

7 The Allied Machine

The Conference of Ministers in Paris and the Management of Security, 1815–18

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Napoleon's Frustration

Following Napoleon's refusal to accept the favourable conditions offered him by the Allies after his defeat at the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813, Napoleon is said to have sighed: 'I am tired of this old Europe! I do not want to reign over such a withered empire!'¹ After 1815 the imperial dream of a united Europe under one military ruler came to an end. In its stead came something different: changes that did not revert back to the fragmented world of the Ancien Régime, but that expanded on a fateful sense of solidarity that the European powers *nolens volens* had been subjected to during the Napoleonic wars. No more war, no more hegemony of one state at the expense of others, and an end to revolution and terror; that was the prevailing attitude and political paradigm. Power must henceforth be subject to law and legitimacy. For Napoleon, this was difficult to fathom.² Thus the lost emperor despaired:

After a twenty years' war, after the blood and treasures that were lavished in the common cause, after a triumph beyond all hope, what sort of peace has Britain concluded? Lord Castlereagh had the whole Continent at his disposal, and yet what advantage, what indemnity has he secured to his own country? He has signed just such a peace as he would have signed had he been conquered.³

Napoleon's question can be answered by looking more systematically into the way the Allied occupation of France was organised between 1815 and 1818 – and to analyse it as an instance of the new European security system and

* The research leading to these findings has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement n.615313.

¹ R. Edgcumbe (ed.), *The Diary of Frances Lady Shelley 1787–1817* (London: John Murray, 1912), 57.

² Comte de Las Cases, *Memorial de Sainte Hélène: Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon*, 4:7 (London: Holburn, 1823), 221. See also J. Bew, *Castlereagh: A Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 409.

³ Las Cases, *Memorial de Sainte Hélène*, 3:6, 92. Cited slightly different by Bew, *Castlereagh*, 408.

corresponding culture at work. The preparations for this occupation, mainly through the deliberations and activities of the Allied Council, provide a perfect case study to show that Napoleon's old Europe had indeed shed its shrivelled skin and emerged in a new form from the ashes of the Napoleonic firebrand. This – until the present not fully contextualised and researched – Allied Council of Ambassadors responsible for executing the occupation was arguably the first instance where Europe's system of collective security was inaugurated on the ground, albeit haphazardly and contested, between 1815 and 1818.⁴ This chapter explains and analyses how the Council functioned as a first platform to manage security in France and beyond, by looking at its political, military and financial operations.

What Sort of Peace?

The aftermath of the Napoleonic wars – the 'horseback diplomacy' and the solidarity found on the battlefields – had made minds ripe for a new form of peace, a peace that was stable and that by means of a new framework of collective risk management would restore a tranquillity and predictability to the international state system.⁵ The treaties concluded between 1813 and 1815 reflected the alliance security of the pre-war period, but went even further by accepting reciprocal obligations, which sometimes even seemed to be motivated by a 'strategy of disinterest'⁶ and a moral or spiritual sense of duty. This multilaterally negotiated and sealed peace can be seen as Europe's *discovery of*

⁴ The Allied occupation in France has been discussed from a military perspective, from the German perspective and with respect to the impact on the French populations, but the Allied Council/Conference of Ministers has not been studied before. See: T.D. Veve, *The Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992); Ibid., 'Wellington and the army of occupation in France, 1815–1818', *The International History Review*, 11:1 (1989), 98–108; P. Mansel, 'Wellington and the French Restoration', *ibid.*, 76–83; E. Kraehe, 'Wellington and the reconstruction of the Allied armies during the Hundred Days', *ibid.*, 84–97; V. Wacker, *Die Alliierte Besetzung Frankreichs in den Jahren 1814 bis 1818* (Hamburg: Kovac, 2001); C. Haynes, 'Making peace: the Allied occupation of France, 1815–1818', in A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and M. Rowe (eds.), *War, Demobilization and Memory: The Legacy of War in the Era of Atlantic Revolutions* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 51–67; R. André, *L'Occupation de la France par les Alliés en 1815, Juillet-Novembre* (Paris: de Boccard, 1924); H. Houssaye, *1814* (Paris: Perrin, 1888); *Ibid.*, *1815: La première restauration, le retour de l'île d'Elbe, les cent jours* (Paris: Perrin, 1893); *Ibid.*, *1815: La seconde abdication – la terreur blanche* (Paris: Perrin, 1905); P. Rain, *L'Europe et la restauration des Bourbons 1814–1818* (Paris: Perrin, 1908). See also C. Haynes, *Our Friends the Enemies: The Occupation of France after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).

⁵ Cf. J. Paulmann, *Pomp und Politik: Monarchenbegegnungen in Europa zwischen Ancien Régime und Erstem Weltkrieg* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 2000), 131. See also chapter 5 by Ghervas in this volume, for her interpretation of peace and security.

⁶ 'To deny interested action, to seem to act in a way unrelated to, or even against the apparent advancement of their interests.' M.C. Williams, *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security* (London: Routledge, 2007), 43.

a *collective security agenda*, based on the *principle of the balance of power*. Because the notion of ‘balance of power’ has been so thoroughly uprooted, modernised and re-appropriated since 1945, it is worthwhile to briefly consider how it was understood and configured in 1815.

The balance of power was first and foremost conceived as a concept of security management. In 1785 already, Jeremy Bentham was convinced that ‘security turns its eye exclusively to the future’, an insight that he went on to elaborate in a variety of new constitutions and penal and civil codes.⁷ Bentham was possibly the most widely read and appreciated political philosopher in the Allied circles. Wellington read his books. Russia’s Tsar Alexander I - communicated with Bentham in June 1814 to discuss a possible assignment in Russia.⁸ Security was exactly what the Allied nations wanted: a stable system of checks and balances based on the principle of the ‘balance of power’ that, rather than a lingering line of short-term ceasefires, would ensure the long-term future of Europe. In the words of the Treaty of Chaumont, signed on 9 March 1814 prior to the first capitulation of Paris, it was to be an alliance ‘for the salutary purpose of putting an end to the miseries of Europe, of securing its future repose, by re-establishing a just balance of Power’.⁹ According to Castlereagh, the new peace had to be ensured by a ‘systematic pledge’, by ‘preserving concert’ and by functioning as a ‘refuge under which all the minor states, especially those on the Rhine, may look forward to find their security upon the Return of Peace’ – thereby suggesting a more institutionalised and sustainable way of structuring and executing international relations than the old-fashioned eighteenth-century conceptions of balance.¹⁰

A novel, invigorated balance of power rhetoric permeated the texts of all of the treaties and correspondence exchanged among the Allies between 1813 and 1818; it was mantra, motto, principle, policy and propaganda, all rolled into one. The concept was of course well-known and had been expanded upon and criticised in pamphlets and treatises since the eighteenth century (by Christian Wolff, Emer de Vattel,¹¹ Samuel Pufendorf and Johann Gottlob

⁷ J. Bentham, ‘letter?’, unpublished, incomplete manuscript, in ‘Manuscripts’, box 61, University College Library London, 47. See also: P.J. Kelly, *Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 77.

