

7 Americanising the Belgian civilising mission (1941–1961)

The Belgian information centre in New York and the campaign to cast the Belgian civilising mission as part of the Point IV Programme

Frank Gerits

Introduction: the ‘Congo Factor’ in Belgian diplomacy

In 1941 three Belgian women toured the United States. They gave lectures in women’s clubs on the Nazi occupation of Belgium. Particularly ‘miss B’, who had ‘rick blond hair and sparkling eyes’ was so successful that Jan-Albert Goris, the director of the Belgian Information Center (BIC) in New York, wanted to hire her permanently. Goris managed Belgium’s public diplomacy operation in the United States, a type of foreign policy that engages foreign publics through pamphlets, radio and film. Cultural diplomacy, an interaction with the public that relies on exhibitions, art and theatre was an important component of this effort.¹ Ambassador Georges Theunis, who had been sent to the United States (US) in October 1939 as a special envoy, however, doubted if ‘miss B’ was the right choice. She, together with the other female speakers, had been rumoured to have several extramarital affairs, since their husbands worked for different companies in the Belgian colony of the Congo. They earned the nickname ‘Congolese widows’ because they had the habit of swarming around every Belgian minister that visited New York in the hope of obtaining some news about their spouses.²

The story of the ‘Congolese widows’ highlights the extent to which the ‘Congo factor’ affected all aspects of Belgian diplomacy, including public diplomacy and the gossip at embassies.³ BIC officials, documents from the foreign affairs archives in Brussels suggest, sidestepped the Cold War and instead utilised modernisation theory and the colonial development efforts in a public diplomacy campaign to increase their margins of manoeuvre with US officials. The relationship between the US and European empires, historians have argued, was held together by the fear of Communist revolt in Africa.⁴ Comparatively little attention has been paid to the role of colonial interests in the Belgian efforts to acquire more influence in Washington. Belgian foreign relations scholars have claimed Belgian politicians never had a lot of interest in the empire that comprised Congo, Ruanda-Burundi.⁵ Instead, the 1950s and 1960s are cast as the decades of Cold War consensus in which the Belgian diplomatic establishment came to support the US after a short detour during the immediate post-war period in which Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak had attempted to forge a good relationship with the Soviet Union and create

a 'third force'.⁶ What motivated diplomats has been reduced to the safeguarding of economic interests, an interpretation rooted in the memoirs of politicians such as Spaak and Paul van Zeeland who were welcomed at the State Department.⁷ Summarising the post-revisionist scholarship, historian Vincent Dujardin writes that 'history' shows 'that if a small country such as Belgium wishes to have any international influence, it must be represented by an exceptional figure'.⁸ The 'Congo Factor', as historian of the Congo Guy Vanthemsche termed it, only figures in the scholarship of Belgium's diplomatic history as a form of embarrassment or, alternatively, as a source of power, particularly since the US relied on the uranium supply from Congo.⁹

The BIC's public diplomacy activities, however, suggest colonialism was at the heart of efforts by Brussels to increase its influence in Washington. Moreover, the BIC office in New York was essential in this attempt to increase the margins for manoeuvre since, as Odd Arne Westad writes, 'no European elite after 1945 was in doubt that it needed US support in order to keep its influence in Africa and that it therefore needed to work with, and sometimes on the Americans'.¹⁰ Although a lot of work remains to be done, it is clear that a colonial perspective on the Trans-Atlantic area sheds new light on the emphasis put on shared ideals and joint policy decisions.¹¹ In the 1960s Karl Deutsch and Hans Morgenthau already criticised the notion of an Atlantic Community that had been peddled by politically engaged historians and political scientists in the 1950s.¹² According to Deutsch, NATO could not be defined as a 'pluralistic security community' because for a community of this sort to develop there had to be a political community with widely spread shared values and communication as well as integration.¹³ Similarly, Morgenthau developed his 'realist' alliance theory in 1959 which argued alliances were a 'community of interests' formed against a common enemy that crumble once the adversary has perished. In the course of the 1980s, however, liberal institutionalist IR scholars like Stanley Sloan, Wallace Thies and Beatrice Heuser revalued the 'shared ideas about man, government and society'. In Sloan's interpretation, for instance, the Atlantic Community was a bastion of common values that required protection from a hostile world.¹⁴ The power of shared values has also seeped into Linda Risso's historical study of the NATO Information Service in which the dividing lines are drawn between US officials who felt cooperation was essential in the battle for hearts and minds and the European powers who wanted to retain their freedom of action. The question of colonialism is evaded.¹⁵

From the perspective of the BIC it becomes clear that colonialism complicated Trans-Atlanticism. Belgian public diplomats relied on a more intricate strategy in which a key concern of US foreign policy towards Africa and Asia, namely economic development and technical assistance, were targeted.

Roosevelt and the Belgian Congo as a war zone in public diplomacy for elites (1941–1949)

The BIC opened its doors in 1941, one year after the Office Belge d'Information et de Documentation was established in London to disseminate information in non-occupied countries. The consulate in New Orleans also organised conferences and

cooperated extensively with Henry Dutilleux, a BIC official responsible for radio and cinema and Robert Goffin who authored radio scripts. By 1943 three Belgian propaganda bureaus – so-called *bureau de propaganda* – had been founded in Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and their activities were monitored by the State Department, as required by US law.¹⁶ Goris coordinated the public diplomacy effort from his office in New York. He was a Flemish writer who, under the pseudonym Marnix Gijsens, published books such as *Lucinda en de lotoseter* in which the protagonist travelled the US. As the commissioner-general he had been appointed by the government to set up the Belgian pavilion of the New York World Fair of 1939, of which the building with Arthur Dupagne's bas-relief on the Congo was resurrected at Virginia Union University, a historically black college, once the fair was over.¹⁷ Goris got the job because he frequented the same social milieu as Belgian politicians. In 1926, for instance, he had visited the US as a fellow of the Educational Foundation of the Commission for Relief in Belgium together with later prime minister Gaston Eyskens.¹⁸ From its inception, Belgian colonialism played a crucial role in the BIC's war time propaganda which targeted not only the US citizens and officials but also a Latin-American public that received translated pamphlets such as *Noticias de Belgica*.¹⁹

