

9 Constructing an International Conspiracy Revolutionary Concertation and Police Networks in the European Restoration

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Introduction

How dangerous was political life in Europe in the Restoration era? Historians disagree about the reality of international conspiracies and subversive plots threatening the regimes established in the Vienna Settlement. According to Adam Zamoyski, the fear of a resurgence of revolutionary terror, coordinated by a *comité directeur*, was a form of political paranoia, which despite its imaginary nature led to the creation of a vast security apparatus, laying the foundation for an invasive and prosecutorial police state.¹ Police historian Clive Emsley similarly argues that ‘the fear of [secret societies] was always greater than the reality; but it was the fear of them that kept political policemen and their *mouchards* in a job’.²

Various factors might have contributed to the political paranoia of the period. In the first place, European politics had already been in the thrall of conspiracies for much longer. In the eighteenth century, there were frequent rumours about ‘aristocratic plots’, and the narrative of conspiracy contributed much to the radicalisation of the French Revolution, culminating in the Terror as an attempt to eradicate all sinister plots.³ Fear of subversion was also an issue during the Napoleonic rule over Europe. In his classic account of the Vienna Settlement, Guglielmo Ferrero contended that it emerged from fear of revolution, counterrevolution and war, but above all, fear of France.⁴

¹ A. Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror. Political Paranoia and the Creation of the Modern State* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 284.

² C. Emsley, ‘Introduction. Political police and the European nation-state in the nineteenth century’, in M. Mazower (ed.), *The Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century. Historical Perspectives* (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997), 1–26, 7.

³ M. Linton, ‘“The Tartuffes of patriotism”: fears of conspiracy in the political language of revolutionary government, France 1793–1794’, in B. Coward and J. Swann (eds.), *Conspiracies and Conspiracy Theory in Early Modern Europe. From the Waldensians to the French Revolution* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 235–54; M. Price, ‘The “foreign plot” and the French Revolution: a reappraisal’, in *ibid.*, 255–68; C. Zwierlein and B.A. de Graaf, ‘Historicizing security – entering the conspiracy dispositive’, *Historical Social Research*, 38:1 (2013), 46–64.

⁴ G. Ferrero, *Reconstruction. Talleyrand à Vienne, 1814–1815* (Paris: Plon, 1944), 1–13.

Moreover, many of the new regimes seemed vulnerable, most of all the rule of Louis XVIII in France. Diehard aristocrats looked with suspicion upon attempts to find a middle way between the order of the Ancien Régime and the new-found liberty of the post-revolutionary era, and were convinced that the revolutionary impulse needed to be suppressed, first of all in France, but also elsewhere in Europe.⁵ The presence of an army of occupation in France contributed to this apparent frailty.⁶ At the same time, fear for the stability of the new order was exacerbated by the return of demobilised soldiers, in total about 2.5 million: 1.66 million veterans in France and the rest scattered across Europe. In the minds of many ‘the army was [. . .] a force recruited and paid by an internal enemy. For a significant portion of the population, being a soldier also meant being Bonapartist’.⁷ This suspicion was further reinforced by the spectre of Napoleon, who even after he had died was sighted in many parts of Europe, often ‘believed to be accompanied by armed forces recruited from a host of different nations: Austrians, Saxons, Bavarians; as well as Turks, Indians, Algerians, American negroes, Persians and even Chinese’.⁸

Against the pathological interpretation of these fears, as a form of collective paranoia, it can be argued that they represented a rational response to an actual wave of revolutionary activity across Europe. Even if the conflicts of the immediate post-Vienna years did not generally involve the mobilisation of starving masses, there were violent conflicts among members of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie – especially the frustrated youth of the well-educated middle class – the army and the clergy about the legacy of the Revolution and the Napoleonic era.⁹ But the fears of the defenders of the Vienna Settlement went beyond concern about scattered revolts. They feared a concerted European-wide revolutionary movement – and to what extent such a movement existed remains contested. In his account of the revolts in Spain, Italy, Greece and Russia, Richard Stites contended that they shared ‘mechanical similarities’, the most important of which was their ‘internationalism’.¹⁰

⁵ D.P. Resnick, *The White Terror and the Political Reaction after Waterloo* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); B. Fitzpatrick, ‘The *Royaume du Midi* of 1815’, in D. Laven and L. Riall (eds.), *Napoleon’s Legacy: Problems of Government in Restoration Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 167–82.

⁶ J. Hantraye, *Les cosaques aux Champs-Élysées. L’occupation de la France après la chute de Napoléon* (Paris: Belin, 2005).

⁷ N. Petitau, ‘Survivors of war: French soldiers and veterans of the Napoleonic armies’, in A. Forrest, K. Hagemann and J. Rendall (eds.), *Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians. Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790–1820* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 43–58, 49.

⁸ S. Hazareensingh, ‘Memory and political imagination. The legend of Napoleon revisited’, *French History*, 18:4 (2004), 463–83, 466.

⁹ M. Lyons, *Post-Revolutionary Europe 1815–1856* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006).

¹⁰ R. Stites, *The Four Horsemen. Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 323.

According to Alan Spitzer, there were intensive contacts between Italian and French Carbonari, or even 'a revolutionary International', even if 'this was a movement [...] with a circumference everywhere and a center nowhere, or rather with a center in the mind of every conspirator who believed that he pulled the strings that moved his foreign comrades'.¹¹

Given this mixture of fact and imagination, it is hard if not impossible to know if there was actually an international revolutionary conspiracy.¹² It is in the nature of the secret societies that they did not document much of their activities and, when they did, used veiled or secret modes of communication. Much of the relevant archival material has also been lost. Most of the police archive of the Restoration era in France was burned during the Paris Commune. Nearly all of the Austrian police papers from the same period were destroyed in a fire caused by riots in 1927, and then again during the battles at the end of World War II.¹³ But the extent of international subversive coordination is not only a scholarly disagreement among today's (and yesterday's) historians. More importantly, it was heatedly debated among contemporaries. Some were convinced there was an international group of conspirators, but even Metternich was certain 'that they lack leaders of distinction capable of inspiring confidence, and that they have neither an overall directorship nor any of the other means required to effectively provoke revolutionary movements'.¹⁴

Even if it was then, or is now, impossible to confirm the actual existence of an international revolutionary conspiracy, the debate about it is itself telling about the perception and construction of the dangers of revolution in the Restoration era. The crucial question is therefore not whether there was actually an international conspiracy, but rather how those who feared such a threat used fragmentary information to support their suspicions of international conspiracy. We aim to demonstrate that this involved a number of epistemic and practical operations, which all contributed to the emergence of a European security culture. However, this culture was not a unified whole, but riddled with political tensions, as a result of competing political interests in the fight against real threats to the Restoration order.

¹¹ A. Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes. The French Carbonari against the Bourbon Restoration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 271.

¹² See also J. Kloosterman, 'Secret societies', *European History Online* (EGO), www.ieg-ego.eu/kloostermanj-2013-en (accessed 18 July 2016).

¹³ R.J. Rath, *The Provisional Austrian Regime in Lombardy-Venetia, 1814-1815* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), ix-x. Rath's study includes archival material he collected in the 1930s, which since has been lost.