⁸ M.P. Rey, *Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), 214–5; for Alexander’s visit to London, see 277–8; S. Conway (ed.), *The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham*, vol.8: January 1809 to December 1816 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). See specifically e.g. ‘No.2319, Bentham to Alexander, June 1815 (Act 67)’.

⁹ ‘Treaty of Chaumont’, in Foreign Office, *British and State Papers: 1812–1814*, vol.1 (London: Ridgway, 1841), 121.

¹⁰ Cited by Bew, *Castlereagh*, 346.

¹¹ See W. Rech, *Enemies of Mankind: Vattel’s Theory of Collective Security* (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013).

von Justi¹²). But the idea came into full vogue again after the introduction of the British ‘Pitt-plan’ in 1805¹³ and Friedrich Gentz’s 1806 book on the balance of power in Europe¹⁴ – both of which included concrete proposals for what Europe should look like after the war, including the desire for a strong Dutch state, free ports on the North Sea, the establishment of a German confederation and redrawing the borders of Italy.¹⁵ In 1815, it became much more than a mere description of spheres of influence – be it in terms of souls, territory, taxes or armies. Early-nineteenth century views regarding the balance of power also included ideological, moral and even spiritual notions.¹⁶ The European community of princes, their entourages, the diplomats and the thinkers, experts, poets and novelists who hovered about them spoke of *repos* and *tranquillité* when they talked about their desire for peace and security, about ‘God’s providence’ and ‘the law of nations’. But above all, the balance of power concept after 1815 was the antonym of tyranny, of the unilateral, aggressive exercise of power on the part of one at the expense of all the others. As such, it was also the opposite of commotion, sudden shock and unexpected revolution. It was the art of moderation, of slowing down the extremely rapid pace of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, by means of establishing a system of management (which of course could be as repressive and imperialist as the statesmen in power were inclined).¹⁷ In the words of Metternich, ‘by putting a brake to those principles subversive to the social order upon which Buonaparte had based his usurpation’.¹⁸ ‘Balancing’ was management; it meant, according to the then-current edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*,

¹² J.H. Gottlob von Justi, *Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts von Europa* (Altona, 1758). See also W. Burgdorf, ‘Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1720–1771)’, in H. Duchhardt et al. (eds.), *Europa-Historiker: Ein biographisches Handbuch*, vol.1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 51–78.

¹³ ‘W. Pitt, Memorandum for security and deliverance of Europe’ (part of letter to the Russian Ambassador at London, 19 January 1805), in K. Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830–1902* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 197–8.

¹⁴ F. von Gentz, *Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe* (London: Baldwin, 1806); *Ibid.*, ‘Über de Pradt’s Gemälde von Europa nach dem Kongress von Aachen’, *Wiener Jahrbücher der Literatur*, 5 (1819), 279–318; G. Schlesier (ed.), *Schriften von Friedrich Gentz: Ein Denkmal* (Mannheim: Hoff, 1838), 88–156.

¹⁵ H. Duchhardt, *Gleichgewicht der Kräfte, Convenance, Europäisches Konzert. Friedenskonferenzen und Friedensschlüsse vom Zeitalter Ludwigs XIV. bis zum Wiener Kongreß* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), 68–76, 137; M. Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013), 39–42; N. van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot: Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813–1831* (Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1985), 41.

¹⁶ See B.A. de Graaf, ‘Bringing sense and sensibility to the continent: Vienna 1815 revisited’, *Journal of Modern European History*, 13:4 (2015), 447–57.

¹⁷ See R. Jones, ‘1816 and the resumption of “ordinary history”’, *Journal for Modern European History*, 14:1 (2016), 119–42.

¹⁸ ‘Metternich, ‘Austrian memoir’. Cited by Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, 165. See also Jones, ‘1816’, 124–6.

providing ‘a bridle upon the strong and a bulwark to the weak’.¹⁹ And one of the primary ways to organise such a daunting management operation was through the efforts of the Allied Council of Ambassadors.²⁰

Inaugurating the ‘Allied Machine’

The ‘Allied Machine’,²¹ as Castlereagh described the Council in 1816 in a letter to Wellington, was conceived as a platform of political deliberation to handle the military occupation of France and the security of Europe as a whole (leaving its end goals open to further discussions). Its sessions began on 12 July 1815,²² but this three-year-long cooperative endeavour was not invented from scratch.

The Council had a precursor in the occupation of 1814 that included two phases: a war occupation (from the time that the Allied forces crossed the French border and seized areas around the turn of the year December 1813–March 1814) and a truce occupation (from the end of March until the Allies left on 1 June 1814).²³ On 15 January 1814 the allied powers meeting in Basel agreed that the Allied Central Administration would work out the administrative details for the cooperation called for behind the advancing front, under the leadership of the Prussian minister, Baron Karl vom Stein.²⁴ Civil administrators had to organise the occupation and to make sure the spoils of war and occupation were shared amongst the Allies.²⁵ Since the Prussian war claim amounted to a total sum of 169.8 million French francs, this was not an easy task.²⁶ But once the Allies entered Paris on 30 March 1814, it was not Prussia’s desire for revenge but Russia’s benevolence that held sway. Backed by an awe-inspiring military force, and motivated by mystical charity and

¹⁹ ‘Balance of power’, in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol.IV: supplement 1815–1824 (Edinburgh: Black, 1842), 308–13, 312.

²⁰ Duchhardt, *Gleichgewicht der Kräfte*, 68–76.

²¹ ‘Castlereagh to Wellington, 13 May 1816’. Cited by Van Sas, *Onze Natuurlijkste Bondgenoot*, 122.

²² For the minutes of these meetings see, amongst others National Archives Kew (TNA), Foreign Office Files (FO) 92/139; Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (GStA-PK). III. Hauptabteilung (HA) Ministerium des Auswärtigen (Mda) I, Politische Abteilung, e.g. no.897, 911, 1464, 1465, 1469. Here: ‘Konferenz der Minister der alliierten Mächte in Paris, protocol 12 July 1815’, GStA-PK III.HA I, no.1464.

