart to Polignac', St. Petersburg

¹⁹⁴ Montemart did not find the material very useful. CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Mortemart to Polignac', St. Petersburg 16-03-1830, fp. 45-47. For a discussion of the intelligence, Haule, 'L'experience coloniale russe', pp. 300-302. ¹⁹⁵ Laran, 'La politique russe', p. 128.

¹⁹⁶ CADLC, 106CP/273, 'Mortier to Polignac', Berlin 24-04-1830, fp. 150-162; 'Mortier to Polignac', Berlin 19-05-1830, fp. 193-199.

¹⁹⁷ TNA, FO 120/108, 'Cowley to Aberdeen', Vienna 17-04-1830.

Wellington talked of grave prospects for British commerce in North Africa. Though French agents constantly kept an eye on news from Britain's ports, it is now considered unlikely that the Cabinet would have resorted to war. A mounting national debt crisis and the passing of King George IV on 26 June 1830 kept the government from acting.¹⁹⁸ Besides, as one author notes, Algiers probably did seem worth the risk of a continental war.¹⁹⁹

This scare over a potential Great Power was a direct result of the British refusal, which was shared and backed by Austrian officials, to accept the French rationalizations for the invasion. Once again, the legitimacy and feasibility of ending Barbary piracy marked the negotiations. Aberdeen's prime objection remained the status of the Ottoman suzerain. He demanded that the Porte should still be allowed to carry out its mediation. Charles X could get his redress through that channel; the mobilized French forces would then serve as an extra source of pressure on the Dey.²⁰⁰ As to the size of the mobilization, the British Cabinet wished to have some sort of official explanation why preparations for an embarkation of over 25,000 men were being made in France's southern ports. The British ambassador Sir Charles Stuart (1779-1845) in Paris, Aberdeen in London and Metternich in Vienna ceaselessly asked what the expedition's 'ulterior views' were.²⁰¹ What were these massive numbers of men going to do? What would follow if they happened to be victorious? There was nothing against the righting of wrongs, but the French forces seemed to be preparing for a 'war of extermination'.²⁰² If this was what the 'destruction' of piracy amounted to, then the British Cabinet was not accepting it. On the basis of what he called the 'intimate union and concert' between France and Britain, Aberdeen demanded a written statement that the French were not planning to create colonies in North Africa. That way, the French government could be kept to its promises and the Cabinet would have something to show to an increasingly critical Parliamentary opposition.²⁰³

The security claims behind the invasion plans were constantly put to the test in these exchanges, but the French government remained steadfast. Polignac deployed a range of

 ¹⁹⁸ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 39-40; CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', London 10-05-1830, fp. 230-235;
 Polignac to Laval', Paris 19-05-1830, fp. 283-284; 'Laval to Polignac', London 25-05-1830, fp. 314-319.
 ¹⁹⁹ Šedivý, *Metternich*, pp. 426-427.

²⁰⁰ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 26-02-1830, fp. 118-124; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 272, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 26-04-1830, fp. 73-74.

²⁰¹ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 26-02-1830, fp. 118-124; CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', London 03-03-1830, fp. 29-33; TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 23-03-1830, fp. 43-50; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 51, 'Metternich to Ottenfels', Vienna 20-05-1830, fp. 113-120; StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 272, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 20-05-1830, fp. 105-106.

²⁰² CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', London 03-03-1830, fp. 29-33; TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', 21-04-1830, fp. 76-81.

²⁰³ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', 21-04-1830, fp. 168-172.

tactics to avoid giving in to the British requests. Establishing some sort of French territorial presence in North Africa was, of course, one of the long-cherished aims behind the invasion, but a statement of intent would only slim the space for manoeuver. The Minister and his ambassadors therefore stuck to verbal promises of French disinterestedness. As Polignac wrote to the ambassador in London: 'A plan (...) so profitable to all peoples interested in the security of the Mediterranean and the ocean, does not seem to be of such a nature that it can cause real disquiet in Europe, or even in England'.²⁰⁴ Because those promises did not satisfy British officials, Polignac began to complain, noting that Britain was the only power so mistrustful of France.²⁰⁵ He also made vague accusations of British consuls and agents who tried to hinder the French expedition, necessitating time-consuming inquiries that he hoped would soften the Cabinet's resolve.²⁰⁶ When other French actors, such as expedition commander Marshall Louis-Auguste-Victor, Count of Bourmont (1773-1846), reportedly talked of founding colonies in a speech to the mobilizing troops, Polignac simply denied the evidence.²⁰⁷ Aberdeen found it most unsatisfactory, writing at some point: 'The affair, in truth, begins to wear a sinister appearance'.²⁰⁸

Did all this mutual distrust and unspecified thinking of war mark the end or disintegration of the Congress System and its security culture? Hardly, because French justifications of the invasion still depended on the use of the tested legitimizing discourses of security and European interests. The French plans for an attack on Algiers and the multilateral manner in which those plans were negotiated rather confirmed the endured existence of an inter-imperial security culture at this point in time. Claims of ending the threat of piracy situated the planned expedition in direct relation to the congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, even if British actors contested those claims. French diplomatic conduct, moreover, was clearly geared towards building allied support and at least carrying the appearance of acting in concert.

As a solution to the unabating objections of the more hostile allies, Polignac suggested to assemble a conference on Algiers in the aftermath of the attack. In itself, the suggestion should serve as an additional indication that the invasion of Algiers was, in fact, closely

²⁰⁴ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 05-05-1830, fp. 203-210.

²⁰⁵ TNA, FO 27/408, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 09-04-1830, fp. 201-205; CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 05-05-1830, fp. 210-211.

²⁰⁶ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', 23-03-1830, fp. 51-53; 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 13/30-04-1830, fp. 71-73; FO 27/408, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 19-03-1830, fp. 33-35; 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 09-04-1830, fp. 182-183; FO 77/21, 'Reade to Murray', Tunis 07-06-1830.

²⁰⁷ TNA, FO 27/409, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 07-05-1830, fp. 111-113; 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 14-05-1830, fp. 161-164.

²⁰⁸ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 04-05-1830, fp. 88-91.

related to the workings of the post-Napoleonic international system. Like the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816 before it, this expedition was intertwined with the continental order of peace and security. French actors positioned their plans in direct relation to the frameworks of collective security that had painstakingly been put in place since 1814-1815, with its supporting architecture of treaties, agreements, protocols and conference proceedings. At a time when international legal reasoning was ascendant, but international law remained rudimentary, such invocations of concerted decision-making at an international meeting would hold a strong legitimating function. With plans as grand as those of the French government, that legitimation was of paramount importance – also because allied support would be further proof of France's new-found first-rank status within the Quintuple Alliance, on par with the other Great Powers.

Polignac's conference proposal has never received much historical attention because it never actually materialized in the jumble of events that would follow in July 1830.²⁰⁹ To European contemporaries, however, it seemed a probable suggestion, and, furthermore, would have been an accepted means of legitimizing military action through agreements and protocols. The royal council discussed and approved the idea, bringing about an invitation to the Great Powers, Spain and the Italian states on 12 May, mere days before the invading army departed.²¹⁰ Foreign diplomats in Paris were soon instructed to actively prepare for the conference.²¹¹ Metternich met up with the British ambassador in Vienna to align Austrian and British positions, even though he remained unsure that the assembly would actually take place.²¹² Aberdeen, for his part, doubted whether Britain should join. He feared that the cast of invitees would ensure that Britain remained isolated in its wish to retain the 'equilibrium' in the Mediterranean.²¹³ As the British Minister pondered on, other statesmen began to think of ideas that could be presented at the conference. Their ruminations read like an overview of contemporary security practices, reflecting the many 'remedies' against piracy that had emerged in the decades before. The set of ideas ranged from giving Algiers to a revived Order

²⁰⁹ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 42. A more detailed discussion in Šedivý, *Metternich*, pp. 430-431.

²¹⁰ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Circular dispatch', Paris 12-05-1830, fp. 89-92 and fp. 93-97.

²¹¹ CADLC, 106CP/273, 'Mortier to Polignac', Berlin 04-06-1830, fp. 224-225; 11CP/412, 'Rayneval to

Polignac', Vienna 18-06-1830, fp. 224-225; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 05-06-1830, fp. 167-172.

²¹² HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 05-06-1830, fp. 167-172.

²¹³ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', 21-04-1830, fp. 168-172.

of Malta, to destroying all armaments and returning the Regency to the Sultan, to setting up a sort of joint allied occupation in the conquered lands.²¹⁴

Another defining feature of security politics within the Congress System was also present throughout these negotiations: the dynamics of exclusion. The security culture that was created after the Napoleonic Wars depended as much on the integration of different powers within a single hierarchical order, as on the exclusion or relegation of other, often non-European powers, outside that order. Not everyone could make their voice heard in this international arena of deliberation. Ottoman interests and North African concerns were routinely pushed aside. While European actors, representing great and small powers, negotiated their mutual considerations and deliberated the possibility of an international conference, non-European diplomatic efforts were hindered, obstructed and ignored. Dey Hussein opted to open negotiations through the intercession of William Henry Quin, a lieutenant of the British navy, in late December 1829, but to no avail. Hussein proposed to conduct talks on neutral ground, at Malta or Mahon, and expressed a wish to reach a peaceful solution. The French government, however, maintained that talking would be beneath the dignity of the King.²¹⁵ The resolve was firm: France was going to carry out its attack and destroy the Regency of Algiers. What would happen afterwards was perhaps for a gathering of allied ambassadors in Paris to decide. At this time, it was also generally known that an Ottoman envoy had indeed departed from Constantinople to try and mediate in Algiers, but that effort would be halted as well. Nothing could now stop the amassed French forces from crossing the Mediterranean.

The crossings of conquest

After the diplomatic boardrooms came the naval broadsides. Once it was decided upon and appeared inevitable, the invasion of Algiers became a matter of envoys, troops and exiles making their ways across the Mediterranean. We have seen how the invasion came to take the shape of a French expeditionary army directed against Algiers alone. It has become clear how perceptions of the pirate threat worked to legitimize this campaign, both internally and internationally. We have also discovered how French statesmen sought to frame an attack on

²¹⁴ Šedivý, *Metternich*, pp. 430-431; CADLC, 11CP/412, 'Polignac to Rayneval', Paris 20-04-1830, fp. 148-151;
2MD/5, 'Indications de pieces remises au Ministre pour le Conseil du 29 Juin', fp. 425; TNA, FO 120/108, 'Cowley to Aberdeen', Vienna 18-07-1830.

²¹⁵ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Quin to Bretonnière', H.M.S. *Pelorus* Mahon 20-12-1829, fp. 156-164; 'Bretonnière to Haggi Khalil Effendy', *Adonis* Port Mahon, 31-01-1830, fp. 212-214; '[??] to Bretonnière', Paris 18-02-1830, fp. 242-243.

Algiers as part of a longer European project to eradicate piracy on the Mediterranean Sea. That claim was not readily or universally accepted. In fact, as the French fleet made its way to Algiers, a single warship set out from Constantinople on a final attempt to avert the invasion. To get a sense of how the plans of the invasion related to implemented practice, we will now leave the international negotiations, and turn to the vessels that crossed the sea. In the summer of 1830, the waters of the Mediterranean witnessed three important journeys that together shaped the outcome of the French invasion of Algiers. We will now turn to these crossings of the Mediterranean, which involved an Ottoman envoy, the French expeditionary army and the exiled Dey Hussein, in order to find out whether these journeys matched the grand justifying narratives of destroying piracy for the sake of security.

Tahir Pasha's quarantined diplomacy

Tahir Pasha (Çengeloğlu Tahir Mehmed Paşa, d. 1851) was more than just an envoy when Sultan Mahmud II picked him to go mediate in Algiers. He personified the final hope of all parties that dreaded French designs in North Africa. His mission was the last option to bring a non-violent conclusion to the war.²¹⁶ Having visited Britain and Italy and having served as the commander of the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Navarino, Tahir was versed in European diplomacy and was well aware of the dangers posed by European arms. The selection of this Admiral, moreover, indicates how much importance the Porte attached to the mission. Though Tahir Pasha was appointed already at the end of 1829, it took up to mid-April 1830 before he left from Constantinople. The delay greatly dismayed the British ambassador Gordon and his Austrian colleague Ottenfels.²¹⁷ French obstruction had caused these delays, together with adverse winds and the proceedings of the Ramadan.²¹⁸ Guilleminot and Polignac were against the mediating effort from the moment of its inception, so they promised to appoint a French envoy (but never did) and put down a string of requirements concerning the ship Tahir would board. The vessel could only be a warship of the second rank with the most basic armaments, otherwise it would not be allowed to pass by the blockade before

²¹⁶ HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrrespondenz, 272, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 31-05-1830, fp. 135-138.

²¹⁷ TNA, FO 78/189, 'Chabert to Gordon', Pera 01-03-1830, fp. 175-182; 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 11-03-1830, fp. 183-184; HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 50, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 10-04-1830, fp. 212-216

fp. 212-216. ²¹⁸ TNA, FO 78/189, 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 26-03-1830, fp. 185-186.

Algiers.²¹⁹ A report to the royal council of late January disclosed the official attitude towards Tahir Pasha: his mission was feared to put all plans for Algiers in disarray.²²⁰

For the French government, the very appointment of Tahir Pasha highlighted an inconvenient fact. It showed that the Ottoman Sultan would not renege his sovereign rights over Algiers, and was willing to take up the guarrel with France as an issue under his authority. The envoy's instructions noted that the complaints against the Algerines ought to be settled by the Sultan rather than foreign powers, and stressed the need to bring about a 'complete termination' of the quarrel between the Regency and France.²²¹ Tahir viewed his mission in exactly the same light. Just before he departed, the British first dragoman came on board his frigate 'Nessioni Zafer' (probably a transliteration of the common Ottoman ship name, Nesim-i Zafer) for a final interview, in which Tahir argued that he had full powers to make Dev Hussein listen to his sovereign. He could even use threats of the Sultan's reprimands to bring things to an amicable solution.²²² Of Algiers and its people, Tahir did not seem to have held a high opinion. He wondered what France hoped to find in the Regency, as the land could hardly cover a tenth of the sacrifices incurred in the expedition. The inhabitants of the country, he noted, lacked the sort of commercial spirit of their Tunisian neighbours.²²³ Tahir did not think it plausible that French forces would actually capture and retain Algiers, calling all communications on the matter mere 'fanfaronade', which he considered a typical trait of the French national character.²²⁴ He set sail on 15 April, and would soon find out that the French resolve was much more serious.

Obstructions, installed by French actors, loomed everywhere for Tahir Pasha. His mission was really not allowed to be successful. Tunis was the first hurdle on the envoy's journey. Tahir Pasha had hoped to proceed to Algiers over land from there, but was barred from even disembarking. Hussein Bey of Tunis had pledged to retain a 'perfect neutrality' during the French attack on Algiers. Receiving Tahir Pasha could have been seen as a breach of that promise.²²⁵ The Ottoman frigate therefore sailed from Tunis again on 12 May, encountering the French squadron blockading Algiers out at sea. Though Tahir Pasha carried a directive to let him pass, the blockade commander captain Auguste Massieu de Clerval kept the envoy from proceeding. He maintained that he had instructions not to let a single ship continue to

²¹⁹ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Instructions to the first French dragoman', Palais de France 16-03-1830.

²²⁰ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Report to the Conseil du Roy', 31-01-1830, fp. 194-197.

²²¹ Y. Sarinay (ed.), Osmanlı Belgelerinde Cezayir (Ankara 2010), p. 160.

²²² TNA, FO 78/189, 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 17-04-1830, fp. 197-206.

²²³ Ibidem.

²²⁴ Ibidem.

²²⁵ Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, pp. 354-255; CADN, 712PO/1/67, No. 9, 'Political depeche from Lesspes', Tunis 14-05-1830, fp. 168-170.

Algiers, regardless of its flag or commission.²²⁶ In order not to lose time in delivering a set of dispatches to the French King, as Tahir himself wrote, he then set sail for Toulon, where he arrived on 27 May and was promptly subjected to a strict guarantine.²²⁷

Aboard his frigate in the sanitary station, Tahir tried to do whatever mediating work he still could. He wrote a letter to Polignac setting out his mission, warning the Minister that the Algerines were preparing a fierce resistance that would make the escalation of hostilities most bloody. 'The voice of conciliation would be preferable', he argued, and called it a sign of 'good government' to re-establish 'peace and good intelligence'.²²⁸ Polignac simply replied that the French King had to obtain his redress, and would surely think of benefitting its Ottoman ally in the process.²²⁹ Tahir then expressed the wish to go to Algiers immediately, writing that his sovereign wanted to see the conflict come to an end before blood would spill.²³⁰ In return, Polignac wrote that Tahir would want to negotiate with the French King on the future status of Algiers and questioned whether he even had the authorization to do so.²³¹ The British ambassador tried to protest against this treatment of the Ottoman envoy, but obtained no results.²³² By early July, Tahir Pasha's guarantine was over. He set sail for Tunis once again, where he arrived after Algiers had already fallen. His mission illustrated the degree to which Ottoman diplomacy had been side-lined. Before the French army could destroy Algiers as the pirate's lair that it purportedly was, all links to its Ottoman suzerain had to be severed, contained and quarantined.

The many sails of the expedition

Toulon's lazaretto was located right opposite the port's arsenal, tucked away in a bay of the Saint-Mandrier peninsula. Had Tahir Pasha been directed there some two weeks earlier, he could perhaps have seen the invading army prepare and embark from the confines of his quarantine. When he arrived in Toulon on 27 May, however, the activity in port would have been closer to the usual levels. In fact, Tahir encountered the hundreds of ships of the expedition out at sea, after being rebuffed by the blockading squadron, and even spent an hour

²²⁶ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Translation of Taher Pasha to Polignac', 27-05-1830, fp. 312-315. The directive that Tahir Pasha could pass is in CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Guilleminot to Commander of the blockade before Algiers'. Constantinople 20-03-1830.

 ²²⁷ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Translation of Taher Pasha to Polignac', 27-05-1830, fp. 312-315.
 ²²⁸ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Translation of Taher Pasha to Polignac', 27-05-1830, fp. 312-315.
 ²²⁹ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Polignac to Taher Pasha', Paris 09-06-1830, fp. 363-364
 ²³⁰ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Polignac to Taher Pasha', Paris 09-06-1830, fp. 363-364

²³⁰ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Translation of Taher Pasha to Polignac', Toulon 27 Rebioul-Akhir 1245, fp. 394.

²³¹ CADLC, 133CP/261, 'Polignac to Taher Pasha', Paris 01-07-1830, fp. 86.

²³² TNA, FO 27/411, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 115-116.

and a half on board of one of the warships, chatting with the officers.²³³ The fleet was perhaps, as one French memorandum suggested, the most formidable to have ever assembled on the Mediterranean.²³⁴ It included over 675 ships, carried about 37,000 soldiers with 4,000 horses, and employed individuals of a dozen or so different nationalities. In a sense, the expedition was itself a Mediterranean affair, involving people from across the region.²³⁵ The preparation and departure of the expeditionary army shows that the notion of attacking Algiers in a bid to end Mediterranean piracy, besides serving as a legitimizing narrative, also had a mobilizing function. It drew in different groups of people with diverse aims and expectations. Particularly important was the involvement of a large group of merchants, sailors and entrepreneurs from all over Europe, as their activities highlight how non-state actors came gave further shape to the security culture in the pursuit of their own private interests.

What did these commercial actors seek to gain by joining this venture? Above all, there was money to be made. The provisioning of the troops -a large concern of the military planners – proved to be a huge operation in its own right. The bakeries of Toulon could meet the demand of 52,000 rations only by baking biscuits day and night, but other goods had to be acquired elsewhere.²³⁶ An English firm provided pressed bales of hay, while other British traders delivered oats and pork. French officials, meanwhile, scanned other Mediterranean ports for further provisions, including the harbours of Sicily for local wines.²³⁷ Merchant ships were chartered in masses to carry all those supplies across the sea. Many of them did not come from France. Freight costs were generally lower abroad, especially in Italian ports like Naples, where ships could be chartered at 13 francs per ton - as opposed to the French price of 16 francs. The British consul in Marseille, Alexander Turnbull, noted in detail what these chartering contracts amounted to. The engagement would be for at least three months, and any damages occasioned by the enemy would be paid by the French government, but otherwise 'the owners are to stand themselves, their own simple sea risk'.²³⁸ It must have been an attractive prospect for Mediterranean merchants at the time. Turnbull estimated that, on a total of 354 transports, a majority of 125 vessels were French, followed by 116 Neapolitans, 78 Sardinians, 16 Austrians, 8 Tuscans, 4 Spaniards, 2 Swedes, 2 Romans, 2

²³³ CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Bourmont to Polignac', aboard *Provence* 01-06-1830, fp. 335-337.

²³⁴ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Memorandum', [n.d.], fp. 50-52.

²³⁵ One French source even speaks of an 'alliance de midi'. CADLC, 2MD/16, '[??]', 27-03-1830, fp. 6-7.

²³⁶ TNA, FO 27/408, 'Extract from Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 17-03-1830, fp. 71-73.

²³⁷ Ibidem; TNA, FO 27/410, 'Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 24-05-1830, fp. 60-62; CADLC, 2MD/4, '[??] to Polignac', Palermo 04-03-1830, fp. 286-287.

²³⁸ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Extract of a letter from consul Turnbull to consul-general Morrier', Marseille 22-02-1830, fp. 160-161.

Russians, and a single Greek, who together carried roughly 69,000 tons of provisions.²³⁹ There was much less interest in this transporting business away from the Mediterranean seaboard. A consul in Nantes noted that the rates were simply too low to arouse much enthusiasm among the local merchants, and expected that to be the case in all of France's non-Mediterranean ports.²⁴⁰

Big businesses and individual speculators from abroad, however, rushed to join the expedition. Commercial excitement for the attack on Algiers was thus not entirely beholden to the south of Europe. One of the biggest merchant firms of Amsterdam got in contact with Polignac, to see if it could acquire saltpetre (a major component of gunpowder) from Algiers.²⁴¹ Marseille also welcomed single entrepreneurs who hoped to make fortunes with special products. An Italian doctor aspired to get rich by selling the recipe for a liquid that coagulated blood and stopped bleeding. 'It has been tried with complete success upon dogs, and horses (...) It does not burn in any way', the British consul in Marseille noted after witnessing several experiments on the city streets.²⁴² Even British businesses provided products with a military use. A company from Liverpool, for instance, installed a 200horsepower engine on a steamer in Bordeaux, and let two of its workmen stay on board during the campaign.²⁴³ The largest deal was probably that of the Rothschild banking house, which provided a considerable loan to the French government in preparation for the expedition.244

More esoteric matters attracted further international participants, especially from the highest echelons of the European nobility. Martial glory over humanity's enemy, wartime experience in a time of peace, and an exotic adventure in an Oriental setting made the expedition seem appealing. Something of an enlistment craze gripped young aristocrats over the spring of 1830. Prussian Junkers, Austrian princes, and Russian colonels all hoped to participate in the upcoming invasion.²⁴⁵ The infamous Lord Cochrane also wished to get involved, on the heels of his failed stint as the Grand Admiral of independent Greece. He proposed to wage war on the Dey as a private party and in a very economical fashion:

²³⁹ They all had to fly the French flag for the duration of the expedition. TNA, FO 27/410, 'Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 24-05-1830, fp. 60-62.

²⁴⁰ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Excerpt from Nantes, 27-02-1830', fp. 162-163.
²⁴¹ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Desaugers to Polignac', Amsterdam 12-03-1830, fp. 317.
²⁴² TNA, FO 27/409, 'Extract from Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 26-04-1830, fp. 76-78.
²⁴³ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Close to Morier', Charente 01-03-1830, fp. 192-193.
²⁴⁴ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Close to Morier', Charente 01-03-1830, fp. 192-193.

²⁴⁴ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Excerpt from [??]', Naples 02-03-1830, fp. 278.

²⁴⁵ CADLC, 112CP/180, 'Montemart to Polignac', St. Petersburg 16-04-1830, fp. 65-66; 106CP/273, '[??] to Polignac', Paris 08-05-1830, fp. 187; 11CP/412, 'Rayneval to Polignac', Vienna 26-05-1830, fp. 203.

involving only 3 ships of the line and 3,000 men, for a sum of 3 million francs at most.²⁴⁶ The number of interested foreigners in fact turned out to be so great that Polignac banned their participation. He noted it would be impossible to take charge of such a large number of curious spectators. The only exceptions were the Austrian prince Friedrich Karl zu Schwarzenberg, whose father was of Völkerschlacht fame, and the Russian colonel Alexei Filosofov, who had served in various campaigns against Ottoman and Persian forces.²⁴⁷

Not all foreign involvement was entirely voluntary. French officials were keen to talk of the invasion's universal importance whenever less eager allies needed to be pushed into assistance. The court of Sardinia, for instance, did not offer support very enthusiastically, which immediately prompted a letter of complaint from Polignac. As France was acting in such a selfless way, without demanding any compensation, could it not at least make use of Sardinia's facilities? The Minister liked to remind the Sardinian government that the Algerines were a group of pirates, 'beyond the communal law of nations'.²⁴⁸ Spain was another case in point. The French military hoped to use Spanish ports and amenities. Planners intended to rally the forces at Mahon (being an exact halfway point on the way to Algiers) and wished to construct a temporary hospital there. The Spanish government was not very eager, since it feared a British reprisal. It gave in eventually, in return for a vague promise that it would be informed of France's ultimate views for the expedition.²⁴⁹ The claim of ending piracy thus also enabled French officials to make requests from other powers. Such demands for support neatly matched the assertion that France was acting to ensure the security of the Mediterranean.

Many French subjects, however, did not even have the option of rejecting the government's call. They were summoned for service and enlisted in the expeditionary forces, whether they wanted to or not. Julien has noted that the raising of troops went easily, with Provence sailors and old cabotage captains enrolling eagerly, but some sources tell a different

²⁴⁶ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 160-161; CADLC, 2MD/4, 'De la None to Polignac', Florence 20-02-1830, fp. 250-253.

²⁴⁷ TNA, FO 27/408, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 29-03-1830, fp. 86-87; CADLC, 112CP/180, 'Excerpt of Colonel Philosophoff to Pozzo-di-Borgo', Algiers 22-06/03-07-1830, fp. 267-268; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz 272, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 06-06-1830, fp. 149-152: Diplomatische Korrespondenz 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 26-05-1830, fp. 149-150; StAbt, Türkei VI, 50, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 26-07-1830, fp. 52-53; Haule, L'experience coloniale russe', pp. 302-303.

²⁴⁸ CADLC, 2MD/4, 'Polignac to Chasteau', Paris 08-03-1830, fp. 301-302; 'Polignac to Chasteau', 13-03-1830,

fp. 347-348. ²⁴⁹ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 41-42; CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Instructions to the French consuls in Spanish ports', 26-04-1830, fp. 225-227; TNA, FO 27/409, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 24-05-1830, fp. 281-282.

story.²⁵⁰ Consul Turnbull in Marseille described 'the press' of seamen as extremely severe. Hardly any excuse for service was admitted, and evasion was near impossible, 'as every man is registered, and followed wherever he goes'.²⁵¹ Men in the port cities were shown an autographed letter of Polignac to inform them of their duty, its justification reading: 'the honour of France and the King necessitate this rigorous measure'.²⁵² And not everyone was entirely sure that they would just be fighting Algerines to defend national honour. Turnbull asserted that 'soldiers and officers made many inquiries about the English fleet, and if they were likely to be attacked or not by our Admiral'.²⁵³ Such statements are mere indications, but they point at a sense of anxiety and degree of uncertainty that marked the preparations, also among the army's rank and file.

The unease over British animosity shows that the French government could not entirely control conceptions of the invasion. This begs the question what sort of narrative the authorities were trying to disseminate among the troops. Did they aim to install that same understanding of the expedition that they used internationally, as a mission to destroy piracy and foster security? One source that can provide a hint of an answer is the Apercu historique. statistique et topographique sur l'état d'Alger, a hefty handbook issued by the Ministry of War. Integrating sections from various foreign sources (including the works of William Shaler and Thomas Shaw), the text provided a selection of information on Algiers with the aim of boosting the army's morale.²⁵⁴ It positioned the expedition amidst a long lineage of violent yet unsuccessful interventions, stretching from the sixteenth-century attack of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V to the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816. France's present effort, the entire structure of the text suggests, would finally accomplish what neither of these predecessors managed to do: 'deliver France and Europe from the triple plague (...) of piracy, of the enslavement of prisoners, of the tributes imposed by a Barbary state on Christian powers'.²⁵⁵ The discourse of the piracy threat, in fact, permeated the publication, being listed as a prime cause of the present conflict (concerning the attacks on Roman shipping under French protection) and informing ethnographic reflections on the inhabitants' supposed proclivity for brigandage.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁰ Julien, La conquête, p. 48.

²⁵¹ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Extract of a letter from consul Turnbull to consul-general Morrier', Marseille 22-02-1830, fp. 160-161.

 ²⁵² TNA, FO 27/408, 'Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 06-03-1830, fp. 7-8.
 ²⁵³ TNA, FO 27/410, 'Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 28-05-1830, fp. 91-94.

²⁵⁴ Julien, La conquête, p. 50.

²⁵⁵ Aperçu historique, statistique et topographique sur l'état d'Alger, a l'usage de l'armée expéditionnaire d'Afrique (Paris 1830), p. 76.

²⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 74 and 214.

Further mobilizing rhetoric that depended on stereotypical notions of civilization and barbarity appeared beyond the realm of texts. Ceremonies and sermons reiterated the dichotomies of barbaric piracy versus civilized benevolence. Civil authorities in the major sites of mobilization held elaborate speeches and organized lavish spectacles at the direct instruction of the central ministries. Expressions of devotion to the King, of loyalty to the ultraroyalist government, and of hope for the stabilization of the monarchy were central themes in many a mayor's speech. The promise of tranquillity loomed large in these official communications. One prefect praised the expedition as a demonstration of the King's 'most precious interest' in the 'security of our future'. Just like the troop manual, speakers asserted the continuity of royal power and referenced the crown's lineage of efforts to castigate Algiers.²⁵⁷ Martial spirits were further aroused by the ceremonial entries and departures of soldiers. In Lyon (home to some of the most extensive festivities) the military rituals took place in the company of firework displays and hearty banquets.²⁵⁸

Bishops and archbishops were mobilized to animate subjects through public prayers. Instructions to pastors detailed the appropriate hymns to be included in all masses for the duration of the war. Soldiers were to be called 'new crusaders' and Algiers described as a 'lair of pirates and anti-Christian barbarism'. The Regency's extermination, churchgoers would hear, was 'a benefit for society' since this was a political entity 'that had put itself beyond the law'. Liturgy and public festivities thus were auxiliary to official rationalizations, drawing from the same justifying narratives of fighting piracy.²⁵⁹ Whether rank-and-file soldiers held the exact same ideas that the command and church tried to spread is hard to know. Yet, at least one letter of a French soldier, filled with violent talk and profanities directed at Dey Hussein, suggests that the image of Algiers as a pirate's nest was well in place.²⁶⁰ Only the choice of words differed significantly from those of the various generals, prefects and pastors.