¹⁴ Metternich's report to Emperor Franz of his Italian trip, 3 November 1817, quoted in Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror*, 173.

‘A Threat to the Existence of Every Throne’

In contrast to its reputation as a reactionary and even rather dull period, the more recent historiography presents the Restoration as a tumultuous and politically innovative time.¹⁵ While the main concern of the parties at the conference tables in Vienna was to suppress revolutionary tendencies in France, the most disruptive political turmoil emerged around 1820 in Spain and Italy. In Spain, the political vagaries of the Restoration era were a continuation of the national uprising against Napoleon, which had led to the Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 as the most liberal constitution in Europe. The attempts of King Ferdinand VII to repress the *liberales* resulted in a series of smaller and unsuccessful uprisings, and finally in a revolt under the leadership of the regimental commander Rafael di Riego y Nuñez, who after a six-month campaign succeeded in reinstalling the Constitution of Cadiz, inaugurating a *trienio liberal*, which was ended in 1823 by a French military intervention.¹⁶

On the Italian peninsula, Austria’s direct or indirect control of most of the territory was challenged both by the previous French regime of Joachim Murat and by some of the British, whose representative, the commander of Sicily Lord Bentinck, had called for the North Italian secret societies to rise up against the Napoleonic regime.¹⁷ These societies consisted of former members of Masonic sects and its offshoots, the Illuminati, from which they inherited their religious rituals and initiations; Jacobin clubs that previously had supported the French; and organisations of disaffected army officers. The most consequential were the Carbonari, who attracted a large following – estimates vary between 300,000 and 600,000 members – the majority of whom was in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.¹⁸ After a period of sporadic and inconsequential revolutionary activities, they organised a short and effective campaign against King Ferdinand I of Naples, and appeared to constitute ‘a threat to the existence of every throne’, as Baron Karl Vincent, the Austrian ambassador to France, wrote to Metternich in July 1820.¹⁹ His suspicion was confirmed

¹⁵ Laven and Riall (eds.), *Napoleon’s Legacy*; S. Kroen, *Politics and Theater. The Crisis of Legitimation in Restoration France 1815–1830* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); E. de Waresquiel and B. Yvert, *Histoire de la Restauration. Naissance de la France 1814–1830* (Paris: Perrin, 1996).

¹⁶ Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 28–120; M. Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 309–48.

¹⁷ C. Duggan, *The Force of Destiny. A History of Italy since 1796* (London: Penguin, 2008), 61.

¹⁸ See A. Lehning, ‘Buonarroti and his secret international societies’, *International Review of Social History*, 1:1 (1956), 112–40; R.J. Rath, ‘The Carbonari: their origins, initiation rites, and aims’, *The American Historical Review*, 69:2 (1964), 353–70; Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 190–242.

¹⁹ As quoted in P.W. Schroeder, *Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith 1820–1823* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 40.

when the north of Italy was also swept by a series of revolts. In response, Austria sent an army (with support from the other great powers), which on 23 March 1821 entered Naples, thereby temporarily ending the revolutionary movement in Italy.²⁰ After the failure of the revolts of 1820–1, many Italian activists went into exile, creating a ‘liberal international’ in France, England and the Low Countries, as well as in Latin America.²¹

Such large-scale uprisings did not take place in Austria or the German states. However, fears of a resurgence of revolutionary activities were nourished by the emergence of nationalist *Burschenschaften*, by the lenient response to them, notably from the South German states, but before that already by the edict of 22 May 1815 on popular representation issued by the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm III. The panic about a lack of steadfastness in response to the revolutionary challenge reached its zenith in July 1819 after the murder of the conservative playwright in Russian pay, August von Kotzebue, by the university student Carl Sand.²² In response, Russia and Austria increased the pressure on the passive Prussian king to impose stricter controls, leading to the Carlsbad Decrees, enforcing in all German lands an even stricter censorship, the proscription of the *Burschenschaften*, monitoring of teachers and students and the establishment of the Central-Untersuchungs-Commission in Mainz to monitor revolutionary movements.²³

In France, the first violent upheaval after Waterloo was launched by counterrevolutionary forces, which after the Hundred Days unleashed a White Terror in the south of France against Bonapartists and former Jacobins. In this counterrevolutionary climate, there was little room for revolutionary activities.²⁴ But there were still scattered and unsuccessful attempts to initiate armed revolt, carried out by revolutionary organisations with colourful names such as Les Amis de la Patrie, Les Chevaliers de la liberté, and the Épingle noire. For instance, there was an armed uprising in Grenoble in May 1816, a rebellion in Lyon in June 1817, as well as a failed attack on the night of 10–11 February 1818 on the commander of the occupying forces in France, the Duke of Wellington, apparently planned from Brussels by a Jacobin émigré and miserably executed by a former Napoleonic army officer. Tensions rose after the murder of the Duc de Berry in February 1820. A plot to kill the king was

²⁰ Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 121–85.

²¹ M. Isabella, *Risorgimento in Exile. Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

²² J. van Zanten, “‘Met verscheidene dolksteken afgemaakt.’ Moraal en politiek in de berichten over de moord op August von Kotzebue”, *De Negentiende Eeuw*, 27:1 (2003), 39–49.

²³ Jarrett, *The Congress of Vienna*, 209–20; W. Siemann, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär. Eine Biografie* (Munich: Beck, 2016), 662–700.

²⁴ Fitzpatrick, ‘The *Royaume du Midi* of 1815’; Resnick, *The White Terror*; P. Triomphe, ‘Les sorties de la “Terreur blanche” dans le Midi’, *Revue d’histoire du XIXe siècle*, 49:2 (2014), 51–63.

unmasked in August 1820, leading to a series of arrests and interrogations, which seemed to disclose the existence of several committees involving a large number of very prominent liberal deputies, generals and bankers.²⁵ Two years later, a series of conspiracies in the army was unveiled, with a strong presence of *charbonniers*. But like all previous revolts, this too ended in failure and severe punishment.²⁶ According to the French foreign minister Étienne-Dénis Pasquier, some of those who received the death penalty for conspiracy against the government were no more than ‘imbéciles’ who were unable to organise a revolt.²⁷ Also Louis Blanc, one of the heirs of this revolutionary legacy, admitted that in the end ‘only chaos remained’.²⁸

Simultaneous with the Spanish, Italian and French unrest, the Greeks revolted under the leadership of Alexandros Ypsilanti, a former officer in the Russian army, who led an international force against the Turks and vainly hoped for support from the Russian Tsar. This was proof for Metternich that the Greek plot was orchestrated by Italian Carbonari to drive a wedge between Austria and Russia. Yet despite enthusiasm from some members of the Russian Orthodox clergy for the Greek fight against Muslims and the memory of the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12, Tsar Alexander I held his distance from what he perceived as yet another ‘shameful and criminal action of a secret society’.²⁹

Finally, in Russia a revolt broke out, inspired by liberal values to which Tsar Alexander seemed to have appealed when in 1812 he had called upon the Spanish troops in Napoleon’s army to follow the example of the *khraibrye partizanay* (brave partisans) who resisted Napoleon at home, and promised ‘all subjugated people [...] liberation from foreign enslavement’.³⁰ Yet when officers revolted in the name of those same values in 1825, these Decembrists soon learned that Alexander’s successor Nicholas I was adamant not to let Russia be overrun by the wave of liberal revolts that had hit other parts of Europe.