In those BIC pamphlets, Belgium was presented as a small country that despite its occupation by Nazi Germany was still contributing to the war effort with the help of its colonial resources. With pamphlets such as *The Belgian Campaign in Ethiopia*, BIC officials sought to erect the Congo as a screen behind which to hide the swift capitulation of Belgium after only eighteen days in May 1940. The Governor-general in Leopoldville, Pierre Ryckmans, had declared his support to the allies and turned his back on King Leopold II who had capitulated and refused to follow his government into exile in London. Consequently, large companies such as the *Union Minière*, the principal mining company in Katanga, as well as the Belgian Congo's African army, the *Force Publique*, were presented as significant contributors to the war effort. *The Grand Work of the Free Belgian Forces*, which conquered Asosa and Gambela in Ethiopia, was shown at universities while photos of Ryckmans's inspection of a scout car were widely disseminated with a tag line which informed the reader that the Congo was an 'important source of raw materials for the United Nations'. Additionally, the Congo also offered an opportunity to showcase the tenacity of the Belgian resistance while the tensions between the King and his government in exile were brushed over. A radio show about a 'Belgian hero' who had faced the firing squad eleven times was produced in 1942 while pamphlets such as *The Belgian Congo at War* and *We Suffer in a Thousand Ways* were printed. A cartoon collection, *Belgian Humor under the German Heel*, brought together drawings made by the resistance.²⁰

At the end of the war, disagreements about the need for an information program in peace time emerged within the foreign policy establishment. In the *Belgian Trade Review* of 1946, a periodical that had been popular during the war, Goris argued that 'a country of Belgium's modest size' had to 'take the initiative to make itself known'. Following the example of the 'Maison Française', which had been established by the French government, he wanted to build a House of Belgium on

US soil where cultural, economic and political information would be on offer. Yet, Theunis viewed the state as a corporation that had to be effectively managed and did not understand how the BIC's work could increase the influence of Belgium in peace time and had wanted to dismantle the costly operation. On 23 October 1944 Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak therefore intervened by writing to the new ambassador in Washington, Robert Compte van der Straten-Ponthoz, who had also been unhappy with Goris, to convince him of the need to show 'the real face of Belgium' abroad.²¹ Spaak, like his successor van Zeeland, believed in the importance of public diplomacy, urging NATIS to increase its efforts to combat Soviet propaganda while expressing concern about the impact Soviet propaganda was having during his conversations with the British ambassador in Brussels.²² The distinction Spaak publicly made between the information-work done by the countries of the Free World, information that was supposedly objective, and the propaganda of the Soviet Union, which was believed to be made up of distortions, confused Goris. In 1947 Spaak spontaneously wrote to Goris to inquire about his sudden plans to leave New York. In his response Goris expressed surprise, because he believed Spaak did not support the BIC's mission. The foreign affairs minister had 'never hidden the repugnance' he had for 'propaganda' which had led him to conclude the BIC's mission, and his own position would be terminated.²³ Goris, however, claimed he understood Spaak's 'repugnance', which indicates both men believed they were engaged in presenting a fuller picture of Belgian colonialism, not propaganda. The semantic confusion about the methodology of public diplomacy led both men to be confused about each other's stance on the BIC.

During the war, Spaak and Goris had both come to realise that foreign affairs was a symbolic matter and public diplomacy an essential instrument of power. Goris admired Franklin D. Roosevelt's fireside chats, radio speeches in which the president directly addressed the US population. For Goris, these showcased the 'magic of eloquence' and brought home the importance of government-to-people communication.²⁴ In an effort to maintain his position as BIC director he stressed the BIC had mass appeal in cables to Brussels by referring to the circulation of 140,000 issues of *News from Belgium* and the 'razor-edged editorials' that had earned him a 'large following'. Goris also voiced his concern about how a dismantling of the BIC would be viewed as a lack of solidarity, particularly by the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with whom the BIC had cooperated within the context of the Inter-Allied Information Center. The centre had published material in which European values were promoted, such as a pamphlet on the storming of the Bastille and the French Revolution. The continuation of the BIC's activities was particularly important for Goris in light of the increased need to propagate the colonial achievements in the face of President Harry Truman's support for Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in August 1945.²⁵ Despite Goris' arguments about influence and colonial power, funding decreased from US dollar (USA) \$78,000 in 1946 to \$75,000 in 1951, *News from Belgium* was abolished and plans to establish a Ministry of Information were cancelled while the Office Belge d'Information was moved from London to Leopoldville in 1950 and converted into the Centre d'Information et de Documentation du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (CID).

Contrary to the claims to mass-appeal, the BIC had focused on elites during the war and continued to do so after the German capitulation. The emphasis on colonial matters though, remained. *News from Belgium*, which collected paper clippings on the Belgian resistance and republished them in a little booklet, included footnotes to increase its 'scientific allure'. In April 1941 an exhibition of Flemish primitives in Gallery Knoedler was organised and an anthology of Flemish poetry printed.²⁶ In March 1945 Spaak approved a plan to establish a university chair in Belgian culture as *Modern Belgian Handicrafts, Portraits by Flemish Masters* and a book on the Congolese administration was printed in 1949. Charles Leonard, the consul in New Orleans, paid attention to the elite audience on the advice of his Dutch colleague in 1947 who had told him to aim for the highest societal levels. Even speeches at the Rotary Club and the Young Men's Business Club in his estimation were ineffective because those audiences were not influential enough.²⁷ Goris resisted plans to increase the number of variety shows in the broadcasts about Belgium because he felt those would harm the 'dignity of Belgium'. Instead, he participated in the Opera Victory Rally about Belgium and Luxembourg on the Blue Network, a radio roundtable discussion with opera music. While the first part on Belgian cultural achievements was edited out of the original script, his explanation about the relationship between Belgium and the Congo was maintained as BIC officials went to conferences and visited the Alliance Française and the Rotary Club to talk about Belgium and Congo, signalling that Goris' priorities lay with the colony, not Cold War antagonism.²⁸

Integrating the civilising mission within the US foreign policy of modernisation through expertise (1949–1959)

In 1952 the BIC expanded its operation not in response to the Cold War heating up but as a means to address the challenge of Truman's Point IV, a technical assistance program spearheaded by White House aide George Elsey and State Department's Public Affairs Officer Benjamin Hardy. Truman raised this fourth point in his inaugural speech of January 1949, in which he told his audience that the US had to 'embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas' since 'our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible'. The Point IV aimed to increase the 'drama' of that day but also reflected the belief that through the exposure to technology dependent peoples would 'find out' that democracy was the cornerstone of technological advancement and economic growth.²⁹ Colonies were excluded from the technical assistance operation since imperial powers resented interference. Liberia and Ethiopia were the only African countries that received assistance.