Opposition figures saw a rather sinister conspiracy in the alliance of military, civilian and clerical forces. Liberals considered the arousal of public spirits a mere reactionary ploy to win the upcoming elections. They feared that a victory in Algiers would boost the ultraroyalists at the ballot box. According to them, this had been the government's aim all along. The *Journal des Débats*, one of the opposition's printed outlets, gave voice to those grim expectations,

²⁵⁷ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 38.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁶⁰ The short note reads 'Le Dai [sic] d'Alger est un sacré couchon & un voleur. Ah bous ce de Matin je te vois rosser va bougre de filon. Tu me verra' and is signed by a soldier of the fourth line. It got into the possession of Metternich through internuncio Ottenfels, who thought the letter would make a nice addition to the Prince's collection of 'raretés en fait de style epistolaire'. HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 50, 'Ottenfels to Metternich', Constantinople 26-07-1830, fp. 32-34.

wondering: 'What lies at the base of this expedition? (...) There is, ultimately, a foolish hope to make a victory against Algiers into a victory against our liberties, and to transform the glory we hope to acquire into a medium of corruption and violence'.²⁶¹ In fact, it was now clear to the members of the opposition that the entire planning of the expedition neatly followed the electoral calendar. Future news of the landing and victory would coincide perfectly with the announcement and first round of the elections for the Chambers.²⁶² There was truth to these suspicions since internal electoral concerns certainly played their part in the coming of the invasion. Yet to lay almost exclusive emphasis on this domestic scheming – as some historians have done - is to forget about the other incentives for the attack, and to follow one particular contemporary narrative perhaps a bit too closely.

For all the oppositional distrust, it is all the more notable that even the most vocal opponents of the expedition did not call its main justifications into question. Liberals also mouthed the narratives of North African barbarity, echoing the official lines on the purported benefits of ending Algerine piracy. Their problem was not with the attack on Algiers itself, but rather with its timing and the way in which it was executed. The expedition was allegedly inadequately planned, lacking a strategy. Liberal speakers in the Chamber abhorred the dangers that the troops would be exposed to as they were used for an ultraroyalist scheme.²⁶³ The towering opposition figure Benjamin Constant laid down this line of reasoning in the short article 'Alger et les élections', published in late June. He castigated the expedition as a reactionary attempt to raise patriotic sentiment, and argued that 'an undisputed, indisputable colonization should be the prize of the victory and the fruit of the sacrifices risked'. As to the position of Dev Hussein, he refused 'to respect the quality of the sovereign in the barbarian'.²⁶⁴ Clearly, the bone of contention was not imperial expansion or decisive warfare against the Regency. Even the opposition mouthed the narratives of piratical Algiers.

The impending expedition was, in fact, easily appropriated to fit traditionally republican narratives of imperial military glory and national martial qualities. Opposition figures had no trouble in recasting the narratives of the war to make them less royalist. They argued this was a war of the people, with successes belonging to the French nation rather than the King. As Jennifer Sessions has shown, a Bonapartist longing for new victories after Waterloo was never far from liberal (and popular) conceptions of the expedition.²⁶⁵ The very act of

²⁶¹ Julien, La conquête, pp. 47-48.

²⁶² Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 27-28.

 ²⁶³ Todd, 'Retour', pp. 219-220.
 ²⁶⁴ Todd, 'Transnational', pp. 285-286.

²⁶⁵ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 26.

attacking piratical Algiers was therefore not at all unpopular, especially as the prospect of conquest loomed large. Suspicions that the government would evacuate the troops after the victory, just to keep the allies satisfied, were actually part of the liberal critiques hailed at the Polignac Ministry.²⁶⁶

The manning of the army further reflected this Bonapartist strand. At its top, the expeditionary force held a curious mixture of Napoleonic veterans and Bourbon favourites. The fierce debates and simmering conflicts that resulted from the make-up of the army command can therefore stand as a final example of the befuddling joust between government and opposition, based on conflicting conceptions of the invasion in which the former posed the attack as a matter of security whereas the latter saw it as a creeping threat to civil liberties. The royal decision to appoint Marshall Bourmont as the expedition's supreme commander sparked further critique, and ridicule. Infamous for his desertion at Waterloo and his role in condemning Marshall of the Empire Michel Ney for treason in 1815, Bourmont was generally considered a traitor. Contempt stretched all the way down the army ranks, where soldiers mockingly sang that he could, at least, not desert them over water.²⁶⁷ A fair share of those lower ranks had in fact served under Napoleon and allegedly did not hold the supreme commander, or any of the other royalist appointees, in very high esteem.²⁶⁸

None of the tensions within the army or between the different political sections of society were resolved when the expedition got ready to depart. Only the righteousness of fighting piratical Algiers remained virtually undisputed. Beyond the basic mobilizing incentive of fighting piracy, there was little that conflicting actors could agree on. Understandings of the expedition's meaning and ultimate aims remained fraught with disagreement – right up to the very last stages of the preparation. Large crowds of locals and tourists amassed for the final inspections of the forces in Toulon, but they generally stood silent when Bourmont or the Dauphin, the Duke of Anloulême, passed by.²⁶⁹ Some final simulations of the amphibious landing were held on 4 May to take away the lingering concerns over the government's planning for the safety of the troops.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ As Polignac himself liked to stress whenever the British ambassador started talking about guarantees of a guick French retreat from Algiers.

²⁶⁷ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 43-44 and 48-49. Or, in the words of consul Turnbull in Marseille: 'From all I could perceive General Bourmont was not a favourite with the army. The name of traitor was often given to him by the officers, without much reserve, this must spread in the ranks'. TNA, FO 27/410, 'Turnbull to Morrier', Marseille 28-05-1830, fp. 91-94.

²⁶⁸ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 6-7 and 35-36.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 53-56.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

Then, the long process of embarking commenced. A total of 37,000 men and all their provisions had to be boarded on hundreds of warships and transports, which took a full week.²⁷¹ By 18 May the army was ready to depart. Bourmont received his final sets of instructions, noting that the capture of Algiers should not become too bloody and stressing once more that Charles X primarily had the 'European goal' of abolishing piracy in mind.²⁷² On 25 May, the many sails of the expedition glided out of Toulon. The collection of ships would first touch at Palma, where an expected storm kept the army sheltered for eight days, stretching the limits of the tenuous Spanish support for this 'disinterested' venture. Though pessimists feared for the continuation of the expedition, the anchors were raised again on 9 June.²⁷³ The fleet set sail for the landing sites on the coasts of Algiers. The final part of the crossing had begun.

Without return. The authorities of Algiers in defeat, refuge and exile

In terms of agitated preparations, the flurry of activity in Algiers mirrored the efforts going on across the sea. Naval stations along the Regency's coast received new units, while the fortress in the capital's seaside quarters obtained additional armaments, including six enormous mortars.²⁷⁴ None of these preparations, however, came even close to the troop numbers and extent of firepower that the French military simultaneously amassed. This was not going to be an equal fight. The preparations once again brought to light how significant the asymmetries in military capabilities between European and non-European states had grown since the end of the Napoleonic Wars.²⁷⁵ Still, Dey Hussein did not consider the battle lost in advance. When the British consul tried to convince him that the situation had become 'most critical', Hussein 'did not listen' and said he would face the French. If the invaders would beat him, he would pay the reparations they demanded. If they lost, he would make them compensate for all the expenses of the contest.²⁷⁶ Outwardly, Hussein did not show signs of defeatism, or an awareness of the immanent disaster. In this exchange, he still conceived of the war as a monetary quarrel. Within days of the French landing, it would become clear that the impact

²⁷¹ Julien, La conquête, p. 51.

²⁷² CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Polignac to Bourmont', Paris 11-05-1830, fp. 275-280.

²⁷³ Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 43-44 and 51.

²⁷⁴ Belhamissi, *Histoire de la marine algerienne*, pp. 67-68; L. Lacoste, *La marine Algérienne sous les Turcs (l'Amirauté d'Alger à travers l'Histoire)* (Paris 1931), pp. 42-43. ²⁷⁵ Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest', pp. 3-4.

²⁷⁶ TNA, FO 3/32, 'St. John to Hay', 04-04-1830, fp. 97-100.

on him personally and on the population of the Regency would be far greater than any sum of financial compensation.

Contemporary sources and regional histories do suggest that a sense of dread and unease held the Ottoman environs of Algiers in its grip. Networks of agents and circulating rumours kept the authorities and populations of the Regencies in an informed state of suspense. Tunis and Tripoli had become sites of precaution ever since the exposure of the designs involving Mehmed Ali. Pasha Yusuf Karamanli ordered the construction of encampments along Tripoli's borders with Egypt and maintained them, even when the plans with Mehmed Ali were said to be discarded.²⁷⁷ In Tunis, Hussein Bey's government also turned the Regency into a 'fortified camp', and offered France extensive guarantees of neutrality.²⁷⁸ Things remained tenuous when a Sardinian squadron arrived off Tunis, seeking to reap the benefits of a French victory and staying in view of the port until the beginning of August. Vocal British opposition eventually kept the Sardinians from trying their own hand at a violent intervention.²⁷⁹ Foreign representatives in Constantinople and Alexandria further noted that the French approach to Algiers kept minds occupied and humours 'disquieted'.²⁸⁰

On 14 June, the invasion began as the first French troops landed on the beaches of Sidi Ferruch (Sidi Fredj), just to the west of Algiers. The problems and limitations of the Algerine defenders were immediately manifest. Strong winds made the disembarking a disorderly affair, but the Algerines did not capitalize on the confusion. The landing in essence went virtually unopposed, with the first serious attack on the French positions following only on 19 June. It was totally unsuccessful. The French counter-attack resulted in the taking of the Algerine camp at Staouéli and the capture of the commander's tent, which belonged to Ibrahim Agha, the Dey's son-in-law. Ibrahim's army could offer only minimal resistance against the French. It was a largely composite force, drawn from contingents provided by local dignitaries and inland tribes. As one historian of Algeria argues, the poor showing of the army 'illustrated the state's fragility and the division within it'.²⁸¹ Further lacking the state-of-the-art artillery of the French, Ibrahim's forces proved no match.²⁸²

²⁷⁷ CADN, 706PO/1/119, 'Ruiz-Sains to Polignac', Tripoli 08-03-1830; 'Ruiz-Sains to Polignac', Tripoli 13-04-1830.

²⁷⁸ Chater, *Dépendance et mutation*, pp. 359-360; CADN, 712PO/1/67, no. 15, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 05-07-1830, fp. 177-178.

²⁷⁹ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 332-333.

²⁸⁰ Mehmed Ali was still hoping that a French success would bring an alliance with Great Britain, TNA, FO 78/192, 'Barker to Aberdeen', Alexandria 06-07-1830, fp. 254-257. For Constantinople, CADLC, 133CP/260, 'Guilleminot to Polignac', Constantinople 11-06-1830, fp. 242-243.

²⁸¹ McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, p. 52.

²⁸² Julien, *La conquête*, pp. 52-53.

Panic arose among the population of Algiers as Ibrahim's troops routed and French forces progressed towards the capital city. On 4 July, the Bordj Moulay Hassan (the city's main landward fortifications) fell to the captors when the Janissary garrisons evacuated the place after five hours of steady bombardments.²⁸³ The fall of the city now seemed imminent. Dey Hussein, holed up in the palace at the Casbah, convened all notables for a meeting. Some of them suggested a general conscription with support of the *ulema*, others talked of saving the population by surrendering.²⁸⁴ That same night, another meeting took place near the harbour, where the city's wealthiest merchants concluded that the fight was lost. To spare the inhabitants, who had already begun to flee in large numbers, they pressed the Dey to sue for peace.²⁸⁵ Hussein followed their advice and signed a convention with Bourmont the following day. The total amount of French losses had been only 409 dead and 2061 wounded for the entire duration of the expeditionary campaign. Algerine losses (both civil and military) are estimated to have been tenfold.²⁸⁶

Far from persisting in tenacious fanaticism, as contemporary stereotypes of this 'piratical' people held, the elites of Algiers chose to take recourse to the conventions of international law. At this dire moment, they sought protection in legal agreements. One Algerine notable, the merchant and scholar Hamdan Khodja, provides insight into what the inhabitants' considerations may have been. Though he wrote his account years later in an effort to hold their own civilizing rhetoric up against the French, Khodja described how the elites of the city considered France a 'honourable nation', which would not violate its treaties. A signed convention would ensure a 'just treatment', guarding populace and property against brutal violence.²⁸⁷ Bourmont and Dey Hussein concluded such a convention on 5 July. It detailed the surrender of the city to the French, under the assurance that the Dey's personal riches, his family's safe passage, and the population's religion, liberties, properties, commerce and industry would be protected.²⁸⁸

Those promises were broken at noon the same day, foreshadowing what would await the former Regency in the years to come. Khodja wrote that the French forces 'followed the example of barbarians' as soon as they entered through the city gates.²⁸⁹ Troops circled the

²⁸³ Ibid., pp. 53-55.

²⁸⁴ [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu*, pp. 190-192.

²⁸⁵ [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu*, pp. 192-193; McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, p. 52.

²⁸⁶ Julien, *La conquête*, p. 56; K. Kateb, 'Le bilan démographique de la conquête de l'Algérie (1830-1880)' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie*, pp. 82-88, there p. 85.

²⁸⁷ [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu*, pp. 190-192.

²⁸⁸ CADLC, 2MD/6, 'Convention entre le General en chef de l'armée française et son Altesse le Dey d'Alger', 1830, fp. 23.

²⁸⁹ [Hamdan Khodja], Aperçu, p. 197.

streets, sacked the storages and swarmed the Casbah, taking whatever they could carry. Officers broke into the Dey's palace, where carved swords, rich fabrics, and bejewelled objects proved to be irresistible Oriental booty. By the middle of August, the Regency's treasury had been emptied and carried back to France in five subsequent shipments, totalling a value of 43 million francs – more than enough to cover the expenses of the expedition.²⁹⁰ The looting would later cause a scandal in France, probing official inquiries. On the streets of Algiers, its immediate effect was 'an unimaginable confusion and disorder'.²⁹¹ This theft and chaos hardly corresponded to the lofty claims with which the expedition had been justified. If this invasion fostered security at all, it was certainly not that of the Algerine population.

Inhabitants of the city and its environs adopted a set of strategies to face the uncertainties caused by the French invasion. Many people continued to flee from Algiers, either across the sea or out into the hinterlands. A chronicler of the city's past, Ahmad Sharif Zahhar narrated of 'the departure of its people into the desert'. There, 'they came to beg among the tents of the Arabs, and they tasted suffering, and hunger, and fear'.²⁹² Local governing authorities reacted to the French invasion with the first instances of indigenous resistance. In Constantine, Hadj Ahmed Bey (c. 1784 - c. 1850) refused to submit to any other authority than that of the Ottoman Sultan.²⁹³ Other elites, particularly within the city of Algiers, tried to work with the French to protect their political and commercial interests.²⁹⁴ However different they may have been, all these local responses can be understood as ways of coping with a future that had suddenly become wholly uncertain.

Amidst the proceedings and promises of the invasion, the question of what would become of the Regency remained unanswered. Marshall Bourmont declared that the French troops would depart within six months and return power to the Ottoman Porte, but the looting after the capitulation had shown the real value of his promises. The fact that Hussein, his family, and the majority of the Janissary corps were made to leave the city gave a very different impression of the French designs. This, in essence, was a near complete removal of the Regency's ruling segments. Archived lists detail how the Janissaries and their families were being siphoned off to Smyrna, Livorno and Alexandria. They were joined by four 'Spanish

²⁹⁰ Weiss, Captives and corsairs, pp. 166-167; Julien, La conquête, pp. 56-58; McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 51.

[[]Hamdan Khodja], Aperçu, p. 199.

²⁹² McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, p. 49. One source mentions as many as 6,000 'Arabs' arriving in Toulon before the city of Algiers had even fallen to the French. CADLC, 2MD/5, 'Préfet Maritime to Marine Minister', Toulon 26-06-1830, fp. 410.

²⁹³ McDougall, A history of Algeria, pp. 52-53.

²⁹⁴ Ibidem. Hamdan Khodja described them in terms of egotism, jealousy and vice. [Hamdan Khodja], Aperçu, pp. 206-207.

renegades': the very last of their kind, who left Algiers voluntarily.²⁹⁵ Hussein, for his part, was going off into exile in Naples, after initially having considered Malta. On 10 July, he and the Ottoman troops embarked their ships. Was this the end of piracy, the destruction of the brigands that the French had talked of? And what would follow in its wake? Only one thing seemed certain as the exiles sailed out onto the Mediterranean: this would be a crossing without return.²⁹⁶

Conclusion. A 'silent march' at the 'end of time'

Officially, the French government had no problem in conceptualizing Dey Hussein's defeat. This was a victory over the triple 'plagues' of piracy, slavery, and tributes. It was therefore a testimonial to France's consolidated position as an equal or, better still, as forerunner amongst the Great Powers, showing that the nation was a worthy member of the Quintuple Alliance, capable of asserting primacy within the security culture. It was thus also a service to Europe, a contribution to humanity's progress, and a sign of the monarchy's greatness. None of these claims were new. They had been used time and again in the coming of the expedition. Now that the venture had proven successful, French authorities wasted no time in rehashing the tested narratives and tried to capitalize on the victory. Publicity efforts were in full swing from the moment the news of Dey Hussein's capitulation reached Paris on Friday 9 July. Within hours, copies of Admiral Guy-Victor Duperré's succinct declaration of the victory, which had been relayed by optical telegraph, appeared at the stock exchange and went out to the press and provinces. A shot from the cannon at the Hôtel des Invalides could be heard ringing in the streets of Paris, confirming the circulating rumour that the King's flag waved over Algiers.²⁹⁷ Even the Journal des Débats, one of the most sceptical liberal journals, joined in on the excitement with headlines extolling the invasion: 'Algiers is taken! (...) Piracy is suffocated in its den: the outrages of Europe are erased'.²⁹⁸ The same officials who had been in charge of the mobilization ceremonies were now called upon to arrange celebrations for the fall of Algiers. Orders from Paris stipulated that a *Te Deum* would be sung in praise of the victory at all French churches, not just on the next Sunday, but also on the following one.

²⁹⁵ ANOM, GGA1E32/1, 'État des Turcs déportés et embarqués', 1831.

²⁹⁶ Describing the departure of the Dey and his considerations for choosing Naples over Malta, TNA, FO 27/413, 'St. John to Stuart de Rothesay', Algiers 29-07-1830, fp. 3-24.

²⁹⁷ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 43-44.

²⁹⁸ Weiss, Captives and corsairs, p. 167.

Charles X would attend the service of gratitude in the Notre Dame, after leading a parade through the capital city.²⁹⁹

At the same time, these jubilations of French officials could not overcome the popular unease and discontent. Some opposition groups and foreign agents considered the celebratory narratives of the victory unsatisfactory. They wanted more information and clearer prospects for the future. During the first actions of the expedition, journalists of *Le Globe* already criticized the manipulation of news on military matters.³⁰⁰ The flow of intelligence from Algiers appeared to be entirely in the government's hands. Beyond the announcement of Algiers' defeat, little was known about what was happening in its wake. 'There is an appearance of mystery and concealment about everything that comes from the African shore', the British consul in Toulon wrote.³⁰¹ Even with victory ascertained many pressing questions therefore remained unanswered. Would the military success also save the monarchy politically? What was the future position of Algiers going to be? What was going to happen with the promise that Mediterranean piracy would be eradicated forever? And, would the proposed international conference on Algiers actually be summoned?

Only the prospect of a European war, of the Great Powers falling out and taking up arms, definitely seemed off the table in July 1830. The courts of Russia and Prussia had supported the French attack from early on, while the officials of Austria and Britain decided to take their loss. The opposing allies would certainly not have agreed with the claim that the preceding decades of international concertation in the fight against piracy legitimized an invasion of Algiers, but they did not fully reject the idea that the Regency of Algiers was a piratical polity either. The Congress System and its security culture thus persevered through the invasion of Algiers, as the enduring negotiations and potential conference indicate. Multilateral deliberation and the concertation of policies did not, as we have also seen in previous chapters, preclude unilateral action. Hence the French attack should not be understood as an aberration from that international system, but rather as an integral and even constitutive event in its history, as an attempt to put France at the front of the continental concert, with its frameworks of conferences and binding protocols still largely intact. The congresses, conferences and cooperative efforts that followed after 1815 had never been about the complete avoidance of war, but about the avoidance of war between the Great Powers over

²⁹⁹ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 43-44.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

³⁰¹ TNA, FO 27/412, 'Robertson to Morrier', Toulon 28-07-1830, fp. 16-17.

imperial affairs. Peace on the continent could thus bring large-scale violence to non-European regions and peoples.

As the failure of the first, grandiose Polignac plan indicated, the invasion of Algiers can be seen as a relocation of martial tendencies away from the Rhineland, towards the European beyond.³⁰² Even in voicing their dislike over French schemes and tactics of dissimulation, other Great Power diplomats continuously referred to the supposed norms of conducting politics within the Congress System. The security culture's 'machinery' of alliances and binding agreements was very much at work in the long run-up to July 1830. In the end, it was a proposed conference that had to bring back unity within the alliance. Some foreign diplomats in Paris were actively preparing for a meeting on Algiers, thinking that an official invitation was bound to arrive soon. Even the British Cabinet, which had once been so sceptical of a conference on the topic, now agreed to participate. This, its Ministers concluded, would be the only way of keeping French designs in check. A European war over 'piratical' Algiers would definitely not be waged.³⁰³

Over the course of this chapter, we have seen how the invasion took shape and was executed amidst continuous diplomatic exchange. It has become apparent that the domestic calculations of Charles X and the Polignac Ministry, though they have long been the dominant explanation in the historiography, cannot entirely elucidate why Algiers could fall at this moment. French officials, almost from the very beginning of the war, denoted it as a conflict against a piratical entity, an entity that could therefore be destroyed for the benefit of either 'humanity', 'Europe' or 'the maritime states'. They could make such claims, and find a more or less accepting audience amongst the different courts of Europe, because of the security efforts of preceding decades. Without that recent history, statements of finalizing a 'European project' towards the abolition of piracy would not have made sense, nor would they have carried international currency. At the same time, the North African and Ottoman resistance against these earlier measures, which have been detailed in Chapter 3, meant that French actors could still frame their actions in this manner. Maritime raiding had dwindled greatly in the Regencies since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, but it still existed. The invasion of 1830 showed what uses the threat perception of Barbary piracy could still serve.

³⁰² Ambassador Stuart reached the same conclusion, 'it may perhaps be fortunate for the interests of Europe, that the desire of military reputation shall have been diverted by this undertaking, from projects, which the Liberal Party do not cease to recommend, for the recovery of the Belgic Provinces and the Frontier of the Rhine'. TNA, FO 27/411, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 120-123.

³⁰³ Šedivý, *Metternich*, p. 432; CADLC, 11CP/412, 'Rayneval to Polignac', Vienna 11-07-1830, fp. 234-242. On the preparation for the conference, TNA, FO 27/410, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 14-06-1830, fp. 187-189; FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 02-07-1830, fp. 124-126; FO 27/411, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 09-07-1830, fp. 65-67.

The importance of piracy to this history, however, was not beholden to the realm of official discourses and attitudes. Maritime raiding was also a material factor in the coming of the French invasion. It had been amongst the direct causes of the war between France and Algiers, had been instrumental in cementing a (temporary) alliance with Mehmed Ali, and had served to mobilize the expeditionary troops. This chapter illustrated how the treatment of piracy shaped the planning and execution of the 1830 expedition in significant ways. The fight against piracy even enabled the invasion of Algiers, as it provided French officials with a discourse and a sense of purpose that could legitimize an attack internationally within the frameworks of inter-imperial concertation. The preceding decades of piracy repression allowed the French government to explicitly link its endeavours to the creation of a new order in the Mediterranean. After the expedition had proved victorious, French as well as international celebrations of the success revolved around the idea that piracy would now disappear forever. Polignac himself was quick to note – in the same quote which opened this chapter - that the 'security of the Mediterranean is re-established; and Europe avenged of a long humiliation', with his government as the laureled avenging agent, deserving of international gratitude.³⁰⁴

Yet such claims also came with obligations. Statements of piracy ending and security existing could be questioned and challenged. Foreign diplomats and European sailors could ask and wonder what the attack and its aftermath really meant in terms of security. Questions hence arose about whether the French presence in Algiers really did anything to stop Mediterranean piracy. Inhabitants of the former Regency also criticized the violence, destitution, and array of insecurities that French military presence brought to them. In terms of the historical development of the post-1815 security culture, this analysis of the French invasion of Algiers has not only shown that France was taking on an increasingly prominent and proactive international role in matters of security, but also that exceedingly violent interventions outside Europe were beginning to characterise that culture. A greater emphasis on territorial solutions to security concerns was particularly important to that violent turn. Polignac's assertion on 'the security of the Mediterranean' already indicates a shift in terms of what was really being 'secured'. This was no longer a reference to 'commerce', 'navigation' or 'the flag' - all indicative of flows and fleeting presences. Instead, it called on a localized, territorialized object of security. The claim, which had also been furthered by commercial actors such as the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, was repeated in the royal council

³⁰⁴ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 133-134.

some weeks later, with the addition that it entailed 'changing the appearance of the entire African coast, perhaps bringing that continent to culture, civilization, and free communication'.³⁰⁵ In this way, the security culture was becoming increasingly intertwined with imperial dominion beyond the European continent.

The colonial implications of this territorialized take on security would, as the next chapter will show, press themselves upon Algiers and the wider Mediterranean in the decades to follow. In July 1830, the prospects were already grim. Ruthless pillage and societal unrest followed the French entry into Algiers. Its inhabitants chose to flee, fight or try their hand at accommodating the invaders, but the latter option would appear increasingly futile. Whether the fall of Algiers would help 'secure' the Bourbon monarchy and its ultraroyalist government was equally doubtful. When Charles X made his way to the *Te Deum* at the Notre Dame on the Sunday after the victory, the crowds once again remained sullen and quiet. 'The march', one onlooker wrote, 'was silent and sad, a vague anxiety seemed to weigh on the population'.³⁰⁶ The impression foreshadowed the public unrest and political revolution that would soon follow in France. In Algiers, popular poetry gave voice to an even more formidable sense of dread. Composed in the wake of the conquest, one poem announced an apocalypse, a foreboding of the worst: 'The end of time has come; Henceforth no more rest'.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ CADLC, 2MD/16, 'Note pour le conseil. Entreprise formée contre les Régences Barbaresques', [??]-08-1830, fp. 37-44.

³⁰⁶ Weiss, Captives and corsairs, p. 169.

³⁰⁷ Cited in McDougall, *A history of Algeria*, pp. 50-51. The song on the fall of Algiers is attributed to Si Abd Al-Qadir.

Chapter 5: Beyond the littoral. Legacies, treaties and the threats of colonies, 1830-1856

None of the 1,200 men knew what they were headed into. They had left Algiers on 22 July 1830 to go to Blida, a town situated some forty-five kilometres to the city's south, on the edges of the Mitidja plains. A group of Blida's inhabitants had come to Algiers just days before, stating that their settlement was not 'tranquil' as tribesmen from the mountains constantly threatened to pillage their quarters. Their pleas, as well as a 'bit of curiosity' amongst the general staff, drove commander-in-chief Marshall Louis Auguste de Bourmont to send out the troops and join their ranks.¹ The march was tiresome. In the smouldering temperatures of mid-summer, the road turned out to be much longer and more difficult to traverse than local intelligence had led the French to believe.² The troops reached Blida only by the evening of the 23rd. Located at the base of the Tell Atlas, the soldiers encountered a town lined by the first forested slopes of the mountain range, reminding some men of the French villages near the Pyrenees.³ A stream flowed from a steep gorge in the hills, watering the orange, myrtle and olive gardens that circled Blida's walls. When the troops set up camp for the night amidst the orchards, some inhabitants of the town came to greet the soldiers, and the French, as a published account later stated, 'would have hardly presumed that they had hostile intentions'.⁴

That presumption was lost at daybreak. Gunfire could be heard after a reconnaissance party ventured into the gorge at dawn. More shots echoed from the mountains later in the afternoon. By the evening, a cavalry unit received fire from Blida's walls. The separate incidents were enough to make Bourmont give orders that the troops retire.⁵ Then, suddenly, attackers came from everywhere. Armed men on horseback and on foot descended from the hills, attacking the retreating forces on all sides.⁶ The French generically described them as 'Kabyle' tribesmen, even though Blida's urban dwellers also took part in the attack. The

¹ M. Rozet, *Relation de la guerre d'Afrique. Pendant les années 1830 et 1831*, vol. 1 (Paris 1832), p. 308. Another account mentions that the army commanders hoped to find suitable lands near Blida for the cultivation of 'sugarcane, cotton, indigo and other plants of the Antilles', T. Quatrebarbes, *Souvenirs de la campagne d'Afrique* (Paris 1831), p. 95.

² Rozet, *Relation de la guerre*, vol. I, p. 309.

³ 'Expédition de l'armée française en Afrique. Contre Bélidéah et Médéah', *Le Spectateur Militaire*, vol. II, *Du 15 octobre 1830 au 15 mars 1831* (Paris 1831), pp. 371-390, there p. 376.

⁴ Rozet, *Relation de la guerre*, vol. I, p. 310.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 311-312.

⁶ Rozet, *Relation de la guerre*, vol. I, p. 313.

onslaught only ended after sundown. The French troops made their way back to Algiers the next day, again under a burning sun, while the cries of the wounded struck 'terror in all souls'.⁷

The defeat at Blida had an immediate impact. It fanned the first local attempts to fight off the invaders, who did not seem to be invincible anymore. It also inspired a forceful crackdown by the French. Within days the army command received a letter from Mustapha Bou Mezrag, whom Dey Hussein had appointed in 1819 as the governor of the mountainous region of Titteri. He now refused to surrender to the French. His message contained a declaration of war, mentioning the many violations of the capitulation treaty that had been signed at the fall of Algiers. Bou Mezrag warned that he would raise an army of 60,000 men and 'throw the French into the sea'.⁸ The statement left no doubts about whether the skirmish at Blida had been an ambush. Fearing to be caught between the 'two fires' of the last few remaining Janissaries in the city of Algiers and the hinterland resistance, the French command took severe measures.⁹ They reinforced their military outposts, increased vigilance and searched all of Algiers' houses for hidden arms. Inhabitants who were found in possession of weapons were imprisoned, deported or executed.¹⁰

The army subsequently set out to defeat Bou-Mezrag, who was holding court in the city of Médéa. On their way, French troops came through Blida again. They initially took hold of the town easily but were ambushed once again after the majority of the army marched on. Overwhelmed by a significantly larger force, the French soldiers hid in the mosques and barricaded Blida's streets. Reinforcements eventually managed to ward off the attackers. The French then brutally retaliated their 21 dead and 48 wounded. They indiscriminately treated the inhabitants of Blida as enemy combatants, killing eight hundred in the process. The streets were allegedly strewn with corpses. 'This unfortunate town may be considered to no longer exist', one report concluded in November 1830.¹¹

As these brutalities in Blida showed, the French were venturing further and further from the coasts of Algiers. An invasion that had at the outset been framed as a measure to end piracy and bring security to the Mediterranean Sea developed into a hinterland war. What drove the French army to march to Blida and countless other inland destinations, and embark on a course of violent expansion in the years after 1830? Anxieties and threat perceptions

⁷ Ibid., p. 314.