At the time, there was widespread uncertainty as to whether these disparate revolts and secret societies were in some way coordinated. It is clear some had this ambition, like Claude-François Cugnet, who in 1824 established the

²⁵ Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 39–50. ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 77–141.

²⁷ É. Guillon, *Les complots militaires sous la Restauration. D’après des documents des Archives* (Paris: Plon, 1895), 80, 84. See for the suspicions about the police as the source of some conspiracies M. Froment, *La police dévoilée, depuis la restauration, et notamment sous MM. Franchet et Delavau* (Paris: Lemonnier, 1829); R.S. Alexander, *Bonapartism and Revolutionary Tradition in France. The Fédérés of 1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 254–9; Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 24.

²⁸ L. Blanc, *L’Histoire de dix ans 1830–1840*, vol. I (Paris: Pagnerre, 1842), 115.

²⁹ Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, 186–239. ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 56.

Légion de la Liberté Européenne, ordre du Soleil.³¹ Its goal was to create a ‘Sainte-Alliance des peuples’. But was this as real as the Holy Alliance of Christian monarchs signed in September 1815? This was in the first place an epistemic problem: how to identify conspiracies, to unveil secrets and to observe the connections between disparate revolutionary activities? Yet it also entailed a practical problem: how to make connections between different police services, and how to share information? This in itself furthermore created a political problem of coordinating conflicting interests and positions regarding the repression of perceived threats. In the remainder of this chapter, we illustrate these epistemological, practical and political operations through examples from the first years of the post-Vienna security culture in different parts of Europe.

Creating Suspicions

Perhaps the most crucial epistemological challenge presented by the fear of a European conspiracy is to create a reliable suspicion, that is, to ascertain the reality of something that is essentially opaque and even perhaps not yet in existence. This requires preemptive and precautionary police technologies, identifying threats and risks before they actually materialise.³² In the case of Restoration politics these technologies entailed at least five epistemic operations: the creation of lists; the disclosure of networks; the monitoring of mobility; the comparison of conspiracies; and the decoding of communication. We briefly discuss how in France, Italy, Austria and the German states, police services deployed each of these operations.

Drawing up lists – The most common technology to control risks is blacklisting, i.e. to draw up a list of persons who are considered suspicious and in need of monitoring or restriction in their freedoms. The fact that a person figured on a list created the suspicion that he (seldom she) was part of an international conspiracy, even if there was not (yet) sufficient proof of malicious motives or criminal acts. This basic operation was already

³¹ Cf. L. Nagy, ‘Un conspirateur républicain-démocrate sous la restauration: Claude-François Cugnet de Montarlot. Origine de l’élaboration d’une culture révolutionnaire’, *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 370 (2012), 131–56, 150. Cugnet was put to death in 1824 after being arrested for his role in the Spanish insurrection. See also L. Nagy, ‘L’Emissaire de charbonnerie française au service du trienio liberal’, *Historia Constitucional*, 15 (2014), 223–54; F. Mastroberti, *Pierre-Joseph Briot, un giacobino tra amministrazione e politica (1771–1827)* (Naples: Jovene, 1998).

³² M. de Goede, *European Security Culture. Preemption and Precaution in European Security*. Inaugural lecture University of Amsterdam (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers, 2011); M. de Goede and S. Randalls, ‘Precaution, preemption: arts and technologies of the actionable future’, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 27:5 (2009), 859–78.

widespread before the Vienna Settlement. For instance, in spring 1814, Emperor Franz I of Austria had tried to smoke out the secret societies by forcing all officials in the occupied areas to declare under oath that they had no dealing with any secret society, followed by an edict of June 1814 prohibiting all Masonic and other secret sects. The final step was to compile lists of all who were or had been members of Masonic lodges in Italy.³³

Another example is the list of names presented in the *Livre noir* by the French Director General of Police François Franchet d'Esperey and his associate, the Parisian police prefect Guy Delavau, who after their appointment in 1819 developed a brutal surveillance regime in which they collected information on an enormous amount of people. The study of their regime, in four volumes of several hundred pages, contains an alphabetical list, starting with a report of 2 April 1822 on 'actors of the theatre de la Gaité' who demonstrated 'some irreverence vis-à-vis the actual government', deemed insufficiently subversive to continue their surveillance.³⁴ More troubling was for instance Stephen Grellet, an American Quaker of French origins, who drew the attention of the authorities when in April 1820 he arrived in Paris, travelling from Turin, and before that in other parts of Europe. It was remarkable and perhaps no coincidence, noted Delavau, that all of these countries revolted just after he had visited them.³⁵

More effective and systematic were the lists created by the Central-Untersuchungs-Commission established in 1819 in Mainz. The appendix to a study of the commission's activities includes two lists with dozens of names, mainly of students but also of their teachers, as well as members of the clergy, lawyers and businessmen who were accused of (complicity in) high treason or membership in secret organisations and were subsequently convicted, often to years of imprisonment. On each of these individuals, some short remarks were added. For instance, on 21 June 1825 Samuel Gottlieb Liesching, trader in Stuttgart, was sentenced for high treason to six months' imprisonment plus the trial costs, while further punishment was suspended as long as investigations did not reveal more aggravating circumstances.³⁶

³³ Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 190–3; Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror*, 166–7. The more general use of lists in this period is also noted by K. Härter, 'Security and cross-border political crime: the formation of transnational security regimes in 18th and 19th century Europe', *Historical Social Research*, 38:1 (2013), 96–106, 102.

³⁴ *Le Livre noir de M.M. Delavau et Franchet ou Répertoire alphabétique de la police politique sous le ministère déplorable. Ouvrage imprimé d'après les registres de l'administration, précédé d'une introduction par M. Année*, vol.I, (Paris: Libraire-éditeur Moutardier, 1829), 1–2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, vol.IV, 1–4.

³⁶ L.F. Ilse, *Geschichte der politischen Untersuchungen welche durch die neben der Bundesversammlung errichteten Commissionen, der Central-Untersuchungs-Commission zu Mainz und der Bundes-Central-Behörde zu Frankfurt in den Jahren von 1819 bis 1827 und 1833 bis 1842*

Disclosing networks – Although having a name listed was already incriminating, it was insufficient to weigh the risk of the persons involved. A second step was to locate suspicious individuals within a network of like-minded persons, who then all became guilty by association. Unveiling such networks was explicitly formulated as the goal of the Mainz commission, which aimed ‘to corroborate through aggregation of individual investigations the true existence of revolutionary initiatives as perceived in various German states, their genesis in different periods, their connections and branches appearing under various names’,³⁷

Indicative of the way in which international networks were analysed are the police interrogations of the IR Commissione di I Instanza in Lombardy-Venetia, led by Antonio Salvotti, intended to unveil a conspiracy of Carbonari in the Papal States. The main focus of its interrogations was the musician Pietro Maroncelli of Forlì. After a first interview with Gio Angelo Canova, clown at a circus in Milan, who denied any contacts with Maroncelli, the commission talked to his brother Giovanni Amadeo Canova, clown at another circus, who admitted to having passed on two letters, ‘treatises of the Carbonaria’, to a certain Zuboli as well as to a brother of Maroncelli. After his arrest, together with his collaborator Silvio Pellico, followed a series of interrogations of Pietro Maroncelli, who soon started to mention names, all belonging to the aristocracy, high bourgeoisie and civil service of Northern Italy.³⁸ Striking in these and other police interrogations is the focus on contacts and names, and the almost complete lack of interest in the ideas or deeds of the people involved – most seemed to be guilty by association only.