²³ See on the differences between the occupations and the impact on the local French populations: J. Hantraye, *Les cosaques aux Champs-Élysées. L’occupation de la France après la chute de Napoléon* (Paris: Belin, 2005); Y. Guerrin, *La France après Napoléon. Invasions et occupations 1814–1818* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2014).

²⁴ Cf. P. Graf von Kielmansegg, *Stein und die Zentralverwaltung 1813/1814* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964).

²⁵ Kielmansegg, *Stein und die Zentralverwaltung*, 22–97; Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 43–5.

²⁶ ‘Report of a meeting of Beugnot, Minister of Finance, with his colleague Bülow, 13 May 1814’. Cited by Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 43–79.

personal messianic inclinations, Tsar Alexander I proved to be extraordinarily gracious. French prisoners of war were released, most looted art works did not have to be returned²⁷ and the city's National Guard unit and the gendarmerie were allowed to retain their weapons.²⁸ Thus, the first attempt at managing peace resulted in magnanimous terms for France, and only a short-lived occupation.

The first peace of Paris did not last long and was quickly eclipsed in the *Cent Jours* of Napoleon.²⁹ The second allied attempt was therefore far more rigorous. On 25 March 1815, in a treaty for 'mutual security', the Allies declared Napoleon an outlaw and pledged that they would not rest until the peace and security of the continent had lastingly been established. This meant that they would have to take Napoleon down one more time, but also that the restoration of the Bourbons had been insufficient to the task of maintaining peace. In Article II the Allies announced a 'common action': Each of the contracting parties would maintain a force of 150,000 men, deployed 'actively and conjointly against the common Enemy', until the object of the war had been attained: the completion of the provisions of the existing treaties of Chaumont and Paris.³⁰

In June 1815, the military defeat was total, according to Clausewitz (who took part in the battle), the French forces were struck in the heart.³¹ Paris had once again to bow to the Allies' superiority – but this time much more deeply. When the Allied powers dictated the occupation statute for France on 24 July, they did it *unisono*, and by a unified military command, rather than through the hybrid and overburdened administration of Stein. This time the occupation would be of much longer duration and would serve as a bond of peace for reparations to be paid. The Allies would occupy two-thirds of French territory.

²⁷ The Berlin Quadriga, however, was restored in spring 1814, and would be a symbol of Prussia in the festivities at the Vienna Congress: B. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and Politics after Napoleon* (London/Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 41. Prussia received some paintings back in 1814, but far less than she, or the other German governments, had laid claims upon. Cf. B. Savoy, *Patrimoine annexé. Les biens culturels saisis par la France en Allemagne autour de 1800* (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2003), 161–82.

²⁸ Cf. the recollections of the Russian officer and aide-de-camp of the tsar: A. Mikhailofsky-Danilefsky, *History of the Campaign in France in the Year 1814. Translated from the Russian* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1839), 383–90; Bew, *Castlereagh*, 349; n.n., *Alexandrana ou bons mots et paroles remarquables d'Alexandre Ier* (Paris: Imprimerie de D'Hautel, 1815), 47. Cited by Rey, *Alexander I*, 268–9.

²⁹ For a detailed account of the turbulence in 1815, see Houssaye, *1815. Les cent jours*; *Ibid.*, *1815. La seconde abdication*; E. de Waresquiel, *Cent jours. La tentation de l'impossible* (Paris: Fayard, 2009).

³⁰ Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers: 1814–1815*, vol.2 (London: Ridgway, 1839), 443–50.

³¹ C. von Clausewitz, 'Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich', in P. Hofschroër (trans. and ed.), *On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 173–5.

French troops had to draw back and remain south of the river Loire while awaiting their disbandment and reorganisation under royal rule. On paper, the civil administration of France was granted to Louis XVIII, but his government would be under the guardianship of an Allied Council of Ministers and an allied occupation army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. This was a real blow to France, and a revolutionary decision in European history: the announcement that a *unified allied force* would remain intact and occupy the territory *for a number of years*, to manage the occupation, and other security-related matters.³²

The Allied Council, also named Conference des Ministres Alliés (or Paris Conference), held its first session on the 12 July 1815, and consisted of the key actors Wellington, Chancellor Metternich, Castlereagh, the Prussian ambassador Humboldt, the Austrian General Schwarzenberg, his Prussian colleague Gneisenau and the Russian envoys Nesselrode, Pozzo di Borgo and Capodistrias. The idea was that none of them would operate alone, but that all decisions would be based on ‘concerted discussion and deliberation’, following ‘common and uniform principles’. The Council met every day, after November 1815 two or three times a week.³³ In October, Wellington was officially appointed by the Allied princes as commander of the allied troops; he was the one who spoke with the French King and government. Owing to his support in 1814 and in 1815 for the return of the Bourbons to the throne, he enjoyed the eternal gratitude of Louis XVIII.³⁴ After October 1815 (until 1818), the council was reduced, and became a Ministerial Conference consisting of three ‘ministers’ (the Austrian Baron Vincent, Pozzo di Borgo and the Prussian Goltz) and Ambassador Charles Stuart, who sometimes invited the French Prime Minister, Armand du Plessis, Duc de Richelieu to their sessions. Wellington was there as often as possible – and, when he was away, travelling between his military headquarters in northern France, along the lines of fortifications in the Netherlands or receiving instructions in London, the Council was instructed to once a week furnish him with reports of its discussions.³⁵

This rather lean institutional structure, physically based in the British embassy and assisted by one or two scribes, made it much easier to coordinate policy and actions in the diverse realms of military, domestic, diplomatic and

³² See the minutes of the Allied Council, ‘3rd, 10th and 13th meeting, 14 and 21 July 1815’, GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1464. See also Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 95–8, 138–43; A. von Ilseman, *Die Politik Frankreichs auf dem Wiener Kongress. Talleyrands aussenpolitische Strategien zwischen Erster und Zweiter Restauration* (Hamburg: Krämer, 1996), 304–11.

³³ ‘12 July 1815’, GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1464; ‘séances 14, 22, 24, 27 August 1815’, TNA, FO146/6.

³⁴ R. Muir, *Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace 1814–1852* (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 2015), 108–9.

³⁵ ‘Séance October 1815’, plus annex with instructions and objectives: ‘Nota to Wellington, signed by Castlereagh, Metternich, Nesselrode and Humboldt’, TNA, FO146/6.

financial affairs than ever before. In this fashion, with the royal courts at a larger distance, we could even argue that in terms of efficiency, the Allied Council was an upgrade of the Vienna Congress. The various meetings of the special commissions set up at the Congress of Vienna to tackle particular questions in parallel with the main set of negotiations might have provided an example of how to manage the post-1815 changes to the system. It was striking – given the conflicting national interests – how much willingness the ambassadors displayed to achieve agreement up until the end of the occupation.