⁸ Quatrebarbes, *Souvenirs de la campagne*, pp. 100-101.

⁹ Rozet, *Relation de la guerre*, vol. I, p. 319.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 319-320, 328.

¹¹ 'Expédition de l'armée française en Afrique. Contre Bélidéah et Médéah', p. 384; B. Brower, *A desert named peace. The violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844-1902* (New York 2009), p. 16.

informed commanders and spurred on soldiers to move into unknown territories against unexpected enemies in the decades to come. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Jules de Polignac had, after the victory over Algiers in July 1830, triumphantly stated that the 'security of the Mediterranean is re-established', but within mere months it became clear that a sense of security was hardly present among the occupying forces.¹² Nor did these occupiers bring safety to the inhabitants of the former Regency. They rather worsened the population's lot, generating an array of insecurities as people were dispossessed, driven from their lands or killed in masses. That destitution of the '*indigènes*', as the French authorities started calling them, inspired new threat perceptions of resistance and conspiracies that supposedly needed to be dealt with ever more forcefully.¹³ Military campaigns were driven by the interplay between security practices and threat perceptions, which gained a newly territorialized and expansive dimension as the French created the colony of Algeria.

This chapter tracks that history of expansion and shows how it was characterized by the same dynamics of security that shaped earlier stages of the fight against piracy. In fact, some older discourses on legitimate and illegitimate violence as well as lingering notions of a 'Barbary pirate' threat continued to hold sway. Whereas the preceding decades had brought naval expeditions, bombardments and diplomatic missions, security practices in North Africa now changed shape, as they took place in a colonial setting, took an a more systematically violent character and became increasingly intertwined with projects of territorial expansion. By following the French occupying forces as they moved through (and beyond) the former Regency of Algiers, this chapter uncovers the colonial security concerns that directed these movements. Historians debate whether French policies in the new colonial territories had any clear sense of direction or amounted to anything more than a haphazard succession of conflicting policies, but the contemporary engagement with perceived threats to security brings to light important continuities and long-term strategic considerations.¹⁴

The threat of piracy in particular links the years before 1830 to the decades that followed. Many authors take the invasion of Algiers as a self-evident conclusion to the fight against 'Barbary piracy' – or, to paraphrase the late Daniel Panzac, as the 'end of the legend'.¹⁵ Yet

¹² CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 133-134.

¹³ Brower, *A desert*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁴ W. Gallois, *A history of violence in the early Algerian colony* (New York 2013), p. 12; D. Todd, *A velvet empire. French imperial power and economic life in the nineteenth century* (Princeton, forthcoming 2020), 'Ch. 2: Algeria: informal empire manqué'.

 ¹⁵ G. Fisher, Barbary legend. War, trade and piracy in North Africa 1415-1830 (Oxford 1957); A. Jamieson, Lords of the sea. A history of the Barbary corsairs (London 2013); D. Panzac, Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820 (Leiden and Boston 2005); A. Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary. Corsairs, conquests and captivity in the seventeenth-century Mediterranean (London 2010); L. Ben Rejeb, "The general belief of the

piracy kept tormenting contemporary minds, both as a recurrent maritime problem and as a well-established threat perception. As the British scholar William Gallois has argued, traditional outlooks on the 'Barbary Coast' can explain just why the violence in Algeria could be so incredibly ferocious. Gallois contends that old stereotypes of brutal fanaticism and the established rhetoric of illegitimate 'barbaric' violence both had a deep influence on French military conduct, offering at least a partial explanation of killings such as the one in Blida.¹⁶An analysis of security concerns and notions of threat will therefore bring to light some deep historical consistencies in the much-debated process of imperial expansion after 1830. Such an analysis will also uncover the perpetuating logic of security practices, which spurred on expansionist policies in ways that contemporaries had not intended and could not control.

In fact, the extension of French colonial dominion in Algeria soon came to be perceived as a potential threat in its own right – not only by local actors and neighbouring authorities, but also by agents and officials of other European powers. This chapter will therefore situate French colonialism in Algeria in a broader regional and European context, showing how the concerted ways of the post-1815 security culture continued to influence the dynamics of imperial expansion in North Africa. The focus here will largely be on France, as this power had increasingly begun to take the lead in matters of collective security and especially in the fight against piracy with the 1830 invasion of Algiers. French conduct, however, still needs to be understood in a broader international framework. The security culture remains an important explanatory factor because colonial endeavours had a propensity for generating international conflict, whether it was through the creation of spin-off wars, the hampering of trade or the creeping encroachment upon competing spheres of interests. After the European powers had proceeded with settling and managing their territorial disputes on the continent in the wake of 1815, the French invasion of 1830 suddenly shook Great Power statesmen, who now started to fear for further incursions into adjacent countries or the founding of other European colonies in the wider Mediterranean. In order to ward off such daunting prospects and keep potentially serious conflicts from escalating into war, imperial actors turned to their tested practices of security. They negotiated, mediated, delineated and de-escalated their mutual concerns, giving further shape to the new inter-imperial order that was being created in the Mediterranean.

world". Barbary as genre and discourse in Mediterranean history', *European Review of History* 19:1 (2012) pp. 15-31, there p. 26.

¹⁶ Gallois, *A history of violence*, pp. 11, 18, 23, 32-33.

Security in this period and setting was as much about European imperial expansion as about keeping that expansion in check. The aftermath of the French invasion was therefore rife with international efforts to put bounds on possible ventures into Tunis, Tripoli and Morocco, together with concerted attempts to keep other colonial projects from materializing. This chapter hence also looks at how territorial expansion came to be perceived and managed internationally as a threat in its own right. The security culture was thus adapting to take on new threats and defend new interests of free trade and territorial control in the colonial setting of North Africa. As the central authorities of the Ottoman Empire were also increasingly being consulted and gradually integrated within this management of shared concerns, we may even say that the security culture was solidifying and expanding from the 1830s to 1850s.

The Congress System also continued to steer international politics in the decades that followed the French invasion. Actual congregations and summits were nevertheless few and far between in this period, as concertation gradually became ingrained in the everyday conduct of diplomacy. With the Crimean War of 1853-1856 the system did experience a conflict that shook its underlying alliances, leading many historians to see it as the ultimate end of the order created at the Congress of Vienna.¹⁷ The war pitted France, Great Britain (and eventually Austria) against Russia in a bid to defend the Ottoman Empire. However, when this war of the Great Powers came to an end, they made peace at another congress and thus kept the post-1815 system of conferences and collective security running. As its participants assembled in February 1856, this Congress of Paris expressly situated itself on a lineage that stretched back to Vienna and its follow-ups. The proceedings even resulted in further measures against maritime raiding. To close off the Congress, the participating powers issued the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. This 'Magna Carta' of the laws of maritime warfare, as jurists like to call it, abolished privateering as a legitimate wartime practice.¹⁸ The document is often taken as an opening to the late-nineteenth-century upsurge of international legislation and positivist legal thinking. However, in this chapter, it will be discussed in the light of what came before: the steady delegitimation of North African corsairing and the violent engagement with the Barbary Regencies.

All in all, this chapter thus takes stock of the many consequences and conflicting legacies of the invasion of Algiers. It analyses the effects of this climatic event in the fight against

¹⁷ P. Schroeder, 'The transformation of European politics. Some reflections', in: W. Pyta (ed.), *Das europäische Mächtekonzert. Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Wiener Kongreβ1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853* (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna 2009), pp. 25-40, there p. 35; M. Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and its legacy. War and Great Power diplomacy after Napoleon* (London and New York 2013), p. 352.

¹⁸ Cited in M. Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere. Piraterie, Völkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen, 1500-1900* (Frankfurt a.M. 2010), p. 349.

Mediterranean piracy, gauging its impact on regional politics as well as on the security culture that arose after 1815. To distinguish between various aspects of this aftermath, I take a threepronged approach, which differentiates immediate from mid- and long-term consequences. In discussing these consequences, this chapter does not abide by a strict chronology, but rather zooms in on specific events that represent larger historical developments. Still, the direct wake of the invasion comes first. Its immediate consequences concern the security goals that French actors and their allies had attached to the expedition – and sets out what became of these. Subsequently, the chapter turns to the two decades following 1830. These were the years in which French expansion commenced and soon posed international problems in Algeria's environs. Lastly, this chapter discusses how earlier European security efforts against piracy were reflected in the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856. That text, I argue, served as a memorial, a recorded legacy of all the negotiation, repression and destruction that had come before. It may generally be seen as the start of a new era of international law, but, in the light of piracy repression, it was also an ending.

The invasion's loose ends. The Crown, the sea, the Regency

French officials had not been modest about their aims in attacking Algiers. Nor was their hidden agenda behind the invasion particularly concealed. By the beginning of July 1830, few onlookers would have missed the exclamations of France fulfilling the Christian duty of ending Muslim piracy and providing security for the maritime, civilized peoples of Europe. Actors as dispersed as Metternich, Aberdeen and Tsar Nicholas I were, moreover, well aware of the French monarchy's hopes that a victory in Algiers would bolster the regime. At the same time, these European statesmen viewed French colonial designs upon the former Regency with varying degrees of concern. The course of history was thus as open-ended as ever in July 1830, but the stakes were clear: the victory in Algiers had to save the Bourbon monarchy, end piracy and bring closure to the question of North Africa's political future. Because French actors had worded their aims so explicitly in terms of security, we may now revisit those claims and find out if they were reached at all. Did the conquest of Algiers secure anything – whether it was the monarchy, the Mediterranean Sea or the French presence in the former Regency? How did those earlier claims determine the French line of policy in the eventful months and years that followed the invasion? And how did the other European governments relate to the French ventures in North Africa?

Securing the Crown

Individual fortunes were volatile in the French political climate of July 1830. At the beginning of the month, King Charles X and Polignac, his head of the ministerial council, still met in the royal residency of Saint-Cloud to discuss and congratulate each other on the army's successes in Algiers. However, by the middle of August, both men had fled Paris and its environs, rushing to make it out of the country. Charles managed to board a ship to England, but Polignac was caught as he tried to reach the island of Jersey. He was then imprisoned in the city of Saint-Lo in Normandy and later put on trial for treason.¹⁹ The invasion of Algiers had not saved the political careers of these once so influential actors.

The position of the Bourbon monarchy and its ultraroyalist government had been under strain for years already, as economic difficulties mounted and conflicts with the liberal opposition gained in intensity. The victory in Algiers did not dampen these troubles but aggravated them. As we saw at the end of Chapter 4, Charles X had marched to a celebratory *Te Deum* in the Notre Dame through streets allegedly lined with silent, sullen crowds. This did not bide well for the stability of his throne. The elections for the Chamber of Peers, with which the timing of the invasion had been made to coincide, further underlined the vulnerability of the monarchy's position. Ultraroyalist, governmental candidates received crushing defeats in the various rounds of voting that took place between 23 June and 19 July. Within two weeks of the victory celebrations, silence made way for revolutionary bluster and the streets of Paris, once again, became home to barricades, rather than royal parades.²⁰

The victory in Algiers did impact the elections, but not in the way that the ultraroyalist regime would have expected. The opposition media did an ingenious job in linking the victory to the vote in a way that put the official rationalizations completely on its head. Whereas the Polignac ministry had intended the invasion as a mark of the monarchy's military might and its sense of Christian duty to all of civilization, publications like the *Journal des Débats* turned that incentive into a story of liberty triumphing over despotism. If the troops had risked their lives to fight for civilization, humanity and order, then so should the citizens who stayed behind. Jennifer Sessions has summed up the attitude in her work on the aftermath of the

¹⁹ TNA, FO 27/412, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 20-08-1830, fp. 251-253. The charges brought before Polignac at the trial included corrupting elections, exciting civil war and depriving citizens of their rights as well as 'plotting against the internal security of the state'. After a long trial, he was found guilty and punished to 'civil death', which meant life imprisonment and deportation, including the loss of all civil rights. D. Pinkney, *The French revolution of 1830* (New Jersey 1972), pp. 180-181, 318-319 and 352.

²⁰ J. Sessions, *By sword and plow. France and the conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca and London 2011), pp. 44-46.

invasion: 'If French soldiers were fighting for liberty on the other side of the Mediterranean, it was the duty of French electors to fight that same liberty at home'.²¹

The government's conduct during these decisive weeks seemed to prove the suspicions that liberals held about the invasion and its uses. In direct retaliation for what he deemed 'attacks' in the press, Charles X invoked the dreaded Article 14 of the Charter on 26 July. This granted the king the power to rule by decree. For members of the liberal opposition, the move appeared a mere prelude to a royal coup d'état and a total suspension of the Charter, just as they had feared before the expedition against Algiers began. It was thus the official handling of the electoral losses, exacerbated by the opposition's anxious perception of that handling, which finally provoked the revolution. Crowds gathered in the streets of Paris on 27 July and violent clashes with government forces ensued. After three days of fighting, Charles had left Paris to be replaced by his cousin Louis Philippe (1773-1850), who took the throne as the 'King of the French' (or 'Citizen King', as he became known) of a new constitutional monarchy.²²

Internationally, the July Revolution and the proclamation of the new regime on 9 August caused less of a stir than perhaps may be expected. Events in Paris inspired other revolutions in the southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Poland, Italy and Switzerland, fanning lingering fears of an international revolutionary conspiracy.²³ Nevertheless, the forceful change of regime in France did not set the Quadruple Alliance in motion, though it still existed and still counted the quelling of any revolution on French territory amongst its treaty obligations. This fact may lead to historical lamentations over the 'dead letter' that this once 'mighty alliance' had become, but the July Monarchy, as we shall see, in fact quickly became embedded in the enduring frameworks of the post-1815 security culture.²⁴ There was, however, some initial hesitation about whether or not to recognize this new regime which, to make matters more complicated, operated under an old flag: the tricolour of the revolutionary years, rather than the white banner of the Bourbons. Port authorities in Russia and the Ottoman Empire were unsure about granting entry to French vessels flying the tricolour.²⁵ The revolution caused further uncertainties, difficulties and ruptures when many of France's most senior officials suddenly disappeared after August. Charles X and Polignac, it turned out, were not the only ones who left their posts. Ministers

²¹ Ibid., p. 58.

²² Sessions, *By sword and plow*, pp. 58-60.

²³ P. Schroeder, *The transformation of European politics*, 1763-1848 (Oxford 1994), pp. 666-711.

²⁴ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, pp. 348-350.

²⁵ CADLC, 11CP/412, 'Schwebel to Molé', Vienna 04-09-1830, fp. 277-279; TNA, FO 78/191, 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 18-09-1830, fp. 1-4.

went into exile under false names and ambassadors left their embassies in the hands of former subordinates, in cases leading to a near total standstill of diplomatic communication.²⁶

The upheaval in the diplomatic service, however, paled in comparison to the confusion that took hold of the army command in Algiers. The news of Charles X's downfall reached the other side of the Mediterranean on the morning of 11 August. It is said to have given extra hope to the initial opponents of the French presence.²⁷ Amidst the commanders of the army, on the other hand, the change of government caused agitated disagreement. Several ultraroyalist generals wanted to turn the expeditionary troops against the new regime by sailing them back to Toulon and marching on Lyon.²⁸ Another option they considered was to proclaim Henri, the ten-year-old grandson of Charles X, as king and make Algiers the 'capital of his new empire'.²⁹ Such illusions had to be let go quickly, when it became clear that the inferior ranks would not carry them out. Bourmont then saw that the Bourbon case was lost, and then tried to save his own. He left his troops behind and boarded a small Austrian brig, which sailed him into exile in England.³⁰

Within less than a month, it had thus become clear that the French victory in Algiers could not save the Bourbon monarchy, or the careers of its most senior (and ardent) supporters. The manner in which the regime of Charles X fell indicated that it could not control or uphold its own rationalizations behind the invasion. Official discourses of providing security, fighting piracy and ending despotism in Algiers became, in the hands of the opposition, narratives of anxieties over liberties and pleas for political change at home. Adopting the government's justifications for the invasion, one liberal journal declared that if 'force' could contribute to 'the general progress of humanity', serve 'justice' and civilize 'the world', then 'the same right (...) legitimized revolutions'.³¹ The links between Algiers and the revolution became even more apparent when new press laws after the king's abdication led to the publication of all sorts of caricatures that featured Charles X and Dey Hussein as fellow despots in exile.³² However, what the liberal opposition did not upend or satirize was the claim to a righteous

²⁶ The former Minister of the Marine Baron d'Haussez turned up in London under the name of 'Mercher', CADLC, 8CP/631, 'Alfred de Vaudreuil to Marshall Jourdan', London 09-08-1830, fp. 178-182. Both Laval in London and Rayneval in Vienna left their embassies, CADLC, 8CP/631, 'Alfred de Vaudreuil to FA Ministry', London 02-08-1830, fp. 172-176, and 11CP/412, 'Schwebel to Molé', Vienna 28-08-1830, fp. 270.

²⁷ Especially because the first victory over French forces at Blida had taken place only two weeks before. Brower, *A desert*, p. 12.

²⁸ C. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine* vol. 1 La conquête et les débuts de la colonisation (1827-1871)
(2nd ed., Paris 1979), pp. 62-63.

²⁹ Quatrebarbes, *Souvenirs*, p. 107.

³⁰ Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1, pp. 62-63.

³¹ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 58-60.

³² Ibid., pp. 62-63.

victory over Algiers itself. They may have called the very legitimacy of the monarchy into question, but the legitimacy of the expedition and its victorious results remained largely unchallenged.³³ The same went for Europe's Great Power governments. Initially, foreign statesmen reacted to the July Revolution with shock and suspicion, but they quickly allowed the new monarchy to join their fold and essentially accepted its claims over Algiers.³⁴ That both the European allies and the French liberals could so easily accept the legitimacy of the victory over Algiers thus further indicated that what was deemed unacceptable or threatening in Europe (conquest, expansionism, military rule) could easily take place beyond the continent. Louis Philippe, as he took over the crown, thus also inherited a military conquest across the sea, along with the international promises that his predecessor had made to acquire it.

Securing the sea

The grandest of the French justifications for attacking Algiers related to security at sea. Polignac had been quick to argue that the defeat of Dey Hussein amounted to nothing less than the reestablishment of security on the Mediterranean.³⁵ But did it really? And was it even possible to substantiate such phrases? French authorities, even in this period of rupture, certainly tried to. As their diplomatic activities in North Africa in the immediate wake of the expedition indicate, French officials did endeavour to suppress the alleged piratical threat of Barbary corsairing completely. Their actions hence show that the legitimizing rhetoric of ending the 'triple plagues' of piracy, slavery and tribute was more than mere talk.³⁶ If the endurance of the monarchy had been the domestic test to the invasion's security claims, then the repression of Mediterranean piracy represented its international counterpart. As Chapter 4 indicated, European statesmen did not disclaim the French assertion that the invasion of Algiers was going to bring an end to the threat of 'Barbary piracy'. In order to live up to these claims and prevent foreign critiques on this account, the French navy sent squadrons and commanders with demands to end corsairing to the Regencies of Tunis and Tripoli immediately after Dey Hussein had been exiled from Algiers.

³³ Sessions, *By sword and plow*, pp. 53-56.

³⁴ M. Laran, 'La politique russe et l'intervention française à Alger (1829-1830)', *Revue des études slaves* 38 (1961), pp. 119-128, there p. 127.

³⁵ CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 16-07-1830, fp. 133-134.

³⁶ Aperçu historique, statistique et topographique sur l'état d'Alger, a l'usage de l'armée expéditionnaire d'Afrique (Paris 1830), p. 76.

It was not in an ad-hoc fashion that the French government decided to address the authorities of Tunis and Tripoli in one broad sweep after taking Algiers. That idea had entered the expedition's planning at an intermediate stage, when the mobilization of the troops was almost completed. Bourmont, then still stable in his commanding position, drafted plans for naval demonstrations before the other Regencies in late June 1830. His suggestions passed the Royal Council on the 30th.³⁷ By mid-July, the French consul in Tunis Mathieu de Lesseps (1771-1832) received instructions that he would have to cooperate with the squadron commander in persuading the Bey to sign a new treaty, 'guaranteeing forever the security of the Mediterranean'.³⁸ If anything, these advance arrangements further illustrate how the Polignac government upheld security claims as strong legitimizing arguments. Security discourses had to preclude or dismantle the opposition of Great Power allies like Britain and Austria, and overcome any questions concerning international law and the legality of the invasion. Expanding the abolition of 'Barbary piracy' to Tunis and Tripoli was thus a means of living up to the lofty, universalist rhetoric that accompanied the invasion of Algiers. It was also a way of definitively replacing the old international legal structures in the Mediterranean, which dated back to the bilateral treaties of the early modern period, with a new, remodelled set of international laws that were more closely aligned to Great Power interests of security and free trade.

The effort to broaden the stakes of the expedition to all of the North African Regencies was a particularly delicate (and painful) issue in the case of Tunis. Its ruler, Hussein Bey, had gone to significant lengths to maintain a 'most perfect' neutrality during the attack, in accordance with French wishes and intimidations. He had denied the landing of Ottoman envoy Tahir Pasha in Tunis, opened the ports to French ships of war, and even sent along two senior officers of his court to be witness to the conquest.³⁹ The Tunisian officials were therefore amongst the first foreigners to compliment Bourmont on the victory over Algiers.⁴⁰ Chroniclers and historians have noted that terror and indignation over the fall of Algiers gripped the population of Tunis, but the Regencies' elites nonetheless did their utmost to accommodate the French.⁴¹ Neutrality and diplomatic dialogue seemed the safest course to follow from the vantage point of the Bey's palace, especially now that a massive military presence was suddenly stationed in the immediate vicinity of Tunis.

³⁷ K. Chater, Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857 (Tunis 1984), pp. 366-369.

⁸ Ibidem

 ³⁹ CADN, 712PO/1/67, No. 16, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 19-07-1830, fol. 178-180.
 ⁴⁰ CADN, 712PO/1/67, No. 14, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 07-06-1830, fol. 174-175.

⁴¹ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 363-365.

To have seen the French navy squadron of seven ships appear in view of the city on 1 August 1830 must therefore have been equally surprising, worrying and disheartening. The gravity of the situation only increased when the French consul made clear that these forces had not come to open negotiations, but to present an ultimatum. Along with the fleet came a special envoy and a list of several demands. The Regency of Tunis would have to give up corsairing, reject Christian slavery and renounce tributes from European powers. Hussein Bey was given eight days to sign the treaty. Alternating between conciliations and threats, Lesseps did open negotiations with Hussein. Each article of the agreement, the French consul reported, required lengthy debates that were, as he suspected, further complicated by the interference of other foreign representatives at the Bey's court.⁴²

What caused most contention was the French attempt to include certain advantageous trade stipulations. The fight against Mediterranean piracy thus went hand in hand with the creation of a new commercial regime, in which invocations of free trade and universalist claims of delivering Europe from a threat to its security were a means of furthering national interests. One of the fiercest opponents of the French efforts, Sardinian consul Filippi, did question these broad claims, noting that Christian slavery had been abolished since the British treaties of 1816.⁴³ However, the French attempt to attain exclusive rights for coral fishing in the Tunisian waters near Algiers provoked most hostility from Filippi, as well as from the British consul Sir Thomas Reade (1872-1849) and Hussein Bey himself. The proposed stipulation would have given France virtual possession over those waters on the borders of Tunis, which was deemed unacceptable by the various parties involved. Bey Hussein signed the treaty on 8 August, which set down the total relinquishment of corsairing, slavery and tributes, but kept the article on the fishing rights open for further negotiations.⁴⁴

The diplomatic talks ran a similar course in Tripoli, where a different fleet under a different commander arrived on 9 August. Vice-admiral Claude de Rosamel (1774-1848) and a squadron of five ships came with a combination of abolitionist and commercial demands the resembled those at Tunis. Pasha Yusuf Karamanli was to renounce piracy, slavery and tribute, grant trade benefits to France and make apologies to the French consul concerning an older conflict, which related to the personal journal of Major Alexander Laing – the British explorer who ventured to Timbuktu in 1826, but never returned. Karamanli signed the treaty on 11 August, meeting all French demands and agreeing to a hefty payment, in two tranches, of

⁴² CADN, 712PO/1/67, No. 19, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 10-08-1830, fp. 184-190.

⁴³ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 370-376.

⁴⁴ Ibidem; CADN, 712PO/1/69, No. 20, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 14-08-1830, fp. 3-5.

800,000 francs in 'war taxes' for outstanding loans.⁴⁵ Like in Tunis, the agreement angered other foreign diplomats, especially the British representative. So much, in fact, that consul Warrington lowered the flag on his consulate and announced that Tripoli should consider itself at war. London never backed the declaration of war.⁴⁶

Within two months of the victory in Algiers, the French had thus brought their effort to 'destroy' Mediterranean piracy to all three North African Regencies. In Tunis and Tripoli, threats of violent repercussions were enough to make the rulers sign away aspects of statehood that they had staunchly defended at various earlier occasions. The wording of the article on corsairing, which was exactly the same in both treaties, clearly echoed the concerns and contestations that North African authorities had voiced during earlier exchanges with other European powers that were involved in fending off the perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy', such as the British diplomatic mission of Lord Exmouth in the spring of 1816 or the Anglo-French expedition of 1819. No longer would the Regencies be authorized – 'not even during wartime', as the article held - to let state- or privately-owned vessels carry out corsairing against the merchant ships of other nations.⁴⁷ When Mahmud Bey opposed the European demands to end corsairing in 1819, he had done so in precisely these terms. He noted that the corsairs were an instrument of the state, necessary for its protection. That stance seemed too dangerous to maintain in August 1830. As Hussein reportedly told the British and American consuls, it had been the 'overwhelming French squadron' and the threat of a large 'military force' that had made him sign this 'most onerous treaty'.⁴⁸

Hussein Bey's regrets foreshadowed the mounting difficulties that were in store for the Regencies after the conclusion of the treaties. The agreements generated serious financial and political problems. This did not primarily have to do with the ban on corsairing and the loss of its accompanying revues from ransom and tributes - even consul Lesseps admitted that the Tunisian peoples had already largely relinquished 'piracy' after 1816.49 It was rather the treaties' commercial clauses and the consolidation of French privileges that brought trouble. The stipulations generated many conflicts over monopolies and customs rights. In both Tunis and Tripoli, infighting between the consuls over commercial favours generated nearly unworkable situations. Increasingly, the Regents found themselves enclosed by European

⁴⁵ CADN, 712PO/1/177, 'Rosamel to Lesseps', aboard *Le Trident* at sea 17-08-1830.
⁴⁶ CADN, 706PO/1/119, 'Ruiz-Sains to Polignac', Tripoli 17-08-1830.

⁴⁷ CADN, 712PO/1/67, no. 19, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 10-08-1830, fol. 184-190, and

¹⁶⁶PO/E/159, 'Tunis et Tripoly. Analyse de la Depeche no. 36 sur la Porte', [n.d.].

⁴⁸ NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 12, 'Porter to Van Buren', USS *Boston* at sea 22-09-1830; TNA, FO 77/21, 'Reade to Murray', Tunis 19-08-1830.

⁴⁹ CADN, 712PO/1/69, No. 21, 'Political Depeche from Lesseps', Tunis 16-08-1830, fol. 5-7.

representatives with financial reclamations, making them turn to successive waves of property confiscation and currency devaluation.⁵⁰

With these events in Tunis and Tripoli, it undeniably became clear what the French claims of re-establishing security meant in practice. As the treaties and their impact show, the claims essentially entailed a continuation of the preceding efforts to curtail 'Barbary piracy' for the sake of humanity, Christendom or Europe. Yet the French ventures also came with a new assertion of primacy, a new attempt to attain the status of first-rank power in the political and commercial realms of the North African Regencies. This was protection writ large. The treaties resembled the older guarantees of great over smaller powers, like those by France over the Papal States or Britain over its Italian allies. Only now they enveloped all three Regencies and had to cover the totality of European shipping – and all of that under the supreme leadership of France. Here, it becomes all the more apparent that the French invasion of Algiers was not solely directed at the domestic audience, but that it also had to communicate something internationally: that France was a first-rank power within the Concert of Europe.

Indeed, the treaties did not solely have implications for the Mediterranean region. Historians who have looked at this oft-neglected aftermath to the invasion of Algiers tend to stress its broader significance for histories of European imperialism. They see these treaties as signs of a 'new imbalance' and an increasing 'symbolic domination'.⁵¹ The agreements, in their view, represent an early version of the 'lopsided' agreements that European powers would impose on African and Asian states throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Conflating agendas of piracy repression and the enforcement of free trade regimes were also at play in those subsequent cases, much as they had been in Tunis and Tripoli.⁵² The 1830 treaties were thus signposts along the way to further global dominance of the European imperial powers. Another such signpost would be the former Regency of Algiers itself. Much about the future of this vanquished Ottoman vassal remained unclear, even as the anti-corsair treaties were signed in Tunis and Tripoli. The question lingered: was France going to secure its position in Algiers with a permanent establishment?

⁵⁰ On Tunis, Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 373, 413-429 and 433. For Tripoli, N. Lafi, *Une ville du Maghreb entre ancient régime et réformes ottomans. Genèse des institutions municipales à Tripoli de Barbarie (1795-1911)* (L'Harmattan 2002), p. 70; A. Nasr, *A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period* (Cambridge 1987), p. 203; CADN, 706PO/1/119, 'Ruiz-Sains to FA Minister', Tripoli 06-11-1830, and 706PO/1/179, 'P. Negri to Schwebel', Tripoli 07-06-1831.

⁵¹ C. Windler, 'Diplomatic history as a field for cultural analysis. Muslim-Christian relations in Tunis, 1700-1840', *The Historical Journal* 44:1 (2001) pp. 79-106, there p. 98; Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 369-370.

⁵² Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 333-334.

Securing the Regency

A fair share of naval intimidation and diplomatic manoeuvring by the French had, supposedly, put a check on the 'piratical' ways of the remaining North African Regencies. Besides bringing France the Great Power prestige of being the prime protector of maritime security, the treaties also served to further legitimate French designs for Algiers internationally. As the rulers of Tunis and Tripoli were made to renounce corsairing, ransoming and tributes, the avowed aims behind the invasion of Algiers had to appear all the more sincere. French actors seemingly took their project of 'destroying' piracy very seriously. The fact that the treaties had been drafted before the ships of the expedition even set sail further indicates how the Polignac government had planned ahead after the invasion. France therefore did not stumble into its Algerian colony. As I showed in the previous chapter, the historical myth of a haphazard and unforeseen colonization has become increasingly untenable.⁵³ Despite the chaos and upheaval of the July Revolution, the French decision to stay in Algiers was thus not a sudden break with the past. There was a conscious governmental effort to secure the newly gained presence in the former Regency. And the abolition of piracy continued to play an important legitimizing role in that effort. Still, the invocation of the pirate threat also brought further international contestation.