This presumption of guilt by association also seemed to guide the French government, as is demonstrated by a note of 22 January 1821 from Director-General of Police Claude Mounier: ‘Various symptoms lead us to believe that the revolutionary faction is preparing something. Perfect unity and extremely active communication exist among the liberals of Paris, Madrid, Naples, Lisbon, Turin, and London.’³⁹ A telling example of how this suspicion was construed comes from a series of reports sent in 1824 by the prefect of the Jura to the Paris General Directorate of Police, discussing the findings of an

geführt sind, appx.1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Meidinger Sohn & Comp., 1860), xiv–xv. See W. Siemann, ‘Deutschland’s Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung.’ *Die Anfängen der politischen Polizei 1806–1866* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1985), 76–86.

³⁷ Discourse by the Bavarian Generaldirektor of the Minister of the Interior (and from 1823 to 1831 Minister of Justice) Georg Friedrich Freiherr von Zentner, quoted by Siemann, ‘Deutschland’s Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung’, 83.

³⁸ A. Pierantonio, *I carbonari dello Stato Pontificio pontificio ricercati dalle inquisizioni austriache nel regno Lombardo-Veneto (1817–1825)*, 2–87.

³⁹ Quoted by Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 62–3.

informant who had observed a ‘detestable spirit’ among prominent members of the government council. They had been present at a banquet where they had sung obscene songs, ‘offensive and outrageous for the Bourbons’.⁴⁰ On the basis of this and other information, the Ministry of the Interior contrived a report disclosing preparations for a revolutionary uprising, in which a central role was played by Frédérique César de la Harpe, former tutor to the Russian emperor Alexander and well-known liberal. During his travels through France, Germany, Switzerland and Italy, he had participated in several revolutionary meetings, notably a gathering on 14 July 1823 in Aarau, where he met with ‘the main leaders, who from Switzerland, direct their secret, revolutionary conspiracies, under the guidance from a supreme Directorate – invisible and universal – presiding over it all in Paris’. During this meeting, a secret society, the *Reformateur Gaulois*, was established, organised ‘on the model of the ancient Roman armies’, and with a complicated password members used to recognise one another (‘Aldeboran’, expressed while holding a fist at one’s breast, and responding with the phrase ‘She continues to be a shining light until the tyrants of the earth will be crushed’). While no other names were documented, the decisive information on the meeting in Aarau came from an anonymous source.⁴¹

Monitoring mobilities – As the previous example already demonstrates – De la Harpe’s European travels were documented in the passports he had received – the great powers had a persistent interest in the movement of strangers within their territory. Some of these strangers were well-known. For instance, the Habsburg Police Ministry kept close watch on French exiles who had fled the Bourbon regime, such as the former French ministers of police, Joseph Fouché and his successor Anne Jean Marie René Savary, Duc de Rovigo.⁴² Other foreigners were less famous, and were less directly monitored. Dispatches sent from border regions reveal that the authorities were deeply concerned about their presence, and compiled extensive reports about persons who wanted to enter the country. For instance, the Comte de Breteuil, prefect of the department Sarthe, wrote a long letter to the Director-General of Police Mounier about a Monsieur Tavary, who, being a veteran from the Vendée, was deemed politically reliable, and also had a good education, but

⁴⁰ ‘Préfecture du Jura aux Ministre de l’Intérieur, Direction de la Police. Confidentiel. 11 June 1824’, National Archives France (AN) F 6684 d.4. This folder contains several other reports from prefects in the French border departments.

⁴¹ ‘Ministre de l’Intérieur, Direction de la Police, Extraits d’une lettre du Préfet de Jura à son S. le Ministre de l’Intérieur, 13 June 1824’, AN F 6684 d.4.

⁴² D.E. Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police. Security and Subversion in the Hapsburg Monarchy 1815–1830* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968), 41.

regrettably, 'his addiction to drunkenness pushed him away from society' – and this was only the first of much more personal observations.⁴³ In the period around 1820, the General Directorate of Police in Paris received many more such detailed reports, for instance, in August 1821 about the presence of Italian revolutionaries in Lyon, but also a report from Besançon, arguing that the *charbonniers* of the Franche-Comté were innocent workers, who had no connection to Neapolitan Carbonari.⁴⁴

The most direct way to control the mobility of potentially dangerous individuals was through the issuing of passports and the registration of travellers. In many European countries after 1815, the mobility of people became more strictly monitored. In France, passports and stricter border control had already emerged during the Revolution and in the Napoleonic era, but further regulation came about in 1816. In 1817, a new Prussian law required that a passport was needed to cross the border, focusing in particular on groups considered a liability to public and private security. In 1820, the Englishman Thomas Hodgkin observed how the Prussian police controlled the whereabouts of foreigners: 'A person is placed by the police in each inn as a valet-de-place, and to be at the same time a spy; he is obliged to give an account of all strangers on their arrival, and to carry their passports to the police for inspection.'⁴⁵ In this way, police services seemed able to keep track of dangerous individuals, even if only after the fact. For instance, after the murder of the Duc de Berry, the French police followed the path of the assassin Louvel through Europe, collecting information from Hamburg, Brussels, Florence, The Hague and other places, often through the intervention of the foreign minister, Pasquier.⁴⁶

Yet the systems to identify potentially dangerous travellers were unreliable. To begin with, before the era of photography it was very difficult to establish a person's identity. Indicators of identity were generally inscribed in the documents.⁴⁷ But even then, registers were not always kept systematically: not all travellers were registered, and registers were soon discarded. Moreover, extensive background checks were time-consuming and inefficient in an increasingly mobile society. Gradually, the control of people's movement shifted to retroactive checks of domicile, notably with respect to claims for poor relief

⁴³ 'Letter of the prefect of Departement Sarthe to General Director of Police, 18 April 1821', AN F7 6689 d.1.

⁴⁴ See documents in AN F 6684 d.1 and d.5.

⁴⁵ T. Hodgkin, *Travels in North-Germany*, vol.I (Edinburgh: Constable and Co., 1820), 83–4; Quoted in Emsley, 'Introduction', 7.

⁴⁶ G. Malandain, *L'introuvable complot. Attentat, enquête et rumeur dans la France de la Restauration* (Paris: Éditions EHESS, 2011), 142–3.