The Allied Council officially had two primary objectives. The first goal was to negotiate, establish and ensure the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. After intense deliberations, requiring the Council to meet at some point as often as three times a week, the Treaty was signed on 20 November 1815. It included: payment of the pecuniary indemnity of 700 million francs, rendering Napoleon harmless once and for all, reducing France's territory to the borders of 1790, with all fortifications now beyond those borders reverting to the allied powers and permitting and maintaining a 150,000-strong allied occupational army (at France's expense).³⁶ Through these stipulations, the Allies hoped to stabilise the French government and to suppress any warlike or revolutionary leanings.

The second objective was broader, to execute the so-called principles of salutary precaution for the peace of Europe as a whole.³⁷ The Paris Conference (as the Council was now often called) was conceived as a venue in which to address points of contention about peace and security: in France, and beyond. It was an attempt to manage the newly established balance of power by creating an institutional framework to discuss security issues and coordinate policies necessary to uphold and 'fix' the system. It was an innovative system for risk management, based on the need for precautionary measures in the face of international crises (yet in comparison to later ages, obviously with less of the necessary will and means to enforce them.)

Managing Revolutionary Unrest

The Allied Council's main task was the management of the transformation of France towards a peaceful, orderly and stable nation. It was not a foregone conclusion on the part of everyone that the Bourbons could once again ensure

³⁶ Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers: 1815–1816*, vol.3 (London: Ridgway, 1838), 280–91; for specific conventions on how the debt should be paid and borders drawn, see 292–361.

³⁷ 'Castlereagh, Memorandum, 13 July 1815', GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1461. See also Lord Liverpool to Castlereagh, 21 July 1815, in A. Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*, vol.11 (London: J. Murray, 1858–72), 47.

that stability – restoration of the Bourbon dynasty had not been an official war aim, nor was it promised in any of the treaties. Again, the Council had to find a unified solution. On 24 June, the provisional government led by acting Prime Minister Fouché (on behalf of Napoleon II) offered Wellington and Blücher a truce. But that proposal was rejected since such a reign, as Wellington explained, was not ‘that description of security which the Allies had in view’.³⁸ A range of other possibilities however were still discussed within the political and public debate: a regency headed by Napoleon’s wife (the emperor of Austria’s daughter) or a regime under the liberal noble Louis Phillippe, Duke of Orléans (the possibility of the elevation to the throne of Marshal Bernadotte was already off the table in 1814). But the British and Austrians preferred to give the Bourbon King Louis XVIII the benefit of the doubt. As Wellington explained to Lord Bathurst, Secretary of War: ‘I conceived the best security for Europe was the restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other government than the King’s in France must inevitably lead to new and endless wars.’ But as a condition for the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, Wellington demanded that Louis XVIII would embrace reforms and sign a constitution, to respect the ‘changes’ that had happened since the fall of the ancien régime.³⁹

The question was whether, the Bourbon regime was indeed in a position to guarantee stability and quell the lingering unrest in France. The first sessions of the Allied Council were to a large extent devoted to the question of pairing Bourbon rule with domestic stability. The Russians were doubtful, the Prussians vengeful. For the Allies, managing domestic security in France meant that Louis XVIII would have to steer a middle course through the Scylla of revolution and the Charybdis of an ultra-royalism. Since the second Restoration, all kinds of disturbances had broken out in the south, where the Allies had no occupation forces and where Louis’ vindictive brother, Charles Philippe, the Count of Artois (later King Charles X), had managed to position governors who supported the ultra cause. (Alleged) supporters of the previous revolutionary and Bonapartist regimes were subject to duress, including many Protestants.⁴⁰ In Paris the King chose to ignore their cries. At first neither Wellington, Castlereagh nor the other Allied ministers paid much heed to the rumours and reports either. That changed after French Protestants alerted their British fellow believers to their fate, and the Prussian head of the allied security agency, Justus von Gruner, sent alarmist reports about ‘une nouvelle

³⁸ ‘Wellington to Bathurst, 25 June 1815’, in J. Gurwood (ed.), *The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington*, vol.8 (London: Parker, 1844), 163–4.

³⁹ ‘Wellington to Bathurst, 2 July 1815’, in *ibid.*, 188–93.

⁴⁰ D.P. Resnick, *The White Terror and the Political Reaction after Waterloo* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 56–62.

Barthelemy'.⁴¹ The Council, acting upon the British and Prussian engagement for their fellow believers, first sent diplomatic notes, attempting to move Louis to contain the ultras.⁴² The terror nonetheless raged on, leading the Allied Council and Wellington to dispatch Austrian troops to pacify the hitherto unoccupied department of Gard in southern France.⁴³

The elections in August 1815 brought an end to most of the violence, but owing to the overwhelming majority of ultra-royalists in the Chamber of Deputies (350 of the 402 seats), the oppression continued legally in all kinds of restrictive and malicious rules and regulations.⁴⁴ Wellington and the Council followed the polarisation of French society with increasing anxiety. In February 1816, the Field Marshall even went as far as threatening the King with the outbreak of war once again.⁴⁵ Wellington, dispatched on behalf of the Paris Conference (as the Council was more often called after November 1815), urged Richelieu and the King to dissolve the *Chambre*, in return for a troop reduction. The carrot and stick strategy proved quite successful. In August 1816 Louis and Richelieu carried out their coup, dissolved the *Chambre* and announced new elections, which took some of the tension away.

Unrest flared up again in 1816 and 1817 – with the Paris Conference hardly able to moderate the French domestic debate. In June 1816 someone – never found – tried to set Wellington's house ablaze.⁴⁶ On the night of 10/11 February 1818 an aggrieved Jacobin from Brussels, named Cantillon, came very close to the Duke and emptied his pistol at him – but missed.⁴⁷ The revolutionary unrest even spread abroad: Emigré Bonapartists from Brussels

⁴¹ 'Martin, Mémoire to Gruner, 24 August 1815', with annex 'Bulletin de ce qui s'est passé à Nîmes', GStA-PK NI. Gruner 88.