Along with the victory over Algiers, the July Monarchy inherited several obligations to the European allies. Internally, the former King and his Ministers had made few reservations about establishing some sort of colonial holding in the vanquished Regency, but they pursued a more cautious policy externally. Polignac repeatedly stated to the European allies – though never in writing – that French aims were essentially 'disinterested', concerning only the destruction of piracy for the sake of everyone's security. He never got tired of rehashing the formula that France had no 'ulterior' motives for Algiers and therefore wished to negotiate with the other continental powers on the issue of its future.⁵⁴ Even when Polignac dashed off the political stage, these assurances remained fresh in the memories of other European statesmen and diplomats. The newly installed authorities of France thus had to take stock of Polignac's pledges.

⁵³ Also, D. Todd, 'Retour sur l'expédition d'Alger. Les faux-semblants d'un tournant colonialiste français', *Monde(s)* 10:2 (2016), pp. 205-222.

⁵⁴ TNA, FO 27/407, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 26-02-1830, fp. 118-124; CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Laval to Polignac', London 17-05-1830, fp. 269-273.

The old conference promise reasserted itself almost as soon as the July Monarchy began to rule. Sir Charles Stuart, the British ambassador to France, visited Louis Philippe and talked about a conference on Algiers less than a week after the new king had taken the throne. Stuart wrote that the July Monarchy had adopted Charles X's assurances concerning Algiers, as Louis Philippe reportedly stated that the Regency's 'future territorial possession (...) must be the subject of consideration in a conference of the powers interested in that question⁵⁵ The proposal, as we have seen in previous chapters, drew from the institutionalized practice of solving questions that were of European importance through diplomatic deliberations at a Great Power meeting, in line with precedents like the London ambassadorial conferences on 'Barbary piracy' and the slave trade. The July Monarchy's new set of ministers likewise told Stuart that it would be 'expedient to concert with the powers interested in the commerce of the Mediterranean'.⁵⁶ However, whether such assertions of the need to act in concert were genuine remained to be seen, as the promises remained somewhat vague. The acting French ambassador in Vienna, for instance, received instructions from Paris not to engage in direct talks with Metternich on the matter of Algiers. He had only to refer to 'general assurances' of acting in accordance with the powers of Europe and leave it at that.⁵⁷ The Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II too was invited to send a plenipotentiary to Paris.⁵⁸ The July Monarchy thus continued to follow the diplomatic policy lines set out by Polignac, and kept the conference proposal as a way of abating foreign critiques.

Regardless of the continuities, the promised conference never materialized. The new French regime also resembled its predecessor in temporizing the actual organization of a meeting, and soon found itself preoccupied with other matters. Stuart and his Austrian counterpart Antoine Apponyi nevertheless continued with the preparations that they had started before the revolution in July. The two had to toe a common line, matching the shared outlook of their governments that Algiers ought to remain under Ottoman suzerainty.⁵⁹ Still, the British aspirations for a conference on Algiers were much smaller than those of the Austrian chancellery. Whereas Stuart received instructions not to take an active part in the discussions for fears of giving way to French schemes of aggrandizement, Metternich saw the conference as a possibility to strengthen the Quadruple Alliance and reassert Austria's pivotal

⁵⁵ TNA, FO 27/412, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 16-08-1830, fp. 229-230.

⁵⁶ TNA, FO 27/413, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 23-08-1830, fp. 38-39.

⁵⁷ CADLC, 11CP/413, 'Sebastiani to Marshall Maison', Paris 18-12-1830, fp. 122-126.

⁵⁸ CADLC, 2MD/7, 'Polignac to Guilleminot', Paris 17-07-1830, fp. 139-152.

⁵⁹ TNA, FO 27/410, 'Stuart de Rothesay to Aberdeen', Paris 14-06-1830, fp. 187-189.

mediating role.⁶⁰ Other continental concerns, however, pushed the conference to the diplomatic background.

Revolutionary troubles and the looming threat of war on the continent were a source of ultimate distraction from the conference plans. Other uprisings followed the revolution in Paris, which rattled the post-Napoleonic status quo along with the security culture of the Congress System. A new wave of unrest seemed to sweep over Europe with revolutions in Poland, Switzerland, Italy and Belgium. The latter two were deemed particularly daunting, as the new French citizen king seemed to topple the entire Quadruple Alliance by choosing the side of the revolutionaries. Offering pledges of military support to Belgians and Italians, Louis Philippe's conduct seemed to pose grave geopolitical dangers in the eyes of his Great Power allies. In the end, he backed down on all fronts. Louis did not meet his promises to any of the revolutionary groups and returned safely to the fold of the old alliance – all for the sake of avoiding continental war and keeping hold of France's established status as one of the first-rank Great Powers.⁶¹ As a result, the conference on Algiers was delayed indefinitely. After all, the July Monarchy was already being integrated into the old Quadruple Alliance and the fate of the former Regency simply appeared less pressing than other possible threats to collective security.

After a rocky international start, the new French regime soon entered into 'a cordial understanding' with the government of Great Britain. Based on their shared liberal inclinations, the July Monarchy and the Whig Cabinet under Prime Minister Charles Grey (r. 1830-1834) adopted close diplomatic relations and together continued to express support for the old idea of a balance of power, both in Europe and in the Near East, where Russia came to be seen as a prime threat to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁶² The Congress System also remained functional as the Great Powers met in London for an ambassadorial conference that eventually recognized Belgium's secession from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as an independent monarchy.⁶³ All this revolutionary and diplomatic activity meant that attention was, like so many times before, drawn away from matters in North Africa. Algiers no longer seemed that pressing to Great Power governments with a possible

⁶⁰ TNA, FO 27/405, 'Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay', Foreign Office 02-07-1830, fp. 124-126; HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 274, 'Appony to Metternich', Paris 12-07-1830, fol. 19-20; M. Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (Pilsen 2013), p. 432.

⁶¹ R. Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the collapse of the entente cordiale* (London 1974), pp. 1-8; M. Šedivý, 'Honour as a political-legal argument. The French July Monarchy, national dignity and Europe 1830-1840', *Český časopis historický* 116:1 (2018), pp. 86-109, there pp. 88-90.

⁶² Bullen, *Palmerston*, *Guizot*, p. 4.

⁶³ N. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813-1831* (Groningen 1985), pp. 327-337.

war waiting to happen on the continent.⁶⁴ An instruction to the French ambassador in Constantinople, dated 26 October, summed it up succinctly: the international discussions on the matter were suspended, but the King's cabinet continued to wish that 'we establish ourselves solidly in Algiers'.65

Reneging on the victory over Dey Hussein would have been a dangerous policy for the July Monarchy anyway. Even Metternich and Aberdeen had to admit this fact.⁶⁶ The July Revolution may have fatally challenged the legitimacy of the Restoration monarchy, but the same did not go for its conquest across the sea. As Jennifer Sessions has shown, French opposition newspapers sought to reclaim the victory as a national rather than royal feat.⁶⁷ Those liberal-leaning publications viewed the promise of an international conference on Algiers in a similar vein, calling it a sign of weakness and a pretext for foreign meddling in national affairs.⁶⁸ Radical political segments that had emerged from the July Revolution called out against the 'conspiratorial bartering' and saw events in Belgium as the beginning of the end for the Vienna order.⁶⁹ In contrast, King Louis Philippe, who took an active role in foreign affairs, was well aware of the need to appease the other powers and essentially favoured a politics of peace.⁷⁰ The choice would continue to hurt his popularity. Faced with a steadily bellicose public opinion, the July Monarchy (and its European allies) saw the Algerian conquest as a place where at least some of that military glory could be attained. Again, like in 1830, peace in Europe would come at the cost of warfare in North Africa.

International debates over the French presence in Algiers flared up periodically, but never to such an extent that the conquest itself was threatened. British statesmen repeatedly asked for further clarifications of French plans over the course of the 1830s, whenever public opinion demanded it or diplomatic tensions over other issues arose.⁷¹ Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), who acted as Foreign Secretary under the first Whig government that Great Britain had seen in decades, was particularly salient in this regard. He

⁶⁴ TNA, FO 27/416, 'Stuart de Rothesay tp Aberdeen', Paris 19-11-1830, fp. 84-86.

⁶⁵ CADLC, 133CP/261, 'Molé to Guilleminot', Paris 26-10-1830, fp. 263-264.

⁶⁶ Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers, pp. 432-433.

⁶⁷ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 53-56.

⁶⁸ Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1, pp. 61-62.

⁶⁹ H. Collingham, The July Monarchy. A political history of France, 1830-1848 (London and New York 1988),

p. 186. ⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 186-187.

⁷¹ On the different outlooks that the British press maintained on Algiers, alternating between unmoved acceptance and lamentations of regret, cf. Julien, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine, vol. 1, pp. 59-60 and J. Swain, The struggle for the control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848. A study in Anglo-French relations (Dissertation University of Philadelphia 1933), pp. 69-70. Examples of the impact on British diplomacy of popular opinion and parliamentary proceedings are in CADLC, 8CP/640, 'Talleyrand to Broglie', London 14-03-1833, fp. 221-223; 8CP/650, 'Sebastiani to Molé', London 23-11-1837, fp. 59-63; 'Sebastiani to Molé', London 19-12-1837, fp. 88-89 and 'Sebastiani to Molé', London 22-12-1837, fp. 91-93.

raised the matter of Algiers' status repeatedly, with varying degrees of force. One of his Palmerston's prime concerns had to do with free trade in the conquered territories, which hardly seemed to live up to the old French promises that unbridled commerce along the coasts of North Africa would be the result of its security practices. In 1836, Palmerston instructed the ambassador in Paris to discuss tonnage duties on British ships in Algiers. If the former Regency had indeed officially become a French colony, then commerce there should be arranged as between Britain and France. Yet, the ambassador had to 'set aside the question as to the occupation of Algiers' and simply deal 'with things as they are'.⁷² Metternich adopted a similar stance. He remained convinced that the July Monarchy could not give up Algiers without provoking serious domestic unrest, which would not foster tranquillity within Europe either.⁷³ The government of Prussia stayed as cautiously supportive of the French conquest as it had been in the summer months of 1830.⁷⁴ Tsar Nicholas I, meanwhile, was less keen on maintaining the close relationships that had existed between Russia and the Bourbon monarchy under Charles X, but he did not retract Russian support for a French establishment in Algiers.⁷⁵ In essence, however, a conference on Algiers was not at the top of the list for any of these statesmen since it was of overarching importance to simply keep the inter-imperial order of peace and security in the Mediterranean intact.

Only in times of diplomatic tension did foreign actors exert greater pressure on the French government over its policies in Algiers. Palmerston would repeat his questions on the status of Algiers when, by 1838, Franco-British relations began to deteriorate over the enduring French support of Mehmet Ali against the Ottoman Sultan.⁷⁶ This time he used very different words. France, he argued, had not kept the promises it made in 1830. She had not acted in concert and disinterest, did not have 'more than the military occupation of a part of the Regency' and therefore had not 'acquired any right of sovereignty over Algiers'. Palmerston now stated that this sovereignty was still vested in the Ottoman Porte, as it had never ceded its rights over the Regency.⁷⁷ Metternich joined in by calling the French possession of Algiers 'perfectly irregular'. Yet, unlike Palmerston, he made that claim to urge the Ottoman Sultan to accept the French conquest and settle its borders rather than confront the July Monarchy

⁷² TNA, FO 27/516, 'Palmerston to Granville', Foreign Office 29-04-1836.

⁷³ TNA, FO 120/153, 'Lamb to Palmerston', Vienna 05-08-1836.

⁷⁴ Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. 1, pp. 41-42.

⁷⁵ Laran, 'La politique russe', pp. 127.

⁷⁶ Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot*, pp. 17-18.

⁷⁷ CADLC, 8CP/650, 'Palmerston to Granville', London 09-02-1838, fp. 169-175.

directly. The Austrian chancellor still felt that asking Louis Philippe to evacuate Algiers would be like asking him to evacuate the throne.⁷⁸

Palmerston and Metternich were right in asserting that France had never obtained formal rights over the Regency. The Ottoman Porte never recognized the French conquest and did not accede the its rights over Algiers. The first negotiations on this issue in Constantinople took place in August 1830, with piracy featuring as a prominent subject of discussion. Ambassador Guilleminot opened the talks on 14 August 1830 by transferring a memorandum to the Reis Effendi, Hamid Bey. The text questioned whether Algiers had lately been under the suzerainty of the Porte at all. After all, the Regency could enter treaties and declare war on its own account. According to the memorandum it therefore followed that the territory would befall the victor in the case of conquest. Algiers, moreover, had been allowed by the Porte to carry out its 'excesses' without reprimand. Surely, there had been the offer of mediation through Tahir Pasha, but that offer had ignored the difference in status of the two parties involved: 'a power of the first rank and a government of pirates'. The memorandum continued with the assertion that 'general opinion in Europe' wanted France to keep the conquest, as it was 'perhaps the sole effective means of bringing a clear and complete security against the return of the various plagues that have for a long time afflicted humanity'.⁷⁹

Still, in spite of these damning assertions, the memorandum did state that the Ottoman Porte could regain authority over Algiers. The text listed ten conditions relating to the transfer of sovereignty over the Regency. Some were about monetary concerns over indemnities for the war (article 3), the debts of Dey Hussein (article 8) and commercial privileges (article 9). Others laid down a complete disarmament of the Regency, which could no longer have a navy or ships of war (article 5), had to change its Pasha and garrisons every five to seven years (article 6) and could keep Algiers only as a simple commercial port 'as the security of the Mediterranean demands' (article 4). References to the fight against 'Barbary piracy' and Mediterranean security were thus also at play in French negotiations with the Ottoman authorities. The memorandum further set out that France would obtain a territorial foothold in an extended zone of concessions (article 2), have a say in the election of the Bey of Constantine (article 6) and keep troops in Algiers (article 10). The reestablishment of

 ⁷⁸ TNA, FO 120/180, 'Beauvale to Palmerston', Vienna 30-07-1839.
 ⁷⁹ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Memorandum remis au Reis-Effendi dans la Conférence du 14-08-[1830] à Orta Keuï'.

Ottoman authority over Algiers along these lines, the memorandum concluded, would offer a template for a similar change in Tunis and Tripoli.⁸⁰

With its limitations on military matters and enduring privileges for France, the offer would come at a considerable financial and political cost. Accordingly, the Ottoman Porte did not accept it. Its members noted that the French government had acted illegally in occupying the Regency and by taking the treasury. Documents in the Ottoman archives show that out of all the conditions, the Porte was only willing to consider issuing a ban on the practice of corsairing.⁸¹ The Ottoman officials also decided to hand the French memorandum to the British ambassador, in order to set him up against Guilleminot and see if London could offer support to the Sultan.⁸² By late November, the British Foreign Ministry indeed received ambassadorial reports on the impossibility of the French demands and the Ottoman protests over such 'unjust and arbitrary behaviour'.⁸³ This line of policy shows that the Porte had recognized the legitimizing importance of European complaints over corsairing and spotted the international tensions that existed behind the French talk of European interests. The Porte was not ignorant of the European concerns over the threat of 'Barbary piracy', as it had never really been in the decades following 1815, but it was also unwilling to accept the French infringements of the old internal legal arrangements. When news of the July Revolution reached Constantinople, the Ottoman authorities decided to further stall the discussions and wait to see whether the political overhaul would have diplomatic consequences.⁸⁴

That wait proved long and disappointing. The newly crowned King and his governing cabinets did not change the policy towards Algiers, leaving the Ottoman objections virtually unaddressed. Guilleminot, being one of the few Restoration ambassadors to remain in place, reported in May 1831 that nothing had changed in his discussions with the Ottoman authorities.⁸⁵ Things were to stay that way for the remainder of the decade. Successive Reis Effendis would raise the question of Algiers again, but the old concerns stayed unresolved. In 1832, the status of Algiers propped up as a point of discussion during negotiations on the territorial delineations of newly independent Greece, sparking animated debate with the French representative.⁸⁶ A similar exchange took place in 1835, again during negotiations

⁸⁰ Ibidem, Also in BOA, HAT 1193/46906 (12 S 1246) 2 August 1830.

⁸¹ BOA, İ.DUİT 139/18 (01 Ca 1246) 18 October 1830.

⁸² Ibidem; BOA, İ.DUİT 139/19 (20 B 1246) 4 January 1831.

⁸³ TNA, FO 78/191, 'Gordon to Aberdeen', Constantinople 29-11-1830, fp. 181-185.

⁸⁴ BOA, İ.DUİT 139/21 (20 B 1246) 4 January 1831.

⁸⁵ CADLC, 133CP/262, 'Note by Guilleminot', Constantinople 19-05-1831, fp. 179.
⁸⁶ CADLC, 133CP/263, 'Varenne to Sebastiani', Constantinople 14-05-1832, fp. 260-262. Just two months earlier there had been an incident relating to a Turkish newspaper claimed that Algiers would soon be returned,

over Greece, but this time ambassador Albin Roussin (1781-1854) bluntly stated that a return of Algiers to the Ottoman Sultan would be impossible.⁸⁷ However, from the vantage point of the Ottoman centre, the issue of sovereignty over the former Regency remained as unresolved by the end of the decade as it was in August 1830. Palmerston thus had a point when he criticized the French government in 1838 over Ottoman rights. Even then, there had still been no Ottoman recognition of French rule in the former Regency. By that point, however, the July Monarchy had long settled upon a policy of consolidation in North Africa, regardless of whether the Sultan and the Porte would officially accept it.

The new French government unequivocally announced its decision to remain in Algiers in 1834. Following the advice of two commissions of inquiry installed by the King, the July Monarchy was going to 'retain its possessions on the northern coast of Africa'. With a vote of seventeen to two, the 1834 commission (which counted Guilleminot and Rosamel amongst its members) concluded that a very limited form of territorial rule – an 'occupation restreinte', or bounded, restricted occupation – would be the most advisable form of organizing the North African possessions. This entailed keeping only the Regency's four significant ports (Algiers, Oran, Bougie and Bona) and restricting agricultural settlement to designated coastal zones.⁸⁸ As the commissioners made their vote, the American historian Jennifer Pitts notes, they did consider anti-colonial arguments. They weighed the violence of even limited colonization against public opinion, but only to conclude that 'to abandon our conquests would be to offend the nation in its legitimate pride'.⁸⁹

A great degree of continuity thus underlay the July Monarchy's decision to stay and hold on to the North African conquest. In general, the 1834 report's themes, phrasings and recommendations bear a lot of resemblance to the plans that Deval, Clermont-Tonnerre or Polignac drafted long before the invasion. The preference for limited settlement, the importance of public opinion and the legitimizing rhetoric of fighting piracy were mainstays of French policy both before and after the 1830 expedition. What was particular to the 1834 decision was its timing. At that point, the July Monarchy had tested the diplomatic waters and become sufficiently confident that the other Great Power governments were going to accept the French presence in North Africa as a new feature of the inter-imperial order of security

⁸⁸ Todd, A velvet empire, 'Ch. 2: Algeria: informal empire manqué'.

to which the ambassador Varenne objected, CADLC, 133CP/263, 'Varenne to Perrier', Constantinople 20-03-1832, fp. 126-128.

⁸⁷ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Memorandum adressée à la Porte sur la légitimité de la conquête d'Alger par la France', Thérapia 30-01-1835. Also, Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers*, pp. 433-434.

⁸⁹ J. Pitts, 'Republicanism, liberalism, and empire in postrevolutionary France' in: S. Muthu (ed.), *Empire and modern political thought* (Cambridge 2012), pp. 261-291, there pp. 277-278.

that was taking shape in the Mediterranean. Tacit British acceptance was, as the historian David Todd argues, one of the main reasons why the July Monarchy waited until 1834 to commence its commissions of inquiry.⁹⁰ The workings of the Congress System continued to shape French policies towards Algiers, as the July Monarchy strove to concert with European partners and employed the established discourses of continental security to legitimize its actions. Negotiations with the Ottoman Porte were, in contrast, directed towards a dead-end almost immediately. French officials did continue to seek after support from the European allies, even though the promised conference on Algiers was not going to take place.

The immediate aftermath of 1830 thus knew but one great disruption in terms of the invasion's overarching security aims. Of all the expedition's short-term goals, only the preservation of Charles X's reign failed spectacularly. The victory across the sea did not help to prop up his rule. In fact, its accompanying rhetoric of vanguishing piratical barbarians, destroying despotism and bringing liberty to Africa opened up even more critiques of ultraroyalist government. Still, the invasion did bring a lasting French presence to Algiers, even as Charles X fell, Polignac fled and Bourmont deserted his troops. The new French regime secured a colonial holding with help, as we have seen, of the same legitimizing narratives that preceded the invasion. The avowed aim of fighting piracy continued to shape diplomatic conduct and negotiations, pervading the stalemated talks with the Ottoman Porte and resulting in the repressive treaties enforced upon Tunis and Tripoli in the direct aftermath of the invasion. Accordingly, notions of security at sea remained at play in domestic and international discussions over the French presence in North Africa. As the French commission of inquiry made its case for 'occupation restreinte' in 1834, it noted that Algiers was to become a 'pacified city'.⁹¹ Just what that 'pacifying' meant on the ground and out at sea became clear in the mid-term aftermath of the invasion, during the first two decades of French rule over the former Regency.

⁹⁰ Todd, 'Retour sur l'expédition d'Alger', p. 220. Also, for a more elaborate discussion of the French attempts to assure British acceptance by the same author, *A velvet empire*, 'Ch. 2: Algeria: informal empire manqué'.

⁹¹ Procès-verbaux et rapports de la commission d'Afrique instituée par ordonnance du roi du 12 décembre 1833 (Paris 1834), p. 397.

Tranquillity as violence. Colonial security in Algeria and its environs

The former Regency of Algiers had become a military bastion by 1834, a place of arms rather than peace. Contemporaries, both French and foreign, noted that France's presence in the occupied territories consisted of little else than military rule.⁹² The July Monarchy's commissions of inquiry recognized this situation and used it to make their case for restricted occupation. Members of the committee were aware that extending the zone of French dominion could be dangerous, costly and ultimately counterproductive. Along Algeria's coasts France would be dominant, but beyond that thin littoral line the committee favoured a more fleeting, distant form of authority. There, alliances with local elites and accommodations of remaining Ottoman structures worked in place of metropolitan control, as the French tried to reconstitute a vassal Regency with themselves 'as the new Turks'.⁹³ Historians of French colonialism in Algeria, particularly David Todd and Julia Clancy-Smith, have characterized this type of rule as informal or indirect.⁹⁴ Over the course of the 1830s and 1840s, however, such informal dominance would be swept away by the progressive expansion of the French military presence. Security played a crucial role in this process, through a well-established pattern of threat perception, repressive action and the extension of military control.

In taking stock of the mid-term aftermath of the French invasion, it is therefore necessary to take on the question of expansion. What drove French colonial rule in the former Regency beyond the limits of restricted occupation, as in the case of Blida that opened this chapter? Who enacted such breaches of metropolitan plans? And what were the justifying arguments that these actors used? As will become clear, discourses and practices of security featured prominently in agendas of expansion. There were many different ideas amongst French actors in the military, colonial bureaucracy and metropolitan politics about what the colony should be, but security concerns overcame these differences. The term 'colonization' itself had diverse and sometimes conflicting meanings, ranging from popular settlement and tropical agriculture to the martial dream of large veteran land-holdings, yet threat perceptions surpassed such disagreements.⁹⁵

⁹² CADLC, 2MD/16, 'Etat d'Alger à la fin de 1832', fp. 57-64; NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 13, 'Brown to McLane', Algiers 06-07-1834.

⁹³ J. McDougall, A history of Algeria (Cambridge 2017), p. 54.

⁹⁴ D. Todd, 'Transnational projects of Empire in France, c.1815-c.1870', *Modern Intellectual History* 12:2 (2015), pp. 265-293, there p. 285 and Idem, *A velvet empire*, chap. 2; J. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and saint. Muslim notables, populist protest, colonial encounters (Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904)* (Berkeley, CA 1997), p. 82.
⁹⁵ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 177-179.

Many of the perceived threats that propelled French expansion even possessed a remarkable continuity. They were still shaped by old notions of 'Barbary piracy', which had become such a prominent concern of the post-1815 security culture. French expansion thus drew from threat perceptions that need to be seen as part of a broader European history that can be traced back to the Congress of Vienna, where activists put forth colonization as a means of ending piracy. After 1830, French military actors continued to reference these notions of threat, even if the seaborne menace of 'Barbary piracy' had become almost completely chimerical. Fighting these threats, conversely, brought a string of new insecurities – both to the inhabitants of French-held territories and to the neighbouring regions of North Africa.

Confusion in arms. The beginnings of expansion

Even the officials who held most executive power in France's newly conquered territories found them a confusing place. Their policies and actions, historians note, often lacked coherence.⁹⁶ Fittingly, the very name of the conquest was open to contestation and prone to alteration. Official designations of the conquered territories shifted from 'former Regency' and 'French possessions in North Africa' before settling on 'Algeria' from 1839 onwards.⁹⁷ It is important to note this initial confusion during the first ten years of the French presence, as it helps explain why restricted occupation withered, why the army played such an important part in that process, and why security concerns were such a crucial perpetuating force in the trajectory of territorial expansion.

Since the victory over Dey Hussein, authority in the conquered territories rested primarily with military commanders. The suggestions from the governmental committee of 1834 left this situation largely unchanged. From that year on, the July Monarchy did start appointing 'Governor Generals of the French Possessions in North Africa', who stood under the orders of the Minister of War, were housed in the former palace of the Dey in the Casbah of Algiers, and were assisted in their duties by a 'civil intendant' and a 'director of finances'. Though this gave French rule more of an administrative appearance than simply leaving things in the hands of a supreme commander, the governor generals were nevertheless all army men.

Initially, the supreme commanders and governor generals succeeded each other rapidly. None of the five leaders in Algeria served longer than two and half years. After 1834, the first

⁹⁶ Gallois, *A history of violence*, pp. 44-46; E. Saada, 'Compte-rendu de "Coloniser, exterminer" par Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison', *Critique internationale* 32 (2006), pp. 211-216.

⁹⁷ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 83.

three governor generals each served short terms, with the longest lasting just two years. Policies changed significantly during these successions. One commander (August 1830 - February 1831) and later governor general (1835-1837), Bertrand Clauzel favoured a colonial policy of tropical agriculture and European settlement. To support his policies, he often referred back to West Indian examples, mentioning his own experiences as an official in Le Cap on Saint-Domingue (now Cap-Haïtien) and as an exiled farm owner in La Mobile, in present-day Alabama, during the first two decades of nineteenth century.⁹⁸ His successor as chief commander, Pierre Berthezène (in office, February - December 1831), advocated a radically different line of action, arguing for the need to follow the original convention signed at the capitulation of Dey Hussein. Rather than confiscating land for model farms of tropical produce, he stressed the necessity of respecting local property, paying indemnities to the dispossessed and rendering justice to the former Regency's inhabitants.⁹⁹ Berthezène, however, was relieved of his functions within ten months, to be replaced by another hard-lined commander. The government in Paris could assert authority by appointing these men, but it largely steered policy reactively, leaving significant leeway to the army.

Military personnel also dominated the early colony in sheer numbers. The capture of Algiers in July 1830 had involved 37,000 soldiers. By April 1833 the French army in the conquered territories still counted about 29,000 troops.¹⁰⁰ Colloquially termed the 'Armée d'Afrique', the force in Algeria also diversified, enveloping indigenous regiments of Zouaves and of the newly created Foreign Legion.¹⁰¹ The unfailingly large numbers of troops nevertheless raised concerns in Paris as early as December 1830. During those heady days of European revolutions and looming continental conflict, an internal report by the Ministry of War noted that national security was hampered if a significant section of the French army was to remain stationed on other side of the Mediterranean.¹⁰² The governmental commission of inquiry likewise deplored that the presence in North Africa amounted to little more than a very costly military post.¹⁰³ Troop numbers nevertheless continued to rise. In 1837 there were

⁹⁸ D. Todd, 'A French imperial meridian, 1814-1870', *Past & Present* 210 (2011) pp. 155-186, there pp. 171-172.

⁹⁹ Brower, *A desert*, p. 17.

¹⁰⁰ Gallois, *A history of violence*, p. 52.

¹⁰¹ J. Peyroulou, O. Siari Tengour and S. Thénault, '1830-1880. La conquête coloniale et la résistance des Algériens' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*, pp. 19-44, there p. 31; F. Quinn, *The French overseas empire* (Westport and London 2000), p. 108.

¹⁰² SHD, GR1/H/5, dossier 7, sub-dossier 5, 'Précis sommaire de le Ministère de la Guerre, Août – Novembre 1830', 03-12-1830.

¹⁰³ Procès-verbaux et rapports de la commission d'Afrique, pp. 19-20 and 26.

as many as 42,000 men stationed in Algeria, even though the government had tried to set an official limit at 30.000 troops.¹⁰⁴

The military contingent in the French possessions thus became ever more dominant, and it managed to obtain that position by invoking security. Governor generals succeed in acquiring increasing numbers of soldiers, despite hesitations and misgivings from Paris, because they kept stating that Algeria was under threat. Though their policies differed, successive governors maintained that more troops were an absolute necessity to keep hold of the French possessions. Amongst them, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud (in office, 1841-1847) was particularly dramatic in consistently arguing that the situation in Algeria was 'menacing', owing to local resistance, arms smuggling and foreign conspiracies.¹⁰⁵ It also helped that Bugeaud and his predecessors found a listening ear with one metropolitan cabinet member: Marshal Jean-de-Dieu Soult, the Duke of Dalmatia (1769-1851), who acted as the Minister of War. This distinguished veteran of Napoleon's Iberian campaigns headed the Ministry of War for most of the 1830-1845 period and eagerly facilitated the demands for more troops, often in direct defiance of his concerned colleagues in Paris.¹⁰⁶

At the close of Soult's ministerial career, there were over a hundred thousand soldiers serving in Algeria.¹⁰⁷ Military conduct in the colony changed accordingly, as more and more troops enabled further territorial expansion and the instigation of more direct control. The phase of restricted occupation, as set out by the July Monarchy's governmental committees, thus began to give way to what historians have termed succeeding periods of 'total conquest' and 'pacification'. By 1847, French military authority spanned nearly all of northern Algeria, covering the entirety of the Tell Atlas up to the fringes of the Sahara.¹⁰⁸ Expansive conquest thus took the place of restricted occupation over the course of two decades, but the transition should not be overstated in terms of military conduct. Large-scale violence was a constant factor of the French presence, even during the times of restricted occupation.

In terms of security, such colonial rule through military means significantly worsened the plight of the local populations. The activities of the French army brought an array of insecurities to Algeria's inhabitants, threatening their existence and endangering their livelihoods. The massacre at Blida in November 1832 is a case in point and it was hardly a

¹⁰⁴ V. Joly, 'Les généraux d'Afrique et la répression des troubles révolutionnaires de 1848' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale, pp. 127-130, there p. 128; Gallois, A history of violence, p. 53. ¹⁰⁵ Gallois, *A history of violence*, pp. 53-55.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰⁷ Joly, 'Les généraux d'Afrique', p. 129.