⁴⁷ Quoted in G. Noiriel, 'Surveiller les déplacements ou identifier les personnes? Contribution à l'histoire du passeport en France de la Ie à la IIIe République', *Genèses*, 30:1 (1998), 77–100, 89.

and later on also voting rights.⁴⁸ But before that, ‘for all the passports, visas, hotel and inn registers, feuilles de route of the stagecoaches and other red tape, it seems the police were continually losing track of people supposedly under close surveillance’.⁴⁹

Comparing conspiracies – The suspicion that the activities monitored by the police services of the European states were part of a vast European-wide conspiracy were further confirmed by comparison. In general, there was a widespread idea that the French Revolution had created a kind of template that could be used to interpret other subversive events. For instance, commenting on the revolt in Spain, the French newspaper *La Quotidienne* stated that ‘revolutions develop along the same lines, they have similar phases and all arrive at the same results. [. . .] Is not the Palace of Madrid what once was the Palace of the Tuilerie, a house of detention?’⁵⁰

Comparison was also a technique used to verify information. This was apparently the goal of a letter of December 1820, sent by the French foreign minister Pasquier to Director-General of Police Mounier. In his letter, Pasquier passed on messages received from Berlin about the activities of a certain Bretel, native of Besançon, who was actively engaged in the organisation of Masonic lodges and Carbonari *venti* from Italy, with the aim to have the Prussian army support the revolutionaries at the universities and to turn Switzerland into a unified republic. These were deemed dangerous developments so close to the French border and, although Pasquier thought the source of these messages was a little suspect, he still wanted to pass them on to Mounier, ‘so that you can compare them to those you have received on the same object’.⁵¹

Finally, comparison served to confirm similarity as proof of coordination. Such seemed to be the goal of a ‘tableau comparatif’, composed in October

⁴⁸ J. Torpey, ‘Le contrôle des passeports et la liberté de circulation. Le cas de l’Allemagne au XIXe siècle’, *Genèses*, 30:1 (1998), 53–76; A. Fahrmeir, ‘Too much information? Too little coordination? (Civil) registration in nineteenth-century Germany’, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 182 (2012), 93–112, 102–6.

⁴⁹ Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror*, 289.

⁵⁰ ‘*La Quotidienne*, 14 January 1821’, quoted in Kôbô Seigan, ‘L’influence de la mémoire de la Révolution française et de l’empire napoléonien dans l’opinion publique française face à la guerre d’Espagne de 1823’, *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, 335 (2004), 159–88, 163.

⁵¹ ‘Letter from Pasquier to Mounier, 1 December 1820’, AN F7 6684 d.9. Apparently following up on a request for further information, the prefect of the Doubs department responded that his investigation of Carbonari activity had revealed that a certain Bretel, a former forester, had been dismissed because of bad behaviour and ‘mauvaise opinion’. He was known as a member of the local masonic lodge ‘et toujours grand partisan des idées révolutionnaires’, ‘Letter of prefect of Doubs to Director General of Police, 14 December 1820’, AN F7 6684 d.5. See for another example of comparison as a mode of verification Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 204–5.

1824 by the French Directorate-General of Police, with an appendix, divided in two columns, enumerating on the left the statutes of the French Société des Sublimes Maîtres Parfaits and on the right those of the German Société Teutonique. Although the articles of the two statutes did not always neatly coincide, the author of the document persisted in enumerating them side by side. Both secret societies envisioned social reform (art.I), and both aimed to 'républicaniser' the state (art.II) by means of a 'constitution républicaine' or 'constitution libérale' (art.III). Both organisations were led by a directing body with absolute power over its members (art.IV). The following articles covered the internal composition, but here local differences created differences between French *églises* and *loges*, and the German *Burschenschaften* and *Propaganden-Kreisen*. Both aimed to find as many recruits as possible (art.VIII), especially among the military (art.IX). Article XIII in both statutes similarly stated that members recognise one another through fixed answers and responses, but in the remainder of the documents the articles seemed to diverge more substantially. Nevertheless, the conclusion was clear: these societies 'came from the same source' and 'obey the same ulterior and secret direction'.⁵²

Decoding communications – European police services intercepted letters and other forms of communication between secret societies, but it was not always easy to interpret the messages. The deliberately mysterious ways in which these groups expressed themselves added to the suspicion that they were trying to hide their true intentions. Some of this opaqueness stemmed from their preference for religious mysticism. This was a legacy of the Masonic roots of many of the secret societies, but those of the Restoration era definitely upped the ante by presenting themselves with names such as Society of the Black Pin, Calderari, Sanfedisti, Concistoriali and Federati, and by 'a good deal of mumbo jumbo and mock religious ceremony'.⁵³

For instance, police investigators in the Papal States reported to Vienna that when members of the Adelfi sect used the name Emilio, they actually referred to Rousseau's *Emile*, as a way to declare their support for revolutionary ideas.⁵⁴ In the context of the trial against the Frenchman Philippe Alexandre Andryane in Milan in 1823, the suspect provided copious documents concerning the regulations and rites of the Sublimes Maîtres Parfaits. Much of this material ended up in Paris as well, where it was intensively studied and documented in the archives of the General Directorate of Police.⁵⁵ Drawings

⁵² 'French Directorate-General of Police, Mémoire, October 1824', AN F7 6684 d.5.

⁵³ S. Hughes, *Crime, Disorder, and the Risorgimento. The Politics of Policing in Bologna* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 78. See also the example of the Carbonari catechism in Zamoyksi, *Phantom Terror*, 169–71.

⁵⁴ Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 206.

⁵⁵ Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 201–2.

and seals also contributed substantially to the secretive reputation of Carbonari and other societies. For instance, the report of the prefect of the Jura on revolutionary sects in Switzerland mentioned that each section of the organisation had their own knives, of which the author provided a drawing.

However, the most secretive aspect of the societies was the use of signs, codes and cryptography. The French authorities saw their suspicions confirmed when in 1824 they received papers found among the belongings of an arrested former French army officer who after the Hundred Days had fled to Catalonia, containing the keys for coded messages. Similar suspicions were raised by the use of secret code in the communication of Italian and German sects.⁵⁶

The key to a secret code is perhaps the most graphic illustration of the epistemological operations that were involved in the creation of reliable suspicions about international revolutionary conspiracies. Police organisations created lists of persons, connected in a secret network that spanned all parts of Europe, who were supposedly members of organisations that were structurally similar and therefore in all likelihood practically coordinated by way of mysterious and secretive modes of communication.

Making Connections

All this epistemic labour contributed not only to a widespread presumption of an organised attack on the stability of the Vienna Settlement. More importantly, it also led to the development of an international network of police services. The central nodes of this network were national police organisations, which were connected to society through a wide range of sources of information and informants, and to each other via various channels of communication.

Creating police organisations – The emergence of the international cooperation of police forces is generally dated to the second half of the nineteenth century,⁵⁷ yet already from 1815 onwards, in every part of Europe, a similar model of policing emerged, due to the impact of Napoleonic reforms on police organisations and to the increasing efforts of police services to investigate international revolutionary threats and protect internal security.⁵⁸ At both the

⁵⁶ ‘Cryptographic notes and comments, 8–10 June 1824(?)’, AN F7 6684 d.6; Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 207.