⁴² 'Gruner to Hardenberg, Gerüchte, 20 August 1815'; 'Gruner to the Prussian King, to Hardenberg and to the Allied Council, 30 August 1815', GStA-PK NI. Hardenberg 10a. See also 'Colonel Ross to Sir Charles Stuart, 11 February 1816', TNA FO27/130; P.J. Lauze de Péret, *Causes et précis des troubles, crimes et désordres dans le département du Gard et dans d'autres lieux du Midi de La France* (Paris: Poulet, 1819); 'Letter from Wellington to Louis XVIII, February 1816', in Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, vol.9, 309–10; Document No.104. 'Extraits des rapports du Colonel Ross, Janvier 1816', in D. Robert, *Textes et documents relatifs à l'histoire des Églises Réformées en France: période 1800–1830* (Genève/Paris: Librairie Droz, 1962), 305–11, 307–8; 'Correspondance [n.d.]', FO27/119. See also A. Wemyss, 'L'Angleterre et la Terreur blanche de 1815 dans le Midi', *Annales du Midi*, 73:55 (1963), 287–310, 295–6.

⁴³ 'Rapport Schwarzenberg to the Allied Council, 16 August 1815'; 'Memorandum Schwarzenberg, 27 August, annex no.97', GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1465, p.62ff., p.109ff. Schwarzenberg was dispatched again in September and October.

⁴⁴ G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, *The Bourbon Restoration* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), 124–40.

⁴⁵ 'Letter to Louis XVIII, composed by Wellington and the Allied Council, 28 February 1816', TNA, FO146/6, séance 28 February 1816.

⁴⁶ Edgcumbe, *The Diary*, 202–3. Shelley refers to 'Monsieur de Cage', a phonetic rendering in English of the French name (Élie) Decazes, the French Foreign Minister and Minister of Police.

⁴⁷ Muir, *Wellington*, 111–13.

disseminated hateful and subversive pamphlets aimed at overthrowing the French and European order. To manage the combined threat of ‘armed Jacobinism’ (dixit Metternich),⁴⁸ Bonapartism and other revolutionary unrest, the Allied Conference – together with Richelieu – composed lists of allegedly ‘dangerous radicals’. Bonapartists, members of Napoleon’s family and a series of regicides and other ‘terroristes dangereux’ were put on lists. These lists were despatched throughout France, and to all the foreign courts of Europe with the request of enforcing these persons to leave France and settle in exile in one of the three allied countries: Prussia, Russia or Austria (not in the Netherlands, the smaller German provinces or Italy for reasons of vicinity to France and an alleged lack of resources to monitor them).⁴⁹

Subsequently, Metternich (with the support of Russia and Prussia) tried to transform the Paris Conference into a kind of ‘European police’, threatening minor countries with military action and enforcement if they would not comply – for example against the new King of the Netherlands, William I. The King, backed by his parliament, was unwilling to adopt censorship laws and limit the freedom of the press such that the plotting and wrangling of French exiles in Brussels – ‘this nest of traitors and libellers’ – would be checked.⁵⁰ To defuse Austria’s threats, William and his parliament eventually, but reluctantly, introduced a number of new laws and deportation regulations (which were subsequently never seriously enforced).⁵¹ But the Allied ministers also had to slow down. For example, the British Foreign Secretary insisted to his ambassador in Paris Stuart that: ‘The Allied Ministers at Paris must be kept within the bounds of their original institution and not be suffered to present themselves as an European Council for the management of the affairs of the world.’⁵² The boundaries of the proposed European transformation were guarded closely by the British ‘balancers’; they should not go too far, i.e. not be too incendiary themselves. And more importantly: the Paris Conference had to remain what it was, a forum for managing security related affairs, not a supranational institution with a jurisdiction of its own.

⁴⁸ ‘Metternich, Memorandum to Hardenberg, 6 August 1815’, GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1461, 75.

⁴⁹ See e.g. ‘Note Metternich to Allied Council, annex 93, 96, protocol 22/27 August 1815’, GStA-PK, III.HA I, No.1465, 89/101; ‘Notice sur les Conventionnels Régicides qui ont pris des Passeports pour le Royaume des Paysbas, annex to protocol 19 May 1816’; ‘Discussion with Richelieu at the Council, 24 February 1816’, TNA, FO146/6; ‘Circulaire of the Allied Council to all the allied partners, 19 July 1817’, TNA, FO146/22.

⁵⁰ E.g. ‘Séance 25 February 1816’, TNA, FO146/6.

⁵¹ ‘Wellington, Memorandum to ministers on the libels published in the Low Countries, 29 August 1816’, in Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, vol.9, 464–9; Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot*, 125–62. See also the contribution of De Haan and Van Zanten in this volume.

⁵² ‘Castlereagh to Stuart, 22 July 1817’, in Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh*, 71.

Managing by Force (and Fortresses)

Between 1815 and 1817 it was very clear that neither the Bourbons nor the new parliament were willing or able to restore the political peace. The European balance of power with respect to France was therefore first and foremost ensured by the military occupation, an ‘occupation of guarantee’.⁵³

The first test for the Council, the negotiation of the second Treaty of Paris, demonstrated that this occupation was indeed a novelty, and not the most logical outcome of Napoleon’s defeat. Prussia tried to convince the Council during the autumn months of 1815 that France’s territorial expanse be reduced permanently. The northern and eastern frontiers must be drawn such that France would lose all of the territories that it had annexed since the seventeenth century, including the fortifications along those borders. The Prussian ministers believed that the balance of power had to be adjusted on the basis of the rights of conquest. Prussians cared about the balance too, as well as nurturing their sentiments of vengeance, but in their opinion a smaller France would be less of a threat. Wellington, Castlereagh, Metternich and the Russians strongly opposed carving France up, because it would only increase the risk of future attacks and leave a power vacuum on the western front. The balance of power would not be served well by such territorial punishments.⁵⁴ In the end, the Prussian’s hard, military interpretation of the balance, and their desire for retaliatory actions, had again to give way to the joint Russian, British and Austrian perception of stability.

The second test was the management of the occupation itself. The governance of the occupation was administered according to the rules and regulations of the eventual Treaty of Paris. Each power was granted access to a large portion of France: the British in the West, the Prussians and Russians in the North and North East and the Austrians in the South-East. Paris was liberated and left to the French King.⁵⁵ In late 1815, there were still about 1.2 million soldiers in France, of which 320,000 were Austrian, 310,000 Prussian, 250,000 Russian, 128,000 British plus other troops from smaller German states and Denmark, Spain and Switzerland; the number would be reduced to 150,000 over the coming months. Wellington oversaw the unified command of these national forces at his military headquarters in Cambrai, or from

⁵³ Haynes, ‘Making peace’, 62.