¹⁰⁸ Gallois, A history of violence, p. 23; Brower, A desert, p. 9.

standalone affair. That same year, a group of cavalry attacked a pastoralist community camping near Algiers, killing a hundred of its members, including women and children, as they had reportedly harassed some travellers coming to the city.¹⁰⁹ Estimates, though they are tentative, hold that as many as 750,000 or 850,000 Algerians died in combat or as a direct result of colonial policies between 1830 and 1875.¹¹⁰ Such menacing violence and its accompanying death tolls were not unique to the French colonial presence in Algeria. The expansion of Spanish and British settler colonies in Argentina, Australia and Tasmania brought escalating skirmishes with original populations, who were systematically wiped out at roughly the same time as the 'total conquest' of Algeria. In the United States, the years after 1840 saw wars and massive expropriations directed against the American Indians. As Christopher Bayly has argued, imperial expansion, Western demographic growth and the increasing land hunger of white settlers tipped the balance against coexistence with indigenous peoples in different places around the world. In these processes of expansion, imperial powers tended to operate in close concertation or in direct emulation of each other, representing another way in which the post-1815 security culture informed and enabled violent colonial projects.¹¹¹

Colonial violence was not solely of the military kind, as expropriations could also ensue through administrative actions. The French historian Isabelle Grangaud therefore asserts that bureaucratic activity in Algeria was part of the brutally violent treatment of the local population. Her work has shown how a great number of expropriations followed after the French army settled in Algiers, putting a significant part of the city under the full or partial domain of the French government.¹¹² Property and realty was taken from indigenous owners as the army housed soldiers, lodged officers, set up hospitals and installed supporting services. These confiscations brought on constant streams of refugees. People departed from the city in masses to flee a situation in which the security of their possessions was constantly uncertain. Still, the first civil intendants of the colonial authority stressed that such practices in Algiers created a legal precedent for the rest of the conquest – and would thus be repeated wherever the French armies appeared.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Brower, *A desert*, p. 17; NARA II, 59, M23, vol. 13, 'Brown to Livingston', Algiers 07-04-1832.

¹¹⁰ K. Kateb, 'Le bilan démographique de la conquête de l'Algérie (1830-1880)' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*, pp. 82-88, there p. 85.

¹¹¹ C. Bayly, The birth of the modern world, 1780-1914 (Malden, MA and Oxford 2004), pp. 439-440.

¹¹² As many as two thirds of the Algerian population of Algiers left the city between 1830 and 1834, reducing its number to about 12,000. Brower, *A desert*, p. 15.

¹¹³ I. Grangaud, 'Dépossession et disqualification des droits de propriété à Alger dans les années 1830' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*, pp. 70-75, there p. 72.

The possessions in North Africa were thus hardly a place where civilization reigned and commerce could flourish, which stood in marked contrast to the lofty ideals that had accompanied the invasion of 1830. As a result, the French government received critiques from various quarters. Probably the most notable piece of criticism was *Le Miroir*, written by Hamdan Khodja (1773-1842) and published in Paris in 1833. Khodja, a onetime notable in the old Regency, scathed the French army for its barbarity and cruel conduct, deploring that all the inhabitant's initial hopes of liberty had been crushed.¹¹⁴ His work deliberately appeared right when the governmental commissions of inquiry were at work, but it had little impact on their final recommendations.¹¹⁵ Still, foreign actors joined in on critiques of the French presence from very early on. The British consul Robert St. John, for instance, deplored the diminishing trade and rising tariffs in the former Regency. He offered a scathing condemnation of the lack of security as he perceived it: 'every port along the coast is a nest of pirates, as I foresaw (...) so that all the benefit to which Europe was promised, is a total insecurity from the natives along the coast, and a heavy drag on our commerce'.¹¹⁶

In short, efforts at expansion beyond the coastal holdings departed from a situation that was scarcely tranquil to begin with. The French possessions in the former Regency lacked a clear line of policy beyond the avowed aim of a restricted occupation, which allowed the military to obtain a position of great dominance. Insecurities abounded for the local population as confiscations and violence steadily became the norm in French-held territories. Their plight only intensified as the army moved out of the limited zone of occupation. The inspiration and justifying claims behind this movement are to be found in the military's conceptions of security and threat. In turn, the reactions of the other European governments with interests in North Africa to this French military expansion continued to be shaped by the frameworks of the security culture.

Old threats in new directions. The drivers of expansion

Historical explanations for the expansion of French territorial rule into Algeria differ greatly, but they generally contain an element of failure. Some authors stress the disappointments of

¹¹⁴ [Hamdan Khodja], *Aperçu*, p. 197.

¹¹⁵ J. Pitts, 'Liberalism and empire in a nineteenth-century Algerian mirror', *Modern Intellectual History* 6:2 (2009), pp. 287–313.

¹¹⁶ TNA, FO 27/416, 'St. John to Stuart' Algiers 13-10-1830, fp. 257-264.

early attempts at agriculture settlement, inspiring a search for further farmland.¹¹⁷ Others argue that the French army grappled with local resistance, as they were unable to bring peace to the possessions.¹¹⁸ One historian notes that the military in part commenced upon campaigns of expansion because metropolitan allowances failed to cover expenses, sparking a search for resources to become self-sufficient.¹¹⁹ The failure of indirect, informal rule also features as an explanation, as does the French wish to retaliate from diplomatic setbacks in the Oriental and Rhine Crises of 1840.¹²⁰ All of these explanations hold their merit, but what ultimately helped turn such failures into arguments for expansive military policies were security concerns and threat perceptions. Fears had an important function in changing French colonial rule in the former Regency, and many of those fears harkened back to the era before 1830.

This is not to say that piracy was the first thing on French military minds, or that sea robbery continued to be a pressing concern. The complaints of the British consul that the 'coast was a nest of pirates' should primarily be read as an overstatement, fitting his complaints over dwindling British commerce.¹²¹ What the consul St. John referred to was a series of takings near the eastern port of Bougie, which the French did not conquer until 1833. Most of the lost ships had wrecked on the coast, where locals killed the crews or stole the cargo.¹²² This type of raiding occurred again in 1835, but by then the French authorities could quickly punish the culpable.¹²³

Sources in the archives of the military authorities, colonial intendants and maritime prefects suggest that piracy nearly completely disappeared in Algeria. This is hardly surprising, as most of the former raiding had been carried out by corsairs. The main incentives and organizing frameworks of these privateers had been provided by the Regency, which was defeated and dismantled by the French. Isolated incidents and nebulous suspicions were therefore all that remained of the piracy threat. Investigations into these incidents generally turned to naught. One such case involved a group of Greek migrants, who were detained and threatened with expulsion over suspicions of piracy in 1844. Proof, as the police chief of

¹¹⁷ Sessions, *By sword*, pp. 178 and 180-181.

¹¹⁸ Clancy-Smith, Rebel and saint, pp. 71 and 82; Brower, A desert, pp. 18-19 and 20-21.

¹¹⁹ Gallois, A history of violence, pp. 73-80.

¹²⁰ Todd, *A velvet empire*, chap. 2.

¹²¹ TNA, FO 27/417, 'St. John to Stuart de Rothesay', Algiers 20-12-1830.

¹²² L. Féraud, *Histoire de Bougie* (Paris 2001), pp. 140-145; TNA, FO 112/3, 'St. John to Murray', Algiers 11-10-1830, fp. 385-386.

¹²³ ANOM, GGA1E85/1, 'Lesquier to President of the Conseil', Algiers 10-02-1835; GGA1E85/2, 'Minister of War to Lesquier', Paris 06-03-1835.

Algiers noted, was lacking: there were no weapons found on the men and they did not even appear to have possessed a boat.¹²⁴

Another pirate incident related to a chase in the waters off Dellys, which was the last port city to fall into French hands in 1844. On a morning in May 1840, an Algerian merchant captain Reis Mohammed ben Mohammed declared that he had been trailed by what he considered a pirate. When a French admiral subsequently visited the region, he thought he could spot the ship in question but was unable to follow it into the enemy port.¹²⁵

Similar sightings of potential pirates also occurred across the Mediterranean. A slight panic gripped Spanish coastal populations and captains earlier in 1840, when a supposed 'Barbary corsair' was spotted near the Cabo de Gata. Merchant vessels and fishing boats had even sought refuge in the ports of Palma and under the cannons of the nearby Castle of San Pedro. The joint search of the French and Spanish navies, however, brought no results. One French commander put the scare down to old fears and memories of the coastal inhabitants, dating back to the days before the conquest of Algiers.¹²⁶ The activity of the North African corsairs had already greatly diminished over the course of the century, but the perception of threat endured even after 1830. The empirical menace thus disappeared from the seaboard. Yet the discursive threat remained.

This endurance of old fears also centred on the former Dey of Algiers, who had left the Regency into exile. From the moment of his departure from Algiers, Hussein became the chief protagonist in a string of suspicious plots fabricated by French ministers and military commanders. Supposedly, the Dey was planning to return to Algiers in order to arouse the 'fanaticism' of the local population against the French.¹²⁷ From his new home of Livorno, he allegedly amassed finances with help of the houses Bacri and Busnach, and supposedly formed a 'parti Algérien', which was engaged in long and secret conferences on 'counterrevolutions' in Africa.¹²⁸ The French consul in Livorno was tasked to report regularly on these plots and diligently did so, despite of his initial hesitations that such conspiracies were rather far-fetched.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ ANOM, F80/1554, 'Directeur d'Interieur to Maréchal', Algiers 13-06-1844.

¹²⁵ ANOM, F80/1554, 'Lt.-Col. Apilidoro to Valée', Gigelli [??]-05-1840 and 'Lt.-Col. Apilidoro to Bourgainville', Gigelli 22-05-1840; SHD, GR1/H/69, dossier 1, 'Valée to Despans-Cubières', Algiers 30-05-1840.

¹²⁶ CCM, MR.4.4.4.3.5.3, 'Consul to CCM', Barcelona 30-01-1840; 'Liet-Gen. to CCM', Marseille 03-02-1840; 'Consul to CCM', Barcelona 10-02-1840; 'Commander brig Agogne to Prefect Toulon', Carthagenas 13-02-1840

 ¹²⁷ ANOM, GGA1E3/12, 'Extract from Lt.-Gen. Lasson de Blaniac to Soult', Bastia 31-07-1832.
 ¹²⁸ ANOM, GGA1E3/2, '[?] to Soult', Paris 06-09-1832; 'Formont to Sebastiani', Livorno 01-10-1832.

¹²⁹ ANOM, GGA1E3/2, '[?] to Soult', Paris 14-08-1832; 'Formont to Sebastiani', Livorno 20-06-1831.

Anxieties amongst French dignitaries reached new heights in 1833, when Hussein took up the plan to move to Alexandria and spend the last years of his life there. Suspicious officials saw the relocation very differently, considering it an attempt to re-establish the former Dey in close proximity of the French occupied territories. Naval stations along the coast of Algeria suddenly had to maintain a particularly active surveillance, which shows how seriously the French took this looming threat from the past.¹³⁰ Hussein eventually responded to the allegations in February 1833, stating that he had indeed received pleas for help from Algerians but that all purported conspiracies were unfounded.¹³¹ Up to then, Hussein had persisted in claiming a pension from the French government, as agreed to in 1830, but his demand was repeatedly rejected. Governmental actors denied Hussein's claims by pointing to his alleged plotting, which they saw as a breach of the capitulation signed upon his defeat.¹³² Dey Hussein nonetheless moved to Alexandria shortly thereafter and would never return to Algeria. He passed away in Egypt in 1838.

Though perhaps seeming trivial or irrelevant in the greater scheme of colonial rule, the French fears about the Dey point to the essence of continuities in threat perceptions. The French treatment of Dey Hussein illustrates that lingering threat perceptions, however chimerical, could serve acute political purposes. As it turned out, the suspicions about Hussein's subversions conveniently dovetailed with the French disregard for the capitulation agreements of 1830. The few cases of piracy in Algeria display a similar functionality. It was no coincidence that a suspected pirate was spotted near a port that was not yet under French control, prompting an immediate naval reconnaissance of the area. Dellys, the port in question, was captured by French forces soon after. The threats discerned in relation to piracy and the Dey both indicate how old fears were put to new ends in the colonial setting of Algeria.

However far-fetched such recurrent fears may have been, they were nonetheless omnipresent. In his work on the early colony, William Gallois stresses that notions of 'Barbary piracy' were very much alive in the minds of French soldiers. He posits that established ideas of 'Barbary' brutality, as ventilated in countless plays, poems and captivity narratives, help explain just why French forces were so violent. Soldiers, Gallois proposes, arrived in Algeria filled with fears and impressed with the idea that North Africa was still the

¹³⁰ ANOM, GGA1E3/6, 'Rigny to Soult', Paris 19-08-1832; 'Rosamel to Rigny', Toulon 11-09-1832;

GGA1E3/5, 'Soult to Rigny', Paris 20-11-1832. Further illustrating the seriousness of these considerations, GGA1E3/2, 'Sebastiani to Soult', Paris 23-09-1832.

¹³¹ ANOM, GGA1E3/2, 'Translation of Hussein Dey to Broglie', Livorno [??]-02-1833.

¹³² ANOM, GGA1E3/1, 'Dey Hussein to Louis Philippe', Livorno 06-05-1833; GGA1E3/14, 'Report to Soult on Hussein's reclamations', 21-05-1833.

'Barbary coast': a unique place, unrivalled in its savagery.¹³³ Anxieties over merciless enemies, evasive conspiracies and unintelligible natives may certainly have been a factor in the execution of violence, as is put forth in other works on 'colonial terror' and the 'spectres' of colonialism.¹³⁴ Yet, alongside these metaphysics and such psychology of terror, perceptions of threat were also instrumental to colonial rule. Notions of piratical brutality, fanaticism, savagery and unlawfulness thus continued to be entertained because they could fulfil the same functions of justification, mobilization and the delegitimation of adversaries that they had fulfilled before 1830.

Perhaps the most prominent example of such functional threat perceptions that were used to single out enemies and legitimize violence was that of the 'brigand' menace. A look at the uses of the term 'brigandage' discloses how an old threat perception featured prominently in military campaigns of expansion in Algeria. French soldiers and commanders consistently designated whomever they were fighting as 'brigands'. This was exactly what Europeans had called the North African corsairs for most of the post-1815 period. Its lineage can even be traced further back in time, to the days of the Ancien Régime or those of the French Revolution, when army commanders brandished counter-revolutionary resistance in the Vendée as the work of criminals, outlaws and bandits. By calling their opponents 'brigands', officials denied them any sign of martial dignity or belligerent legitimacy. As several historians have argued, the use of the 'brigandage' frame became a commonplace of French imperial rhetoric (though it also featured in Ottoman, British and other powers' parlance), where it helped demonize enemy populations and made it impossible to see enemy noncombatants as innocent bystanders.¹³⁵ In Algeria, the 'brigand' label applied to anyone engaged in unwanted violence, whether it took the form of resistance by local remnants of the Ottoman state or consisted of isolated attacks by nomadic groups.¹³⁶ Such framing still was intended to reject the legality of the opponent's agenda and actions, distinguishing sanctioned from unsanctioned warfare.

¹³³ Gallois, *A history of violence*, pp. 11, 18 and 23.

¹³⁴ M. Taussig, 'Culture of terror – space of death. Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the explanation of torture', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:3 (1984), pp. 467-497, there pp. 492-494; J. Hevia, *The imperial security state. British colonial knowledge and empire-building in Asia* (Cambridge 2012); A. Stoler, *Along the archival grain. Epistemic anxieties and colonial common sense* (Princeton and Oxford 2009), pp. 20 and 24-25.

¹³⁵ A. Forrest, 'The ubiquitous brigand. The politics and language of repression' in: C. Esdaile (ed.), *Popular resistance in the French wars. Patriots, partisans and land pirates* (Basingstoke and New York 2005), pp. 25-43; D. Bell, *The first total war. Napoleon's Europe and the birth of modern warfare* (Bloomsbury 2007), p. 8. ¹³⁶ Gallois, *A history of violence*, p. 40; Brower, *A desert*, p. 17.

Because 'brigands' were not belligerents they could not rightfully hold arms. A hefty share of the correspondence between the governor generals and the ministries in Paris concerned the import, sale and possession of weapons in Algeria. To that end, the naval stations of Algiers, Bona and Oran were tasked to carry out an active surveillance. Their chief missions became stopping contraband from places with loose regulations on the trade in arms, particularly Malta.¹³⁷ On land, Algeria's civil intendants set up systems of surveillance over suspected arms smugglers, while soldiers carried out arrests and executions without trial of Algerians found in the possession of firearms.¹³⁸

Besides supporting efforts of disarmament, the delegitimizing frame of 'brigandage' had to justify the further extension of imperial authority. Police files in the French colonial archives abound with descriptions of sabotage, arson, theft and murder carried out against European settlers or on their lands.¹³⁹ As these acts were attributed to local 'brigands' regardless of their proponents, such cases helped support the demands for ever greater numbers of troops that the governor generals put forth so successfully. In this sense, the further extension of colonial authority thus depended on highly similar notions of threat as the very invasion of Algiers itself. Both before and after 1830, the alleged repression of a criminal, illegitimate adversary had to legitimize military action. This was not a unique feature of French colonialism in North Africa. Highly similar discourses of security and brigandage were used, amongst many others, by Ottoman authorities in the mountainous regions of the Empire or by Dutch colonial officials in the Indonesian archipelago.¹⁴⁰

Still, the 'brigand' threat perception fulfilled a crucial function in the expansion of colonial rule in Algeria. This became particularly apparent in the French engagement with the most sizeable armed opposition in the early years of the colony. The French struggle with the Emir Abd al-Qadir (1808-1883), the most famous leader of any local resistance movement in Algeria, displayed all uses of the 'brigandage' rhetoric and can therefore serve to explain how old threat perceptions inspired campaigns of expansion and ruthless warfare. As such, the efforts against Abd al-Qadir brought French forces to act in more brutal, bloody, even

¹³⁷ ANOM, F80/597, 'La Bretonnière to Drouert', Algiers 16-08-1835; F80/598, Subfolder, 'Police générale, Haute police, Mésures pour empêcher l'affluence de la population maltais à Bône', 'Schneider to Valée', Paris 22-01-1840.

¹³⁸ ANOM, F80/597, 'Clauzel to Lt.-Col. Marey, Agha', 12-09-1836; F80/598, Subfolder, 'Police, Visites ches les Armuriers', '[?] to Procurer-General', Algiers 10-09-1840. Also, TNA, FO 3/33, 'St. John to Hay', Algiers 20-10-1831, fp. 235-236.

¹³⁹ The policing files in ANOM, F80/595 and 597, 'Algeria, Ministry of War and Interior, Police, Sûreté Générale, Affaires diverses', 1833-1852, cart. 1-2, especially the subfolder 'Police générale. Objets divers' which contains most of the documents prior to 1850.

¹⁴⁰ Bayly, *The birth of the modern*, p. 436; J. à Campo, 'Discourse without discussion. Representations of piracy in colonial Indonesia, 1816-25', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 34:2 (2003), pp. 199-214.

piratical ways themselves. This conflict had a few short precursors between 1832 and 1837, but largely took place from 1839 to 1847. It marked the definitive end of the restrained occupation; however violent the earlier phases had already been.¹⁴¹

At first, Abd al-Qadir was far from a criminal – or an enemy – in the eyes of the French military command. He had emerged as a factor of importance in western Algeria during the period of chaos that followed the invasion. Backed by Sufi notables as well as tribesmen due to the established lineage of his family, the 24-year-old Abd al-Qadir soon became of interest to the French. They initially considered him a potential collaborator, as he managed to keep some control over warring groups in Oran and imposed a form of statehood in most of the province. Inspired by his visits to Mehmed Ali's Egypt as a youngster on pilgrimage, the Emir raised taxes, issued currency and created a functioning diplomatic network of agents.¹⁴² Within a context of 'occupation restreinte', the French considered Abd al-Qadir an indigenous intermediary who could reign in the hinterlands as long as he acknowledged French suzerainty. In 1837, Abd al-Qadir and the French authorities concluded the Treaty of Tafna, which granted the Emir territorial control over the province of Oran and nearly all of Tittery (central Algeria) under exactly these conditions.

These arrangements of indirect rule crumbled in 1839, as the French extended their presence in eastern Algeria – where the search for local partners was less successful – and started to creep in on the territories held by the Emir. Abd al-Qadir declared war on the French in November of that year, his forces razing colonial settlements across the Mitidja plains.¹⁴³ From that moment Abd al-Qadir too became a figure of threat. In French army reports he started to feature as a religious fanatic heading a fundamentalist campaign against the Christian presence in Algeria, even though Abd al-Qadir's cause was hardly shared by all his coreligionists. The raids on colonist settlements and farms further cemented the new status of his conduct as illegitimate acts of brigandage. This struggle, French military commanders asserted, was not a war against an accepted belligerent.¹⁴⁴

Irregular tactics hence abounded in the war against Abd al-Qadir as the army tried to cut the Emir's support among the inland tribes and 'pacify' them in the process. Anything could go in fighting this type of adversary according to Thomas Bugeaud, the governor general and supreme commander of the French military in Africa. All groups that did not comply with French wishes were subjected to 'severe punishment'. Such retaliation involved the mass

¹⁴¹ Gallois, A history of violence, p. 60; Todd, A velvet empire, chap. 2.

¹⁴² Clancy-Smith, Rebel and saint, pp. 71-72; McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 62.

¹⁴³ Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and saint*, pp. 71-72.

¹⁴⁴ Gallois, A history of violence, p. 36.

killing of the populace, the looting of grain, the cutting of orchards, the capture of livestock and the destruction of property.¹⁴⁵ Ravishing the social fabric and taking away all bases for resistance were the stated goals of this policy of 'pacification', which had to assert French territorial control over the hinterlands of Algeria. Violence against civilians hence steadily developed into standing practice, overseen by Bugeaud in Algeria and Minister Soult in Paris.

Under Bugeaud's auspices, the punitive actions against tribes and indigenous settlements began to be referred to as 'razzias'. Derived from the Arabic *ghazw*, the term was a striking allusion to the old days of 'Barbary piracy'.¹⁴⁶ The word 'razzia' had been used to describe corsair raids on coastal villages and island communities. One of the least distant examples was the 'razzia' on the Italian island of San'Antioco in October 1815, where Tunisian corsairs carried off 160 Sardinian subjects into captivity.¹⁴⁷ In the history of colonial Algeria, the French conduct of the 'razzia' came to be associated with extraordinary acts, especially the infamous killing of at least 700 people by asphyxiation during the 'smoking' in the caves of Dahra in 1845.¹⁴⁸ William Gallois, however, has shown that these raids were in fact much more common. They were not solely about extermination, but also deliberately involved the taking of captives – giving the French 'razzias' even more of an 'Barbary pirate' sheen. In the month of March 1842 alone, French military documents listed the imprisonment of an unspecified number of women and children as well as '100 fighting men', together with the confiscation of over two thousand heads of cattle.¹⁴⁹ Following in the distant, but direct, wake of an invasion that had to end piracy, the French military had started to turn piratical itself.

The war against Abd al-Qadir thus once again disclosed all the inconsistencies of the French presence in Algeria. Having come to bring civilization, the French army carried out brutal campaigns of attrition and extermination. Colonial dominion brought violence where it promised security. If this was tranquillity, it was the tranquillity of a ravished village or a smouldering orchard. In abolishing piracy along the coasts of Africa, the French had taken over the practice of raiding, perpetuating razzias by directing them inland. Military prisoners were even put to work on the mole in Algiers' harbour, just as corsair captives had done before the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of 1816 sought to end this 'Christian slavery'.¹⁵⁰ The former Regency of Algiers thus remained a special place in the minds of French colonial

¹⁴⁵ Brower, A desert, pp. 21-22; Gallois, A history of violence, p. 67.

¹⁴⁶ Gallois, A history of violence, pp. 4-5; D. Cook, 'Ghazw' in: K. Fleet et al (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam (3rd

ed., 2013). Consulted online on 20-05-2019.

¹⁴⁷ Panzac, *Barbary corsairs*, pp. 272-273.

¹⁴⁸ B. Brower, 'Les violences de la conquête' in: Bouchène et al (eds.), *Histoire de l'Algérie à la période coloniale*, pp. 58-63, there pp. 59-60.

¹⁴⁹ Gallois, *A history of violence*, p. 106.

¹⁵⁰ ANOM, GGA1E88/1, 'Bresson to Clauzel', Algiers 03-09-1836.

actors and their metropolitan superiors. Here, in these piratical environs, military acts knew no bounds or restraints.

Beyond Algeria, however, the situation was entirely different. There, French commanders had to acknowledge the presence of other powers and the security interests that other actors upheld. This had become apparent during the conflict with Abd al-Qadir, which at various points threatened to spill over into neighbouring Tunis. It became even more apparent as the Emir's efforts started to falter, forcing him to retreat further and further from the Algerian littoral towards Moroccan territory. Abd al-Qadir eventually saw himself forced to surrender in 1847, his tribal support base having dwindled almost completely.¹⁵¹ By that time, French forces had moved in on the borders of Tunis and Morocco, using the increasingly common justifications of fighting brigandage and providing security to extend colonial rule. None of this conduct, which only brought insecurity to Algeria's original population and worsened its economic plight, was unique to French colonialism. The expansionist potential of security claims was well known amongst all imperial powers in the region, who were acutely aware of the perpetuating nature of colonial security practices. As the French military appeared to move beyond the former Regency of Algiers, these other imperial actors therefore came to treat French expansionism as a threat in its own right.

Regional ripples. Tunis, Tripoli and the threat of expansion

It was no secret that the suppression of brigandage or piracy could go hand in hand with further extensions of imperial power. Rather than marking the failure of domination, colonial rule tended to utilize and thrive upon insecurity. Anxieties over brigandage, simmering rebellions and elusive conspiracies were, as events in Algiers showed, effectively used to justify new security measures and extensions of territorial authority.¹⁵² Contemporaries recognised this productive relationship between alleged insecurities and colonial rule. British officials were especially worried about unbridled increases of French dominion in North Africa and tried to stop them. To other imperial actors, French expansion in North Africa was a threat in its own right, and the frameworks of the security culture were their chosen means of keeping it in check. By the 1840s, senior British statesmen – like the rest of their European

 ¹⁵¹ Sessions, *By sword*, p. 122.
 ¹⁵² B. Stuchtey and A. Wiegeshoff, '(In-)securities across European empires and beyond', *Journal of Modern* European History 16:3 (2018), pp. 321-334, there p. 323.

allies – had begun to accept French colonial rule in Algeria as a 'fait accompli', but they did not want to see it encroach upon neighbouring states like Morocco or Tunis.¹⁵³

What means could opponents of further territorial changes employ to stop French expansion and retain what remained of the regional status quo? These actors – which not only included British, but also Austrian, Spanish and, increasingly, Ottoman officials – turned to multilateral discussion, mediation, military de-escalation and concerted action. In short, they continued the tested means of doing things together in order to temper unilateral extremities, and utilized exact same diplomatic methods that had been tested on the European continent in the wake of 1815. They applied the modes and aims of the security culture to the altered situation in North Africa. In that region, conflict between the imperial powers (with its potential for spill-over into Europe) now had to be avoided through means of concertation and cooperation. There were, however, serious challenges to these attempts, ranging from wars and rebellions to resurgent cases of piracy. The international engagement with these issues shows how colonial politics impacted security far beyond the confines of French-held Algeria, pointing out the broader regional consequences of the invasion's mid-term aftermath.

Strife riddled the wake of 1830 in North Africa. Though it did not necessarily cause them, the French attack on Algiers preceded, and certainly contributed to, a range of other conflicts in the region and the wider Ottoman Empire. There were rebellions in Tripoli and looming international interventions in Tunis, as well as the possible entry of the French army into Morocco. At a greater distance from Algeria, the aftermath of the invasion further pitted Mehmed Ali against his Ottoman suzerain as the Egyptian viceroy continued his expansive projects into Syria.¹⁵⁴ Each of these came with significant international involvement, which, contemporaries felt, opened up a range of complications. The further expansion of French territorial holdings was a continuous source of worry amongst Great Power statesmen, but it was not their sole concern as the events of the 1830s and 1840s also touched upon other possibly disruptive issues. Consular disobedience, small-power imperialism and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire were each treated as matters of security, warranting intervention and concerted involvement. Such matters had the potential to rock the Great Power alliance, unsettle the enduring peace between the states of Europe and provoke all-out war. The latter option seemed imminent at times, but massive conflict was generally averted during these two decades, as the Great Power governments safely navigated through a series of crises around the Mediterranean. To highlight this endurance of inter-imperial efforts to manage matters of

¹⁵³ CADLC, 8CP/658, 'St. Aulaire to Guizot', London 04-10-1841, fp. 228-231.

¹⁵⁴ V. Aksan, Ottoman wars, 1700-1870. An empire besieged (Harlow 2007), pp. 363-364.

collective security, we will now turn to the illustrative cases of Tripoli and Tunis, where rebellions and interventions were kept from becoming sources of conflict between different powers.

First amongst the series of international crises in the Mediterranean was a rebellion in Tripoli against the regime of Yusuf Karamanli, which broke out in 1831. It quickly progressed to the point of a developing power vacuum. Karamanli's reign had been faltering since the late 1810s, when European piracy repression commenced, but the French actions of 1830 fatally unsettled his ruling dynasty. The dictated treaty that banned corsairing, ended tributes, re-abolished Christian slavery and granted France commercial privileges further intensified the financial and political problems of the Regency. Faced with mounting calls to pay his foreign debts, Karamanli turned to the emergency measure of taxing the *kuloglu* class (of mixed Janissary-local descent), which had traditionally been exempt from taxation. The levy of the tax provoked a series of revolts in the coastal regions that coincided with the ongoing uprisings of the inland tribes, making Yusuf Karamali's position untenable.¹⁵⁵ The pasha abdicated for his youngest son Ali in August 1832, but the unrest endured. Who would fill the vacuum that emerged as Tripoli's dynastical regime crumbled? Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire could have fought each other to take the position, but, in the end, they did not.

Military action nevertheless was the preferred solution of some actors, who actively pushed for an armed intervention in Tripoli. The British consul Hanmer Warrington was the prime proponent of this option. He repeatedly called on London to send a fleet, occupy the country or put the rebels under British protection in order to counter 'French ascendancy' in the region.¹⁵⁶ For Warrington, the tumultuous situation in Tripoli was something of an endgame. He had been acting belligerently since the start of his consular posting in 1814. Over the years this 'uncompromising' veteran of the Iberian campaigns had gradually amassed an armed band under his consular directive. Warrington even designed a uniform to match, which included the feathered hat of a field marshal, the epaulettes of an admiral and the boots of a hussar.¹⁵⁷ He actively sided with the rebels, helping them obtain weapons from

¹⁵⁵ M. Minawi, *The Ottoman scramble for Africa. Empire and diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz* (Stanford, CA 2016), p. 26; F. Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East. The opening of the Maghreb, 1660-1814', *The Journal of North African Studies* 4:4 (1999) pp. 1-26, there pp. 18-19.