⁵⁷ M. Deflem, *Policing World Society. Historical Foundations of International Police Collaboration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45–51.

⁵⁸ C. Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); *Ibid.*, ‘A typology of nineteenth-century police’, *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés*, 3:1 (1999), 29–44; D.H. Bayley, ‘The police and political development in Europe’, in C. Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of the National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

national and the local level, these organisations began to monitor political opinion and to prosecute presumed enemies of the state. Already in 1815, a Sicherheits-Kommission was established in Hanover. In 1819 a Ministerial-Untersuchungs-Kommission was created in Berlin, shortly thereafter followed by an Immediat-Untersuchungs-Kommission and a Staatspolizeiliche Ministerialkommission. The most well-known is the Mainzer Central-Untersuchungs-Kommission installed in 1819, which claimed to play an overarching role for all German states.⁵⁹ Metternich and his minister of police Count Sedlnitzky also set up central police directories in Venice and Milan to supervise all police activities in the Italian territories.⁶⁰ In the Papal States, a Carabinieri Pontifici (or *forza politica*) was established, which filed a weekly *Rapporto Politico* with information on a wide range of topics, notably on issues of political conformity, or *alta polizia*, related to the security of the Papal States. Moreover, Metternich created a *Beobachtungs-Anstalt* in Milan and similar bureaux of investigation in Florence and Rome to monitor secret societies in Italy.⁶¹

Perhaps ironically, the French police force after 1815 was less well organised than the police in other countries. In 1818, the Ministry of Police was incorporated into the Ministry of the Interior, and became a General Directorate of Police led by Claude Mounier. At the same time, several other police services were created, some little more than private intelligence services for various individuals at the court of Louis XVIII. At the municipal level, local mayors shared power over the police with a *commissaire* appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. Departmental prefects ruled the gendarmerie, but could also mobilise local officials to collect information. And then there was the Cabinet Noir, which in some form or another had existed already in the ancien régime but played a pivotal role in the Restoration in the surveillance of communication. As such it was more closely connected to the postal service and the ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs than to the police itself, yet it contributed to the chaotic multiplication of police services as well as to an

1975), 328–79; M. Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State. Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁵⁹ Siemann, 'Deutschland's Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung', 77, 123–222. See also A. Lüdtké, 'Praxis und Funktion staatlicher Repression: Preußen 1815–50', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 3:2 (1977), 190–211; A. Lüdtké, 'Gemeinwohl', *Polizei und 'Festungspraxis': Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preussen, 1815–1850* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982).

⁶⁰ Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 23–4, 73–5.

⁶¹ Hughes, *Crime, Disorder, and the Risorgimento*, 35–45, 76; S.C. Hughes, 'Fear and loathing in Bologna and Rome. The papal police in perspective', *Journal of Social History*, 21:1 (1987), 97–116; Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror*, 167.

abundance of information, and according to some critics even to an 'intelligence cult for intelligence purposes'.⁶²

Collecting information – Police services collected information about revolutionary activities from various sources. Some of these sources were publicly available. One of the first decisions made by the Mainzer Commission was to acquire subscriptions to about nineteen journals and newspapers from various countries.⁶³ Also in the French intelligence reports public sources, like newspapers and pamphlets, were quoted or copied.⁶⁴ Other sources were private, such as letters and other private communication, available due to a frequent violation of the confidentiality of mail. In many cases postmasters were responsible for forwarding letters to the authorities.⁶⁵ The most important source of information however was the intelligence provided by paid informants, many of whom worked undercover.⁶⁶ Some went to great trouble to get information. For instance, in a report of April 1824 to the Garde de Sceaux, the *juge de paix* of the canton of Mulhouse tells about an informant who, while hiding in a cupboard, overheard that a secret society in Jena was 'planning to assassinate all the sovereigns, with the sole exemption of the Grand Duke of Weimar Saxony'.⁶⁷ Although many informants did not seem very reliable, many of them were able to get the authorities' attention.⁶⁸

Important information also came from the confessions of arrested conspiracy suspects. Famous cases include the Danish Johannes Ferdinand Witt von Döring and the Frenchman Alexandre Andryane. Witt von Döring had travelled extensively around Europe, until in the spring of 1824 the police of Bayreuth turned him over to the Prussian authorities. In his long confession, he claimed there was a close link between French and German revolutionaries, in which a central role was played by the prominent philosopher and politician Victor Cousin. While visiting friends in Saxony, Cousin was then arrested in

⁶² P. Riberette, 'De la police de Napoléon à la police de la congrégation', in J. Aubert et al. (eds.), *L'État et sa Police en France (1789–1914)* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1979), 35–58, 45–7; J. Tulard, 'Le mythe de Fouché', in *ibid.*, 27–34, 31.

⁶³ Siemann, 'Deutschland's Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung', 81.

⁶⁴ E.g. copies of pamphlets and of articles of *Der Staatsmann* and other newspapers, AN F7 6684 d.3.

⁶⁵ Hughes, *Crime, Disorder, and the Risorgimento*, 77; Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police*, 44–5; Zamoyski, *Phantom Terror*, 162–3.

⁶⁶ C. Fynaut and G. Marx, 'Introduction: the normalization of undercover policing in the West: historical and contemporary perspectives', in C. Fijnaut and G. Marx (eds.), *Undercover. Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective* (The Hague: Kluwer, 1995), 1–28, 4–9; Riberette, 'De la police de Napoléon'.

⁶⁷ 'Report of Chagué, juge de paix of the canton of Mulhouse to the Garde de Sceaux, 16 April 1824', AN F7–6684 d.2.

⁶⁸ Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 245–73; Riberette, 'De la police de Napoléon', 51.

October 1824, and interrogated for months by the Mainzer Commission, until his release in summer 1825.⁶⁹ Witt-Döring also gave testimony about the Sublimes Maîtres Parfaits, but his confession on this point could not match the information provided by Alexander Andryane, who was arrested in Milan in January 1823, carrying papers containing the statutes, codes and rituals of the sect, among them a document of the Grand Firmament – as the leadership of the Sublimes Maîtres Parfaits was called – of 17 September 1820, which stated their goal as being to turn public opinion, notably among the army, towards hatred against their oppressors and a political revolution against tyrants.⁷⁰

Communicating intelligence – The documentation Andryane provided to his Italian interrogators was sent to Paris and stored in the archive of the General Directorate of Police. It is but one example of the lively communication between national police services. Even if there was no actual international network of revolutionaries, police services in their search for connections between local revolts did create an international network for policing revolutionary threats. According to the *Livre noir* on the French political police, ‘The embassies, consulates, foreign police, the ministries, the regional and local administration, certain religious communities and clerical authorities maintained secret ties to the Paris police force.’⁷¹ The same was the case with the police services in Italy, which frequently reported back to Vienna. But there was also lively communication between other parts of Europe. For instance, the French General Directorate of Police in Paris corresponded with the Superintendencia General de Policia del Reino in Madrid on French revolutionaries in Spain,⁷² and with a Swiss representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on reports about ‘weapon factories’ and ‘secret societies’.⁷³ A most remarkable document in this respect is the *Mémoire sur les Sociétés Secrètes & les Conspirations sous la Restauration* from 1823, sent to Metternich, who deemed it of such importance that he forwarded it to the Russian tsar, who in his turn thanked the French for this thorough piece of work. The honours were received by Franchet, but the actual author of the report was Simon Duplay, former secretary of Robespierre,

⁶⁹ Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, 202–9. De Witt Döring revealed much of this information in a memoir, J. Witt, *Les sociétés secrètes de France et d’Italie, ou Fragments de ma vie et de mon temps* (Paris: Levasseur, 1830).