⁵⁴ See the protocols of 14/21 July 1815, GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1464; Cf. M. Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 18–19; Cf. Bew, *Castlereagh*, 207–15, 398–9.

⁵⁵ ‘Memorandum on the temporary occupation of part of France, 31 August 1815’, in Gurwood, *Despatches*, vol.8, 253–5; Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 11–31; Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 141–6.

Paris, and regularly travelled to Brussels and the Netherlands to inspect the building and expansion of a system of twenty-one forts and garrisons along three parallel lines of fortifications, which functioned as the new European ‘collective defence system’, ranging from the fortresses at the North Sea coast (Nieuwpoort, Ostende) via Dendermonde, Ath, Doornik, Oudenaarde, Gent and Dinant until the German lines of defence at Mainz.⁵⁶

In practice, ‘on the ground’, this meant that Wellington gave the directives, the Paris Conference defined the framework (e.g. regarding the payment of interest and debts, the administration of justice and dealing with complaints against the occupation forces) and the military commanders of the powers in their regions independently arranged for billeting, barracks, requisitions and the general wellbeing of their troops – the latter differing greatly per unit and commander. The occupation transformed a good deal of northern and western France into an ‘alien’ country. French residents had to deal with foreign troops. While Prussian forces suffered a rather bad reputation and were widely resented, in areas where the occupiers and the local population spoke the same language (as in the Alsace region), a sense of fraternity and mutual respect actually took root.⁵⁷ Also among the Allies themselves, the occupation occasioned a greater degree of understanding and rapprochement. Through joint troop inspections, parades, field exercises and the exchange of military orders or sitting on joint legal committees that dealt with disputes amongst themselves or with French complainants, the first glimmerings of a common European security culture were evident, rooted as they were in the joint management of the French security risk.⁵⁸

From the outset the military occupation took a huge toll on the French treasury and on the nation’s self-esteem. Skirmishes and incidents on the streets were the order of the day, even though the commanders, given the measures at their disposal, were generally able to keep these insurgencies under control. Wellington struggled as commander with the dilemma that he wanted to keep his military forces up to snuff, but also saw that their presence often only fuelled unrest and in some places even tended to radicalise national discontent. He warned his men, ‘[i]f one shot is fired in Paris, the whole

⁵⁶ Cf. W. Uitterhoeve, *C. Kraijenhoff, 1758–1840: Een Loopbaan onder Vijf Regeervormen* (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2009), 289–318; H.D. Jones, *Reports Relating to the Re-Establishment of the Fortresses in the Netherlands from 1814 to 1830* (London: Spottiswood, 1861); Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 93–108; R. Gils, *De Versterkingen van de Wellingtonbarrière in Oost-Vlaanderen* (Gent: Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen, 2005).

⁵⁷ See Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 262–90; Haynes, ‘Making peace’, 62–3.

⁵⁸ Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 37–40. See for such a cooperation: ‘Rapport van den Inspecteur-Generaal der Fortificaties betreffende de ontworpen grondslagen tot een algemeen systema van Defensie van het Rijk, 15 March 1816’, National Archives The Hague (NL-HaNA), Algemene Staatssecretarie, 2.02.01, inv.no.5654.

country will rise against us.’⁵⁹ In other words, stabilising the country (the first aim) clashed with executing the Treaty’s stipulations (the second). That was one of the reasons why, after hesitating for some time, the Allied ministers agreed to a reduction in troop levels as partial compensation for the dissolution of the *Chambre Introuvable* in September 1816. In February 1817 Wellington sent 30,000 of his troops home.⁶⁰

At the same time, the Conference asked Wellington to accelerate the transition of the military presence from an ‘occupational guarantee’⁶¹ towards a collective defence system, the barrier of forts and fortresses in the Netherlands and Germany.⁶² The Allied Conference had originally wanted to have this ‘Wellington Barrier’ completed prior to the troops’ departure, but its construction and the necessary reinforcements took longer than first planned. In 1818 an initial series of forts was provisionally completed, and – permanently manned by Dutch garrisons – could serve as a replacement guarantee for the security of France and Europe.⁶³ Its completion and staffing by garrisons was secured by a secret military protocol to the Congress of Aachen.⁶⁴ This physical dimension of security was most evident in the countryside, and did indeed transform the image of security into artefacts of power and protection in the 1820s.

Financial Securities

The greatest challenge for the Conference was the management of the French payments and the arrangement of financial securities. Again, for the Prussian commanders and the representatives of the smaller German states, the right of the victor to redress was decisive. Moreover, reparations were not only a redress for the payments the German states themselves had had to pay after 1806, but would also help fund a stronger Prussian army and German fortresses in a time of economic hardship in a war-torn Central Europe. Playing to public opinion and achieving satisfaction at home certainly mattered too, as

⁵⁹ Cited by Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 67. ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 109–23.

⁶¹ Haynes, ‘Making Peace’, 62.

⁶² ‘Allied Council, 2, 6, 7, 8 October 1815’, GStA-PK III.HA I, No.1469; ‘Correspondence Krayenhoff-Wellington, December 1815’, TNA, FO92/15.

⁶³ Although Wellington and the Allies insisted on an international defensive/garrison force, the Dutch King William I refused to house foreign troops in Dutch forts. So, Dutch troops manned the forts, with German troops nearby. Wacker, *Die alliierte Besetzung*, 223–31.

⁶⁴ Wellington, ‘Memorandum’, 5 November 1818 and final version: ‘Reserved protocol – Quadruple Alliance’ & ‘Protocole Militaire’, 15 November 1818, Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, vol.12, 817–9, 835–7. See also protocol and annexes of the meeting of the Congress of Aachen, 15 November 1818, Aachen, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatskanzlei, Kongressakten, inv.nr. 17, Subfolder ‘Protokolle’, Aachen 1818, pp. 157–72.

well as deterrence of potential new war-mongers. That is why the Prussian commander of Paris, Müffling, and after November 1815 Ambassador Von der Goltz on behalf of the King, continually pushed for higher reparations. The Prussian commanders, along with the Dutch, were this time also the first to come, with bayonets at the ready, to retrieve stolen works of art. The Louvre was stripped of the masterpieces of Lucas Cranach, and Cologne got its Rubens back (the *Kreuzigung Petri*). 'Fiat Justitia!' were the triumphant words of the Prussian commissioner John Henry when he wrote home.⁶⁵

Harder still was the process of making the French financial commissioners not only accept but also carry out the indemnifications and liquidation of private claims and standing debts. With great reluctance and delay tactics, Prime Minister Richelieu and Controller-General of Finance Baron Louis negotiated with their European counterparts to reduce the burden of payments. All the haggling drove the Dutch and Prussian commissioners for the arrears crazy.⁶⁶