¹⁵⁷ S. Legêne, *De bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel. Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname in de negentiendeeeuwse Nederlandse cultuur van het imperialisme* (Dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam, 1998), p. 236.

Malta. Despite repeated instructions to remain neutral, Warrington continued to push on, hoping to finally realize his expansive schemes of British dominance in Tripoli.¹⁵⁸

Still, close concertation between the British, French and Ottoman authorities kept Warrington's hopes from materializing. The consul's calls to stop further French ascendancy in North Africa fell on deaf ears, thanks to bilateral talks in London. The French ambassador Talleyrand suggested a concerted approach to the British Ministers in March 1833.¹⁵⁹ Britain and France would refrain from involvement, allowing Ottoman forces to restore authority and bring Tripoli under direct control of the Porte. In 1835, the newly appointed French representative in Tripoli received matching instructions. He was told to aid the Ottoman cause as it was 'faithful to the principles of equity and justice'.¹⁶⁰

The resolution of the crisis came when a naval expedition ordered by Sultan Mahmud II sailed to Tripoli in May 1835. Its arrival assured a quick defeat of the coastal rebels. On 28 May, the reign of the Karamanlis came to an end as Ali Pasha was arrested and the dynasty's remaining members were taken to Constantinople.¹⁶¹ Despite British consular attempts to the contrary, Tripoli had not become a source of contention between Great Power governments. Warrington nevertheless tried to continue his schemes by supporting inland tribes against Ottoman rule, until their final defeat in 1842. In fitting form, the consul was forced to leave Tripoli in 1846, after a violent tussle with a Neapolitan colleague brought his resignation. He was then seventy years old.¹⁶² That Warrington's warlike machinations did not lead to large-scale conflict attests to the continued workings of the security culture. There had been the potential for strife over further European imperial expansion into Tripoli, but it was effectively kept in check.

A second case that points to the enduring impact of the security culture in the wider Mediterranean is the Regency of Tunis, which a similar dynamic of conflict and concertation between France, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire and the smaller European power of the Kingdom of Sardinia. In the aftermath of the French invasion of Algiers, Hussein Bey and his elite circles had opted for cordial relations with France, but with little result. Tunis was still forced into a detrimental treaty that renounced corsairing and granted economic privileges to France in the immediate wake of 1830. Just like in Tripoli, the treaty sparked a succession of complications. Foremost was the Bey's increasing unpopularity with both his subjects and his

¹⁵⁸ Nasr, A history of the Maghrib, pp. 203-204.

¹⁵⁹ CADLC, 8CP/640, 'Talleyrand to Broglie', London 19-03-1833, fp. 235-236.

¹⁶⁰ CADN, 706PO/1/100, 'Rigny to Bourboulon', Paris 04-03-1835.

¹⁶¹ Minawi, The Ottoman scramble for Africa, p. 26; Nasr, A history of the Maghrib, p. 205.

¹⁶² J. Wright, 'Warrington, Hanmer George (1776–1847)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (online ed., Oxford 2008), accessed 27 July 2017.

Ottoman superiors. He sent a mission to Constantinople in an attempt to at least restore relations with the latter. The Tunisian envoys had to explain to the Empire's most senior military commanders why the Sultan's envoy Tahir Pasha had been hindered in his mediating efforts between France and Algiers in 1830. Still, regardless of the momentary defection, the Sublime Porte quickly reinstated its normal relations with the Regency.¹⁶³ This left Hussein Bey with the domestic challenges to his rule. Besides simmering popular discontent, the Regency faced a veritable 'war of the consuls'. The commercial stipulations of the 1830 agreement with France pitted foreign representatives against the authorities and each other, as they made ever more burdensome claims for reclamations and indemnities.¹⁶⁴ Within two years of its signing, the treaty appeared to threaten the continued existence of the Regency.

The chief menace to Tunis came not from Britain, France or another Great Power, but from the Italian Kingdom of Sardinia. The Sardinian consul Count Filippi demanded, under the threat of war, that the Bey put his nation on the same rank as France and grant Sardinia the same commercial privileges. In this Filippi succeeded, when Hussein entered a similar treaty with Sardinia in 1832. The text even mimicked the French treaty clauses that abolished corsairing and Christian slavery.¹⁶⁵ Still, Filippi continued to seek pretexts for starting a war. An expansionist faction at the court in Turin backed him on this, as it hoped to raise Sardinia's international standing through a North African venture of its own.¹⁶⁶ Another opportunity presented itself when Hussein fell out with the consul of Naples in February 1833, who immediately received Filippi's support. Within a month, a Sardinian fleet of war appeared before Tunis, joined by several Neapolitan vessels. The Sardinian King Charles Albert was hesitant about invading Tunis, but the commander of the fleet actively worked towards that goal, calling for an expeditionary corps of up to 16,000 men.¹⁶⁷ The fall of another North African Regency seemed immanently possible.

While the colonial enthusiasts of Sardinia readied themselves for an invasion, Great Power officials tried to keep the attack from happening. To this end, they utilized one of the mainstays of diplomatic conduct within the post-1815 security culture. The consuls of Britain and France offered their services as 'disinterested mediators' between Sardinia and Tunis, in a similar vein as in other diplomatic crises, like the Belgian question or the issue of Greek independence. Together, they urged the Bey to adopt a prudent policy. Hussein had rejected

¹⁶³ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 422-424.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 433.

¹⁶⁵ Chater, Dépendance et mutations, p. 433.

¹⁶⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 442-444.

all Sardinian demands and given orders to defend the city, but nevertheless listened to the Anglo-French suggestions. Following this mediation, he proceeded to offer his apologies, salute the Sardinian flag and grant the requested indemnities.¹⁶⁸

Great Power mediation helped avert a Sardinian foray into Tunis. Instigated through bilateral diplomatic contact between the Ministries and consulates of Britain and France, this mediating effort provides further evidence of the security culture's enduring vitality. In unison, British and French actors set bounds to protect their mutual imperial interests. Their actions also reasserted the established international hierarchies between powers of different ranks. The Sardinian episode at Tunis once again showed how the imperial ambitions of Europe's smaller powers depended heavily on the acceptance of their more formidable counterparts, especially in the Mediterranean. The thwarting of Sardinian expansionist ventures thus greatly resembled the Great Power opposition to other smaller power initiatives on Mediterranean waters, like the Spanish-Dutch Alcalá league that featured in Chapter 3. Tellingly enough, the entire process repeated itself again when the Sardinian navy made new moves on Tunis in 1843. British and French mediation swiftly interceded in this case too, avoiding Sardinian expansion.¹⁶⁹

Even as the threat of Sardinia abated, the authorities of Tunis still found themselves getting dragged deeper and deeper into the colonial troubles of French-held Algeria. People and goods moved regularly from Algeria to Tunis and vice-versa, which assured that troubles would mount as soon as the French army crept closer to the neighbouring Regency. Tensions with Tunis, in fact, became pressing by 1838, right after the French conquered the city of Constantine in eastern Algeria.¹⁷⁰ Territorial disputes ensued over seemingly trivial issues like forestry, and soon French officials began to urge for a clearer delineation of the border.¹⁷¹ Fearing that this would give cause to further expansion, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Palmerston asserted that Tunis was not to be infringed upon. He repeatedly stated that Britain would not look with 'indifference' upon any attempt against Tunis.¹⁷² In setting out those lines, Palmerston referenced the 'alliance' between France and Britain. This

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 438-440 and 451-453.

¹⁶⁹ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 519-520.

¹⁷⁰ TNA, FO 27/537, 'Palmerston to Grenville', 17-11-1837; Swain, *The struggle for the control of the Mediterranean*, pp. 106-107; Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 501-502.

¹⁷¹ CADLC, 8CP/650, 'Molé to Sebastiani', Paris 22-02-1838, fp. 194-202; 712PO/1/172, 'Schwebell to Roussin', Tunis 26-03-1838.

¹⁷² TNA, FO 27/537, 'Palmerston to Grenville', 17-11-1837; FO 27/555, no. 72, 'Palmerston to Granville', 09-02-1838; CADLC, 8CP/650, 'Palmerston to Granville', London 09-02-1838, fp. 169-175.

cooperation, he claimed, was 'founded upon mutual interest, and mutual honour', necessitating the search for a 'timely understanding'.¹⁷³

The French did not miss the message and kept from venturing across Algeria's eastern borders.¹⁷⁴ Tunis' autonomous position did, however, become increasingly difficult to maintain. Following the take-over of power in Tripoli, the Ottoman Porte sought to pull a similar feat in the other Regency. Sultan Mahmud II, rumours held, was planning to send a fleet of war and interfere in the nomination of a new Bey after the death of Hussein in 1835. French actors immediately expressed their dismay and complained about the possible station of Ottoman troops near the Algerian border, but did not take further action.¹⁷⁵ In the end, the dynastical line of succession continued as Ahmad Bey took the throne in 1837, but it had become clear that the Regency of Tunis was increasingly hemmed in between the French colonial holdings and an Ottoman Empire that was reasserting, rather than withdrawing, its presence in North Africa.¹⁷⁶ The new Bey tried to face the threats to Tunisian autonomy with an ambitious project of military reform, including a complete reorganization of the navy. He did away with the old frigates and corvettes and wished to create a great naval establishment, an 'African Toulon', at Porto Farina.¹⁷⁷ Much like in Tripoli, the page was turning on the old institution of corsairing. Still, enduring international concertation kept these far-reaching changes in the Regency of Tunis from provoking violent conflict.

Taken together, the two examples of Tripoli and Tunis indicate how the security culture continued to function and expanded to include the authorities of the Ottoman Empire. The years following 1830 saw a fair share of regional conflicts and rebellions, but none of these provoked a Great Power war. These decades were not free of imperial competition, but such competition was simply not allowed to turn mutually detrimental. The cases of Tripoli and Tunis especially show how this central principle of the security culture was maintained in North Africa. Both cases also highlight the new role that the Ottoman Empire was beginning to take on, precluding its later admission to the ranks of the Great Powers after the end of the Crimean War in 1856. Ottoman officials and forces could restore order in the Regency of Tripoli as a way of avoiding further Great Power conflict. The same possibility loomed for the Regency of Tunis. Yet, the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II had to give up his claims to

¹⁷³ TNA, FO 27/518, 'Palmerston to Granville', 01-11-1836.

¹⁷⁴ Until Tunis became a French protectorate in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.

¹⁷⁵ TNA, FO 27/523, 'Aston to Palmerston', Paris 29-07-1836; FO 27/518, 'Palmerston to Granville', 01-11-1836; CADN, 712PO/1/172, 'Eyragues to Schwebell', Thérapia 23-07-1837.

¹⁷⁶ Nasr, A history of the Maghrib, p. 187.

¹⁷⁷ Chater, *Dépendance et mutations*, pp. 485, 509-513 and 517; A. Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples* (Cambridge 1991), p. 274.

Algiers as part of this admission to the ranks of the Great Powers. Metternich described this concession in a letter to Constantinople in March 1837, stating that the Porte should not demand the evacuation of French forces from Algiers on the basis of the principle that a Great Power should not 'expose itself to the possibility of a rejection, particularly when this Great Power has no means of avenging itself'.¹⁷⁸ What the Ottomans could not do in Algiers, they were able to in Tripoli: reassert imperial control with the backing of the first-rank powers. Here, we can thus see a first rehearsal or indication of the Ottoman Empire's later incorporation in the security culture as a Great Power.

In navigating through a series of major political changes in the region, Great Powers actors tried to set limits and threatened with war, but, in the end, stuck to routes of de-escalation. Potential sources of conflict – such as overbearing consuls, small powers with colonial ambitions or disputes over borders – were each managed and kept from spiralling out of control. In unison, Great Power officials assured that their imperial agendas would not threaten collective security or provoke violent clashes, even if this entailed accepting the French preponderance in Algeria or supporting the re-instalment of Ottoman rule over Tripoli. As such, the overlooked events of the 1830s and 1840s disclose how a new inter-imperial order, in which the different Great Powers (actively and passively) supported each other in their imperial travails, was definitely solidifying the Mediterranean region. By the 1850s, however, a new case of piracy would put the workings and endurance of that order to the test.

The pirates of the Rif

In this international context of inter-imperial cooperation, the repression of piracy remained an issue that had the potential to cause unsettling consequences. It therefore had to be managed accordingly. As we have seen, threat perceptions of 'Barbary piracy' still held sway long after 1830, with rumoured pirates from North Africa continuing to cause sporadic unrest in Spain and French-held Algeria. Maritime prefects and colonial officials put this lingering sense of menace to the lasting power of coastal traditions and popular folklore. Yet, by the beginning of the 1850s a pirate threat had started to manifest itself in such a way that it could not be syphoned off as a fantasy or relic. From around 1846, increasing numbers of European merchant ships were being plundered – or worse – in the coastal waters of northern Morocco. Piracy thus once more became a central concern to the maritime states of Europe, spurring on new repressive efforts. This time, however, avoiding imperial expansion or averting the

¹⁷⁸ Cited in Šedivý, Metternich, the Great Powers, p. 435.

creation of new colonies became as pressing as ending the raids out at sea. The international engagement with this instance of piracy therefore provides a final illustration of how the security culture functioned in relation to colonialism in North Africa.

Moroccan territories had come to fall under the threat of potential French expansion before this upsurge of piracy even took place. Like Tunis, Morocco was situated in direct vicinity of France's colonial holdings and further encroachment was hence a very real possibility. From the moment of Dey Hussein's defeat, the Moroccan Sultan Abd al-Rahman (r. 1822-1859) became increasingly embroiled in Algerian affairs – first by backing local elites in Oran and Tlemcen against the French, then by tenuously supporting Abd al-Qadir.¹⁷⁹ The military commanders of the French possessions, on the other hand, viewed Morocco as a place of intrigue where British conspiracies were brewing.¹⁸⁰

Geopolitical concerns and military tensions grew to great heights in the early 1840s. In the most critical stage of the conflict between the French and Abd al-Qadir, the Emir decided to direct his troops onto Moroccan lands. From there, he launched renewed campaigns against the French in Algeria. In an attempt to end those border-crossing skirmishes, France eventually declared war on Morocco in 1844.¹⁸¹ French forces launched an overpowering offensive by land and sea. At the border river of Isly, commander Bugeaud obtained an important victory over a large Moroccan army in August. That same month, French naval forces bombarded Tangiers and briefly occupied the fortress island of Mogador (Essaouira). Accepting defeat, the Sultan officially abandoned his support for Abd al-Qadir, which had not been too substantial to begin with.¹⁸² In the peace treaty, Abd al-Rahman also signed away the last few tributes that Morocco still received from Naples, Sweden and Denmark. The Franco-Moroccan War of 1844 thereby demolished another remaining vestige of North African corsairing.¹⁸³ Yet Great Power statesmen primarily saw the quick victory as proof that Morocco was hardly a formidable bulwark against further French expansion.¹⁸⁴

The results of the Franco-Moroccan War clarify why geopolitical concerns featured so prominently as piracy became ascendant along Morocco's Mediterranean coast. Great Power anxieties over territorial gains and pretexts for invasions were at least as daunting to official minds as the upswing in attacks on European shipping. During the four years between 1846

¹⁷⁹ A. Tablit (ed.), Le gouvernement marocain et la conquête d'Alger (Algiers 1999), pp. 11-12, 14-15, 18.

¹⁸⁰ SHD, GR1/H/6, 'Sebastiani to Louis Philippe', Paris 26-02-1831; Gallois, A history of violence, p. 68.

¹⁸¹ Gallois, A history of violence, p. 72.

¹⁸² Sessions, *By sword*, p. 118; Tablit, *Le gouvernement marocain*, p. 41.

¹⁸³ C. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death. European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth century', *Journal for Maritime Research* 18:2 (2016) pp. 139-154, there p. 148; TNA, FO 99/13, 'Foreign Office to Drummond-Hay', 23-08-1844.

¹⁸⁴ TNA, FO 99/24, 'Foreign Office to Drummond-Hay', 26-05-1845.

and 1850, several merchant ships were plundered or captured in the waters off Morocco, including six British, one French and a Prussian vessel.¹⁸⁵ This was a wholly new kind of piracy, even though a U.S. Secretary of State assuredly called it the work of 'the Corsairs of Barbary', who, in his mind, had returned to 'make the entrance of the Mediterranean a place of danger'.¹⁸⁶ These pirates were actually local fishermen, who raided without official backing. As one historian notes, they acted 'without regard to any law, and without any ideological or religious motive'. Ships belonging to Muslims or Christians were all fair game to them.¹⁸⁷

These pirates hailed from the Rif region in Morocco's northeast, specifically from the Guelaya peninsula. Many of their attacks took place in the direct vicinity of the peninsula's old Spanish enclave Melilla and in the wider maritime area that was generally called the Cape Tres Forcas, which saw plenty of commercial traffic pass from Gibraltar.¹⁸⁸ The riches of that traffic contrasted starkly with the destitute situation on land. The Rif is mountainous and barren. Its fishermen communities hence were poor frontier societies, in which smuggling and piracy played major economic roles. The region was also largely impenetrable, meaning that the Sultan's authority there was piecemeal at best. This was a territory into which Abd al-Oadir could retreat even after the Sultan had renounced his support, in order to launch further strikes against the French until his final surrender in 1847.¹⁸⁹ Moroccan control at these fringes of the country, where borders were porous and unmarked, indeed consisted of little more than the 'episodic reprisal' of recurrent revolts.¹⁹⁰ Sultan Abd al-Rahman told a foreign consul that he considered the Rif's habitants 'not so much as common subjects, but as savage bandits, who are outside the domain of the law'.¹⁹¹ The raiders of the Rif were thus without protectors. Unsupported by official backing, they were of an entirely different variety than the 'Barbary corsairs'. Their actions were actually piratical.

The 'Rif pirates', as European contemporaries soon called them, only became more prolific during the 1850s, raising the commercial stakes at hand and bolstering calls for repression. Multiple ships under the flags of Great Britain, France, Prussia and Spain were

¹⁸⁵ A. Lambert, 'The limits of naval power. The merchant brig *Three sisters*, Rif pirates and British battleships' in: B. Elleman, A. Forbes and D. Rosenberg (eds.), *Piracy and maritime crime. Historical and modern case studies* (Newport, RI 2010), pp. 173-190, there p. 174.
¹⁸⁶ NARA II, 59, M77, vol. 14-16, 'Buchanan to Hyatt', Washington 09-02-1849, fp. 87-89.

¹⁸⁷ C. Pennell, 'The geography of piracy. Northern Morocco in the mid-nineteenth century', *Journal of Historical Geography* 20:3 (1994) pp. 272-282, there p. 272.

¹⁸⁸ CCM, MR.4.4.4.3.5.3, 'Consul Gibraltar to CCM', Gibraltar 07-11-1848; 'Chef Marine to CCM', Marseille 29-11-1851.

¹⁸⁹ TNA, FO 99/24, 'Foreign Office to Drummond-Hay', 09-10-1845.

¹⁹⁰ Pennell, 'The geography of piracy', p. 274; Tablit, *Le gouvernement marocain*, p. 43.

¹⁹¹ Pennell, 'The geography of piracy', p. 275.

taken between 1851 and 1856. Total numbers are hard to compute with cases spread through different national archives and sources that vaguely mention 'foreign ships' falling prey to pirates.¹⁹² Still, the noted losses in individual cases could amount to considerable sums. Underwriters of Lloyd's in London contacted the British government to recover the value of the plundered vessel *Hymen* and its cargo of coal, which was worth 2,500 pounds.¹⁹³ The ransom of a French crew in 1855 was even more costly, as the total sum was about 16,000 francs.¹⁹⁴ What caused this upsurge in piracy in the Rif is subject to debate, but historians suggests it was an effect of the 'war on smuggling' that the Spanish governor of Melilla commenced against Moroccan shipping in 1855, which left the Rif tribes with even less opportunities for legitimate trade.¹⁹⁵ The British Foreign Office, for its part, put the piracies down to a lack of enforcement. A report to the Admiralty of September 1855 mentioned 'a nuisance which becomes each year greater from impunity'.¹⁹⁶

Affecting punishment on the pirates of the Rif was, however, a complicated undertaking. One naval historian notes that the 'standard British response', tested in East Asia, of sending a warship, recovering the capture and chastising the 'insolent barbarians' was doomed to fail. The steep cliffs and small nooks of the Rif coast made landing difficult and dangerous, while the reclusion of the villages rendered them invulnerable to bombardments. Reliable maps and charts of the area were also lacking.¹⁹⁷ In August 1856, a Prussian attempted landing operation failed completely because of these adverse conditions. Trying to storm a forty-meter high rock face under constant enemy fire, the landing group suffered seven dead and 22 wounded, including its commander Prince Adalbert (a younger brother of King Friedrich Wilhelm III), who was shot in the thigh.¹⁹⁸

Technological innovations in shipping could help in these difficult conditions. Steamships of the British and French navies held some advantages, due to their speed and manoeuvrability. Royal navy steamers like the *Polyphemus* and *Ariel* – amongst the first of

these people'. TNA, FO 99/69, 'Foreign Office to Admiralty', [??]-1853, fp. 55-56.

¹⁹² Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 148-149; TNA, FO 99/69, 'Drummond-Hay to Clarendon', Tangier 03-07-1854, fp. 78-82. One source lists two British merchants and a Prussian ship (*Violet, Vampire* and *Flora*, respectively) that were 'exposed to destruction or arrogance' between 1851 and January 1853, while noting that 'there is reason to support that various other vessels have been placed in jeopardy, if not actually attacked by

¹⁹³ TNA, FO 99/74, 'Harper to Drummond-Hay', 25-06-1856 and 'Harper to Clarendon', 26-06-1856, fp. 243-245. The ship's owner, Mr. Richard from Liverpool, put the total loss (including the 'personal effects and cash' of the crew) at 3,651 pounds. The amount insured on the ship, a barque, was 1,000 pounds at Curry & Co., Liverpool Agents. TNA, FO 99/74, 'Report by Vice-consul Reade', Tangier 07-06-1856, fp. 143-144.

¹⁹⁴ TNA, FO 99/69, 'Reade to Clarendon', Tangier 30-04-1855, fp. 185-187.

¹⁹⁵ Pennell, 'The geography of piracy', p. 277; Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', p. 174.

¹⁹⁶ TNA, FO 99/69, 'Foreign Office to Admiralty', 08-09-1855, fp. 238.

¹⁹⁷ Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', p. 175.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 186.

their kind to be employed effectively against Mediterranean piracy – managed to chase away or capture several pirate vessels. However, they could not bring the raids and attacks to stop.¹⁹⁹

The British governor of Gibraltar, General Robert Gardiner, had spotted this bind as early as 1852. Hampering pirates at sea could only do so much, but landings on the coast were not feasible either. He noted that some of the navy's plans involved considerable penetration into the country, but found it 'very questionable how far it would tend to promote the greater security of our merchant vessels, unless frequently repeated'.²⁰⁰ His line of reasoning nevertheless suggested that, to ensure security, Rif piracy had to be fought on land.

At the same time, territorial measures of repression were what European officials perhaps feared most. In this setting of colonial interest, actors were weary of seeing an imperial competitor establish itself on Moroccan soil. Military action on land was generally thought to be a precursor to lasting occupation. Such fearful concerns existed in all quarters, with British, French and Spanish actors dreading expansion by each other.²⁰¹ French offers of military aid to the Sultan were likewise deemed to open the road to a full-blown invasion.²⁰² Once foreign troops moved in, they would have been hard to get out, unless through interimperial warfare, which had to be averted. Ideas went around of a joint expedition involving British, French and Spanish troops, but even those were found too risky in the light of possible imperial annexation. Arguing against concerted action, the Governor of Gibraltar, Sir Robert William Gardiner (1781-1864), warned that merely calling on the aid of Spain would instantly bring French involvement.²⁰³ The burdens of piracy may have been shared, but imperial setbacks and colonial usurpation were apparently more daunting threats.

In the end, plans for the repression of Rif piracy centred in on the Moroccan Sultan himself. With European authorities mistrusting each other, punitive action from the Sultan of Morocco seemed the only remaining option that was acceptable to all parties. Abd al-Rahman initially maintained his dictum that the Rif and its 'bandit' inhabitants lay beyond his control and the Sultanate's jurisdiction.²⁰⁴ Foreign pressuring, however, brought a change to that

¹⁹⁹ Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', pp. 176-177; Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 148-149; TNA, FO 99/69, 'Drummond-Hay to Clarendon', Tangier 03-07-1854, fp. 78-82; 'Rice to Admiralty', *Prometheus* at Lisbon 18-08-1854, fp. 164-167.

²⁰⁰ TNA, FO 99/69, 'Gardiner to Grey', Gibraltar 18-01-1852, fp. 4-9.

²⁰¹ Pennell, 'The geography of piracy', p. 279; Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', pp. 177, 180 and 186; Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 148-149; TNA, FO 99/74, 'Drummond-Hay to Hammond, Tangier 30-05-1856, fp. 97-100.

²⁰² Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', p. 184.

²⁰³ TNA, FO 99/69, 'Gardiner to Grey', Gibraltar 18-01-1852, fp. 4-9.

²⁰⁴ TNA, FO 99/69, 'Russell to Admiralty', Foreign Office 06-01-1853, fp. 31-34.

stance. At the behest of his superiors in London, the British consul kept urging the Sultan to take control over the Rif, warning that a lack of action could bring a French invasion. The Sultan was told that without dominion over the Rif he would 'no longer have any security against further inroads in his territories'.²⁰⁵

Abd al-Rahman gave in to the international demands and warnings, taking it upon himself to affect repression. As a result, successive expeditions departed from Tangiers for the Rif in 1855 and 1856.²⁰⁶ Counting as many as 6,000 horsemen, these forces had to chastise the piratical tribes of the Rif. They were tasked to burn and destroy huts and boats, seize property and take prisoners. Together with these measures of severity, the expedition's commander Muhammad bin'Abd al-Malik imposed heavy fines and punitive taxes. The campaigns thus extracted further resources from an already destitute area, meaning that the imposition of central control hardly bettered the situation in the Rif. Piracy in the area did diminish, but only until authority over the area broke down again in later decades.²⁰⁷

For all the detrimental effects it had on the communities of the region, the international involvement with Rif piracy fitted neatly within the dynamics of the inter-imperial security culture. As such, it was typical of the period spanning the 1830s to 1850s: the mid-term aftermath of the French invasion of Algiers. During these decades, European cooperation endured in the face of successive crises, but always under the looming threat of imperial conflict. The ways in which Rif piracy was confronted internationally mirrored the handling of rebellion in Tripoli and tensions in Tunis. Limits were laid down and backed with intimidations in order to avoid a confrontation amongst European powers.

Multilateral cooperation in such issues of imperial interest took place through diplomatic communication and mediating efforts at the ministerial, ambassadorial or consular level. Daunting crises and mutual threats were, in these cases, managed by the established state apparatuses, rather than through newly created commissions, standing bodies or large-scale international meetings. This did not mean that the security culture, with the system of conferences and congresses that supported it, had petered out. It simply took another form with regards to security concerns in the increasingly colonial setting of North Africa. Practices of concertation got embedded in the standard channels of diplomacy, meaning that

²⁰⁵ TNA, FO 99/74, 'Clarendon to Drummond-Hay', [??]-06-1856, fp. 253-254.

²⁰⁶ Lambert, 'The limits of naval power', p. 184; TNA, FO 99/69, 'Reade to Clarendon', Tangier 06-12-1855;

^{&#}x27;Reade to Clarendon', Tangier 31-12-1855, fp. 248-268; FO 99/74, 'Drummond-Hay to Clarendon', Tangier 10-06-1856, fp. 145-154; 'Drummond-Hay to Clarendon', Tangier 23-06-1856, fp. 230-242.

²⁰⁷ Pennell, 'The geography of piracy', pp. 279-280; Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 148-149.

successors to the Congress of Vienna, on-par in grandiosity and lavishness, became increasingly rare.

In the setting of North Africa, the security culture's dynamics of concertation especially worked to halt further expansion of French territory and avoid the creation of new colonies. It was as if the invasion of 1830 had suddenly awakened Great Power actors to the reality that conquest and colonization in North Africa were real possibilities. Because of their potential to uproot European peace, such contingencies subsequently had to be avoided. Within Algeria the French could pursue their own agendas of security, but beyond its borders security would be managed collectively. One aspect of 1830's aftermath was thus the further development of inter-imperial cooperation over matters in North Africa. That development went hand-in-hand with the destruction of local forms of maritime raiding. Its impact, however, was later turned into something global, when the Great Powers first nearly destroyed the post-1815 international system and then suddenly revived it.

The recorded legacy. The Paris Declaration of 1856

After having traced the continuing importance of the inter-imperial security culture in managing potential sources of conflict in North Africa, one question may still present itself: how lasting were these international efforts to manage security and maintain the peace between the Great Powers? The historical literature tends to describe the middle of the nineteenth century as a rough season for stability and security in Europe. First came the democratic tempest of the 'Springtime of the Peoples' in the revolutionary year of 1848. Urban protests and rural revolts swept the city streets and country roads from Austria to Poland and throughout the German and Italian states.²⁰⁸ In France, that year saw the overthrown of Louis Philippe and the toppling of the increasingly conservative July Monarchy. Troops from Algeria were sent into Paris to beat down protesting workers, leading to a bloody affair that only increased the King's problems.²⁰⁹ In December 1848, voters elected a nephew of Napoleon, Charles-Louis Bonaparte (1808-1873), as President of the Second French Republic. As Paul Schroeder has argued, this change of regime and choice of President in no small part had to with popular discontent over France's 'conservative foreign policy', which was ultimately geared towards maintaining the Great Power peace.²¹⁰ Yet,

²⁰⁸ On the 'distorting' effect of the 'Crimean War' label, A. Lambert, *The Crimean War. British grand strategy against Russia, 1853-56* (Manchester and New York 1990), p. xvi.

²⁰⁹ Joly, 'Les généraux d'Afrique', pp. 127-130.

²¹⁰ Schroeder, *The transformation*, p. 799.

contrary to what Schroeder maintained, the events of 1848 did not spell out the definitive ending of the Congress System.