Nonetheless the BIC wanted to defend Belgium's reputation, particularly since Goris believed Truman's speeches on Point IV and the propaganda put out by the State Department had created a 'dangerous atmosphere' whereby colonial peoples might feel encouraged to revolt.³⁰ Pamphlets, such as *The Point Four Pioneers: Report from a New Frontier* in October 1951, declared the US was committed to fighting the 'ancient enemies' of underdevelopment such as poverty, disease,

hunger and illiteracy. The publication was presented as a 'battle report', but what was particularly important was the 'human factor' since the pioneers in this pamphlet's story had worked with patience, courage and imagination to make development efficient. Frank Pinder, for instance, had made a trek into the remote areas of Liberia without waiting for supplies, had contracted malaria, fallen ill with dysentery and suffered from other tropical illnesses all the while having long talks with village elders before undertaking action.³¹

What bothered BIC operatives was the implication of this type of propaganda, namely that there was a need for assistance to begin with. Belgium – Goris believed – already possessed the 'knowledge and skill to relieve the suffering of these people', as Truman phrased it in his inaugural address but instead was still perceived to be an exploitative colonial power engaged in the trade of 'red rubber'.³² First-hand knowledge of Belgium's civilising work, delivered by an official who should be transferred from the Congo to New York, therefore had to reassure US audiences that Belgium was doing everything in its power to effectively develop its colonies.³³ The US threat to the colonial claims had already been a source of concern during the war when Ely Culbertson, a famous bridge player and advocate for strong international institutions, wrote about how the Belgian Congo could be given to the Nazi regime to fulfil their need for 'Lebensraum'.³⁴ To prevent these theoretical blueprints from acquiring political weight the BIC propaganda stressed the war had not resulted from a competition 'between "imperialisms"', but originated from Hitler's war against the Jewish people, as William Gardner wrote in his *Catholic Resistance in Occupied Countries* of 1942, a pamphlet published by the BIC. Press releases highlighted the surprise of US soldiers who had expected 'people fighting wild animals and living in miserable villages' but instead encountered a 'great and modern city' where the 'population is civilized and friendly' upon their arrival in Leopoldville.³⁵

In March 1952 Minister of the Colonies André Dequae sent his predecessor Pierre Wigny to the US on a fact-finding mission to figure out why US public opinion disapproved of the European colonial powers and Belgium in particular. In Wigny's estimation these negative attitudes were not rooted in a sense of economic or political unfairness but were primarily philosophical and the product of a particular understanding of history. Americans believed their prosperity had begun after becoming independent from Great Britain and colonial peoples therefore deserved to be put on the same trajectory. Belgian civilizational ideologues, in contrast, justified treating indigenous groups differently since they were supposedly on a different developmental level. The fallacy in the US logic therefore was the over-appreciation of African 'youthfulness' as well as their tolerance for 'premature emancipation', the notion that colonies could become independent even without sufficient preparation. Negative attitudes were fostered through the old anticolonial literature that was still available in libraries and bookstores, such as Roger Casement's report from 1904 on the atrocities of the Congo Free State, which allowed King Leopold II to amass huge profits from the rubber extraction.³⁶

At the same time, Wigny felt influential groups held more nuanced opinions since many read the work of modernisation theorists and development economists.

Development economics had originated with Colin Clark, an Englishman whose book *The Conditions of Economic Progress* became popular in Anglo-American academic circles in the 1940s. He was particularly influential for his 'discovery' of global poverty as a technical problem that could be solved. In the Council of Economic Advisers to the President, economist Walter S. Salant worked to integrate these academic insights into policy and advocated for the extension of capital to the underdeveloped world. He found a willing ear with the former press officer for Nelson Rockefeller at the Office of Inter-American Affairs who believed the US needed to introduce a global technical assistance program to reduce international economic and political instability. With Truman's announcement of point Four, Hardy and Salant's idea were translated into policy.³⁷

Wigny and Goris believed US anticolonialism was rooted in 'sentimentality' not 'reason', and they therefore, together with Ryckmans, drew up a strategy that urged 'propagandists [. . .] to relentlessly present' Belgian 'actions from the angle of 'Point Four'', an easy task since Point IV in Goris' estimation was identical to the 'colonial idea'. Wigny believed the so-called 'Belgian thesis' was 'perfectly acceptable' for US public opinion if it was presented as offering 'equality of opportunity for everyone' and a rejection of 'discrimination'. This 'Belgian thesis' had been worked out by Ambassador Fernand Vanlangenhove and Ryckmans at the beginning of the 1950s and argued that colonial territories were not the only areas in the world where indigenous peoples were not represented by their government. It was therefore unfair, in their estimation, that only countries with colonies and not India or Brazil, were obligated to inform the UN about their activities. Even though this reasoning failed to garner support at the UN, Wigny had come away from his public speaking engagements at US universities with the impression that the thesis appealed to US audiences. Economic measures, technical assistance and social policies such as the provision of educational and medical services as well as the provision of political opportunities via mixed consultative councils all dovetailed with 'le point IV du programme de Truman'. By Americanising the Belgian civilizational work Goris wanted to make it more acceptable to the US public. To increase the country's 'moral credit' and consequently the margins for manoeuvre, the BIC personnel had to speak the language Americans understood, the language of 'public opinion'. Few elements of criticism could for instance be used to improve the effectiveness of the message because US target audiences distrusted official propaganda.³⁸

Those strategic recalibrations, however, were difficult to implement, since US law required all foreign information agencies in the US to clearly communicate to readers who had produced the pamphlets. Wigny therefore recommended the creation of a research institution, an 'Institut belge d'Afrique', which would be able to cultivate an objective image of the Belgian civilising work in industry and agriculture while giving it an '*allure scientifique*'. Moreover, an institute could become a less obtrusive policy influencer because it would be able to work in an identical way to many of the other academic research centres that targeted the US government. Harvard and the MIT Center for International Studies were also populated by economists and sociologists like Daniel Lerner and Walt Rostow, who had researched ways to jumpstart the modernisation process and had become

advisers to Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1950s and 1960s.³⁹ By mimicking the language of expertise, Brussels tried to increase their manoeuvrability.