Richelieu's highest priority was nonetheless to meet the stated deadlines, in order to bring the occupation to an end as quickly as possible.⁶⁷ Exactly as the Allied Conference had stated, the occupation was the 'security to the Allies for their punctual Liquidation'.⁶⁸ Richelieu's problem was however the total amount of the indemnifications and private claims. The French treasury would simply not be able to cough that up, even with higher taxes and/or further delay. The second Treaty of Paris had determined that the French would have to pay an overdue debt of 700 million francs, added to which was an amount of about 360 million francs per annum for the maintenance of the troops. On top of this came an almost similar claim for the liquidation of private debts. Opinions on the Allied Conference differed initially as to exactly how these payments were to be made. Austria and Germany wanted to be paid more quickly and in cash, whereas Britain and Russia were satisfied with government bonds and longer payment periods. The latter arrangement eventually prevailed.⁶⁹ France eventually paid a total of 1,893 million francs. That was less than the reparations imposed on Germany after World War I, but in

⁶⁵ Savoy, *Patrimoine*, 183–95, 183.

⁶⁶ 'Rapport sur le travail de la Commission nommé pour assurer l'exécution des articles de la Paix de Paris du 30 Mai 1814 auxquels il n'y a pas été satisfait jusqu'ici par la France'. Untitled piece bearing these words written by Canneman: 'travail de M. de Humboldt'; and 'Protocoles des séances des Commissaires des Puissances Alliées et des Commissaires français chargés de discuter la Convention projetée relativement à l'accomplissement du Traité de Paris du 30 Mai 1814, 5–15 November 1815', NL-HaNA, Canneman, 2.21.005.30, inv.no.36. See also H. Landheer, 'Afrekenen met het Verleden: De vereffening van de achterstallige schulden van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in het begin van de negentiende eeuw', in H. Boels (ed.), *Overheidsfinanciën tijdens de Republiek en het Koninkrijk, 1600–1850* (Hilversum: Verloren, 2012), 189–230, 220–2; H.C. von Gagern, *Der zweite Pariser Frieden* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1845), 316–22.

⁶⁷ Bertier, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 154.

⁶⁸ 'Castlereagh to Wellington, 24 April 1818', TNA, FO92/33.

⁶⁹ See TNA, FO146/6 for the discussion during the sessions of 6 and 10 March 1816.

absolute terms more than any other externally imposed war debt in the nineteenth and twentieth century.⁷⁰

Here too, it was Wellington who reined in the Prussian drive for revenge. He also rejected Gneisenau and Blücher's argument that Prussian public opinion (in particular via the *Rheinische Merkur* – a short-lived, 1814–16, liberal newspaper edited by the Catholic publicist and German nationalist Joseph Görres) was breathing down their neck; as Wellington (rather exaggeratedly) claimed in October 1815: 'The *Rhenish Mercury* is a paper set up and patronized by the Prussian military Jacobins, having in view to be established in Germany, and eventually all over Europe, the dominion of Prussian military Jacobinism; a tyranny rather more degrading than that from which we have lately escaped.'⁷¹ (Interestingly, this citation is also evidence of Wellington's acceptance of some of the conspiracy theories propagated by Talleyrand, Metternich and others on 'armed Jacobinism'.) Tsar Alexander supported Castlereagh and Wellington in tempering Prussian vengeance. Another solution had to be found for the remainder of the debt; neither the treasury nor the population could come up with that kind of money within the prescribed period. As a result, Richelieu, with the help of Wellington, forged a plan to enlist international financial assistance. Via Wellington's Dutch contacts⁷² the private banking houses of Hope and Baring in London and Amsterdam were contacted and a large loan was secured in 1817, with a second following in 1818.⁷³ Public response to the loans, both in France but also abroad, was immense; twelve times as many subscriptions to the financial securities-on-offer were registered – producing a robust moral boost to political and economic confidence.⁷⁴ France could now fulfil all of its outstanding financial obligations.

⁷⁰ E.N. White, 'Making the French pay: the costs and consequences of the Napoleonic reparations', *European Review of Economic History*, 5:3 (2001), 337–65, 341, 361.

⁷¹ Cited by Muir, *Wellington*, 93.

⁷² 'Baring to Richelieu, 7 October 1817, Paris. Annex to the Allied Council's protocol of 8 October 1817', TNA, FO 146/22. See also Oosterlinck a.o., 'Baring, Wellington and the Resurrection of French Public Finances', 1081–3; Report of Wellington's financial liaison in Paris, Dutch financial liquidation commissioner Elias Canneman, to the Dutch King, 12 October 1817. NL-HaNA, ASS, 6366.

⁷³ E.g. 'Wellington to Castlereagh reporting on a meeting with Hope and Baring, Paris 1 January 1818', and 'On a "convention pécuniaire", 27 August 1818', TNA, FO92/33.

⁷⁴ Bertier, *The Bourbon Restoration*, 154–5; Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 113–4, 150–1. See also Chapter 15 by Sluga in this volume; J. Greenfield, 'Financing a new order. The payment of reparations by restoration France, 1817–1818', *French History*, 30:3 (2016), 376–400; K. Oosterlinck, L. Ureche-Rangau and J.M. Vaslin, 'Baring, Wellington and the resurrection of French public finances following Waterloo', *The Journal of Economic History*, 74:4 (2014), 1072–1102; D.C.M. Platt, *Foreign Finance in Continental Europe and the United States, 1815–1870. Quantities, Origins, Functions and Distribution* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984); P. Ziegler, *The Sixth Great Power. Barings, 1762–1929* (London: HarperCollins, 1988).