Tellingly enough, Louis Napoleon spoke of upholding the old international system in the midst of his ascension to power in France. He announced his determination 'to adopt the great system of neutrality towards foreign countries' while the revolutions of 1848 were still engulfing the continent. During the crisis between Austria and Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein in 1850, Louis Napoleon again invoked 'the equilibrium of Europe' to clarify why France would remain neutral.²¹¹ Domestically, this new Napoleon did not shy away from usurping power, but internationally he kept France closely aligned with its European allies. Louis oversaw a military coup in 1852 – again with the involvement of military men from the Algerian colony – and suspended the republican constitution. Subsequently, France once again became an imperial entity under a Bonaparte, as the former President styled himself Napoleon III, Emperor of the Second French Empire. This caused significant unrest amongst the governments of the Great Powers and the smaller states that neighboured France, but Emperor Napoleon III remained true to his word and, for the time being, did not attempt to expand French territory at the expense of Belgium, Sardinia, the Rhineland or Switzerland.²¹²

All this revolutionary fervour and change of regimes on the continent did not significantly alter collective security efforts in North Africa either. The most significant changes in French colonial rule over Algeria after 1848 were of an administrative nature. Following the declaration of the Second Republic, the new regime in Paris decided to recognize the three northern provinces of the colony as French departments, which permitted colonists to elect representatives to the National Assembly. On an ideological level, this new political context bolstered calls for France's 'moral conquest' of Algeria, as republican deputies spoke of 'a vast field of colonization on which to apply (...) all the general instincts that lead France to become the apostle of civilization in the world'. Even as the Bonapartist authorities restored the colony to military rule after the coup of 1852, republican ideals continued to be projected onto the holdings in North Africa.²¹³ Yet in a military sense, none of these ideals really changed the face of the French presence. Brutal campaigns continued as the army progressed further into the hinterlands towards the edges of the Sahara. By 1857, French forces had taken

²¹¹ Both cited in M. Abbenhuis, An age of neutrals. Great Power politics, 1815–1914 (Cambridge 2014), p. 43.

²¹² Abbenhuis, *An age of neutrals*, p. 56.

²¹³ G. Murray-Miller, 'Imagining the trans-Mediterranean republic. Algeria, republicanism, and the ideological origins of the French imperial nation-state, 1848–1870', *French Historical Studies* 37:2 (2014), pp. 303-330, there pp. 323-324.

the town of Laghouat 'with a terrible carnage' and occupied the oases of Suf (El Oued) and Wadi Righ (Oued Righ).²¹⁴

If the tempest of 1848 did not fundamentally alter the post-1815 security culture or the trajectory of French colonialism in Algeria, then neither did the other great international thunderstorm of the mid-nineteenth century. By 1853, the event occurred that statesmen had dreaded the most since 1815: a Great Power war. The causes of this conflict lay exactly with the issue that had so long been seen as a potential cause of rupture: imperial expansion. Tsar Nicholas I sought to capitalize on Russian preponderance on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire by occupying the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, starting a war that brought British, French and, eventually, Austrian involvement. The conflict, which is now generally referred to as the 'Crimean War' rather than its British original of 'Russian War', lasted from 1853 to 1856. Largely fought in dire conditions on the Crimean Peninsula through sieges and infamous charges, the war resulted in over half a million deaths, impressing contemporaries of the costs that warfare in the industrial age could have.²¹⁵

Alongside its new level of destruction, the Crimean War simultaneously brought the return of an old and distant threat. Privateering once again became a serious concern to the warring parties, if only as a potential threat and on Atlantic rather than Mediterranean waters. A veritable scare nevertheless gripped Great Britain's commercial classes during the early stages of the Crimean War. Between September 1853 and June 1854, rumours of Russian plans to hand out privateering commissions to American sailors caused a panic amongst British merchants – with rising insurance rates to match.²¹⁶ These fears only died down again when the Cabinet adopted a Dano-Swedish proposal to close neutral ports to privateers and started pressuring other states to do the same, resulting in declarations from countries including Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Argentina and Chile. This series of declarations by neutrals, it subsequently became clear, essentially laid the groundwork for an innovative piece of international law that came into being shortly after the conflict.²¹⁷

The Crimean War ended when a new Russian government under Tsar Alexander II decided to take defeats at the hands of Anglo-French forces, and the possibility of an Austrian entry into the conflict, as a sign to terminate hostilities. To arrange the peace at hand, the warring powers, after preliminary talks in Vienna, convened in Paris in February 1856. It had taken a

²¹⁴ McDougall, A history of Algeria, p. 75.

²¹⁵ A. Lambert, *The Crimean War. British grand strategy against Russia, 1853-56* (Manchester and New York 1990), pp. xvi-xxi.

²¹⁶ J. Lemnitzer, *Power, law and the end of privateering* (Basingstoke and New York 2014), pp. 37-40.

²¹⁷ Lemnitzer, *Power, law*, pp. 42-43.

Great Power war, but now, for the first time in decades, a genuine follow-up to the post-1815 series of congresses took place. This Congress of Paris, which lasted for little over two months, also held a particular importance for matters of maritime raiding as an international legal concern.

The assembly of the Congress of Paris ought to indicate that the Great Powers had hardly lost the ability to cooperate and act in concert. Still, the historiography long did not recognize this congress as part of an extend historical lineage. The Crimean War was simply deemed to have put an end to the Congress System as it emerged during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Yet the Crimean War may very well be understood, as Matthias Schultz suggests, within the frameworks of concerted international politics, where it holds a key position in the development of the Congress System through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.²¹⁸ British and French forces came to the aid of the Ottoman Empire against a Russian assault in order to maintain the balance of power and keep the international system in place.²¹⁹ Ongoing diplomatic activity, moreover, ensured that the conflict did not escalate into a world war with much more intensive campaigns in the Pacific and Americas.²²⁰ Edward Ingram does note that the Crimean War brought a boomeranged 'return' of imperial warmongering to the European continent, marking an upsurge of Great Power bellicism.²²¹ However, as the run-up to the 1830 invasion of Algiers showed, such warlike tendencies had been an integral part of the European Congress System for much longer. Its security culture even effectively accommodated the rising thirst for military glory, either by directing it elsewhere or keeping it in check through concertation amongst the Great Powers.

Another grounds on which the Congress of Paris has been disassociated from the post-1815 lineage is its supposedly limited scope. Some historians deem the Congress of Paris to be of a different sort than its precursors. They see the Crimean War, which pitted Great Power allies against each other, as the great demolisher of the Vienna Order and hence look upon the Congress of Paris as a more old-fashioned congregation of the 'war-termination variety'.²²² Surely, many of the discussions in Paris did revolve around the 'war-terminating' business of

²¹⁸ M. Schulz, Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815-1860 (Munich 2009), p. 299.

 ²¹⁹ M. Baumgart, Der Friede von Paris 1856. Studien zum Verhältnis von Kriegführung, Politik und Friedensbewahrung (Munich and Vienna 1971), pp. 9-11; Todd, 'A French imperial meridian', pp. 161-162.
 ²²⁰ Schulz, Normen und Praxis, p. 298.

²²¹ E. Ingram, 'Bellicism as boomerang. The Eastern Question during the Vienna System', in: P. Krüger and P. Schroeder (eds.), *"The transformation of European politics, 1763-1848". Episode or model in modern history?* (Münster 2002), pp. 205-225, there pp. 206-207.

²²² Schroeder, 'The transformation of European politics. Some reflections', p. 35; Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 352.

arranging troop evacuations, redrawing boundaries and providing guarantees. In this vein, Russia had to withdraw from the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which were recognized as autonomous parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Yet, the Treaty of Paris that resulted from the discussions in February and March 1856 did more than merely end war, set out the transition to peace and make territorial arrangements. Its seventh article admitted the Sublime Porte into the European system, amongst the ranks of the Great Powers. Though the meaning and intentions of this article are much debated, it nevertheless sought to extend the web of alliances created in 1815.²²³ Resembling the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, when France was allowed into the Quintuple Alliance, the Congress of Paris thus widened the circle of Great Powers by creating entirely new alliances. Another set of stipulations arranged for the creation of a 'European Commission' that ensured 'free navigation' on the mouths of the Danube.²²⁴ Such measures echoed the Congress of Vienna, where similar arrangements had to secure free navigation on the Rhine.²²⁵ There was thus much more to this congress than merely ending war.

Historical actors who were involved in its proceedings also had no trouble in positing the Congress of Paris a true successor to Vienna and its follow-ups.²²⁶ This became particularly apparent when their discussions turned to the issue of privateering. By the time that the talks in Paris were nearing their conclusion, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Alexandre Walewski (1810-1868), who presided over the congress, suggested that they somehow had not yet brought enough. He ended a long exposé on various subjects – including Greece, Italy and the Belgian press – with a call to build a legacy. In order to live up to its lineage, Walewski argued, the Congress of Paris had to provide something grand, a moral touchstone for future generations to look back upon. The Congress of Vienna had abolished the slave trade, but what could the Congress of Paris be remembered for? What would its contribution to the progress of humanity be? Walewski immediately went ahead to

²²³ J. Pitts, 'Boundaries of Victorian international law', in: D. Bell (ed.), *Victorian visions of global order*. *Empire and international relations in nineteenth-century political thought* (Cambridge 2007),

pp. 67-88, there pp. 72-73; A. Cobbing, 'A Victorian embarrassment. Consular jurisdiction and the evils of extraterritoriality', *The International History Review* (2017) pp. 1-19, there pp. 1-2; M. Koskenniemi, *The gentle civilizer of nations. The rise and fall of international law 1870-1960* (Cambridge 2002), p. 53; J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich 2009), p. 149; Ingram, 'Bellicism as boomerang', pp. 206-207.

²²⁴ C. Ardeleanu, 'An experiment in international administration'. The European Commission of the Danube and the security of Danubian navigation in the long 19th century (forthcoming, Brill).

²²⁵ J. Schenk, *The Rhine and European security in the long nineteenth century. Making lifelines from frontlines* (forthcoming, Routledge).

²²⁶ For the contemporary understanding linking the Congress of Paris to the Congress of Vienna, CADLC, 53MD/2117, No. 1, 'Questions de forme et d'étiquette', fp. 1-4 and No. 2, 'Note sur la situation respective des puissances représentées à Vienne en 1815', fp. 5-12.

answer those questions. He proposed that the delegates create a universal code of maritime warfare, which would regulate the laws of conflict at sea by treaty.²²⁷

The aim and rhetoric were grand, but Walewski's proposal was slim. He put forth four general principles that had to make war at sea more just, granting more protection to private property and free navigation. The first article therefore simply asserted that privateering had to end. It succinctly stated: 'Privateering is, and remains abolished'. The two subsequent articles further ensured property in wartime, noting that neutral flags would cover enemy goods and that enemy flags would cover neutral goods. Captures of neutral merchant cargoes, either by navies or by licensed privateers, would thus no longer be legal – unless the goods in question were arms, munitions or other types of contraband. Finally, the fourth principle declared that blockades of ports in wartime had to be effective 'in order to be binding'. A blockading force had to be sufficiently large to constantly prevent access to the enemy coast. This would end the already much-contested practice of the 'paper blockade' in which a belligerent declared a blockade without effectively enforcing it, creating opportunities for irregular searches and confiscations.²²⁸

The discussion and passing of these principles went as swiftly as their reclamation. The first to react to Walewski's sudden overture was Lord Clarendon, the British plenipotentiary. He stood up to second the proposal and announced that there would be no further negotiations on this subject. Most of the other delegates muttered that they had received no instructions from their courts on anything relating to maritime law and would have to obtain those first. Only Otto von Manteuffel, the Prussian attendee, immediately expressed his country's support for these ideals, but he had been invited to the Congress only to ratify the allied decisions, owing to the disfavoured Prussian neutrality during the Crimean War.²²⁹ The other attendees received their authorization by 14 April, six days after Walewski's speech.²³⁰ The sole significant alteration that was arranged to the initial plans, besides a few references to past practices of belligerent rights, was their change from a treaty into a declaration. Rather than entering into the difficulties of enforcing and ratifying a multilateral treaty, Clarendon successfully proposed to create a declaration to which all of the world's other powers would, at once, be invited to accede.²³¹

²²⁷ Lemnitzer, Power, law, pp. 65-66.

²²⁸ Drafts of the stipulations are in CADLC, 53MD/2117, No. 34, 'Projet de déclaration', fp. 93-95.

²²⁹ Lemnitzer, Power, law, pp. 65-66.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 68.

²³¹ Ibid., pp. 67-68.

On 16 April 1856, the Congress thus issued the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law with its four principles virtually unchanged. The initial signees – besides Walewski and Clarendon – included Count von Buol-Schaunstein for Austria, Manteuffel for Prussia, Prince Orlov for Russia, Count Cavour for Sardinia and Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha for the Ottoman Empire. Within a relatively short time, these delegates had entered into a series of very fundamental decisions.²³²

Historians and legal scholars have been fascinated by the speed and ease of this international agreement ever since 1856. What allowed the delegates at the Congress of Paris to sign away on some of these once deeply contested issues so swiftly? Surely, there had been preparatory discussions between French and British officials for months, but the other attendees nevertheless agreed without any prior notice.²³³ Most of the literature treats this question by positing the Declaration as a well-timed and therefore highly effective compromise between small and large naval powers. The former wanted to see the wartime seizure of their lucrative neutral trade come to an end, while the latter wished to be ridded of privateers harassing their big commercial fleets.²³⁴ British statesmen had long insisted on their nation's 'ancient rights' in taking enemy goods from neutral vessels, but Clarendon now saw that Great Britain stood completely alone in that position.²³⁵ The practice of privateering had to go in return, which was a low price to pay for most states in this trade-off. As one author argues, it was simple to formulate 'high-sounding principles' and obtain 'easy prestige' in relation to a practice that had become largely obsolete.²³⁶

Many authors stress that the privateer had been overtaken by time as an instrument in interstate conflict, making its abolition a largely uncomplicated affair.²³⁷ Technological innovations in shipping and the increase of global trade are thought to have caused this redundancy. Steamship lines and telegraph communications had made seaborne trade more regular, as it ran with tighter margins on a stricter schedule that made delays ever costlier. To match these new commercial realities, liberal ideologues and politicians argued that private property ought to be respected in times of war. The introduction of steamship technology simultaneously inspired new fears of a privateering effort carried out by speedy steamers,

²³² Lemnitzer, Power, law, p. 62.

²³³ Ibidem.

²³⁴ Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere*, p. 341.

²³⁵ Lemnitzer, Power, law, p. 64.

²³⁶ O. Anderson, 'Some further light on the inner history of the declaration of Paris', *The Law Quarterly Review* 76 (1960), pp. 379-385, there pp. 383-384.

²³⁷ For a brief discussion of misconceptions on steaming and privateering, D. O'Connor, 'Privateers, cruisers and colliers. The limits of international maritime law in the nineteenth century', *RUSI Journal* 150:1 (2005), pp. 70-74.

which could hurt global trade to an unprecedented degree.²³⁸ A case in point was the privateer scare of the Crimean War, which brought a series of international declarations by neutrals that, as the historian Jan Lemnitzer has shown, acted as a precedent to the Paris discussions.²³⁹

The Paris Declaration thus extended a series of international agreements that had arisen during the late war, but it also further enhanced them. The Crimean War arrangements merely assured that privateers could not enter neutral ports to safely buy provisions or sell their captures. Privateering would thereby become both more difficult and less lucrative, further underscoring its impracticality. The Paris Declaration built on those imposed constraints by rendering all support for, or participation in, privateering fully illegal. The privateer hence became indistinct from the pirate. Whereas the former had once received the legal backing of a recognized authority, he would now stand alone. Indeed, the reservoir of official support for privateering dried up at a staggering speed as more and more states acceded to the Paris Declaration. By December 1856, forty powers from all over the world had signed off on the practice of licensed raiding and equated privateering to piracy.²⁴⁰

The ease with which the Paris Declaration came about and spread across the globe was not, however, solely a result of privateering's redundancy. It had as much to with the international repression of unwanted violence, with the impact of the post-1815 attempts to create a system for mutual security (either through treaties, conferences or joint military campaigns), as with the decreasing practicality of an old practice. The Paris Declaration's abolition of privateering cannot be separated from the larger nineteenth-century fight against perceived pirates in the Mediterranean Sea. Few scholars note this, but the Paris Declaration is deeply related to the suppression of 'Barbary piracy' as a threat to security.²⁴¹ The Declaration's equation of piracy and privateering further solidified the increasingly indiscriminate application of the terms since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It was, after all, around 1815 that European actors began to frame North African privateering as illegitimate piracy, as a piratical threat to both security at sea and the establishment of continental peace. By doing away with the distinction between legitimate privateering and illegitimate piracy, the Paris Declaration thus sanctified a

²³⁸ Lemnitzer, Power, law, pp. 8-10.

²³⁹ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

²⁴⁰ Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere*, p. 342.

²⁴¹ Exceptions are W. Brenner, *Confounding powers. Anarchy and international society from the Assassins to Al Qaeda* (Cambridge 2015), pp. 180-181 and Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere*. Satsuma Shinsuke points out that the abolition of privateering coincided with British campaigns against indigenous sea raiders in East and Southeast Asia, S. Shinsuke, 'Plunder and free trade. British privateering and its abolition in 1856 in global perspective', in: O. Atsushi (ed.), *In the name of the battle against piracy. Ideas and practices in state monopoly of maritime violence in Europe and Asia in the period of transition* (Leiden 2018), pp. 43-65, there p. 69.

process that can be traced back to the Congress of Vienna. In a broader sense, the Congress of Paris served to bolster and enlarge the security culture that had begun to take shape after 1815 because it fully asserted France's role as a first-rank power, brought the Ottoman Empire closer towards the Quadruple Alliance and truly commenced the labour of codifying the new regime of international law.

The manner in which contemporaries worked towards and argued for the Declaration bore strong resemblances to the preceding decades of the fight against piracy. Advocates and defenders of the arrangement used terms and arguments that echoed the many expressions of outrage over 'Barbary piracy'. When panic struck the British markets during the Crimean War, periodicals and dailies condemned privateering 'an odious and piratical mode of acquiring wealth' and described anyone who participated in it as 'merely a pirate with a pardon in his pocket'.²⁴² This rhetoric of privateering being nothing but sanctioned piracy had, of course, been tested time and again in the decades following 1815.

The process of accession to the Declaration also featured such discourses of legitimacy and illegitimacy. States that would not readily subscribe to the four principles were swiftly deemed to be piratical or at least uncivilized. As Clarendon argued, those powers that did not sign were to 'be isolated on a point in which the whole civilized world will be against them'.²⁴³ Accession to the Declaration could easily change from an invitation into a demand, backed by intimidations and diplomatic pressuring.²⁴⁴ The government of the United States soon faced such adversity as it wished to retain licensed raiding and reneged on signing. For Clarendon, the American reluctance to end privateering was enough reason to ponder war against 'that nation of pirates', even before the Paris Declaration had been issued.²⁴⁵ As a state, contesting the principles of maritime law thus meant seeing oneself being relegated to the status of a barbarian situated outside the ranks of civilized nations.

Opposing the decisions of the concerted Great Powers was a potentially dangerous venture, that much had become clear in the first half of the nineteenth century. Authorities of the Ottoman Regencies in North Africa had once taken a stand against European attempts to dictate the law. As we saw in Chapter 3, the rulers of Tunis and Algiers had once contested the delegitimation of privateering, maintaining that there was nothing piratical about their corsair warfare. They had even turned discourses of security and perceptions of threat against

²⁴² Cited in Lemnitzer, Power, law, pp. 37-39.

²⁴³ Kempe, *Fluch der Weltmeere*, p. 344.

²⁴⁴ Lemnitzer, Power, law, pp. 8-10.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 60-61.

the concerting Europeans themselves, noting that such intimidating attempts to enforce security threatened the very statehood of the Regencies.

By 1856, these international contestants in North Africa had disappeared or been made to change their conduct irrevocably. Violent intimidation, commercial extortion and imperial conquest had destroyed these vestiges of privateering. The French treaties of 1830, in which Tunis and Tripoli renounced corsairing, topped the process of repression. Those treaties hence were the true precursors to the Paris Declaration. They rendered privateering piratical, blurring distinctions between types of raiding. They had also been shaped by intimidation, by threatening signees into compliance. The Paris Declaration further consecrated what the fight against piracy had destroyed, sanctifying the results of the 1830 treaties and raising them to international legal standing.

Conclusion. A recurring dream

For all its suddenness, novelty and 'easy prestige', the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law actually drew from ideas, practices and terminologies that had been on the Congress System's tables for decades. The delegates in 1856 liked to stress that their diplomatic efforts linked back to 1815. They saw their work on maritime law as a next step in a development that had started at the Congress of Vienna, as evinced by the lofty claims of Walewski. Through this development, European contemporaries noted, the conduct of inter-state relations had become increasingly humane, civilized and orderly. To keep warfare within regulated bounds was central to this notion of progress.²⁴⁶ Curtailing the disruptive potential of privateering fleets could therefore seem a highly moral gesture. It hence became the go-to subject when the attendees of the Congress of Paris sought to situate 1856 on the lineage of 1815. The resulting Declaration had to crown the historical development of the Congress System, and memorialize the parties involved in its making.

Yet the Paris Declaration was also very much the product of an international context that was vastly different from that of 1815. The abolition of privateering could be such a grand but harmless gesture, such a source of easy prestige, because the number of states that continued the practice had been forcibly reduced. Those privateering entities, of which Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli were the prime Mediterranean examples, had since 1815 been fought as pirates, and framed as a threat to security at sea. The Paris Declaration therefore makes up the long-

²⁴⁶ C. Hamilton, 'Anglo-French seapower and the Declaration of Paris', *The International History Review* 4:2 (1982), pp. 166-190, there p. 190.

term aftermath of 1830, as it sought to extend one of the prominent aims of the French invasion far into the future. The notion that privateering was in essence piratical, which had helped justify the French expedition to Algiers, became more than a shared threat perception, it became a principle of international legal agreement.

By bringing an end to North African corsairing through treaties and colonization, the 1830 invasion of Algiers helped create the circumstances in which the Paris Declaration could be issued. The invasion's short-term consequences enveloped the establishment of a French presence in Algeria and the abolition of privateering in the other Regencies. Even if 1830 could not stave off revolutionary disaster for the Bourbon Restoration, it did effectively destroy state-sponsored raiding in North Africa. However, the abolition of corsairing in Tunis and Tripoli, as well as French expansion into Africa, did not result in a withering of perceived threats or a decrease of security concerns. It rather was the perceived threats and the security practices employed against them that propelled French expansionism. Despite the generally recounted historical narrative that the beginnings of French colonial rule in Algeria were confused and often contradicting, fighting the perceived 'Barbary pirate' threat (however chimerical it had become) did provide a significant degree of continuity to French conduct in Algeria. This is not to say that Algeria became a place of perfect security. The two decades that made up the mid-term aftermath of 1830 rather saw a host of new insecurities and conflicts. This was primarily so for the population of French-held Algeria, which was being subjected to brutal and often irregular types of violence. As we have seen in our discussion of the war against Abd al-Qadir, the French army was itself turning piratical with its regular execution of 'razzias' against inland tribes and communities.

New sources of insecurity also manifested themselves in the wider North African region, drawing in other imperial powers for mutual fears of French or another competitor's territorial expansion. Those potentially disruptive issues were nevertheless managed through the exact same practices of concertation that had brought the Great Power delegates to Paris in 1856. The security culture endured in the wake of 1830, through interventions in Tripoli, tensions in Tunis, a piratical upsurge in Morocco and even the Crimean War. As became clear, the ways in which the Great Powers – with the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire – managed to navigate through this series of crises exemplifies that a new international order had definitely taken shape in the Mediterranean. Through inter-imperial concertation these different parties together mediated in conflicts and kept threats to security in check for the sake of furthering mutual interests in the realms of commerce and politics.

As all these aspects of the long fight against piracy coalesced during the Congress of Paris, one last spectre of 1830 reappeared again. It was the combustible fantasy of Jules de Polignac, put to paper just before the invasion, which sought to redraw the political map of Europe, put France's expanses on former Napoleonic footing again and do away with the entire territorial settlement of the Congress of Vienna.²⁴⁷ Perhaps it was only fitting that a new Napoleon, the Emperor of the Second French Empire, brought this plan to light again.

On 26 November 1856, shortly after the Congress, Napoleon III summoned the British ambassador to talk about these old machinations, of which he had received a copy from Charles-Edmond de Boislecomte, Polignac's former cabinet chief. The Emperor noted 'that he was far from dreaming of such territorial changes', as the document had 'but historical importance'. Instead of rekindling former rivalries, he wanted to show how far Great Britain and France had come and set out how much further they could go. Britain could progress deeper into the Americas and Persia, while France could extend its African possessions, bringing 'the coast of the Mediterranean in the hands of Christians alone'. The Emperor continued: 'Instead of being jealous of each other's prosperity, each should see in the progress of the other a source of advantage to itself'. His interlocutor remained silent, but Napoleon III essentially spoke of the European, inter-imperial cooperation that solidified after 1830.²⁴⁸ Together and with mutual understanding, these European powers could circumvent and grasp the world. The corsairs of North Africa had long lowered their sails, but this hunt for imperial gain and glory was far from over.

²⁴⁷ A. Pingaud, 'Le projet Polignac (1829)', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique 14 (1900), pp. 402-410.

²⁴⁸ TNA, FO 27/1140, 'Crowley to Clarendon', Paris 28-12-1856.

Conclusion

For most of the early nineteenth century the port of Algiers had received all kinds of traffic, including returning corsairs, aspirational merchants, secretive diplomats on special missions and the armed multitudes of a colonial army. Yet by the end of the 1850s an entirely new type of visitor was making its way through the harbour: the modern tourist. Reverend Edward William Lewis Davies (1812-1894) was one specimen of this novel breed of traveller. The 55-year-old British pastor (and prolific writer on all things leisure) came to Algiers in late February 1857 and stayed for two months, hoping that the mild climate would better the health of his consumptive wife.¹ Davies and his company arrived in the North African city on a steamer from Marseille, operated by the Messageries Imperiales that carried official memoranda and private letters to the French colony, after a journey of forty-eight hours. In his later travel account, he compared the steamer to the 'best hotels in France' and noted that on board 'even a cup of good tea at daylight is not forgotten'. Upon his arrival ashore, Davies found that 'no city ever presented a cleaner appearance than Algiers'. The Reverend also assured his readers that a traveller would be perfectly secure in these environs, claiming that 'the human person is as safe, if not safer, from violence in French Algeria than it is in some parts even of Great Britain'.² Davies saw few faults in Algeria as a holiday destination, aside from the small, expensive rooms, the steep steps and the 'constant ebb and flow in the tide of visitors' that made it 'unbearable' to stay at the Hôtel de la Régence on Algiers' Place du Gouvernement.³

In many ways, the British Reverend's sojourn in the French colony of Algeria exemplified the political, military and technological changes that had so profoundly altered the appearance of the Mediterranean Sea over the course of the early nineteenth century. His travels took place on a comfortable steamer that ran within the French imperial service, and which could set course for North African shores regardless of the seasonal gales that had dictated the timing of Mediterranean crossings in the age of sail. Davies' traversal of the waters also hinted at a different conception of seaborne movement. Whereas venturing out onto the Mediterranean Sea had potentially been a dangerous undertaking, it was now a source of

¹ R. Rodgers, A Frenchwoman's imperial story. Madame Luce in nineteenth-century Algeria (Palo Alto, CA

^{2013),} p. 156. Some of Rev. Davies' other works include *Wolf-hunting and wild sport in lower Brittany* (London 1875) and *Our sea-fish and sea-food* (London 1887).

² E. Davies, Algiers in 1857. Its accessibility, climate, and resources described with especial reference to English invalids (London 1858), pp. 7, 20 and 112.
³ Ibid., pp. 12-14.

relaxation. While European sailors could in 1814 still run the risk of being robbed, captured and imprisoned in any of the three 'Barbary Regencies', by 1857 Reverend Davies set out to Algiers for the benefit of his wife's health without a care in his mind.

Would the couple's two-month holiday have been possible, or even conceivable, without the repression of 'Barbary piracy' and the concerted effort to enforce security in the Mediterranean that commenced after 1815? Overseeing the totality of the four intervening decades, the answer ought to be negative. Of course, travellers had been visiting the cities of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli for centuries, even in the heydays of 'Barbary piracy'. Charlotte of Brunswick, the Princess of Wales, had no reservations about sojourning in Tunis for several weeks in 1816. Only when a British squadron and an Admiral with a fiery temper appeared before the city did she begin to feel insecure in the Ottoman Regency. Still, regardless of such precedents, the situation in Algiers in 1857 bore the marks of the fight against piracy as a perceived threat to security. This fight had helped bring on the French colonization of Algeria, which allowed unprecedented masses of Europeans to securely venture into this former realm of danger, whether they were Maltese innkeepers, French agricultural settlers or British tourists with a fair share of money at their disposal. The latter group, in fact, would truly become a mass phenomenon. The wildly popular Murray's guidebooks added an instalment on Algiers and Tunis in 1878, whose listings of residencies, sights and excursions, 'offered the reader the prospect of a pleasurable encounter with an exotic that was preserved and made safely available'.4

What many sojourners and guidebook authors failed to note (or chose to ignore) were the asymmetries of power, the imperial structures and the colonial violence that underlay the safety of their travels. Davies did not take any issue with this fact, as he felt 'the civilization of the world gained a step' by the French colonization of Algeria, but some travellers did.⁵ The French painter and author Eugène Fromentin (1820-1876) represented this other kind of tourist, being slightly more historically aware and clamouring for an encounter with the romanticised dangers of the former pirate Regency. He spent a year on the northern edges of the Sahara in 1852-1853, where he sketched studies of the landscape and worked on notes that were published as a high-grossing serial in the *Revue de Paris*. Searching exotic adventure and craving for the mystique of the Orient, Fromentin instead found the safety and orderliness of Algeria dull. When he passed through Blida, the town that French forces razed

⁴ P. Crowley, 'Introduction. Travel, colonialism and encounters with the Maghreb: Algeria', *Studies in Travel Writing* 21:3 (2017), pp. 231-242, there p. 234. One of the first editions of the handbook is R. Playfair,

Handbook for travellers in Algeria and Tunis (London 1878).

⁵ Davies, Algiers in 1857, p. 80.

in November 1830, Fromentin noted: 'The city no longer exists. From the lips of the Arabs the name still sounds like a tender, much-missed memory of delights from days gone by'. In 1852, Blida only possessed 'immense barracks' and 'colonial streets', 'and instead of Arab life, there's camp life, the least mysterious of any'.⁶

What Fromentin found boring, and Davies convenient, was, in effect, the appearance of security. Yet that particular sense of safety had come at an unjustifiably large price in this colonial setting. It had cost lives and destroyed polities. Tranquillity apparently reigned in Algeria around the middle of the century, as French governor generals had completed their destructive project of 'pacification' and the largest sources of resistance in the northern regions of the colony had been quelled. International acceptance of the French dominion over Algeria was also firmly established by the 1850s, barring recognition from the Ottoman Porte. In a similar vein, the 'Barbary pirate' threat that had once provided such an important legitimation for the intervention had been wholly eradicated from the Mediterranean. Nothing, Fromentin argued, reminded the traveller in Algeria of this violent past. Of the colony's recent history, he wrote: 'We forget that to make it ours ten years of warfare against the Arabs (...) were necessary. A traveller remembers these things only when he passes near the cemeteries'. According to Fromentin, the past remained gravely silent: 'The real history of the colony is, here as everywhere, entrusted to tombs'.⁷ But was it really? Were warfare, insecurity and piracy as dead and buried as Fromentin made them out to be? Or was the recent past perhaps more alive in its tombs than this Orientalist adventure-seeker could have imagined?