From 1952 onwards the Belgian operation to influence US publics and the US government focused on projecting the notion that Belgian colonialism was an undertaking aimed at improving the development of its colonial subjects in a way that was scientifically valid. The special issue of *The New York Herald Tribune* on the Belgian Congo of November 1951, a project that had been approved by Dequae, was hailed as a model because it included criticism.⁴⁰ Goris' note on the extension of Belgian colonial propaganda in April 1952, which dealt with the challenges of how to implement this policy of correcting what the 'average American' – 'l'Américain moyen' – knew about the Congo, concluded that the object of criticism often was not even Africa but the 'idea itself of colonialism'. Those negative ideas, the note went on, were fostered at schools where children had to read books on Leopold II's atrocities, such as Mark Twain's *King Leopold's Soliloquy*. Nonetheless, Belgium benefitted from the racial fanaticism in South Africa and the underdevelopment of French and Portuguese territories, which made the Congo look more favourable in comparison. What was missing was a reference work on the Congo with an '*allure scientifique*' – the term also used by Wigny – written for a wider audience. Getting development experts to publicly talk about the Congo also served to bolster the new scientific approach. During the war the BIC had sent radio programmes on the Congo to about 200 radio stations, but in 1952 it requested funding from Brussels to directly target political commentators on those radio stations.⁴¹ Goris also accepted aid from the Ford Foundation, which organised an exchange program to allow scientists in the Congo and in Belgium to go to a US institution to do part of their research. He welcomed financial aid for the development of 'the science of man' and welcomed the donations to scientific libraries in the colony.⁴²

In short, by providing expertise, influencing experts and accepting expert aid, Goris redefined the public image of the Belgian civilising mission in developmentalist terms. While this Americanisation approach was new, it drew strength from the elite focus that had already pervaded the war-time BIC. Keeping the US out of Congolese affairs – the original intention of the 'Belgian thesis' – paradoxically enough led Goris to involve the US in the Congo. Although Geir Lundestad famously concluded that the Western Europeans 'were so interested in involving the Americans in the affairs of their continent that it can be argued that they invited the Americans in', it is clear that, when it came to colonial empire, Belgium worked to create an illusion of invitation to avert US interference in its colonies of the Congo and Ruanda.⁴³

Americanising developmental challenges: the Congo crisis and the return to primitivism (1959–1961)

Throughout the 1950s this strategy to increase the margins of manoeuvre through developmental expertise remained firmly in place. The BIC received pamphlets from Inforcongo in Leopoldville to disseminate in the US, and Goris sent

information to the foreign affairs department in Brussels to keep ministers up to date about the latest books that were published on the Congo in the US. In January 1959, Goris' integration strategy fell apart. Riots broke out in Leopoldville after a prohibited political demonstration organised by the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), one of the Congo's most important political parties, in Leopoldville, a city that had experienced a demographic explosion and a subsequent crisis in public facilities.⁴⁴ It led King Baudouin to declare in a radio speech that Belgium intended to 'assist the Congolese people on their path to independence, without delay, but also without irresponsible rashness'.⁴⁵ Echoing the 'magic of eloquence' he had already admired in Roosevelt's fireside chats, Goris concluded the King's statement had made 'an excellent impression' because the 'magic word of independence had been uttered'. Riots in Brazzaville, in the French colony at the other side of the Congo river, made Goris even happier since the unrest demonstrated 'the inability of indigenous populations to govern themselves'. These incidents would serve to temper what he perceived to be the US fervour for African nationalism.⁴⁶

The communication strategy he outlined in April 1959 played up the so-called primitive characteristics of the Congolese, signalling a reversal of the development story that had been projected in the mid-1950s. The continuation of cannibalism in certain areas of the colony, a colonial myth, had to be stressed once more in all the pieces of communication as well as the difficulties that arose when trying to integrate 'primitive' people into a modern economy. Goris in effect reversed the narrative of Belgium acting as an effective moderniser. Since the press had been positive about the Congo trip that Minister of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Maurits van Hemelrijck had undertaken in June 1959, he felt confident that stressing the primitivism of African nationalists would not taint the Belgian reputation the BIC had worked hard to improve throughout the 1950s. *The New York Times*, for instance, reported how in Bukavu on 13 June 1959 Hemelrijck was cheered on by the African Congolese as the European settlers expressed their anger.⁴⁷ A communication plan that could further stretch the margins of manoeuvre in the future, Goris noted, had to therefore stress that the new Ten Year Development Plan approved in 1959 enjoyed the support of international organisations but was struggling with anticolonial demagoguery that mischaracterised many of the facts the US public received.