At the Congress of Aachen, meeting between 30 September and 15 November 1818, the final financial conventions were concluded. Hence, France was rewarded with an invitation to accede to Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance (via a special stipulation), and the Allies' occupying army left France in that same year. With that, this particular project of collective security in the Paris Conference temporarily came to an end. Wellington himself bid farewell to the troops, who were to have left France by 30 November 1818.⁷⁵ A 'Europol' *avant la lettre* was not set up. France had wrested itself from its financial yoke, was still not-quite bankrupt and the turbulent times seemed to have abated – at least for now. And the Allied Conference had managed to stay intact and in charge till the end, in November 1818, when its protocols were formally 'closed' by the princes in Aachen.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The Allied Council (and after November 1815, the Allied or Paris Conference) was a platform for managing the transition in France and the security of Europe. This was a hazardous task since the various objectives of the occupation regime were diametrically opposed. The military occupation, and the seizures associated with it, confirmed the superior power of the Allies but humiliated France. The mere existence of the Allied Council also increasingly undermined the French government that had agreed to it. The attempt to stabilise the King's government and to mitigate the political divisions and radicalisation in the country could not, in the long run, comport well with the ongoing attempts to sap the country dry, like the Prussian commanders tried to do in the areas that they occupied. That is why Wellington recommended ending the occupation sooner than anticipated, after three instead of five years. Military, the dissolution of the Grande Armée and expulsion of central Bonapartists had been achieved and the construction of a ring of fortresses around France was well under way. Financially, the Allied goal that the debts be paid, and looted artworks returned, had been achieved. Politically, it was still questionable whether the Bourbons would survive and whether Louis XVIII had profited from the support he had received from the Allies' bayonets.

Apart from the changes in France itself, the Allied Council also contributed to a broader culture of European security. The remarkable thing about this

⁷⁵ Cited by Veve, *The Duke of Wellington*, 161.

⁷⁶ 'Protocol 5 December 1818, with formal closing instructions by the Metternich, Castlereagh, Hardenberg, Bernstorff, Nesselrode and Capo d'Istrias from 22 November 1818', TNA, FO146/30. The four members, Vincent, Pozzo di Borgo, Stuart and Goltz, however kept continuing their sessions, as the princes had asked them to manage the remaining territorial and financial matters. But they now did not longer convene as the Allied Conference within the framework of the Paris Treaty, but as a mere ambassadorial conference.

council was that its participants, from high to low, were in many ways ‘joined at the hip’ for years. Castlereagh, Tsar Alexander I, Friedrich Wilhelm III, Wellington and their ministers were away from home for at least a year. Tsar Alexander was in Europe for almost all of December 1812 through October 1815; Castlereagh left London on 28 December 1813 and remained on the continent, except for two short trips back home, until the end of November 1815, albeit much to the increasing chagrin of Parliament. After the rulers and foreign ministers returned home in late 1815, a large number of notable representatives remained in place: Wellington, Pozzo di Borgo, Vincent, Goltz, Müffling, Charles Stuart. The physical presence of government leaders and their ministers during the lengthy negotiations on peace and security reflect a sense of how much value was attached to these ongoing discussions. In their respective homelands, the physical absence of these leaders and their ministers was generally also deemed to be in the interest of national security.

In that light, this period of high profile, intensive, well-documented and, for that time, widely reported consultations qualifies as a modern form of ‘summit’. According to David Reynolds, the modern form of summitry is contingent on the use of aircraft, the presence of daily ‘newsreels’ and the need for bilateral restrictions on the use of weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁷ There were no planes in 1815, let alone talk shows. But statesmen continued to spend protracted periods in each other’s capitals, with their deliberations reported on extensively in the newspapers and magazines of the day. A review of the (British) *Examiner*, the *Wiener Zeitung*, *Allgemeine Zeitung* and the (Dutch) *Rotterdamsche Courant* reveals that the ‘news sky’ was already quite transnational.⁷⁸ And the fear for mass destruction in the conventional wars of the time and the threat of revolution continued to hang like a sword of Damocles over their heads. Indeed, there was even talk of a ‘progressive’ form of summitry that led to the institutionalisation of standards and practices embedded in a growing community of professional agents.⁷⁹ Owing to their prolonged proximity in working together and to the ease of communicating with those they had come to know well, new ideas and concepts were generated and

⁷⁷ D. Reynolds, *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 11–36.

⁷⁸ See for a rich analysis of the European press coverage of Vienna and its aftermath Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, 99–111.

⁷⁹ M. Schulz, *Normen und Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 70–1; Reynolds, *Summits*, 7. See also R. Keohane: ‘By clustering issues together in the same forums over a long period of time, they help to bring governments into continuing interaction with one another, reducing the incentives to cheat and enhancing the value of reputation’, Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 244–5. For more on ‘forum talk’ and ‘face-to-face diplomacy’, see J. Mitzen, *Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Global Governance* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013).

circulated, or new meanings were ascribed to old terms, like the concept ‘balance of power’.⁸⁰ On the cultural front, an international array of *belles lettres* were shared and discussed, ranging from the popular novels and writings of Sir Walter Scott (a friend of Castlereagh), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe or Madame de Staël. Intellectuals such as Grimm and Humboldt (despatched to France to identify looted art), worked in the Bibliothèque Nationale and deepened existing ties with French *érudits*.

As stipulated in the Treaty of Paris, the Allied Council established a territorial, a military and, to a certain extent, also a political balance. It was a system of collective risk management, as provided for in Article VI of the second Treaty of Paris:

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the Four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their Meetings at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves, or by their respective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of the Peace of Europe.⁸¹

In addition to the high-profile summits and meetings of state leaders, this treaty also provided for a new system of ministerial or ambassadorial conferences with which the bellicose and revolutionary ghosts of the future had to be laid to rest, in France and beyond. The Allied Conference in France was the first example of this system, and with an eye to the short-term stipulations of the Paris Treaty (which were met) a successful example. That France in its heart would remain divided, and would again be shaken by a revolution, the Allied Conference could not have prevented – although Wellington was very critical of the ongoing polarisation in France. The system of fortifications did not prove to be a durable barrier, falling prey to urban development and the rapid expansion of train connections in the 1840s. But given what they knew then, the Conference was a thorough and comprehensive instrument to implement the principles of mutual security and the balance of power in a gradual and diplomatic way. It was a masterpiece of change management.

The system of ministerial or ambassadorial conferences provided a forum for managing and containing international crises when they started. In fact, we

⁸⁰ See also in this context D. Armitage, ‘Globalizing Jeremy Bentham’, *History of Political Thought*, 32:1 (2011), 63–82; *Ibid.*, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁸¹ E. Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place since the General Peace of 1814* (London: Butterworths, 1875), 372–6.

could argue that the Vienna Order shifted gears from summitry to the mechanism of the conferences. Royal visits and summits of course still took place, as in Aachen, but they became partly disaggregated from the real diplomatic business. Even during the Congress of Aachen, the Allied Conference kept up its work in Paris. With Vick (Chapter 6 in this volume), we could argue that the governments of the great powers had discovered the efficiency of managing their joint conflicts and interests within a multilateral framework, rather than relying solely on the classical modus of bilateral correspondence or contacts between ambassadors in the respective capitals. Conferences became a seminal modus of international relations from the 1820s onwards. For this discovery, the Allied Council laid the groundwork.