⁷⁰ A. Lehning, *De Buonarroti à Bakounine. Études sur le Socialisme International* (Paris: Éditions Champ Libre, 1977), 288, fn.37. Excerpts of the interrogations of Andryane are in I. Rinieri, *Della Vita e delle Opere di Silvio Pellico da lettere e documenti inediti*, vol.II (Turin: Libreria Roux di Renzo Streglio, 1899); Rath, *Provisional Austrian Regime*, 209.

⁷¹ *Le Livre noir de MM. Delavau et Franchet*, vol.I, lxxxvii.

⁷² All these letters collected in AN F7 6684 d.6.

⁷³ Letters and bulletins collected in AN F7 6684 d.2.

and turncoat par excellence, who became the most important expert on secret societies and other subversive activities in France.⁷⁴

Raising Tensions: Brussels as a Liability

The creation of reliable suspicions and the concomitant emergence of an international police network did not lead automatically to thoroughly organised police states, but did create political tensions, which in some cases undermined the system of collective security emerging after 1815. This can be illustrated by the example of debates on revolutionary conspiracies planned and organised in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.

In 1814 the Allied peacemakers created the new United Kingdom by combining the old Dutch Republic with the former Austrian Netherlands as a European bulwark against France. To provide political legitimacy for his rule, the new king of the Netherlands, William I, declared the recent revolutionary partisanship a thing of the past and adopted a liberal attitude to constitutional freedoms.⁷⁵ Although this cautious and liberal governance was successful *pro domo*, it made the United Kingdom of the Netherlands a sanctuary for Bonapartists and Jacobins who managed to escape prosecution in France. The Netherlands offered many advantages for French refugees. It was close to France, and in the southern provinces French was the dominant language. Also, there was no danger of extradition, since article 4 of the Dutch constitution stipulated that foreigners enjoyed the same rights as residents. For this reason the radical journal *Le Nain Jaune Réfugié* advertised the Netherlands as ‘une terre hospitalière et libre’ in which refugees enjoyed protection by the king.⁷⁶ At the end of 1816, Brussels had become a safe haven to several regicides – Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, Jacques-Louis David, Lazare Carnot – many *proscrits* and more than thirty distinguished officers from Napoleon’s army, for example Georges Mouton, comte de Lobau and Dominique Vandamme.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ L. Grasilier, ‘Un secrétaire de Robespierre. Simon Duplay (1774–1827) et son Mémoire sur les sociétés secrètes et les conspirations sous la Restauration’, *Revue International des Sociétés Secrètes* (March 1913), 6–49; Riberette, ‘De la police de Napoléon’, 45; G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, *Metternich et la France après le Congrès de Vienne*, vol.II (Paris: Hachette, 1970), 565.

⁷⁵ See I. de Haan, P. den Hoed and H. te Velde (eds.), *Een nieuwe staat* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2013); M.M. Lok, *Windvanen*, passim; J. Koch, *Koning Willem I* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2013); J. van Zanten, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard* (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2004), passim.

⁷⁶ *Le Nain Jaune Réfugié*, February 1816.

⁷⁷ W. Lemmens, ‘“Une terre hospitalière et libre?” Franse migranten tussen restauratie en revolutie in het Brussel van Willem I (1815–1830)’, *De Negentiende Eeuw*, 36:4 (2012), 263–84; H.T. Colenbrander, ‘Willem I en de mogendheden (1815–1824)’, *De Gids*, 95 (1931), 370–407, 376.

It did not take long until the concentration of these revolutionary leaders and Bonapartists in the Low Countries became a source of anxiety to the great powers.⁷⁸ Especially Prussia and Austria were concerned that the bulwark against French expansionism they had created was itself becoming a security risk. Metternich reminded King William that ‘French exiles were not to be tolerated in the medium states [...] at the frontier of the French kingdom.’⁷⁹ At the same time, the Austrian ambassador in the Netherlands Baron Binder advised the Dutch government to ‘surrender’ the French refugees to Russia, Austria and Prussia, where they could be kept under close surveillance.⁸⁰

The Austrian pressure caused disagreement among the Dutch ministers. King William’s general-secretary Falck opposed extradition on historical grounds: the Netherlands had been a hospitable and congenial nation since the seventeenth century.⁸¹ But the minister of Foreign Affairs Baron van Nagell complained that the Netherlands was isolating itself, while the minister of Police and Justice Van Maanen – already in office under Napoleon’s brother King Louis Napoleon Bonaparte – thought ‘the French faggots’ were corrupting the already frustrated youth with their liberal periodicals. He suggested monitoring all foreigners by checking their travel documents and whereabouts regularly. He also ordered the police to look for connections between journalists, students, veterans and refugees, and especially to pay attention to French exiles.⁸² William, however, claimed that his tolerant policy regarding refugees was a question of national honour.⁸³ He believed that the French government was responsible for the situation by issuing travel papers to the refugees.⁸⁴

At the end of April 1816, Wellington tried to mediate on behalf of the French. The Dutch king convinced the Duke that the problems with the refugees could be easily solved by stricter oversight in France on travel documents. He also repeatedly emphasised that the security threat they posed

⁷⁸ Emerson, *Metternich and the Political Police*, 40.

⁷⁹ M. Chvojka, ‘Joseph Fouché and the Austrian State Police after the Congress of Vienna’, <http://irhis.recherche.univ-lille3.fr/dossierPDF/CIRSAP-Textes/Chvojka.pdf>, 7 (accessed 12 July 2017).

⁸⁰ Colenbrander, ‘Willem I en de mogendheden’, 376.

⁸¹ H.T. Colenbrander, *Gedenkschriften van Anton Reinhardt Falck* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1913), 185–91.

⁸² National Archives The Hague (NL-HaNA), Legatie Frankrijk 1814–1884, 2.05.47, inv.no.87, 218–222; Lemmens, ‘Une terre hospitalière et libre?’, 277.

⁸³ A. van de Sande and H. de Valk, ‘Italian refugees in the Netherlands during the Restoration 1815–1830’, in *L’émigration politique en Europe aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Actes du colloque organisé par l’École Française de Rome (3–5 mars 1988)* (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1991), 191–204.