Rather than Americanising the Belgian civilising mission to increase the impact of Brussels in Washington, BIC officials were now asked to invest time and effort in making the negative anticolonial attitudes towards the Belgian colonial government comprehensible to a US audience. Incorrect or inaccurate accusations, for instance about the number of deaths in Leopoldville, had to be corrected in pamphlets and radio shows. The BIC personnel, which had always avoided talking about Congolese primitivism to not give credence to 'accusations that' Belgium 'had not done more in 50 years', now took this step. The US public had to be informed about the large role played by the Belgians in the birth of democracy in the Congo. Rather than talk about the work of Belgian missionaries who had converted Africans, emphasis had to be put on something the US public

was supposedly obsessed over: the contrast between the introduction of savings accounts and salaries by the colonial government on the one hand and the indigenous idea that taxes were a form of theft committed by the state on the other hand. Lastly, the BIC also had to explain their resistance to Kimbanguism, a religious movement led by Simon Kimbangu that resisted colonial oppression through non-violent means. To explain the Belgian antipathy towards Kimbanguism, Goris urged BIC officers to compare the Congolese religious movement with 'Jehova's witnesses' who were seen as anarchists in the US⁴⁸

By Americanising the dark sides of colonial government into propaganda the BIC was unknowingly creating a public relations disaster on Independence Day, on 30 June 1960. Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, took the stage that day after Baudouin had sung the praises of Belgian colonialism. He, in contrast, criticised the colonial regime: 'Morning, noon and night we were subjected to jeers, insults and blows because we were "Negroes"', he proclaimed. International broadcasters could pick up how the Prime Minister wondered: 'Who will ever forget that the black was addressed as "tu", not because he was a friend, but because the polite "vous" was reserved for the white man?'.⁴⁹ A day later mutiny broke out among soldiers of the *Force Publique* while the mineral rich province of Katanga seceded under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe with the support from the Belgian government and the Union Minière. Belgium now again turned into a country that had not sufficiently invested in modernising its colony and failed to increase its influence in Washington D.C. Inforcongo in Leopoldville transformed into a refugee agency that resettled returnees and give them financial support. The Inforcongo office in Brussels utilised its network to find work for the 'colons' who had lost their home and possessions. Incidents of rape and murder by Africans compelled others to leave their colonial existence behind on evacuation flights organised by Sabena, the national airline. The returned colonial officials together with the subcommittee for the coordination of Belgian publicity and propaganda campaigns abroad – created in May 1955 – pleaded with Eyskens in August 1960 to invest in PR. Spaak made sure the subcommittee remained involved with public diplomacy by giving the Belgian institute for Information and Documentation the responsibility over press releases on the Congo crisis in 1960. This non-profit, which had been created by the subcommittee and was known as Inbel, acquired official support in 1961 and became the main official public diplomacy institutions.⁵⁰

Goris' office continued to work and remained independent. He initiated a six-point special information programme with the expressed aim of damage control. The first decision was the recruitment of a new assistant to respond to the flood of questions the office in New York was receiving via mail and telephone. Goris printed 5,000 copies of a brochure that reported on the Belgian realisations in the Congo. He also began to disseminate bulletins on the efforts to improve education facilities, economic structures and social services, the so-called *foyer social*. Pamphlets were published that countered the attacks on the Belgian colonial project. Lastly, BIC officials actively contacted and worked with American journalists to craft a favourable view of Belgium in the US press.⁵¹

By the end of the 1950s, Goris' office thus still worked to increase the influence Belgium had in the US, but rather than Americanising the Belgian civilisation project, he wanted US citizens to identify with the challenges the colonial project faced in the Congo. In both cases, however, the language and imagery of modernisation theory was relied upon because it tapped into the US understanding of the colonial world: a place where political unrest, hunger and disease could be tackled by development aid, a place in which Belgians had already done a lot of work that was not driven by imperial aims but by the same willingness to deliver on the promises of modernity.

Conclusion: creating the illusion of invitation through elitism, expertise and primitivism

In the post-war period, Goris worked to increase Brussels' margins of manoeuvre within the US-led world order by rewriting the Belgian civilising mission in the language of modernisation theory because this discourse permeated the US understanding of Africa and the wider Third World. The Congo was not veiled from international scrutiny as a diplomatic embarrassment by Belgian diplomats. The colony was also not explicitly played up as a major source of power, which was what the Portuguese strategy consisted of, nor presented as a site the Belgians insulated against Communist infiltration, a French and British approach.⁵² Instead, the BIC, with Spaak's support, sought to sidestep the Cold War conflict and played on Truman's developmental concerns to increase the manoeuvrability of Brussels towards the US. Congo's utility as a story that could highlight Belgium's contribution to the war effort was abandoned in 1947 when the BIC constantly sought to present the Belgian civilising mission as aiding the US modernisation efforts in Africa. When independence riots broke out the Congolese were restaged again as subjects who refused to modernise.

The BIC's story points to the myriad ways in which decolonisation complicated the Trans-Atlantic relationship. A history of how information agencies utilised the idea of an Atlantic community of values in which the cultural heritage and political ideas were shared obscures how the fundamental ideological fissure between the US and Europe on the question of colonial rule was exploited by European empires on different levels.⁵³ On the level of goals the BIC's road to influence in Washington lay in equating what both the US and Belgium sought to do in Africa. Maintaining colonial rule was sold as being in the best interest of the modernisation project, a scheme US officials and the public wholeheartedly supported in a bid to remake the Third World. On the level of strategy, the Point IV Program rather than the Marshall Plan were on the minds of Belgian public diplomats during the early Cold War. In pamphlets and radio shows the civilising work that was executed by Belgians in the Congo was Americanised by presenting it as part of the Point IV efforts and by the end of the 1950s by making the argument that both Belgians and Americans were faced with the same challenges while executing their work in Africa. On a conceptual level the Belgian case highlights that the Cold War was not only exported to the Third World, but colonialism was

also brought into the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Belgium sought to create the illusion that it accepted US guidance in colonial matters in order to maintain empire and increase the country's leeway in the international system. Ultimately, however, it was the Congolese themselves that broke that illusion in the riots after independence.