A secure Mediterranean?

This dissertation has exhumed the series of historical events that not only made colonial Algeria a safe destination for European tourists, but that also reshaped the Mediterranean Sea as a space of security. Historians have long maintained there was a greater degree of safety on the Mediterranean Sea in second half of the nineteenth century than there had ever been since the heydays of the Roman Empire.⁸ Yet it remained unclear how this safety exactly took shape, especially in relation to the underlying notions of threat that guided the pursuit of maritime security. Over the course of the preceding chapters, we have therefore uncovered the

⁶ E. Fromentin, *Between sea and Sahara. An Orientalist adventure* (trans. B. Robinson, London and New York 2004), pp. xxiii-xxiv and 80-81.

⁷ Ibid., p. 73.

⁸ D. Abulafia, The great sea. A human history of the Mediterranean (London 2011), p. 561.

historical engagement with purported threats at sea, and thereby traced the creation of a new order of security in the Mediterranean. We have thus seen how the repression of 'Barbary piracy', which European contemporaries perceived as one of the most urgent and persistent threats to security, was used to effectuate significant changes in the Mediterranean region. In fact, the fight against this imputed piratical threat fostered new ideas of the Mediterranean as a regional whole that could be rendered secure through policing efforts and imperial interventions. As a result, the appearance of the Mediterranean Sea and its shorelines changed profoundly between 1815, when the fight against 'Barbary piracy' slowly commenced, and the closing years of the 1850s, when the Mediterranean seemed perfectly secure from piratical threats.

This dissertation has analysed how these changes came about, and weighed their impact. It showed that ideas and practices of security reshaped regional politics, altered local economies and destroyed a sea-spanning tradition of licensed maritime raiding. The changing fates of the three 'Barbary Regencies' in North Africa indicated how old states disappeared and new ones were created through the fight against piracy. Algiers was invaded, conquered and colonized by the French, Tripoli had to give up its autonomous status to direct Ottoman control and the authorities of Tunis embarked on a large project of state reform in a bid to keep their independence from European as well as Ottoman dominion.

Economically, the alleged 'pirate nests' of North Africa were forced to subject to new standards of free trade. The Regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli each had to be remodelled and integrated in the new commercial regime that was being set up in the Mediterranean by the concerting European powers. Officials, activists and merchants from all over Europe had started to frame the raids of the North African corsairs as piracy in part because this maritime activity was allegedly incompatible with the upsurge of commerce that they expected would follow after 1815. Europeans' material losses to the 'Barbary pirates' were not particularly significant at this time, as North African corsairing steadily declined during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Still, commerce was an important factor in the fight against piracy and the remaking of the Mediterranean. It featured as a legitimation and prospected goal of repressive efforts. Over the preceding chapters, we have seen how attempts to end corsairing often went hand-in-hand with the 'opening up' of North African markets to European trade. In practice, this meant that all three Regencies increasingly had to face imbalances of foreign trade, devaluations of their currencies and invasive ventures of European entrepreneurs, especially after the 1830s.

Thirdly, the European repression of North Africa's privateers as pirate outlaws effectively destroyed the broader Mediterranean tradition of sanctioned maritime raiding, or corsairing. Although European actors undertook their repressive efforts in the name of a still rudimentary international public law, the fight against 'Barbary piracy' actually disregarded and dismantled the established Mediterranean frameworks of the legal and reciprocal warfare carried out through privateering and the ransoming of captives. In their place, the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856 completely abolished privateering and equated it with piracy.

The new order of security that emerged in the Mediterranean during the first half of the nineteenth century was thus marked by imperial domination, commercial inequalities and an international law that disrupted regional legal traditions. Yet none of these changes sparked the sort of massive, drawn-out conflicts between empires that had proven so disruptive during the decades of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars that preceded 1815. In this dissertation, I have highlighted how the inter-imperial characteristics of the new regional order can account for the absence of warfare amongst the Great Powers. As we have seen, the provision of security on Mediterranean waters could generate international disagreements and provoke conflicts. British and French claims of protection over smaller power shipping clashed repeatedly. Plans for Christian maritime alliances against the 'Barbary Regencies' ignited fears of Russian expansionism. French assertions that an invasion of Algiers would foster European security brought dismay from British and Austrian statesmen in 1830. Still, large-scale European wars over these issues did not break out, not even in the times of greatest tension.

To clarify why such wars did not occur, this dissertation used the analytical tool of the security culture to study the post-1815 fight against Mediterranean piracy. As it arose amongst European statesmen in the wake of Napoleonic Wars, this security culture enveloped shared idioms of security, shared perceptions of threat and shared understandings of how to enact security in practice. The concerted management of issues that had the potential to rekindle large-scale European conflict characterised this security culture. To foster such concertation, contemporary statesmen, diplomats and lower-ranking officials created and maintained an international system of congresses, ambassadorial conferences and expert commissions that had to generate agreement and legitimize subsequent security practices. These frameworks informed the repression of 'Barbary piracy', as this particular threat to security featured in multilateral discussions throughout the early nineteenth century. By viewing the fight against 'Barbary piracy' through the conceptual lens of the security culture,

it becomes clear that its nineteenth-century repression depended much more on concerted, European endeavours than the historiography's proponents of British naval hegemony and the 'Pax Britannica' would allow for.⁹ Hence, the new order that arose in the Mediterranean had a decidedly inter-imperial character, as it depended on the multilateral management of security issues and the avoidance of mutual conflict.

Still, this discussion of the new inter-imperial order that emerged in the Mediterranean does not answer the main question of this dissertation. The question, that is, of *how* discourses and practices of security fostered the creation of this new Mediterranean order. Therefore, we will now return to the three hypotheses that I laid out in the introduction to this work, and find out whether security indeed functioned as a legitimizing discourse, perpetuating logic and ordering principle during the four decades between 1815 and 1856, when the fight against 'Barbary piracy' was in full swing.

Security as legitimation and contestation

If there was but one strand of continuity throughout the manifold changes that reshaped the international order on the Mediterranean in the first half of the nineteenth century, then it was certainly the concept of 'security'. The term itself kept popping up during the period that has been under scrutiny in this dissertation. 'Security' appeared in many places and in the company of many different adjacent terms. It featured in diplomatic correspondences, treaty texts, congress protocols, travel journals, activist pamphlets, ship logs, court files and a fair share of poetry. Its terminological companions were not just 'tranquillity' and 'peace', but also signifiers that spawned notions such as the 'security of commerce', 'of navigation', 'of the flag' or even 'of the Mediterranean'. Security was thus omnipresent in the nineteenthcentury sources, featuring prominently in the archival and published materials that I have drawn from. Why was this the case? As we have seen, the terminology of security could become so omnipresent not only because it held a strong emotive component for contemporary actors, as it gave expression to a longing for future stability, for peace and tranquillity after all the upheaval of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The notion of security could rise to such international prominence also because it had a strong legitimizing potential, allowing historical actors to bolster calls for action and justify implemented practices in fighting off purported threats to that future stability.

⁹ P. Kennedy, *The rise and fall of British naval mastery* (London 1976), pp. 158-163; J. Kraska, *Maritime power and the law of the seas. Expeditionary operations in world politics* (New York 2011), pp. 50-57; R. Holland, *Blue-water empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London 2012), p. 66.

Invocations of security helped foster a repressive turn against the privateering of the North African Regencies due to the term's legitimizing function. This effect immediately became apparent at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, when European actors began to frame this old type of maritime raiding as a 'Barbary pirate' threat to the newfound order of peace. The first to do so were the public activists and smaller power diplomats who attempted to put the threat of 'Barbary piracy' on the international agenda during the peace negotiations of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. Their calls for action already illustrated how references to security could easily combine with plans for European conquest, colonization and crusading in North Africa. Such proposals for general leagues and universal alliances of the European, 'civilized' or Christian powers were not entirely new. Their pleas harkened back to many an Enlightenment tract that had made similar suggestions to end the 'piracies' of the 'Barbary Regencies'.¹⁰

Still, the agenda-setting efforts at the Congress of Vienna could have a much greater impact because they coincided with the creation of a new continental order of security. The Congress' Final Acts and the follow-up Treaty of Paris of November 1815 instigated a lasting peace among the powers of Europe that would enable governments to work together against shared threats. More importantly, these agreements also laid out a new frameworks of multilateral diplomacy, in which regular congresses, ambassadorial conferences and international committees had to bring peaceful solutions to pressing issues of continental importance. The perceived threat of 'Barbary piracy' became one of these issues that Great Power officials tried to settle together through negotiations on potential solutions and mutually acceptable lines of action. The pirate threat hence featured in official deliberations during the ambassadorial conferences in London (1816-1823) and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818). It was this link to the broader security culture of the post-Napoleonic period that had to don repressive efforts against the North African Regencies with a shimmer of legitimacy.

In studying the wake of 1815, we have encountered many instances in which European actors called on collective security to legitimize the repression of 'Barbary piracy', albeit to mixed results. The British Admiral Lord Exmouth, for instance, declared to Dey Omar Agha of Algiers that his privateering had to stop in March 1816, as this had 'become necessary under the present change of the political situation in Europe'.¹¹ When Omar Agha rejected,

¹⁰ A. Thomson, *Barbary and Enlightenment. European attitudes towards the Maghreb in the 18th century* (Leiden and New York 1987), pp. 130-132.

¹¹ TNA, FO 8/2, 'Exmouth to Croker', Algiers 06-04-1816, attached 'Exmouth to Dey of Algiers', 24-03-1816.

Exmouth came back and proceeded to bombard Algiers on 27 August, together with a Dutch squadron. Over a decade later, French officials noted that an invasion of Algiers would finally be able to ensure the 'security of the Mediterranean'.¹² In the aftermath of this invasion, a French diplomat in Constantinople argued that keeping the former Regency as a conquest was 'perhaps the sole effective means of bringing a clear and complete security' to the seas, and asserted this position was in accordance with 'general opinion in Europe'.¹³ Security, defined in direct relation to the European system of conferences and congresses, thus repeatedly had to justify militant diplomacies, violent interventions and territorial conquest by referring to the supposedly overarching interests of uninterrupted commerce, the spread of civilization or the enforcement of international law.

At the same time, such references to security worked to denounce and delegitimize the conduct of the allegedly piratical actors and political entities. Together with calls for repressive action, discourses of security and perceptions of threat helped undermine the existing treaty relations and established institutions that regulated the privateering activities of the North African Regencies. The perception of the North African privateers as pirates brought forth the idea that the authorities who licensed them were not legitimate sovereigns, but bandit leaders at best. Journalists and pamphleteers first began to question the worth of treaties with the Regencies right after the Congress of Vienna. European statesmen and diplomats followed suit after some hesitation. By attempting to make the Regencies stop the 'piracies' of their corsairs, these European actors effectively called into question the sovereign status and belligerent rights of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.

However, neither the authorities in North Africa nor their suzerain in Constantinople readily accepted such infringements of sovereignty on the basis of security claims and piracy accusations. On the contrary, they felt that old diplomatic agreements and legal arrangements dating back to the early modern period were suddenly being upended and redrawn. As we have seen throughout the preceding chapters, non-European actors criticized, contested and opposed the discourses and practices of security that were geared against them. In September 1819, Mahmud Bey of Tunis vocally rejected the demands of an Anglo-French diplomatic expedition to end corsairing, stating that he had never 'so disregarded customs and infringed treaties as to deserve such a letter from you'.¹⁴ Likewise, in the same year Djanib Effendi in Constantinople criticized the supposed legality of concerted European efforts directed against

¹² CADLC, 8CP/630, 'Polignac to Laval', Paris 05-05-1830, fp. 203-210.

¹³ CADN, 166PO/E/159, 'Memorandum remis au Reis-Effendi dans la Conférence du 14-08-[1830] à Orta Keuï'.

¹⁴ TNA, CO 2/10, 'Translated declaration of Mahmud Bey', Tunis 29-09-1819, fp. 81-83.

the Ottoman Empire. He noted that the Ottoman Sultan had not shared in the deliberations of the congresses and was 'in no wise bound by their resolves'.¹⁵ The legitimizing function of security could thus be heavily contested, indicating that security practices were also seen as illegal infringements of sovereignty and unwarranted intimidations, which ran against established international legal standards.

In showing that security functioned as a legitimation for militant diplomacy and violent action, this dissertation has provided further insight into the how and why of the post-1815 repression of North African corsairing. The rise of security as a central concern in European diplomacy and the simultaneous creation of an international framework to manage security can together explain the timing and progress of the nineteenth-century fight against 'Barbary piracy'. Histories of the North African corsairs have stressed that their repression resulted from the 'return to peace' in Europe, or from a change in European 'outlooks' and 'attitudes' following the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁶ Over the course of these chapters, however, we have obtained a deeper understanding of these changes. We have found out that discourses and practices of security, no matter how disputed, were of paramount importance in the repression of the 'Barbary pirate' threat. Security, as we have seen, worked to topple the old system of treaties and legal arrangements that regulated maritime raiding in the Mediterranean, creating in its stead a new, hierarchical international order. On the basis of Great Power security considerations, contemporary statesmen created a ranking of powers in which first-rank members could overrule smaller powers or trample upon supposedly 'uncivilized' polities like the North African Regencies. The notion of security thereby inspired the fight against piracy's beginnings, drove its progress and, at times, directed its course towards unforeseen destinations

'A mist that time will soon dispel'. Security's perpetuating logic

At certain pivotal moments, the effort to foster security on Mediterranean waters appeared to evade international control and seemed to take on a dynamic all of its own. Though it was

¹⁵ TNA, FO 78/92, 'Liston to Castlereagh', Constantinople 06-08-1819, fp. 209-212.

¹⁶ D. Panzac, *Barbary corsairs. The end of a legend, 1800-1820* (Leiden and Boston 2005), pp. 4-5; C. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death. European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth century',

Journal for Maritime Research 18:2 (2016), pp. 139-154.

part of a longer historical process, the fight against the threat of 'Barbary piracy' was not a matter of simply enforcing a repressive regime. Nor was it a linear affair that neatly followed a particular policy into implementation. Contestations by local, non-European actors did much to upend and reverse the concerted practices of security. Yet even the most senior European statesmen who were involved in its makings sometimes had no idea of how the fight against piracy would develop.

An illustrative example is a remark by Prince Metternich from March 1830, when the French government appeared set on invading Algiers and invoked European security but would not offer details of its further plans in North Africa. 'The entire affair', Metternich noted, 'is enveloped in a mist that time will soon dispel, and I am afraid that once this veil is raised, there will remain nothing but regrettable and compromising intrigues'.¹⁷ Anxious of a potential war between France and Great Britain, the Austrian statesman thus dreaded the unforeseen consequences that security efforts could bring. Indeed, few diplomats and pamphleteers in 1815 would have expected that vanquished France was going to invade and eventually colonize Algiers under the banner of the fight against 'Barbary piracy'. Yet security efforts begot new security efforts as perceived threats proved elusive or resilient, which meant that the repression of piracy developed in unanticipated ways.

In the first three chapters of this dissertation it nevertheless became clear that the incontrollable and unpredictable nature of security was discernible from the start. The international treatment of 'Barbary piracy' as a threat to security developed beyond the control and against the wishes of Great Power statesmen from the very beginning of the post-1815 period. Uninvited activists, distant writers and smaller power diplomats brought the issue of 'Barbary piracy' to international attention during the Congress of Vienna, contrary to Metternich's and Castlereagh's unwillingness to discuss the violent repression of this purported threat.

The fight against piracy continued to elude Great Power control after the Congress of Vienna as well. Dutch and Spanish officials set up their own defensive league against the North African corsairs in 1816 and tried to turn their arrangement into a general European alliance. This Spanish-Dutch initiative had Tsar Alexander I's sympathy, which sparked British and Austrian fears of Russian expansionism in the Mediterranean. Great Power representatives subsequently attempted to create their own 'system of security' against piracy, but failed. Throughout the nineteenth century, Europe's most senior officials thus

¹⁷ HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich, Diplomatische Korrespondenz, 276, 'Metternich to Appony', Vienna 19-03-1830, fp. 53-54.

endeavoured to outclass smaller power security practices by seeking to address the underlying concerns. My analysis of such attempts has shown that security could be an obligation as much as an instrument, and could drag governments into unintended ventures.

Contemporary actors became increasingly aware of security's perpetuating logic over the course of the early nineteenth century. The French invasion of Algiers in 1830 and its aftermath particularly impressed European and Ottoman officials of this dynamic. Renewed security concerns as well as revived threat perceptions of 'Barbary piracy' and 'brigandage' drew the French military deeper and deeper into the North African hinterlands during the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, up to the point where French colonial expansionism threatened to breach the borders of neighbouring Tunis and Morocco. We have also seen how this nearly unbridled expansion went hand-in-hand with the growing irregularity of French military conduct in the colony, as imperial troops carried out 'razzias', subjected prisoners to forced labour and thus began to act in piratical ways themselves.

Officials of the European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire subsequently turned to the tried and tested diplomatic practices of the post-1815 security culture to keep territorial conquest in North Africa in check. Colonial expansionism, with its propensity for generating inter-imperial conflict, thus became the threat that had to be managed through multilateral diplomacy, mediation and concerted action – even if actual conferences and congresses on this issue did not take place. Even in the wake of 1830, which is so often posited as the end of the post-Napoleonic international order, we have encountered Ottoman, Spanish, Austrian, Prussian, British and French officials who cooperated and concerted to keep potential crises within bounds, including revolutions in Tripoli, a looming Sardinian invasion of Tunis and the resurgent piracy in the Rif region of Morocco.

When overseeing the totality of the decades between 1815 and 1856 it is strikingly apparent that security efforts in the fight against piracy ceaselessly generated new uncertainties and constantly revived perceptions of threat. This is not to say that security practices against piracy failed or that the new order in the Mediterranean was not actually secure. In this dissertation, such questions have not been of primary interest. The enduring cycle of security practices and renewed anxieties rather indicates how security's perpetuating logic helped drive the fight against piracy, which was never entirely carried out by a single naval hegemon and which often evaded the control of Europe's most senior statesmen. This perpetuating logic also fostered the highly productive relationship between security and imperial expansion, as the repression of evasive threats could be used to justify further domination. Contemporary visions of security in the Mediterranean revolved around the promise of an orderly future, but it were ultimately the tools of empire that had to bring that orderly future about.

Security and the ordering of the waters

Despite the many unexpected reversals, sudden dashes and unintended consequences that made the fight against Mediterranean piracy such an open-ended historical process, it always came with a specific vision of the future. 'Security', as Jeremy Bentham had it in his oft-cited dictum, 'turns its eye exclusively to the future'.¹⁸ That future vision was highly normative and rested on a recurrent imaginary of threat and danger. It tended to envelop presumptions that the Mediterranean Sea was going to be a space of legality, prosperity and civilization once piratical threats were finally eradicated. Regardless of who was speaking or enacting security, the individuals involved usually referenced such visions of the Mediterranean as an orderly place. If the notion of security always entails the expectation being free from harm in the future, then the vision of an orderly Mediterranean was the fight against piracy's ultimate promise. This future orderliness was certainly not the sole objective that French, British or Dutch actors had in mind when they carried out repressive efforts against the 'Barbary pirates'. Still, it provided a shared sense of purpose to that fight. This conception of the fight against piracy as an ordering project hence represents the third and final way in which security engendered changes in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean.

The idea that the eradication of the 'Barbary pirates' would bring orderliness to the Mediterranean imbued many calls for their violent suppression. Sir William Sidney Smith's proposals at the Congress of Vienna already put forth that promise. This retired Admiral of the Royal Navy, and self-appointed head of the 'Knights Liberators of the Slaves in Africa', noted that piracy would only end when North Africa was reigned by governments 'useful to commerce', which lived in 'harmony with all civilized nations'.¹⁹ Commercial benefits and the spread of civilization were thus the supposed benefits of fighting piracy. Arguing in a similar vein, the British radical pressman William Hone stated that the destruction of 'Barbary piracy' could pacify the Mediterranean in a pamphlet that he issued shortly after the Congress of Vienna. He declared that a 'Saturnian reign' was about to commence, in which peaceable tendencies would prevail over the incessant warmongering of the North African

¹⁸ B. de Graaf and C. Zwierlein, 'Historicizing security. Entering the conspiracy dispositive', *Historical Social Research* 38:1 (2013), pp. 46-64, there p. 52.

¹⁹ W. Smith, *Mémoire sur la nécessité et les moyens de faire cesser les pirateries des états barbaresques* (London 1814), p. 5.

Regencies.²⁰ The same sentiments made Tsar Alexander I profess his support for a general alliance against 'Barbary piracy' in 1816, when he was toying with ideas on the complete disarmament of Europe.²¹

Such prospects of peace, tranquillity and prosperity in the Mediterranean for the long haul nevertheless had to justify violent action against the purportedly piratical states of North Africa in the short run. New vistas of order almost necessarily came with short-term preemptive interventions to attain and protect that secure future. In this way, the general peace that arrived in Europe after 1815 was directly related to imperial expansion and warfare outside the continent. The Ottoman authorities appeared keenly aware of this link between the peaceable projects of the European powers and the possibility of violent intervention. In the summer of 1819, following a series of concerted communications by the Great Power ambassadors in Constantinople, Sultan Mahmud II warned his vassals in North Africa: 'If you do not stop attacking the ships of these empires, they will join forces and attack you'.²² Such concerns proved to be well founded when French forces unilaterally invaded Algiers in 1830 with the avowed aim of fostering 'the security of the Mediterranean'. Again, violent action against the purported threat of 'Barbary piracy' was accompanied by visions of a peaceful future. A note that the French royal council discussed in August 1830 further set out what this project of Mediterranean security entailed, namely: 'changing the appearance of the entire African coast, perhaps bringing that continent to culture, civilization, and free communication'.²³

As the fight against piracy proceeded, this ordering principle transitioned from the realm of discourse and expectation to that of codified international law. Though European actors often talked of the 'Laws of Civilized Nations' or 'the rights and usages considered as sacred by all civilized nations', international law existed only in a rudimentary shape for much of the early nineteenth century.²⁴ The frameworks of collective security that arose in 1814-1815, with its supporting architecture of multilateral treaties, protocols and conference proceedings, in itself constituted a body of international law according to its creators. Yet, not everyone subscribed to this opinion, as the many non-European contestations of measures against 'Barbary piracy'

²⁰ W. Hone, *The cruelties of the Algerine pirates. Shewing the present dreadful state of the English slaves and other Europeans at Algiers and Tunis* (London 1816), p. 15.

²¹ Vnešnjaja politika Rossii, ser. 2, vol. 1, pp. 108-111, 'Tsar Alexander to Castlereagh', 21-03/(02-04)-1816; Palmer, *Alexander*, pp. 354-355.

²² BOA, HAT 300/17829 (1234 L 24) 16-08-1819.

²³ CADLC, 2MD/16, 'Note pour le conseil. Entreprise formée contre les Régences Barbaresques', [??]-08-1830, fp. 37-44.

²⁴ NL-HaNA, 2.05.44, inv. 59, 'Croker to Exmouth', 18-07-1816; TNA, FO 8/3, 'Note to the Dey of Algiers', 05-09-1819, fp. 172-173.

indicated. In addition, this new order of revised international law turned out to be highly hierarchical, giving primacy to the concerns and interests of the Great Powers over those of the second- and third-rank states or of the imputed 'uncivilised' polities.

Strikingly enough, the legal arguments behind the repression of the 'Barbary pirates' only entered into recorded international law in a post-hoc fashion. The Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856 stipulated that 'Privateering is, and remains, abolished', but the privateers of North Africa had nevertheless been fought as pirates since the coming of European peace after the Congress of Vienna.²⁵ By 1856, Algiers had already been conquered and the authorities of Tunis and Tripoli had long been forced to renounce their corsairing forever. The concerted European effort to suppress 'Barbary piracy' may have been animated by the wish to reshape the Mediterranean as a space of order, prosperity, civilization and legality, but the normative bases of that ordering project were only created when most of the fighting was already done, when the daunting figure of the pirate already seemed to have disappeared from the Mediterranean seaboard.

The old pirate

As we put them together and observed them throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, we may conclude that discourses and practices of security against the perceived threat of piracy fostered the creation of a new inter-imperial order in the Mediterranean in three important ways. They legitimized the concerted repressive actions and unilateral imperial interventions that had to remove piracy from Mediterranean waters, even if that legitimacy was open to contestation. Security also helped reshape the Mediterranean through the perpetuation of practices, as threats proved elusive or actors latched onto previous security efforts to carry out unexpected and unprecedented policies. Finally, notions of security gave the fight against piracy a sense of purpose, providing it with the ordering principle of a tranquil future that could be attained through the eradication of threat.

To understand how the new Mediterranean order of the nineteenth century took shape it has proven necessary to look beyond the standard clarifications of naval hegemony, rising international law, progressive state-building and altered European attitudes towards maritime raiding. In going beyond those clarifications, we have found out how contemporaries made sense of and worked towards the creation of a new order in the Mediterranean, uncovering how they distinguished threats and carried out repressive efforts, all within a broader security

²⁵ CADLC, 53MD/2117, No. 34, 'Projet de déclaration', fp. 93-95.

culture that they themselves created in the immediate aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.

This effort to fight threats and manage shared security concerns was far from over in 1856, if only because piracy did not disappear from the waters of the world's seas. Reports indicate that pirates continued to roam around the eastern Mediterranean islands of the Aegean Sea on an annual basis, setting out for prey in the summer months.²⁶ The marauders of Morocco's Rif region did not stop their activities either. Coastal communities turned to piracy sporadically in times of hardship, which happened in the late 1890s.²⁷ Beyond the Mediterranean, concerting European powers and the U.S. navy took on piracy together in the South China Sea from 1866 onwards.²⁸ Indeed, the sort of inter-imperial cooperation and combined naval effort that we have seen in our Mediterranean case became increasingly common in other localities and colonial settings around the world.²⁹

This multilateral, cooperative engagement against shared security concerns was not beholden to the perceived threat of piracy. The concerted dynamics of the security culture were also at play in other realms and other guises in the second half of the nineteenth century. They shaped the workings of new institutions like the European Commission of the Danube (initiated at the Congress of Paris in 1856), the committee that oversaw the European intervention in the Syrian civil wars of the 1860s and the mixed courts regime that was established in Egypt after 1876.³⁰ Similar efforts to fight shared threats together could also be discerned on the non-diplomatic level by the end of the nineteenth century, which further attests to the longevity and expansiveness of the perceived threat of anarchist terror in the 1890s and 1900s indicates that the security culture continued to work until the outbreak of the First World War. The repression of alleged anarchist terrorists also highlights that distinctions

²⁶ CCM, MR.4.4.3.5.3, 'Min.-Sec. Marine to CCM', Paris 04-06-1854.

²⁷ C. Pennell, *A Country with a government and a flag. The Rif War in Morocco, 1921-1926* (Wisbech 1986), p. 30.

²⁸ J. Chappell, 'Maritime raiding, international law and the suppression of piracy on the South China Coast, 1842–1869', *The International History Review* (2017), pp. 1-20, there pp. 11-14.

²⁹ L. Benton and L. Ford, *Rage for order. The British Empire and the origins of international law, 1800-1850* (London and Cambridge 2016), p. 145.

³⁰ C. Ardeleanu, 'An experiment in international administration'. The European Commission of the Danube and the security of Danubian navigation in the long 19th century (forthcoming, Brill); O. Ozavci, Dangerous gifts. Imperialism, security, and civil wars in the Levant, 1798-1864 (forthcoming, Oxford University Press); B. de Graaf, "To give to the indigenous people the same security as to the European people". The Mixed Courts of Egypt between progress and providence' (forthcoming journal article).

between legitimate and illegitimate violence, which took shape during the repression of Mediterranean piracy, remained an important aspect of security efforts well beyond 1856.³¹

The history of security thus endured further into the nineteenth century. The developments that had marked the fight against Mediterranean piracy were far from over by the 1850s. Security continued to bring actors together in common projects, it continued to provide a legitimation for repressive action against all sorts of perceived threats to order. The past did not lay silent in its tombs, not even in colonial Algeria. Though we have encountered few actual pirates in this dissertation, owing to the belligerent status of North Africa's corsairs, one could still encounter pirate-like figures in 1850s Algiers that appeared to live up to all the contemporary literary clichés. Contrary to what Eugène Fromentin noted in his travel writings, the memory of the fight against piracy and the demise of the corsairs was still very much alive by the middle of the century. Reverend Davies, the French artist's fellow tourist from Great Britain, encountered these memories in the living flesh when his wife went on a boat tour of the harbour of Algiers. Having put her on the small sloop, Davies noticed something about the local tour guide:

'he looked the personification of an Algerian pirate, and had doubtless cut many a throat and scuttled many a fine ship in his day. He had lived at Malta and had picked up a little English, of which he was very proud. He affected a love for our countrymen; saw Lord Exmouth bring the Queen Charlotte to an anchor under the very guns of the fort, and heard him send his famous message to the Dey, in which he gave him two hours to deliberate on the terms proposed. (...) But the old corsair was more than garrulous: he was crafty and revengeful as any tiger. He hated the French mortally, and could not understand why they, after taking the city, did not take themselves off as other conquerors had before them. On every occasion on which he was hired, he remembered to point out the weak parts of the French fortifications, and suggested that if English powder was as strong as it was formerly, the city was no stronger now than in the days of Lord Exmouth'.³²

Whether the exchange actually took place or not, the remarks of the old guide still indicate that the past was not dead and buried in 1857 – as it never really is. A righteous anger rings through the Algerian pirate's words, even if they possibly were only penned down for literary effect. His statements contain the dismay and indignation brought on by colonial rule, fanned on by the inconsistencies of imperial civilizing efforts that supposedly brought security but often involved mere violence. Sentiments such as those of the old man in Algiers would grow unabatedly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They would bring on new

³¹ W. Klem, 'Founded on fear. Transnational police cooperation against the anarchist "conspiracy", 1880s-1914' (unpublished PhD dissertation, Utrecht University 2019).

³² Davies, Algiers in 1857, pp. 116-117.

conflicts and further insecurities that last until today, but which are rarely understood as faraway echoes of the nineteenth-century fight against piracy.

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Scholarships and awards	
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Peer-reviewed journ	nal articles
2016	'Imperiale angsten. Veiligheid en wereldrijken in de historiografie', <i>Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis</i> 129:4 (November 2016), pp. 615-630 ['Imperial Anxieties. Security and Empires in Historiography']
Peer-reviewed book	chapters
(Forthcoming, 2020)	'The Plague at Sea. Science, Sanitation and Corsair Captains in 1817' in: Peter Burschel and Sünne Jüterczenka (eds.), <i>Frühneuzeit-Impulse</i> , vol. 4, <i>Das Meer. Maritime Lebenswelten</i> <i>in der Frühen Neuzeit</i> (Cologne: Böhlau)
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Book reviews	
2018	'Review of: Meeks, Joshua: France, Britain, and the Struggle for the Revolutionary Western Mediterranean. Cham: PalgraveMacmillan 2017' in: H-Soz-Kult, 18-05-2018, available at https://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher- 28630