⁸⁴ Colenbrander, ‘Willem I en de mogendheden’, 378; Cf. E.H. Karsten, ‘Fransche uitgewekenen in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden’, *Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen*, 105 (Utrecht, 1865), 65–87, 79–82; N.C.F. van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot. Nederland, Engeland en Europa, 1813–1831* (Groningen: Wolters Noordhoff, 1985), 128–34.

was not as real as the French and the other Allies imagined. Wellington seemed convinced by the king's argument that the regicides were 'old and infirm, and either very rich or poor [...] desirous of being allowed to live in tranquility and obscurity'.⁸⁵

Despite Wellington's reassuring dispatches, on 29 August 1816 the Ambassadors' Council demanded that William extradite the regicides and take action against the liberal and revolutionary press. Under threat of dissolving the kingdom and abandoning its defence against French aggression, the Dutch king agreed to an Alien Bill, which made it illegal to insult foreign governments or heads of state. He also became more receptive to the arguments of Van Maanen and allowed the minister to take legal action against French journalists who had found shelter in Brussels. After some were extradited, most journals and publicists went underground, which made them even more obscure and suspect.

In February 1818 it became clear that Brussels was still a liability when an assassination attempt was made on Wellington in Paris. The Duke now changed his view on the exiles in Brussels, blaming the Dutch government for sheltering refugees, but also for encouraging their plotting against France and its allies.⁸⁶ Wellington's accusation was not entirely unfounded. The refugees played an important part in salons or private clubs, like the lodges of Brussels Freemasonry. These establishments quickly became places where diplomats and aristocrats were robbed of their secrets and conspiracies were planned. Moreover, one of the most prominent members of these societies was the Dutch crown prince William. After he had fallen out with his father in the autumn of 1815, he started to consort with Bonapartist refugees in the Masonic Lodge L'Espérance and the ill-famed salons of 'La vieille garde', a circle of French ladies who had been well known in Parisian society during the Empire and still harboured warm feelings for Napoleon. His subversion became even more threatening when in July 1816 the journal *Le Mercure* suggested that the Prince of Orange would make a good candidate for the French throne, in case of a revolution against the Bourbons. Adding to the suspicion was the claim of the French police in 1818 that his friends De Crucquembourg and Brice were behind the Paris attack on Wellington. In a letter to the prince, Wellington warned his old subordinate in the Spanish campaign: 'I will not conceal that this [...] has brought your name into discussion in a way very disagreeable to your friends.'⁸⁷

⁸⁵ 'Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart, 9 May 1816', in H.T. Colenbrander, *Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840*, vol.8.I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1915), 33.

⁸⁶ 'Wellington to Clancarty, 24 March 1818', quoted in Karsten, 'Fransche uitgewekenen in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden', 77; Van Sas, *Onze natuurlijkste bondgenoot*, 155.

⁸⁷ Colenbrander, 'Willem I en de mogendheden', 396.

Things went from bad to worse when the name of the crown prince was also mentioned in a plot against the French king. Already in 1816 Prince William was approached by Carnot to organise a coup in Paris. In his diary the prince wrote that the plan 'seemed noble' because the French were suppressed by the Bourbon.⁸⁸ It took until 1820 before a plan was devised in which Prince William, as commander-in-chief of the Dutch army, would invade France as soon as Wellington's army of occupation had left, while the French opposition would start a revolution against Louis XVIII, to be replaced by the Dutch prince. Fortunately for Louis XVIII, the French secret police discovered the conspiracy. In a painful turn of events, the Allies allowed the French minister of foreign affairs Pasquier to interrogate the Prince of Orange without the intervention of the Dutch government. During the interview the prince denied everything: 'I'm innocent, like everyone before the law. I cannot be subjected to intervention by a foreign minister.' But in his autobiographical notes he complained that 'a chatterbox' had thwarted the conspiracy.⁸⁹

By 1820 Europe's interest in the Netherlands ebbed away. Other seats of unrest took pride of place. But still, the Dutch crown prince was kept under close observation by the Prussian ambassador in the Netherlands, Franz Ludwig von Hatzfeldt. When the young William appeared to be a supporter of the coup in Naples, Hatzfeldt reported to Berlin that the crown prince was still willing to help the revolutionary party.⁹⁰ His father decided to do the opposite, and to cooperate fully with the Allied powers in matters of security, thus contributing to the concertation of policing revolutionary threats to European security.

Conclusion

All over Europe, there were revolutionary uprisings of disaffected supporters of the Revolution, Napoleon, a liberal regime or national liberation. The regimes confirmed or established by the Vienna Settlement were deeply worried that these uprisings formed part of an international conspiracy. They set up police organisations, which stood in frequent communication with one another, exchanging information on suspected travellers, comparing notes on secret societies and piecing together information that appeared to confirm the existence of an international network of activists, which threatened to undermine the Restoration order. To what lengths the post-Vienna regimes went to uphold this order is shown by the large number of arrests and convictions, often involving the death penalty, and, as the 'Dutch moment' in this period

⁸⁸ Van Zanten, *Koning Willem II*, 262.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 276–8.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 279.

demonstrates, also by the fact that they allowed the French government to interrogate an heir to the throne of a sovereign country.

The result of these responses to the epistemic, practical and political challenges posed by the fear of an international revolutionary conspiracy was not the emergence of a fully developed police state. On the contrary, the European security culture emerging after 1815 was characterised by contrasts and tensions, which contributed to its contested nature and its eventual demise. For one thing, despite the large number of informants and dossiers, the response to the epistemic challenge of making a reliable estimate of invisible and secret threats to the established order was rather weak. Much of it consisted of conjectures and guesses, based on limited, partial and manipulated information, following leads of highly unreliable and often deceptive paid informants. Moreover, on closer inspection, it was often not clear on whose side the members of the government, army, police and court, as well as members of the wider public, actually stood. In many cases, the people involved had been supporters of previous regimes, members of a Masonic lodge or clubs and societies, politically in opposition or otherwise indisposed to accept the regimes of the Vienna Settlement. 'Loyalty was a matter of dates', as Talleyr-and famously said.

The result of policing an international conspiracy was also mixed, because of the growing critique and resistance against the intrusive nature of much of the police surveillance. In fact, much of the documentation on the post-Vienna security culture comes from critics of the police, who were thought to be more inimical to peace and liberty than the alleged internationally active revolutionaries.⁹¹ Political leaders also became aware of the counterproductive effect of repression. For instance, after the publication of *Le mie prigioni* in 1832, the prison memoirs of Silvio Pellico, Metternich observed that they 'did not contain a single word of truth [...] but their effect was more terrible for Austria than a lost battle'.⁹² In other countries, more than a battle was lost: by 1830, some of the states established in 1815 had disappeared, or undergone a dramatic political transformation. The suspected revolutionaries of the immediate post-Vienna period hardly played a role in the upheavals of 1830 and beyond. In the end, they created a danger for the established order, not because they themselves undermined the Vienna Settlement, but because the states responding to these fears curbed political participation by its citizens, which in the end undermined their own legitimacy.

⁹¹ *Le Livre noir de M.M. Delavau et Franchet*, vol.I, lxxviii.

⁹² Quoted in J.A. Davis, 'Cultures of interdiction: the politics of censorship in Italy from Napoleon to the Restoration', in Laven and Riall (eds.), *Napoleon's Legacy*, 237–56, 252.