Notes

- 1 Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge and New York 2009) x; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, 'What Are We Searching for? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State', in: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (eds), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*, Vol. 6 (Oxford and New York 2010) 4–5.
- 2 All translations are the author's. Marnix Gijsen, *De Loopgraven van Fifth Avenue: De Oorlogsjaren in New York (Meulenhoff Editie)* (Amsterdam 1980), 33.
- 3 Guy Vanthemsche, *Congo: De Impact van de Kolonie Op België* (Tielt 2007) 99.
- 4 Ebere Nwaubani, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950–1960* (Rochester 2001) 35.
- 5 Rik Coolsaet, *België en Zijn Buitenlandse Politiek 1830–2000* (Leuven 2001) 421.
- 6 Maarten Van Alstein, 'De Belgische Diplomatieke Elite, Spaak, En Het Onstaan Van De Hegemonische Koude Oorlogsconsensus: Interpretaties Van De Vijandige Bipolarisering 1944–1949' (doctoraat, Universiteit Antwerpen. 2009) 422.
- 7 Maarten Van Alstein, 'Wat Betekende de Koude Oorlog? Belgische Diplomaten en de Vijandige Bipolarisering: Edouard Le Ghaet En Baron Hervé de Gruben', *Bijdragen Tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis* 20 (2008) 103–144.
- 8 Vincent Dujardin, 'Go-Between: Belgium and Détente, 1961–73', *Cold War History* 7:1 (January 2007) 95–116; Vincent Dumoulin, *Spaak* (Brussel 1999) 1–10.
- 9 For an overview of the literature: Idesbald Goddeeris and Sindani E. Kiangu, 'Congomania in Academia: Recent Historical Research on the Belgian Colonial Past', *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 126:4 (2011) 54–74; Guy Vanthemsche, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', in: Csaba Lévai (ed.), *Europe and the World in European Historiography* (Pisa 2006) 89–119; Debates over the responsibility of the Belgian state in the assassination of Lumumba have been particularly fierce: Ludo De Witte, *De Moord Op Lumumba* (Antwerpen 2000); Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Boston, MA 2015).
- 10 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge 2005) 132.
- 11 An introduction to Belgian public diplomacy can be found in: Frank Gerits, "'Défendre l'Oeuvre Que Nous Réalisons En Afrique": Belgian Public Diplomacy and the Global Cold War (1945–1966)', *Dutch Crossing: Journal of Low Countries Studies* 40:1 (2016) 68–80.
- 12 Salvadori Massino, *NATO: A Twentieth Century Community of Nations* (Princeton 1957) 6.
- 13 Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York 1967) 118.
- 14 Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2005) 245.
- 15 Linda Risso, "'Enlightening Public Opinion": A Study of NATO's Information Policies Between 1949 and 1959 Based on Recently Declassified Documents', *Cold War History* 7:1 (February 2007) 65.
- 16 Gijsen, *De Loopgraven van Fifth Avenue*, 91; Archives de Service public fédéral affaires étrangères, Brussels, Belgium (hereafter: ASPFAE), Dossier 11.828, 'Rapport

- sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942, 1–20; AMVC-Letterenhuis, Antwerp, Belgium (hereafter: AMVCL), G994, B1, 'f: Avermate Roger, letter, Marnix Gijzen to Roger Avermate', 3 October 1977; ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center pendant le deuxième semestre 1943', 1943, 1; ASPFAE, AA, AEII 3274, 'Note sur l'extension de la propagande coloniale belge aux Etats-Unis', 15 April 1952, 2–3.
- 17 Jan Robert, 'Dr. Goris Goes to the Opera: Het New Yorks Archief van Marnix Gijzen', *Zuurvrij: Berichten Uit Het AMVC-Letterenhuis* 1 (2002) 18–23.
 - 18 Gaston Eyskens, *Gaston Eyskens de Memoires* (Tielt 1999) 24.
 - 19 ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942, 12.
 - 20 Vanthemsche, *Congo: De Impact van de Kolonie Op België*, 120–122; ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942, 3–4.
 - 21 AMVCL, Gijzen, Marnix, G994, B1, 'Letter, Jan-Albert Goris to Fernand van Langenhove', 29 June 1946; Jan-Albert Goris, 'When Will New York Have the Long Awaited House of Belgium', *Belgian Review: Trends in Trade and Tourism* 1 (1946) 12, 23
 - 22 Linda Risso, 'Propaganda on Wheels: The NATO Travelling Exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s', *Cold War History* 11:1 (February 2011) 15; Giles Scott-Smith, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (New York 2012), 12; United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter: UKNA], FO 371/118200, 'Letter, Christopher Warner to P.F. Hancock', 31 January 1955.
 - 23 AMVCL, Gijzen, Marnix, G994, B1, 'Letter, Goris to Spaak', 27 August 1947, 'Letter, Spaak to Goris', 9 August 1947.
 - 24 Gijzen, *De Loopgraven van Fifth Avenue*, 29, 60.
 - 25 Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA 2006) 181; Andrew Roadnight, *United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years* (New York 2002); ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, 'Letter, Theunis to Spaak, "Objet: Sort future des services d'Information"', 16 August 1944; ASPFAE, Dossier 12.014, 'Letter, Spaak to van der Straten-Ponthoz', 23 October 1944, 'Letter, van der Straten-Ponthoz to Spaak', 13 October 1944; ASPFAE, Dossier 12.014, 'Note pour M. le ministre des affaires étrangères, "Object: Continuation de la propagande aux Etats-Unis pour la durée de la guerre"', 7 November 1944, 15; 'rapport sur l'activité du Belgian government information center pendant l'année 1946', 1947, 2.
 - 26 Robert J. Young, *Marketing Marienne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940* (Piscataway 2004) 174; Marnix Gijzen, *De Stem Uit Amerika: Een Keuze Uit de 'Wekelijkse Correspondenties Uit America van Doctor Jan Albert Goris' van 1946 Tot 1964, Bezorgd en Ingeleid Door Willy Devos*, edited by Willy Devos, Brt Brochure (Brussels 1982) 41–44.
 - 27 ASPFAE, Dossier 10.984, Henry Fast, 'Tour de conférences à la Côte Ouest faite par Henry Fast en Décembre 1944', 4 January 1945, telegram, Goris to Spaak, 19 November 1945; ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942; ASPFAE, Dossier 12.014, Report, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian government information center pendant l'année 1946', 1947, 'Letter, Spaak to Goris', 3 March 1945, Report, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian government information center pendant l'année 1949', 20 June 1950; ASPFAE, Dossier 10.984 ter, Report, Monsieur A Remes to Spaak, 'Objet: Rapports politiques: relevé trimestriel du 1er trimestre de 1945', 30 April 1945, 'Letter, Charles Leonard to Spaak', 16 December 1947.
 - 28 ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, Report, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942, 3–4, Report, 'Rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center pendant le deuxième semestre 1943', 1943, 2; Robert, 'Dr. Goris Goes to the Opera: Het New Yorks Archief van Marnix Gijzen', 33–34.

- 29 The argument of drama can be found in: Hannah Nicole Higgin, 'Disseminating American Ideals in Africa, 1949–1969' (PhD dissertation, Cambridge University. 2014), 29–30; Quoted in: Amanda Kay McVety, 'Pursuing Progress: Point Four in Ethiopia', *Diplomatic History* 32:3 (2008) 386.
- 30 ASPFAE, AA, INFO(36), 'Raisons et Moyens de Faire de La Propagande Idéologique coloniale aux Etats-Unis', 4 July 1951; ASPFAE, AA, AEII 3274, 'Note sur l'extension de la propagande coloniale belge aux Etats-Unis', 15 April 1952, 2–3.
- 31 Truman Library, Independence Missouri, Papers of George M. Elsey, Box 62, Pamphlet, 'Point Four Pioneers: Reports form a New Frontier', October 1951.
- 32 Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/229929.
- 33 ASPFAE, Dossier Aux 30.7, 'Note sur une extension des services du Belgian Government Information Center', 7 February 1952.
- 34 Gijsen, *De Loopgraven van Fifth Avenue*, 93–94.
- 35 ASPFAE, Dossier 11.828, William Gardner, 'Catholic Resistance in Occupied Countries', 18 March 1942, 'rapport sur l'activité du Belgian Information Center Avril 1941-September 1942', 15 October 1942.
- 36 ASPFAE, AA, AII, 3274, Pierre Wigny, 'voyage aux Etats-Unis 7 mars–23 avril 1953', 3; Vanthemsche, *Congo: De Impact van de Kolonie Op België*, 132.
- 37 McVety, 'Pursuing Progress: Point Four in Ethiopia', 376, 378.
- 38 ASPFAE, AA, AII, 3274, Pierre Wigny, 'voyage aux Etats-Unis 7 mars–23 avril 1953', 3; Vanthemsche, *Congo: De Impact van de Kolonie Op België*, 132.
- 39 ASPFAE, AA, INFO (36), Pierre Ryckmans, 'Propagande aux États-Unis', 24 August 1952, 10; ASPFAE, AA, AII, 3274, Pierre Wigny, 'Voyage aux Etats-Unis 7 mars–23 avril 1953', Note sur l'extension de la propagande coloniale belge aux Etats-Unis, par Jan-Albert Goris, 15 Avril 1952, 2.
- 40 ASPFAE, INFO (36), 'Raisons et Moyens de Faire de La Propagande Ideologique coloniale aux Etats-Unis', 4 July 1951, Letter, C. Dupont to O. Louwers, 30 October 1951.
- 41 ASPFAE, AA, AEII 3274, 'Note sur l'extension de la propagande coloniale belge aux Etats-Unis', 15 April 1952, 2–3; ASPFAE, Dossier Aux 30.7, 'Note sur une extension des services du Belgian Government Information Center', 7 February 1952, 9.
- 42 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park Maryland, RG. 306, UD-WW 285, Letter, Goris to Melville J. Herakovits, 29 October 1952.
- 43 Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford and New York 2003) 2.
- 44 Zana Aziza Etembala, *De Teloorgang van Een Modelkolonie: Belgisch Congo (1958–1960)* (Leuven 2008) 194.
- 45 State Archives in Belgium, Leuven, Archief Gaston Eyskens, 6069, Verklaring Koning, 13 Januari 1959.
- 46 ASPFAE, AA, INFO (85), Jan-Albert Goris, 'Note pour Monsieur l'ambassadeur Delvaux de Fenffe', 7 April 1959.
- 47 'M. Van Hemelrijck, Helped Free Congo', *New York Times*, 11 October 1964, 88.
- 48 ASPFAE, AA, INFO (85), Jan-Albert Goris, 'Note pour Monsieur l'ambassadeur Delvaux de Fenffe', 7 April 1959, 1–2.
- 49 Citation taken from: Patrice Lumumba, *Patrice Lumumba, The Truth About a Monstrous Crime of the Colonialists* (Moscow 1961) 44–47.
- 50 Gerits, 'EDéfendre l'Oeuvre Que Nous Réalisons En Afrique', 75; State Archives in Belgium, Brussels, 405 Inbel, n°5, Report, 'Inbel Rapport 1966', 1966, 5; SAB, 405 Inbel, n°1, Report, 'Inbel Rapport 1962', 1962; ASPFAE, AD, Dossier n° 14320, Letter, William Ugeux to Spaak, 21 March 1962.
- 51 ASPFAE, Dossier Poux Aux 30.7, Letter, 30 November 1960.
- 52 Heriberto Cairo, 'Portugal Is Not a Small Country: Maps and Propaganda in the Salazar Regime', *Geopolitics* 11: 3 (2006) 367–395. Historians have always doubted French concerns about communism, see Marc Michel had when he wrote: 'it is perhaps doubtful

- whether all French officials suspected collusion between the nationalists and the communists', see Marc Michel, 'The Decolonization of French Africa and the United States and Great Britain, 1945–58', in: John D. Hargreaves and Roy C. Bridges (ed.), *Imperialism, Decolonization, and Africa: Studies Presented to John Hargreaves: With an Academic Memoir and Bibliography* (New York 2000) 164; James P. Hubbard, *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941–1968* (Jefferson 2010) 1–10; W.M. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22:3 (September 1, 1994) 462–511.
- 53 Linda Risso, *Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service*, 1st ed. (New York 2014) 12.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Archives

- AMVC-Letterenhuis, Antwerp, Belgium
 Archives de Service public federal affaires étrangères, Brussels, Belgium
 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park Maryland, United States
 State Archives in Belgium, Leuven, Belgium
 Truman Library, Independence Missouri, United States
 United Kingdom National Archives, London, United Kingdom

Literature

- Aldrich, Richard J., *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London 2001).
- Cairo, Heriberto, 'Portugal Is Not a Small Country: Maps and Propaganda in the Salazar Regime', *Geopolitics* 11:3 (2006) 367–395.
- Coolsaet, Rik, *België en Zijn Buitenlandse Politiek 1830–2000* (Leuven 2001).
- Coolsaet, Rik, Dujardin, Vincent and Roosens, Claude, *Buitenlandse Zaken in België: Geschiedenis van Een Ministerie, Zijn Diplomaten En Consuls van 1830 Tot Vandaag* (Tielt 2014).
- Cull, Nicholas J., *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge and New York 2009).
- De Witte, Ludo, *De Moord Op Lumumba* (Antwerpen 2000).
- Deutsch, Karl Wolfgang, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York 1967).
- Dueck, Jennifer M., *The Claims of Culture at Empire's End: Syria and Lebanon Under French Rule* (Oxford and New York 2009).
- Dujardin, Vincent, 'Go-Between: Belgium and Détente, 1961–73', *Cold War History* 7:1 (January 2007) 95–116.
- Dumoulin, Vincent, *Spaak* (Brussel 1999).
- Etambala, Zana Aziza, *De Teloorgang van Een Modelkolonie: Belgisch Congo (1958–1960)* (Leuven 2008).
- Eyskens, Gaston, *Gaston Eyskens de Memoires* (Tielt 1999).
- Gerard, Emmanuel and Kuklick, Bruce, *Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba* (Boston 2015).

- Gerits, Frank, ‘“Défendre l’Oeuvre Que Nous Réalisons En Afrique”: Belgian Public Diplomacy and the Global Cold War (1945–1966)’, *Dutch Crossing: Journal of Low Countries Studies* 40:1 (2016) 68–80.
- Gienow-Hecht, Jessica C.E., ‘What Are We Searching for? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents and the State’, in: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark Donfried (eds), *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy* (Oxford and New York 2010) 3–12.
- Gijssen, Marnix, *De Loopgraven van Fifth Avenue: De Oorlogsjaren in New York (Meulenhoff Editie)* (Amsterdam 1980).
- Gijssen, Marnix, *De Stem Uit Amerika: Een Keuze Uit de “Wekelijkse Correspondenties Uit America van Doctor Jan Albert Goris” van 1946 Tot 1964, Bezorgd en Ingeleid door Willy Devos*, edited by Willy Devos. Brt Brochure (Brussel 1982).
- Goddeeris, Idesbald and Kiangu, Sindani E., ‘Congomania in Academia: Recent Historical Research on the Belgian Colonial Past’, *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 126:4 (2011) 54–74.
- Goris, Jan-Albert, ‘When Will New York Have the Long Awaited House of Belgium’, *Belgian Review: Trends in Trade and Tourism* 1 (1946) 12, 23.
- Higgin, Hannah Nicole, ‘Disseminating American Ideals in Africa, 1949–1969’ (PhD dissertation, Cambridge University. 2014).
- Hubbard, James P., *The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941–1968* (Jefferson 2010).
- Louis, WM Roger and Robinson, Ronald, ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 22:3 (September 1, 1994) 462–511, doi:10.1080/03086539408582936.
- Lumumba, Patrice, *Patrice Lumumba, The Truth About a Monstrous Crime of the Colonialists* (Moscow 1961).
- Lundestad, Geir, *In the United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford and New York 2003).
- Massino, Salvadori, *NATO: A Twentieth Century Community of Nations* (Princeton 1957).
- McVety, Amanda Kay, ‘Pursuing Progress: Point Four in Ethiopia’, *Diplomatic History* 32:3 (2008) 371–403.
- Michel, Marc, ‘The Decolonization of French Africa and the United States and Great Britain, 1945–58’, in: John D. Hargreaves and Roy Bridges (eds), *Imperialism, Decolonization, and Africa: Studies Presented to John Hargreave: With an Academic Memoir and Bibliography* (New York 2000) 153–177.
- Nwaubani, Ebere, *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950–1960* (Rochester 2001).
- Osgood, Kenneth, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA 2006).
- Risso, Linda, ‘“Enlightening Public Opinion”: A Study of NATO’s Information Policies Between 1949 and 1959 Based on Recently Declassified Documents’, *Cold War History* 7:1 (February 2007) 45–74.
- Risso, Linda, *Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War: The NATO Information Service*, 1st ed. (New York 2014).
- Risso, Linda, ‘Propaganda on Wheels: The NATO Travelling Exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s,’ *Cold War History* 11:1 (February 2011) 9–25.
- Roadnight, Andrew, *United States Policy Towards Indonesia in the Truman and Eisenhower Years* (New York 2002).
- Robert, Jan, ‘Dr. Goris Goes to the Opera: Het New Yorks Archief van Marnix Gijssen’, *Zuurvrij: Berichten Uit Het AMVC-Letterenhuis* 1 (2002) 18–23.

- Scott-Smith, Giles, *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (New York 2012).
- Sloan, Stanley R., *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2005).
- Van Alstein, Maarten, 'De Belgische Diplomatieke Elite, Spaak, en Het Onstaan Van De Hegemonische Koude Oorlogsconsensus: Interpretaties Van De Vijandige Bipolarisering 1944–1949' (Doctoraat, Universiteit Antwerpen. 2009).
- Van Alstein, Maarten, 'Wat Betekende de Koude Oorlog? Belgische Diplomaten En de Vijandige Bipolarisering: Edouard Le Ghaet En Baron Hervé de Gruben', *Bijdragen Tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis* 20 (2008) 103–144.
- Vanthemse, Guy, *Congo: De Impact van de Kolonie Op België* (Tielt 2007).
- Vanthemse, Guy, 'The Historiography of Belgian Colonialism in the Congo', in: Csaba Lévai (ed.), *Europe and the World in European Historiography* (Pisa 2006) 89–119.
- Westad, Odd Arne, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge 2005).
- Young, Robert J., *Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940* (Piscataway 2004).